

1-1-1976

Intelligence and Sensibility in the Dance

Curtis Carter

Marquette University, curtis.carter@marquette.edu

UNIV
A-12.3
Series 2



by Curtis L. Carter

A Professor of Philosophy and Chairman of the University Committee on the Fine Arts at Marquette University, he is deeply involved in the dance field as a writer and critic. Currently he is a member of the National Executive Committee of the American Dance Guild, and serves as Chairman of the Wisconsin Dance Council.

I.


At present a conceptual plague besets at all levels the understanding of dance as an art form. It is grounded in a misguided separation of sensibility from intelligence. Sensibility includes physical motor impulses and action and the feelings these are intended to express; intelligence refers to notions of formal structure, analysis, interpretation of meaning, and reasoning that lead to theoretical studies of dance. According to those dancers, writers, and educators who separate sensibility from intelligence, dance is an art of sensibility. The choreographing of dances, their performance, and their perception by viewers consist, accordingly, of physical-emotive processes in which the intellectual factors that generate aesthetics, philosophy, and theory can be neglected without significant loss. This one-sided approach surrounds dance with an unfortunate aura of anti-

intellectualism, and dance suffers correspondingly as those genuinely interested in the arts are led to regard dance as inferior in kind and in significance to art forms whose intellectual components are not so neglected. Dance is thus regarded as unworthy to be given space in the cultural pantheon occupied by such universally recognized art forms as poetry, music, and painting.

The image problem for dance is not new. Crato, a character in the Greek satirist Lucian's dialogue on dance, mouths the skeptical view:

Who that is a man at all, a lifelong friend of letters, moreover conversant with philosophy, abandons his interest, Lycinus, in all that is better . . . to sit enthralled by the flute, watching a girlish fellow play the wanton with dainty clothing and bawdy songs and imitate love-sick minxes, the most erotic of all antiquity . . . a ridiculous business in all truth . . .¹

For more complex philosophical reasons Hegel, writing in the nineteenth century, excludes dance by name from the list of "essential" arts (architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry);—he relegates it, in fact, to the category of imperfect arts, along with such other genteel forms of human leis-



intelligence and sensibility in the dance

ure as gardening.² And contemporary understanding of dance continues to exhibit a similar anti-intellectualism. The reluctance of many colleges and universities to consider dance a serious academic concern, and the relative neglect of dance in elementary and secondary school curricula, reflect the comparatively low image of dance in contemporary cultural life.

Now there is no particular merit in making dance intellectually respectable merely for the sake of modifying an undesirable cultural image unless, of course, something important is lost by the present sensibility emphasis. I believe there are significant losses. In the first place, choreographers and dancers do not receive their due recognition as contributors of significant forms of human creative expression. Their contribution to others through performance and participation in movement experiences is impaired because the audiences and participants lack balanced awareness of both sensible and intellectual aspects of dance that are necessary to its full appreciation. Other issues are also at stake: The preparation of choreographers and dancers, in both professional company schools and in university dance programs, hovers uneasily in a tenuous and often directionless state and falls short of meeting personal and professional-artistic needs in

practically every case. The use of dance as a form of general education is equally inhibited by the failure of dance educators to integrate the intellectual aspects of dance with the physical. The scholarly investigation of the intellectual aspects of dance, and the establishing of dance as a recognized field of study also suffer from neglect due to the exclusive emphasis upon sensibility.

The popularity of dance is in the ascendant today, as we all regularly and joyfully remind ourselves. This phenomenon is both the cause and the result of increased writing about dance. The current wave of popularity that dance enjoys makes it all the more urgent that new viewers and old ones receive encouragement and support from a corresponding surge in the quality and quantity of scholarly literature and educational programs augmenting the raw dance experience with aesthetic and philosophical concepts. Without such support, the rise in the popularity of dance will undoubtedly remain on a superficial level. The "boom" might indeed boomerang into a setback for dance because popular taste has a tendency—fatal for art—to atrophy at the level of familiar, entertaining, and easily grasped images. Moreover, without a deepening of audience experience through the development of both the intellectual and sensible aspects of dance, it could become

increasingly more difficult to support the less popular experimental frontiers of dance.

Twyla Tharp's statement, "I've survived inattention. I hope to God I survive attention,"³ is as applicable to the future of all of dance as it is to her own work.

I have been careful to state the importance of both the physical-emotive and the intellectual aspects of dance; no one should therefore accuse me of opting for a strictly intellectual or conceptualist approach to this art. The physical-emotive aspects of dance are not in question; they are essential. If I appear to emphasize the intellectual here it is only because that side of dance so frequently remains unexplored, and is nevertheless desperately in need of spokesmen. My purpose here is to examine both generally and with particular attention to dance aesthetics, philosophy, and theory the implications of the divorcement of sensibility from intelligence. Dance, as I will understand it here, includes all forms of the art that are designed for performance by trained dancers, or by non-dancers who act according to the directions of an artist-choreographer, and also includes certain creative movement-experiences intended for participation rather than for performance. The essay will support and defend the notion that both sensibility and intelligence are necessary and complementary features that function in all aspects of dance, including choreography, performance, participatory educational dance, as well as in the experiences a viewer undergoes while absorbing a performance. Creators, participants, and viewers each apply intelligence respectively to the making, doing, and perceiving of dances. The choreographer translates ideas into movement patterns, the participants in dance classes experience the created order of the dance with their minds as well as with their bodies. Viewers, on the other hand, perceive the formal patterns of the dance and symbolic meanings, while experiencing its physical-kinesthetic and emotive aspects. Approaches to dance that deal only with the physical-emotive aspects of dance are therefore, incomplete, and those who present dance from this limited perspective must take responsibility for the poor cultural image of dance, for the incompleteness of dance experience that lacks intellectual content, for deficiencies in dance education, and for the arrested development of dance research and scholarship.

II.

Before turning directly to the implications of the present split between sensibility and intelligence for theoretical writings on dance, which includes dance aesthetics, philosophy, and theory, I would like to consider briefly the background and reasons for that split. The principal factor in the background is a half-truth deriving from a selective focus on the physical-emotive aspects of dance. This "half-truth" asserts that dance takes the physical-motor impulses of the human body and the stirrings of undifferentiated feeling states as its medium. This claim, while true, is only a half-truth because it omits the essential fact that no dance as art would exist at all if there were not a creative-analytical mind at work selecting and shaping the physical impulses and feelings according to an idea or a concept. In his discussion of Isadora Duncan's method for creating dance, John Martin refers to these initial stages of physical impulse and feeling as "vague and inspirational" sources of dance.⁴ At this stage we do not yet have dance. Intelligence must relate the physical impulses and feelings into the meaningful patterns and symbols and must correlate movement with music, lighting, costumes, and sets. Today's dancers also integrate computer and video technology into their works. Such acts of intelligent selection are not adequately covered in a discussion of dance as physical-emotive movement.

The reasons, as well as the background, for the division of sensibility from intelligence, and for the accompanying second class status of dance in the general concept of arts and culture, are complex. They go far deeper than aversion from the physical-bodily aspects of human experience, or than mere snobbery. These reasons rise out of a series of misunderstandings that combine with the previously mentioned half-truth that dance is a physical-emotive art. I will examine critically some of the more important considerations here, for the purpose of showing their ineffectiveness as reasons to justify the separation of sensibility from intelligence, and to clear the way for properly integrating these elements in future discussions of dance.

One unavoidable factor contributing to the unexamined separation of sensibility from intelligence is the very absence of a tradition of concern with such questions among

choreographers and dancers themselves. The question of how sensibility and intelligence function in dance is philosophical in nature, and—to my knowledge—it simply has not been discussed on that level. The practitioners and critics of dance who have shown *some* concern for dance theory have in their theory, given exclusive importance to the physical-emotive aspects while virtually ignoring the intellectual.

A related circumstance contributing to the separation of sensibility from intelligence is the fact that for many people dance lacks an independent identity; and it has been considered an adjunct of other arts like music and drama, or as a part of physical education, rather than as an entity in its own right. Library journals classify dance in the category of sport, and dance periodicals are located in the music index. Colleges and universities, moreover, remain uncertain what place dance should occupy in the curriculum. For historical reasons it has been assigned to physical education departments, and now the trend is to place it with drama or music, in a school of fine arts. But no clear identity for dance as an independent area of art or of study emerges in these processes. The identity problem for dance is an ancient problem too: Demetrius the Cynic typifies the skeptical view of the identity of dance when he denounces dance as a mere adjunct to music and silk vestments, consisting of meaningless, idle movements with no sense at all. Upon hearing Demetrius' denunciation, a dancer is said to have stopped the music and proceeded to give a performance of the loves of Aphrodite and Ares, using movement alone; so convincing was he that Demetrius shouted at the top of his lungs, "I hear the story you are acting, man, I do not just see it . . ."5

The rationale that supports the division of sensibility from intelligence in dance often includes the belief that dance, by its physical-emotive nature, is the antithesis of abstract intellectual activity. Such thinking, I believe, operates on the mistaken assumption that abstractions do not apply to dance. This error is a principal source of confusion in the understanding of dance. Abstractions function in dance, just as they do in other forms

Sue's Leg, Twyla Tharp, choreographer.
Courtesy: WNET, **Dance in America**, N.Y.

Photo removed

Photo removed

of expression. The formalist choreography of such Balanchine works as "Jewels" cannot be fully appreciated apart from its conceptual structure of form. Anthony Tudor's theatrical realism in the ballet "Pillars of Fire," though suggesting episodes from "real life," is successful precisely because it is an abstraction of the human experience of stifling Puritanism in conflict with human desire. The dance is compelling because it abstracts essential elements to make a point that would not be possible to make by simply placing an event from "real life" on the stage. Every developed dance style, moreover, including ballet and modern dance, is based upon a set of abstract principles that help to explain the choreography. Isadora Duncan, Martha Graham, Doris Humphrey, and others all build their approaches to dance on abstract theories concerning the uses of the human body for realizing art. Such principles are not used mindlessly or mechanically, and the styles of each choreographer change and grow. But underlying such developments of dance styles are abstract principles that can be articulated as a syntax of the various movement styles. The abstract principles which comprise the various styles are there to be articulated verbally for anyone with perceptual and verbal skills. These examples, though they do not constitute definitive arguments, are sufficient to show that the absence of abstraction does not provide the grounds for separating sensibility from intelligence in dance. The absence of abstraction therefore fails to distinguish dance from activities that are recognized to have intellectual as well as sensible characteristics.

Underlying the confusion regarding abstraction is a related confusion on the nature of intelligence. If we are to discuss the relation between sensibility and intelligence in dance, we must not limit the notion of intelligence to mere verbal understanding. It is an error, as Edwin Denby has said, to suppose that dance intelligence is necessarily the same as verbal intelligence.⁶ But it is an even greater misconception to suppose that because the primary medium of dance is physical movement, intelligence is lacking. Throughout this essay I have stressed the fact that intelligence gives

The Mooche, Estelle Spurlock, Alvin Ailey Dance Co. Photo by Johan Elbers.

dance its formal structure and its symbolic meanings through the operation of creative and interpretive cognitive processes. Today we cannot even say, as Denby once did, that verbal intelligence is entirely separable from dance, because choreographers from Doris Humphrey to Trisha Brown and beyond continue to experiment with combinations of words and movements in their dances. In short, no substantial argument can be advanced to support the too-common assumption that dance is an art form in which intelligence plays no role. On the contrary, the post-modern choreographers such as Yvonne Rainer, Trisha Brown, Steve Paxton, and others *require* that the knowledgeable viewer take account of the intellectual concepts upon which their dances are constructed.

III.

The remaining two sections of this paper will examine the implications of the separation of sensibility from intelligence for writing about dance. Too much talk about the physical-feeling aspects of the dance has obscured the issue of writing about dance. There are undoubtedly some who feel that any attempt to write about so physical an activity as dance would be wasteful, worthless activity. Why write about dance at all? There are several answers that can be given to this. First, people want to, enjoy, and are determined to write about dance. This fact alone should tell us something of the importance of dance writing. For it cannot be that writers simply plunge into this very difficult work merely for the exercise. The remuneration scale, the attitude of editors, and the attitude of the general public do not support a strong interest in dance writing and scholarship. But, the difficulty of the task, the lack of pay and places to publish have not deterred a growing number of writers from writing about dance. It must be that people write about dance because they believe that the activity, however yet undefined as to methods, is necessary. The investment of relatively unrewarded time and creative effort itself places a value on the activity that cannot be ignored.

But there are other reasons for writing about dance. Writing is a fundamental way in which societies such as ours incorporate important activities and experiences as a part of the on-going culture. If dance is the oldest art form as tradition claims, it behooves those interested in the welfare of dance to take

greater care to see that dance is incorporated effectively into present-day cultures. This incorporation must occur not only through the channels of visual-bodily memory as it is passed from one dancer to another, but by means of writing as well. Obviously writing is not the only means available for preserving the experience of dance. Film and video tape, together with photographs, offer the means for providing more accurate recording of dance movement. But these media have not, nor do I think they ever will, replace words as a means of preserving and fostering the developments of culture. They do not measure in the same breadth and depth as do words the *human personalized response* to dance. Video tape and film moreover at their present stage of development are incapable of providing a vehicle for the precise articulation of theoretical concepts and their analysis that words can provide. We should not be misled therefore by the availability of these media for providing us with physical facts. Facts require interpretation that is articulated best in words. It is incumbent upon those of us who care about dance to carry on the present surge of interest in writing about the dance. In support of the continuation of writing on dance it is worthwhile to recall John Martin's words, written for **Theatre Arts Monthly** in 1934:

To get one's dancing from the printed page is at best a makeshift delight, and yet the scope of dance so far exceeds the scope of any individual's powers of participation that to neglect the printed page is to forfeit many of the rewards of the dance. Indeed, even such dancing as can be captured in one's present moments lacks much of its potential quality if it is viewed without illumination of that background which lives alone in books.⁷

On the other side of the issue, there are problems to be dealt with. The natural distrust that choreographers and dancers hold for all writing that attempts to reduce their work to words, for example, hinders the advance of writing on dance by raising doubts about the credibility of the writing. Suspicion of this kind is understandable to a degree, since the writer cannot possibly present in words the full experience of the dance as the choreographer or the dancer envisions it. Dance writers themselves exhibit considerable distrust of one another, putting aside the natural suspicions that choreographers and dancers share

for writing about their art. Critics regularly question the credibility of their peers and sometimes hold them in contempt. They are universally skeptical of aesthetics, philosophy, and theory as well as anthropology and history, because all of these forms of writing are removed from the direct experience of dance by an intervening conceptual framework.

Skepticism has been directed against the whole attempt at research or reflective writing by some critics. This sentiment is expressed in the remarks of the critic Martin Gottfried, who is addressing the 1969 CORD Conference on dance research:

I think—I'll tell you I'm very prejudiced against research. I don't think we really could ever get along, because I think the whole idea of research is very sterilizing and very antagonistic to life. I think the theater exists only in life, living people on stage, and, the records are something like freeze-dried coffee . . . The only thing that counts, whether it's the dance or the theater, is what goes on on the stage. And the rest, I think, is irrelevant.⁸

Although he himself is a critic, Gottfried is really attacking widely all efforts to write on dance. One is free to reject arbitrarily the validity of all writing and research on dance as Gottfried has done. But such personal assertions, even if they were to be amassed in large numbers, do not override the convincing reasons already cited in support of dance writing and research. Gottfried fails to see that his position contradicts his own action of asserting a *theoretical* claim to the effect that art is "just pleasure, just joy."⁹

Even so able a writer as Marcia Siegel has expressed serious reservations about forms of writing about dance that are at all removed from direct involvement with the dance experience. Remarking on dance criticism, Siegel notes,

Dance is a physical art, and I think the over-intellectualized kind of writing where the writer detaches himself from all sensory

Baryshnikov, American Ballet Theatre.
Photo by Martha Swope

Photo removed

ephemeral qualities and emotional connotations, is just about worthless. The one inescapable fact about dance criticism is that you have to be in contact with the real

live thing as it is performed. Yet the path between evading the dance event through mental gymnastics and condemning it too superficially through journalism is far from clear, and it's found mostly by instinct at this point.¹⁰

Siegel's statement raises a different kind of issue. Siegel does not question the value of writing and research on dance, and I am sure that she deplors the low level of dance literacy that presently exists. But her statement in the quotation would limit the scope of relevant (what she would approve of) writing on dance to writing that is directly in touch with the sensory, ephemeral qualities of live performance. This proposed limit effectively invalidates all writing other than criticism! Theoretical discussions of dance necessarily go beyond the sensory-emotive experience of first hand contact with performance that is the life blood of the critic. I doubt very much, however, that Siegel really intends to limit even her own writing on dance to criticism. Her preference for the particular, sensuous-emotive qualities, as opposed to the more abstract, intellectual writing on dance reflects a particular brand of philosophical empiricism, wherein "the truth" about dance is thought to exist independently of abstract concepts and generalizations in the physical-emotive qualities of sensibility. Siegel's preference may be valid; but such innocent claims to truth do have a history, and they can be justified or refuted by application of philosophical analysis.

Here is a situation in which the philosophy of knowledge—epistemology, can help the dance writer, by providing the procedures for testing various claims to knowledge and by identifying the philosophical foundations that support these claims. Uncritical acceptance or rejection of the claims of sensibility over intelligence impedes unnecessarily the progress of the intellectual-scholarly life of dance.

Kirkland, American Ballet Theatre.
Photo by Martha Swope

Photo removed

Photo removed

A portion of writing that is to be done on dance of necessity will exhibit the abstract, intellectual tone that writers favoring sensibility downgrade.

Present ruts in thinking about dance impede the development of its intellectual side and, thereby, widen the separation of sensibility and intelligence, and plotting the dance writer's way out of these ruts should not be left to instinct. Concepts and models for developing the intellectual life of dance are implicit in the data of sensibility, and in the existing intellectually based formal structures and symbolic character of dance. General concepts of aesthetics—form, expression, symbolic significance—that are applicable to the other arts can be formulated suitably for the discussion of dance. Present efforts to develop the theoretical aspects of dance do not yet compare to the advancements in these other arts. The most pressing current needs, therefore, are to use existing conceptual models where these are appropriate for dance, and to create new ones for advancing dance research and scholarship.

Patricia Rowe, a speaker at the CORD conference on Research In Dance: Problems and Possibilities (1967), takes a more sympathetic approach to theoretical writing about dance than does either Gottfried or Siegel:

In a sense, the creators and performers need no theories. Their primary work consists in making and doing. But others who are also concerned with inquiry in the arts—aestheticians, critics, historians, educators—find that their work cannot proceed in the absence of theory.¹¹

Rowe's position shows a clearer understanding of the importance of aesthetics, philosophy, and theory than does either of the previous writers. But Rowe widens the rift between sensibility and intelligence and thus inadvertently supports the irrelevance of these intellectual disciplines when she reintroduces the notion that creators and performers need no theories to guide their work. All forms of human symbol making behavior, including dance, proceed under the dominance of implicit and explicit theoretical guidelines.

Parade, Leonide Massine, choreographer. Joffrey Ballet, City Center. Photo by Gary Chryst.

Choreographers and dancers who understand the theory that underlies their work are in a better position to direct their efforts to their desired artistic aims than are those who stumble along mindlessly, and in ignorance. It is not, however, the primary business of choreographers and dancers to verbalize their theories, and to do analytical or critical studies. Others who are trained as philosophers and theoreticians can use the data that choreographers and dancers provide to develop these studies.

IV.

Previous arguments in this paper show clearly the connection of sensibility to intelligence. Their relationship must now be articulated and explored further in the context of dance research and writing. A first step is to delineate the different levels of knowledge that pertain to dance, and to approach each one with the proper conceptual methods and skills. I will limit this discussion to criticism, aesthetics, philosophy and theory of dance. Criticism is included because it provides the essential facts of aesthetic experience that constitute the data for developing theory and philosophy of dance. The other three appear for the purpose of calling attention to their relative neglect.

In very brief form, here is how I propose to delineate the four areas:

Criticism: represents the first level of verbal literacy, a direct verbal response to dance performances consisting of observation, description, interpretation, and evaluation.

Dance aesthetics: provides the conceptual framework for experimental and philosophical inquiry into dance as a form of art, examines the relations of dance to other forms of art, analyzes appreciative and critical responses to dance. All of these are based on analysis and interpretation of criticism, experimental and historical data, and reflective thinking.

Philosophy of dance: includes dance aesthetics, linguistic and logical metatheory analysis of terms, concepts and forms of reasoning applied to dance at all levels; broadly based substantive discussions of dance in relation to such areas as language, science, and education; and examination of dance in relation to the wider questions of human values and culture.

Dance theory: develops formal and technical principles, rationale, and general conceptual framework for various approaches to dance.

Today's dance criticism, which is the most developed form of writing on dance, aims at explicitness through concrete images, and it frequently emphasizes sensibility for the purpose of bringing the performance to life for the reader. The prevailing critical method of describing movement has resulted in some valuable data showing what perceptive critics see in contemporary dance performances. But there is room for other approaches that develop the ideas that such dance exemplifies, together with the discussion of its sensibility. The most important considerations for the discussion here, however, are the relations of criticism to the areas of aesthetics, philosophy, and theory. Criticism, as I have indicated, provides essential data for these areas, because it is the closest source of facts concerning performances and the aesthetic responses to these performances.

However useful criticism is as a source of the facts for other levels of writing, the methodological approaches for the theoretical studies of dance will differ from the descriptive and evaluative approaches of criticism. These other forms of writing consist of abstract modes of thinking, by their very nature; they employ reflective thought and analysis more than the first hand perceptual impressions of criticism. Critics and others accustomed to their language of sensibility might object that theoretical concepts are too abstract for discussing dance. But this objection applies inappropriately the standards for evaluating criticism to theoretical writing. Instead of establishing criteria for good aesthetics, philosophy, and theory of dance, these writers cry, "abstract" and "removed" when they should be concerned with clarity of concepts, adequacy of explanatory hypotheses, appropriate principles of theory, the quality of reflective thinking, the rigor of reasoning, the adequacy of research, and the appropriateness of research methodologies to particular topics. Fundamental deficiencies in these areas will go unnoticed if the critical examination of concepts of theory remains at the lowest level of name calling. Dance writers and their readers should not confuse the necessity for remaining in direct contact with the facts of dance experience, which is incumbent upon every

writer, with how such facts are to be used to formulate the theoretical principles of dance. Dance writers should not think of abstractness and "removedness" as the marks of irrelevancy for discussing dance. On the level of theory, writers of necessity exchange sensuously attractive language for conceptual clarity and subtle tracks of reasoning, and their thoughts cannot always come packaged in the image-bearing language of criticism. The arguments offered here find the balance between sensibility and intelligence attainable through dance writing, only in a broad spectrum of approaches that includes the sensibility of criticism and also the sometimes arid, abstractness of philosophical writing. All points on this spectrum, including vivid descriptions of movement and the theoretical concepts that articulate underlying intellectual bases of dance are essential for defining the place of dance in human experience.

Dancers and choreographers have rightly urged that writers learn about dance from observing and participating in movement experience. *Quid pro quo* these same dancers and choreographers will surely agree to taking comparable time for learning about the methods and substance of dance aesthetics, philosophy, and theory. Their reward undoubtedly will be a fuller grasp of the sensible and intellectual parameters of dance as a form of art.

In conclusion, it is impossible to spell out a complete plan at this time for the development of each important area of writing about dance. But here are some immediate steps that will facilitate their development. First of all, establishing an attitude of mutual respect among critics and scholarly writers will be an effective counter force for the often paranoid suspicions that obtain among writers representing different aspects of dance writing. Second, the developing methodologies for aesthetics, philosophy, and theory of dance should explore the usefulness of multi-disciplinary approaches with theater, music, anthropology, philosophy, and other disciplines. Multi-disciplinary programs provide a stop-gap remedy to present deficiencies in college and university dance faculties. But the long range goal should be to establish a body of qualified scholars who devote their full time to the study of the theoretical aspects of dance, because dance is not likely to receive

the full attention of any discipline in multi-disciplinary approaches. Dance scholarship consequently will remain on a superficial level. Third, a restructuring of college and university dance curricula to include high quality academic programs for students who wish to study and develop the intellectual aspects of dance through aesthetics, philosophy, and theory of dance is urgently needed. Presently there is not a single dance program in the country that has adequate faculty and research resources for doing this. Dance programs are able to prepare dance teachers for dance-physical education programs and occasionally for a professional dancing career, but no one is really doing for dance what a university is supposed to do best: to

conduct research, to contribute to scholarly knowledge about dance, and to train scholars in the field. Fourth, there is a need to create regional dance research centers across the country. At present, the Lincoln Center Library for the Performing Arts and perhaps the Harvard Theater collection provide limited opportunities for research. There is need for a wider distribution of resources in regional centers. The University of Wisconsin, as the first University dance program in the country is a logical place for a Midwest research center for dance, as the University of California in Los Angeles is the place for a west-coast center, and we might add an additional center in Texas. The availability of resources would greatly increase the potential for research and scholarship in these geographically diverse areas of the country. Fifth, most of all there is need for a greater number of first rate minds to join the pioneers in the scholarly tasks that must be accomplished for dance. Progress along these lines will undoubtedly contribute toward bringing together sensibility and intelligence in the field of dance. □

Photo removed

Appalachian Spring, Martha Graham, choreographer. Dancer: David Walker. Courtesy: WNET, **Dance in America**, N.Y.

- ¹ Lucian, "The Dance," *Dance Index I* (1942): 104. Lucian himself however attempts to refute this skeptical view of dance.
- ² G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics II*, trans. Sir T. M. Knox (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975), 628.
- ³ Twyla Tharp, *People Weekly*, February 2, 1976, p. 22.
- ⁴ John Martin, "Isadora Duncan and Basic Dance: Project for a Textbook," *Dance Index I* (1941): 7.
- ⁵ Lucian, p. 105.
- ⁶ Edwin Denby, *Looking at the Dance* (New York: Horizon Press, 1968).
- ⁷ John Martin, "Toward a Dance Library," *Theatre Arts Monthly* XVIII (May 1934): 361.
- ⁸ Martin Gottfried, "Journalistic Resources," *The Proceedings of the Second Conference on Research in Dance* (Warrenton, Va.: Committee on Research in Dance, 1969), pp. 81, 85.
- ⁹ Gottfried, p. 83.
- ¹⁰ Marcia Siegel, "Two Views of Dance," *Arts in Society* VIII (1971): 673.
- ¹¹ Patricia A. Rowe, "Research in Dance in Colleges and Universities in the U.S.: 1907-1967," *The Proceedings of the Preliminary Conference on Research in Dance* (Riverdale, New York: Committee on Research in Dance, 1967), p. 8.