Husserl’s Concept of the ‘Transcendental Person’: Another Look at the Husserl–Heidegger Relationship

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This paper offers a further look at Husserl’s late thought on the transcendental subject and the Husserl–Heidegger relationship. It attempts a reconstruction of how Husserl hoped to assert his own thoughts on subjectivity vis-à-vis Heidegger, while also pointing out where Husserl did not reach the new level that Heidegger attained. In his late manuscripts, Husserl employs the term ‘transcendental person’ to describe the transcendental ego in its fullest ‘concretion’. I maintain that although this concept is a consistent development of Husserl’s earlier analyses of constitution, Husserl was also defending himself against Heidegger, who criticized him for framing the subject in terms of transcendental ego rather than as Dasein. Husserl was convinced that he could successfully respond to Heidegger’s critique, but he did not grasp that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology was an immanent development, rather than a scathing criticism, of his own phenomenology.

Introduction

It is fair to call the Husserl–Heidegger relationship the classic topic of phenomenology. It was at the heart of the phenomenological debate even before the publication of Heidegger’s ground-breaking *Being and Time* (1927) and has received attention again in recent phenomenological scholarship. Many philosophers, and not only those affiliated with the phenomenological movement, have developed their own philosophical standpoint by associating themselves with the Husserlian or the Heideggerian versions of phenomenology (and derivations of them), or by thinking through the dispute between the two thinkers in order to become clear about their own philosophical standpoint. With regard to the nature of their relationship, some have claimed, on the one hand, that Husserl and Heidegger have very little or almost nothing in common. Others, on the other hand, have argued that they are in fact working on the same philosophical project without being aware of it. Because of its complexity, this has been a long-standing issue, and not only within phenomenology, which has contributed to the way phenomenology as a whole has been received by the philosophical world at large. Lastly, given their difficult personal relationship one should regard Husserl’s and Heidegger’s views of one another with great scepticism. Indeed, a great deal of misunderstanding, deliberate or otherwise, led to their dispute and to the feud that ultimately ended their friendship.
In this article I am focusing on a specific topic that will offer one pathway into this difficult field, namely, the question of **personhood** or of a phenomenological **anthropology**. What is at stake, moreover, is the question of phenomenology as **transcendental philosophy** that, for Husserl, could only be based on consciousness framed in a transcendental register. To Heidegger, phenomenology – leaving aside the question as to its status as transcendental – must begin with considering concrete *Dasein*, which, however, is just a point of access to the question of *Being* as the actual *telos* of his project. Historically, the last philosophical debate between the two took place during their collaboration on an entry for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (on ‘Phenomenology’) which Husserl was asked to write in 1927. Perhaps because Husserl already sensed the differences in Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology (he did not read *Being and Time* until 1931), Husserl called on his former assistant to help him draft this text. The differences arising here are paralleled by passages in Heidegger’s *Marburg Lectures* as well as in *Being and Time*, where Heidegger (in §7) famously defines ‘phenomenology’ purely in terms of a formal method of ‘letting things be seen in the way they show themselves’ – and in so doing, severs an immediate link to consciousness. Indeed, he divorces phenomenology abruptly from that which for Husserl could ever be the topic for phenomenology, namely, consciousness or subjectivity conceived as transcendental, i.e., as distinct from worldly subjectivity. Yet, disconnecting the phenomenological method from a method for analysing consciousness does not mean that Heidegger did not thematize subjectivity in his own way – as factical being-in-the-world, which he termed *Dasein*. Heidegger clearly wanted to move away from the tradition of what Gadamer has called *Reflexionsphilosophie*, i.e., a philosophical inquiry that gains access to the question of subjectivity by reflection, or more generally, theory. Regardless of his often scathing critiques, the question of man is, certainly up to *Being and Time*, at least one very important aspect of Heidegger’s overall project. At the end of 1927, Heidegger writes the following remarkable sentence to his Marburg colleague, the theologian Rudolf Bultmann: ‘The fundament of [my work] is developed by starting from the “subject”, properly understood as the human *Dasein*, so that with the radicalization of this approach the true motives of German idealism may likewise come into their own’. It will be my claim that Husserl and Heidegger (the Heidegger of the ‘phenomenological decade’ 1919–29) had this very paradigm ‘subjectivity’ in common. This claim will not be met with resistance if it can in principle be agreed that Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity in Division I of *Being and Time* is at least a minimal account of what it means to be a human subject. By ‘paradigm’ I mean, furthermore, that subjectivity was both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s
methodological foundation in developing their respective philosophical ‘systems’, regardless of where this foundation led them – Husserl, to a full-fledged eidetic science of consciousness, Heidegger, to a new ontology that thematizes the Being of the entities. Also, both had important thematic things to say about human subjectivity itself. However, the difference in the way they understood subjectivity can be seen as the central topic around which their dispute evolved. Although Husserl considered Heidegger’s redrafting of phenomenology as a hermeneutics of facticity fundamentally flawed – derogatorily rendering it ‘anthropologism’ – the criticisms that Heidegger levelled against Husserl’s concept of the transcendental subject, e.g., in his comments on Husserl’s draft of the encyclopedia entry, remained in the back of Husserl’s mind and resurfaced in peculiar contexts in his later manuscripts. It is my contention that the curious term ‘transcendental person’ that Husserl employs in some of these manuscripts, while being consistent with his earlier discussions of personhood (especially in Ideas II), is a direct reply to his pupil’s objections. It is this concept on which I would like to focus centrally in this paper, as it both forms a memorable catchy term for Husserl’s standpoint and yields an optimal target for Heidegger’s critique.

In section 1, I shall sketch both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s project of a philosophy of human subjectivity. It will become clear that Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s ‘unparticipating observer’, if plausible, has fatal consequences for Husserl’s project as a whole. Husserl acknowledges this critique to a certain extent and responds with a recasting of the transcendental subject in terms of the subject’s ‘concreteness’, for which the ‘transcendental person’ functions as a key term. In section 2, I shall set Husserl’s concept of the transcendental person in the context of his mature concept of constitution. This will prepare for a presentation of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s concept of the transcendental subject in section 3. In section 4, I shall try to elucidate Husserl’s counter-critique of Heidegger’s objections and shall attempt to reconstruct Husserl’s position, drawing from the scattered remarks that Husserl makes throughout his research manuscripts.

It is my intention to recount Husserl’s arguments against Heidegger as convincingly as possible, not to judge the ultimate veracity of Husserl’s position. In fact, a last assessment will, I believe, have to come to the conclusion that Husserl, probably more than Heidegger, wore blinkers that simply did not allow him to see beyond the polemic context and terminology in which Heidegger dressed his novel thought. Scholarship in this field made it clear that it was up to interpreters who did not belong to either Husserl’s or Heidegger’s camp to see the issues at stake more clearly. Their insights will be incorporated as much as possible in the course of this article. The purpose of the article is to present Husserl’s alleged arguments against Heidegger as he
penned them in his private study in his last years. This includes Husserl’s way of understanding
Heidegger’s attack – regardless of the fact that today we can perhaps no longer agree with
Husserl’s judgment. Whether Husserl understood Heidegger correctly – ultimately, I believe, he
did not – must be left open to further interpretation, as it goes beyond the scope of this paper. The
paper does not argue in favour of or against ‘Husserlian’ or ‘Heideggerian’ phenomenology, but is
meant as a further look at their relationship. I shall draw on Husserl’s hitherto unknown
manuscripts in the context of his reflections on the phenomenological method that culminate in
the concept of the ‘transcendental person’.

1 Philosophy as ‘Anthropology’ and Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s Concept of
the ‘Unparticipating Observer’

One can say, rather superficially, that Husserl’s philosophy had subjectivity as its topic,
Heidegger’s the question of Being. Nevertheless, one can make the case that Heidegger’s
emphasis, at least up to Being and Time, was on subjectivity as well. This is warranted by pointing
out that the subject, qua Dasein, is the focus of the fundamental ontology in Division I of Being and
Time, an analysis that is supposed to lead, ultimately, to the question of Being. The difference
between them is that Heidegger conceives of this subjectivity radically differently from the way
Husserl did; to the point that Heidegger considered ‘subjectivity’ or ‘consciousness’ inadequate
terms altogether. Heidegger’s critique of Husserl in Being and Time is first and foremost a critique
of Husserl’s conception of subjectivity, or more precisely, his framing of subjectivity along the lines
of Cartesianism and in terms of transcendental philosophy. Yet, in this reading, Husserl merely
stands at the end point of a development gone awry since Descartes. Heidegger’s
counter-concept of Dasein, a ‘being in the here and now’ as the term for that being which we
ourselves are (as essentially finite, caring beings), stands in stark contrast to Husserl’s
teleological concept of subjectivity as an endless field of research accessed by (potentially)
endless reflection. In this sense, and not completely without legitimacy, Heidegger’s approach
has been portrayed as that of a ‘hands on’, pragmatically oriented philosophy of practical
subjectivity and Husserl as an over-theoretical ‘armchair philosopher’ who seems to have no
interest other than describing in endless detail the inkwell he sees standing before him on his
desk. Both readings are certainly exaggerated and to a certain extent unfair; yet they were the
ways in which, falsely or not, the contrast between the two was often perceived – and in fact, by
Husserl himself. A closer look at both will reveal their inadequacy.

Indeed, to overlook the fact that Heidegger’s characterization of what it means to be a
human *Dasein* is a piece of ‘theoretical’ philosophy is fundamentally to misread Heidegger. Thus, the characterization of Husserl as the ‘theoretician’ and Heidegger as the ‘practitioner’ is an oversimplification and ultimately grossly misleading. They have in common a phenomenology of the subject, in Heidegger’s emphasis on *Dasein’s* practical behaviour and relation to itself, the others, and the world, and Husserl’s focus on science and eidetic intuition in order to bring out general characteristics of transcendental subjectivity. However, this distinction still does not get to the core of the matter with regard to the question of subjectivity. Getting to the ‘things themselves’ for Heidegger meant getting back to the original and concrete sense of what it means to be a factual concrete human subject. In a sense, this is no different from what Husserl wanted in his life-world ontology, except that Husserl never seemed to get beyond the foundations and in the end never arrived where Heidegger already was. Indeed, as we shall see, one of Husserl’s criticisms is that Heidegger took his point of departure ‘too high up’ (‘zu hoch angesetzt’ is a recurring complaint of Husserl’s) vis-à-vis Husserl’s approach ‘from the bottom up’. Husserl also could not overlook the compelling and genial simplicity of Heidegger’s designation of the human being as *Dasein* as being-in-the world. Heidegger was, ‘with one stroke’, where Husserl always wanted to be, as he was always busy with laying adequate foundations. Thus, it was Heidegger’s strong emphasis on the ‘concreteness’ of subjectivity which, I believe, in turn prompted Husserl to recast or reformulate his own conception of transcendental subjectivity in terms of the ‘transcendental person’. The term ‘transcendental person’ appears only a few times in Husserl’s entire work (and only in his private notes), as though Husserl was insecure about employing it. Although it features only in some later manuscripts, I am inclined to call it a key concept regarding what Husserl himself considered his main discovery, i.e., transcendental subjectivity in its universal dimensions (ultimately as intersubjectivity\(^\text{13}\)). Thus, to Husserl, only when one thematizes the person from the standpoint of transcendental phenomenology will one be in a position to arrive at the subject’s fullest and concrete being. Accordingly, Husserl believed that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology had no bearing on transcendental philosophy. Along with the irritation one must feel regarding the peculiarity of the term itself, what is perplexing is the motive which led Husserl to introduce this term, namely, the defence of his standpoint against Heidegger’s attack – and with Heidegger, the entire budding ‘existentialist movement’. Apart from immanent developments in Husserl’s thought with respect to the concept of personhood from *Ideas* II onwards,\(^\text{14}\) I believe that the strongest motive for employing this term comes as a reaction to Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s conception of phenomenology as transcendental idealism. Although the opposition between idealism and realism might be a tired philosophical distinction (especially since Husserl’s peculiar idealism at the same time has a
strong realistic tendency\footnote{14}, it seemed to many phenomenologists in Husserl’s circles that traditional ‘idealisms’ imply claims that seem almost impossible to reconcile with the character of phenomenology. Indeed, phenomenology is dedicated to the analysis of concrete phenomena, ‘things themselves’, instead of seemingly artificial distinctions that idealism makes, such as that between a mundane and a transcendental subject. Heidegger was, in this sense, decidedly an anti-idealist, although it is another question whether or not he subscribed to the transcendental turn. To Husserl, rejecting idealism included rejecting the transcendental turn. Heidegger’s critique of Husserl in this respect is most explicit in his famous comments on Husserl’s *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article as well as in certain passages in *Being and Time*. *Being and Time* can certainly be read in its entirety as a philosophical programme set up against or in competition with Husserl’s. One can speculate that these issues – Husserl’s transcendental project and Heidegger’s developing systematics – were the topic of the discussions that Husserl and Heidegger had at least up to 1929. And in 1931, the year in which Husserl gave his talk ‘Phenomenology and Anthropology’ throughout the German Kant societies – with ‘anthropology’ designating the adversarial philosophies of Scheler and, especially, Heidegger – Husserl concluded that Heidegger’s philosophy presented nothing but a pre-transcendental, i.e., naïve anthropology – ‘anthropologism’ – and not a transcendental phenomenology as a first philosophy in the sense that he, Husserl, inaugurated it.\footnote{15}

This is not to say, however, that Husserl’s phenomenology cannot also be understood in a certain ‘application’ as an anthropology, if one understands by this term a philosophical science devoted to the question of the human subject. Indeed, this would be an anthropology with a special meaning of *anthropos* and in a transcendentally clarified framework. Hence term the ‘anthropology’ is used here not as a term for a positive science but as the title for a philosophy that considers the question of man as a basis for further inquiry. In this sense, all transcendental philosophy since Kant can be called ‘anthropology’. Regarding Husserl’s reading of Heidegger, it is thus highly indicative that Husserl picks up mainly on Heidegger’s concept of *Dasein* and treats this as the centre of *Being and Time*, a reading, in other words, that made it possible for Husserl to term Heidegger’s philosophical project altogether an ‘anthropology’. We know that Heidegger repeatedly complained that many of his contemporaries understood his philosophy as just another version of existentialism – i.e., a philosophy that has human existence as its basis – rather than fundamental ontology. This was, in Heidegger’s eyes, a standard misunderstanding of his philosophical position, which was, instead, purportedly devoted to the *gigantomachia peri tes ousias* (the ‘giant battle concerning being’) inaugurated by Plato and Aristotle – and forgotten
since. We must leave aside the question of what Heidegger’s philosophy, at least in the period of *Being and Time*, was ‘really about’; the only point made here is that it is not unreasonable to read *Being and Time* as a highly original sketch of an anthropology (of *Dasein*), and that, furthermore, this was the way *Husserl* read it, as did so many of his contemporaries. If, however, one concedes that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is a question regarding the human subject as well, and if one goes along with Heidegger’s own assertion in *Being and Time* that the question of Being can only be dealt with from the perspective of a fundamental ontology of *Dasein*, then one can say that the question of a philosophical anthropology – as a philosophy of the subject – lies at the heart of the discussion between the two. This assertion can be further supported if one means by anthropology a philosophy that poses the question of the human being in ‘fullness’, as a *person*. For an anthropology of this sort, the main question would be what exactly *constitutes* this full-fledged personhood. It is in this respect that Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s concept of the transcendental ego exerts its fullest force.

Essentially, Heidegger holds that Husserl’s consideration of the ego as a transcendental ‘entity’ is far too abstract to account for the human being in her everyday life. ‘Abstract’ means here that the theoretical locus that Husserl seems to assume is not where *Dasein* actually takes place ‘first of all and most of the time’: in its factual, average everydayness (*durchschnittliche Alltäglichkeit*). It is this quotidian existence in its finitude that Husserl overlooks in Heidegger’s opinion. This is due to the neglect on Husserl’s part – and with him the entire Western philosophical tradition – to pose the question of the being of that entity which *exists* and as such *understands* itself and the world, rather than simply being *present-to-hand* (*vorhanden*). It is only a hermeneutics of *Dasein*’s quotidian facticity or average everydayness that can account for the person’s ‘true’ being, even if the primary mode of this being might be inauthentic. Thus the phenomenological account must first of all pay attention to this basic mode of *Dasein*’s existence and, since it is non-thematic, one must actually learn to see it, thereby not dismissing this basic mode of life. Indeed, Husserl’s concept of the subject as transcendental ego, according to Heidegger, tacitly ‘leaps over’ the question of the mode of being (*Seinsart*) of this entity (as well as the world it lives in), and, furthermore, leaves the question unanswered as to whether this transcendental ego is the same as or different from its ‘factual’ mundane counterpart. In framing the subject as transcendental ego, i.e., as different from any other worldly entity, Husserl sees that there is a difference in being between the subject and other entities. Yet he does not exploit this insight. Heidegger’s question of the being of the subject, as distinct from other *vorhanden* and *zuhanden* entities, is only possible on the basis of Husserl’s discovery. In this sense, one can say, Heidegger is presenting not so much a critique of Husserl as an immanent modification of his
Heidegger’s critique aims not only at the concept of the transcendental ego (its exact ontological status), but also at Husserl’s methodological ‘device’ or agent inextricably involved in analysing it, namely, that of the ‘unparticipating observer’. Of course, Heidegger was not so naïve as to overlook the fact that in his own account the analysing agent must somehow distance itself from its own entanglement in the world – since it is one and the same Dasein that now lives ‘naturally’ and later philosophizes. However, he wants to undercut the theory–practice distinction altogether. In this sense, it is Heidegger’s contention that Husserl’s concept of the ‘unparticipating observer’ also reflects Husserl’s theoretical or all too abstract methodological approach to the question of the subject. This might account for the fact that an explicit analysis of the philosophizing agent is missing in Being and Time. Thus, because of the ‘detached’ stance of the ‘unparticipating observer’, Husserl does not ‘see’ the worldhood of the world and the human being’s engagement in it in their concrete modes. Or, as Merleau-Ponty famously phrased it: the reduction cannot be completed, for if it were, we would be disembodied spirits. Even to pose this deliberate detachment as an ideal is Husserl’s proton pseudos. This is not to say that Heidegger completely rejects the transcendental reduction – perhaps there is a reduction in Heidegger of a completely different kind. Rather, what he questions is the problematic methodological intention implied in proposing an ‘unparticipating observer’ in the course of the transcendental reduction.

The purpose of Husserl’s unparticipating observer is to assume a standpoint, an ‘attitude’, that enables a description of the world and man after an epoche from (a bracketing of) the ‘natural attitude’. The natural attitude is Husserl’s term for our unreflecting (‘naïve’) everyday living in the world. To do philosophy, to Husserl, implies a break with this unreflecting lifestyle. Moreover, this change of attitude from the natural to the philosophical standpoint also by necessity entails a transcendental turn from the naïvely living human ego, who takes the existence of the world for granted, to the ego that experiences the world. As such, the transcendental ego is the agent that ‘constitutes’ the world in intentional acts. Thus, although the transcendental turn is that which enables Husserl first of all to open the view upon the ‘natural attitude’, from reading the ‘Fundamental Reflection’ in Ideas I one could argue that at the same time, and precisely with this methodological step, he closes the door to a genuine recognition of this sphere of the ‘natural attitude’. Indeed, living in the life-world is discussed and then dismissed in few pages. In short, if one needs to take a step away from the ‘natural attitude’ in order to view it in the first place, one has taken the wrong approach from the very start. In this sense, Heidegger’s insistence on the facticity of Dasein must also be conceived as a general attack on one of the fundamental principles of Husserl’s phenomenology which, according to Heidegger, takes too abstract a
stance to give a truly phenomenological account of the human being as existing in her life-world. As Landgrebe, Husserl’s former assistant, rightly remarks, ‘in Heidegger’s rejection of the “unparticipating observer” lies an attack on one of Husserl’s core thoughts’, namely, his notion of philosophical theory. Such a stance accounts for an abstract view of subjectivity and cannot represent its true concretion. In other words, because of his ‘theorizing’ presupposition, Husserl failed to really get ‘to the subject itself’. The upshot of this critique is ultimately that the distinction between a ‘mundane’ and transcendental subject is impossible, and it is ultimately a rejection of Husserl’s conception of transcendental phenomenology as a theory that can only begin its work after breaking with the ‘natural attitude’. Certainly, Heidegger considers his fundamental ontology in Being and Time a piece of transcendental phenomenology as well, in so far as, according to Gethmann, Heidegger’s phrase ‘meaning of being’ is shorthand for ‘the aprioric condition of the possibility of entities and the possibility of relating to them. “Meaning of Being” is, as it were, the term that succeeds Kant’s aprioric synthesis’. However, Heidegger criticizes Husserl’s concept of transcendental philosophy as relying on the break with the natural attitude. In other words, the ‘natural attitude’ is a phenomenologically impermissible construction.

While this critique is widely known, there are some hitherto unknown points that Husserl has made to oppose these objections and which further clarify both his method’s status and its focus on subjectivity. I think that Husserl was aware of the critique (at least this critique) made by Heidegger, and some of the passages from the Nachlass will help to support this assessment. Yet, Husserl’s arguments are at the same time nothing but a logical continuation of his mature concept of intentionality and constitution, and they highlight a certain aspect of his peculiar concept of ‘the transcendental’. The ‘transcendental person’ evoked here can be interpreted as a particular emphasis on the ego’s concreteness, which is not opposed to but further clarifies Husserl’s concept of ‘transcendental’. Hence, in the next section of this paper I shall reconstruct this concept. In the third section I shall briefly summarize Heidegger’s arguments against Husserl’s position. Perhaps Husserl has got Heidegger entirely wrong in this critique, and perhaps the project of ‘fundamental ontology’ has more to say about these issues than Husserl’s somewhat reductionist and simplifying understanding of his pupil’s intentions. In any case, the scholar interested in giving a just account – this author, that is – has to acknowledge that Husserl did understand Heidegger in this way, and that this understanding might have been a misunderstanding or a different one from that which Heidegger would have preferred or deemed adequate. Yet, a reconstruction of Husserl’s arguments cannot disregard the presuppositions that guided him, even though they may be ultimately skewed. Subjecting Husserl’s understanding of Heidegger to a critique is a project for a different study.
The ‘Transcendental Person’ as Concrete Unity of That Which Constitutes World

Husserl’s analyses dealing with the problem of the human person start out from the methodological assumption that a certain position is required with regard to that which is to be described. Whereas one can analyse objects in the world ‘objectively’ in the way the positive sciences, such as biology, physics, and even to a certain extent psychology, do, Husserl points out that this type of description speaks from a certain perspective or attitude. What makes this attitude ‘objectivistic’ is that it talks about objects as existing in themselves, i.e., without the ‘import’ of the viewer’s perspective. This objectivistic attitude, however, cannot grasp the essence of subjectivity because, to use Nagel’s famous terminology, it will only give a ‘third-person perspective’ account of what is and can be experienced only from a ‘first-person view’. Indeed, subjectivity in its germane essence can only be grasped when performing a shift to the first-person perspective. Unlike the ‘objectivistic’ or ‘naturalistic’ attitude (Husserl’s terms) that reconstructs causal relations between objects, the ‘personalistic attitude’ views human activity and interaction with the world in its genuine mode of existing (analysed under the heading of ‘motivation’). Opposed to the scientific ‘view from without’ (the third-person perspective) is the ‘view from within’, the first-person perspective, and a discipline doing justice to the experience of the human subject must be conceived of in this sense as a ‘science of the first-person perspective’ that avoids the fundamental category mistake of framing this science with the basic categories of the natural sciences. This will suffice for a summary of Husserl’s view of the fundamentality of ‘attitudes’ and his insistence on taking a special standpoint – the personalistic attitude – in order to analyse subjectivity.

Distinguishing the first- and third-person perspectives and explicitly shifting to the first-person perspective are not yet sufficient to establish phenomenology as a rigorous science. What makes phenomenology different from a psychological account? Phenomenology gives us access to the ‘view from within’ and thereby thematizes the multitude of ways in which we experience the world subjectively. This ‘view from within’, this experience of world, breaks down into many types of experience and attitudes. Phenomenology is certainly a ‘rigorous science of the subjective’ in analysing the different attitudes the subject takes towards the world. Phenomenology’s main insight is that the world is in a certain way given, and its task is to analyse and categorize these modes of givenness. Yet, merely shifting to the first-person perspective from the previously occupied third-person perspective is not enough to establish a science. The
question, then, is how to frame the first-person perspective adequately to make such a scientific account possible. Depending on this framing, a certain type of science will result. Since the personalistic attitude differs substantially from the naturalistic attitude, one can also expect that the epistemological character of a science of the personalistic attitude will be different from that of a science of the naturalistic attitude. Indeed, when Husserl insists that phenomenology – the science of the personalistic attitude – is a ‘rigorous science’, he is intent on carrying over this rigour from the natural sciences, but with a fundamentally different sense of rigour. What makes the natural sciences rigorous is that they are exact and produce repeatable results under reproducible conditions and what they ascertain is laws of nature. However, their results pertain to factual entities in nature (plants, animals), and the laws they formulate are laws with respect to factually existing entities. The laws can only be formulated on the basis of things existing in nature. Phenomenology’s rigour, on the other hand, consists of the fact that its results are not just lawful but eidetic, i.e., true of any subject or consciousness and at all times, whether such a subject exists or not. Phenomenological laws are laws as well; they are not laws of ephemeral nature, but laws of ‘spirit’. Phenomenology as eidetic science deals not with specifically human consciousness but with consciousness as such, regardless of whether it is human, animal, or divine. Transcendental phenomenology is an eidetic science of transcendental subjectivity.

In order to clarify the special status of phenomenology as an eidetic science of consciousness as such, Husserl contrasts it with psychology as an empirical science of the first-person perspective. Given that Husserl claims to have founded a radically new science, he must clarify what distinguishes it from traditional psychology. The personalistic attitude is customarily occupied by the psychological observer, i.e., the psychological scientist who has not made the shift from specifically human consciousness to analysing consciousness as such. In Leibniz’s terminology, psychology only establishes verités de fait, not verités de raison. For Husserl, therefore, the psychologist’s methodological stance is inconsistent for several reasons. First, because it considers only the human psyche in its accidental disposition and not psychological states of affairs ‘as such’, it leads into psychologism. A psychologistic account amounts to a relativism that, because it is merely describing factual consciousness, is relative to the specific character of the accidental human subject, and not normative or eidetic. Should the psychological states of affairs or, e.g., the hard wiring of the human brain change, so could the structure of consciousness, which contradicts the essence of consciousness. Husserl’s famous sentence ‘The tree burns but the essence of the tree does not burn’ applies to the essence of consciousness as well. This critique can be traced right back to the Prolegomena of the Logical Investigations of 1900.
Following from this psychologistic mistake, psychology considers its position *fundamental* in order to describe the way the world is given to a subject, and in so doing disregards the fact that it is merely one way of describing among others – it wears epistemological ‘blinders’. It takes its point of view as absolute, whereas it is merely relative to its specific perspective. In Husserl’s terminology from the *Crisis*, psychology is indifferent to the ‘paradox of subjectivity’, that the subject is an object *in* the world, and as such an object for disciplines of the third-person perspective such as psychology or biology, *and at the same time* a subject *for* the world, a subject which ‘has’ in the first-person perspective the world as its correlate. Therefore, psychology, precisely by taking the seeming fundamentality of its position for granted, declares its stance to be absolute and continues to maintain on the epistemological level a problematic duality between two different accounts that is not plausible phenomenologically. Indeed, psychology does not even see, let alone attempt to solve, the paradox of the two accounts and their basis in the two fundamental perspectives.

The phenomenological reduction and the transcendental attitude attained therein purportedly solve these problems. First, the attitude of the phenomenologist is *neither* naturalistic *nor* even personalistic in a simple and straightforward way, in the sense of naturalism. It is ‘personalistic’ in the purely formal sense of adhering to the first-person perspective; however, it goes beyond the perspective of the psychologist as it aims at an *eidetic science* of subjectivity as such. The phenomenological attitude is an attitude that commits to neither epistemological position naïvely and is hence neutral with regard to any absolute (‘metaphysical’) truth claim. Rather, it is an ‘absolute’ stance in the sense of attempting a ‘bird’s-eye view’ that is aware of the partialities of other attitudes which *take themselves* as absolute without being *entitled to* (because they are merely relative).  

It is not a stance *beyond* the distinction between first- and third-person perspective; it is firmly a first-person perspective in a non-naïve (‘critical’) way, i.e., by being *aware* of its particularity. It is this ‘metaphysical impartiality’ that Husserl intends with the ‘unparticipating observer’.

Thus, the *transcendental (phenomenological)* attitude shares with the personalistic attitude in principle the ‘view from within’. What makes it transcendental, however, is the fact that it considers the ‘conditions of the possibility’ of consciousness *as such* and not of a specifically human or any other (kind of) consciousness. For example, a condition of the possibility of having perception is to have a body not as a mere physical body (*Körper*) but as an organ of conscious activities (*Leib*). Even a God could not have disembodied perception, because it belongs to the essence of ‘external perception’ that things are given in adumbrations that are only revealed in bodily interaction with them. Furthermore, consciousness is framed in terms of *intentionality*. 27
This means that it does not consider only a certain stratum of consciousness, such as the soul (as opposed to, or ‘above’, or somehow appended to the body), but conscious life as such which is intentional in every respect when experiencing a world. Indeed, stipulating a priori formal distinctions such as mind and body without looking at the ‘things themselves’ is unphenomenological. The uninhibited and impartial look at our experience of world teaches us that the world is given in a manifold of ways and is given to different stands we take with regard to it. Yet, in spite of this multiplicity, we experience this world as a unity or totality. Thus, despite its multi-layered experience, conscious life in general ‘constitutes’ the world for itself through intentional acts.

Husserl’s paradigm of intentionality in the framework of his mature theory of transcendental constitution indicates that the world as the totality of what consciousness experiences is ‘built up’ from intentional acts. These acts can be conscious acts in the discrete sense of acts of thought (such as reflection or imagination), but also such ‘physical’ actions as walking around a three-dimensional object, touching it, dealing with it in certain contexts. The latter are not merely physical movements (i.e., without conscious ‘ego-involvement’), but are ways in which consciousness, necessarily as embodied subjectivity, experiences world, even ‘unconsciously’. Thus, the famous analysis of perception is an example of an eidetic account of how subjectivity on a very elementary level (‘passivity’) constitutes three-dimensional objects. If we look at ‘experience of world’, we do not at first find any kind of duality; we just have ‘givennesses’ for consciousness. ‘Consciousness’, however, is equally not some kind of abstract entity ‘tacked on’ to the body, but is my subjective awareness of myself and the world on any given level, no matter whether I am dreaming, feeling pain or ‘physical’ distress, or performing an intellectual activity such as doing phenomenology. Thus, viewed from the perspective of the phenomenologist, how we interact with other human beings emotionally and affectively, how we deal with them not only as physical bodies (Körper) but as ‘besouled’ lived-bodies (Leiber), is a form of constitution. Even purely ‘intellectual’ acts such as willing or desiring, when they are factually carried out, involve a ‘physical’ component when my willing results in an action or when a certain emotion changes my countenance. All ways in which conscious life in an embodied manner experiences the world fall in principle under the rubric of constitutive analysis as an eidetic account of consciousness. In other words, intellectual acts are just one type of acts. All experiences, each in their own way and specific manner, contribute to constituting the world for a subject, not a specifically human subject but a subject as such that is necessarily constituted as having a lived-body, living in a world as the totality of givenness for consciousness.

From this perspective, it becomes clear that the term ‘transcendental person’ is the most
consistent translation of these matters into one concept, assuming that ‘person’ is a term that formally designates a conscious being as such in its fullest dimensions, not just as psyche or as a psychological researcher reflecting solipsistically, but a conscious and responsible agent living in a social setting with others and with rules, living in a state of affects, emotions, etc. and as essentially embodied. ‘Person’ is the conscious being in the fullest account of constitution, i.e., the highest level that ‘contains’ all other, partial strata. Taking the transcendental ego in its ‘fullest’ dimensions means expanding ‘ego’ into ‘person’. The term ‘person’, moreover, implies a unity or identity, namely, that acts are carried out from a single identical pole. Whereas this conception of ‘person’ is fairly standard (and deliberately so), employing the term ‘transcendental’ in this context is original. By ‘transcendental’, Husserl does not mean any categorical determinants or principles a priori; ‘transcendental’ does have the meaning of ‘conditions of possibility’, since the transcendental framing of the person comprises that which is essentially needed for a consciousness to experience a world, e.g., a body as the organ of its acts. ‘Transcendental’ indicates, furthermore, that the methodological tools used to analyse subjectivity in its genuine sense cannot be those of other ‘worldly’ entities. Transcendental phenomenology is a genuine separate discipline that thematizes a region enclosed within itself (ein in sich geschlossenes Gebiet), that of pure consciousness. This broad understanding of ‘the transcendental’ opens up a wide array of phenomenological research into personhood, following Husserl’s definition of phenomenology as ‘transcendental empiricism’, i.e., as a ‘positive’, descriptive science of transcendental life. Hence, although this concept of transcendental is quite distinct from its traditional, Kantian heritage, what Husserl means by the term is quite straightforward when combined with ‘person’. The transcendental person is the human being in its broadest, i.e., intersubjective and genetic, dimensions as viewed from the standpoint of the transcendental theory of constitution. Of these dimensions, factual human life is but one instantiation of various potentialities; in other words, eidetic laws of transcendental life are valid, no matter if any life factually exists. The transcendental person is man in ‘fullness’ or ‘concreteness’ with all actualities and potentialities. It is not an entity different from that of the ‘mundane person’; rather, it is the same human being viewed from the standpoint of the rigorous scientific first-person perspective of transcendental phenomenology. One quotation will suffice to outline this concept:

I, the human being in the world, living naturally only as this human being and finding myself in the personal attitude as this human person, am thusly not another ego which I find in the transcendental attitude. [...] The transcendental ego as pole and substrate of its potential totality is, as it were, the transcendental person which is primally instituted [urgestiftet] through the phenomenological reduction. This ego will be framed henceforth in terms of the universality of the concrete transcendental and takes on for itself the all-embracing life that brings into play all potentialities and that can then
actualize all possible modes of self-actualization. It will become apparent that natural personal existence and life is only a particular form of life, a life that remains identical in view of all potential changes, i.e., [it is] the actual and possible unity of life, centred through the identical ego-pole, which remains the same in all these potential changes.

The transcendental person is thus not an abstract or ‘theoretical’ moment of the human person, but the person viewed in its fullest ‘concretion’. As such, it is just a different term from the more familiar concept of the monad that Husserl employs sporadically in 1910\textsuperscript{31} and prominently in the 1920s (in Husserl’s quite ‘unterminological’ manner of thinking). The ‘monad’ as a term for the transcendental ego entails (having recourse to Leibniz) that the ego, as a sphere of experience of world, implies the world within it. It also, moreover, reminds us of the Leibnizian distinction between factual and eidetic truths, the latter of which phenomenology strives to ascertain as truths of the subject as person \textit{in its concretion}. ‘Person’ and ‘monad’ highlight different aspects of one and the same structure, and it is especially its appeal to ‘concretion’ that presumably leads Husserl to shift terminology to the ‘transcendental person’. To summarize: phenomenology is an eidetic science of transcendental subjectivity, i.e., it formulates eidetic laws of consciousness as such. In this sense, it is not bound to a specific type of consciousness, e.g., that of \textit{homo sapiens}, and thus avoids the problem of psychologism and scepticism. The full-fledged consideration of consciousness on all levels of constitution, however, renders the transcendental ego actually more adequately a transcendental \textit{‘person’}. Husserl intends a universal discipline of \textit{experience-of}, and to counter the misunderstanding that this experience-of is merely a ‘mentalism’ (a study of merely intellective acts), he employs the term ‘transcendental \textit{person}’. The concept ‘person’ grasps the entirety of what it means to be a conscious being on all of its levels, i.e., in its fullest \textit{concretion}. One possible explanation of why Husserl reverts to the term ‘person’ in this context, apparently out of the blue, is that the concept of the monad does not sufficiently account for the ‘concretion’ he feels he needs to emphasize in order to counter Heidegger’s critique, to which we shall turn now.

3 \textbf{Heidegger’s Critique: The Questionable Mode of Being (Seinsweise) of the Transcendental Ego}

While Heidegger presumably did not know of Husserl’s reflections with regard to the status of the transcendental ego as transcendental person (these sparse comments are from the manuscripts of the 1930s), the thrust of Heidegger’s critique is clear: it comes from the presumption of the fundamental role – or, for that matter, Husserl’s disregard of the fundamental role – of human \textit{existence (Dasein)} in determining the nature of the human being. It cannot be grasped in its unique and genuine character by considering it from an ‘abstract’ stance such as
Husserl’s alleged ‘unparticipating observer’. This attitude fails to bring *Dasein* into view, not because it could not possibly focus on *Dasein* (for, as mentioned above, an analysis of *Dasein* also implies a ‘distanced’ stance), but because it treats *Dasein* in an all too theoretical fashion. A theoretical consideration will only thematize consciousness, not *Dasein*. To restate Husserl’s position, the establishment of the ‘unparticipating observer’ goes hand in hand with his shift from the natural to the transcendental perspective, i.e., from practice to theory. Although the ‘natural attitude’ might be the first for us (*pros hemas*), it is not the first by nature (*te physei* or *kath’ auto*), because it is a *product* of constitution and therefore cannot be a basis for philosophy as genetic, constitutive analysis. Hence the natural attitude as the *product* of constitution must be relinquished by the philosopher, who, instead, explains its coming-about. Husserl’s point here is, with respect to Heidegger, that *Dasein* is a term for the subject *living in the natural attitude*.

For Heidegger the fundamental mode of *Dasein* is its factual existence, and this is also the methodological foundation from which to approach any analysis of its ‘essence’, an essence which lies precisely in its existence as *caring* for its own being. And only through existing can *Dasein*’s being become known in a fundamental way. This does not mean, to Heidegger, that existence is opposed to doing theory. Rather, theory for Heidegger is a *derivative mode* of factual existence. Human *Dasein* as an essentially *understanding* entity is *always already* in the mode of understanding and interpreting itself. *Dasein* exists always already in the mode of self-interpretation (*Selbst-Auslegung*), and doing theory is just one, explicit, mode of life. We would misunderstand Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s ideal of the ‘unparticipating observer’ if we thought that such a stance is impossible for Heidegger. Rather, Heidegger’s critical point is that to Husserl it is, in fact, an *ideal*, a model stance of phenomenological description. In a polemic phrase, presumably aimed at Husserl, Heidegger holds that one cannot gain any genuine knowledge of the things in our surroundings merely by ‘gaping’ or ‘staring’ at them as Husserl’s distanced observer would supposedly do, but by being actively involved with their usage. Instead, the character of *Dasein* and its primary mode of knowledge is that it is ‘already-being-with’ the world and its artifacts, and we do not need to construct an ‘intentional connection’ between subject and object first. Heidegger writes:

> Initially, this already-being-in-the-world is not solely a rigid staring [*Begaffen*] at something merely objectively present [*vorhanden*]. Being-in-the-world, as taking care of things, is *taken in* by the world which it takes care of. 33

This practical involvement is nothing other than *Dasein*’s specific way of being as being involved in dealing with these artifacts. The analysing and the acting ego cannot truly be separated; philosophical analysis is just a self-unfolding and making-explicit of everyday activity. To analyse

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subjectivity ‘theoretically’, i.e., by being at a distance from oneself by a ‘splitting of the ego’, as Husserl would have it, means to lose it in its primary mode of life. Thus, it should not be a transcendental observer that theoretically analyses the subject’s constitution of the world. Rather, it is a factically existing Dasein that not only understands the world ‘always already’, but also has to analyse it in this factical mode in making this mode explicit to itself. But it is a making-explicit that it always already carries out in doing things. Husserl’s doctrine of ‘constitution of world’ by a transcendental subject leaps over the factum that this constitution is actually carried out by a factical Dasein. In his comments on the Encyclopaedia Britannica article, Heidegger writes, quite provocatively: ‘Transcendental constitution is a central possibility of the existence of the factical self.’ What kind of possibility is this? It is significant that Heidegger does not even mention the term ‘transcendental subject’, as it is, to him, not really a subject in the strict sense of the term. So in order to determine the meaning of ‘transcendental subject’, one needs to address the ontological status of that being which constitutes the world:

That which constitutes is not nothing, thus it is something and existing, yet not in the sense of the positive. The question of the mode of being of that which constitutes cannot be avoided. [...] What is the mode of being of this absolute ego – in which sense is it the same as the factical ego, in which sense is it not the same? One must be clear that these seemingly rhetorical questions contain a fundamental criticism, for one can easily spell out their consequence: if the absolute ego is the same as the factical ego, then the whole project of transcendental phenomenology with its ensuing theory of constitution essentially collapses, that is, it becomes obsolete as a discipline divorced from ‘factical’ considerations; and if it is not the same, then this analysis can tell us nothing about the existence of factical Dasein. Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, in other words, cannot inform us about anything substantial concerning the status of that which is essentially a caring Dasein in the world, the human subject. Perform ing the transcendental turn is simply the wrong way to attempt to get at Dasein. While Husserl wants to get to the subject, he in fact is turning away from it.

If, therefore, Heidegger submits, the question regarding the being of the absolute, constituting ego must be posed in order to determine its status – and that means its status vis-à-vis that of the ‘mundane’ ego – and if accordingly, as Heidegger further claims, transcendental constitution is merely a possibility of the factical ego, then this amounts to saying that the transcendental ego in fact cannot have the ‘ability’ to constitute the world through its own ‘power’. This is the case not only because its mode of being has not been clarified, for to clarify it would mean, to Heidegger, becoming aware of its problematic status. Moreover, if its status is merely that of a ‘possibility’ of concrete Dasein, it cannot be treated as an ‘entity’ of its own. It is
merely a stance that *Dasein* takes at certain times. *Dasein* lives as understanding *already*, and making this understanding explicit (i.e., in theory) is only something that occurs occasionally. Finally, the attempt to clarify the status of the transcendental ego is completely pointless. One cannot speak of it as an ego proper precisely because this transcendental ego as world-constituting cannot in itself be part of this world and hence cannot be in the sense of existence.  

In Heidegger’s reading, Husserl ‘stumbles’ over his own claim that that which constitutes the world is in itself not a worldly ‘entity’. Husserl’s problem is that he does not address the question of the being of the transcendental, a question that poses itself naturally if one considers the world-constituting agency not itself an entity of this world. Had Husserl done so, he would have seen that ‘transcendental subjectivity’ is merely an abstract stratum (defined in terms of ‘possibility’) of concrete subjectivity rather than an entity of its own type that can be described by a reflective turn to immanence. Husserl conceivably shied away from this question because he believed that by virtue of the epoché he could be neutral with regard to any metaphysical or ontological claims. Yet, given the plausibility of Heidegger’s critical points, his unarticulated conclusion (in a letter to his teacher, after all, from which these quotations are taken) is that the very idea of a transcendental ego is absurd – if, that is, one does not make the attempt to salvage this concept of the transcendental by somehow ‘linking’ it to the factual ego as *Dasein*. But already the dualism involved here is problematic. ‘Transcendental ego’ is a concept without any meaning of its own, but only ‘in conjunction’ with the concrete factual existing ego that exists, over against other entities with their own modes of being (as zuhanden artifacts and vorhanden things). In other words, ‘transcendental ego’ is, for Heidegger, merely an abstract moment of the full concept of *Dasein* as factically existing in a factual world. It is dependent on the factual subject rather than the other way around – whereas for Husserl, the concrete subject is ‘merely’ a ‘mundanized’ transcendental ego.

This means, to Heidegger, that the question of the human being can only be tackled by addressing its concrete existence in the unity of her lived-experiences immersed in a world – *Dasein* is to be understood as essentially ‘being-in-the-world’. In this sense, *Dasein* is a transcendental concept as well, but Heidegger does not endorse Husserl’s equation of the transcendental attitude with theory as a distanced act of reflection. Husserl’s transcendental approach does not get us really to the ‘things themselves’, i.e., to *Dasein*’s existence in the world and interaction with artifacts and tools, and to understanding oneself and one’s own being in such interactions. An analysis of *Dasein*, thus, does not preclude it from being carried out in a transcendental register. This means, however, that Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity does deal with the human being’s existence in this very world of practical engagement and with Luft 18
(self-)understanding in and through this engagement. Although Heidegger would reject labelling his attempt as ‘anthropology’, the main category of personhood and the traditional topics of anthropology are nevertheless present in his analysis of Dasein, categories (‘existentials’) such as understanding, language, affects, moods. ‘Anthropology’, it will be recalled, was the name Husserl gave to Heidegger's project in Being and Time. Even though Heidegger criticizes traditional anthropology for passing over the question of human being’s existence – and it is known how Heidegger shuns the traditional canon as a whole – Husserl is not entirely mistaken in reading Being and Time as a phenomenological anthropology in so far as Heidegger does not reject the basic themes of traditional anthropology – in focusing on the concept of life as in Dilthey’s hermeneutics or even in nodding to Husserl’s insistence on the concept of intentionality. Rather, what Heidegger rejects is their methodologically inadequate treatment (in not posing the question of Dasein’s being) as well as an implicit acceptance of a traditional philosophical canon that would place anthropology alongside other positive sciences dealing with the same ‘entity’, such as sociology and biology. Rather, hermeneutics of facticity is fundamental ontology of Dasein, i.e., this ‘discipline’ (again, an inadequate term for Heidegger’s intentions) is foundational for all other philosophical ‘disciplines’. This means that the being of Dasein is fundamentally different from the being of other entities. Hence a fundamental ontology of Dasein that gives us the basics of an ontology of the human being. Moreover, fundamental ontology of Dasein is destined to let us gain access to the more fundamental question of Being, which is the true goal of Heidegger’s endeavour. However, this access will only be granted by reframing the question of the human being or the person by conceiving of it as Da-Sein, i.e., as having an intrinsic connection to Being (Sein).

This is why Division I of Being and Time (§§9–44) presents merely a ‘preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein’. For without an analysis of Dasein, preliminary as it may be, we cannot gain an appreciation of the question of Being. It is this ultimate aim that motivates Heidegger to reject framing the question of the human being in the traditional discipline of anthropology (and, as we know, to reject other traditional disciplines, such as ethics). Nevertheless, as Heidegger states in §10 of Being and Time (‘The Delimitation of an Analytics of Dasein against Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology’), he deems it a valid and necessary task to ‘determine positively ontologically the mode of being of the person’. It is in this context also that Husserl is mentioned alongside Scheler and Dilthey as failing to solve the problem of Dasein’s true being – although framing consciousness in terms of intentionality makes some headway in overcoming problematic traditional paradigms, e.g., the metaphysics of ‘substance’.41
Thus, Husserl is correct in reading Heidegger’s analytics of Dasein as also ultimately a consideration of the personhood of the person, however different from Husserl’s transcendental framework, carried out from the standpoint of Dasein’s concrete, average quotidian existence and its own manner of doing ‘transcendental philosophy’. Despite his more general interest in the question of Being, Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology presented in Being and Time can be termed a ‘pragmatic’ (as opposed to ‘theoretical’) phenomenology of concrete human existence. It is different from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology in so far as ‘transcendental’ in Husserl implies performing a splitting of the ego into transcendental and mundane parts and henceforth divorcing theory from practice, a move that Heidegger fundamentally criticizes. Thus, because Husserl completely ignores Heidegger’s Seinsfrage, or disregards its importance, he can see in Heidegger’s Being and Time merely a naïve, pre-transcendental anthropology of Dasein. Yet, this impression is not completely unwarranted from reading the Division I of Being and Time.

4 Husserl’s Critique of Heidegger’s ‘Anthropologism’ and Transcendental Phenomenology as ‘Philosophically Genuine Anthropology’

While the reader of Husserl’s manuscripts dealing with Heidegger (to which we shall turn now) can see that Husserl acknowledges Heidegger’s critique to a certain extent – at least the one mentioned in the previous section – Husserl in turn touches on a weak (or at least dark) spot in Heidegger. Husserl might have been blind to many aspects of Heidegger’s approach, but he saw very clearly that Heidegger’s critique of the transcendental ego and the concomitant theory of transcendental constitution amount to a critique of Husserl’s ideal of philosophy as ‘rigorous science’, i.e., as eidetic science of transcendental subjectivity. To Heidegger, the actual phenomenological analysis cannot be carried out by an unparticipating observer who stipulates eidetic truths, but must and can only be performed by factical Dasein itself in its individual concrete existing and its always already occurring self-interpretation. In other words, an ‘eidetics’ of the human subject understood primarily as transcendental subject is absurd, not because such an eidetics is impossible, but because such an eidetics of transcendental subjectivity cannot let us gain insight into the fundamental mode of subjectivity, factical existence. Such a project is, to Heidegger, fundamentally flawed in wanting to do justice phenomenologically to human Dasein. Rigorous, i.e., eidetic science is pointless with regard to an entity whose essence is to exist. This is one reason why Heidegger insists in §7 of Being and Time that the phenomenological method has to take its cue from the specific topic in question, rather than approaching an entity with a
It does not do justice to Dasein, because Dasein’s mode of being is fundamentally different from that of other entities. An eidetics can hence only be ‘existential’, not categorical, which is to say, it can retain its rigour, but not in the sense of ‘naïve eidetics’. Husserl thought, in turn, that a project of phenomenology as an eidetic discipline, that is, a rigorous science, means that it is either rigorous science or else mere Weltanschauung, i.e., an articulation of human being’s view of the world, a mere description without normative claims. Husserl understood Heidegger’s critique of the questionable mode of being of the transcendental ego and the method of doing this as going against Husserl’s even more fundamental claim that philosophy was a rigorous science. To Husserl, rejecting this fundamental tenet ultimately accounts for the crisis of European sciences in general. This makes it understandable why, to Husserl, giving up the connection between science and philosophy has such fatal consequences. Hence, it will come as no surprise that this is the first point where Husserl attacks Heidegger.

Thus, Husserl asks, what is the theoretical status of Heidegger’s analyses of factual Dasein? More generally, what is Heidegger’s stance concerning theory or science? Heidegger, too, claims a certain philosophical validity to his analyses and not just a personal truth pertaining to one’s own private Dasein. In other words, the emphasis on Dasein’s facticity cannot mean to Heidegger that his results are arbitrary or ‘merely subjective’. It is here that Husserl launches his counter-critique. In spite of Heidegger’s explicit rejection of philosophy’s ‘scientificity’ and in spite of Being and Time’s strong emphasis on a certain methodological solipsism based on the specific mineness (Jemeinigkeit) of Dasein, Heidegger does claim a certain generality, or in Husserl’s words, attempts to establish ‘rational’ and ‘general human truths’ regarding Dasein’s existence. No matter how one defines ‘rationality’ or ‘truth’, any theory that calls itself philosophical (and does not merely claim biographical or ‘subjective’ truth) aims at ‘the truth’. In this sense, Heidegger’s analyses must inevitably presuppose a ‘theoretical’ stance as well. An analytics of Dasein, even in its focus on Dasein’s facticity, cannot preclude a ‘scientific’, i.e., rational, intersubjectively consensual account that in some way or another requires a theoretical stance. It is not that Heidegger does not take such a stance; of course he does, as we have seen, and he knows this. Husserl’s point is that this theoretical stance necessarily entails the claim to rationality and scientificity. The opposition is not between the theoretical Husserl and the atheoretical Heidegger: Husserl maintains that doing theory implies the very idea of rationality and scientificity. Husserl writes of Heidegger:

The philosopher doing anthropology believes that he can be a philosopher and in any case aims at truths, i.e., eidetic truths, at the least general human truths, whose nexus is
a theoretical nexus that has its origin in a theoretical interest. This interest could be a mere passing one, it could be motivated practically, ethically, religiously, in the hope of bettering human beings by these insights, to spare them from intellectualistic or rationalistic aberrations etc. Yet, if one can identify science and rationalism, then every anthropology, no matter how it is characterized and no matter how it may thematize human ‘existence’, is equally rationalism.

As Husserl clearly saw – and as has been pointed out time and again by scholars – *Being and Time* notoriously excludes the question of that Dasein which describes factual Dasein: the description cannot be other than from a ‘theoretical’ standpoint and the results of its analyses cannot but be ‘rational’, i.e., generally true findings (whether or not they are eidetic, i.e., *verités de raison*). According to Husserl, the seeming omission of the ego of the philosopher or her ‘theoretical attitude’ accounts for Heidegger’s rejection of the necessarily scientific character of philosophy. To Husserl, statements such as ‘Dasein’s being is distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it’ are in principle not different from ‘every object in three-dimensional space gives itself in adumbrations’, even though the subject matters to which these statements pertain might be fundamentally different. Nevertheless, making such statements is *nolens volens* a scientific endeavour. To Husserl, the argument against philosophy as science (not just rigorous science!) amounts to a sceptical argument which criticizes general truth and in so doing itself claims general truth. Moreover, Heidegger’s emphasis on ‘doing’ rather than ‘theorizing’ cannot be a critique of the methodological paradigm of theory because such a critique must itself assume a ‘theoretical’, ‘reflective’ perspective. Although this has long been noticed by critics of *Being and Time*, it is important to point out that Husserl too reconstructs Heidegger’s rejection of philosophy as science from this perspective. In the end, as has been shown above, Husserl was flogging a dead horse by insisting on the unacknowledged ‘theoretical status’ of Heidegger’s project. However, it is not easy to see from one’s first readings of *Being and Time* what Heidegger’s view of the status of theory is. Indeed, it requires a great deal of interpretation to see what he has in mind when he deliberately brackets the question of the philosophizing Dasein.

Next, Husserl raises the issue of the alleged fundamentality of Dasein in its factual existence. What exactly legitimizes Heidegger’s claim that Dasein’s life in its factual being-in-the-world is in fact the most fundamental level? In other words, what does it mean to be a fundamental level? Does it mean that it cannot be transcended or ‘penetrated’ in a transcendental questioning regarding its origin, i.e., the conditions of its possibility? And even if this factual level is the most fundamental, it is still not self-evident that it should be privileged over other dimensions of meaning. To Husserl, acknowledging that concrete existence is a fundamental stratum does
not prohibit questioning its origin. In other words, factual existence might be fundamental in the sense of a basis of our everyday life, but this is not to say that it is an absolute ground upon which everything is relative. What Husserl has in mind is, of course, the depth dimension of the natural attitude that can only be accessed by a genetic analysis. Fundamentality and absoluteness are not automatically coextensive, as Heidegger seems to assume. Declaring the level of Dasein as fundamental means, to Husserl, rejecting the transcendental question concerning the constitution of Dasein that can only be clarified in a genetic inquiry. With respect to Heidegger’s claim to the fundamentality of the fundamental sphere of Dasein’s life, Husserl remarks:

The radical question is now whether this natural ground of judgment (the ground that is presupposed by concrete life in all its activities and thus also theoretical life in which the sciences of this primal ground, the positive sciences, originate) is indeed a primal basis with regard to which one can no more inquire into the grounds of its validity, or whether it has, as we shall see, an origin which is, to be sure, deeply concealed but which can be revealed, a most complicated foundation systematically to be analysed, a constantly living but always concealed foundation, as absolute life and absolutely concrete being of that subjectivity which we ourselves are.

‘Anthropologism’ is Husserl’s term for that kind of inquiry which considers this ‘factual ground’ as absolute. It is a ‘false philosophy by absolutizing a positivistic world’, ‘positivistic world’ being shorthand for ‘the world of the natural attitude’. The acknowledged fundamentality of concrete existence, which Husserl would not reject, does not preclude the claim that this life has a deeper level, which is hidden from this life because this life is merely living in the ‘natural attitude’. The natural attitude is characterized by being ‘intentionally infatuated’ (verschossen) with things in the world. Life in the natural attitude is blind to intentional achievements that make experience of world possible, in other words, to the transcendental dimension. All being is relative upon being experienced; hence the only absolute upon which everything is relative is ‘transcendental consciousness’. For Husserl, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of Dasein amounts to a philosophy of or in the natural attitude, i.e., a ‘naïve’ philosophy, just like every philosophy that does not perform the phenomenological reduction. This critique of Heidegger has to do only in part with the fact that factual existence is first and foremost active and not contemplative. Certainly there can be, Husserl maintains, contemplation in the natural attitude; nevertheless, the activities of the ‘natural attitude’ and the sciences arising on its basis are by definition ‘positive’, i.e., they take place on the basis of the natural attitude that takes the existence of the world for granted. To Husserl, however, this basis is itself something that is constituted, and it can only become explicit through a radical break with the natural attitude. One could even say, with Husserl, that the fact that this factual life does not know of its deeper, constituting level is precisely the
‘proof’ that there is such a deeper level. It is only accessible through a break with the traditional way of seeing things; this was the whole point about natural attitude’s ‘naïveté’. Nothing is ‘wrong’ with the natural attitude; a problem arises, however, when the philosopher – not the human person living in the natural attitude – absolutizes it. This is why for Husserl, doing philosophy requires a break with the natural attitude, and the only place the philosopher can ‘go’ after leaving the natural attitude is the transcendental sphere. For Husserl, doing philosophical theory can only mean doing transcendental philosophy. And doing transcendental philosophy means turning away from the natural attitude, a break which Heidegger did not accept. From Heidegger’s point of view, Husserl completely overlooked the fact that Heidegger already tacitly stands in the realm of the philosophical dimension opened up by Husserl, since Heidegger clearly took over, if in a modified fashion, fundamental phenomenological paradigms such as intentionality (as already being-with entities). Heidegger’s claim, however, is that doing philosophical theory is but a radicalization of a ‘reflective’ tendency inherent in Dasein’s everyday life, rather than an inherently ‘unnatural’ or ‘artificial’ performance.

While Husserl, oriented to the ‘things themselves’, in principle applauds the approach from concreteness and fact-oriented analysis, this does not mean to him that this sphere, which we find ourselves in and live in first and foremost, is an absolute sphere upon which everything would be relative. After all, Heidegger’s own analysis presupposes a theoretical attitude from which to describe even this concrete everydayness. How to conceive of this concreteness, which both sought, is certainly an open question. It may well be that Heidegger and Husserl mean different things by this category. More precisely, Husserl feels deeply misunderstood in assuming that the stance of the ‘unparticipating observer’, who gives a description of how an embodied consciousness constitutes world, only describes this constitution in terms of theoretical or intellective acts. The unparticipating observer does not merely, or even primarily, describe an unparticipating agent. Here we can recall Husserl’s concept of the transcendental person: only the person viewed in this way as experiencing world in a manifold of acts and activities and from the unity of its ego-pole can account for the subject’s life in a world. The totality of experience and its corresponding phenomena are grasped by the term ‘transcendental constitution’. This constitution is not a mere possibility of the factual ego, but that which the ego ‘always already’ does in all of its factual, practical, willing, thinking, etc. activities, including the philosophical. This constituting activity is not a rigid structure, but a continuing process in the transcendental history of self-enworlding subjectivity. Apart from Husserl insisting on the importance of the ‘unparticipating observer’, his methodology thus, Husserl’s abbreviated remarks can also be construed as indicating the importance of a genetic analysis in the constitution of something like
the natural attitude or everyday life, a dimension that is indeed missing in *Being and Time*. The genetic sphere, however, only reveals itself when we break with the natural attitude and assume the transcendental stance that for the first time opens up the sphere of constitution. Furthermore, transcendental constitution is not merely a potential, abstract moment of the ego that would depend on its ‘actualization’ by factical existence; on the contrary, factical existence is the concrete ‘actualization’ of the transcendental as the totality of egoic potentialities. Speaking of Heidegger, Husserl writes:

> Is it not precisely the method of ‘classical’ phenomenology, by opening up pure conscious life primarily in its most general forms and then progressing to the constitutive problems, that it also opened the way towards a reflection of the world which views any scientific world constitutively in its concrete relation to constituting subjectivity? Is not practical subjectivity also constituting, was it ever the intention of my phenomenology merely to reveal the nature of natural science constitutively? When one starts out, as I do, by explicating a natural concept of the world in a transcendental-aesthetical manner, then this signifies, as I still believe despite Heidegger, a necessary and a priori first system of tasks, that I have chosen the method of abstractive theoretical consideration only differently, but in a certain sense I have chosen it more primitively than Heidegger.

Thus, the concept of the transcendental person as that which constitutes the world in *all* forms of experience is intended to counter the critique that the transcendental ego is too abstract a concept to grasp the true personhood of the person. Husserl feels that Heidegger wrongly understands transcendental consciousness as a mere transcendental *ego* and not what it truly is, the transcendental person. Yet, framing the transcendental person as that which constitutes in *all* manners of intentionality also has consequences for Husserl’s own conception of the unparticipating observer. This observer might be ‘only’ theoretically interested as well, but this theoretical work is equally constituting and as such carries out a ‘continuing constitution’ of the world itself in terms of covering new ground in phenomenological analysis. In terms of constitution, there is no difference between theory and practice – since all acts constitute – and any such distinction, like that of mind and body, is dogmatic. Husserl’s late realization that this observer constitutes as well must be conceived as a clear concession to Heidegger’s critique. However, Husserl is not willing to give up the idea of a break with the natural attitude in order to cross the threshold into phenomenology.

These points by Husserl are meant as a counter-critique to Heidegger’s assertion that factical existence is the absolute sphere whose transcendental origin cannot be questioned. The ‘philosophically true anthropology’ that Husserl proposes in the form of his transcendental phenomenology is an account of the transcendental which is, rightly understood, the absolute of philosophy. As absolute, it still has the general character of ‘consciousness’ as something that
needs theoretical reflection in order to describe it. For only this view yields the perspective upon
the universe of subjectivity’s concrete potentialities that can only be ‘thought up’ in reflective
variation. This overarching ‘absolute’ essentially comprises the transcendental person as that
which constitutes the world in all of its actualities and potentialities and the world as the necessary
correlate of this constant process of constitution. Only in this universal consideration can one
claim to have reached true concreteness, in contrast to which the purely ‘mundane’, factual
existence of Dasein is but an abstract, i.e., limited stratum. It is abstract because it absolutizes
factual existence – in Husserl’s terms, the natural attitude – without seeing that a different attitude
or perspective on the world is also possible, no matter how one wants to characterize this account,
as ‘theory’, contemplation, unparticipating observation, or otherwise. In a ‘hermeneutical’ twist,
one could rephrase Husserl’s point as insisting that one can only reach true concreteness when
naïve concretion has been understood from a different standpoint. Being naïve equals remaining
in an abstract position; hence:

Natural Dasein in the synthetic achievement of the formerly concealed … life turns out
to be an abstract stratum in the concretion of transcendental subjectivity. Natural life
becomes understood [i.e., after the transcendental turn] as a limited form in which the
ego actualizes its potentialities in pre-formed habitualities and in this way carries
through an egoic Dasein … which holds a higher, richer manifold of possibilities out of
consideration…

In other words, where no real case can be made for why the factical foundation should be
fundamental in an absolute sense, why (in other words) it could not be subjected to a constitutive
analysis, the project of ‘fundamental ontology’ is necessarily flawed. Husserl argues that
phenomenology can only be carried out as ‘transcendental’. That means, to him, making a radical
turn to subjective experience (more precisely, subjective experience as such) that, in turn, can
only be achieved by a break with the natural attitude. Husserl believed that Heidegger’s sketch of
a hermeneutics of facticity was just an account of factical Dasein in the natural attitude (the first
criticism discussed). Furthermore, Husserl questions the ‘fundamental’ ground of the natural
attitude as an ‘absolute’ basis. What he merely hints at here is his draft of genetic phenomenology
that reconstructs the natural attitude we currently live in as a product of genetic layers of
constitution (the second criticism discussed). It should be clear from the previous section that
the first criticism is unfair to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of Dasein. Just because
Heidegger omits an explicit analysis of the philosophizing agent does not mean that he has no
position on the matter. As the last quotation from Husserl shows, however, doing theory as
self-explication of already-present self-understanding is simply not enough. For Husserl, one
needs to become a ‘complete theoretician’ in order to perform an eidetic variation of all ‘egoic
possibilities’, but, Heidegger’s point seems to be, this performance is itself the realization of such a possibility, a possibility of the ‘factual self’. The second criticism does point to a dimension that at least seems to be absent in Being and Time. Whether such a genetic account could be supplied in the framework of Being and Time’s fundamental ontology is another, open question.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Husserl’s insistence on the concreteness of the transcendental ego as transcendental person as well as on the concreteness of the phenomenological analysis of transcendental constitution in these late texts is indeed peculiar, especially since some of these statements are made in contexts where Husserl explicitly addresses Heidegger. The reading presented here is intended to highlight a certain aspect of Husserl’s theory, and the claim is that Husserl’s insistence on this aspect is motivated by Heidegger’s critique. Husserl’s critique of Heidegger results partly from Husserl’s clear misunderstanding of Heidegger’s intentions. Still, Husserl’s critique articulates his serious concern regarding the lack of a genetic dimension in Heidegger’s sketch. An analysis of Dasein, because it seems to be missing a ‘depth dimension’, cannot give us a notion of human subjectivity’s concretion, although this is what Heidegger seems to want in his insistence on ‘facticity’ and approach from ‘quotidianity’ (Alltäglichkeit). At the same time, the concept of the transcendental person is but a continuation of Husserl’s concept of constitution which is already present in Husserl’s earlier analyses of personhood, although Husserl did not employ this terminology at this early stage. Although Husserl’s analyses of the person do describe, e.g., the person’s bodily involvement in her activities and thereby reach a very high level of ‘concretion’, Husserl was still under the impression that his (mostly unpublished) analyses were not convincing enough given the popularity of Heidegger’s existential philosophy. Heidegger’s critique merely presses Husserl to reframe his already operative concepts. The persistence with which Husserl presents this claim for concreteness shows that he is intent on salvaging his approach from the attack on his phenomenology launched so forcefully by his former favourite, and undoubtedly most talented, pupil. It is clear that this is an attack to be taken seriously, although Husserl seems to dismiss it rather lightly, which conceals the deeper and more problematic issues, the difficulty of which I have tried to indicate.

To Husserl, Heidegger merely stands at the peak of what he calls ‘fashionable philosophy of existence’ which has abandoned the ideal of rigorous philosophical inquiry as well as the transcendental turn and indulges in factual, finite existence. But this criticism – although it sounds rather like the typical complaint of the older generation against the thoughtlessness of the newer – stands for fundamental issues that Husserl has with Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology.
The problem is precisely the question of the *foundation* that Heidegger seems to take too lightly in Husserl’s view. Because of its unjustified claim to an absolute status, fundamental ontology cannot be transcendental philosophy, and if it cannot be transcendental, then it cannot have the status of rigorous science. This is why Heidegger’s philosophy cannot be a valid anthropology (as it could have been had it been manageably contained), but is instead merely a problematic ‘anthropologism’. It could have been a veritable phenomenological anthropology, Husserl believed, if it had remained within the framework of constitutive phenomenology. A phenomenology of the human person could have had a valid place as part of Husserl’s sketch of an ontology of the life-world, and not as a project so radically *divorced* from Husserl’s. However, by absolutizing the sphere of *Dasein*, Husserl thought that Heidegger – who did not mince his words in his critique of the ‘old man’ – made a radical break with his teacher and turned against the latter’s project – more radical than it should have been to judge from Heidegger’s own intentions. Articulating Husserl’s standpoint, Alweiss correctly asserts that *Being and Time* ‘could have succeeded in its departure from Husserl only by returning to Husserl and by acknowledging its indebtedness’.  

So the conflict between the generations worked both ways. In order to pose and answer the question of man, Husserl suggests, one needs an anthropology which has to proceed in a transcendental register and as an eidetic science, concretely as a constitutive, genetic analysis of the correlation of consciousness and world. Any claim to the fundamentality of *Dasein* blocks the way to subjectivity’s concreteness which lies not in a given ‘facticity’, but in a ‘transcendental concreteness’, which in turn understands a given facticity, even that of doing philosophy, as a realized possibility of the universe of egoic, transcendental potentialities. For Heidegger, in turn, Husserl took the right path in framing subjectivity in terms of intentionality, but stopped short at a premature stage – consciousness – and did not break through to the question of the *being* of consciousness. But Heidegger’s step beyond meant breaking with the very paradigm of consciousness and its firm link to ‘unparticipating theory’, a move which Heidegger was very well aware of. Yet, Heidegger wanted not to disregard the question of the human being, but to free it from its confined concentration on the notion of *consciousness*. To be fair to Husserl one has to insist that he did articulate the human being’s ‘practical, valuing, willing’, etc., activity, but he continued to articulate his philosophy in the language of mentalism. Heidegger wanted not to dismiss Husserl, but to bring him into his own. It is this move that Husserl could not comprehend.

Regarding the question of the person: in Husserl’s eyes, Heidegger took his point of departure on much too high a level in trying to frame subjectivity’s concreteness in terms of its factual fundamentality. The whole constitutive problematic after Husserl’s genetic turn precedes...
an analysis of factual subjective life, which Husserl took to be a ‘static’ analysis. In his hermeneutics of facticity, Heidegger has tried to construct a house without first laying the foundations, and the foundations, to Husserl, could only lie in absolute, world-constituting consciousness. Although Husserl in turn might have been all too quick in criticizing Heidegger as simply going with the flow of the \textit{Zeitgeist}, he did have a keen sense of Heidegger’s thought as breaking with fundamental principles of his thought, which, in turn, Heidegger merely wanted to bring to full fruition rather than abandon altogether – although at times his rhetoric might have sounded otherwise. To Husserl, the question of personhood has to be further refined, and that means expanding constitutive analysis into a genetic, intersubjective account of how the life-world is built up through constitutive strata. The analysis of the ‘natural attitude’ is only the last word in a long story. To Heidegger, such an analysis of \textit{Dasein} was not the last word either; indeed, one can more adequately call it ‘the first word’, since the ‘fundamental ontology’ of \textit{Dasein} was only a preliminary stage in a continuing project that was dedicated to thematizing the Being of the entities. Ultimately, therefore, the topic of personhood had only a passing relevance for Heidegger’s project as a whole. The question whether Husserl rightly understood Heidegger’s greater intentions must be left undecided here. There can be no doubt, however, that Husserl had a clear sense of the thrust of Heidegger’s critique as well as of its potentially devastating consequences for his transcendental phenomenology. It was this critique that Husserl tried to counter with the tools and methods available to him and which culminated in the concept of the ‘transcendental person’. It was these ‘tools and methods’ that Heidegger was no longer willing to use, though he was indebted to his teacher’s phenomenology in almost every respect. Yet, one can see clearly how both Husserl and Heidegger took their departures, distinct as they may be, from the person living in the natural attitude or \textit{Dasein}’s average everydayness. 

Notes

1. The first major (i.e., book-length) work that, to my knowledge, deals with the Husserl–Heidegger relationship is Misch’s (Dilthey’s son-in-law and outstanding pupil) \textit{Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie}, published in four instalments between 1929 and 1930. This book was studied intensively by Husserl; see G. v. Kerckhoven (ed.) ‘Edmund Husserls Randnotizen zu Georg Mischs \textit{Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie}, Dilthey-Jahrbuch, 12 (1999/2000), pp. 145–86. (This volume of the \textit{Dilthey-Jahrbuch} contains Husserl’s as well as Heidegger’s marginal remarks on Misch’s book.) However, as Gadamer has often reported, he and his fellow students were already in the early 1920s discussing the novelty of Heidegger’s phenomenological approach.
vis-à-vis traditional phenomenology (meaning mostly Husserl). For current scholarly work on the Husserl–Heidegger relationship see L. Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003), as well as the important works by S. G. Crowell; I shall quote from this research below. I shall also consider E. Tugendhat’s and C.-F. Gethmann’s ‘classical’ works on this topic.

2. This goes especially for the figures who were present as students or foreign scholars in Freiburg and Marburg in the 1920s and early 1930s, of whom I only want to mention the most important: Pato ka, Ingarden, Fink, M. Müller, Landgrebe, Celms, Cairns, and Gadamer. Most of these went on to become pivotal figures in the phenomenological movement or, as in the case of Gadamer, have developed their own way of thought. None of these achievements, however, was conceivable without the influence of Husserl and Heidegger. On a larger scale, few philosophers after the Second World War have been indifferent towards this discussion, which has been of outstanding importance to twentieth-century philosophy’s self-understanding. Again, it is not only philosophers in the German-speaking world who have in one way or another taken a stand on this relationship. Focusing on Germany, I only mention (again) Gadamer, Adorno, Apel, Habermas, Tugendhat, Schmitz, Held, and Waldenfels. In France, one should mention Levinas, Ricoeur, and J.-L. Marion; and in North America, Arendt, Jonas, Schutz, Gurwitsch, Spiegelberg, Wild, and Sokolowski, among others.

3. *Being and Time*, p. 34 (I am quoting throughout from the original German 16th edn (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1986)). All translations, unless otherwise noted, are mine.


5. This term was coined by Crowell: see his *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths towards Transcendental Phenomenology* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern, 2001), p. 115, following Kisiel’s coinage (from *The Genesis*) of ‘metaphysical decade’ as a term for the decade afterwards.

6. The radical reading of Heidegger’s project is, of course, that he is doing something radically different from any previous philosophical attempts. Such a reading can be supported by Heidegger himself, who claims in the introduction to *Being and Time* that the whole of Western metaphysics is flawed and needs to be replaced. I only wish to say that
I do not endorse such a reading and find it philosophically unproductive. I shall not argue for my reading here, but can only state it theoretically.

7. I follow the translation by R. Bruzina that has become almost standard now, although ‘non-participating’ might be more elegant.

8. In the following, I am drawing from texts published in 2002 in *Husserliana* (*Hua*) XXXIV, *Zur Phänomenologischen Reduktion: Texte aus dem Nachlass* (1926–1935). (Volumes from Husserl’s collected works, the *Husserliana* (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer), will be referred to as ‘*Hua*’ with the volume numbers in roman numerals.)

9. See *Being and Time*, p. 442, and Heidegger’s comment in his own copy of *Being and Time*, p. 98 (‘Natur’).

10. Gethmann claims that Heidegger’s point is really a two-fold critique, (a) Husserl’s identifying of the constituting agent with the transcendental subject and (b) his identifying the constituted with the totality of objects. See C. F. Gethmann, *Dasein: Erkennen und Handeln. Heidegger im phänomenologischen Kontext* (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1993), pp. 26f. Yet, since Husserl sees transcendental consciousness and that which it constitutes as moments within one structure (*Hua* XXXIV, p. 469), he merely draws out a distinction that is already implied in Husserl’s concept of transcendental consciousness.

11. Or perhaps even earlier, if one agrees with Heidegger’s claim that the concept of the subject was taken over by Descartes from the Greek (Aristotelian) concept of hypokeimenon.

12. A ‘classical’ interpreter of this sort is H. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time*, Division I (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1991): ‘From Plato’s theoretical dialectic, which turns the mind away from the everyday world of “shadows”, to Descartes’ preparation for philosophy by shutting himself up in a warm room where he is free from involvement and passion, to Hume’s strange analytical discoveries in his study, which he forgets when he goes out to play billiards, philosophers have supposed that only by withdrawing from everyday practical concerns before describing things and people can they discover how things really are. The pragmatists questioned this view, and in this sense Heidegger can be viewed as radicalizing the insights already contained in the writings of such pragmatists as Nietzsche, Peirce, James, and Dewey’ (p. 6).

13. Though it would be interesting to see how Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity compares to Heidegger’s framing of *Dasein* as *Mit-Dasein*, this problematic, as leading beyond the scope of this paper, will have to remain bracketed in this context.
14. See *Hua IV*, which contains the unpublished draft of *Ideas II*. For Husserl's further developments of the concept of personhood in the context of the distinction between nature and spirit (naturalistic and personalistic attitude respectively), see *Hua – Materialien V, Natur und Geist. Vorlesungen*, 1919.


16. Husserl's famous letter to Pfänder is published in *Hua – Dokumente* III, Vol. II, pp. 180–4. A brief historical summary: Husserl was asked by the editorial board of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* to write an entry on phenomenology. Husserl agreed, but solicited Heidegger's help. The collaboration occupied Husserl and Heidegger throughout 1927, but ultimately failed and was abandoned. Husserl went on to submit his own draft of the article. This collaboration can be seen as the last true philosophical discussion between the two philosophers. The personal break between them began in 1929 after Heidegger's inaugural lecture in Freiburg (on taking over Husserl's chair), 'What is Metaphysics?', which Husserl attended and which he clearly saw as deviating from his own method. In 1931, Husserl paid a visit to several local Kant societies in Germany where he delivered his lecture 'Phenomenology and Anthropology' (published in *Hua XXVII*), in which he attacked (without mentioning names) specific modern philosophical approaches which he saw as merely 'existential' or 'anthropological'. Heidegger later wrongly claims (in his *Spiegel* interview) that Husserl spoke in the Berlin sports palace and openly attacked both himself and Scheler. See also the definitive historical account on their relationship by K. Schuhmann, 'Zu Heideggers Spiegel-Gespräch über Husserl', *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 32 (1978).

17. In one manuscript (Text no. 17, *Hua XXXIV*, pp. 264ff.), Husserl ponders the question of ontology in the tradition of Aristotle and from there launches a critique of Heidegger. Even from this approach the question of being leads to the question of consciousness that has being (the problem of intentionality) and finally to the transcendental reduction. Passages from this and other texts from 1931 that were most probably written as reactions to Husserl's study of *Being and Time* will be discussed later.

18. It might be that Husserl and Heidegger rejected the term 'anthropology' for different reasons – Husserl presumably because it lacks the transcendental 'index', Heidegger because it lacks any reference to fundamental ontology. I certainly do not want to propose anthropology as a 'new' fundamental discipline, but merely to point to the perceived centre
of gravity in the Husserl–Heidegger discussion. So to those objecting to the term ‘anthropology’, I would immediately concede that this is merely a word I am picking up from Husserl but assert that one would merely be disagreeing about terminology.

19. As early as 1919 in his first lectures in Freiburg, Heidegger criticizes the sciences for providing a ‘maximum of theorization’ and a concomitant ‘greatest possible elimination [Austilgung] of the situation’, meaning the concrete situation of Dasein. This situation has to be remedied by philosophy, i.e., it cannot be treated in the Husserlian style of ‘rigorous science’ that falsely emulates the (theoretical) method of the sciences. See Heidegger, Uber das Wesen der Universität und des akademischen Studiums, in Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, GA 56/57 (Frank-furt-on-Main: Klostermann, 1987), p. 207. Heidegger is influenced in his critique of ‘theory’ by Dilthey, as R. A. Makkreel points out. See Makkreel’s instructive article ‘Heidegger, Dilthey und der Vollzugssinn der Geschichte’, Heidegger-Jahrbuch I (Freiburg/Munich: Alber, 2004), pp. 307–21.

20. E. Tugendhat, e.g., (Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967), pp. 263ff.) thinks that there is no apparent epochē or reduction in Heidegger not because Heidegger would reject it, but rather because he accepts it from the very start and only radicalizes Husserl’s position. From the very start Heidegger feels no need to fend off the spectre of an ‘objective world’ that Husserl was struggling with. Another reading favoured by Bernet and others claims that there is in fact a ‘reduction’ in Being and Time, although Heidegger does not employ this term. Heidegger’s form of reduction can be seen in Angst as that emotional or attuned state of Dasein in which it is brought before the facts of its radical loneliness. See R. Bernet, ‘Phenomenological Reduction and the Double Life of the Subject’, in T. Kisiel and J. van Buren (eds) Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in his Earliest Thought (New York: SUNY Press, 1994), pp. 245–67, as well as J.-L. Marion, Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, and Phenomenology (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern, 1998).

21. Landgrebe concludes in his essay ‘Husserls Phänomenologie und die Motive zu ihrer Umbildung’ (originally published in 1939): ‘So besteht ein notwendiger Zusammenhang zwischen der Universalität der phänomenologischen Methode und der Haltung des unbeteiligten Zuschauers’ (Der Weg der Phänomenologie (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1978), p. 34), and then goes on to say (and I am quoting the second half of the sentence above): ‘[F]assen wir diese Zusammenhänge ins Auge, so wird die Behauptung verständlich, dass in der Ablehnung des “unbeteiligten Zuschauers” durch Heidegger ein Angriff auf einen Kerngedanken Husserls beschlossen liegt, auf denjenigen, an dem der Anspruch seiner

23. Husserl discusses the difference between naturalistic and personalistic attitudes in *Ideas* I and especially *Ideas* II. *Ideas* II in its passages on the constitution of the spiritual world gives an account of the constitution of world from the personalistic attitude, i.e., from the first-person perspective.

24. For a discussion of these two fundamental attitudes and motivation as ‘spiritual causality’, see the classic study by B. Rang, *Kausalität und Motivation: Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Perspektivität und Objektivität in der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls*, Phaenomenologica 53 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973). Moreover, it is not by accident that I employ Nagel’s terminology here, as I do believe that Husserl and Nagel have much in common in this regard. I have tried to elaborate on this connection in my “‘Real-Idealism’: An Unorthodox Husserlian Response to the Question of Transcendental Idealism” (currently under review).

25. In this sense, Heidegger criticizes Husserl’s ideal of rigorous science, which derives its model of rigour from mathematics. In his lecture course of 1923, *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, trans. J. van Buren (Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), he writes that Husserl wants to elevate phenomenological description ‘to the level of mathematical rigor […]. Is it justified to hold up mathematics as a model for all scientific disciplines?’ (p. 56). To be fair, Husserl does not claim this; rather, his point is that *phenomenology* must be an eidetic science, and an eidetic science cannot be anything but rigorous. Yet not all rigour is mathematical. The critique – and this is indeed a valid point and presumably what Heidegger meant – must rather be: why does phenomenology have to be an eidetic discipline? Heidegger’s criticism is that it is absurd to engage in an eidetic science with regard to factual *Dasein*. An analysis of *Dasein* should certainly be *rigorous*, but not in the sense of eidetic (which Husserl equivocates). Ironically, the criticism often levelled against Husserl – i.e., that phenomenology is merely about ‘description’ – applies in this respect more to Heidegger than to Husserl!

26. I thus agree with Crowell’s assessment that the discipline of psychology that Husserl portrays here is a mere construction made to give a clear ‘pedagogical’ definition of transcendental phenomenology, as psychology’s counterpart. Crowell holds that ‘pure phenomenological psychology is an unholy hybrid of insights and motives culled from
transcendental philosophy, on the one hand, and elements that accrue to it from a purely conjectural association with positive science, on the other’ (‘Does the Husserl/Heidegger Feud Rest on a Mistake?’, p. 130). Crowell’s main argument regarding the unresolved feud between the two philosophers is based on the problematic or unclarified concept of the transcendental employed by Husserl and criticized by Heidegger. Husserl, Crowell holds, in turn makes the mistake of framing the transcendental in terms of psychological description, thus stopping short of his own insights because of his own assumptions regarding phenomenological analysis. Thus, Heidegger’s critique amounts to questioning the assumed relatedness of the transcendental to psychology (see p. 135), whereas Husserl’s own concept of intentionality already thematically goes beyond his own methodological presuppositions. I very much agree with this assessment and believe that my reconstruction of the transcendental person as a concrete agent of intentional acts complements Crowell’s reading. Yet, whereas Crowell merely mentions the theme of intentionality as the topic of psychological or phenomenological research, it has to be insisted that this intentionality in the mature Husserl is a concept that goes far beyond act-intentionality in the sense of the Logical Investigations. Husserl’s concept of intentionality includes all human behaviour such as feeling, willing, acting, etc. All of this is part of ‘intentional analysis’, an account, to Husserl, that describes the human being in its broad dimensions as ‘horizontal’ intentionality and ‘connected to’ or ‘carried out’ by an embodied agent. For a broader treatment of these themes, see also Crowell’s Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning and my review article ‘The Condition of Possibility of Transcendental Phenomenology’, Husserl Studies (forthcoming).

27. To be fair, one should mention that Husserl does envision a ‘phenomenological psychology’ that investigates intentional structures without performing the transcendental turn (see his 1925 lecture on ‘Phenomenological Psychology’, Hua IX) – but it is also fair to say that this is merely a construction in order to clarify the status of transcendental phenomenology. Such a discipline is indeed a hybrid, to say the least!

28. Of course, the concept of transcendental subjectivity in Husserl is neither a human’s nor any other creature’s but an a priori structure. Thus, the concept ‘transcendental person’ seems to me to indicate the transcendental ‘correlate’ of the concrete human person as we know it in our life-world. The transcendental person is an individual human subject conceived in her ‘full concreteness’. It is thus a problem to equate – as Husserl seems to do in some of these passages – the transcendental ego with the transcendental person. I thank Sara Heinämaa for bringing this problem to my attention.
29. See e.g., *Hua* XXXV, p. 305, where Husserl speaks of ‘transzendentale Erfahrungswissenschaft’ or ‘transzendental begründete Erfahrungswissenschaft’.


31. Indeed, the term ‘monad’ already appears in the *Logos* article ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’ and in the 1910/11 lecture ‘Basic Problems of Phenomenology’, published in *Hua* XIII. Thanks to Dermot Moran for pointing this out.

32. Already in texts from the early 1920s, when Husserl develops the concept of the monad, he emphasized its ‘concretion’: see *Hua* XIV, appendix II (from 1921), pp. 42ff. Here he writes: ‘Das konkrete Ich ist ein durch die immanente Zeit sich hindurch erstreckendes Identisches, ein sich nach seinem “geistigen” Bestimmungsgehalt, nach seinen Akten und Zuständen Änderndes, in sich immerfort tragend den absolut identischen Ichpol und andererseits sich auslebend in seinem Leben, dem konkreten Zusammenhang der Akte, die im Pol identisch zentriert sind’ (pp. 43f.). In a marginal note to this passage he writes, obviously at a later stage: ‘Aber diese ganze Betrachtung gibt keine Konkretion, wie ich selbst schliesslich sehe. Das Ich ist doch immerzu “konstituiert” (in völlig eigenartiger Weise konstituiert) als personales Ich, Ich seiner Habitualitäten, seiner Vermögen, seines Charakters’ (p. 44). In a text from 1930 Husserl then points out that the monad in its fullest concretion has to be conceived of as transcendent, as ‘das transzendentale absolute Sein in Form einer Menschenmonade oder transzendentales Subjektsein in der Wesensgestalt “transzendentales Menschentum”’ (*Hua* XXXIV, p. 154). As such it has the possibility of living in the ‘mode of the natural attitude’ (p. 148). Hence, whereas Husserl has nothing to correct regarding the characterization of the human being in terms of the monad, what he does criticize about his earlier account is the methodological indifference with regard to its status as transcendent. In my reading, the term ‘transcendental person’ merely places greater emphasis on this methodological consideration which Heidegger overlooked. For a reconstruction of Husserl’s monadology and his relation to Leibniz see Karl Mertens, ‘Husserls Phänomenologie der Monade. Bemerkungen zu Husserls Auseinandersetzung mit Leibniz’, *Husserl Studies*, 17 (2001), pp. 1–20, and Michael Shim, ‘Towards a Phenomenological Monadology: On Husserl and Mahnke’, in D. Carr and C. Lotz (eds) *Subjektivität – Verantwortung – Wahrheit: Neue Aspekte der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls* (Frankfurt-on-Main/Berlin/Bern: Lang, 2002), pp. 243–59.


35. Ibid.
36. This is in accordance with the fact that Heidegger always held Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, i.e., Husserl’s descriptive phenomenology before the transcendental turn, in great esteem: it supposedly gave Heidegger ‘eyes’ for the first time. ‘*Husserl hat mir die Augen eingesetzt*’, Heidegger would later write. See *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1988), pp. 86f.

37. This issue is taken up by Fink in his critique of Husserl in the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*. Here this critique is utilized for a different end (the reconciliation of the natural and transcendental attitudes), but essentially amounts to the same: Fink claims that the transcendental ego, because it is not existing but a ‘nonentity’, in his words a *me-on* (because it *constitutes* being), cannot be described by normal language, which is, as a mundane phenomenon, itself constituted. To say that the transcendental ego cannot be grasped by ‘logifying’ description (by using the language of the natural attitude, and there is no other) amounts to saying that it does not ‘exist’ at all – which is what Heidegger essentially claims. For a critique of this Finkian line of argument see Crowell’s essay ‘Gnostic Phenomenology: Eugen Fink and the Critique of Transcendental Reason’, pp. 244–63 in *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, and chapter 4 of my ‘*Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie*’: *Systematik und Methodologie der Phänomenologie in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Husserl und Fink*, Phaenomenologica 166 (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 2002).

38. Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, has pointed out that Heidegger too insists that describing *Dasein* is itself an act of *reflection*, i.e., a reflective turn that runs counter to the natural attitude.

39. Gander recently made the interesting claim that Heidegger in *Being and Time* is performing an ‘anthropologization of phenomenology’ because of the ‘hermeneutic correction’ of Husserl’s original account, yielding space for a ‘legitimate notion of “anthropology”’ (H.-H. Gander, *Selbstverständnis und Lebenswelt: Grundzüge einer phänomenologischen Hermeneutik im Ausgang von Husserl und Heidegger* (Frankfurt-on-Main: Klostermann, 2001), p. 217). In other words, it is the *hermeneutical* dimension of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology that accounts for such an ‘anthropologization’ of phenomenology.


41. It has been argued that Heidegger takes up the fundamental theme of intentionality in his characterization of *Dasein’s* being-in (*Sein-in*) or being-with (*Seinbei*), instead of, as has always been Husserl’s paradigm, in terms of the correlation of intention and fulfilment.
This theme cannot be discussed here in detail, but, if true, points to another consistent development from Husserl to Heidegger (instead of a radical break between both). See Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl*, 2nd edn (Frankfurt-on-Main: Klostermann, 1988).

42. See *Being and Time*, p. 27. See also *Ontology*, pp. 56f.

43. *Hua* XXXIV, p. 258.

44. While the absence of this philosophizing agent was noted in passing by many readers of *Being and Time* already when it was published, this issue is dealt with in detail in Rudolf Bernet’s insightful essay ‘Différence ontologique et conscience transcendantale: la réponse de la *Sixième méditation cartésienne* de Fink’, in *Husserl*, ed. Eliane Escoubas and Marc Richir (Grenoble: J. Millon, 1989), pp. 89–116. Bernet reads Fink’s *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* equally as a critique – inspired by Husserl, to be sure – of this dark spot in Heidegger’s hermeneutics of *Dasein*.

45. In fact, Husserl does acknowledge human facticity and ‘existential’ questions about life and death, especially in his late lectures on *Phenomenological Psychology* (*Hua* IX) and in the drafts on the *Crisis* (*Hua* XXIX). These issues need to be clarified transcendentally, but this does not mean that they are in themselves ‘fundamental’.

46. *Hua* XXXIV, pp. 258f.


48. Of course, the religious person who has broken with the natural attitude will go elsewhere.


51. Cf. also the following interesting passage from the *Nachlass* (B II 4/82) from 1929: ‘diese Welt … ist nichts von ihm, dem absoluten Ich und Ichleben Getrenntes, nicht etwas neben ihm und zu ihm Beziehung Habendes. Es hat zu ihm Beziehung als in ihm Konstituiertes zum Konstituierenden, und diese Beziehung liegt ganz und gar innerhalb der absoluten, der transzendenten Subjektivität.’ This corresponds to another passage from the C-manuscripts where Husserl states that the world is a ‘transcendental non-ego’ (*Nicht-Ich*). Cf. also *Hua* XXXIV, pp. 230 f., where Husserl speaks of transcendental phenomenology as a ‘self-interpretation [Selbstauslegung] of the transcendental ego.

52. Hua XXXIV, p. 198. Note that Husserl here employs the term Dasein almost as a matter of course, as well as his curious reversal of ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’!

53. Indeed, as Husserl says explicitly in a conversation with D. Cairns in 1931: ‘Constitutional analysis is not the same as descriptive analysis. … Such naivété is present also in Heidegger so far as he takes Dasein (human existence) as basic instead of having its constitution, its genesis parallel to the world-genesis.’ D. Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink (The Hague: Nijhoff), pp. 27f.

54. Hua XXXIV, p. 257.


56. Recall that, to Heidegger, transcendental constitution was a possibility of the factual self!

57. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at SPEP 2002 (Chicago) and at the University of Northern Florida, Jacksonville, and Georgia State University, Atlanta, in the spring of 2003. I would like to thank all readers as well as all of the participants of these discussions, especially James Hart, David Carr, David Weberman, Donn Welton, Eric Wilson, John Maraldo, and Dermot Moran, for their insightful comments. Furthermore, I would like to thank Kyle McNeel and Pauline Marsh for their help with the grammar and style of this article as well as an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on an earlier draft.