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By James B. South

The sixteenth century Jesuit philosopher Francisco Suárez has long been recognized as an important figure in the history of thought. He stands near the end of a long tradition of scholastic thinkers whose thought, broadly inspired by Aristotle, had provided the dominant mode of thinking about philosophical problems in an academic setting for over three hundred years. In addition, his thought continued to exert an influence long after his death and long after Descartes inaugurated the modern era of philosophy.¹ In this paper, I want to discuss the account of internal sensation that he provides in his massive commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*.² The notion of an internal sense was integral to Aristotelian influenced accounts of cognition for a reason brought out clearly in the following passage from Thomas Aquinas:

It must be said that sense does not apprehend the essences of realities, but only their exterior accidents. Likewise, imagination does not apprehend the essences of realities, but only likenesses of bodies. The intellect alone, then, apprehends the essences of realities.³

Suárez echoes this sentiment:

There is a great difference between sense and intellect because sense stops at (*sistere*) the cognition of sensible external accidents. Intellect, however, does not stop there but from the cognition of accidents it advances to contemplating those realities that are concealed (*latere*) under the accidents. And therefore it is called "intellect" as from "reading within"⁴

By demarcating the respective spheres of sensation and intellect in such a way, both thinkers appear to be causing themselves some real problems. How, after all, can the intellect know an essence if the human cognitive apparatus is never in direct contact with such an essence? Are we risking a view in which the intellect must simply create an essence from the accidental information with which it works? To solve such potential problems, both Aquinas and Suárez delineate a theory in which the internal senses play an essential mediating role between external sensation of accidents and intellectual knowledge of essences. For both thinkers, the internal sense is the location of the phantasms, that is, images (*imagines*) or likenesses (*similitudines*) of a particular sensible object. These phantasms, as we shall see soon, are required for any intellectual cognition and so their nature and status in the internal sense power is crucial for any account of internal sensation.

Now, Aristotle had posited the notion of an internal sense as a means to bridge the gap between the radically discrete activities of the external senses and our everyday awareness of

the unity of perception. Moreover, the internal sense was used to explain such phenomena as dreams, creative imagination and the like. Finally, the internal sense provided an intermediary that was concomitant with the activity of intellect and, in fact, necessary for intellectual cognition.⁵ Subsequent generations of Aristotelian thinkers took up Aristotle's comments on the internal sense and elaborated complex schemes of multiple internal sense powers designed to account for a wide variety of mental activities.⁶ My aim in this paper is not to deal with every aspect of Suárez's account of internal sensation, however interesting that might be. Instead I want to focus on two primary issues that were the subject of great controversy throughout the later middle ages: 1) the number of the internal senses and 2) the relation of the internal sense apparatus to both the external senses and the intellect. I hope to show that his discussion of the internal senses succeeds in its purpose of accounting for the relation between sense and intellect within the Aristotelian problematic while at the same time advancing several rather novel theses concerning the internal senses. Unfortunately, it would be far beyond the scope of the paper to consider all attempts prior to him to enumerate a theory of the internal senses.⁷ Accordingly, I shall consider his version of the theory in some abstraction. The one point of reference I shall use is the one that Suárez himself thinks is the second most plausible account of internal sensation available: that of Thomas Aquinas.⁸

1. The Number and Scope of Internal Sense Powers

It is well known that Thomas distinguishes four such internal sense powers: common sense, imagination, the estimative power (called the cogitative power in humans) and memory. I shall briefly review his description of each power and then discuss more generally the significance of his account. The crucial move in his account is the separation between the common sense on the one hand and imagination, estimation and memory on the other. The common sense is the root of the external senses and completes them. Unlike the individual external senses, which are limited to their own proper objects, the common sense is able to judge among the various objects of the proper senses. So, while vision, for example, can judge between colors, only the common sense can judge that a color is not a sound. Thus, the actions of the external senses individually flow into the common sense and the common sense is aware of all the sensory experiences at one time.⁹ However, the common sense straddles the line between external senses and internal senses and, while technically an internal sense power, it has much more in common with the external senses than the other internal senses. One way that Thomas marks the distinction is by refusing to name the product of the activity of common sense

a “phantasm.” The phantasm is the paradigmatic product and object of the internal sense powers and, moreover, plays a most important role in intellectual cognition since the agent intellect “abstracts” the intelligible content, the nature or essence of a reality, from the phantasm. Without the phantasm, human intellectual cognition would not be possible.¹⁰

The three powers more properly termed internal senses, the imagination, the estimative/cogitative and memory are clearly described by Thomas and each has a specific function. Imagination (*imaginatio*), sometimes called the phantasy (*phantasia*), performs two essential functions: (a) it receives and stores the sense impressions gathered by the external senses and common sense and (b) it joins together otherwise discrete experiences to create new phantasms such as gold mountains or winged horses. Analogously, sense memory is retentive of sensory experiences. It differs from imagination in two basic ways. First, it is responsible for the character of the past (*ratio praeteriti*) that our sense experiences can possess. Second, it is primarily receptive and retentive of a certain type of experiences, those that result from the estimative/cogitative power.¹¹ This latter power has a peculiar character in that it relates primarily to sensible qualities that cannot be reduced to one of the five external sensible qualities. Thus, for example, in animals, the estimative power senses intentions, or notions, that are agreeable (*conveniens*) or disagreeable (*disconveniens*) or more broadly, dangerous and useful. While in animals this is the result of a kind of natural instinct, in humans the cogitative power takes on a function very close to reasoning. This function of the estimative power is rather curious and the point is brought out well by the traditional designation of such sensible features as “insensible” (*insensatae*). The basic idea here is that the animal must be sensing something over and above the sensible accidents readily apparent. A sheep, for example, is not sensing just the collection of sensible qualities that constitute the wolf—such accidents as color, shape, and smell—but also the “danger” present by virtue of the wolf’s presence. The mysterious nature of these insensible sensations is a problem that worries Suárez. Now, in addition, to this peculiar function of the estimative power, Thomas assigns a variety of other operations, that are peculiar to the estimative power as it exists in human, that is, the cogitative power. So, for example, it is the cogitative power that apprehends an individual as an instance of a natural kind and Thomas is led by this function to call the cogitative power the particular reason (*ratio particularis*) pointing to its ability to investigate (*inquiro*) and compare (*confero*). In addition, it is the power responsible for incidental sensation, that is, the ability to sense the individual as the subject of all the proper sensible qualities it possesses. So, for example, in seeing an individual, I sense immediately through my five senses all the sensible qualities the individual possesses. At the same time, incidentally, I sense the subject of those sensible qualities. The extension of the estimative

power to include this scope of operations is possible for Thomas because he believes the cogitative power has an affinity and nearness (*affinitas et propinquititas*) to the intellect. Consequently, the cogitative power is, as it were, elevated beyond its mere estimative functions and includes these additional functions by reason of its likeness to the intellect. Here we see one of the central ways in which Thomas tries to elucidate the peculiar status of the internal senses as intermediaries between the restricted external senses and the intellect. By attributing quasi-intellective functions to the cogitative power, Thomas goes a long way towards making the operation of the intellect less discontinuous from sensory processes than it might otherwise be.

Now at this point it is important to note that Thomas has committed himself to the existence of four internal senses and that three of them are associated with the phantasm, which Thomas defines as the “likenesses of individuals” (*similitudines individuorum*).¹² By contrast Suárez argues that in fact there is only one internal sense power, one that he usually calls “*phantasia*.” Suárez’s argument for his thesis takes place in explicit dialogue with Thomas Aquinas’s account of the internal sense powers. Indeed, as mentioned above, he admits that Thomas’s position is the second most plausible theory available, second only to his own. Hence in rejecting Thomas’s account, he is indirectly, but forcefully, arguing for his own alternate account.

Suárez begins his discussion of the internal sense by doing a little vocabulary work. He describes and defines seven terms traditionally attributed to the internal senses. These are: 1) common sense (*sensus communis*), 2) phantasy (*phantasia*), 3) imagination (*imaginatio*), 4) estimation (*aestimatio*), 5) cogitation (*cogitatio*), 6) memory (*memoria*), and 7) reminiscence (*reminiscentia*). What unites these terms is that they all signify some operation of sense distinct from the activity of the five external senses.¹³ The emphasis on function or operation is important since he will proceed to fix the referent of each of the traditional terms by providing some functional role for each term.

Beginning with “common sense,” Suárez tells us that the term is proper to that operation by which we cognize (*cognoscere*) all the proper sensibles of the external senses and are thereby in a position to judge (*discernere*) among them. It is typically described as the common principle or source of the external senses and as well as the terminus to which the external senses “flow together” (*influere*).¹⁴ By contrast, “phantasy” (*phantasia*) refers to the operation whereby we know all sensible objects, including external sensible objects in their absence. In other words, it conserves the species or images of things sensed and can know them “abstractively”, that is, when the original sensible object is no longer present. In this way,

phantasy is contrasted to the common sense, which can know only the species of objects sensed externally when the objects are present to the external senses.¹⁵ It should be noted that Suárez's use of the term "abstract" in the context of discussions about knowledge refers to the absence of an object only while the correlative term "intuitive," means only that the object is present. We should not make the mistake of thinking that one is mediated by a species while the other is not. Rather all cognitive operations, whether intuitive or abstractive take place by means of a species, either sensible or intelligible. So, the common sense, as much as the phantasy, requires a species for its operation. "Imagination" (*imaginatio*) refers to the same operation as phantasy, but adds the feature of being able to compose and divide sensible objects as well as to create impossible objects. It is what allows us to be able to think about such items as gold mountains, Pegasus, and the like.¹⁶ So far, we have been talking about internal sensory activities that are relatively unproblematic in that they are dependent simply on the ordinary sensible accidents of external objects. Even in the case of gold mountains and flying horses, the imagination is simply putting together prior sensory experiences in new ways. However, the operation known as "estimation" introduces a new factor into the internal sensory process. Estimation involves the apprehension of a sensible object under an aspect such that the sensitive appetite is moved and directed as a result. It is, for example, what allows animals to sense objects not just as their sensible accidents present themselves, but also as agreeable or disagreeable to them, as something to approach or something to flee.¹⁷ The same operation in humans is customarily given a special term: "cogitation." While I shall discuss this operation in more detail below, right now I want to stress that Suárez, here at the beginning of his discussion, explicitly denies to the cogitative operation any ability to reason (*rationari*) or to judge about particulars. He states:

The cogitative is thought by many to be a certain sensitive power in humans that can reason concerning particulars and that can compose and divide, but that power exceeds the limits of the sensitive part. . . . And therefore "cogitative" means nothing more than the interior sensitive power itself discerning among the agreeable and disagreeable as it exists in a special way in humans. In this manner it has some greater perfection because not only is it led by an instinct of nature, but also by increased knowledge and experience and often, too, it is directed by reason.¹⁸

In denying any intrinsic capacity for reasoning to the cogitative operation, Suárez makes one of his most important breaks with the Thomistic tradition. As we saw above, Thomas views the cogitative power as perhaps the most important of the internal sensory powers and ascribes to it a broad range of activities, including the sensing of the particular as an instance of a type.

Presumably, it is at this point that the accidents sensed by the external senses are rendered suitable for abstracting universal content. It is precisely such a role for the cogitative power that Suárez denies here. The cogitative power has access to nothing more than the sensible accidents presented to it by the actions of the external senses. Moreover, in his discussion of the functions of estimation and cogitation, he is focusing on the fundamental fact that there is nothing mysterious transmitted during the process of sensation. A sheep flees a wolf because the sheep sees, smells and hears its sensible properties, not because it senses danger or some other such property in a wolf.

The final two terms used to describe operations of the internal sense are “memory” (*memoria*) and “reminiscence” (*reminiscentia*). Obviously, we can know the past as past and we experience a sense of time. Memory is simply what allows us to perform these two operations. It is also the corresponding “abstractive” operation in relation to the estimative power, just as the imagination is the abstractive operation corresponding to the intuitive knowledge of the common sense. The basic idea is that we can remember objects in their absence.¹⁹ More complexly, “reminiscence” is also used to signify the memory of past experiences, but it is distinguished from memory, insofar as its operation is supposedly more complex. Reminiscence functions discursively and in cooperation with the imagination. While Suárez accepts that this is a common enough usage, he worries that it attributes more knowledge to the internal senses than is warranted and suggests instead that such a knowledge of the past is really the work of the intellect:

Thus I judge that reminiscence chiefly arises from the intellect, at least in relation to reasoning (*discursus*) and compositions which are added to intellect. Now, because sense always accompanies intellect, when the intellect reasons through different places and times the sense also accompanies it. That inquiry that arises in sense is not a proper reasoning, but is a kind of succession of apprehension proceeding from one to another and can be called reminiscence and an operation of sense dependent on a previous reasoning of the intellect.²⁰

Again, we see his characteristic restriction of the scope of the internal sense power at work here inasmuch as any complex assessment of the past or process of reasoning involving past experience is said to be an intellectual process, albeit one dependent on sense.

I have run through in a brief manner the discussion of the meaning of terms used to describe internal sensory operations for two reasons. First, it is important to see that Suárez is fully cognizant of the variety of teachings concerning the internal senses. At the same time, though, I hope to have made it clear that in his discussion he refuses to beg any questions about the nature of internal sensation. He has done no more than recognize common internal sensory

experiences in which humans and higher animals engage. Most importantly, he has refused to make a simple enough inference from an operation to a power on which the operation depends. A characteristic way of arguing for the existence of a separate power of the soul is to argue that each operation that has a proper object requires the existence of a distinct power. Thomas Aquinas, for example, states

A power as such is directed to an act. Therefore we must derive the nature of the power from the act to which it is directed; and consequently the nature of a power is diversified according as the nature of the act is diversified. Now the nature of an act is diversified according to the various natures of the objects.²¹

As mentioned, among the views arguing for a plurality of internal sense powers, Suárez finds most probable the view of Averroes and Aquinas that there are four such powers and it is this view that he criticizes in most detail. Indeed, despite the weight of such impressive authority, however, Suárez wants to argue that in fact there is only one internal sense power, one that he calls, generally, *phantasia*. Now, his basic argumentative strategy is to dispute the division of internal senses that is based on the existence of different types of objects, that is, the ordinary sensible qualities available to the five external senses and the more peculiar intentions of danger, utility and the like accessible to the estimative/cogitative power.²² Hewing closely to Thomas's exposition in the *Summa theologiae*, he views the latter's position as resting on two foundational principles. The point of both principles is to demonstrate that the objects of internal sensory experience are radically different. Here is how he sets forth the basic point:

The fourth opinion [that of Averroes and Thomas], which is the more probable among those mentioned, has a two-fold foundation: The first is that sensitive cognition arises sometimes through sensed species (*species sensatae*) and sometimes through unsensed species (*species insensatae*) and powers cognizing through them are distinct. For powers cognizing through different types of species are themselves different. . . . The second foundation is that in sensitive powers a power cognizing in the presence of an object and a power cognizing in the absence of an object are distinct powers. This is proven since a power cognizing in the presence of an object ought to be easily capable of apprehending and being immuted, while a power cognizing in the absence of an object ought to be conserving and retentive of species. Now these two properties cannot exist in the same material power for easy apprehension in corporeal bodies originates from moisture while retention originates from dryness. These two cannot predominate in the organ of the sense power, therefore. . . .²³

In this passage we have two principles working in tandem to deliver four distinct internal sense powers: a distinction between types of sensory information and a distinction between intuitive and abstractive powers. I shall call the former the "unsensed species principle" and the latter the "presence/absence principle." The former, perhaps, is the most difficult point and the one that

Suárez spends the most time worrying over, while the distinction premised on the presence or absence of the sensible object is rather straightforward.

A brief look at the corresponding texts of Aquinas will show that Suárez rather accurately represents his thought in this regard. So, for example, in *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 78, q. 4, Aquinas does indeed state that a crucial attribute of a subset of the internal senses involves their ability to perform their proper operations in the absence of the sensible object while the other internal sense powers require the presence of the sensible object:

Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but also when it is absent.

From this principle he concludes that two of the internal sense powers, the common sense and the estimative power, must be capable of receiving easily the species from sensible objects while the other two, the imagination and memory, must be able to retain species once received. There is as well a physiological consequence that follows from this distinction: the reception of species requires the internal sense powers be appropriately “moist” in order that the apprehension of species occurs in an optimal manner while retentive powers must be “dry.” Thomas’s conclusion is straightforward: since the same power cannot be both primarily moist and primarily dry, it follows that such powers must be distinct. In sum, then, this basic physiological difference between receptive and retentive powers corresponds to the distinction between powers that require the presence of their objects and those that do not. The result is a demarcation of the common sense and estimation, as receptive, and imagination and memory, as retentive.

What remains unclear is why four such internal senses are required. Why not just have a sense power that is receptive and one that is retentive? The answer, of course, is that there are two types of sensory information received and consequently two types retained. Thomas argues that there are two types of sensory information available to the internal sense powers: that which is sensed by the external senses and that which is not sensed by the external senses. He writes:

But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also because of other advantages and uses, or disadvantages; just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not because of its color or shape, but as a natural enemy. . . . Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive.²⁴

In Suárez’s terminology, this is the distinction between sensed species (*species sensatae*) and unsensed species (*species insensatae*). He explains this distinction by saying that sensed species are those that represent sensible objects in the internal sense in the same way that they are represented in the external senses. This is not to say that such species are themselves

actually sensed, it is just to say that the sensible qualities sensed by the external senses are transmitted in some way to the internal senses as well. The green on the tree that I see is received in the common sense as an awareness of green. Unsensed species, by contrast, are those that represent sensible objects in some other manner, under some different aspect, than objects are represented in the external senses. The standard example is the way that a sheep perceives a wolf as dangerous. The main point is that there is nothing in the sensed species of a wolf that would lead a sheep to such a perception. So, there must be some additional information available to the internal sense powers allowing them to recognize that danger. Again, the conclusion follows rather straightforwardly: if two sense powers sense different types of species, they must be really distinct powers.

In summary, then, the two principles generate an account of internal sensation that requires four distinct powers. We have two receptive powers, the common sense and the imagination. The former is receptive of the sensed species, the latter receptive of the unsensed species. The two retentive powers, the estimation and memory, are respectively retentive of sensed and unsensed species. The question we must now consider is why Suárez rejects this derivation of internal sense powers. As we have seen, Suárez does not dispute that there are many operations that match up with terms such as common sense, imagination, etc. However, he wants to argue that the only reason to posit diverse powers for each operation would be if operations existed that the same power could not perform. In other words, the number of non-compossible operations determines how many distinct internal sense powers we must posit. In addition, he believes that we should not posit a distinct internal sense power based simply by restricting its range of operations. What he means is that if there is one sense power that receives unsensed species and another that both receives and retains such species, we should only posit one sense power—the one that has the greatest range of operations. The power with the more restricted range would be redundant. In fact, he invokes an argument used by Thomas himself who stated that in the case of humans we should not posit more interior sense powers than are present in the perfect animals. If we should discover in humans some more perfect sensory operation, it is not because of some additional power that it has, but rather is due to the greater perfection of the sense power in humans. In fact, Thomas explicitly uses this principle in rejecting the Avicennian distinction between *phantasia* (the retention of sensed species) and the imagination (the ability to creatively combine such species) because in humans the imagination can perform both operations.²⁵

Suárez proceeds to reject the first of Thomas's foundational principles, namely, the presence/absence principle that requires distinct powers due to the need for such powers to

have different physical natures (moist vs. dry). In this way, both the common sense/phantasy duo and the cogitative/memory duo are reduced to one power for each set. In one fell swoop, we go from four powers to two. His argument for rejecting the principle involves recognizing that a power knowing in the absence of an object must have previously received a species of the absent object. So, for example, in order to remember the tree in the park I sat under yesterday, I must have sensed the tree in the park and formed a phantasm of it. If the original experience generates a phantasm, there is no reason to think that the phantasm I use the following day is any different from the original. If it were, it would have arisen in the absence of the original object, yet such a possibility is ruled out by the very passivity of sensory experience. After all, a sensible object immutes a sense power only when it is present to the power. Consequently, the common sense and imagination, which are immuted only thanks to the external senses, must both be immuted in the presence of the object. In this way both are able to know in the presence of the object. Thus, Suárez concludes that a power that can know in the absence of an object can know in the presence of the object as well. His point here is rather subtle, but amounts to the claim that reception and retention, apprehension and conservation, are not differentiated by the presence and absence of the object. The image I retain of the tree is the very image of the tree that resulted from my original, present experience. In brief, if the common sense is incapable of retaining sensed species, it cannot be the source of my later imagination and the result is that the imagination must have been immuted at the same time as the common sense, that is, when the object is present. Moreover, the case of gold mountains, centaurs and the like, while more complicated, are nonetheless reducible to experiences had in the presence of objects.

Suárez takes this argument as sufficient evidence that the imagination is immuted in the presence of the object. Hence the distinction between the reception and retention of species does not prove that there must be separate powers to perform both functions. Rather, it shows that both the apprehensive function of the common sense and the retentive function of the imagination take place in the same power. In this way the reception and retention of sensed species by the same power shows that such operations are compossible and his first principle—no positing of different powers for compossible operations—is satisfied. The same line of reasoning shows that the distinction between the estimative power and memory collapses as well. The estimative power and memory are posited as having a special type of object, the unsensed species. Putting aside for the moment any questions of the existence of such species, it is clear that there is no more reason to distinguish between the reception of the unsensed species in the presence of the object and the conservation of the same species. Again, the memory must receive such species to retain at the same time as the estimative power

apprehends them.²⁶

The problem that remains for Suárez's reductive strategy is the argument concerning the physical composition of the internal sense powers. Since dryness is supposed to be crucial for retention and moistness for apprehension, Thomas argued that we must posit two separate powers, one moist, one dry, for these two different operations. Suárez responds by pointing to material substances that both receive impressions and retain them, for example, lead (*plumbum*). In addition, he points out that the reception and retention of species is not a wholly material process, but rather is an intentional process. While there is a material component to apprehension and retention in the internal sense, the crucial aspect is the causing of knowledge and that arises, he says, without any resistance.²⁷ Finally since the imagination can receive sensed species as well as retain them, any attempt to posit a separate common sense that merely receives sensed species runs afoul of Suárez's second intuitively plausible claim as well, namely, that there is no need to posit a power with a lesser range of operation when there is a power that performs on a broader level. Thus, the mere presence or absence of a sensible object is not sufficient to require a multiplicity of sense powers.

The second "foundation" provided by Thomas Aquinas for the distinction between internal sense powers involved the "unsensed species principle" and captured the idea that animals are aware of more than is provided to them by the external senses. Suárez views the distinction between types of species to be the primary motivation for distinguishing between the common sense/phantasy duo and the estimative/memory duo. He wants to argue that the distinction between sensed and unsensed species is untenable, and in this way remove any remaining foundation for a distinction of powers. The focus of his attack is on the significance of the difference between the sensed and unsensed species. Consider the sheep sensing the danger of a wolf present to it and recognizing that it must flee. Suárez states that experience suggests that there is a simultaneity in the sensing of the wolf and the fleeing. This sort of simultaneity only makes sense, however, if it is one and the same species that presents the wolf to the sheep and also presents the danger. Such sensory knowledge is possible because animals have built in natural instincts such that when they perceive something that is a danger, for instance, they flee. Nonetheless, what they perceive is simply the sensible qualities of the external object as presented to the common sense via the five external senses. Suárez, then, is at a loss even to describe what an unsensed species would be. How can a sensible species represent a wolf under the aspect of "enemy"? The only way a sensible species can represent anything is by representing the sensible qualities of the wolf: its color, shape, scent, etc.²⁸

Suárez concludes from these considerations that the internal sense power is really and formally one power, and that the various terms used of it show only a diversity imposed by reason both because the acts of the power are different and because we think about the power with inadequate concepts. He points out that his position on the internal sense power is similar in inspiration to the more common view that the intellect and will constitute one power although it performs a multitude of differently described actions. Just as the intellect goes by many names: intellect, reason, memory, speculative intellect, practical intellect while remaining one power, so too the internal sense power is describable in multiple ways, but those ways are compatible with its being only one power.²⁹

With this rejection of the existence of unsensed species, we get to the heart of Suárez's account of internal sensation. Not only does he remove a foundation for the view that the various functions of the internal sense are operations of separate powers, he also shows resistance to expanding the cognitive role of internal sensation. It appears that he has two essential motivations. First, he wants to give pride of place to the role of the external senses. They provide us with immediate contact to the world around us and, along with the action of the intellect, are sufficient to ground our understanding of the world. Hence, the role of the internal senses is little more than a means of "transferring" experience, as it were, from the excessively material external senses to the immaterial intellect. The internal sense becomes basically a mere intermediary, with little to do on its own other than uniting the variety of external sensory experiences into a unified whole. Second, he wants to stress the continuity between internal sensation in animals and internal sensation in humans.

Positing an internal sense with the wide variety of functions that Thomas's cognitive power has in effect separates the sensitive powers of humans too radically from that of animals. The consequence of this second motivation, of course, is to recognize the possibility that a much broader range of human activity is instinctual. So, when the sheep only senses the wolf as its bundle of sensible accidents, it instinctively flees. By the same reasoning, then, when a person senses a particular threatening object, she does not sense anything special, but rather instinctively responds to the sensory experience. Of course, Suárez would, no doubt, point to the role that intellect and will could play in teaching us to overcome such instinctual behavior, but the fact would remain that much of our sensory life is instinctual.

As we saw above, one of the features of the cognitive power, according to Thomas, was its function of incidental sensation, that is, its ability to sense the individual under the collection of proper sensibles attainable by the external senses. Suárez singles out this function in particular and subjects it to a critique. He gives the traditional definition of incidental sensation as that

which in no way immutes a sense power, but is only known through the immutation of another object to which it is conjoined.³⁰ With this understanding of incidental sensation as a base, he can explain how a substance, an individual of a kind, is sensed because while the substance itself does not immute a sense power, the sensible accidents that are conjoined to the substance do. In other words, from the power (*vis*) of the sensation of a thing that is *per se* sensible, something else is perceived incidentally. That means the white that immutes the eye immutes it insofar as it exists in a subject, and that subject is what we sense incidentally. So far so good. However, Suárez also wants to insure that we do not have some exaggerated opinion about the capabilities of the internal sense power. After all, the incidental sensible, separate from the proper sensibles, would be another type of unsensed species, and we have already seen that Suárez has no use for such species. The result is that there is no proper sensed species of the substance itself. Instead, we properly sense only its accidents. Consequently, for Suárez, incidental perception is of little moment. Basically the internal sense power unites into a phantasm the likenesses of the proper sensibles of a sensible object, proper sensibles that by their very nature are themselves united within some substance. Nonetheless, despite some verbal similarities with Thomas's view, Suárez is insistent that the sense does not know the individual as individual and hence has no cognition of the individual as an instance of a kind. The completed phantasm is no more than a collection of accidents. Recall that when discussing the term "cogitative power," Suárez was careful to restrict its meaning to the functions of the estimative power as it exists in humans. What this meant was that it was under the direction, at least part of the time, of reason. It should come as no surprise, then, to find that Suárez ascribes to reason and the intellect the ability to know individuals as instances of a kind. The knowledge of the substance of a singular object is the result of discursive and inferential reasoning. It amounts to knowing the accidents of a subject and noting how these accidents change over time. By noticing these changes, the intellect comes to recognize that something stands under these accidents and is able to arrive at the conception of a substance as something that supports accidents.³¹ I shall return to a discussion of the significance of placing such a restriction on the internal sense in my concluding remarks. For now, though, I hope it is sufficient to note how restricted is the scope of the internal sense power for Suárez. He in effect blocks every attempt Thomas makes to enhance the power of the internal sense, reserving those extended powers to the intellect. The cogitative power is denied, accordingly, any transitional role in the process of cognition. It does not itself reason or impart to the phantasm any note of intelligibility not already present to the external senses. Such a result of his account of the internal sense power puts into stark light the two problems we must next address. Given that the internal sense provides no

preparation of the phantasm, that is, it adds nothing to the information received by the internal senses, it seems that Suárez could be accused of positing a power that itself is superfluous.³²

Moreover, the problematic with which we started, how the intellect can extract intelligibility from the data of sense, is even more manifest. The gap between the phantasm and the intellect appears just as great as that between the intellect and the external senses. He owes us an account of the necessity of the internal sense as performing some role that cannot be carried out by the external senses alone, and he must explain the relation between intellect and phantasm in such a way that the gap between the two can be crossed.

2. The Relation of the Internal Sense to the other Cognitive Powers

In addition to the number and scope of the internal senses, there is another traditional issue that Suárez takes up that is central to his account of internal sensation. That issue is the relation of internal sensation to external sensation and to intellectual cognition. Here Suárez is best seen as reacting against two types of views. Both views propose that the process of cognition is essentially a causal one. The idea here is that at each of the steps of cognition, the preceding step plays a direct causal role in the succeeding step. The first view holds to a kind of transmission account in which, for example, the external sense transmits its species to the internal sense whereupon the internal sense produces the phantasm. On this view cognition is essentially a passive operation in which something must be received at each step along the way—the sensible species in the external senses, the phantasm in the internal sense and the intelligible species in the intellect. The second view is best seen as a subtle variant of the first replacing the purely passive account of cognition with one that allows for a more active role for each cognitive power in relation to its own act. So, for example, on such a view, the sensible species in the external sense plays some causal role in the production of the phantasm in the internal sense. The causality involved here is usually that of instrumental cause to principle cause: the sensible species is the instrumental cause in the production of the phantasm. Despite the priority of the principle cause, the causality of the preceding cognitive step is necessary, but not sufficient for the later step. The intellect complicates the issue greatly since on either of these views, there must be some way to explain how an essentially material entity, the phantasm existing in the internal sense power, can effect a change in an immaterial power such as the intellect. Even restricting the role of the phantasm to instrumental cause and giving the principle cause to the work of the agent intellect in its abstractive process requires that we explain how the agent intellect can causally interact with the material phantasm.

Again, Suárez uses Thomas Aquinas as the background against which he will work out

his own position. As we saw above, Thomas straightforwardly asserts that the common sense, as the root and principle of sensation, is the power in which all external sensation terminates. Moreover, the common sense is able to discriminate among the various sensible species it receives and is that power that is reflexively aware of the activity of sensing. In addition, he distinguishes the common sense from the imagination by stressing that the common sense is physiologically suitable for the reception of sensible species, while the imagination is physiologically suitable for the retention of such species. By parallel reasoning, the reception of the insensible intentions in the cogitative power are distinguished from their retention in sense memory.³³ I suggest, then, that this kind of unproblematic reception in the internal senses of the species received in external sensation is that against which Suárez wants to react.

Suárez offers two arguments in support of rejecting the notion that an external sensible species can directly effect the internal sense. The first argument involves the more perfect (*perfectior*) status of the internal sense. Suárez takes it as axiomatic that the species must be proportional to the power in which it inheres. Since the internal power is more elevated than the external power, the external sensible species is insufficient to perform the role of the total immediate principle of the internal sensible species.³⁴ Now in this objection he is rejecting only the purely passive view of the transmission of the sensible species to the internal sense such that by itself it cannot account for the phantasm. Nonetheless, this argument from the “more perfect” status of the internal sense leaves open the possibility that the external sensible species plays some causal role in the transition from external to internal sensation. The second argument is a bit more complicated. Suárez accepts the standard view that the internal sense power is located in the brain. Now, given that the external sense powers are located in the sense organs, some explanation must be forthcoming to show how a species in an external sense power can be transmitted to the internal sense power. Suárez believes that supporters of the traditional account have two options. First, one could claim that there are intervening media between the external powers and the internal sense power such that the species can be transmitted from the former to the latter. Suárez presses an empirical objection against such an account to the effect that the media linking external sense organs and powers to the internal sense power in the brain are neither diaphanous nor illuminated. Of course, in external sensation the medium has both of these characteristics and if either of these conditions is missing, it is likely that sensation will be somehow affected. As a result, Suárez points out that if the species were to travel via the non-illuminated and opaque media between the external and internal sense, it would suffer distortion in the process.³⁵ Obviously, any such distortion would raise grave skeptical

possibilities.

Suárez concedes that supporters of the passive transmission view have another option open to them. They could argue that there simply are no media between internal and external sense powers. In other words, the external power acts directly on the internal power. As he quickly points out, though, a theory along these lines must be able to explain how such direct activity can occur given the spatial distance between the powers. If the species of the external sense caused the species in the internal sense at a distance, then whenever something is sensed by the external sense, the internal sense would receive the same species. Experience, however, is sufficient to demonstrate that a perfectly functioning external sense can receive a species without thereby sensing. He mentions such examples as the way in which objects within our field of perception remain unnoticed by us, cases of apoplexy, delirium and even mystical ecstasy. The problem for the supporter of the transmission account is that if the mere reception of a species in the external sense immediately causes the reception of the same species in the internal sense, then it would be possible for the delirious or ecstatic person to remember things that they could have seen, but did not see.³⁶ We must be careful here. Suárez is not committing himself to the view that we only sense that of which we are actually aware. In fact, he takes notice of the phenomena that we sense aspects of our environment even when we are focused on other aspects.³⁷ His point is rather that the only things that we can imagine are those that we have actually sensed. Perhaps we can get at his point with an example. Consider the person whose only experience of a sweet food came at a time when she was running a fever. Suárez's point is that she cannot remember at some later time what that food would have tasted like if she was not running a fever that blunted her ability to taste it. In the same way, the ecstatic person who sees a burning bush does not see the bush without flames at the same time.

These objections, focusing as they do on the fact that the posited multiplication of the species would in fact result in distortion in the internal sense, suggest a different account of the relation of external sensation to internal sensation (and, by extension, the relation of internal sense to intellect). Such an account would consist in the claim that the crucial precondition of the activity of internal sense must be the act itself of external sensation, or, as Suárez puts the point: "The sensed species of the internal sense does not arise from an external object by a mediate species, but from an external sense by a mediate act of its cognition."³⁸ A little background on Suárez's account of external sensation will help us to understand this position more clearly and he helpfully provides it for us:

. . . through an act of knowing there is produced its intrinsic term, which is a representative quality of [a known] reality in second act. Therefore, through this

quality, which the external sense forms within itself, one can believe with probability that there is produced in the internal sense a species representative of the same object . . .³⁹

This passage is rather concise and needs to be unpacked a bit. The basic idea is that the external sense power in its initial state is purely potential in respect to the act of sensing. It must be actualized by the reception of an external sensible species produced by a sensible object. Once a species is received in the external sense, the power is in a position to sense the external sensible object. However, Suárez holds that the mere reception of the sensible species, while necessary, is not sufficient for the act of sensing to take place because the power that has received the sensible species has been actualized, but only up to a point. It is no longer purely passive, but it also is not yet actually sensing. This first level of actuality must be raised to the act of sensing itself. This actualization is the work of the sense power itself. This second level of actuality is simply the act of sensing and results in a qualitative change in the sense power. The major point for Suárez is that the qualitative change is chiefly the work of the sense power itself in cooperation with the determination brought to it by the external sensible species. While he is willing to call the act of sensation, as qualitative change, an “expressed species,” he does not think that this species is some product distinct from the act of sensation itself. The two levels of actuality within sensation explain why he is unwilling to accept that the sensible species is simply transmitted to the inner sense. If the sensible species is not able to cause by itself the act of external sensation, it cannot be expected to cause the act of internal sensation. Moreover, since the expressed species is only the completed act of sensation, there is no left over “product” in the act of external sensation to be transmitted to the internal sense.⁴⁰

This brief summary of the external sensory process enables us to understand the basic framework for internal sensation. Just as external sensation requires two successive “actualizations,” so too does internal sensation. Hence, when Suárez states that the species of internal sensation arises from external sensation, he is arguing that the first level of actuality of internal sensation is dependent on external sensation, not the sensible species of external sensation. Again, caution is in order. We must not conclude that the act of external sensation is somehow transmitted to the internal sense power. Suárez has already dealt with the problems raised by any transmission account: a result of external sensation would still have to “jump the gap” between the less perfect power and the more perfect internal sense power. Moreover, there is an important difference between internal and external sense powers that must be factored into a transmission account. External sensation relies on the presence of a sensible object for both its origin and conservation. Such is not the case with internal sensation. Also, since a species

should be proportional to its power, the fact that internal and external senses are different powers requires that their species be different. Suárez's conclusion is clear and succinct: the expressed species of *external* sensation, that is, the actual activity of sensation, and the impressed species of *internal* sensation are really distinct.⁴¹ As a result, he must provide us with an account of the relation between external sensation and internal sensation that both allows for the activity of external sensation, but avoids the traditional view that there is some sort of transmission of a species between the external and internal sense powers.

While it might be thought that he has driven too deep a wedge between the two sense powers, this is not so. While the inner sense is the more perfect power, the act of external sensation is the more perfect act. So it is at least possible for the higher grade of actuality to be productive of a lower level of actuality. That is all Suárez needs. He is looking for something that can bring the internal sense power to the first level of actuality. He finds it in the second level of actuality achieved by the external sense.

Now you say: if these species [external and internal] differ in kind, the internal species will be a more perfect species than external sensation because it is an act of a more noble power. Therefore, it cannot be produced (*producere*) by the former. I respond by denying the first consequence, for the comparison is not correct. Therefore, in comparing the first act of one power to the first act of another, that one is more perfect which is an act of a more perfect power, and it is the same in comparing the second acts to each other. Nevertheless, in comparing a second act of a less perfect power to the first act of a more perfect power, the former will be more perfect because in its own nature it is constituted in a higher grade of actuality.⁴²

However, while he has shown that it is possible for the lower power to produce a species in the higher power, he has not yet explained the productive process.

In fact, it turns out that to speak of a productive process between the external and internal sense powers is quite misleading. We cannot understand the external sense as productive in the manner in which an efficient cause is productive. His claim, which sounds rather strange on the surface, is that the internal sensible species is really the result of the activity of the internal sense power itself. This is due to the fact that no act of cognition ever produces any quality distinct from itself.⁴³ This is a crucial element of his theory. The point he is making involves the relation between the act of cognition as act and the product of the act, the expressed species or concept. By denying any real distinction between act and resulting product, he aims to safeguard the directness of cognitional activity at the same time that he takes away any kind of species that, separated from its originary act, could be passed along to another power. The result of the cognitive activity simply is the cognitive activity and there is no other result of cognitive activity,

no distinct species, that can be multiplied to another power.

If the transmission account of species does not explain how one power enters into the operation of another power (or, in the terminology he used above, how the external sense can be productive of the activity of the internal sense), we still need an account of how the imagination can produce its own species. Here, Suárez has recourse to an interesting theory about the relation between the various powers of the soul. While the powers, for example the various external senses, the internal sense and the intellect, are all really distinct from one another, nonetheless, they all flow from the same soul and consequently, to use his term, are “rooted” in the same soul. He states:

The interior and exterior senses are rooted (*radicare*) in the same soul, and thus it is the same soul that sees through vision and imagines through imagination. There is, therefore, a natural harmony (*consensio*) among these powers since from the very fact that the soul perceives some reality it immediately forms a likeness (*similitudo*) of that reality in its imagination through the power of the imagination itself, not by means of a power distinct from the imagination. So, for example, given an external sensation, a species naturally results in the interior sense from the activity of the soul itself through the imagination, not from the activity of sensation, although in the presence of the reality sensed.⁴⁴

This important passage is not immediately transparent. The basic negative point is clear, though: the actions of the external senses are not the cause of the production of a species within the internal sense power itself. For that we need to posit the soul itself, present equally to both powers, which is somehow able to provide the internal sense with the result of the activity of the external senses.

Unfortunately, Suárez is sketchy on the details of this process, simply letting the notion of the soul’s presence to the internal sense suffice as an explanatory device. Nonetheless, the basic idea is sufficiently clear: while vision, for example, performs the operation of visual perception, the soul, as its source, perceives. In other words, the soul “perceives” through vision. Now, Suárez cannot mean “perceives” here in a purely literal manner. After all, the sense power of vision perceives and one of Suárez’s arguments concerning the nature of external sensible species points out that they cannot immute the soul directly insofar as they are material realities, but instead must immute the sense power.⁴⁵ Hence, he must mean something more like an awareness that the soul has of its powers’ operations. Something more is at work in this view as well, I believe. He is pointing to the fact that the soul’s cognitive powers are also dependent on the soul itself for their existence insofar as they flow from the soul at the first moment of the soul’s creation. In other words, while the powers retain their distinctness from the soul, it remains the case that the soul is their source and origin. Consequently, there must exist some relation

between the soul and its powers such that the soul is both aware of the powers' activities and in some way is productive of those activities as well.

We shall soon see how he cashes out the "awareness" about which I am now speaking. Now, though, I want to bring out one further issue stemming from his claims about the relation between cognitive powers. There is, after all, a fundamental difference between internal and external sense. The external senses are dependent on objects in the external world for their operations. The internal sense, though, being a step further along in the cognitional process is dependent proximately on the external sense powers, not the external world. At the same time, however, it can also act independently of the external senses in such cases as dreaming, remembering past sensory images, and other like operations. Hence, the role that soul plays in internal sensory cognition is going to be quite different than the one it plays in external sensation. Recall that in external sensation, the sense power is brought to its first level of actuality when it receives the sensible species. At that point, the sense power itself takes over and raises itself to the second level of actuality. Now, the internal sense power does not, as we have seen, receive a species from the external senses, nor does it receive one from the soul. There is simply no transmission of any species at all. This crucial difference in the internal and external senses points us to a basic understanding of the role of the soul in internal sensation. It must in some way contribute to the level of first actuality in the internal sense. Tying things together a bit, the soul's awareness must contribute to the elevation of the internal sense to the first level of actuality, that is, to its production of a phantasm.

At this point Suárez owes us an account of the mechanism by which the soul acts. He has already begun by asserting an essentially negative point, namely, there is no efficient cause of the act of the internal sense other than the power itself. Therefore, we should not view the soul's awareness of the act of seeing, for example, as the efficient cause of the imagination's act of imagining. If the soul is not an efficient cause, what kind of role does it play in the imagination's operation? To answer this question, we must have recourse to his account of the activity of the intellect. Like the imagination, the intellect is a power really distinct from the soul as well as the other powers of the soul. So far, he has argued that the sensory apparatus consists of two clusters of cognitional activity, each essentially self-contained, but relatively connected: external sensation, and internal sensation. Now, external sensation is dependent on its own activity in concurrence with the actual sensible object's species while internal sensation is dependent on the activity of external sensation, but that activity has no direct effect on the internal sense. Instead, the internal sense is somehow aware of the result of the external sense through the intermediary awareness of the soul itself. The intellect is a third such component of cognitive

activity and, as we might expect, is not directly dependent on the activity of the internal sense. Indeed, the internal sense has no direct effect on the intellect, although the intellect is dependent on the activity of the internal sense in much the same way that the internal sense is dependent on the external senses. The reason for this complicated picture of the activity of the intellect is clear enough, given that the phantasm itself is material and the intellect is immaterial,⁴⁶ but that cannot be the only reason. Rather, the intellect is just a special case of the primary independence and relative dependence of the soul's powers. There will be, then, a striking parallel in the relation between internal and external sensation and the relation between internal sensation and intellect. If we can understand the latter, we should be in a position to understand the former as well.

Suárez goes to great lengths to argue that not only does the internal sense have no direct role in the work of the agent intellect, but also that the agent intellect does not do anything to the phantasm in order to produce the intelligible species, thereby repudiating any theory of the agent intellect in which it is asserted that "there is a certain spiritual power in us . . . whose work is to illuminate (*illustrare*) phantasms and in this way to make (*efficere*) the intelligible species."⁴⁷ The basic implication of such a view is that the agent intellect and the phantasm must concur in the production (*producere*) of the intelligible species since if the agent intellect were able to produce the intelligible species without any dependence on the phantasm it would simultaneously be able to produce the species of all realities and would have no dependence on sensation at all.⁴⁸ So, while he wants to preserve such a concurrence, he must be careful to explain what the concurrent activity is and he does this by first discussing what the activity is *not*. He accepts the following as essential data that must be saved in any explanation of the relation of phantasm and agent intellect:

- (a) The agent intellect never creates (*efficere*) a species unless it is determined by the cognition of internal sense.⁴⁹
- (b) Such a determination cannot arise from the efficacy of the phantasm, that is, the phantasm is not the efficient cause of the agent intellect's act.⁵⁰

Now, (a) is relatively unproblematic given the essential union between body and soul, and is a mainstay in Aristotelian inspired accounts of intellectual cognition. He states:

The soul, while it is in the body, has an intrinsic dependence on the phantasy, that is, it cannot operate through the intellect unless it operates actually through a phantasm at the same time. . . . Not because the phantasms themselves are understood, that is, are cognized, but because through them the phantasy operates with the intellect simultaneously.⁵¹

It is (b) that is the crux of Suárez's position and in support he appeals to the exact same principle that he used to explain the relation between external and internal senses. The internal sense and the agent intellect are rooted in the same soul and hence they have an order (*ordo*) and harmony (*consonantio*) in their operations.⁵² As a result, there is no direct causal connection in either direction, that is, the phantasm has no direct causal role in the work of the agent intellect and the agent intellect has no direct causal action in regard to the phantasm. Instead, there is some sort of "determination" involved in the relation between agent intellect and phantasm:

The agent intellect never effects a species unless it is determined by the cognition of the phantasy. . . . Now the reason can be: for the agent intellect is indifferent to effecting all species and consequently, so that it might effect "these" or "those", it requires some determinant. But there is nothing else by which it can be determined except the phantasy's cognition.⁵³

Notice that here in discussing the relation between phantasm and agent intellect we have an emphasis on the second level of actuality (the phantasy's cognition) as determinative in exactly the same way in which the external sensory operations are related to the internal sense. Yet in that case we saw that the determination was in fact rather indirect. There was no transmission of species from the external sense to the internal sense, but rather the soul's "awareness" played the key role. The same is true for the phantasy/agent intellect relation: the phantasm, by virtue of its existence in the internal sense, acts as a kind of "matter" in relation to the agent intellect, "either through exciting the soul or at least as an exemplar."⁵⁴ Now, the relation between the phantasm and the agent intellect is not an arbitrary or accidental one:

It is said that in the soul's powers there is another mode of determination insofar as one power prepares the matter of another, or insofar as one power's act has a necessary connection with the other's act.⁵⁵

The picture that is emerging from these rather enigmatic statements is one in which there is no causal connection between powers, although there is a necessary one. Hence when Suárez talks of "matter" in this context, we cannot take him to mean "material cause," but instead must understand matter here in some loose sense at a determining influence. In addition, we have an added piece of the puzzle in his mention of an "exciting of the soul" that takes place when one power operates.

Returning to the activity of the internal sense in relation to the external senses in light of the discussion of the relation between phantasm and agent intellect, the phantasm is produced by the imagination directly using the data of the external senses as a kind of matter. The kind of necessary connection referred to in the discussion of the agent intellect applies here as well, yet the talk of "necessary connection" is somewhat problematic. Clearly, the assertion of the

necessary connection between sense and imagination and imagination and intellect is designed to accomplish a couple of philosophic tasks. First, and foremost, it is designed to alleviate the discomfort that might be caused in his rejecting a view according to which one act of cognition directly causes the next until we reach the final step of intellectual cognition. In other words, in denying a continuous and direct line of causation from sensible object to intellectual knowledge, it might be thought that he is introducing a note of skepticism into his account of cognition. However, by pointing to the necessary connection of the independent operations and powers of external sensation, internal sensation and intellect, he seems to avoid such a consequence. Of course, the mere assertion of a necessary connection is not sufficient, but we are not yet in a position to judge his success in avoiding skeptical consequences. I shall return to a consideration of the issue of skepticism in the conclusion of the paper. The second philosophical task accomplished is to mark the fact that the power itself, while responsible for producing its act, still maintains some dependence on acts that have preceded. Indeed, the phantasm is restricted to the contents of sensory experience, and even its creative aspects is limited by its prior sensory cognitions.

There is one remaining problem that must be addressed before we can understand his account fully. Suárez's theory of cognition, and more particularly of the production of the phantasm and intelligible species, is dependent on there being a structural sort of analogy between imagination and intellect. In fact he tells us that the intelligible species arises "in the same way" as the phantasm.⁵⁶ Now, the problem arises when we consider that the agent intellect is productive of the intelligible species, but there is no power in the internal sense analogous to the agent intellect, at least in the traditional delineation of sense powers. This would seem to threaten the structural analogy between the two powers. In fact, though, he argues that in the internal sense power there is an ability that deserves to be called an agent internal sense and that it produces phantasms. Of course, he recognizes that there is no warrant in either the text of Aristotle or in the authority of Thomas for calling the internal sense an "agent" power:

But to the negative authority of Aristotle, that he never spoke of this, I respond that he also of never spoke of nor treated precisely many other matters. It is true that St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 79, a. 3, ad 1) seems to deny this activity of species to every sense, but perhaps he is speaking of senses in regard to the first reception of species that arises from the object, from which there then arises the production of some other species.⁵⁷

The rather defensive tone of this passage is noticeable and suggests that he knows he is striking out on his own and that allusions to the tradition are not going to be relevant for the explication of his theory. Now, the positing of an agent sense power immediately raises a

problem. Suárez, as we have seen, argued extensively for the unity of the internal sense power, yet the existence of an agent sense power appears to threaten that unity. Is he after all committed to there being two powers: an agent internal sense and a potential internal sense? The answer is no, but to see that, we need to take another brief detour through his account of the intellect.

Suárez is aware of a range of views concerning the agent and potential intellects. He recognizes that both Aristotle and Thomas, for example, speak of the two intellects as distinct realities (*res distinctae*) and that Averroes, following a Greek tradition, argues that they are separate substances distinct from the human soul.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, he views as most probable (*valde probabilis*) the teaching of Augustino Nifo, in his *De intellectu* that in fact the agent and potential intellects are one and the same power.⁵⁹ The arguments in support of this teaching not only provide us with the means of understanding how the agent intellect functions, but also, by extension, how the internal agent sense is and is not related to sensory experience. While Suárez presents several arguments in support of this thesis, he places greatest emphasis on the way in which his account provides a role for the agent intellect, both in this life and in the one to come. The basic idea is that the human intellect is midway between that of angels and that of animals with purely sensitive souls. Angelic intellects have no need of abstracting species from phantasms, so species exist innately (*inditae*) in them, while the sensitive soul, having no such innate species requires the agency of external objects to initiate the sensory process. The crucial passage reads:

The angelic intellect has from its nature innate species of all realities that, as it were, flow from the proper power of the intellect as (*quasi*) passions flow from an essence. However, the sensitive power, especially (*maxime*) the external senses, lack species and receive them from outside objects. Now our intellect also by its nature lacks species—in which it also falls short of the perfection of an angelic intellect—nevertheless it has a certain agreement with it, namely, that as soon as our soul knows some reality through the phantasy a species representing that reality flows (*dimanare*) from the intellect itself. So, this agency is more in the manner of a certain emanation of the species from the intellect, and thus that agency is not a distinct power.⁶⁰

Here we have a pretty radical rethinking of the nature of the agent intellect. The agent intellect becomes, in effect, the name given to an internal agency within the intellect, an emanation, by which the species arises in the intellect when the internal sense power performs its proper operation. This passage provides us with the only discussion of an alternative mechanism to the literal reception of a species. The intellect simply does not receive a species from outside itself. And, just as the intellect does not receive the phantasm from the internal sense so too it follows that the internal sense does not receive the sensible species from the external senses.

One reason, he believes, for rethinking the notion of the agent intellect is that the naturalness, as it were, of the agent intellect is protected, since if it were distinct from the potential intellect, after the current life, it would have nothing to do. However, the idleness of a distinct agent intellect in the afterlife would mean that the intellect in this life is arranged in an ad hoc manner. The idea here is that the agent intellect only has a job to do, on a more traditional interpretation, when it abstracts and illuminates the phantasm. Hence, the soul separated from the body and deprived of phantasms would have no need for an agent intellect. By claiming that the agent intellect is simply an efficiency within the intellect itself by which the species through which we know arise, he is preserving a role for it independent of any particular state in which the intellect as a whole finds itself.⁶¹

In addition, the comparison of the way that species flow from the intellect with the manner in which a *passio* flows from an essence is of some importance. Suárez differentiates between a *passio* and common accident by noting that a *passio* cannot be separated from an essence, while a common accident can be so separated and the reason for this inseparability is based on the fact that the *passio* is “rooted” (*radicare*) in the essence in a way that a common accident is not.⁶² While we should be careful not to push too far the analogy between species and intellect on the one hand and essence and *passio* on the other, nonetheless the analogy does signify the extremely close connection, perhaps even inseparability, of the species and the intellect from which it flows.

One important consequence of this line of thought is that the denial of a causal connection between the phantasm and the agent intellect, other than the concomitance of the internal sense and the intellect, shows a commitment to a form of “occasionalism” insofar as the work of the internal sense is an occasion for, but not a cause of, the activity of the intellect. However, he does provide us with some context for understanding how the one power occasions the other by telling us that it is as matter or exemplar that the external sense relates to the internal sense. Such an occasionalism even in the case of internal sensation may strike us as odd, but it follows from his fundamental premise of the non-causal relation existing among all cognitive powers and he is driven to assert that non-causal connection because he can find no causal account that works. Moreover, this occasionalism along with the fact that the species flows from the intellect itself immediately raises the possibility that Suárez is committed to some form of innatism. In other words, the species are already present in the intellect and simply need some determinate, but non-causal experience, say the soul’s awareness of the activity of the internal sense, to be produced.

It is necessary to be careful in the ascription of innatism to his account and we must be clear

on the definition of innatism in this case.⁶³ On at least one understanding, the term “innate” extends not just to actual preexistent knowledge, but also to latent and dispositional knowledge. Latent knowledge is that which is present in the soul but not such as to have been known prior to the experience that causes the knowledge to surface, while dispositional knowledge is a kind of structural principle or principles that accounts for and predetermines the type of knowledge we can have.⁶⁴ Now, it is clear that Suárez is not committed to any form of explicit pre-existent knowledge. After all, he wants to save a place for the concurrence of imagination and intellect and the link between them seems rather stronger than talk about a kind of platonic recollection. Indeed, he explicitly rejects Plato’s account of knowledge saying that it ignores the natural union of soul and body. Moreover, he endorses the claim, attributed to Aristotle, that the intellect is a *tabula rasa*.⁶⁵ Nonetheless, the fact remains that the knowledge of the senses, both external and internal, is not causally connected to the activity of the intellect. The intellect produces the intelligible species from within itself with the mere “determination” or “example” of the senses to work with. Consequently, he is juggling two concerns and they mix rather uneasily. The conclusion that there must be some form of innatism in the case of intellect is inescapable. Consider the following passage from Descartes by way of comparison:

. . . if we bear well in mind the scope of our senses and what it is exactly that reaches our faculty of thinking by way of them, we must admit that in no case are the ideas of things presented to us by the senses just as we form them in our thinking. So much so that there is nothing in our ideas which is not innate to the mind or the faculty of thinking, with the sole exception of those circumstances which relate to experience, such as the fact that we judge that this or that idea which we now have immediately before our mind refers to a certain thing situated outside us. We make such a judgement not because these things transmit the ideas to our mind through the sense organs, but because they transmit something which, at exactly that moment, gives the mind occasion to form these ideas by means of the faculty innate to it.⁶⁶

The similarities (and differences) are striking between the teaching of this passage and Suárez’s account. While Suárez betrays no concern about the potential disagreement between the intelligible species and the phantasm that determines it, he nonetheless is as emphatic as Descartes is about the way in which these species flow from the intellect itself with internal sensory experience providing only the occasion for the production of the species. Indeed, in a discussion of the way in which accidents flow from an essence, Suárez gives an important explanation of the process:

Form is not active unless there is a naturally resultant activity from it, which is called a “flowing” (*dimanatio*), for an effective flowing without an action is difficult to understand. Similarly, it is said that the same reality does not act in itself except

in this genus of accident, that is, a result, or certainly that it does not act unless as a power of generating.⁶⁷

The implication from this passage is that the production of the species is a “naturally resultant activity” from the power itself. It is hard to see how the species, then, could be considered anything but innate, not in the sense of the platonic theory as he understands it, but as some sort of dispositional or latent theory.

Now, there is one crucial way in which the analogy between Descartes’s and Suárez’s accounts breaks down. Descartes is talking about full-blown innate ideas, that is, bits of knowledge. Suárez, however, is discussing only the generation of the intelligible species and does not identify these species with actual knowledge. Since the intelligible species is only a “partially completing immediate instrument” (*partialiter complens immediatum instrumentum*),⁶⁸ he is not committed to the claim that our concepts are innate in any way other than Thomas would be. They are innate because they are produced by the intellect itself. Where he diverges from Thomas would be the denial of causality between the internal sense and the intellect.

This account of the agent intellect is all we have from which we can extrapolate how the internal sense is properly named an “agent” internal sense. We have noted above that the external senses have no direct causal role in the formation of an act of internal sensation other than as a kind of “matter” or determination of the internal sense. It follows, as odd as it may sound, that the species within the internal sense by which it imagines, remembers, cogitates and performs its other functions must in fact be its own product, a product occasioned by, but not caused by, the activity of the external senses. Now, Suárez does state that the senses lack species and thus need the agency of something external. However, he qualifies that claim by pointing out that such a requirement applies especially (*maxime*) to the external senses.⁶⁹ In fact by immediately adding this qualification, he is pointing to the much more complicated picture of internal sensation with which he furnishes us, one in which the internal sense lacks a species in only a qualified manner, namely because it needs some determination from the external senses in order to produce its own species within itself. So, unlike external sensory experience, which requires that the power receive a species from the sensible object, the internal sense produces its own species. Most importantly, it follows from the structural parallels obtaining between internal sense and intellect that the products of the internal sense are innate. Such a conclusion cannot help but sound odd to us, but I can see no other way to account for the strict similarities that Suárez mentions in discussing the two powers. It follows, then, that internal sensible species, phantasms, flow from the very agency of the internal sense power in accordance with a

determination from the soul. The soul itself is affected by (is excited by), but not effected by external sensation. Hence, it really does seem that if we have a noneffective “exciting,” that the soul itself must be actively aware of what is happening in its powers. Only such an active awareness accounts for both the non-passivity of the soul and its determinative role in both internal sensation and intellect.

There is, then, a striking parallel between the need for an agent internal sense and an agent intellect. Both are required because the intellect and the internal sense cannot know without some determination from outside themselves, yet at the same time, nothing outside the relevant power is causally present in the two powers. Consequently, Suárez posits an efficiency, a “*resultantia*,” within each of the two powers. He can then argue that the power itself produces the species by which it knows so that all causality resides in the power itself. At the same time, though, while the species arises from the power itself, there must be some determination that prompts, as it were, the power to create one species and not another. In the movement from external sensation through internal sensation to intellectual cognition, each power produces an act of cognition and a proper species through which it knows. However, the effect of that cognitive act is severely circumscribed. One power’s act of cognition is not the cause of the next power’s act. Instead, each act of cognition merely has some effect on the soul in which the power is rooted such that the soul determines the succeeding power’s cognitive act. In the case of both internal sensation and intellectual cognition, he uses the term “agent” to point to a certain activity present within the power itself that allows it to know, and he is willing to call that activity by a name that usually denotes a distinct power. One cannot help but sense that Suárez is straining to be creative within a traditional scholastic vocabulary, and that the traditional vocabulary both provides an access to his thought and obscures, at first anyway, the novel ways in which he is using it.⁷⁰

Conclusion

In this paper, I have tried to provide an overview of the main themes of Suárez’s account of internal sensation by stressing two main issues. The first involves his reduction of a multiplicity of such internal powers to just one power. The second involves the complex relationship that obtains between the internal sense power and the other cognitive powers (the external senses and the intellect). I now want to conclude by making a few general remarks about his account. The most striking feature of his theory is the way in which he downplays any progressive cognitive role for the internal sense. The strong impression we get is that the internal sense just replicates and synthesizes the information received from the external senses. Of course, one of

its operations is a kind of creative imagination whereby I can construct fictional objects such as gold mountains. However, he resists importing into the internal sense any real ability to reason about its objects. The internal sense becomes little more than an instinctive capacity. There is no reasoning internal to it so its work is pretty much automatic. Now, he recognizes that reason can direct the activity in some way, but that feature refers more to the way in which the intellect might direct the attention of the internal sense.

Lost in Suárez's account is any of the richness present in Thomas's. The internal sense in humans is little different than the internal sense in animals. It is worth considering why Suárez might abandon this richer account of internal sensation. The justification can be found in their differing conceptions of the role of intellect. It is a well-known fact that for Thomas the proper object of the intellect is the common nature or essence present in material singular objects.⁷¹ Consequently, the gap between the particularity of sense and the universality of intellection is quite large. By developing a rich account of internal sensation, Thomas mediates this gap by importing quasi-reasoning features into internal sense. Suárez has no such worry. He holds that the proper object of the intellect is the material singular object itself.⁷² It is the work of the intellect, after its initial knowledge of the singular, to discern the universal features of nature. Accordingly, the only mediating function appropriate to the internal sense is providing a synthesized phantasm representing the sensible accidents of a singular object in a unified manner. I need a phantasm of *that* tree before I can have *that* tree present to my intellect. Thus, the intelligible species is not a representation of the universal nature present in material objects, but is only an immaterial representation of a material phantasm. The agent intellect's operation involves no universalizing. Given these different starting points, it seems unproblematic that Suárez rejects all the mediating work that Thomas's account of internal sensation supplies. This rejection of the rich mediation of internal sense also leads to a strikingly different account of the relation of the internal senses to the other cognitive powers. By making each of the cognitive powers self-contained, he isolates the intellect from the sense powers. His convoluted theory of the non-causal mechanisms of cognition suggest a dissatisfaction with accounts of human cognition that do not take into consideration the radical dualism implicit in the distinction between the materiality of sense and the immateriality of intellect. Most impressive is the way in which he sets up the parallel between the pairs external sensation/internal sensation and internal sensation/intellect. This structural parallel shows that the issue is not just one of immaterial power/material power, but rather concerns the distinctness of powers. The result is that the soul itself must play a role in cognition. Specifying that role, as we saw, is quite difficult, but at the very least we can think of it as a kind of general awareness of the contents of the distinct powers.

However, while it is unclear if that awareness is conscious or preconscious in some way, it remains the case that the separate activities of the powers are insufficient in and of themselves to account for our cognition. The commitment to the distinction of powers seems to rest on two foundations: the radical discontinuity between material powers and immaterial powers as well as the inability to discover some mechanism by which the external senses could communicate their information to the internal senses. The impression one gets is that Suárez was driven to his account because no other account was unproblematic. While his own account may seem excessively baroque, he never accepts needless complexity. This radical distinctness of powers also leads, in the end, to his acceptance of the innate presence, whether latent or merely dispositional, of species in both the internal sense and the intellect, requiring only some logically prior occasion to bring forth the species.

Notes

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1. The standard biography of Suárez is Raoul Scorraile, *François Suárez de la Compagnie de Jesus*, 2 vols, Paris 1911. More recent discussions include Jorge J. E. Gracia, *Francisco Suárez: The Man in History*, in: *The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 55 (1991), 259-66; Carlos Noreña, *Suárez and the Jesuits*, in: *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 55 (1991), 267-86; For overviews of Suárez's influence, see J. Irriarte, *La proyección sobre Europa de un gran metafísico, o Suárez en la filosofía en los días del Barroco*, in: *Razón y Fe*, número extraordinario, (1948), 229-65; Jean-François Courtine, *Suárez et le système de la métaphysique*, Paris 1991, 405-18; John P. Doyle, *Suárez—The Man, His Work and His Influence*, in: *Francisco Suárez, Disputation LIV*, trans. John P. Doyle, Milwaukee 1995, 1-15. For a catalog of the works of Suárez, see M. Solana, *Historia de la filosofía española, época del Renacimiento*, vol. III, Madrid 1941, 333-40.

2. *Francisco Suárez, Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima*, ed. Salvador Castellote, 3 vols., Madrid 1978-1991. Henceforth, I will cite this work as *DA*, followed by disputation, question and paragraph. This work has a rather complicated textual history. Briefly, the *Commentaria* is the result of Suárez's early teaching assignment at Segovia in 1572. The work was never published in Suárez's lifetime. However, towards the

end of his life, Suárez decided to rework the material for publication. He replaced the nomenclature of “disputation” and “question” with that of “book” and “chapter” and managed to rework the entire first disputation and the first six questions of the second disputation before his death in 1617. When his editor, P. Alvarez put together the final edition of the work in 1621, he used the revised first books (based on the first 18 questions of the early version) and the early manuscript to make a complete work. Castellote’s recent critical edition of the entire early version is the one I follow here. For the full manuscript history of the *Commentaria*, see Castellote’s introduction to vol. 1, xxxvii-lxviii.

3. *Summa theologiae* I, q. 57, a. 1 ad 2: “Dicendum quod sensus non apprehendit essentias rerum, sed exteriora accidentia tantum. Similiter neque imaginatio, sed apprehendit solas similitudines corporum. Intellectus autem solus apprehendit essentias rerum.” All translations from the *Summa theologiae* are from *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, New York 1945, edited and annotated, with an introduction, by Anton C. Pegis. Latin texts are from *Summa theologiae*, cura et studio Instituti Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis, ad textum S. Pii Pp. V iussu confectum recognita, Ottawa 1941-45.

4. *DA IX.4.1* (vol. III: 152): “Est differentia magna inter sensum et intellectus quod sensus in externorum accidentium sensibilibus cognitione sistit, intellectus vero non sic, sed ex accidentium cognitione ad contemplanda ea quae sub accidentibus latent ingreditur, et ideo intellectus dictus est quasi «intus legens».”

5. Recent accounts of Aristotle’s theory of the imagination include: Martha C. Nussbaum, *Aristotle’s “De motu animalium”*: Text with Translation, Commentary, and Interpretive Essays, Princeton 1978, 221-69; Malcolm Scofield, *Aristotle on the Imagination*, in: G. E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L. Owen (eds.), *Aristotle on Mind and the Senses: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum*, Cambridge 1978, 99-140, reprinted in: Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie O. Rorty (eds.), *Essays on Aristotle’s “De anima”*, Oxford 1992, 249-77. Dorthea Frede (*The Cognitive Role of phantasia in Aristotle*, in: *Essays on Aristotle’s “De anima”*, 279-96) stresses the mediating role that imagination plays between sense cognition and intellectual cognition.

6. For developments in the theory of the internal senses after Aristotle, see Harry A. Wolfson, *The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic and Hebrew Philosophic Texts*, in: *Harvard Theological Review* 2,8 (1935), 69-133, reprinted in: Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams (eds.), *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion*, vol. 1, Cambridge, Mass. 1973, 250-314; George Klubertanz, *The Discursive Power: Sources and Doctrine of the “Vis Cogitativa” According to St. Thomas Aquinas*, St. Louis 1952; E. Ruth Harvey, *The Inward*

Wit. Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, London 1975.

7. For an idea of the complexity of such a task, see the studies mentioned in the previous note.

8. For Suárez's statement of the plausibility of Thomas's account, see *DA*, VIII.1.13 (vol. III: 28).

9. For Thomas's account of the common sense, see *Quaestiones de anima*, q. 13; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4. For discussion of his treatment of the common sense, see E. J. Ryan, *The Role of the "Sensus Communis" in the Psychology of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Carthagen, Ohio 1951, 127-46; R. W. Schmidt, *The Unifying Sense: Which?*, in: *The New Scholasticism*, 57 (1983), 1-12; Francois-Xavier Putallaz, *La sens de la réflexion chez Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris 1991, 45-58.

10. A standard thomistic position. See, for example, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 84, a. 7. For Thomas's refusal to call the species in the common sense a phantasm, see *Summa theologiae* I, q. 89, a. 5 and *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, c. 73. For helpful discussion of these passages, see Edward P. Mahoney, *Sense, Intellect and Imagination in Albert, Thomas and Siger*, in: Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge 1982, 607.

11. The central passages for Thomas's demarcation of the role of the internal sense powers are *Summa theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4 and *Quaestiones de anima*, q. 13. R. Brennan (*The Thomistic Concept of the Imagination*, in: *The New Scholasticism*, 15 (1941), 149-61) gives a good exposition of the various functions of the imagination.

12. *Summa theologiae* I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 3.

13. *DA*, VIII.1.1 (vol. III, 14). The most extensive discussion of Suárez's account of the internal sense power is Salvador Cubells, *Die Anthropologie des Suárez*, Munich 1962, 13745. See also, the brief remarks in J. M. Alejandro, *La gnoseología del Doctor Eximio y la acusación nominalista*, Santander 1948, 227-9.

14. *DA*, VIII.1.2 (vol. III: 14-16).

15. *DA*, VIII.1.3 (vol. III: 18).

16. *DA*, VIII.1.8 (vol. III: 22).

17. *DA*, VIII.1.9 (vol. III, 22).

18. *DA*, VIII.1.10 (vol. III, 22-4): "Cogitativa a multis putatur esse potentia quaedam sensitiva hominis, potens ratiocinari circa particularia et componere et dividere. Sed haec virtus excedit limites partis sensitivae . . . Et ideo cogitativa nihil aliud signif cat quam ipsamet potentiam sensitivam interiorem discernentem inter conveniens et disconveniens, prout

speciali modo in homine existit; et in illo habet maiorem aliquam perfectionem, quia non tantum ex instinctu naturae ducitur, sed etiam ex maiori cognitione et experientia, et saepe etiam a ratione dirigitur.”

19. *DA*, VIII.1.11 (vol. III: 24).

20. *DA*, VIII.1.12 (vol. III, 24-2): “Quare iudico reminiscentiam potissime fieri ab intellectu, saltem ad discursum et compositiones, quae illi admiscuntur, quia vero sensus semper comitatur intellectum, ideo quando intellectus discurrit per diversa loca et tempora, sensus etiam comitatur, et illa indagatio, quae fit in sensu, non per proprium discursum, sed per quamdam successionem apprehensionum, ab una in aliam procedendo, dici potest reminiscentia et operatio sensus, dependens a praevio discursu intellectus.”

21. *Summa theologiae*, I, Q. 77, a.3.: “Dicendum quod potentia, secundum illud quod est potentia, ordinatur ad actum. Unde oportet rationem potentiae accipi ex actu ad quem ordinatur; et per consequens oportet quod ratio potentiae differat a ceteris, ut differat a ceteris ratio actus. Ratio autem actus diversificatur secundum differentiam rationem obiecti.”

22. In addition to the argument he puts forth against the thesis of a multiplicity of internal sense powers, Suárez also tries to show that the authority of Aristotle is on his side. See, for example, *DA*, VIII.1.21 (vol. III, 40-4). In this assertion, he may in fact be correct. See Klubertanz 1952 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 6), 24-8.

23. *DA*, VIII.1.14 (vol. III, 28-30): “Quarta ergo opinio, quae inter citatas est probabilior, duplex habet fundamentum: Primum est cognitionem sensitivam, aliam fieri per species sensatas, aliam per insensatas, et potentias cognoscentes per illas esse diversas, nam potentiae cognoscentes per species sensibiles differant rationum differentiae sunt. . . . Secundum fundamentum est quod in potentiis sensitivis potentia cognoscens in praesentia obiecti et in absentia sunt distinctae. Probatur. Nam potentia cognoscens in praesentia debet esse facile immutativa et apprehensiva, cognoscens vero potentia in absentia debet esse conservativa et retentiva specierum; ista autem duo non possunt convenire eidem potentiae materiali; nam facilis apprehensio in corporalibus provenit ex humiditate, retentio vero ex siccitate; quae duo non possunt praedominari in organo eiusdem potentiae; ergo.” A quick perusal of the major texts of Thomas Aquinas in which he discusses the four internal sense powers shows such principles at work. In addition to *Summa theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4, see *Quaestio de anima*, a. 13; *In II De anima*, l. 6.

24. *Summa theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4: “Sed necessarium est animali ut quaerat aliqua vel fugiat, non solum quia sunt convenientia vel non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed etiam propter aliquas alias commoditates et utilitates, sive nocumenta; sicut ovis videns lupum

venientem fugit non propter indecentiam coloris vel figurae, sed quasi inimicum naturae. . . .
Necessarium est ergo animali quod percipiat huiusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit
sensus exterior.”

25. *Summa theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4. For discussion of Avicenna’s view, see Klubertanz 1952 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 6), 92-7.

26. *DA*, VIII.1.17 (vol. III, 34-6)

27. *DA*, VIII.1.18 (vol. III, 36)

28. *DA*, VI.2.16 (vol. II, 492)

29. *DA*, VIII.1.24 (vol. III, 44-6).

30. Thomas discusses incidental sensation at *Sententia libri De anima*, Book II, lectio 13; *De veritate* q. 1, a. 11. For Aristotle’s discussion, see *De anima* II, 6. W. Bernard (*Rezeptivität und Spontaneität der Wahrnehmung bei Aristoteles*, Baden-Baden 1988, 75-86) argues that incidental sensation has an intellectual component. He is followed by Charles Kahn (*Aristotle on Thinking*, in: Nussbaum-Rorty 1992 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 5), 368). For a different view, see S. Cashdollar, *Aristotle’s Account of Incidental Perception*, in: *Phronesis*, 18 (1973), 156-75.

31. *DA*, IX.4.6 (vol. III, 160).

32. Thomas holds that one of the roles of the internal senses is to prepare the phantasms prior to their illumination and abstraction by the agent intellect. See the discussion in Klubertanz 1952 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 6), 259 for a list of texts where Thomas discusses this issue.

33. *Summa theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4; *Quaestiones de anima* a. 13.

34. *DA*, VI.2.9 (vol. II, 478).

35. *DA*, VI.2.9 (vol. II, 478).

36. *DA*, VI.2.9 (vol. II, 480).

37. *DA*, VI.2.9 (vol. II, 480-2). Leen Spruit (*Species intelligibiles: from perception to knowledge*, 2 vols., Leiden 1994-95, vol. 2, 299) has some interesting remarks on the centrality of the notion of “attention” in Suárez’s account of cognition, arguing that it provides him a way to demarcate effectively the active and passive sides of cognition.

38. *DA*, VI.2.10 (vol. II, 482).

39. *DA*, VI.2.10 (vol. II, 482): “. . . quod per actionem cognoscendi producitur quidam intrinsecus terminus illius, qui est qualitas repraesentativa rei in actu secundo; per hanc ergo qualitatem, quam sensus exterior in se ipso format, potest probabiliter credi produci in sensu interiori speciem quamdam repraesentativam eiusdem obiecti. . . .”

40. For Suárez's account of external sensation, see the helpful discussions in Alejandro 1948 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 13), 219-27; G. Picard, *Essai sur la connaissance sensible d'après les scolastiques*, in: *Archives de philosophie*, 4 (1926), 1-93; Cubells 1962 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 13), 143-55; Allison Simmons, *Explaining Sense Perception: A Scholastic Challenge*, in: *Philosophical Studies*, 73 (1994), 257-75. Suárez's account of external sensation can be found at *DA*, V.5 (vol. II, 368-412).

41. *DA*, VI.2.11 (vol. II, 484).

42. *DA*, VI.2.12 (vol. II, 484): "Respondetur negando primam sequelam, nam comparatio non recte fit; comparando ergo actum primum unius potentiae ad actum primum alterius, ille est perfectior, qui est perfectoris potentiae; et idem est comparando actus secundos inter se. Tamen comparando actum secundum potentiae minus perfectae ad actum primum potentiae perfectioris, ille erit perfectior, quia ex suo genere est in altiori gradu actus constitutus." For a helpful discussion of grades of actuality and potentiality in cognition, see Walter M. Neidl, *Der Realitätsbegriff des Franz Suárez nach den "Disputationes Metaphysicae"*, Munich 1966, 12-7.

43. *DA*, VI.2.13 (vol. II, 486) While Suárez states that this position is "probable," not certain, nonetheless he sees it as the best explanation. Accordingly, I will simply view it as Suárez's considered opinion.

44. *DA*, VI.2.13 (vol. II, 486): "Sensus interior et exterior in eadem anima radicanter, unde eadem est anima quae videt per visum, et per imaginationem imaginatur; est ergo haec naturalis consensio inter has potentias, quod eo ipso quod anima aliquid visu percipit, statim format similitudinem illius rei in imaginatione sua, non mediante potentia ab imaginatione distincta, sed per virtutem eiusdem imaginationis, ita ut posita sensatione extrinseca, naturaliter resultet species in interiori sensu, non ex activitate sensationis, sed ex activitate ipsius animae per imaginationem, ad praesentiam tamen rei sensatae." See also III.3.21 (vol. II, 148). The most extensive study of the soul's powers remains Joseph Ludwig, *Das akausale Zusammenwirken (sympathia) der Seelenvermögen in der Erkenntnislehre des Suárez*, Munich 1929. Ludwig discusses passages throughout Suárez's writing and shows that this view of the relation of the soul's powers has roots in earlier thinkers, especially those typically classified as "Augustinian." Spruit 1994-95 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 38), 302 recognizes that in addition to speaking of a kind of "sympathy" or "harmony" between the soul's powers, Suárez also talks of a common "root" that can explain this harmony. Spruit finds this a melding together of ideas taken from John Peter Olivi (sympathy) and Giles of Rome (rooting of powers in the same soul). I take it that in fact these metaphors point to the same general

point: there is no causal interaction between the soul's powers. Consequently, the soul itself must play some role in the activities of these various sense powers.

45. *DA*, II.3.10 (vol. 1, 174).

46. For the materiality of the phantasm, see *DA*, IX.2.2 (vol. III, 78), where Suárez states bluntly that “the phantasm is material” (“phantasma autem materiale est”).

47. *DA*, IX.2.3 (vol. III, 82). For discussion about the role of the agent intellect, see Alejandro 1948 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 13), 329-33; Cubells 1962 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 13), 190-3; Spruit 1994-95 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 37), vol. II, 301-5.

48. *DA*, IX.2.4 (vol. III, 82).

49. *DA*, IX.2.11 (vol. III, 94).

50. *DA*, IX.2.12 (vol. III, 94).

51. *DA*, IX.7.6 (vol. III, 202): “Anima dum est in corpore habet intrinsecam dependentiam a phantasia, id est, non potest per intellectum operari nisi simul actu operetur per phantasma. . . . Non quod ipsa phantasmata intelligantur, id est, cognoscantur, sed quod per illa phantasia simul operetur cum intellectu.”

52. *DA*, IX.2.12 (vol. III, 96).

53. *DA*, IX.2.11 (vol. III, 94): “Intellectus agens numquam eYcit species nisi a phantasiae cognitione determinetur. . . . Ratio autem esse potest, nam intellectus agens est indifferens ad efficiendas omnes species, et ideo, ut efficiat has vel illas indiget aliquo determinante; nihil est autem aliud a quo possit determinari nisi a phantasiae cognitione; ergo.”

54. *DA*, IX.2.12 (Vol. III, 96).

55. *DA*, IX.2.13 (Vol. III, 98): “Dicitur quod in potentiis animae est alius modus determinationis in quantum una potentia praeparat materiam alteri, vel in quantum actio unius potentiae habet necessariam connexionem cum actione alterius.”

56. *DA*, IX.2.12 (vol. III, 96).

57. *DA*, VI.2.16 (vol. II, 492-4): “Ad auctoritatem vero negativam Aristotelis, quia hoc numquam dixit, respondetur quod multa etiam alia non dixit neque exacte tractavit. Verum est quod D. Thomas, *I p., q. 79, a. 3, ad 1*, videtur hanc activitatem specierum denegare omnibus sensibus. Sed forte loquitur de sensibus quantum ad primam receptionem specierum, quae fit ab objecto, ex qua oritur cuiuscumque alterius speciei productio.” Thomas, in the passage cited, states: “Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and hence there is so need for an agent sense. Therefore it is clear that, in the nutritive part, all the powers are active, whereas in the sensitive part all are passive, but in the intellectual part,

there is something active and something passive.” [“Dicendum quod sensibilia inveniuntur actu extra animam; et ideo non oportuit ponere sensum agentem. Et sic patet quod in parte nutritiva omnes potentiae sunt activae; in parte autem sensitiva, omnes passivae; in parte vero intellectiva est aliquid activum, et aliquid passivum.”] Thomas is clear in this passage and Suárez’s attempt to read something else into what Thomas says is an indication of the real distance between the two views.

58. He discusses the view of Aristotle and Thomas at *DA*, IX.8.16 (vol. III, 232-4) and the view of Averroes at *DA*, IX.8.3 (vol. III, 214).

59. *DA*, IX.8.17 (vol. III, 234). For Nifo on the denial of a real distinction between agent and potential intellects in the rational soul, see *Augustini Niphi Suessani philosophi in via Aristotelis De intellectu libri sex*, Venice 1554, IV, f. 35 v. For discussion, see Edward P. Mahoney, *Pier Nicola Castellani and Agostino Nifo on Averroes’ Doctrine of the Agent Intellect*, in: *Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia*, 25 (1970), 400-3; *id.*, *Agostino Nifo and Saint Thomas Aquinas*, in: *Memorie Domenicane*, 7 (1976), 210-1.

60. *DA*, IX.8.18 (vol. III, 234-6): “Angelicus enim intellectus ex natura sua habet inditas species omnium rerum, quae quasi dimanant a virtute propria intellectus, quasi passiones ab essentia; potentia autem sensitiva, maxime exteriores et speciebus carent et illas ab extrinsecis objectis recipiunt; intellectus autem noster et ex natura sua speciebus caret—in quo et a perfectione angeli declinat—, habet tamen convenientiam aliquam cum illo, scilicet quod statim ac anima nostra cognoscit per phantasiam rem aliquam, dimanat ab ipso intellectu species representans rem illam. Unde haec efficientia potius est per modum cuiusdam emanationis speciei ab intellectu, et ita non est potentia distincta illa efficientia.”

61. *DA*, IX.8.18 (vol. III, 236).

62. *DA*, III.1.21 (vol. II, 78-80).

63. Previous scholars have been split on the whether Suárez’s account amounts to a version of innatism, Nigel Abercrombie (*Saint Augustine and French Classical Thought*, New York 1972 [reprint of the 1938 edition], 82) states that Suárez is clearly committed to a form of innatism. See also, Ludwig 1929 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 44), 56-7 who comments on the passage cited in note 60. Spruit 1994-95 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 37), vol. II, 304 rejects any innatism in Suárez. However, Spruit appears to miss the fact that the crucial passage discussed by Ludwig is not just about angelic cognition, but also about the human intellect. Alejandro 1948 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 13), 186-8, speaks only of a “dynamic power” (*potencia dinámica*) and an “innate force” (*fuera ingénita*).

64. For different varieties of “innatism” see the helpful remarks in Dominic Scott,

Recollection and Experience: Plato's Theory of Learning and its Successors, Cambridge 1995, 91-5.

65. *DA*, IX.2.2 (vol. III, 80).

66. *Comments on a Certain Broadsheet*, in: *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, tr. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothof and Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge 1985, vol. 1, 304 (= *Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, Paris 1964-76), vol. VIII B, 358-9. Abercrombie 1972 [1938] (*op.cit.*, above, n. 63), 86 suggests that Suárez's version of "occasionalism" is considerably less vague than Descartes's. For additional discussion of this passage in Descartes, see Scott 1995 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 64), 91-6.

67. *DA*, III.3.14 (vol. II, 136): "Forma non est activa nisi actione naturaliter resultanti ex illa; quae dicitur dimanatio, nam dimanatio effectiva sine actione difficile intelligitur. Et similiter dicitur quod idem non agit in se, nisi isto genere actionis, scilicet, per resultantiam, vel certe quod non agit, nisi ut virtus generantis."

68. *DA*, V.4.16 (vol. II, 366). Picard 1926 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 40), 38-41, Alejandro 1948 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 13), 196-9 and Cubells 1962 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 13), 112-7 all correctly stress the instrumentality of the species in the context of the immanent process of cognition.

69. See quote above, note 59.

70. *DA*, IX.8.18 (vol. III, 234-6).

71. *Summa theologiae* I, q. 85, a. 1.

72. *DA*, IX.3 (vol. III, 106-52).