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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION, REGION, RACE, AND ATTITUDES TOWARD GLOBALIZATION

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One of the most widely held views among economists is that comparative advantage-based free trade is welfare enhancing.¹ Yet, as evidenced by recent protests directed at global institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization, controversy continues to surround many aspects of globalization. On one hand, the controversy involves studying issues belonging to positive analysis, such as the economic impact of increasing trade and capital flows and the effect of immigration on destination economies. On the other hand, it also involves issues belonging to normative analysis, such as whether these impacts are consistent with the “good” life, as defined by Judeo-Christian ethics.

Recent public opinion surveys show that U.S. residents are evenly split over international trade policy, and that this phenomenon is apparent in other nations as well (Bergsten, 2001). This gap between public policy demands and potential economic welfare gains creates an interesting policy problem as special interest groups and non-governmental organizations become more globally organized, thereby increasing their capabilities of influencing economic policy in several countries simultaneously (OECD 1996). Consequently, the disconnect between public perceptions and the policy recommendations of economists raises the possibility of a “democratic deficit” (Johal and Ulph 2002) in that policies are increasingly shaped by the lobbying efforts of special interest groups rather than in the welfare interests of the general public. In an effort to better understand the determinants of various *group* demands for global economic policies, it is a valuable exercise to study the determinants of *individual* level policy preferences. In fact, Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) point out that though there are a number of studies in the economics literature on the effects of increased globalization on host economies, little research has focused on the determinants of *individual preferences* regarding policies that shape the pace and progress of globalization. They argue that only after indi-

vidual preferences are understood can reasonable policymaking efforts be made.

Given the importance of examining globalization and attitudes towards it, it is surprising to see the relative lack of attention paid to the influence of religious beliefs on individual level global-policy preferences. Iannacone (1998) argues that though the study of religion has found legitimacy in many of the social sciences, it qualifies as new territory within the field of economics. This may be explained, at least partially, by the lack of rigor often associated with measuring political and social factors, such as religion. As Barro and McCleary (2002) discuss in their research on economic growth, the economics discipline increasingly needs to reach beyond narrow measures of economic variables to include various political and social factors. Because religion is typically considered to be an important influence on ethical judgements, it ought to be considered when studying determinants of individuals’ preferences. Though measuring and rigorously examining religion may not lend itself easily to standard economic analysis, its potential impact is still substantial and therefore should not be overlooked.

Despite the difficulties of measuring religion, the economics discipline has not completely ignored the importance of religion in shaping economic attitudes and affecting economic outcomes, and recently there has been a renewed attention to this relationship. Welch and Mueller (2001), in their taxonomy of the relationship of religion to economics, recall Alfred Marshall’s statement in his *Principles of Economics* that “. . . the great forming agencies of the world’s history have been the religious and the economic.” Though economic studies in this area are very diffuse (for summaries of the literature see Smith and Sawkins 1998 and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2002), what is yet to be considered in the literature is the relationship between religious affiliation and *international-policy* preferences.² And yet, a recent study on American views of globalization (PIPA 2000) shows that these views are

affected by moral beliefs and varying degrees of confidence in a market-based system.

Religious denominations embrace certain values and beliefs in their social teaching that will impact the economic life of their members, and different denominations may offer different approaches to living these values. Thus, it may be argued that an individual's religious affiliation is one factor that shapes views toward alternative policies, which in turn may shape globalization. Different denominations have different approaches to the issue of globalization and so individuals' policy preferences will vary in accordance with their religious affiliation. Given the dynamic nature of globalization and the sometimes vague discussion of the "good" life by religious leaders, inter-denominational differences may have grown even greater, and there may even be significant differences in opinions regarding global issues within a given major denomination. As Iannaccone (1998) argues, in nearly all denominations there exist a number of economic statements from leading thinkers that can justify a number of economic positions. Consequently, it is important for economists to study not only the relationship between religion and preferences towards globalization, but also how various religious denominations relate the outcomes of increased globalization to a virtuous life. For example, the 2000 General Conference amendments to the social principles of the United Methodist Church included the statement:

Increasingly economies of nations are related through the international economy. There is the rise of globalization through multinational corporations. Countervailing powers need to be developed to counteract exploitation by these corporations.

The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (2002) statement on international trade maintains that:³

Trade liberalization is designed to open markets and increase general economic welfare by promoting efficiency of production and hence increasing the availability and reducing the cost of goods and services. However, trade liberalization, while it may produce job gains in some areas, can produce job losses and family and community dislocation in other areas and can also lead to environmental degradation. There is also a growing concern that trade rules may unduly benefit investors in some countries to the detriment of workers and the economies of poorer countries creating a widening gap between rich and poor. Coupled with growing international financial instability, trade has moved from being considered a technical matter to a political one.

As indicated above and discussed in more detail in the next section, there exist a number of studies on individuals' trade and immigration-policy preferences. These studies

include variables that control for an individual's region of residence and their race (African-American) and ethnicity (Hispanic). Yet as Smith (1987) points out, these variables may be used as (arguably less than desirable) proxy measures for major religious affiliations and sub-denominational affiliations. For example, a control variable for African-American may actually reflect the importance of being Baptist while Hispanic may reflect the importance of being Catholic, as opposed to being African-American or Hispanic. Likewise, controls for regions may actually reflect the importance of being affiliated with the American Baptist Convention or the Southern Baptist Convention as opposed to residing in the north or south respectively.⁴ Of course geographical boundaries have weakened over time. Our objective is to test directly for religious affiliation, religiosity, regional, racial, and ethnic effects.

Specifically, we examine the attitudes of individuals in the United States regarding two economic issues: First, whether the United States should limit imports to protect its economy; and second, whether the number of legal immigrants into the United States should be changed. We find varying degrees of agreement regarding limiting or expanding trade and immigration among religious affiliations. We also suggest that these differences are even more important when judged jointly with the individual's geographic location and ethnic or racial background.

Our contribution, therefore, is twofold. First we argue that organized religion is an important issue to consider when studying factors that shape individual policy preferences on international economic issues and show how its effect may have been indirectly captured in earlier studies via other demographic factors. Second, we allow for and investigate inter-denominational differences. We suggest that the influence of religion is linked to other factors such as the individual's geographical location or ethnic/racial background. These tangential factors may help to explain inter- (and intra-) denominational differences in opinions towards issues of globalization. We have no doubt that all denominations are concerned with issues such as global hunger, poverty, and the distribution of income. It is apparent, however, that different denominations will have varying preferences that lead to different approaches to addressing these issues. In other words, different denominations will understand the broad question of whether to give a man a fish or teach him to fish differently. As a result of their different perspectives and teachings, members of different denominations will offer varying responses to this question. We seek to test whether these denominational differences are seen in issues of globalization after we account for the typical factors that are standard in the literature on preferences towards globalization.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the standard political economy of global

trade and immigration policy preferences, and further motivates the need to incorporate religion into the analysis. Section II provides the results of a survey on national identity that relate to our study and describes the connections among demographic and cultural characteristics and an individual's religious affiliation. Section III empirically tests the significance of religious affiliation on trade and immigration policy preferences while controlling for other demographic, economic, and political factors. Section IV offers a conclusion.

I. The Political Economy of Trade and Immigration-Policy Preferences

The most recent examinations of trade and immigration-policy preferences in the economics literature focus on two common theories of international trade policy preferences: the Ricardo-Viner (R-V) model and the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model. Both theories consider the effect of increased trade on factor returns and provide a framework to explain how individuals evaluate the effect of opening trade on their income. (Scheve and Slaughter 2001a,b survey this literature.) Thus, the major focus of the study of global-policy preferences is how an individual's income is affected by increased globalization.

The different outcomes of these competing models can be illustrated as follows: If we assume that the United States is relatively abundant with high-skilled labor the H-O model predicts that high-skilled workers in the U.S. would support free trade while low-skilled workers would not. According to the R-V model, workers employed in comparative advantage sectors would support free trade; those employed in comparative disadvantage sectors would not.

Single-Nation and Cross-Country Studies of Trade and Immigration-Policy Preferences

There exist in the published literature a number of qualitative and quantitative single-nation studies on the determinants of policy preferences. The most recent and relevant of these is Scheve and Slaughter (2001a,b) who use individual-level survey data for the United States to identify if individual skill level or factor type is a significant determinant of trade-policy preferences. Daniels and von der Ruhr (2003a,b) directly extend the analysis of Scheve and Slaughter to ten advanced economies. Both sets of authors find that factor type, rather than sector of employment, and asset ownership influence trade policy preferences. Other demographic characteristics, such as gender, race, and trade union membership were found to be important determinants, while age was not.

Religion and Economics

Empirical studies of the link between religion and economics are also prominent, but less numerous in the eco-

nomics literature, and are largely summarized in Iannaccone (1998). Lowry (1998), for example, considers religion and membership in environmental groups. The premise is that religious affiliation may reflect an individual's beliefs about "the good society" (p. 225) and the specific policies the affiliation espouses. Likewise, the strength of an individual's religious affiliation may, in turn, affect the degree of their policy convictions. He finds that the number of members per household of Judeo-Christian denominations has a negative and significant effect on state membership rates to groups advocating policies in favor of environmental preservation. Further, the results find evidence suggesting that religious affiliation will positively affect membership to sportsmen groups advocating private stewardship of natural resources. Glaeser and Glendon (1998) test Max Weber's view that economic growth of Protestant nations exceeds that of Catholic nations because Calvinism accepts the dogma of predestination while Catholicism accepts the dogma of free will. They argue that predestination may be a more socially efficient belief system. Though the doctrine of free will provides incentives to those individuals who believe in an afterlife, predestination offers incentives to everyone because of their inherent desire to convince others that they are members of the group chosen by God. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2002) expand on this by examining the impact of religion on attitudes toward several issues, including the market economy. They find that, on average, religious beliefs are conducive to higher per capita income and growth after controlling for individual characteristics such as health status, age, gender, education, income, and perceived social status, as well as country fixed effects. In a similar manner, Mehanna (2002) finds that countries whose dominant faith is Protestant tend to be more open, in terms of trade, than Catholic or Muslim nations.

In addition to an individual's religious affiliation, it may be argued that the strength of that affiliation (known as religiosity) plays a separate role in affecting their preferences.⁵ In other words, a devout member of a denomination may have different views than a less active member of a religious group. Dahl and Ransom (1999) consider the importance of the strength of religious affiliation—or religiosity—in the presence of economic self-interest by surveying members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints on tithing beliefs. Their premise is that devout members, defined by church attendance, are less likely to allow financial self-interest to affect their definition of income for tithing purposes. Their study allows individuals to treat gifts, inheritances, stock market gains, unemployment insurance, tax-deferred pension plans, and self-employment income differently as they subjectively define their income for tithing purposes. While they find a pattern that more frequent churchgoers appear less self-serving than infrequent churchgoers, their likelihood ratio statistics

are insignificant. Smith and Sawkins (1998) attempt to explain the difference in religious participation across countries controlling for a Catholic monopoly in some nations and the retention rate of adult participation. They appeal in part to Iannaccone's (1998) discussion of religious human capital in which an individual's appreciation of a religion is affected by their own religious knowledge, familiarity with a religion's doctrines and rituals, and community with other members of the religion. Greater religious human capital and markets where multiple religions are competing for followers tend to increase membership retention. Gwin and North (2002) are more specific in their study of cross-country differences in religiosity. They find that the establishment of a state sanctioned religion reduces religiosity while constitutional protection of religious participation increase religiosity.

As discussed earlier, little attention has been paid to how religion affects preferences towards international policy issues. An exception is Barro and McCleary (2002) who note that religion may have a significant influence in international trade and finance through such channels as how the religion encourages or discourages interactions with strangers, but do not pursue the issue.

It seems, therefore, that there is an area in the literature that requires further examination to consider how religion is related to preferences towards globalization. The next section illustrates how a respondent's professed religious affiliation relates to their international trade and immigration-policy preferences. We also comment on how the influence of religion may be masked by other demographic factors that are often considered. In particular, we consider some interesting interactions between religious affiliation, race and ethnicity, and region.

II. Survey Data

The data employed in this study are the results of a survey conducted and compiled by Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung. The survey, which embodies the most current international survey data available on a broad range of global issues, is part of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and is titled *ISSP: National Identity 1996*.⁶ This survey focuses on respondents' attitudes toward issues of national identity and international relations, and includes many demographic variables on the respondents.

Description of the Survey Questions

The first survey item considered here asks, "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The United States should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy?" The second item asks, "Do you think the number of immigrants to the United States nowadays should be increased or decreased?" Re-

sponses to these questions serve as the variables of interest and are related to religious affiliation. It is important to note that using policy-oriented questions assumes that the respondent has some understanding of the effects of global-policy changes on their individual welfare.

Religious Affiliation

In the political economy literature, a number of demographic and economic variables are typically used to explain international policy-preferences, including the respondent's skill level (alternatively measured by income or education), gender, age, political ideology, trade union membership, and citizenship. The lack of a systematic inclusion of religious affiliation is understandable, as religion is difficult to measure, and is not always easily linked to *a priori* hypotheses regarding its relationship to specific economic outcomes. Moreover, its interaction with other influences on a person's preferences is difficult to disentangle. Barro and McCleary (2002) note interactions between a person's participation in a religion, where the person lives, and the person's occupation. Thus, religion, region, and occupation may have observationally equivalent impacts on a person's views; and to separate them may be challenging. We can also easily add another complicating factor by including ethnic and racial background into the mix; noting that people of similar heritage may concentrate in certain areas, and/or share a certain religion. Regardless of how these factors interact, the core influence of religion on policy preferences is still important to understand so as to determine whether it is region, race, ethnicity, or religion, or some combination thereof that is important.

To begin to explore these issues, we relate the responses to the policy questions described above to religious affiliation. The survey instrument asked individuals if they belonged to a religious group. There were approximately 30 denominations with which the individual could identify including Catholic, Jewish, Moslem, various Protestant denominations, Shinto, Hindu, Buddhist, and Sikh. Individuals were also allowed to select no affiliation or to refuse to answer. In our sample, individuals identified only with Catholic, Jewish, Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, Episcopalian, other Protestant, other Christian, none, and two refused to answer (and are treated as missing observations). The distribution of the sample among these groups is illustrated in Figure 1.

By allowing for various Protestant denominations, as opposed to aggregating them, this study allows for differences in attitudes among these denominations. As discussed and summarized by Pyle (1993), a common hypothesis is that individuals affiliated with fundamentalist denominations tend to hold conservative economic and political attitudes. Moreover, Coreno (2002) argues that in order to defend radical traditionalism against the penetration of

secular values, fundamentalists often form small, interdependent—yet independent—enclave communities. By forming enclave communities they are able to separate themselves, as much as possible, from the encroachment of secular changes. We suspect that this cultural aspect shapes their conservative views forming a brand of isolationist conservatism. We expect *a priori*, therefore, that fundamentalist Protestants are more likely to oppose free trade and greater levels of immigration. We suspect that differences among Protestant denominations may be

discriminated along the continuum of fundamentalist groups (Baptists for example) to moderate (Lutheran for example) to liberal (Episcopalian for example). To classify Protestant religions in this manner, we rely on categorization scheme of Smith (1987, 1990). Likewise, we expect that individuals who identify with denominations classified as liberal will be less likely to oppose international trade and immigration.


It is important to point out that we examine inter-denominational differences but not intra-denominational differences. For example, we test Baptist as a single denomination even though one may argue that the views of, say, the American Baptist Convention differ from those of the Southern Baptist Convention.

Religion, Race, Ethnicity, and Region

Participation in a religious organization centers on congregating at a particular place, or one's place of worship (one's local church, parish, or synagogue). Hence, there is likely to be a strong connection between region and religious affiliation as some regions have a dominant religion (as measured by the number of affiliates). This is easily seen on a national basis, for example, with Catholicism dominant in the Southern region of Europe and Protestantism dominant in the north. This is important to acknowledge because in the literature, regional effects are often argued to be a relevant influence to consider in an analysis of policy preferences. If, in fact, a regional influence is captured in the data, it may actually reflect in part the influence of religion. This would support our claim that religion ought to be incorporated into economic analysis.

It can be argued that a dominant religious affiliation does not exist in the United States because of its unique

Figure 1. Religious Affiliation of Respondents



religious diversity. Smith (1987, p. 1) reports that early in the history of the United States, the French aristocrat Talleyrand derisively observed that “the United States has thirty-two religions but only one sauce.” Nonetheless, a dominant religion may exist at a regional level.

Typically a religion is defined as “dominant” if it has a higher number of affiliates, or a relative majority (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2002) for example). Table 1 shows the distribution of religious affiliations across the nine U.S. Census divisions.⁷ Based on a relative majority, Catholic domi-

nates the New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, Mountain and Pacific divisions, while Baptist dominates the West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central divisions. We expect, therefore, that a regional control variable may unintentionally pick up the effect that a dominant religion has within a region. For example, controlling for the South Region of the United States divisions will certainly reflect the dominance of Baptist conventions and associations in this area (among other things).

In addition to religious affiliation being connected to region, there is a connection between religion and race and ethnicity. Our sample reflects the dominance of Baptist associations and conventions among African-Americans with more than half (55 percent) professing an affiliation with the faith. This aspect is more significant among Hispanics with 64 percent affiliated with Catholicism.

Of course there is transitivity that exists in the above discussion. If affiliation is correlated to race and ethnicity, and affiliation is correlated to region, then it could well be that region and race and ethnicity are correlated. Indeed our sample has a high concentration of Hispanics in the Pacific region, with 45 percent of the sample in this region, and approximately one-quarter in the West South Central region. If, for example, there is a difference between the attitudes of Hispanic Catholics and Non-Hispanic Catholics toward trade and immigration, we could expect a difference between the attitudes of Catholics in, say, the New England And Middle Atlantic regions, and those in the Pacific region. In a similar manner, approximately one-quarter of the African-Americans in our sample reside in the South Atlantic Region. The South Atlantic, East South

Table 1. Geographical Distribution of Religious Affiliation
Percentage within each region affiliated with the listed religion

	New England	Middle Atlantic	East North Central	West North Central	South Atlantic	West South Central	East South Central	Mountain	Pacific
Roman Catholic	45.5	37.9	27.1	20.4	11.6	3.3	19.5	29.9	19.8
Jewish	3.9	4.9	2.2	1.0	2.8	nil	0.8	1.0	2.1
Baptist	10.4	9.4	15.3	23.3	35.6	52.7	35.0	10.3	11.5
Methodist	2.6	6.9	9.2	7.8	11.6	13.2	9.8	7.2	7.3
Lutheran	1.3	6.4	13.5	17.5	4.4		2.4	7.2	4.7
Episcopal	3.9	2.0	1.3	1.0	2.8	2.2	2.4	2.1	3.6
Other Protestant	11.7	13.8	14.4	7.8	17.2	18.7	17.9	10.3	14.6
Other Christian	1.3	4.9	2.2	6.8	1.6	nil	5.7	10.3	12.0
None	19.5	13.8	14.8	14.5	12.4	9.9	6.6	21.7	24.4

Central, and West South Central regions account for nearly one-half of African-Americans, with an additional 25 percent in the Middle Atlantic Region.

Given the strong association among religion, race, ethnicity, and region, we must once again exercise caution in interpreting the impact each individual characteristic will have on opinions regarding economic issues. Tables 2A-C and 3A-C provide the distribution of responses to the two policy questions in light of racial, ethnic, religious, and regional characteristics. For the entire sample, 69 percent responded “strongly agree” or “agree,” 14 percent responded “neither agree nor disagree,” and 17 percent responded “strongly disagree” or “disagree” to the question on restricting imports.

Tables 2A-C show that African-Americans agree to a much greater extent and Hispanics disagree to a much greater extent than the overall sample and the sub-group of all others. For African-Americans, this aspect is most pronounced among Catholics, Baptists, Methodists, and in the South Atlantic, East South Central and West South Central divisions. For Hispanics it is difficult to discern any particular pattern due to the small number of observations spread out over several regions and religions. For the two divisions where we do have a sufficient number of observations, West South Central and Pacific, there is an apparent difference in views, with over 72 percent of Hispanics in the West South Central agreeing that imports should be restricted as compared to only 47 percent in the Pacific. For all others in our sample, over 75 percent of Baptists and Methodists, and individuals in the East South Central and West South Central divisions agree that imports should be restricted while less than 60 percent of Jews and Episcopalians and

individuals in the West North Central and Mountain divisions agree.

Tables 3A-C provide the responses to the question “Do you think the number of immigrants to the United States nowadays should be . . . ?” There are too few observations on Hispanics to draw any discernable pattern other than evidence of strong support in favor of increasing immigration in the West South Central division. Among African-Americans in the West North Central division there is also evidence of above average support for increasing immigration. For all others there is evidence of above average support for increasing immigration among Jews. There also appears to be an intersection of a regional effect and a denomination effect for Baptists in the East South central division.

III. Empirical Results

To test for the effect of religious affiliation, we control for other characteristics by including the following variables. Age and education are continuous variables measured in years. Following the economics literature, education is included as a measure of skill. Scheve and Slaughter (2001b) show that, when controlling for other demographic characteristics, education, income, and occupational classification are proxy measures of skill and, therefore, should not be included together in the same regression models. Following Daniels and von der Ruhr (2003a) we use education as a measure of skill.

Political affiliation ranges from unity, for far left, to five for far right and is treated as a continuous variable in the regression. Non-citizen, Female, Union, Hispanic, and African-American are dummy variables that take the value of

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Table 2-A. Responses of African-Americans to “U.S. should limit the import of foreign products.”

Census Division	Catholic	Jewish	Baptist	Methodist	Lutheran	Episcopalian	Other Protestant	Other Christian	No Affiliation	Division Total
New England										
Middle Atlantic	75.0	-	62.5	66.6		100.0	100.0		100.0	65.0
	25.0	-	37.5	33.3		-	-		-	30.0
	-	100.0	-	-		-	-		-	5.0
East North Central	100.0		60.0	100.0	100.0		66.6	100.0		78.6
	-		40.0	-	-		33.3	-		21.4
	-		-	-	-		-	-		-
West North Central			100.0							83.3
			-						100.0	16.7
			-						-	-
South Atlantic	100.0		76.9	100.0			100.0			85.7
	-		15.4	-			-			9.5
	-		7.7	-			-			4.8
East South Central			100.0						100.0	100.0
			-						-	-
			-						-	-
West South Central			100.0	100.0			-			88.9
			-	-			100.0			11.1
			-	-			-			-
Mountain										
Pacific	-	-	75.0	100.0						66.7
	100.0		25.0	-						33.3
	-	100.0	-	-						-
Denomination Total	80.0	-	81.3	87.5	100.0	100.0	77.8	100.0	75.0	79.5
	20.0	-	16.7	12.5	-	-	22.2	-	25.0	18.1
	-	100.0	2.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.4

Table entries are percentages responding “Strongly Agree” or “Agree,” “Neither Agree Nor Disagree,” and “Strongly Disagree” or “Disagree” respectively. The lower right cell shows the total percentage of African-Americans responding to each category.

Table 2-B. Responses of Hispanics to “U.S. should limit the import of foreign products.”

Census Division	Catholic	Jewish	Baptist	Methodist	Lutheran	Episcopalian	Other Protestant	Other Christian	No Affiliation	Division Total
New England										
Middle Atlantic	50.0		-						-	37.5
	50.0		100.0						100.0	62.5
	-		-						-	-
East North Central							100.0			100.0
							-			-
							-			-
West North Central										
South Atlantic										
East South Central										
West South Central	75.0						100.0		50.0	72.7
	25.0						-		-	8.2
	-						-		50.0	9.1
Mountain	50.0			100.0					100.0	75.0
	-			-					-	-
	50.0			-					-	25.0
Pacific	40.0						-	100.0	66.6	47.1
	30.0						-	-	-	17.6
	30.0						100.0	-	33.3	35.3
Denomination Total	53.8		-	100.0			50.0	100.0	57.1	56.1
	30.8		100.0	-			-	-	14.3	24.4
	15.4		-	-			50.0	-	28.6	19.5

Table entries are percentages responding “Strongly Agree” or “Agree,” “Neither Agree Nor Disagree,” and “Strongly Disagree” or “Disagree” respectively. The lower right cell shows the total percentage of Hispanics responding to each category.

Table 2-C. Responses of All Others to “U.S. should limit the import of foreign products.”

Census Division	Catholic	Jewish	Baptist	Methodist	Lutheran	Episcopalian	Other Protestant	Other Christian	No Affiliation	Division Total
New England	66.7 23.3 10.0	100.0 - -	83.3 16.7 -	50.0 50.0 -	- 100.0 -	100.0 - -	16.7 33.3 50.0	- 100.0 -	63.6 27.3 9.1	61.7 26.7 11.7
Middle Atlantic	72.0 16.0 12.0	57.1 28.6 14.3	75.0 25.0 -	87.5 12.5 -	55.6 22.2 22.2	33.3 66.7 -	73.7 15.8 10.5	50.0 - 50.0	62.5 18.8 18.8	68.3 18.3 13.5
East North Central	61.1 27.8 11.1	- -	84.2 15.8 -	84.2 10.5 5.3	81.5 14.8 3.7	- -	66.7 16.7 16.7	66.7 33.3 -	62.5 16.7 20.8	70.2 19.3 10.5
West North Central	61.1 16.7 22.2	- -	46.2 23.1 30.8	80.0 20.0 -	61.5 30.8 7.7	- -	60.0 -	60.0 -	44.4 11.1 44.4	55.7 17.1 27.1
South Atlantic	76.2 4.8 19.0	75.0 -	82.6 10.9 6.5	73.7 15.8 10.5	66.7 33.3 -	40.0 40.0 20.0	76.9 7.7 15.4	100.0 -	61.1 16.7 22.2	74.8 12.2 12.9
East South Central	100 -	-	76.5 5.9 17.6	75.0 12.5 12.5	50.0 50.0 -	50.0 -	90.0 10.0 -	-	100.0 -	82.2 8.9 8.9
West South Central	78.6 7.1 14.3	- 100.0 -	70.0 15.0 15.0	60.0 20.0 20.0	100.0 -	50.0 -	100.0 -	33.3 66.7	75.0 25.0 -	75.8 10.6 13.6
Mountain	61.1 33.3 5.6	100.0 -	85.7 14.3 -	66.7 16.7 16.7	20.0 -	100.0 -	55.6 33.3 11.1	55.6 -	53.8 30.8 15.4	59.4 21.7 18.8
Pacific	66.7 14.3 19.0	50.0 -	72.7 27.3 -	66.7 33.3 -	62.5 25.0 12.5	50.0 -	65.0 10.0 25.0	64.3 21.4 14.3	71.9 12.5 15.6	66.7 16.3 17.1
Denomination Total	67.7 19.2 13.1	58.9 17.6 23.5	76.2 15.0 8.8	75.3 17.3 7.4	66.6 20.8 12.5	47.8 21.7 30.4	71.4 12.8 15.8	58.1 11.6 30.2	64.4 17.4 18.2	65.0 16.0 13.7

Table entries are percentages responding “Strongly Agree” or “Agree,” “Neither Agree Nor Disagree,” and “Strongly Disagree” or “Disagree” respectively. The lower right cell shows the total percentage of all others responding to each category.

Table 3-A. Responses of African-Americans to “The number of immigrants to the United States should be . . .”

Census Division	Catholic	Jewish	Baptist	Methodist	Lutheran	Episcopalian	Other Protestant	Other Christian	No Affiliation	Division Total
New England										
Middle Atlantic	33.3 66.7 -	100.0 -	12.5 50.0 37.5	- 100.0	- -	- 100.0	- 100.0	- -	- 50 50	15.8 36.8 47.5
East North Central	- 33.3 67.6		25.0 25.0 50.0	50.0 -	- 100.0	- -	33.3 -	- 100.0	- -	21.4 14.3 64.3
West North Central			50.0 -	- 100.0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- 100 -	37.5 12.5 50.0
South Atlantic	- -		- 20.0 80.0	- 100.0	- -	- -	- 50.0 50.0	- -	- -	- 40.0 60.0
East South Central			20.0 40.0 40.0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- 100	16.7 33.3 50.0
West South Central			20.0 20.0 60.0	- 100.0	- -	- -	- 100.0	- -	- -	14.3 28.6 57.1
Mountain										
Pacific		- 100.0	- 100.0	- 100.0	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- 100.0
Denomination Total	14.3 57.1 28.6	100.0 -	17.1 24.4 58.5	10.0 20.0 70.0	- -	- 100.0	14.3 28.6 57.1	- 100.0	- 50 50	15.1 27.4 57.5

Table entries are percentages responding “Increased a Lot” or “Increased a Little,” “Remain the Same,” and “Reduced a Lot” or “Reduced a Little” respectively. The lower right cell shows the total percentage of African-Americans responding to each category.

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Tables 3-B. Responses of Hispanics to “The number of immigrants to the United States should be . . .”

Census Division	Catholic	Jewish	Baptist	Methodist	Lutheran	Episcopalian	Other Protestant	Other Christian	No Affiliation	Division Total
New England										
Middle Atlantic	20.0 40.0 40.0		- 100.0 -					- 100.0 -	- 100.0 -	37.5 62.5 -
East North Central										
West North Central										
South Atlantic										
East South Central										
West South Central	14.3 28.6 57.1								100.0 - -	72.7 18.2 9.1
Mountain	- - 100.0								- - 100.0	75.0 - 25.0
Pacific	33.3 44.4 22.2						- 50.0 50.0	- - 100.0	- 66.7 33.3	47.1 17.6 35.3
Denomination Total	22.7 36.4 40.9		- 100.0 -				- 50.0 50.0	- 33.3 66.7	28.6 42.9 28.6	20.0 40.0 40.0

Table entries are percentages responding “Increased a Lot” or “Increased a Little,” “Remain the Same,” and “Reduced a Lot” or “Reduced a Little” respectively. The lower right cell shows the total percentage of Hispanics responding to each category.

Table 3-C. Responses of All Others to “The number of immigrants to the United States should be . . .”

Census Division	Catholic	Jewish	Baptist	Methodist	Lutheran	Episcopalian	Other Protestant	Other Christian	No Affiliation	Division Total
New England	3.4 31.0 65.5	33.3 -	- 33.3 66.7	- -	- 100.0 -	- 100.0 -	- 44.4 55.6	- -	9.1 45.5 45.5	4.5 31.3 64.2
Middle Atlantic	13.7 27.5 58.8	- 28.6 71.4	- -	10.0 20.0 70.0	- 15.4 84.6	- 50.0 50.0	19.0 28.6 52.4	12.5 25.0 62.5	15.0 30.0 55.0	11.4 25.0 63.6
East North Central	9.1 29.1 61.8	25.0 50.0 25.0	8.3 25.0 66.7	- 35.3 64.7	3.6 35.7 60.7	33.3 -	4.3 30.4 65.2	- 66.7 33.3	3.7 29.6 66.6	6.5 31.0 62.5
West North Central	17.6 11.8 70.6		6.3 25.0 68.8	- 16.7 83.3	11.8 17.6 70.6	- 100.0 -	14.3 -	- 60.0 40.0	16.7 50.0 33.3	11.1 24.7 64.5
South Atlantic	8.3 41.7 50.0	28.6 57.1 14.3	5.96 23.5 70.6	4.5 22.7 72.7	- 44.4 55.6	14.3 -	6.1 18.2 75.8	- 33.3 66.7	13.3 33.3 53.3	7.2 26.8 66.0
East South Central	- - 100.0		3.3 20.0 76.7	- -	- -	- 100.0	7.7 7.7 84.6	- -	71.4 -	3.1 13.8 83.1
West South Central	20.0 26.7 53.3	100.0 -	10.0 26.7 63.3	- 11.1 88.9	- -	- 50.0 50.0	11.8 11.8 76.5	- 50.0 50.0	- 33.3 66.7	10.8 22.9 66.3
Mountain	- 38.5 61.5		10.0 20.0 70.0	- 33.3 66.7	14.3 14.3 71.4	- 100.0 -	11.1 44.4 44.4	12.5 12.5 75.0	6.3 25.0 68.8	6.0 32.1 61.9
Pacific	9.1 22.7 68.2	- -	12.5 18.8 68.8	27.3 27.3 72.7	- 33.3 66.7	- 50.0 50.0	9.1 27.3 63.6	15.4 38.5 46.2	5.6 69.4 25.0	7.4 26.7 65.9
Denomination Total	9.5 29.0 61.4	20.0 32.0 48.0	6.7 22.6 70.7	2.1 74.5 23.4	4.6 28.0 67.1	7.4 25.9 66.7	9.1 23.4 67.5	9.3 34.9 55.8	7.6 30.4 62.0	7.7 26.7 65.5

Table entries are percentages responding “Increased a Lot” or “Increased a Little,” “Remain the Same,” and “Reduced a Lot” or “Reduced a Little” respectively. The lower right cell shows the total percentage of all others responding to each category.

the specific demographic group, and the value of zero otherwise. The nine census divisions are collapsed into the four larger census regions of Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. The West region serves as the control group in our analysis.⁸ We also use dummy variables for Catholic, Jewish, Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, Episcopalian, other Protestant, and other Christian affiliations. Hence, individuals that do not claim to belong to any religious affiliation represent the control group. Each religion variable is interpreted as the effect that belonging to a particular group, say Catholic, relative to not belonging to any religious affiliation. We use dummy variables as well to create cohort groups within the Hispanic, African-American, Catholic, and Baptist populations.

Coefficient estimates of binary and multinomial choice models are notoriously difficult to interpret. Basically, in this application, the coefficients represent the effect that a particular characteristic (variable) has on the likelihood that an individual will select the indicated response relative to the base response, which in this application is neither agree nor disagree.

We estimate three different multinomial logit models for both policy questions, generating estimates of the effect of various individual characteristics on the likelihood that an individual will either agree with the policy statement or disagree with the policy statement relative to neither agreeing nor disagreeing. For example, in Model 1 of the “restrict imports” question, the coefficients for education indicate that the more educated the individual, the less likely the individual will agree with a policy that restricts imports and the more likely they will disagree with such policies relative to neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the policy. To visualize this effect, picture the question ranging from “agree” to “neither” to “disagree,” with all the individual responses being distributed across this range. Increasing the individual’s level of education shifts this distribution of responses from the left (agree) toward the right (toward neither or disagree).

Limiting Imports

Table 4 provides regressions estimates for three different regression models of the “limit imports” question. Model 1 includes political, demographic and economic characteristics. The results indicate that more educated the individual, the less likely the individual will agree with a policy that restricts imports and the more likely they will disagree with such policies relative to neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the policy. This result is consistent with the economics literature, indicating that the individual’s skill level is an important determinant of trade policy preferences. Given what standard trade theory concludes—that, in relatively skilled-labor abundant nations such as the

United States, trade increases the real returns to high-skilled individuals and lowers real returns to low-skilled individuals—this variable indicates a self-interest motivation.

In addition to the results for skill (education), the results indicate that non-citizens are more likely to disagree with import limitation policies, while union members are more likely to agree. Females and African-Americans are less likely to disagree, while Hispanics are less likely to agree. Individuals in the Northeast region are more likely to choose “neither agree nor disagree” than to disagree or agree with policies that restrict imports.⁹

Model 2 adds the major denominations and religiosity to Model 1. One result changes, as the New England control is no longer significant in the disagree model. This is likely due to the inclusion of the denomination controls, as New England is a predominately Catholic region as noted earlier in Table 1. In addition to the results reported above, Catholics, Baptists, and Methodists are all less likely to disagree with policies to limit imports. Those who identified with “other Christian” are more likely to agree or disagree that to respond as neither agree nor disagree.

Model 3 creates cohort groups within Model 2. Specifically, Hispanics and Catholics are divided into three groups, non-Catholic Hispanics, Catholic Hispanics, and non-Hispanic Catholics. The results indicate that it is religion that is important, as the non-Catholic Hispanic group is insignificant while Catholic Hispanics and non-Hispanic Catholics are less likely to disagree with policies that restrict imports. Likewise, African-Americans and Baptists are divided into non-Baptist African-Americans, Baptist African-Americans, and non-African-American Baptists. Again it is religion that is important as non-Baptist African-Americans is insignificant while Baptists African-Americans and non-African-American Baptists are less likely to disagree with the policy statement. Religiosity is not significant in either Model 2 or 3 indicating that it is more important to belong than believe.

Comparing and contrasting the results among models 1, 2, and 3 lead us to conclude that there is a regional effect, at least in the Northeast, and a religion effect. We also conclude that religion, rather than race or ethnicity is more important. Without controlling for religion, Hispanic and African-American variables may actually be reflecting religious affiliation effects that result from a majority of Hispanics being Catholic and African-Americans being Baptists.

Immigration

Table 5 provides the results on the question as to whether the number of immigrants into the United States should be increased or reduced. The response “neither increased nor reduced” is the base category. Model 1 indicates that

Table 4. Multinomial logit estimates for: The United States should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.

Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
Intercept	3.88* (0.63)	-1.53*** (0.80)	3.97* (0.65)	-1.07 (0.84)	3.82* (0.64)	-1.12 (0.83)
Age	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Education	-0.19* (0.03)	0.11* (0.04)	-0.19* (0.03)	0.09** (0.04)	-0.20* (0.03)	0.09** (0.04)
Political (left to right)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.02 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.04 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.04 (0.12)
Non-Citizen	-0.23 (0.43)	1.12** (0.46)	-0.22 (0.43)	1.00** (0.48)	-0.22 (0.43)	1.07* (0.47)
Female	0.02 (0.16)	-0.42** (0.21)	-0.02 (0.16)	-0.47*** (0.22)	-0.02 (0.16)	-0.47*** (0.22)
Union	0.74* (0.27)	-0.13 (0.38)	0.81* (0.27)	-0.04 (0.39)	0.80* (0.27)	-0.06 (0.39)
Hispanic	-0.74*** (0.42)	-0.55 (0.56)	-0.81*** (0.43)	-0.45 (0.57)	-0.33 (0.83)	0.37 (0.93)
Non-Catholic Hispanic						
African-American	-0.07 (0.32)	-1.74** (0.77)	-0.08 (0.33)	-1.58** (0.79)	-0.22 (0.46)	-1.72 (1.09)
Non-Baptist African-American						
Northeast	-0.42*** (0.24)	-0.56*** (0.31)	-0.43*** (0.24)	-0.48 (0.32)	-0.43*** (0.24)	-0.48 (0.32)
Midwest	-0.37 (0.23)	-0.22 (0.29)	-0.36 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.30)	-0.36 (0.24)	-0.10 (0.30)
South	0.18 (0.23)	-0.30 (0.30)	0.23 (0.24)	-0.11 (0.31)	0.25 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.31)
Catholic			0.14 (0.26)	-0.65*** (0.34)		
Hispanic					-0.83 (0.52)	-1.56*** (0.78)
All Others					0.18 (0.27)	-0.57*** (0.34)
Jewish			0.81 (0.67)	0.94 (0.73)	0.83 (0.68)	0.96 (0.73)
Baptist			0.00 (0.27)	-0.76*** (0.39)		
African-American					0.04 (0.46)	-2.23** (1.11)
All Others					-0.20 (0.29)	-0.78*** (0.40)
Methodist			0.18 (0.33)	-0.86** (0.50)	0.19 (0.34)	-0.85*** (0.50)
Lutheran			-0.08 (0.34)	-0.73 (0.47)	-0.07 (0.35)	-0.70 (0.47)
Episcopalian			-0.50 (0.51)	-0.48 (0.63)	-0.48 (0.52)	-0.47 (0.63)
Other Protestant			0.32 (0.31)	0.05 (0.39)	0.32 (0.32)	0.05 (0.39)
Other Christian			0.97** (0.53)	1.06** (0.57)	0.96** (0.53)	1.06** (0.57)
Religiosity			0.21 (0.17)	0.35 (0.24)	0.21 (0.17)	0.37 (0.23)
χ^2 (df)	188.16 (22)		220.46 (40)		222.08 (44)	
McFadden pseudo-R ²	9.0%		10.5%		10.6%	
Sample Size	1,254		1,212		1,212	

Note: * significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 10 percent; standard errors in parentheses.

Table 5. Multinomial logit estimates for: Do you think the number of immigrants to the United States nowadays should be . . .

Variable	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Increased	Decreased	Increased	Decreased	Increased	Decreased
Intercept	-0.94 (0.92)	1.73* (0.54)	-0.90 (0.95)	1.60** (0.56)	-0.86 (0.96)	1.61* (0.56)
Age	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01*** (0.01)
Education	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.14* (0.03)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.14* (0.03)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.14* (0.03)
Political (left to right)	0.09 (0.14)	0.24* (0.08)	0.11 (0.14)	0.24* (0.09)	0.11 (0.14)	0.24* (0.09)
Non-Citizen	0.27 (0.43)	-1.33* (0.37)	0.27 (0.44)	-1.31* (0.37)	0.24 (0.45)	-1.32* (0.38)
Female	-0.15 (0.24)	0.12 (0.14)	-0.18 (0.24)	0.12 (0.14)	-0.19 (0.24)	0.12 (0.14)
Union	-0.37 (0.37)	-0.22 (0.21)	-0.33 (0.37)	-0.23 (0.21)	-0.32 (0.37)	-0.22 (0.21)
Hispanic	0.39 (0.55)	-0.62 (0.43)	0.28 (0.57)	-0.57 (0.43)	-0.46 (1.12)	-0.73 (0.65)
Non-Catholic Hispanic						
African-American	0.71*** (0.42)	0.09 (0.30)	0.69 (0.45)	0.08 (0.31)	0.40 (0.64)	-0.01 (0.43)
Non-Baptist African-American						
Northeast	0.20 (0.37)	-0.20 (0.22)	0.10 (0.38)	-0.17 (0.22)	0.11 (0.38)	-0.16 (0.22)
Midwest	0.30 (0.36)	-0.19 (0.21)	0.30 (0.37)	-0.15 (0.22)	0.31 (0.37)	-0.14 (0.22)
South	0.12 (0.35)	-0.01 (0.20)	0.04 (0.37)	-0.01 (0.21)	0.03 (0.37)	-0.01 (0.21)
Catholic			0.13 (0.40)	-0.13 (0.24)		
Hispanic					0.64 (0.71)	-0.34 (0.57)
All Others					0.05 (0.41)	0.11 (0.24)
Jewish			1.24*** (0.65)	-0.25 (0.53)	1.19*** (0.65)	-0.26 (0.52)
Baptist			0.06 (0.45)	0.22 (0.26)		
African-American					0.87 (0.62)	0.37 (0.44)
All Others					-0.06 (0.47)	0.19 (0.26)
Methodist			-0.87 (0.71)	0.26 (0.31)	-0.88 (0.71)	0.26 (0.31)
Lutheran			-0.54 (0.64)	0.12 (0.32)	-0.59 (0.65)	0.11 (0.32)
Episcopalian			0.32 (0.90)	0.59 (0.53)	0.29 (0.90)	0.58 (0.53)
Other Protestant			0.27 (0.47)	0.20 (0.28)	0.25 (0.47)	0.20 (0.28)
Other Christian			0.03 (0.65)	0.21 (0.38)	0.04 (0.66)	0.21 (0.38)
Religiosity			0.38 (0.26)	-0.17 (0.15)	0.37 (0.26)	-0.17 (0.15)
χ^2 (df)	84.95 (22)		105.37 (40)		106.56 (44)	
McFadden pseudo-R ²	4.5%		5.6%		5.6%	
Sample Size	1,116		1,077		1,077	

Notes: * significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 10 percent; standard errors in parentheses.

African-Americans are more likely to prefer that the number of immigrants be increased while individuals with higher levels of skill (education) and non-citizens are less likely to prefer decreases in the number of immigrants. Individuals that identify their political ideology to the right and older individuals are more likely to prefer that the number of immigrants be reduced.

Models 2 and 3 add religious affiliation and religiosity to the base model. The results indicate that those individuals who identify themselves as Jewish are more likely to prefer that the number of immigrants be increased. The African-American effect is no longer significant. Otherwise the results of the base model hold across Model 2. The inclusion of cohort groups in Model 3 has no impact on any results.

IV. Conclusion

Significant work continues to be done examining the demographic, economic, and cultural influences that affect an individual's global-policy preferences. Somewhat lacking in the literature is a systematic study of how one's religious affiliation influences these preferences. This can easily be understood given the difficulty of incorporating religion in typical economic analysis. Nevertheless, an individual's religious affiliation is an important cultural element and, therefore, the social teaching of one's affiliation will be reflected in an individual's attitudes toward global economic issues. Hence, religious affiliation, together with other cultural elements, is an important determinant of individual attitudes toward global economic issues. The importance placed in previous literature demographic factors—such as race, ethnicity, and region—in explaining policy preferences may inadvertently be reflecting the significance of religious influences as well.

Future research should focus on the differences among and within denominations so as to better understand the relationship between a particular denomination, its social teaching on globalization, and its effect on its members. Specifically, does religion-based social teaching differ along the continuum from fundamentalist to liberal orthodoxy. An analysis of intra-denominational differences would go much farther in investigating this question than we are able to do here.

Endnotes

- 1 Alston *et al's* (1992) survey of American Economic Association members shows that the degree of consensus regarding tariffs and import quotas is second only to that on wage and price controls.
- 2 One exception is O'Rourke and Sinnott (2001), who examine individual level trade-policy preferences and

include as an explanatory variable whether the individual is Catholic or not. This approach, however, compares Catholics with a benchmark group that includes all other individuals who are affiliated with other Christian, and non-Christian faiths, as well as those with no religious affiliation at all. It is impossible, therefore to determine if the estimate reflects the importance of being Catholic, being Christian, or simply being affiliated with any faith.

- 3 Martin and Laczniak (1989), however, point out the inherent inconsistency between this position and the Bishops concerns for the development of the third world, as protecting jobs in the United States may well be at the expense of developing nations.
- 4 The Southern Baptist Convention and the Northern Baptist Convention, later renamed the American Baptist Convention originated primarily over the slavery issue.
- 5 Though the study of religion and religiosity is a relatively small part of economic research, it is widely studied in other disciplines such as sociology. This is illustrated by the fact that sociology has a journal entitled *Sociology of Religion* dedicated to this area of research. Two papers from it are, in fact, discussed in the next section.
- 6 Independent institutions in each country collected the data for the ISSP. Neither the original collectors nor the ZENTRALARCHIV bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretation presented here.
- 7 The states in each division are: New England—Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island; Middle Atlantic—New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey; East North Central—Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio; West North Central—North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri; South Atlantic—West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Delaware, Maryland; East South Central—Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi; West South Central—Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas; Mountain—Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico; and Pacific—Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, and Hawaii.
- 8 The four aggregated census regions include the following divisions: Northeast—New England and Middle Atlantic; Midwest—East North Central and West North Central; South—South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central; West—Mountain and Pacific.
- 9 Using the nine divisions as opposed to the four regions indicates that individuals in the West South Central region are more likely to agree with the position that imports should be restricted. This result holds across all three versions of the models (as do the other results reported within the text) even when controlling for

Baptists, the majority denomination in the region. Hence, there is evidence of a regional effect in addition to a religion effect.

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