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The Condition of Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy

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Review Essay:

The Condition of Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy

Steven Galt Crowell: *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning. Paths Toward Transcendental Phenomenology*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001 (Northwestern Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy) 323 pp., US-\$ 32 (paper).

By Sebastian Luft

Introduction

In this intriguing book, Steven G. Crowell takes on the challenge of situating phenomenology in contemporary philosophy. To this end, he engages with several traditions outside of, and interpretative strands within, phenomenology. The real topic of the book is seemingly Heidegger; yet it is a Heidegger who can only be understood in the rich tradition that made his originality possible, namely, Husserl and, in critical rejection, the dominant school in Germany at the time, Neo-Kantianism. In this sense, it is a book Husserl aficionados should consider as well. Crowell presents the reader with a collection of thirteen substantial articles, twelve of which have been published previously, ranging over more than a decade in which the author has worked extensively through matters pertaining to phenomenology. The chapters have been arranged into two sections: Part 1, entitled “Reconfiguring Transcendental Logic” (chapters 1–5), and Part 2, “Phenomenology and the Very Idea of Philosophy” (chapters 6–13). These section titles stand for several overarching questions that Crowell addresses that can be paraphrased as follows: ‘What constitutes phenomenology as phenomenology, i.e., as a methodology?’, ‘What are its distinguishing traits?’, and ‘Where can it contribute to discussions within current debates in the philosophical world at large, for instance in the philosophy of mind?’ The debate over phenomenology as transcendental philosophy cuts right to the core of the issue, tackling the very question regarding the preconditions of phenomenology itself as a reflective undertaking that is auto-reflexive, as a philosophical endeavor with the character of being “necessarily related back to itself.”¹ Without such a (self-)reflection on the very possibility of its own activity, phenomenology cannot claim to be a critical enterprise. If it is not critical, however (Crowell argues), it can only be pre-transcendental, naïve, realistic or (at best) mystical or “Gnostic” (cf. the introduction, 3–19).² Crowell accepts none of these options but explores, rather, what constitutes phenomenology as a *transcendental* enterprise. Crowell’s reflections

center on the question concerning *the condition of possibility of transcendental philosophy* itself, to recall a well-known book title.³

Although the chapters display some unavoidable overlap due to their previous publication, this is not perceived as redundant. Instead, there is a guiding thread visible throughout the book, and the reader is led along it nicely by following a convincing systematic order. It is as if the author has had in mind an overarching idea all along as he wrote the chapters, and putting these remotely published articles together has turned out to be a felicitous decision. This book is an important contribution to contemporary phenomenology, especially to Husserl and Heidegger scholarship, and it conveys the author's conviction of what constitutes the issues central to phenomenology for the future of this philosophical movement. Thus, the work presented in this book presents more than an exercise in exegetical interpretation, but rather a mature stance within (transcendental) phenomenology. Elements of this position are presented in an adumbration of several topics in the historical context of German philosophy of the first half of the twentieth century (in the interplay between Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology), but especially in the discussion of the infamous Husserl-Heidegger relationship. Yet, this book is more about Heidegger than Husserl (or, for that matter, anybody else from the Phenomenological Movement). It is a Heidegger, however, who is essentially seen through an Husserlian prism; who cannot be understood on his own but stands on the shoulders of giants, the largest being Husserl. If the reader will finish this book convinced of Crowell's interpretation, she will have to admit to herself that it is impossible to remain a "Husserlian" in the way some do, i.e., as opposed to the "Heideggerians."⁴ This is, in itself, a merit.⁵ Many of Crowell's issues are merely hinted at – especially in the large apparatus of footnotes, where most of the revisions and additions have been made – due to overarching interests in the story he is telling. This is certainly also due to pragmatic constraints – the book, as it stands, is a tome of over 300 pages. The abbreviated comments about phenomenology's contribution to contemporary philosophy of mind (McDowell) seem especially worthy of future development.

In the following, I will limit myself to discussing a number of (systematic and historical) issues that seem crucial to Crowell's overall standpoint. Any criticisms voiced here should be seen as questions or markers on the margins where I would be interested in hearing Crowell's response. Husserl, Heidegger, and *the Space of Meaning* is sure to spark further discussions within phenomenology and in phenomenology's conversations with other contemporary philosophical currents. It is to be hoped that these essays will not remain Crowell's last word on these issues.

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1. Phenomenology as a Transcendental Theory of Meaning

Crowell's overall claim is that phenomenology must come forth as a *transcendental* enterprise, and as such, that it is a transcendental theory of *meaning* (cf. especially chapters 3, 5, 9 and 10 et passim). Furthermore, Crowell contends, this theory has been realized in part by Husserl but has been furthered in vital respects by Heidegger and must be further developed in the light of the unfinished nature of Heidegger's own project.⁶ In so doing, however, Heidegger has in principle remained within the "space of meaning" that Husserl opened up. This presents both a systematic and an exegetical claim that is by no means a matter of course for many phenomenologists; namely systematically (a) that phenomenology needs to perform the transcendental turn in order to truly come into its own. That is, phenomenology is not merely concerned with a realistic, empirical description of phenomena that somehow are "given" without questioning *the fact that* and *the way in which* they are given. Indeed, phenomenology should clarify the conditions of possibility that make this givenness possible. Anything else would be mere "picture book phenomenology." These conditions of possibility are thus conditions of *meaning*, i.e., of how it is possible that we as conscious beings can *make sense* of that which is given (be it as *meaning-intending* or *understanding* agents). In thematizing this "space of meaning," phenomenology is *eo ipso* engaged in the project of transcendental philosophy. "To the things themselves" can only mean 'to the things as they are given as themselves, i.e., in the manner of meaning.'

Furthermore, concerning his exegetical method (b) Crowell claims that the first steps of this transcendental enterprise have been made by Husserl with the decisive achievement of the transcendental reduction. Husserl has remained, however, too caught up within a certain "Cartesianism" or "theoreticism" (or "mentalism") that renders his own achievements incomplete (69 ff.). He has, in other words, methodologically fallen short of his own accomplishments in the actual descriptive work he carried out, especially in his analyses of the lived-body and intersubjectivity. It was Heidegger who has exploited, in his own novel terminology, these phenomenological visions in the framework of his fundamental ontology of Dasein – although Heidegger himself at many occasions blatantly shunned the supposedly inadequate attempts of his mentor, Crowell interprets this more as a typical pupil's reaction against a dominant mentor. Heidegger was not able to see, or deliberately overlooked, what he owed to Husserl. Conversely, something similar can be said for Husserl as well, who surmised that Heidegger's philosophy was a complete misunderstanding of his own intentions. To Crowell, phenomenology "as it ought to be" can only be achieved in realizing that it has to be construed as

transcendental philosophy *and* as it was conceived in the horizon opened up by Husserl *and* further fleshed out by Heidegger. This is, roughly, Crowell's overall thesis.

In the following, I shall discuss the ramifications of this claim and why it is contentious. It is important to realize that it *is* a contentious claim, precisely because it is presented in such a coherent manner.⁷ The intention of Crowell's strategy, however, is clear: Counter to, e.g., Husserl's self-interpretation, phenomenology is by no means something "completely divorced" or "unique" *vis-a-vis* other philosophical tendencies of the tradition. Phenomenology will only assume its true potential when it realizes how it can *contribute*, to be sure in its own way, to modern philosophy. This requires toning down certain ambitions, on the one hand Husserl's radical claim that only transcendental phenomenology has ever entered the "promised land" of philosophy; on the other, Heidegger's belief that one should dispense with the entire tradition of Western philosophy and inaugurate a "new thinking." If there is a common denominator of what phenomenology means, Crowell seems to imply, it is rolling up one's sleeves and getting down to "the things themselves," thus remaining true to Husserl's idea of phenomenology as a genuine "working philosophy."

2. McDowell and the Status of Transcendental Philosophy

In his interesting systematic introduction, Crowell discusses several tenets of McDowell's interpretation of transcendental philosophy as presented in his influential *Mind and World*. McDowell's attempt becomes interesting for phenomenology due to Crowell's reading of phenomenology as essentially a transcendental theory of meaning. It is this focus that both Husserl's and Heidegger's philosophy share in common. The possibility of this comparison rests on the premise that what Husserl and Heidegger have thematized as "the space of meaning" is essentially the same as, or at least comparable to, what McDowell has called (with Sellars) "the space of reasons."⁸ McDowell's notion of "the unboundedness of the conceptual" means that the space of reasons has essentially no limits for us as rational animals; this is why our thought is, and must be, "answerable to the world." The world comes with, as it were, a necessary friction with our thought. If we adhere to the (Kantian) difference between mute intuitions and blind concepts, however, we end up in a situation where we lose this necessary resistance, something that McDowell calls a "frictionless spinning in the void." Crowell shows how the Neo-Kantian Emil Lask saw this dilemma already more than seventy years earlier, a dilemma that later plagues McDowell (a "neo-neo-Kantian," 6) as well: "For both [Lask and McDowell], then, epistemological dilemmas are to be overcome through the recognition that meaning spans the

traditional divide between perception and conception” (15). Yet, both end in an aporia, and this is where phenomenology joins the picture; indeed, “to work out the difficulties facing such a view requires a phenomenological perspective that remains largely absent in both” (ibid.). In other words, phenomenology challenges the (Sellarsian) claim that the “myth of the given” *is* but a myth, i.e., something that cannot be thematized and worked with philosophically.⁹ For this is precisely what phenomenology does: taking seriously *what* gives itself *in the manner in which* it gives itself is more than just a mythologeme but actually something that can be worked out in essential “regions” and in a rigorous scientific method. Givenness might be a “myth,” i.e., at first a riddle, but as such a solvable one.¹⁰

Moreover, that which gives itself is more than just brute, pure nature, but something that is “cultivated” through the human mind in its essentially meaning-bestowing activity: “Viewed through the prism of transcendental phenomenology, McDowell’s vague references to *Bildung*”¹¹ indicate just where a genuine *phenomenological* idealism [. . .] must insist on its contribution. One cannot simply posit a correlation between experience and nature, between seeing-as and seeing what-is; one must show what this sense of nature *amounts* to through an account of evidence *in* which it is given *as* nature. Here Husserl and Heidegger have provided some of the crucial tools in their reflections on the constitution of the space of meaning” (16–17). Like Rorty, McDowell, too, simply takes, and hence misunderstands, this space of meaning as an ultimate given into which one cannot further inquire. “The phenomenologist must insist, however, that *her* interest in the constitution of meaning is not anxiously motivated by a background gap between reason and nature, but precisely by a *reflective* interest in getting clear about how the space of meaning [. . .] is structured in its details” (17). Thus, the import of transcendental phenomenology is to emphasize that philosophy’s task is not finished until it has thematized, not the things in the world (the task of the positive sciences), but the way the *world itself* “reveals” itself, as Heidegger would say. It is not about clarifying worldly entities but the *worldhood of the world* itself, “worldhood” being a trait of the human “mind” itself, an *esistenziale* of *Dasein*. Thus, McDowell’s “empirical realism [. . .] must be grounded in an equally new transcendental idealism” (18). This “new idealism” is precisely Husserl’s sense of idealism as “transcendental empiricism,” i.e., an account of how things come to present themselves to conscious agents who are *a priori* (“always already”) bound up, living, in the space of meaning. The strength of phenomenology, then, is to actually flesh out these modes of givenness, not to *replace* conceptualism, but to offer “a functional concept of *intuition* to go along with the functional object

concept” (19). In this sense, phenomenology stands opposed both to Neo-Kantian constructivism (or, in Lask’s version, conceptualism) and McDowellian realism.

One could object here that it is not quite clear what exactly Crowell wants phenomenology to accomplish, i.e., what its “opposition” is supposed to denote. On the one hand, he speaks of phenomenology “conflicting” (19) with (this type of) Kantianism, and, on the other, of phenomenology supplying the necessary intuitionistic “counter-balance”¹² that Kantian “conceptualism” cannot provide. Crowell speaks here of “a functional concept of intuition *going along* with the functional object concept” (19, emphasis added), which is, I must confess, a somewhat fuzzy phrasing. Is “going along” to mean that phenomenology (as in the first case) is to *replace* conceptualism or (as in the second case) to be an *addition* to it? Both alternatives do not seem to go together well, since the first reading is *critical*, the second *conciliatory*. It seems that Crowell both wants his cake and eat it. For if I understand McDowell’s intention correctly, it is about supplanting or displacing the conceptions-intuitions distinction altogether by subsuming it into a higher “absolute idealism,” as he says, “to reject the idea that the conceptual realm has an outer boundary”.¹³ If this is correct, then, the conciliatory reading – i.e., that phenomenology can supply the essential insight into intuitions that McDowell’s position cannot allow for – does not work, since the alternative has been abandoned altogether; if, that is, one follows McDowell here. If one, however, were to take the route of the critical reading, one would have to *reject* the thesis of the “unboundedness of the conceptual” and concede that phenomenology’s domain lies with intuitions, and not concepts, thus adhering to the Kantian dichotomy that McDowell regards as a symptom (or an “exculpation”), rather than a solution to, an anxiety that has plagued philosophy since Kant. If the latter is the case, this would necessarily play into the well-known criticism that phenomenology is merely “pure description” and, hence, cannot make any critical, normative claims. Certainly this cannot be Crowell’s intention. The question, it seems, amounts to the alternative “Kant *and* Husserl” or “Kant *or* Husserl” – concepts *with* intuitions, concepts *or* intuitions? Far from being in a position to answer this question, this reviewer is still not clear on phenomenology’s actual relevance for transcendental philosophy. Many philosophers in the Kantian tradition are not convinced that they really need phenomenology, and although phenomenologists cannot accept being shunned in this way, Crowell’s arguments still, unfortunately, leave me unconvinced as to how exactly they should help phenomenology’s case. It seems that supplying this “functional concept of intuition to go along with the functional object concept” would be giving an answer to a question the very meaning of which has been shown to be altogether artificial.

3. Lask and the Neo-Kantians vs. Phenomenology

In the first part (“Reconfiguring Transcendental Logic”), Crowell deals with phenomenology’s *Auseinandersetzung* with the then-prevalent philosophical school in Germany, Neo-Kantianism. The big star of the Neo-Kantian scene is, to Crowell, Emil Lask. To be sure, he is hardly a figure that would be identified as one’s paradigmatic Neo-Kantian – judging from traditional historical presentations one would rather expect Cohen, Natorp and Cassirer for the Marburg School, Windelband and Rickert for the Southwest tendency. And, one might criticize Crowell’s focus on this single figure within Neo-Kantianism – and a very untypical one at that due to his original attempt of reconciling Kant’s critical philosophy with Aristotle’s realism. However, Lask serves a special function in Crowell’s story, as someone who had a significant influence both on Husserl (indirectly) and Heidegger and their idea of a transcendental logic¹⁴ as a methodology germane to philosophy. In this sense this focus on one figure is justified.¹⁵ Also, in connection with how Crowell engages with McDowell, it becomes clear that Crowell sees history, as it were, repeating itself in the last decades of the twentieth century. Lask’s logical “conceptualism” is presented as a version of a “proto-McDowellian” position to which phenomenology reacted between 1900 and 1920. History never repeats itself identically, for sure, but there is something in Lask and McDowell that makes them congenial as counter-weights to phenomenology’s seeming obsession with intuitionism.¹⁶ The truth lies, as always, somewhere in the middle: Phenomenology can, systematically, supply something that is “emptily intended” in “conceptualism” but that is not, and cannot be, thematized from the latter angle. Thus, the way Lask’s sketch of a “logic of philosophy” has led Heidegger (and indirectly Husserl) to work out a specifically phenomenological version of transcendental logic in a sense *anticipates* McDowell’s attempt to explain how mind and world hang together (and, like Lask, McDowell equally attempts a reconciliation of Aristotle and Kant). This also indicates how phenomenology might react to this challenge in the twenty-first century; that is, once it turns to face the challenge of contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, which has already to a large extent overcome its aversion towards “continental” philosophy. Crowell’s point is for phenomenology to step up to the plate as well, to overcome animosities present between the two camps and to get to work together on the things themselves. Concerning Lask and Neo-Kantianism, Crowell is one of the few scholars who take seriously the Neo-Kantian backdrop without which the development of phenomenology is inconceivable. Within this movement, Lask takes on a special function for the development of the *early Heidegger*. As Crowell shows in an

admirably clear way – anybody who has read Lask will conclude that he is anything but an easy author – Lask’s attempt presents an ingenious amalgamation of Aristotelian and Kantian motives into a new “transcendental logic.” The main insight is that the true distinction transcendental philosophy has to reckon with is not a Platonic dualism between real and ideal being but with that between being and validity, between what is and what *holds*, what is *valid*—a distinction that Lask takes over from Lotze’s interpretation of the Platonic forms as validities (*Geltungen*). Though Crowell ultimately sees Lask’s project as failing (51 ff., 74 ff.), it influenced the young Heidegger who was on the way to working out the *Seinsfrage* and the ontological difference between Being and the entities. The chapters in “Reconfiguring Transcendental Logic” have the aim of “making logic philosophical again,” i.e., to reconstruct phenomenology’s quest to establish a transcendental logic as a genuine methodology for philosophy itself. In this sense, Husserl *overcomes* Lask’s one-sided focus on logic by supplying a theory of transcendental subjectivity as the locus where “meaning” is actually experienced in evidence. From this point of view, Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is the necessary step that provides a space for subjectivity *without* (as this was the only alternative in Lask’s eyes) lapsing into psychologism. Heidegger essentially went the same critical path as Husserl. The point of this reading is that Heidegger’s focus on *Dasein* was equally motivated by, or not essentially distinct from, the transcendental reduction, although Heidegger would reject the term “reduction” and the ensuing transcendental vocabulary. This motivates Crowell’s reading of Heidegger as essentially occupying the same philosophical space as Husserl— that of transcendental philosophy conceived as giving an account of how the space of meaning is experienced by an experiencing agent. In both cases— Lask’s immanent problem of being unable to account for subjectivity *as well as* Husserl’s parallel attempts at drafting a transcendental logic – Lask was Heidegger’s catalyst for his own development in conjunction with, and in critique of, Husserl. The merit of these passages dealing with Lask is to highlight a figure that has received too little attention in phenomenological research.¹⁷

4. The Importance of the Early Heidegger (Against van Buren’s and Kisiel’s Readings)

Turning more to Heidegger’s philosophical development, Crowell engages critically with van Buren’s and Kisiel’s readings of Heidegger; Kisiel’s archival work being perhaps the most important source in reassessing Heidegger’s philosophical development leading up to *Sein und Zeit*. What Crowell does have in common with these scholars, however, is the acknowledgment

of the importance of the young Heidegger, i.e., as of his *Habilitationsschrift* on Scotus. Yet, while he recognizes these influences on the young Heidegger –mysticism, the “system” of Catholicism, St. Paul, Kierkegaard, Aristotle, the poets of expressionism, and whatever other influences one might detect – the main impulse, so Crowell claims, remains Husserl and his idea of philosophy as rigorous science, even if Heidegger transformed the very meaning of “rigorous science.” Or to say it differently, there can be no doubt concerning these other influences – after all, Heidegger was a remarkably erudite intellectual and well-versed in the cultural currents of his time. However, concerning the question of “what made Heidegger the classical Heidegger,” i.e., the founder of the fundamental ontology of *Dasein* and the author of *Sein und Zeit*, there can be no doubt that it was Husserl who, as Heidegger later confessed, “placed eyes in his sockets”—a clear reference to the phenomenological style of philosophizing. The question, hence, amounts to nothing other than that of who or what the “real Heidegger” really consists in. This emphasis on Husserl is clearly a critical reevaluation of van Buren’s and Kisiel’s work. It is especially Kisiel’s reading that Crowell takes issue with.

According to Crowell, one can distinguish two main tendencies in Heidegger, one “mystical” (in the attempt to “eff the ineffable,” 7), the other is “the Heidegger who is concerned with the reflexive issue of the possibility of philosophy itself, the Heidegger who constantly chastises other thinkers for not being rigorous enough, for succumbing to metaphysical prejudice and losing sight of the things themselves” (7). Both readings are incompatible or at least conflicting, to Crowell. The “mystical” reading, especially van Buren’s, is influenced mainly by Derrida and generally by postmodernism and Crowell rejects it rather quickly,¹⁸ while Kisiel’s work receives more attention. Although in the end this reading amounts to a similar “mysticism,” it is more focused on Heidegger’s concern with the “pretheoretical origins of meaning” (117) due to Heidegger’s (in Kisiel’s words) “BCD methodology”— biography, chronology, doxography (117). While Kisiel is applauded as the first one to really shed light on the textual situation of Heidegger’s early writings – something completely obfuscated in the philologically insufficient *Gesamtausgabe*—his interpretation does not withstand close scrutiny. Kisiel focuses especially on the aspect of “life itself”—oftentimes emphasizing a favorite phrase of the early Heidegger which also Gadamer called attention to: “*es weltet*,” “it worlds” – a pre-theoretical “structure” that escapes any direct reflection. All that philosophy can do is to “repeat” this pre-theoretical life and thereby perform a “belated” (*nachträglich*) “illumination” (a term reminiscent of Jaspers’ notion of philosophy as “*Existenzerhellung*”).

Against this interpretation Crowell argues that this “comportment” of repetition is itself nothing but *reflection*. This is in line with Crowell’s overall reading of Heidegger according to which Heidegger implicitly takes over Husserl’s concept of philosophy as a *reflective* activity, something that (in Husserl’s words) runs counter to the “world-infatuated” tendency of the natural attitude. Crowell thus reads these passages that Kisiel quotes for his cause, in the completely opposite direction; he asserts, “Heidegger all along follows Husserl’s view that philosophical cognition, phenomenology, is not an objective theory but ‘clarification,’ a kind of comportment that works by methodologically exploiting the ‘turning back upon itself’ implicit in life’s own course. Repetition *is* ‘reflection’.” (126). This is possible because, to Heidegger, *Dasein* is essentially reflective and can reflect upon itself because it intrinsically *is* philosophical.¹⁹ Although this disagreement with Kisiel presents seemingly “mere quibbles” (128), I would want to insist that this does indeed confront us with the decisive question of how to read Heidegger’s philosophical project as a whole. Is Heidegger, simply put, a “mystic” or a “rigorous scientist”? Although Crowell clearly argues in favor of the latter alternative, I would suggest that his reading is somewhat of a (perhaps deliberate) over-emphasis and that the truth lies somewhere in the middle.

Crowell reads, it seems, the early Heidegger backward from the finished end product, i.e., the “systematic” presentation of 1927. Curiously enough, he almost completely ignores those passages that made *Sein und Zeit* so famous as to produce such a “detonation” (Gadamer) in the cultural landscape of its time. Namely, those passages where Heidegger speaks of a “destruction of Western metaphysics” and there is plenty of polemics against philosophy as “rigorous science” and calls for an “overturning of traditional ontology.”²⁰ Perhaps Crowell’s reading might in the end be *too* conciliatory with regard to his relation to Husserl and the rest of the tradition. When Crowell focuses on the early Heidegger himself, one is reminded, by contrast, of the interpretation that Gadamer has always insisted upon, namely, that *Sein und Zeit* was an *aberration* from Heidegger’s early intentions that were, in effect, more held in awe by the “event” (*Ereignis*) character of the world.²¹ To Gadamer, the *Kehre* was nothing but a *Rückkehr*, a return to Heidegger’s early intentions that were temporarily suppressed in *Sein und Zeit*, in which he was influenced by Husserl and transcendental philosophy in its systematizing tendency in Neo-Kantianism (after all, Heidegger was in Marburg at the time when he wrote *Sein und Zeit*). While I am convinced by Crowell’s interpretations of the crucial passages, there still is more “subversiveness” in Heidegger (even in the published work) than Crowell seems to want to allow for. Hence, the opposition in interpretation perhaps ought not to

be as strong as Crowell himself makes it, i.e., between a “mystical” and a “rigorous scientific” Heidegger. Maybe one can accommodate both tendencies if one does not make them out to be such strong oppositions, and this seems fairer to Heidegger’s (partly also obscure) intentions in his early years. Perhaps one has to acknowledge that Heidegger was more “underway” and searching and, hence, vacillating between seemingly attractive tendencies, rather than to hold him to one position from the very start. The picture we would get, then, would be more of an ingenious and creative but searching philosopher who is still trying on different sets of clothes, and in the end creates an altogether new fashion, consisting of different traditional styles, thus better reflecting the unfinished nature of the published fragment of 1927. In the end to be fair, one should point out that a sound Heidegger interpretation is not Crowell’s interest. Rather, it is about “thinking with Heidegger against Heidegger, [so as to] reappropriate the potential of some of those fecund impulses from the phenomenological decade’s research into the space of meaning” (128).²²

5. The Husserl-Heidegger Relationship

The claim that Husserl and Heidegger are in principle working on the same phenomenological project surely must raise eyebrows both on the side of “Husserlians” as well as “Heideggerians.” Before discussing the arguments for this thesis, one might take a step back and ask what is *gained* by such a harmonizing reading. Could it be that it is overly conciliatory and, as such, so general that it reduces both Husserl and Heidegger to merely watered-down travesties of their own attempts? This is what staunch representatives of either “camp” might maintain. If Husserl and Heidegger both (as is known from their respective correspondences with other parties) so vehemently insisted on the *originality* of their respective positions and, henceforth, on the incompatibility with the other’s standpoint, what sense can it make to synthesize them *postfactum*? Would we today not be better off realizing what is strong in both positions and leave the question of what they have in common completely aside? Why not follow Husserl’s and Heidegger’s *own* instructions here? So, again, what can be gained in such a reading?

To begin with, such a reading is not new. It has been proposed early on (as Crowell also notes) by figures such as Oskar Becker (who worked in intimate proximity to both Husserl and Heidegger) and has been emphasized again, famously, by scholars such as Tugendhat, Gethmann and Bernasconi; and Crowell, in going along with this reading, wants to exploit the positive elements to be harvested from this line of thought. But what is more troublesome to

Crowell is the “clannish” behavior that has been displayed by representatives of both “camps” in the past. By the 1980s, great strides were made in both editions, thus giving the scholarly public a much more differentiated picture of both philosophical projects as they began to unfold, in the case of Husserl, essentially between 1900 and 1913 and then again as of the 20s, and, in the case of Heidegger, between 1919 and 1929.²³ Both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s developments can now be seen in a much clearer light. The possibility of insight into the respective “workshops,” however, also facilitated a certain “specialization” on both sides of research that seemed to widen the gap between both. Hence the situation of “Husserlians” versus “Heideggerians.” If, Crowell contends, phenomenology continues to quarrel over these petty issues, then it will not be able to make any serious progress in the “things themselves.” It will remain caught up in futile infighting instead of thinking about what makes phenomenology a specific philosophy in its own right, so as to bring it back into the arena of contemporary philosophical discussions. Should this “conciliatory” move in the end be motivated by politics? It is to be sure; but it is more than just that. Crowell presents several arguments for the claim that Husserl and Heidegger are essentially working on the same project of transcendental phenomenology. In order to validate this claim, however, both are interpreted in a way that is provocative to both sides of the divide. To begin with, what exactly is the claim when emphasizing the commonalities between both thinkers? What does one mean with Husserl’s alleged *influence* on Heidegger – or vice versa? For it is something quite different to say (a) that Heidegger has been decisively influenced by Husserl so as to develop his own philosophy as fundamental ontology (hardly anything contentious), and (b) that Heidegger has been influenced by Husserl, but in away that he *transformed* his teacher’s original scope so as to make it *incompatible* with Husserl’s original framework. The second alternative is the story one oftentimes hears from both camps, the argument being, essentially, that Heidegger rejected the reduction and the transcendental turn. Since Crowell is clearly aware of these alternatives, his suggestion certainly is not a naïve rephrasing of either thesis. So what exactly is his claim? One has yet to be more precise: What does one mean by “transformation”? Is Heidegger’s transformation of Husserl such that it renders Husserl’s version obsolete, that it is but one rung on the ladder to true phenomenology (or “thinking”) that has been sublated? Or is it rather a move that transforms Husserl’s intentions in such a way so as to bring to full fruition Husserl’s own darkly anticipated intentions? It is, I believe, the latter that Crowell claims. This reading makes it possible to see Heidegger as operating within the transcendental field that Husserl has

opened up through the reduction, and yet see Heidegger's achievements, as radical as they maybe, as further refining and ameliorating the house that Husserl had built.²⁴

Criticisms of Husserl are thus internal suggestions for solving problems that Husserl had left unanswered. At the same time, this implies that Heidegger took over main tenets of his teacher, most importantly the phenomenological reduction. The form that the reduction takes in Heidegger is a reflective move that *Dasein*, as a being essentially capable of philosophizing, performs in order to become clear about its own being. As an intrinsically *understanding* being, it reflects upon its own conditions of understanding by doing philosophy. This justifies, for Crowell, the claim that Heidegger goes along with both the reduction and the transcendental turn. Now it seems that this interpretation would satisfy neither Husserlians nor Heideggerians. Do not Husserlians insist that Heidegger rejects the epoché, i.e., that he, in the first place, is critical of the whole concept of the natural attitude as a necessary precondition for performing the epoché? Did not Heidegger insinuate that the natural attitude was a "theoretical construct" produced by the "unparticipating observer," that he had mocked as a mere "gaping" at the world and hence not understanding it primarily as a practical world of meaning in which we are engaged "always already"? It would take too much space here to sort these issues out, and I think Crowell does an excellent job at doing so. Yet the bottom line is that Crowell's interest lies, again, not in doing justice to either interpretatively: "It thus becomes possible to project a significant rapprochement between Husserl and Heidegger, one that leaves neither totally unrevised" (181). The rapprochement consists in utilizing both attempts as attempts of grasping the space of meaning as the theme of transcendental phenomenology. We can thus, with Husserl and Heidegger, retain a sense of the phenomenological reduction if we realize that it needn't be such a fundamental break with the natural attitude, but rather a reflective move that is already prefigured in *Dasein's* everyday life itself, a tendency that merely has to be grasped and made explicit. This step overcomes Husserl's unresolved issue of how it becomes possible to distance oneself from the natural attitude. That which would become thematized, hence, would not be a "transcendental field" opposed to that of the natural attitude, but merely a different ("strange") look at that which we "always already" do and are when we exist. Doing transcendental phenomenology would amount to thematizing how meaning unfolds in our everyday life, meaning that we usually take for granted, but which is something that in fact reveals itself to us in a certain genesis when we exist in the world with others and in a certain tradition. This would be, it seems, a way of reappropriating motives from Husserl's genetic phase. This means reinterpreting the reduction in a way that one meets both thinkers half-way:

The reduction is a reflective move within life, not a radical break with the natural attitude, and it would remain a transcendental operation in that it, in this methodological move, reflects upon the conditions of possibility of this being-in-the-world as a world of meaning that we always already understand. In this way, Crowell nudges both thinkers in a direction that eliminates the explosive potential in both. Apart from methodological issues, Crowell delves into the actual subject matter of phenomenology. In short, is phenomenology a theory of cognition or an analysis of how *Dasein* exists in the world – i.e., is phenomenology epistemology or ontology? Crowell discusses this issue in the context of Husserl's and Heidegger's (failed) collaboration on the *Encyclopedia Britannica* article. Heidegger here takes issue with the unclarified nature of the transcendental subject's being. This subject, to Husserl, is not *in* the world but *constitutes* it. Hence, it cannot exist like beings in the world but yet must "be" something. Husserl's "answer" to this question is, indeed, not really an answer at all; namely he retorts with the infamous problem of the "paradox of subjectivity" as being at the same time an object *in* the world and a subject *for* the world. To be fair to Husserl, one should insist that it is a paradox only as long as one has not realized the radical change of attitude that the reduction brings about. In other words, the paradox arises when one realizes that one can view the same "entity" from both the natural and the philosophical perspective, and through this realization the paradox dissolves. This, however, does not really further the issue. Heidegger's pressing Husserl on the question of the "mode of being of the transcendental ego" must be, so Crowell contends, perceived as putting further pressure on Husserl to clarify the issue. If I understand Crowell's point correctly, Heidegger seems to want to convey to Husserl that precisely through the reduction to a world-constituting subjectivity Husserl has unknowingly envisioned what is, to Heidegger, *the* big discovery, namely that the manner of being of the human subject is radically different from any other inner worldly being. Heidegger's point would be, then, not to reject the paradox but to bring it to full fruition. Husserl, as so often, had the ground-breaking insight, but was not able to embrace it fully. From this perspective, Heidegger's framing of the human subject as *Dasein* is but a consistent development from Husserl's own insight. Transcendental phenomenology thus moves from an epistemology of subjectivity (fixated on "theoretical intentionality," 202) to an ontology of *Dasein* as a fundamental discipline that thematizes *Dasein* in the uniqueness of its being, as opposed to *vorhanden* and *zuhanden* entities in the world. *Vorhanden* and *zuhanden* are modes of being of those things that *Dasein* discovers and deals with – in Husserl's terminology, constitutes. Again, whether this reading will satisfy members of either camp remains to be seen. The question comes down to that of whether either parties will accept the

move “from epistemology to ontology.” Husserlians might object (as Husserl himself has complained bitterly²⁵) that it would be a misunderstanding to think that Husserl merely analyzed theoretical, intellectual acts and not willing, valuing etc. acts as well. In this light, epistemology is, to be sure, about “knowing” the world, yet in a broad manner. In this light, the question “epistemology or ontology?” would be a mere quarrel over words. Followers of Heidegger, on the other hand, might object that the shift to ontology is about more than just labeling Heidegger’s own attempt in opposition to traditional terminology. It is, rather, about a whole new style of thinking that does away with the entire problematic ontology of Western philosophy. Even bringing him into the proximity of Husserl would be selling Heidegger’s true intentions short. There are certainly passages in Heidegger’s oeuvre that would support this reading as well. This issue cannot be decided here, and it surely will remain a quarrel over which both parties will fight as long as they will remain “camps.” However, Crowell points to fruitful paths as to how one can exploit the best in both thinkers to move to a richer phenomenological account of the space of meaning. Whether members of either camp will be willing to join the arena, and hence to tone down some radicalities on either side, will be up to them. At the very least, the passages where Crowell discusses the relationship between Husserl and Heidegger show why this debate is such an exciting issue not only for phenomenologists, but for philosophers in general who want to reconstruct the development of Western philosophy in the twentieth century.

6. The Problem of (Dis)Continuity Between Life, Science and Philosophy

Next I will address one systematic issue that concerns especially the self definition of phenomenology, esp. in its dispute with the Neo-Kantians over the very role of philosophy. Crowell initially argues in favor of phenomenology but runs into a new difficulty. The issue concerns what Crowell terms the “continuity thesis” (75). It is, essentially, about the question concerning the *status* of philosophy in general, or its *locus vis-a-vis* other “intellectual” endeavors. Here, phenomenology takes a radically different position than the Neo-Kantians who (supposedly) adhere to the continuity thesis. What is this thesis about? It states that philosophy stands in one line with the attempts of the positive sciences and that there is an essential continuity between sciences and philosophy. This idea can be derived from one of the main tenets of Neo-Kantianism (esp. the Marburg school), namely the transcendental method of construction. The world as we know it – and this is all we can address after the transcendental turn – becomes constructed through subjective activities that in different modes constitute reality for us. This begins with primitive acts (speaking, gesturing etc.) but continues with “higher order”

activities such as positive sciences and, furthermore, other cultural activities. In this vein, philosophy does essentially nothing different; it continues to construct reality and its specific task is to interpret the doings of the entirety of constructive human activities.²⁶ This is why, e.g. to Cassirer, the critique of reason must turn into the critique of *culture*. Culture is the overarching term for all constructive activities of mankind. Since philosophy itself reflects critically upon the entirety of these constructions (in the different spaces of meaning that Cassirer calls “symbolic forms”), it clarifies how all of these activities melt into an overarching world view (*Weltanschauung*). That is, philosophy itself contributes to and itself articulates this world view and is nothing divorced from it. Against this, phenomenology emphasizes philosophy’s radical *difference* or *discontinuity* with all other positive disciplines. The motive for this lies in Husserl’s ideal of rigorous, i.e., eidetic science in its break with the natural attitude.²⁷ To Husserl, doing philosophical eidetics *necessitates* the break with the straight-forward life of the natural attitude. Philosophy, in this sense, is about establishing supra-temporal truths and ought not to be a “commentary” on the state of the current society or (scientific) community. For, if one were to conceive of philosophy in this way as merely factoring into a world view, one would end up in naturalism as well as historicism. Philosophy would be naturalistic because it applies worldly (“natural”) categories to something that is radically different, i.e., the space of meaning, which is a transcendental concept. And moreover, philosophy would be historicistic, because it is not dealing with eidetic truths but (seemingly) reduces philosophy to articulating the contingent beliefs of a contingent cultural setting at a certain time. “The philosophical significance of the space of meaning,” Crowell thus writes, “can be appreciated only by bracketing the naturalistic assumptions underpinning the idea of such a continuity” (75). A philosophy that subscribes to the “discontinuity thesis,” like Crowell believes phenomenology must, holds that the space where philosophy dwells has to be *radically different* from all worldly activities, as it articulates what makes these very activities *possible*. The space of meaning can never be thematized by remaining *within the world*, but only by breaking with the naïve prejudices of worldly existence, with what Husserl called the *general thesis of the natural attitude*. This is why, to Crowell, truly doing philosophy involves performing the reduction. The philosophical attitude must be radically different from any comportment within the natural attitude. It is inconceivable from here, however, how philosophy could have any practical consequences –even if one wants this, like Husserl. The issue thus comes down to the general question whether or not philosophy can or ought to have anything concrete to say within the life-world, have any *influence* on it, or impinge upon it. Discontinuous philosophy hence cannot

(want to) do this, for then it would, *nolens volens*, contribute to the formation of world views. To say it with Husserl's famous phrase in the *Cartesian Meditations*, philosophy can only *explicate* a sense that it can *never alter*. Although only the break with the natural attitude enables a thematization of the space of meaning, philosophy will forever be unable to *contribute* to it or *act within* it; it forever remains "beyond" (*jenseits*) the life-world. It can, hence, never close the gap it itself has opened. It is these issues that especially Husserl (and Fink) clearly saw and wrestled with, chiefly in the late texts concerning the self-enworlding of the transcendental subject.

First off, one can challenge Crowell's view by questioning that especially Husserl was ever content with this radical discontinuity.²⁸ Particularly when spelled out in the context of politics, such a conclusion must make one queasy. Husserl in some late manuscripts (after 1933!) himself questioned his own earlier assumption of an "unparticipating observer" and speaks of the phenomenologist as performing a "continuing constitution" (*Fortkonstitution*) of the world through her very activities as a philosopher.²⁹ Although this raises further unsolved problems that cannot be discussed here, one should at the very least mention that Husserl himself moved beyond this idea of a radical discontinuity, or at least questioned it throughout. I do not point this out as a lack in Crowell's presentation of Husserl but rather as a genuine problem that Husserl saw and that drove him to continually rethink this "discontinuity thesis" that is implied in the radical break through the reduction. Thus, while Husserl never ceased to emphasize the radical difference of the performance of phenomenology, he was not, and could not be, happy with the possible consequences of this discontinuity.

Further, concerning Heidegger and his being equally an advocate of transcendental phenomenology – of the discontinuity thesis thus – one can ask whether or not this is a just adjudication. This question arises precisely through the interpretation that Crowell presents. It would seem that Heidegger would equally have to subscribe to philosophy's status as different from the positive sciences, and there are plenty of passages where Heidegger speaks of philosophy as not being *scientific* and in general as "different" from the sciences. Yet, Crowell's whole interpretation of the grand achievement of the early Heidegger highlights the aspect of philosophy being nothing but the self-articulation of life that life itself always already carries out and that it only has to make explicit. Crowell quotes Heidegger (GA 61, p. 88) as saying that philosophical categories are "nothing invented, no 'framework' or independent society of logical schemata. They have their own mode of access which, however, is not such as would be foreign to life itself, imposed upon it arbitrarily from without, but is just the eminent way in which *life comes to itself*." Crowell concludes in a Novalis-esque gesture: "Philosophy is not a theory

about life but life's own homecoming" (145).³⁰ Later he writes: "The difference between life oriented towards entities *through* meaning and philosophy oriented toward meaning (being) *as* meaning must be seen as the difference between naïve and reflective life." (146). But, one would have to conclude, they are both forms of *life*. Now, if I am not mistaken, all of this speaks *against* the discontinuity thesis of which Heidegger, too, is supposed to be an advocate. In fact, it speaks for the very opposite: In order for philosophy to be "life's own homecoming," there *must be*, it seems to me, a fundamental continuity between ordinary life and philosophy. If this is the case, philosophy *must be* essentially isomorphic or continuous with the very movement of life itself. So do we not have a contradiction here? Maybe one way to resolve this issue would be to ask *what* the discontinuity is with. Could one say that Crowell's point is that philosophy must be *discontinuous* with the sciences but *continuous* with pre-theoretical life? Is the point similar to Husserl's in the *Crisis*, namely that the sciences, due to their idealizations, are responsible for a certain *alienation* with the life-world, whereas philosophy must pay heed to this life-world precisely in its pre-theoretical status? Phenomenology, in reminding of us of the life-worldly basis of any human activity, thus counteracts the idealizing tendency of the positive sciences. But Husserl has a slightly more complicated story. He would never say that the sciences themselves are discontinuous with natural life on the one hand and philosophy on the other. The sciences merely articulate the pre-theoretical curiosity and prescientific tendencies of natural life, like the practical activities of the land-measurer (the geometer), only to elevate them to a level of methodological rigor (e.g., abstract geometry). And in this sense, there is (ideally – not in times of crises) a further continuity between science and philosophy as well, as philosophy is but a higher-order reflection, regardless of the fact that doing philosophy, and eventually phenomenology, requires a methodological radicality that ultimately *questions* all prejudices of the natural attitude. Philosophical inquiry must have its seeds in the natural attitude; otherwise there would be no possibility to overcome the natural attitude. In this sense, Husserl shows us a way to *integrate* life, science and philosophy, whereas Heidegger does not really tell us a story of how the sciences fit into the picture while, in general, *also* adhering to the continuity thesis with respect to life and philosophy.³¹ Perhaps this is too general a way to rephrase Crowell's point, but when spelled out it essentially comes down to this assessment.

Thus it seems that both Husserl and Heidegger are more prone to be on the side of the "continuity thesis" than Crowell wants to allow for when he stresses the difference between phenomenology and the Neo-Kantians. To be sure, both Husserl and Heidegger vigorously attack the idea of philosophy as contributing to world views (and the concomitant naturalism and

historicism). But could it not be, rather, that the whole impulse of both Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity and Husserl's analyses of the life-world is about restoring a *healthy* continuity between life and philosophy, life and thought; to reconcile this very problem of the *danger* of discontinuity by giving continuity a new meaning? This would seem to me a more just presentation of their specifically phenomenological attempts, and I do not think that Crowell would disagree with this assessment. His own argument for the discontinuity thesis, however, seems to run counter to his own intentions in reading Husserl and Heidegger as articulating the space of meaning, a space of which the sciences, too, are a part. To be sure, the situation of philosophy, especially today, is such that it is endangered by all kinds of disciplines impinging on its original domains, such as sociology, anthropology, linguistics, etc. Insisting on the "special status" of philosophy has, for good reasons, been a major concern for philosophers (especially, but not exclusively) in the transcendental tradition. However, one part of the self-assertion of philosophy, it seems to me, depends upon telling a convincing story about how philosophy itself comes into being in and through the pre-theoretical life-world, something which both Husserl and Heidegger obviously do an exceptionally good job at explaining. However, if this is done at the risk of losing what makes philosophy special, one does end up with a problem. In the end, it seems one is left with the option of allowing for this to happen (of actually *considering* it a problem), and hence giving up some of the "aloofness" of philosophy (something that would be of less concern for some more "grounded" philosophers), *or* of fighting to retain this distance.

7. Gnostic Phenomenology (Fink vs. Husserl)

In conclusion, I want to mention the interesting last article in this collection, which deals with Fink's attempt at drafting a transcendental theory of method in the Husserlian framework (of the *Meditations*). This important text (the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*) still has not received the attention it deserves, i.e., in reassessing the scope and limits of transcendental phenomenology. Many phenomenologists still either ignore it or dismiss it all too light-handedly. While Crowell in the end rejects Fink's attempts as well (not surprisingly given his overall reading of transcendental phenomenology), he nevertheless sees the "Sixth" as a serious challenge that needs to be addressed by anyone subscribing to transcendental phenomenology. Crowell articulates his uneasiness (reading the "Sixth" had "a chilling effect," 244) and takes a critical stance. As is known, the Sixth Meditation experienced its first reception in France (through Merleau-Ponty), and Crowell reads Fink essentially as a Postmodernist (Fink at times sounds like a "parody of Derrida," 244). The issue that interests Crowell most is the question of

phenomenology as metaphysics, and he is skeptical about Fink's project that he terms "Gnostic phenomenology." As Zahavi has rightly pointed out, Crowell does not advocate a wholesale rejection of the project of a phenomenological metaphysics altogether; rather, the way phenomenology does metaphysics must be different from "straightforward" versions as known in the philosophical tradition.³² The problem is where Fink is *headed* with his "critique of transcendental reason." Namely, in steering transcendental phenomenology to Hegelianism (246), Fink lapses back into a stance that Husserlian transcendental phenomenology has already overcome. Fink ends up undoing the Copernican turn, and this is what makes it, to Crowell, "Gnostic."

Crowell traces this Gnosticism in several aspects of Fink's draft. Presumably under the influence of Heidegger, Fink presses Husserl on the issue of the status of being or rather "pre-being" of the transcendental field. Since it cannot "be" in the sense of the "positive," it must be – as this seems the only alternative – a non-being (*me-on*). Crowell keenly picks up on the problem that follows from this move. If the transcendental cannot "be," how is it supposed to be experienced? Is this not a frontal attack on phenomenology's ideal of intuition? Crowell writes: "Are not all reflective acts, as acts, bound up in the stream of constituting subjectivity – and thus to the extent that the onlooker 'looks' on, is this not also a reflective act in which objectivities of some sort are constituted?" (253) This points back to the problem discussed in the previous section: It is precisely this Finkian consequence of phenomenology as "meontology" that makes Husserl question the discontinuity thesis. The unparticipating onlooker, though having broken with the natural attitude, continues to constitute through her "phenomenologizing" acts. The transcendental is not a new (me-)ontological sphere; rather, it is nothing but the world as it is viewed from the *philosophical* attitude. It is a reflective move anyone can take when reflecting on the space of meaning itself. Were this not the case, then these discoveries could not be communicated between human beings. In Fink's story, the onlooker is a certain privileged "spin off" of transcendental subjectivity (prior to its individuation), who forms a "hermetic doctrine" (252) that cannot be communicated with other individuals living in the natural attitude. Hence, Fink moves phenomenology into a new sphere, namely *constructive* phenomenology that deliberately "abandons the basis of transcendental 'givenness,' and no longer exhibits things *intuitively*" (*Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, p. 5, quoted by Crowell, 254). Fink's point is, of course, that this move is necessary for phenomenology to truly come into its own. Phenomenology must move from a "regressive" to a "constructive" stage. In so doing, however, one not only gives up phenomenology's main tenet of intuition but also dispenses with the Copernican turn. Crowell

discusses a number of examples where Fink runs into problems, and shows how Fink essentially gets caught up in problems similar to the antinomies that Kant already overcame (e.g., the question of birth and death of transcendental life, which turns out to be a pseudo-problem). He concludes: “The critical solution is thus wholly diagnostic, showing why we must reject the temptation to move from intuitability to nonintuitability” (257). In other words, if phenomenology wants to become metaphysical, it cannot do this in the way of constructive phenomenology. Moving beyond the sphere of intuition means moving outside the dimension of that which is phenomenologically accessible. In a McDowellian vein, Crowell states: “[T]he very idea of an external horizon to what is revealed in the reduction makes no sense.” (258) While Crowell rejects *this* attempt of a phenomenological metaphysics, he leaves it open as to exactly *how* such a metaphysics should have to be accomplished. I look forward to hearing Crowell’s positive account of this issue.

This last essay sums up Crowell’s argument for why phenomenology must “come forth” as rigorous scientific, transcendental philosophy. Phenomenology must embrace the Copernican revolution; Fink’s phenomenology of phenomenology “ought to teach us that the desire to go beyond [the Copernican turn] is a mistake.” (263) It is clear, however, that Crowell thinks that Fink’s attempt is nothing to be dismissed easily; it seems a tempting path, but is, in truth, a slippery slope.³³

These are just the most prominent issues in an otherwise remarkable and inspiring book. Hopefully the points made in this review are more than “mere quibbles,” but instead raise questions and concerns in an ongoing discussion in phenomenology. While I cannot do justice to all aspects of Crowell’s work here, it should be clear that *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning* is an intellectual treat that deserves to be taken seriously by phenomenologists and other sympathetic philosophers. More than anything else, Crowell’s work is a motivation to continue with phenomenology, its genuine problems and still open fields of research as they have been inaugurated by Husserl and furthered by Heidegger. A challenging and not always easy, but in the end rewarding read.³⁴

Notes

1. Cf. Hua. III/1, p. 137.
2. Simple numbers refer to the pages of Crowell’s book.

3. Cf. Thomas Seebohm, *Die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Transzendental-Philosophie. Edmund Husserls tranzendental-phänomenologischer Ansatz, dargestellt im Anschluß an seine Kant-Kritik*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1962.

4. The Husserl-Heidegger relationship has received heightened attention again in the last years, as witnessed, e.g., by the books by Lilian Alweiss (*The World Unclaimed. A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl*, Athens: Ohio U Press, 2003) and Soren Overgaard (*Husserl and Heidegger On Being in the World*, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 2004).

5. Although there can be no doubt about the author's superb grasp on Husserl's philosophy (the early works as well as the later material), he hardly draws from sources other than the major published works. While it would not have changed the overall, and I think correct, reading of Husserl, it would have been welcomed if he had included other material from the manuscript material – especially from the intersubjectivity volumes and the lectures on transcendental logic from the 1920s.

6. That is, Crowell essentially disregards the Heidegger after the *Kehre*–Heidegger's strength remains in him being a philosopher in the transcendental tradition.

7. Dan Zahavi in his review ("Mind, Meaning, and Metaphysics," in: *Continental Philosophy Review* 36, 2003, pp. 325–334) agrees that Crowell's reading, although more focused on Heidegger, is "by and large correct" (p. 333). Yet, the "real hero" (p. 326) is Husserl. I shall again refer to Zahavi's review below.

8. Cf. John McDowell, *Mind and World*, Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University, 1996, pp. 14–15 et passim, and Crowell, op. cit., pp. 12–19. Although Crowell does not directly *identify* space of reasons and space of meaning, I take it that he wants to bring them into an essential connection. Consider, e.g., the quotation from p. 15 that I cite above. One might interject here that the claim of the compatibility between both "spaces" is questionable. To McDowell, "reasons" refers to justifications of inferences; whereas "meaning" seems to denote a pre-theoretical sphere of signification (I owe this point to Michael Shim). I cannot discuss this problem here and proceed with the assumption that Crowell's comparison is correct.

9. On this topic, cf. also G. Soffer's insightful article "Revisiting the Myth: Husserl and Sellars on the Given," in: *The Review of Metaphysics*, Dec. 2003 (57/2), pp. 301–337. The point that Soffer makes is that Sellars's definition of "the given" actually does not pertain to Husserl's concept of *Gegebenheit*.

10. As Husserl says: Unsolvable riddles are nonsense (*“Unlösbar Rättsel sind Widersinn.”*).

11. Cf. *Mind and World*, op. cit., p. 84 and Lecture IV, passim.

12. This is my term, not Crowell's.

13. *Mind and World*, op. cit., p. 44. It is thus not, in McDowell, about *foregoing* transcendental idealism, i.e., going back to the ancient pre-transcendental realism (Aristotle) but about a new absolute idealism that can account for the true “reality” that we encounter.

14. Although Heidegger was clearly influenced by Lask, Crowell shows how Husserl's knowledge of Lask did not go beyond acknowledging the general admiration people displayed for this young genius who died in the trenches of World-War I. Crowell's point is rather that Lask was in the throws of working out an interesting reinterpretation of transcendental logic that was also attempted by Husserl a decade later in the framework of his *genetic* phenomenology.

15. To be fair, one should say that Crowell deals with the entire Neo-Kantian tradition in an overview in chapter 1.

16. The same point – the similarity between McDowell the Neo-Kantian attempts – has been made by Michael Friedman in his response to McDowell, cf. “Exorcising the Philosophical Tradition,” in: *Reading McDowell. On Mind and World* (ed. by Nicholas H. Smith, London/New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 25–57, here pp. 38–41). Surprisingly, McDowell's laconic rejoinder to Friedman's remark in what he calls an “uncharacteristically hasty reading of my book” (ibid., p. 274) is: “This too makes no contact with my thinking” (p. 272).

17. While Lask is certainly known in the German-speaking Neo-Kantian as well as phenomenological circles, he is virtually unknown in North America. His original books are out of print and have not been translated into English.

18. Crowell deals with van Buren's reading mainly in his introduction, pp. 7–12.

19. Husserl uses similar phrases in his manuscripts when he speaks, e.g., of philosophizing as an essential “possibility” of the human being, or of the natural attitude as a “mode of transcendental subjectivity.” Cf. Hua. XXXIV, p. 148 (and the whole text no. 8).

20. Accordingly, Crowell also dismisses the idea that Heidegger was an existentialist in any shape or form. Certainly Heidegger *was* no existentialist, but his rhetoric is soaked with existentialist vocabulary (anxiety, moods etc.), a stylistic device that he, arguably, employed deliberately. *Hony soit qui mal y pense!*

21. Gadamer presents his reading of the Husserl-Heidegger relationship in several essays, most importantly “Die phänomenologische Bewegung,” in: *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 3, *Neuere Philosophie I, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger*, Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1987, pp. 105–146, esp. pp. 120 ff. On his reading of Heidegger, which I am summarizing above, cf. the essays on Heidegger in the said volume, esp. “Der eine Weg Martin Heideggers,” *ibid.*, pp. 417–430, esp. pp. 423 ff.

22. Crowell follows Kisiel’s coinage, who calls the decade from 1919 (the *Kriegsnotsemester* lecture) to 1929 (the *Kantbuch*) Heidegger’s “phenomenological decade,” when he coins the term “metaphysical decade” for the years following Heidegger’s phenomenological phase.

23. For Husserl, one should mention Hua. XXIV, the lecture course of 1906/07 where Husserl develops the phenomenological reduction, Hua. XXV and XXVII, the collection of speeches and essays Husserl produced from 1905–1936, and Hua. XXIX, the appendix volume of the *Crisis*. Concerning Heidegger, it was essentially the early Freiburg and the Marburg Lectures, most of which were published in the 80s and 90s, that have radically changed the image of Heidegger’s work leading up to *Being and Time*.

24. Cf. p. 92: “Husserl had built the house; Heidegger was concerned with the zoning laws.”

25. Cf. Hua. XXXIV, p. 260, here with explicit reference to Heidegger.

26. I here leave aside the question of thematizing subjectivity as essentially a reconstructive analysis and the problems that arise from this method. While it deserves to be mentioned that this was especially the point where both Husserl and Heidegger took issue with the Neo-Kantian (especially Natorp’s) approach to subjectivity, this aspect can be neglected for the present purpose.

27. I am not claiming that *only* philosophy is an eidetic discipline; rather, I claim that, to Husserl, the idea of philosophy as rigorous science can only mean that it is an *eidetic* science.

28. In the contexts where Crowell discusses Husserl in this respect, he mostly refers to the 1911 essay “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” where Husserl famously attacks historicism (especially Dilthey), and hardly makes any mention of the later Husserl’s turn to genetic phenomenology and the problem of history. One can doubt, perhaps rightfully, that Husserl’s later work really changes the situation (as Crowell holds), but it is incontestable that Husserl clearly tried to move into a new direction that would incorporate history. Indeed,

in his 1927 lecture on “Phenomenological Psychology” (published in *Hua. IX*), Husserl famously speaks of his late realization that he and Dilthey, while working on the same problem, met in the middle like two mountain workers drilling a tunnel coming from two sides. Incorporating the position of the later Husserl might have made it clear that, while the discontinuity thesis is certainly valid for the Husserl of 1911 (and 1913), it probably was at least shaky in the later years.

29. Crowell acknowledges this point in his critical discussion of Fink’s attempts, cf. the last essay on Fink’s alleged “Gnostic phenomenology,” esp. p. 253.

30. Cf. the famous dialogue in Novalis’ *Heinrich von Ofterdingen* (in the second, unfinished part called “*Die Erfu’llung*”): “Wo gehen wir denn hin? Immer nach hause.” Thanks to Gerhard Buhr for supplying me with the exact location of this passage.

31. Zahavi, op. cit., pp. 333 f. (footnote 3) seems to make a similar point, pointing out that Husserl’s attitude concerning the relation between philosophy and the positive science is “more conciliatory” (ibid.) than Heidegger’s.

32. Zahavi, op. cit., p. 328.

33. This reviewer has also dealt with Fink’s challenge (cf. “*Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie*.” Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 2002), and I am pleased to see a deep agreement between Crowell’s critical stance and my own.

34. I thank Paul Crowe for helpful comments on an earlier version of this review, and Donald R. Moore and David McPherson for his help with grammar and style.