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Gonna Party Like It's 1899: Party Systems and the Origins of Varieties of Coordination

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Introduction

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, modes of business representation across the capitalist democracies seem worlds apart. Despite pressures associated with postindustrialization, the “macrocorporatist” Scandinavian countries maintain highly centralized, national employers’ peak associations that engage in wage and policy-making negotiations with highly centralized labor unions and government bureaucrats. In Germany and other continental European countries, national employers’ associations have lost power in both political representation and collective bargaining. But employers’ industry-level groups continue to coordinate collective firm activities and to negotiate sectoral (often private) cooperative agreements with their workers, or what we might call “sector coordination.” Finally, an aversion to cooperation appears bred in the bone in the Anglo-liberal lands of Britain and the United States: highly fragmented or “pluralist” associations organize employers and workers, and the representation of business interests remains a highly individualistic affair.¹

This article explores the origins of peak employers’ associations around the dawn of the twentieth century to understand why countries produce highly centralized macrocorporatist groups, weaker national associations but stronger industry-level groups, or highly fragmented pluralist associations. We argue that government actors led in the creation of peak employers’ organizations; therefore, party competition had a significant impact on the evolution of the associations into their mature institutional forms. The terms of political engagement (set by party-system characteristics and state structure) influenced the political incentives of both public and private sector leaders and shaped the evolution of employers’ organizational capacities.

First, the incentives for cooperation were much different in two-party systems than in multiparty systems. In the former, large umbrella parties tended to include employers as well as other social actors, employers were often dispersed across parties, and right parties could reasonably hope to win electoral majorities and had little reason to compromise with the other parties. In these cases there emerged a fragmented, pluralist system of business representation. Countries with multiparty systems, however, were likely to have partisan organizations dedicated to the interests of specific social groups (such as labor, business, and farmers), and each party

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had a political incentive to cooperate with the others in order to participate in the governing coalitions. Moreover, these business-oriented parties recognized their limited chance to win an electoral majority and sought to delegate policy-making power to social actors in private institutions; they thus had a strategic reason for nurturing labor-market coordination.

In turn, a second political feature influenced the level of coordination: the degree of state centralization versus federalism. Countries with strong national governments were more likely to produce a *national* dedicated business party, which covered the interests of most companies and served to develop the collective voice of business: these countries produced encompassing, macrocorporatist employers' associations. In federal countries, by contrast, diverse business parties developed at the regional level and employer organizations remained fixed at the sectoral level.

We also acknowledge other causes for employer organization: the structure of the economy and features of labor (strength of labor militancy and levels of skills associated with preindustrial guilds). Yet we argue that these explanations are bounded, as they suffer from some inconsistencies, fit uneasily with the empirical data, and do not capture the full story. For example, *both* high levels of labor militancy and strong norms of social cooperation are said to spur cooperation in coordinated countries.² But these motivations for coordination suggest quite different relations between the social classes, and while guilds motivate cooperation to secure collective goods, labor activism inspires defensive action to contain militancy.

Recognizing the causal salience of the structure of political competition supplements and improves upon other theories of associational development in several ways. First, association building at the industry level and at the national, multisector level relies on *substantially different processes*. Economic structures, labor activism, and preindustrial cooperation are highly salient for the evolution of *sectoral* or *regional* employers' organizations. But national, multisectoral, peak employers' associations require a moment of disconnect in social life, in order to overcome the high transaction costs of group formation beyond the industry level. Timing is also important in that national patterns are solidified when regional economies and political communities become incorporated into national and even global structures. As we demonstrate in our case histories, the leadership for the development of peak employers' associations came from business-oriented party activists and bureaucrats seeking to advance industrial development policy and to solve specific problems of political control. Business-oriented party leaders and bureaucrats in both predemocratic and democratic regimes feared the rising tide of democracy and labor activism. They therefore viewed the employer organization as a useful tool for political control because it could secure parliamentary advantage and serve as a societal counterweight

to working-class activism. Political leadership was vital to the emergence of these peak associations, and the structure of political competition played a decisive role in the structure of these groups.

Second, political agency becomes more important at those critical junctures where the range of possible actions and impacts of outcomes are expanded and the structure of political competition *shapes the strategic choices of political actors*. The dawn of the twentieth century constituted a moment of enhanced opportunity for building institutions for labor-market coordination. An ideology of cooperation gripped employers across the Western world during this period. It was a time when national industrial development policies, highly organized peak employers' associations, and labor-market coordination came to be viewed as solutions to the rise of national economies, the globalization of trade, and the need to transfer regulatory privilege from agriculture to industry. While experiments in building peak employers' associations articulated very similar ambitions for high levels of nonmarket coordination, these parallel experiments ultimately produced different organizational forms. And party competition played a major role in producing these diverse outcomes.

Finally, as we have argued elsewhere, there is a “dynamic and mutually-reinforcing relationship between the spheres of industrial relations and political party competition.”³ Our investigation of the historical circumstances surrounding the emergence of national patterns of business organization helps to unravel the *reciprocal influences* of movement in the two spheres and highlights the element of historical contingency that may be overlooked in less historically grounded studies.

The Collective Organization of Business

This article questions why countries differ in their development of encompassing and centralized national peak associations and in their broader levels of employer coordination. First, some nations produce multisector and centralized national associations that minimize sectoral disputes (what we call *macrocorporatism*); second, some create predominately sectoral level and privately driven cooperative associations (*sectoral coordination*); and third, some develop fragmented groups with considerable intrabusiness competition (*pluralism*).⁴

While peak employers' associations and coordination had been relatively weak everywhere at the end of the nineteenth century, divergence among nations along the paths of macrocorporatism, sectoral coordination, and pluralism were pronounced by the 1920s and more so in the 1930s, even though full-blown macrocorporatist coordination did not develop until after the Second World War.⁵ Table 1 documents this divergence in employer organization in the early

decades of the twentieth century for sixteen (now advanced industrialized) nations. The table reports the level of employer coordination on two core dimensions. First, a macrocorporatist dimension captures the scope and centralization of national peak employers' associations, their policy-making authority, the corresponding density of labor organization, and collective bargaining centralization. Second, a sector coordination dimension captures typical sectoral cooperation on things such as training, research and development, and export marketing, as well as the strength of long-term finance and producer relations. (See the appendix.)

The Scandinavian polities of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden and the Benelux nations displayed increasingly strong macrocorporatist organization of employers (with moderate sectoral cooperation) during the early decades of the twentieth century. The Germanic nations and Italy exhibited moderate macrocorporatist employers' organizations and strong sectoral cooperation during this period. The Anglo-liberal polities (and Finland and France) were characterized by pronounced pluralist employers' organization: the development of encompassing, centralized, and integrated national peak associations and sectoral coordination remained low in these systems from the turn of the century until World War II.

Party Competition and the Origins of Employers' Associations

Our central question is to understand why countries produced peak multisector employers' associations in the mold of macrocorporatism, sectoral coordination, or pluralism. We argue that the structure of political competition shaped the strategic choices of employers and sympathetic politicians and significantly influenced the development of the various forms of peak employers' associations. Both employers and party leaders or bureaucrats on the right had incentives for forming encompassing employers' associations. Yet structural features of party politics—multiple versus two-party systems and federal versus centralized governments—significantly determined the outcomes of these struggles to create collective institutions.

Employers had incentives to develop national business organizations and other nonmarket methods of coordination at the turn of the twentieth century to shift policy privilege from agriculture to industry and to contain labor activism. Inspired by ideas of developmental capitalism, they sought national rather than regional policy solutions to the challenges of (1) industrialization, (2) state supports for competing in world markets and for protecting the home turf from invasive imports, (3) arrangements to restrict the cut-throat competition of laissez-faire capitalism, and (4) investments in skills.⁶

Politicians on the right in both democratic and predemocratic regimes also had incentives

for nurturing encompassing national business associations during this period, as these groups served several political purposes. Party leaders had electoral incentives to nurture groups that would solidify their constituent base and to reach out to potential business constituents who belonged to other parties but who shared the goal of advancing capitalist development. Bureaucrats were motivated to organize employers to gain political support for help in passing legislation or help in implementing public policies. Finally, political leaders sympathetic to employers had incentives to delegate power to private forums, when they believed that those in such nonlegislative arenas could more readily advance their policy ambitions and social class constituency's interests.⁷ Although the political authority was not transferred through democratic elections, predemocratic political parties were important in parliaments; indeed, incentives for leaders on the right to build up party power and to cultivate employers' associations to bolster their own political power may have been stronger in predemocratic regimes than in democratic ones.⁸ While conservative elites worried about the working-class threat across systems, elites in predemocratic regimes feared revolution.

Although party leaders and employers everywhere had a shared interest in business organization, the specific forms of peak employers' associations were deeply influenced by the structure of party competition. Two political features, in particular, had a critical impact on the strategic choices of party leaders in their institution-building efforts: the structure of parties (two versus multiple parties) and the degree of federalism versus centralization.⁹

First, the number of parties mattered, in that multiparty systems are more likely than two-party systems to produce dedicated business parties, to inspire cooperation among social actors, and to delegate policy-making power to private channels. Multiparty systems have higher coverage of specific groups, so that employers are more likely to belong to a single party. But as discussed below, in federal systems of government, these dedicated business parties are likely to remain *regional*. Dedicated *national* business parties inspire coordination, by focusing attention on common goals among constituents and making credible promises to members; consequently, their platforms do not fluctuate to appeal to the median voter, as occurs in two-party systems.¹⁰ Coalition governments—usual in multiparty systems—further encourage cooperation among competing interests (which must form governments) and stable policy outcomes. Leaders of business parties under these conditions have incentives to delegate policy-making authority to private channels, because they are unlikely to win electoral majorities. Their constituents are more likely to secure favorable policy outcomes via direct negotiations with workers than via parliamentary processes.

In comparison, two-party systems tend to consist of catchall parties that bring varied

constituencies under the partisan umbrella. Employers may be dispersed among parties, and parties may seek to cultivate competing business associations. When employers belong to competing parties, they may feel that no single group speaks for them and may be more resistant to government regulation than would be the case in countries where a dedicated business party represents their interests. Employers in catchall parties are less likely to believe the policy promises of party leaders, because parties' positions fluctuate to attract the median voter; in addition, even if a party follows through on its promises to employers, it may be voted out of office in the next election and all will be lost.¹¹ Party leaders in this system may be less willing to delegate policy-making authority to private actors, because they are less identified with these actors and because they have hopes of winning outright electoral victories. Thus two-party systems tend to experience policy fluctuations and less stable regulatory climates for business; the promises of politicians are less believable, government figures are less willing to delegate authority, and employers have greater difficulty creating organizations for coordination.

A second feature of political engagement matters enormously to the formation of peak employers' associations—the level at which political competition is organized. Centralized governments produce national, centrally organized, and regionally homogenous parties, because the political action largely takes place at the national level. These countries tend to engender well-organized corporatist associations as well. In stark contrast, parties and public policies tend to vary materially and ideologically across regions in federal systems of government with their decentralized political authority. This geographical variation engenders regionally fragmented associations, because the region is the locus of much of the policy-making action. While centralized party systems are more likely to produce class-based political cleavages, federal party systems often divide the electorate along class, regional, religious, and/ or ethnic lines and are more likely to include employers and workers within the same party. Thus, the institutionalization of national versus regional parties has a feedback impact on social structures.¹²

To sum up, the characteristics of partisan representation—the number of parties and their degree of centralization—permit a rather simple parsing out of the worlds of business politics. First, centralized, multiparty systems tend to produce encompassing and highly coordinated corporatist associations with a high level of state involvement (macrocorporatism). These party systems delegate significant policy-making authority to the peak associations, but industrial relations systems retain a strong role for government, because employers trust that their dedicated business parties will represent their interests in political channels.

Second, countries with two-party systems (either centralized or decentralized) tend to

produce pluralist employer representation, in which no unitary peak group can claim to speak for collective business interests. These party systems do not delegate much policy-making authority to organized business and labor. That is because even when one party becomes significantly linked to business (for example, the U.S. Republican Party in 1896), the business-oriented party can hope to win an outright majority. In countries with centralized, two-party systems, the central government may periodically seek to impose high levels of coordination on business and labor (as in Britain), but the gains are then likely to be reversed when the opposing party gains power. These countries, that is, may exhibit greater levels of coordination than countries with federal two-party systems, but their experiments in coordination are time limited.

Third, federalist, decentralized multiparty systems are likely to produce high levels of employer coordination at the industry level (sector coordination), but they have weaker peak associations and less state involvement. Federal multiparty systems have difficulty producing dedicated national business parties, because sectional cleavages remain salient. Moreover, while business-oriented politicians have incentives to delegate political authority to social partners, the absence of a single business party makes employers more resistant to state oversight.

We present these theoretical predictions in Table 2 and denote four model groups of countries that fit the type of party system and state structure for each combination of the two factors. Space constraints of this article do not permit a full quantitative analysis of cross-national variations in coordination. Nonetheless, our historical, qualitative case study material on four prototypical countries helps substantiate our claims, and the simple “cross-tabulation” of political institutional dimensions in Table 2 produces some suggestive information about our theoretical predictions.¹³ Computing group means for the 1900–1938 country-decades (displayed in each cell), one finds significant differences in average macrocorporatism and sector coordination across multiparty and two-party systems (using a t-test for difference of means). Multiparty systems and centralized polities have relatively high macro-corporatism with moderate sector coordination while multiparty, federal systems have strong sector coordination and moderate macrocorporatism. While both centralized and fragmented polities have low sector coordination, centralized, two-party systems display modestly higher macrocorporatist employer organization than federal, two-party systems.

Linkages between Party and Industrial Relation Systems

Certainly the structure of political competition was not the only determinant of variations in employers’ multisector peak associations. In the following discussion we consider other factors

that appear in the scholarly literature. While acknowledging their strengths, we also discuss their limitations in capturing the entire story of business organization. In particular, we explore two broad sets of variables—the structure of industry and the features of the working class. Finally, we reflect on the interaction between these various theoretical arguments, paying particular attention to the evolving complementarities between the structure of party and industrial relations systems.

At the outset, we reject the proposition that national variations in employer organization simply conformed to deep ideological and cultural norms. From the standpoint of the present, nothing may seem surprising about macrocorporatism in Denmark, sectoral coordination in Germany, and pluralism in Britain. Each country has its own foundation myth of the exceptional circumstances that account for its trajectory in the pantheon of national permutations: think of British regard for individual agency versus German affection for the state. Yet these patterns of coordination—seemingly indelibly imprinted on national psyches—were much less distinctive a century ago. The ideological underpinnings of nationalist industrial development and peak employer organization were essentially the same across advanced nations and differed fundamentally from countries' earlier conceptions of collectivism. Moreover, ideological determinacy fails to capture the peculiar ironies of national trajectories. The *ancien régime* persisted in Burkean ideals of old Tory England and similarly struck a responsive chord with German conceptions of organic society. Despite the importance of the state in German ideology, Germany produced sectoral coordination with little state involvement, and the British conception of a National Industrial Council after World War I inspired coordination across advanced societies.¹⁴

One set of explanations attributes the variations in employer coordination to differences in industrial structure that reflect the stage and type of capitalist development. Yet while industrialization broadly accounts for the general timing of coordination, scholars hold diverse views about national propensities to organize. In some accounts, early industrializers organize in a “search for order” by forming sector trade associations or multisector umbrella organizations to manage competition, to assist in rapid industrial growth, and to protect against risk. In other accounts, late developers organized in order to catch up with their competitors.¹⁵ In like manner, some view those firms seeking to compete in international arenas as having a greater need for associations than domestic producers, because such associations offer collective support in battling the common enemy of foreign firms. Yet other scholars view countries with fewer exporting firms as having fewer wage pressures and therefore showing greater willingness to grant higher wages to labor and to cooperate with it.¹⁶

High levels of regional or sectional diversity also inhibit the development of encompassing, centralized employers' associations. Divisions over tariff reform, for example, constrained the national, multisector organization of employers in Britain and manufacturing and financial interests diverged dramatically over fiscal policy after World War I. Nevertheless, employers overcame diversity more readily in some countries than in others. Thus, Maier argues, British elites were more unified than German ones, due to the commercial needs of the landed gentry and to British public education.¹⁷ But German employers managed to reconcile differences between heavy and light industrial sectors in the face of democratic revolution after World War I, when they created the Reich Association of German Industry, whereas British employers at that time failed to produce a single encompassing employers' association.

Another set of explanations for cross-national differences in levels of employer organization points to (again contradictory) features of labor: employers organize either to *resist labor activism* or to *achieve collective provision of skills* for their highly productive workers. Some suggest that firms organize to stunt union militancy and that levels of business organization reflect the strength of worker mobilization. Industrial unions reinforce solidarity among workers of all skill levels and heighten capacities for cooperation with employers over training and wages; craft unions, by contrast, pursue self-interested strategies that benefit upper strata workers and motivate workers to control the numbers of people who may acquire the skills to practice a craft. Strong ethnic and religious cleavages also diminish the incentives of both worker organization and employers to organize.¹⁸ Other scholars argue that firms historically using highly skilled workers were more likely to organize in order to provide collective training mechanisms and to ensure labor peace. These skills levels were tied to preindustrial guild traditions, as guilds facilitated vocational training systems, allowed firms to develop specific assets, and enabled the development of a skills-based export sector.¹⁹

These theories seem instinctively true but rely on different underlying processes for arriving at cooperative industrial relations. Each suffers from inconsistencies. Scholars attribute high levels of business organization in Denmark both to a highly mobilized labor movement and to a collectivist culture, yet it is hard to reconcile pitched warfare on the one hand with cozy coordination on the other. Moreover, economic and labor differences between the liberal and coordinated countries at the beginning of the 1900s are overstated; for example, large companies in prewar Germany began developing firm-based strategies for building skills and controlling labor that were similar to those advanced by their American counterparts.²⁰

Attributing a high level of employer organization to the presence or absence of preindustrial guilds is also somewhat problematic, in that guilds have a dual impact on

associational life. They have an *economic* impact in producing high skills and nonwage competition by employers, both of which foster cooperation; consequently, the decline of British guilds led to a drop in both skills and solidarity.²¹ Guilds also have a *political* impact in fragmenting political identities and inhibiting organization above the sectoral level; for example, the fractious Danish guilds failed to organize until a leader of the Right Party (Højre) induced them to join the manufacturers' new multisectoral organization. In addition, craft unions elicited different business responses: when strong Danish craft unions sought to wrest control over skills from employers, firms organized at the national level to reclaim their managerial prerogative and to stabilize patterns of industrial engagement. Yet strong craft unions in Britain worked against multisector action, because employers shed skilled labor instead, and weak craft unions in the United States allowed business to remain fragmented. Whereas Sweden and Denmark have similar, highly corporatist peak employer associations, there are differences: Sweden has industrial unions and Denmark has craft unions.²²

Although we view industrial structure and labor arguments as having certain limitations in capturing the full variation of employer organization, we certainly do not wish to dismiss these explanations. Therefore, we offer four insights about the linkages between these industrial structure, labor-oriented, and party system explanations.

First, the formation of business sectoral groups and national peak associations, in fact, relies on substantially different processes in each case. Sectoral and regional cooperative groups are motivated by specific labor-management conflicts or enabled by craft traditions of collective skills provision.²³ But national group formation presupposes political will, as an enormous gulf divides a pluralist network of industry associations from a highly centralized, capacious peak organization with substantial power over its constituent groups. With the emergence of national industrial economies, local traditions for cooperation needed a major reworking, and the context of political competition had a powerful impact on these great transformations.

Second, one might be concerned that the very structure of party systems was closely linked to economic cleavages, which also shaped business organization; in this way party systems are endogenous. Cusack et al., for example, suggest that the variation in workplace skills was an important determinant of the national adoption of proportional representation electoral systems in the 1920s. We acknowledge that in many cases European political parties emerged from economic interest groups; for instance, social democratic parties were created by organized labor, conservative parties had deep connections to the landowning gentry, and many economic cleavages were mirrored in partisan divides.²⁴ At the same time, the relationship

between economic and party structures is complicated, because religious and ethnic cleavages—in addition to class cleavages—were significant sources of political parties. Thus, potential cleavages needed to be expressed politically and interpreted in order to form the bases for parties. Moreover, while many parties were created from the bottom up from economic interest groups, others were created from the top down by factions in the legislature. The latter, alternative route to party development diminished the importance of economic structure, by introducing new factors and agency into the calculus of party development.²⁵ Thus, the process of party formation is itself a process of social construction and may reflect the idiosyncracies of agency at historical junctures that then have lasting legacies for future political engagement.

Third, in the cauldron of late-nineteenth-century politics—with its attendant movements toward national and even international industrial economies and expanded democratization—partisan forms and institutions for labor relations were both evolving. We have elsewhere referred to this as a “dynamic and mutually-reinforcing relationship between the spheres of industrial relations and political party competition,” and Iversen and Soskice refer to the linkage between the two spheres as coevolution. This relationship may well be an example of what Capoccia and Ziblatt refer to as “reciprocal causality,” a matter for which an investigation of historical circumstance can best shed light on the directionality of causal findings.²⁶

Finally, the period from 1890 to the First World War was a critical juncture that presented an opening for coordination: the political responses at that moment lay the groundwork for the evolution of the future political economy. Just as liberalism swept through Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, replacing mercantilism as the hegemonic ideology, an impulse for cooperation seemed ubiquitous from the late nineteenth century until shortly after the First World War. The organizing philosophy of nationalist industrial development inspired the images and structures of industrialization, and national peak associations were a key component. While the success of this new public philosophy depended, in part, on its congruence with older philosophical traditions, political structure and agency had an indelible impact on national responses at this critical moment.²⁷

A weak version of our argument is that the preindustrial skills tradition defines the basic cleavage between coordinated and uncoordinated business communities but that the political features of nation-states (party structure and federalism) explain the differences in levels of coordination, as is found between countries with macrocorporatism and sectoral coordination. A stronger version of the argument suggests that political structures had a feedback impact on economic development: two-party systems with little incentive to nurture strong national employers' associations rewarded employers who engaged in low-skills competition while

hampering the establishment of future collective skills-building institutions.

To assess the effects of the structure of political competition on employers' organization, we offer comparative case studies of Denmark, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. We employ these cases to demonstrate that the causal argument had its intended effect using process tracing, or the careful temporal reconstruction of the cases. We identify intermediate steps between cause and effect and use our qualitative data to construct analytic narratives to reveal the underlying incentives to produce action.²⁸

For each nation, we suggest that the political rules of the game will have foundational impacts on association building. The structure of party competition will influence whether a dedicated business party develops and business-oriented party leaders and bureaucrats should be directly involved in the creation of the groups. The groups should all initially seek high levels of coordination, and the incentives for government actors to delegate policy-making authority should be shaped by party competition.

The Case of Denmark

The dynamics of partisan competition demonstrate how Denmark came to create a macrocorporatist peak employers' association that organized industrial relations with government and labor at a very high level. First, the character of party organization—the centralization of political competition within a multiparty system—led to the creation of a dedicated business party. The Danish system of partisan representation included three main parties (Højre on the right, Venstre for rich farmers, Social Democrats on the left) and a small faction, Moderate Venstre. Højre was something of a cross-class party through the 1880s, including most of the countries' employers and government bureaucrats, as well as a large number of the urban working class (ranging from 16 to 40 percent of the party constituents). But a huge number of Højre working-class voters migrated to the Social Democratic Party during the 1890s, after legislation enabled the national party to be established in the late 1880s. Thus, by the late 1890s Højre consisted mostly of employers and bureaucrats and struggled to represent all employers, regardless of sectoral splits on economic questions of the day.²⁹

Second, leaders of the cooperation-oriented faction of Højre helped to create the peak employers' association for their own political purposes—to unify its core industrial constituency. The Employers' Federation of 1896 (that became Dansk Arbejdsgiversforening, da) was founded by Niels Andersen (a Højre member, and later party leader of parliament, and a construction industry employer) and Vilhelm Køhler (a brick factory director) to show that Højre could produce a middle-way politics between the older conservative legacy and the new social democratic

challenge.³⁰

Third, the employers' federation sought to develop as a highly coordinated association, in order to influence public policy, obtain the right to self-regulation, and gain industrial peace. While many stress the group's interest in labor peace, policy influence was equally important; for example, in a commemoration of da's first twenty-five years, the authors claimed that "the most important evidence of the organization's energy and vision was its contribution to the solution of the question about insurance against workers' accidents."³¹ The left had proposed a major workers' accident insurance reform along the lines of the German model, with benefits tied to the wage earner and controlled by a worker fund. The employers favored a citizen-based and tax-financed alternative and Niels Andersen proposed that it be administered by a Labor Insurance Council, rather than as either a direct state program or a private program. The employers' federation sought to unify all employers around its position and waged a campaign to bring the handicraft sectors into the employers' federation.³²

The other central goal of the employers' association was to achieve industrial peace. To this end the federation issued a regulation stating: "No inequality between employers and workers concerning the work relationship (including, for example, wages and performance) should give rise to work stoppages from either side. This inequality should, instead, be settled with a compromise or an arbitration." Niels Andersen had to work to convince employers to accept this vision of industrial peace, and the greatest resistance came from the iron industry, led by S. C. Hauberg, who initially favored a politics of confrontation with labor. The Employers Federation intervened in a labor dispute within the metal industry in 1897 and suggested a labor court (Arbejdsdomstol) to avoid future strikes. Niels Andersen also sought to organize labor during this episode, to promote its side of the progress in the iron industry conflict and to urge the early labor organization (DsF) to play the same leadership role in negotiations that da was attempting to do on the employers' side. Scholars credit these actions with being largely responsible for the centralized form of the Danish lo: indeed, employers actually organized at a national level before Danish workers and the Employers' Association ultimately succeeded in getting the industrial court it wanted with its establishment of the Joint Committee of 1898 (Fællesudvalget af 1898).³³

Fourth, both employers and their government allies feared that the employer voice would be diluted after the parliamentary reform, due, in part, to the structure of multiparty competition. Consequently, there was an incentive for business interests to seek to have policy-making delegated to private channels of representation. Coming parliamentary reform threatened the power of the Right Party (Højre), and a faction of the party determined that coordination with

other parties and social actors was essential for maintaining its influence. Højre's initial defense against the rising social democratic challenge was to form a center-right alliance with the farmers' party, Venstre. The result of this experiment was the loss of a quarter of the party's members of parliament in the 1892 and 1895 elections. Højre had already begun forming voting committees among the electorate, and the employers' association was akin to this earlier effort. The desire for industrial self-regulation was also responsible for the very moderate line taken by employers after winning a major trade battle, the "Great Lockout" of 1899. The September compromise established employers' control over the organization of work and transferred power over labor policy to the social partners, while retaining a supervisory role for government.³⁴

Finally, the resolution of the conflicts surrounding the origins of the employers' associations created important policy legacies: the dedicated business party Højre would remain closely connected to the employers' association, and the social partners would collaborate in collective bargaining and policy negotiations with the state at a highly centralized level. The impact of business unity within the party on the evolution of a collective voice of business within the employers' association is made clear by the sequence of events following the introduction of full proportional representation in 1915. With the advent of PR, Højre was reorganized into the Conservative People's Party, becoming an even purer business party than it had been by the 1890s. This political consolidation of the nation's employers reduced regional differences among industrialists and enabled a stronger centralization of authority within da in the 1919, when all vestiges of regional distinctions were removed and the organization was reorganized along functional lines.³⁵

The Case of Britain

The dynamics of partisan competition also demonstrate how Britain came to create fragmented, pluralist employers' associations, despite enormous efforts to the contrary. While employers, labor, and the state periodically sought to develop capacities for coordination (explaining why Britain appears somewhat corporatist at various times in its history), these efforts were repressed in the dynamics of two-party competition.

First, given that Britain lacked a dedicated business party in its largely two-party system, employers were dispersed across parties. Initially, more industrialists belonged to the Liberal Party; but the party also included ideological proponents of liberalism and many workers. Employers began to migrate to the Conservative Party or to the splinter Liberal Unionist faction when the Liberal Party was rent asunder by the Irish Question in 1886; however, the Conservatives also did a poor job meeting business needs. While the Liberal ideological

commitment to liberalism made the party adverse to industrial development policies, the Conservatives, albeit more open ideologically to old Tory notions of organic coordination, had ties to the landed gentry and to financial interests that led them to block policies beneficial to industrialists. Before the war (in 1914), ninety-four manufacturers were members of the House of Commons: sixty-four of these were Liberals and thirty were Unionists; eighty-one members from commerce and finance were divided nearly equally among the parties. After the war the Conservatives became the “bosses party.”³⁶ The prewar partisan divisions among employers did not merely play out along industrial sector lines as even firms within industry were divided on the tariff issue, and the issue of Home Rule worked against easy reconciliation of employers’ interests. By 1901 a majority of employers (apart from those who produced staples products and financial interests) came to support protection, and even many cotton industrialists wanted some tariffs. While the Labor Party was also beginning to emerge during this period, it largely voted with the Liberals and supplanted the Liberal Party altogether after the Great War, thus preserving the structure of two-party competition.³⁷

Second, the role of two-party competition initially helps to explain the absence of a national-level British employer organization at the end of the nineteenth century, when employers elsewhere were moving to form national organizations. Employers were distributed electorally between the Conservative and Liberal Parties and lacked a forum in which to consider their broader collective political interests. Moreover, neither party was motivated to organize a national business organization from the top down to serve its electoral needs.

Yet a national peak association (the Federation of British Industries, or FBI) was finally organized during the First World War, when partisan infighting and the lack of coordination became intolerable, and the long arm of the state had a role in its creation. While the FBI was officially organized by industrialist Dudley Docker, there is considerable evidence that Conservative Party activists, and especially Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, were deeply involved.³⁸ Docker had been quite close to Steel-Maitland since the latter ran for office in 1906; for example, Docker offered to lend Steel-Maitland one or two of his Daimler cars during the 1906 campaign. Docker was the only “considerable subscriber” in Steel-Maitland’s reorganized East Birmingham Conservative Association in 1914 and Steel-Maitland was on the verge of joining the board of Docker’s company when he was offered the job of Under Secretary of the Colonies in 1915. Steel-Maitland and Docker had a scheme for privately training Birmingham men as officers, a scheme that Docker would finance, but it ran into difficulty with the military command. Finally, in November of 1915, a few months before the FBI organizing meeting, Docker and Steel-Maitland had a secret correspondence, hand carried by a Mr. Malcolm, “who is perfectly confidential.”³⁹

The Conservatives were motivated to form FBI, in part, to seek organizational help in their battles with the Liberal Party; for example, they asked the FBI to support locating a department to control commercial intelligence in foreign countries within the Foreign Office. The FBI was also asked to weigh in on a plan for reconstruction and, in particular, to support the Conservative desires to sustain economic stimulus over the Liberal Party's priority (in keeping with its close ties to financial interests) for protecting the pound in foreign monetary exchange. Steel-Maitland was deeply interested in social and economic coordination and wanted desperately to unify British employers and labor in the common cause of creating a domestic production machine that would match the needs of the war effort, sustaining the party's imperial ambitions, and supporting its highly articulated vision of industrial development policies. Finally, the creation of the FBI should be viewed as a constituency-building exercise and a logical continuation of SteelMaitland's broader campaign to expand the network of local conservative groups. He implemented this campaign during his tenure as party chair and described himself as "a party manager with an intelligence service through the country!"⁴⁰ In this vein, he wrote to Bonar Law:

The war has obliterated many old Party distinctions. . . . Classes have joined in the prosecution of the war and the true national view for the future must be that new questions, new differences of opinion, new groupings of men may arise, while those who have often combated one another over the old questions may find themselves largely in sympathy over the new.⁴¹

The Foreign Office was determined to make the FBI work and lent Roland Nugent and Guy Locock to FBI to help the association mobilize its constituency. At the first annual meeting Dudley Docker emphatically recognized the enormous contribution of government bureaucrats, stating: "Perhaps I may be allowed to say here how greatly we were indebted in the early days to Mr. Tait for the assistance he gave in the formation of this association. . . . Next, we come to Mr. Nugent, whom, you will remember, the Foreign Office were kind enough to allow to come to us and who has filled the post of director and secretary . . . in an extremely able manner."⁴²

Third, the organizers of the employers' association initially had ambitions for a high degree of coordination among business, labor, and the state, wanted considerable industrial policy-making to be delegated to the private sector, and sought to model itself after the Swedish peak employers' federation. At the first annual meeting the FBI's founder, Dudley Docker, explained: "One of the principal objects with which the Federation has been formed is to command the attention of the Government of this country when framing industrial legislation. In regard to which we shall hope to be of some service, not merely to manufacturers, but to the

community as a whole.”⁴³ As occurred in Denmark, Docker wanted substantial industrial policy-making authority to be delegated to the private sector, sought to create a “Business Parliament” for making industrial policy, sorely regretted Britain’s lack of a dedicated political party for manufacturers (feeling that the Liberals, in particular, had failed to respect industrialists), and wanted “to transform Britain into a model corporatist state.” As the *Globe* (owned by Docker) expressed in an editorial entitled, “The Party or the State?”: “The party system has been carried on to unnecessary lengths” such that it has “become deliberative only in name. . . . It is the reason why so much of our legislation is inefficient, even when not injurious, to our commercial interests.”⁴⁴

Fourth, the FBI’s corporatist ambitions were diminished by party politics. Neither party could speak definitively for business, and both parties (and warring governmental departments) cultivated their own set of employers. Just as the Conservatives cultivated the Federation of British Industries, Prime Minister Lloyd George and the Board of Labor nurtured a group called the National Conference of Employers’ Organisations (drawn from the former free-trade contingent), and the two groups competed for power. The FBI’s corporatist ambitions were also thwarted by limited party incentives to cede policy-making privilege to organized business and labor—each party hoped to win a majority through legislative channels. Business and labor initially supported cooperation through the National Industrial Conference, yet Parliament refused to delegate authority to an industrial council. At this point the employers’ and labor organizations came to believe that cooperation was impossible: neither side wished to cede control over industrial relations unless it felt that it would have some input into the process.⁴⁵ Unlike in Denmark, where a system of self-regulation was created with the development of the corporatist business and labor organizations, the British state retained firm control over industrial relations.

Finally, the failure of these early efforts to significantly develop labor-market coordination gave way to a heightened state of class conflict and deep skepticism about government solutions. Party politics so disgusted employers that “coalitionists” from both major parties (dominated by employers) contemplated forming a Centre Party. The electoral rules and path dependencies of the party structure prevented the emergence of a new party, but the experiment reflects the depth of disappointment with the current system.⁴⁶ Viewing German coordination with great admiration, Winston Churchill, famously remarked, “We are organised for nothing except party politics.”⁴⁷ Although Britain later tried to achieve coordination, liberalism was renegotiated at each developmental juncture due both to legacies of earlier failures in cooperative experiments and to the type of partisan conflict inherent in two-party systems.

The Case of Germany

It is puzzling that Germany, with its strong state tradition, came to create a system of sectoral coordination in which the social partners largely develop and implement labor-market policy without much input from the state. We suggest that the dynamics of federal, multiparty competition contributed to the emergence of a medium level of industrial coordination in Germany: the weak and regionally diverse nature of party competition produced business parties at the regional level but not at the national level. Immediately before the German revolution in 1918, business-oriented bureaucrats were motivated to unify employers into a peak association and to delegate power to labor-market partners, in order to stave off more radical parliamentary reforms. This effort produced the Reichverband. Yet with the continuing absence of strong parties during the Weimar years, employers remained skeptical of their political representation by the party system and struggled to retain private control over industrial relations. In addition, without a unifying dedicated business party (similar to the Danish Conservative People's Party), the German national peak association never managed to unify diverse constituencies (as happened with the Danish peak association after 1919). With the rise of the National Socialist Party, the state essentially took over industrial life; but after the war employers lobbied to return industrial relations to a private system of sector coordination that resembled the Weimar system.

First, the federal multiparty system in Germany gave rise to business-oriented parties in the nineteenth century but did *not* produce a single, *national* dedicated business party; rather, parties drew uneven support across regions and employers remained dispersed across parties. The Law of Association forbade centralized political parties in Prussia until 1899 and local parties were only loosely connected to parliamentary parties. Strong regional economic differences also worked against both dedicated business parties and unitary peak employers' associations: heavy industry and agricultural estates favored protection, while lighter, export industries favored free trade. And these conflicts played out in bureaucratic struggles.⁴⁸ Yet even when trade divisions began to diminish and even though some parties (such as the National Liberals) counted both heavy and light industrialists among their members, the federal nature of the German political system constrained the emergence of parties with broad national representation. After World War I and the revolution, politicians tried to develop more organized, clearly defined parties, yet employers remained dispersed among the diverse right parties. The Weimar parties splintered so much that by 1929 there were twenty-nine parties in the Reichstag, and of those only nine had legislative influence.⁴⁹

Second, as happened elsewhere, business-oriented bureaucrats were heavily involved in the creation of the peak employers' associations and were motivated by their own political

purposes. The story played out a bit differently in Germany than it did in Denmark, for example, because bureaucrats rather than party leaders took the lead after World War I and were motivated by the very weakness of parties to seek other sources of political support. An initial effort at association building happened in 1876, when Wilhelm von Kardorff, a close friend of Bismarck's and member of parliament from the small manufacturers' Free Conservative Party, formed the Central Association of German Industrialists (Centralverband Deutscher Industrieller, or cvl) to advance tariff reform and to build support for tariff candidates in the upcoming election.⁵⁰ Kardorff's widely publicized pamphlet, "Against the Current," was influenced by the American Henry Carey, who also inspired Lincoln's national development policies; Kardorff described the political links of the association in his correspondence with Carey. In October 1878 the coalition of industrialist and agrarian protectionists won a majority in the Reichstag, and in the December 1878 election, aided by the Centralverband, protectionist voters turned out in heavy numbers.⁵¹ The Centralverband was very much an association for large industry. Consequently, Liberal politicians, who were closer to the free-trade, consumer-product wing of business, sought in the 1890s to create a source of countervailing power in the Bund der Industriellen. Liberal politician Gustav Stresemann spearheaded the effort to expand the Bund into a national association.⁵² This dual structure resulted in employers being dispersed across parties, industrial sectors, regions, and associations.

German bureaucrats tried periodically to unify employers and assisted in creating the Reich Association of German Industry (rdI) in 1919 by uniting the two existing groups. Motivated to sustain wartime economic coordination and to stave off threats of revolution, corporatism was viewed as an alternative to socialism. But without much party leadership, bureaucrats rather than party politicians guided the association building. There was considerable infighting between the Centralverband and BdK sides (represented by Stinnes and Stresemann) and Stresemann was vetoed by Hugenberg and Stinnes from joining the directorate. One of the new managers of the Reich Association, Hermann Bucher, came directly from the German Foreign Office, and Joseph Koeth (a successor of Walter Rathenau in the Raw Materials Division of the Prussian War Ministry) came from the Demobilization Office. Koeth wanted to delegate policy-making privilege to business and labor and believed that industrial committees should be allowed to regulate themselves.⁵³

Third, a desire for coordination motivated the development of the rdI. The intensive needs of the German war machine motivated the formation of institutions for coordination during World War I and quasi-public corporations (Kriegswirtschaftsgesellschaften) were formed to organize production in each industrial sector. The architect of the German war economy, Walter Rathenau,

had a vision for peacetime reconstruction along the same lines. Every industry was to integrate firms into an association and all associations would belong to a national group that would (sometimes with labor) engage in self-government. Although Rathenau was forced out of power and later assassinated, his ideas inspired the creation of cooperative cartels. Negotiations for cooperative peacetime policies between business and labor (the Stinnes-Legien Accord) began in 1917, even before the German revolution.⁵⁴

Fourth, fearing a revolution, business-oriented bureaucrats and employers sought to have public policy-making delegated to private organizations. Worried about the possibility of major losses in legislative struggles, employers concluded that economic democracy was preferable to socialism. German industrialists were on the defensive after the war and viewed corporatism as the means to regain some power. Jakob Reichert (Union of German Iron and Steel Industrialists) explained his disdain for Junkers and the middle class, and remarked: "Allies for industry could be found only among the workers."⁵⁵ But the German peak association never managed to achieve the strength of the parallel Danish organization. In Denmark the reorganized Conservative People's Party included most employers and helped to unify the political voice of business; subsequently, the employers' federation reorganized along functional lines. In Germany the absence of a single dedicated business party constrained the emergence of full-blown macrocorporatism. Employers continued to be distributed across parties (such as the Democratic Party, the Catholic Center Party, the German People's Party, and the German National People's Party). Party politics hampered the business-labor effort to plan for postwar contingencies, led employers to distrust the party system, and contributed to considerable infighting within the rdl over leadership and policy. The high hopes for the Reich Association of German Industry failed to pan out, as the organization remained a rather loose-knit peak association and real decision-making power was retained at the lower, sector level.⁵⁶ Thus a leader in the organization, Paul Silverberg, stated in 1922 that the Reich Association was "nothing other than a really loose peak association, which can impose very few rules on its members, branch associations and individual firms, can commit them to nothing, and in which there is a lot of talking."⁵⁷

The Case of the United States

We have fully reported the American story elsewhere and, therefore, will note only briefly that the structure of two-party competition in the United States also dashed hopes for high levels of coordination among employers.⁵⁸ First, the United States failed to develop a dedicated business party, although the Republican Party at the end of the nineteenth century often seemed

to speak for employers. While American manufacturers in the Northeast and Midwest were Republicans, industrialists in the South and West voted Democratic, as they did not wish to participate in a party with African Americans and were bitter about the war.

Second, Republican Party activists were deeply involved with the development of the first national umbrella association in the United States, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM).⁵⁹ The McKinley campaign sought to mobilize employers through the NAM in order to reach across partisan lines to promote his candidacy in the 1896 election and to augment support for the party's industrial policy agenda. NAM's creators viewed the business organization as an agent for political nationalization and a vehicle for organizing manufacturers across sectional divides. The *New York Times* recorded the most significant event at NAM's second annual meeting as "the applause which greeted a mention of the name of Major McKinley. This applause told as plainly as could a preamble and resolution the real purpose of the delegates."⁶⁰

Third, NAM's initial policy positions reflected a vision of industrial cooperation that resembled positions taken by European employers: the association lobbied for a department of commerce and—in true corporatist fashion—wanted to be licensed as the legitimate spokesman for employers in cooperative business-government arrangements.⁶¹

But, fourth, party politics—dynamics of regionally dominated two-party competition—worked against the realization of NAM's corporatist aspirations. Congressional representatives from the South and West voted against NAM's legislative proposals (such as the formation of a department of commerce and the granting of a national charter to the association), because they viewed these policies as advantaging Eastern and Midwestern manufacturers. Left without its anticipated central role in managing the transition to industrial capitalism, NAM started to wither away at the end of the century and only gained new life when it reconstituted itself as an organization devoted to fighting organized labor in 1903. Finally, this critical juncture signaled a setback for coordination in the American political economy and strengthened the liberal impulse among U.S. employers.

Conclusion

The seeds of capitalist organization were sown at the end of the nineteenth century, when employers and their government collaborators struggled to transform the regulatory environment to privilege industry over agriculture. To this end, organizers in both the state and the private sector sought to develop high levels of coordination among the social partners, with the result that associations of the social partners were important actors in the break with the preindustrial structures of the *ancien régime*. Yet some countries produced macrocorporatism, in

which the economic and political activities of business and labor were highly coordinated, nationally focused, and endowed with significant state support. Others delivered a system of sector coordination, in which coordinated industrial relations were largely left under the control of private channels of self-governance by the social partners. Finally, in some countries employers had great difficulty finding common ground, had fewer political reasons to negotiate with labor, and formed fragmented “pluralist” groups.

We have argued that because leadership for association building came from the state, the political rules of the game were crucial to outcomes. The structure of party competition and state centralization shaped incentives for strategic coordination for both political actors and employers. Dedicated business parties were likely to develop in countries with multiparty systems and strong centralized governments, and regional business parties developed under conditions of multiparty competition and federal governmental structures. In these countries, where no single party was likely to gain power, parties had an incentive to nurture private associational channels for policy-making, and these produced macrocorporatist groups and systems of sectoral coordination. Two party systems had electoral incentives to cultivate business constituencies; but lacking a dedicated business party and incentives to delegate power, business groups remained pluralist and highly fragmented.

These insights into the origins of peak employers’ organization also have implications for the origins of corporatism and pluralism. While employers of various industrial nations all sought institutions for coordination at the dawn of industrial capitalism, they had profoundly different success rates that reflected the political climate in which they waged the struggle to project their industrial goals. We suggest that the resolution of the political conflicts at the birth of associations had a lasting impact on industrial relations, national systems of regulation, and the future potential for coordinated competitive strategies: cross-national variations in employers’ association led to fundamentally different patterns of business engagement with the state for a century to come.

This work has significance for our understanding of institutional innovation. We subscribe to a punctuated-equilibria model of institutional change, in which the resolution of political conflicts at critical junctures creates lasting institutional legacies. Yet while we appreciate the important role for agency in these transitional moments, we move beyond agency to theorize the political structural constraints on strategic action. In this way, we endorse other recent work that accords a primary place to political parties,⁶² while focusing rather more on the *structure* of party competition that shapes agency.

Our research also has important theoretical implications for the understudied construction

of business preferences for economic and social policies. Comparative scholars often assume fundamental differences in firms' preferences within coordinated and liberal market economies, and trace these preferences back to preindustrial guilds.⁶³ While we accept that images of industrialization are influenced by older estate and guild traditions, we also view interests as socially constructed and receptive to politics.⁶⁴ Thus, while the scant research on the origins of employer organizations usually attributes causality to industrial development or working-class mobilization, we add political structural determinants. Moreover, while scholars commonly root political party development in the structure of societal cleavages, we emphasize the inverse, by looking at how parties influence the construction of class cleavages.⁶⁵

Thus, the work also has bearing on the evolution of diverse forms of industrial capitalism, as it addresses an important pillar in the institutional underpinnings in the varieties of capitalism. With our hitherto untold story about the political origins of national associations, we reveal that stylized facts and an absence of dialogue between business historians and students of party politics have left us rather blind to the enormous importance of political structures in the evolution of corporate cooperation. Patterns of political engagement (even in pre-democratic regimes), as well as protocorporatist structures, matter, and incentives for both state and labor-market actors contribute to cross-national variations in peak business groups. Politics as well as economics has a role in the origins of models of capitalism.

Finally, the analysis has important real-world implications for social solidarity and equality. Americans often take as a given the current spirit of atomistic individualism; yet if one believes in the reconstructive powers of associations and electoral politics, hope may yet remain for those who seek cooperative collective action to address the challenges of postindustrialization. Like Nixon opening China, employers—if given a forum to articulate their collective interests—could help build support for public policies to enhance human capital. An essential concern is whether the institutions for coordination that developed during the golden age of manufacturing can survive in the postindustrial age. States must respond to changing economic conditions and cure earlier welfare traps; yet their ultimate success in continuing to provide collective social goods may depend on their ability to build new coalitions of broad majorities. For these reasons, it is essential that we understand the historical context of the construction of coalitions and institutions that support both economic efficiency and social solidarity.

Notes

1. Martin and Swank 2004; Martin and Thelen 2007; Hicks and Kenworthy 1997; Hoepner 2007.

2. Hall and Soskice 2001; Thelen 2004; Due et al. 1994; Galenson 1952.
3. Martin and Swank 2008, 14; see also Iversen and Soskice 2009.
4. While we focus in this article on the structure of encompassing and centralized national peak organizations, we conceptualize coordination more broadly as including two other related dimensions: the degree to which peak associations are integrated into governmental policy-making processes and the predominate mode of economic coordination in the economy. These dimensions are closely related and we elsewhere investigate all aspects of employers' coordination with quantitative methods. Where encompassing and centralized national associations develop and are integrated into state policy-making forums, coordination is national in scope and state involvement in cooperative institutions is extensive. When peak associational organization is moderate, cooperative institutions are driven by predominately private endeavors and occur at the subnational (primarily economic sectoral) level. Finally, low formal peak organization and policy-making representation correspond to market-based coordination of the economy.
5. While in some post–World War II macrocorporatist nations, foundational institutions were not created until the 1930s or later (Katzenstein 1985), in others, protocorporatist institutions were established by 1910 (Crouch 1993).
6. Bensel 2000.
7. Martin 1994; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003; Maier 1975.
8. All political elites on the right feared greater democratization and cultivated constituencies to thwart the working-class challenge: the Danish Right Party created conservative clubs and worker electoral groups in the 1880s (Dybdahl 1969) and in Germany, Stresseman sought the expansion of the National Liberal Party. The Danish head of state was not allowed to take action if both bodies of parliament stood against a proposal, and the lower body held budgetary responsibility and was democratically elected by proportional representation. In Germany the Prussian Parliament wielded considerable authority: Bismarck worked with the National Liberal Party to pursue his goals of nation-building and with the small Free Conservative Party to pass tariff legislation (Lambi 1962, 68–69; Klug 2001, 244).
9. See discussion of these in Martin and Swank 2008.
10. Cusack et al. 2007; Kitschelt 1993.
11. Downs 1957.
12. Coleman 1987; Hawley 1966; Amorin and Cox 1997; Manow and van Keesbergen 2007; Chhibber and Kollman 2004.

13. For a full quantitative analysis, see Martin and Swank 2010.
14. Wehler 1970, 140; Bruun 1931; Blackbourn and Eley 1984; Lowe 1978.
15. Hawley 1996; Bradley 1965; Lynn and McKeown 1988, 2–3; Baldwin 1990; Gershenkron 1962; Gourevitch 1986.
16. Davenport-Hines 1988; Gourevitch 1986; Katzenstein 1985; Galenson 1952. Moreover, Britain industrialized quite early, and many British firms experienced significant trade pressures and supported protective tariffs by the end of the nineteenth century; therefore, one might have anticipated greater support for national organization (Trentmann 1996; Klug 2001, 219, 236).
17. Tolliday and Zeitlin 1991; Burgess 1975, 305; Turner 1984, 6–7; Maier 1975, 41.
18. Korpi and Shalev 1979; Crouch 1993; Stephens 1979; Clegg et al. 1889; Thelen 2004; Manow and Van Kersbergen 2007.
19. Galenson 1955; Unwin 1966; Thelen 2004; Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007; Swenson 2002.
20. Dunleavy and Welskopp 2007; Spencer 1979, 62; Sweeney 2001.
21. Unwin 1966. Zeitlin 1990 suggests that British skills remained high through the First World War.
22. Agerholm and Vigen 1921; *Det faglig arbejdsbevaegles*; David 1970; Galenson 1952.
23. See recent work by Kuo 2010 on the various motivations for employer organization and the conditions under which associations take a positive or negative approach toward labor relations.
24. Lipset and Rokkan 1967.
25. Manow and Van Keesbergen 2007; Duverger 1954.
26. Martin and Swank 2008, 14; Iversen and Soskice 2009; Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010.
27. According to a punctuated-equilibria model of institutional change, decisions made at critical junctures establish enduring path dependencies; Orren and Skowronek 2004; Wehler 1970, 140; Bruun 1931.
28. Mahoney 2010.
29. As a member of Parliament put it in 1895, members “might very well be protectionists or free traders, sympathizers of co-operative societies as well as opponents of cooperative societies” (Dybdahl 1969, 6–12, 17).

30. Dybdahl 1969; Agerholm and Vigen 1921; Nielsen n.d.
31. Agerholm and Vigen 1921, 5, translated by Cathie Jo Martin.
32. Andersen 2006; da – Korrespondance, General udgånnde 1896 6 30 til 1899 9 21, Erhvervsarkivet, Aarhus.
33. “Vedtægter for Arbejdsgiverforeningen af 1896”; Agerholm and Vigen, 6–47; da to iron industry. Letter. 1897. 46-48, June 23, 1897; da to DsF. Letter. 1897._52 July 12,1897; 1898_138 22/3/1898; Due et al. 1994, 77–79.
34. Vigen 1946; Petersen 1979, 218; Due and Madsen n.d., 26; Due et al. 1994, 80–81.
35. Dybdahl 1969, 12; Galenson 1952; Beretningen om Dansk Arbejdsgiversforenings Virksomhed, 1927–28.
36. Guttsman 1963, 40–41, 88–89, 104; Ridings 2001, 771; Turner 1984, 3–4; Garst 1999, 800.
37. Burgess 1975, 305; Turner 1984, 9; Phillips 1981, 167–68; Fraser 1962, 60, 66–67; Dutton 1981, 879.
38. Blank 1973; Davenport-Hines 1984; Nettl 1965; Grant and Marsh 1977.
39. Docker, D., to Steel-Maitland n.d.; Steel-Maitland to Docker 1/10/1916; Steel-Maitland to Docker. May 24, 1915; Davenport-Hines, 55-56, 63; correspondence in ASM GD193/GD166/2; D Docker to ASM, November 13, 1915.
40. Nugent to Peter Rylands, January 18, 1917; Nugent. “Exerpt from letter to Mr. Docker of 27th March, 1917. Reconstruction Scheme; Cline 1970, 168; Arthur Steel-Maitland to Lord Milner, February 19, 1910; ASM letter to McKenna, August 16,1915.
41. Steel-Maitland to Bonar Law, November 16, 1917.
42. “Company Meeting. Federation Of British Industries.” March 12, 1917: 12.
43. “Company Meeting. Federation Of British Industries.” March 12, 1917: 12.
44. Turner 1984, 33–39; Davenport-Hines 1984, 83.
45. Turner 1984, 34–35; Macara 1921; Lowe 1978, 668.
46. “Concern about Indemnities.” May 15, 1919: 14; “A Centre Party Coalition.” May 14, 1919: 13.
47. Alderman 1984, 144.
48. Ritter 1990, 27, 44; Schonhardt-Bailey 1998; Herrigel 1996; Forbes 1979, 331–39.
49. Klug 2001, 232–33; Schonhardt-Bailey 1998, 328; Pollock 1929, 861–78; Kocka 1999, 42.

50. Eley 1978, 327–51; Dawson 1904, 15–16; Böhme 1967, 230–31.
51. Kardorff to Carey, Philadelphia; Lambi 1962, 67; Craig 1978, 87; Klug 2001, 244.
52. Tipton 1977, 850–51.
53. Bunn 1958, 284; Wolff-Rohe 2001; Brady 1942, 72; Gatzke 1954, 51; Mierzejewski 2002, 202; Feldman 1975; Maier 1975, 62.
54. Redlich 1944, 321; Lauterbach 1944, 29–30; Bowen 1947, 159; Rogers and Dittmar 1935, 483–84
55. Maier 1975, 15, 40–59, 59.
56. Turner 1969, 58; Wolff-Rohe 2001; Gatzke 1954, 51; Rogers and Dittmar 1935, 483–84.
57. Cited in Mierzejewski 2002, 202.
58. Martin 2006.
59. NAM 1926; Gable 1959; Martin 2006.
60. *New York Times*. 1896. “Manufacturers Cheer for McKinley.” (January 22): 1.
61. Search 1900, 12–13.
62. Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010.
63. Hall and Soskice 2001; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001.
64. Gourevitch 1986; Katzenstein 1985.
65. Duverger, Lipset, and Rokkan 1967; Bartolini 2000.
66. Further details and data sources for these measures are available in an electronic appendix, at http://www.marquette.edu/polisci/faculty_swank.shtml.

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Appendix

Table 1 reports the level of employer organization in two ways. First, along the macrocorporatist dimension, we report a continuous index of formal organization and representational articulation. Our measure is an additive index of three component measures: (1) scope of employers' organization (that is, the share of employers organized in national peak associations; (2) the centralization of power (for example, control over strike/lockout funds, bargaining strategies) in national peak associations; and (3) the integration of national associations into national policy-making forums. Each country-decade is scored 1, 2, or 3 (where 1 is minimal and 3 is high) on each component dimension. While one could infer with confidence that high levels of organization correspond with macrocorporatist coordination, and intermediate levels equate with sectoral coordination, we actually compute broader indices for macrocorporatist coordination and sectoral coordination.

For macrocorporatism, we combine our index of employer organization with a directly comparable measure of labor organization and collective bargaining centralization. As the correlation between this measure and our focal measure of employers displayed in Table 1 is very high ($r = .95$), we utilize only the employers measure for the present illustration of macrocorporatist organization.

Second, we report an additive index of sector coordination, which is composed of similar 1–3 scaled measures of the extent of sector coordination to provide (commonly within economic sectors) collective business goods (that is, training, research and development, export marketing, and industrial development strategies) and the strength of long-term finance and producer relations (that is, reliance on bank finance and institutional bank-producer linkages). Both macrocorporatism and sector cooperation indices are expressed as standard (z) scores to facilitate comparison.⁶⁶

Appendix A – Tables

Table 1: Patterns of Employers' Organization: Macrocorporatism and Sector Coordination, 1900-1938

<i>Nations</i>	<i>Macrocorporatist Organization</i>			<i>Sector Coordination</i>		
	<i>1900</i>	<i>1925</i>	<i>1938</i>	<i>1900</i>	<i>1925</i>	<i>1938</i>
Relatively Low Employer Organization, 1920s–30s						
Australia	–0.93	–0.93	–0.93	–1.09	–0.91	–0.91
Canada	–0.93	–0.93	–0.93	–1.09	–0.91	–0.91
Finland	–0.93	–0.16	–0.16	–0.75	–0.16	0.1
France	–0.93	–0.93	–0.93	–0.74	–0.57	–0.57
New Zealand	–0.67	–0.42	–0.42	–1.09	–0.57	–0.57
United Kingdom	–0.67	–0.67	–0.42	–1.09	–0.91	–0.91
United States	–0.93	–0.93	–0.93	–1.09	–0.91	–0.57
Mean	–0.86	–0.71	–0.67	–0.99	–0.7	–0.62
Relatively High Sector Coordination, 1920s–30s						
Austria	–0.41	0.87	na	0.5	1	na
Germany	–0.16	1.13	na	1.34	1.68	na
Italy	–0.93	–.41 ^a	na	–0.03	.78 ^a	na
Switzerland	–0.16	0.61	1.39	0.27	0.97	0.97
Mean	–0.41	0.55	Na	0.52	1.11	na
Relatively High Macrocorporatism, 1920s–30s						
Belgium	–0.93	–0.41	1.39	–0.38	–0.03	0.63
Denmark	0.36	1.13	2.16	0.64	1.11	1.11
Netherlands	–0.93	0.1	0.66	–0.43	0.1	0.1
Norway	–0.16	0.62	2.16	–0.77	0.1	0.77
Sweden	–0.16	0.62	2.16	–0.06	1.12	1.45
Mean	–0.36	0.41	1.71	–0.2	0.48	0.81

SOURCES: See text and appendix for details on measures of macrocorporatism and sector coordination. Detailed information and data sources for all component of these measures are available at www.marquette.edu/polisci/fculy_swank.shtml.

^a Employers organization measured circa 1921-22.

Table 2: Political Institutions and Employers Organization at the Dawn of the Twentieth Century: Theoretical Predictions, Nations, and Modes of Organization

<i>Number of Parties</i>	<i>Level of State Centralization</i>	
	Centralized system national parties, unity high coverage of specific interests	Federal system regional parties, variation low coverage of specific interests
Multiparty system dedicated parties, high coverage of specific interests	Prediction: full-blown macrocorporatism Nations: Denmark (Netherlands, Norway, Sweden) Macrocorporatism: .72 Sector coordination: .58	Prediction: sector coordination, coordination without much state involvement Nations: Germany (Switzerland) Macrocorporatism: .50 Sector coordination: 1.06
Two-party system catch-all parties, low coverage of specific interests	Prediction: pluralism with periodic state-led, top-down coordination Nations: Britain Macrocorporatism: -.14 Sector coordination: -1.09	Prediction: pluralism with market competition, segmentalism Nations: United States (Australia, Canada) Macrocorporatism: -.93 Sector coordination: -.93