Theology Faculty Research and Publications   Theology, Department of

2008

Key Ethical Issues in the Practices and Policies of Refugee Serving NGOs and Churches

Agbonkhianmeghe E. Orobator
Marquette University, agbonkhianmeghe.orobator@marquette.edu

Recommended Citation

Key Ethical Issues in the Practices and Policies of Refugee-Serving NGOs and Churches

Agbonkhianmeghe E. Orobator

Humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and churches constitute a permanent feature of refugee camps in eastern Africa. From Lukole (Tanzania) to Rhino Camp (Uganda) and Kakuma (Kenya), they provide a variety of services to communities of displaced people.[1] The cast of faith-based, refugee-serving organizations includes the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), the Tanganyika Christian Relief Services (TCRS), the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), and the different national affiliates of Caritas Internationalis. A variant of this involvement exists in the form of international church-related organizations, like the World Council of Churches (WCC), the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People, and the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), which focus on international advocacy and policy issues on behalf of uprooted people, occasionally producing critical reflections on forced migration and ethical responsibilities towards refugees.[2] In addition to this variety of refugee-serving NGOs, there exists a plethora of missions and mandates internal to each organization, the perception of which determines how each one views the ethical issues generated by forced migration and its preferred advocacy framework. This chapter examines some divergences arising from the mandates of refugee-serving NGOs.

To date the subject of refugee-serving, faith-based NGOs and churches has attracted remarkably scant scholarly attention. By way of introduction, some reminders are relevant. First, refugee assistance predates the international refugee regime; it did not commence only with the regime's adoption. Second, prior to this regime, the bulk of care and assistance was provided by religious agencies.[3] Third, and most important, Christian ethics and practice of refugee assistance have firm foundations in Scripture and theology. Both ethics and practice draw upon the "memory of exile" encapsulated in the Jewish religious tradition and the archetypal forced migration of Joseph, Mary,

and Jesus to Egypt, which combine to keep the community called church "attuned to the plight of refugees and migrants today."[4]

This chapter presents and analyzes some ethical issues that arise in the practices and policies of NGOs, faith-based organizations, and churches seeking to come to the assistance of refugees and assesses how such analysis may serve a broader project of effective advocacy. It assumes that faith-based organizations bring a unique perspective to the care and assistance of forced migrants that should neither be subsumed hastily under a generalized category nor facilely exempted from the strict ethical standards required of humanitarian actors.

Problems of Perception and Principles of Neutrality and Impartiality

Leaving aside the difficulty of producing a definition of "forced migration" that fully satisfies the interests, objectives, and expectations of all the actors, including forced migrants themselves, contemporary literature is divided on the nature and perception of the refugee crisis. Three partly overlapping and partly antithetical "angles of perception" can be distinguished. They raise ethical issues for humanitarian NGOs and churches.

Forced Migration as a Political Problem

Gil Loescher expresses the first position succinctly when he asserts that "the global refugee problem is not a humanitarian problem requiring charity, but a political problem requiring political solutions."[5] Although Loescher's main concern is with international agencies and governments responsible for oversight of the international refugee regime, an extreme form of his position would consider a purely humanitarian or charitable response, such as prioritized by some faith-based NGOs, to be suspect, because this approach attends to symptoms, rather than dealing with underlying political issues. What is required, Loescher argues, is "multilateral cooperation" that would compel a host of international organizations to effect institutional, legal, administrative, and structural reforms of the international refugee regime. Hence, he concludes, "to deal with political problems requires efforts that well exceed the scope of humanitarian organizations."[6]

An approach that prioritizes political solutions has ethical implications for the policies and practices of humanitarian NGOs. First, one cannot ignore issues of protection and human rights violations in the context of forced migration. Second, the practice of charity, if delinked from other structural and institutional concerns (such as reform of the international refugee regime), is essentially ineffectual. And, third, it is a disservice to uprooted people not to see beyond charity in attempting to address their needs and concerns.

To limit refugee assistance to charity contradicts the fundamental truth that forced migrants are victims of a violation of basic human rights. Whether in Kakuma, Ngara, Adjumani, or elsewhere, a refugee is a person who has been denied his or her rights by a constellation of political actors. While there is room for emergency response to their immediate needs, the overarching concern should be how to respect and restore those rights. As Mervyn Frost argues, such people "ought to be seen not as supplicants

deserving charity but as people whom we need to establish as citizens in democratic free states in order to secure our own freedom."[7] Documentary evidence suggests that this is not a shared assumption among humanitarian NGOs, some of which continue to conceive of refugee assistance "in terms of charity rather than as a means of enabling refugees to enjoy their rights."[8]

Forced Migration as a Human Rights Problem

Following upon the assertion that human rights violations lie at the root of displacement, a second approach sees forced migration as essentially a human rights problem.[9] In light of this approach, the fundamental goal of care and assistance should be the monitoring and reporting of violations of the human rights of displaced populations in view of securing more adequate protection for them. Often, the social context of these human rights violations is characterized by lawlessness, arbitrariness, and impunity. Hence, some authors speak of "spaces" or "zones" of exception, which not only facilitate abuses, but also excuse moral accountability and stigma of guilt for atrocities committed against refugees.[10]

Protection can be understood at many levels. Establishing adequate and functional legal and policy instruments to guarantee the rights of forced migrants represents one level. Another is the oversight of human rights situations in camps to prevent abuses. Each level calls for an appropriate response. Humanitarian NGOs, especially faith-based organizations, argue with reason that their very presence also constitutes an effective form of protection. By their presence in refugee camps, NGO personnel provide both protective humanitarian and political cover for displaced populations. Such cover serves as a deterrent to violators of human rights. Nearly all observers agree on the effectiveness of this form of refugee protection. Firm evidence also shows that religious or faith-based organizations are best placed to provide this cover, since they are more likely to remain in areas where international agencies maintain little or no significant presence and may enjoy the confidence of refugees as "natural 'social partners.'"[11] Faith-based NGOs tend to take a longer view of the refugee situation than other NGOs and commit resources to the lifespan of refugee crises. The fundamental ethos and experience of JRS amply illustrate these points.

JRS adopts a three-prong approach to refugee assistance: accompaniment, service, and advocacy. Accompaniment presupposes "being with" forcibly displaced or uprooted populations; it does not make sense from a distance: "It is by *being with* refugees that one discovers how to serve them. Similarly, accompanying refugees leads spontaneously to defending their cause."[12] Besides, JRS recruits a balanced mix of international, national, and local staff. Taken as a whole, one sees how the presence of such humanitarian workers can serve as a deterrent to human rights violations and abuses. It also facilitates advocacy, because the latter presupposes "withness."[13] Seen in this optic, the kind of assistance implied by "accompaniment" transcends superficial responses to the problem of forced migration. The matter, however, is not as unproblematic as this analysis of accompaniment might suggest. There is a critical ethical issue here: Is accompaniment (or "withness") simply a passive experience? Of what value is this act if it does not translate into an active advocacy against human rights violations and the defense of rights

of displaced people? In addressing these questions, it is important that we understand advocacy as a multifaceted reality that assumes various concrete forms besides the defense of human rights. The guaranteeing of conditions such as education, microcredit schemes, income-generating projects, skills acquisition, and women's empowerment, all of which further the socioeconomic development of displaced populations, are among the different facets of advocacy.

The issues that surface here concern neutrality and impartiality—fundamental in the ethos of humanitarian action in the midst of conflict and complex emergencies. On these issues controversies have raged between those who espouse the inviolability of neutrality and impartiality and those who advocate political solidarity (or taking sides with victims of human rights violations), respectively categorized by Thomas Weiss as "classicists" (keep politics and humanitarian action apart) and "political humanitarians" (keep them together).[14] This is not the place to rehash the debate, some elements of which have clear ethical implications for refugee-serving NGOs. The crucial question facing the latter is what to do in the event of abuse: when accompanying forced migrants, do neutrality and impartiality attenuate the obligation to monitor, document, report, and denounce acts that violate their rights? No easy solutions exist for these ethical problematics, but the following considerations help situate them within a larger analytical framework.

First, it has become commonplace to link "protection," as a political duty, with "assistance," as a humanitarian option. From the perspective of the subject of forced migration, the two are inseparable: the refugee in need of assistance is the same one whose rights are being violated. There are not two realities at stake here, writes Elizabeth Ferris: "Protection and assistance are, of course, closely linked. If refugees do not receive the assistance they need to survive, they will seek it elsewhere. Women will turn to prostitution to feed their families, young people will be recruited to join rebel forces when there are no educational or other opportunities in refugee camps, and refugees may turn to crime—which often brings reprisals."[15] The tendency for some authors to frame this issue in terms of conflicting alternatives does not obscure the fact that we are not dealing with mutually exclusive options. Both options essentially overlap; each humanitarian crisis entails a political consequence and unfolds within a highly politicized space. The concomitant responsibility toward forced migrants, while not absolutely tied to specific political goals, need not become an excuse for political inaction.[16]

Second, if political action or human rights activism and humanitarian assistance overlap, they do not simply merge into one and the same reality, certainly not in the context of forced migration. Any confusion of roles can have deleterious consequences. An unguarded statement, hasty conclusions, and unfounded allegations can jeopardize access to and assistance for crisis-affected people, especially in situations, such as a remote refugee camp, where accurate reporting and independent confirmation are not readily available. Former International Committee of the Red Cross president Cornelio Sommaruga makes a salutary point when he stresses the need to correctly identify and distinguish the roles of the different players in crisis situations.[17] In the context of forced migration, for example, these roles can span the gamut of protection, assistance, relief aid, publicizing abuses, human rights advocacy, policy formulation, and so on. Humanitarian workers operate on the basis of a clear mission to provide relief

and material assistance. Their inability to monitor comprehensively the climate of human rights in refugee camps need not lessen the validity of their roles. Nevertheless, it bears repeating that a situation of *forced* migration points to violations of human rights. Humanitarian organizations cannot but confront the situation. As I have mentioned above, and many authors concur, humanitarian and faith-based NGOs are often the only ones in close proximity to displaced populations in situations where budgetary constraints hinder adequate protection by UNHCR, thereby compelling them to meet the multifaceted needs—including protection and defense of human rights—of displaced populations.[18]

Third, a useful rule of thumb would require humanitarian NGOs to make their presence count beyond offering palliative care and assistance to refugees. Rather than maintain strict silence and passivity in the name of neutrality, which ultimately could amount to complicity, they need to identify collaborators and dialogue partners and establish strategies and protocols for reporting abuses while at the same time preserving the humanitarian space that would allow them to continue to serve the needs of crisis-affected people.[19]

Forced Migration as a Problem of Charity

A third and final angle of perception sees the refugee problem as a problem of charity. The only appropriate response from this perspective is to give refugees handouts. Today, given the multifaceted nature of forced migration, it would be hard to defend this approach in its pure form. This form, if ever it existed, would correspond to what Weiss has condemned as "visceral charity"[20]—superficial at best and inhumane at worst. In both cases, this kind of charity easily excuses nonengagement in critical issues of human rights and justice.

From an ethical perspective, charity as virtue (as opposed to visceral charity) manifests a different dynamic in the context of forced migration. As a motivation for humanitarian action, charity is neither blind to political implications nor uncritical of acts of injustice that may exist in any given humanitarian space, such as a refugee camp. Those such as Weiss who have published the obituary of charity need to understand the difference between a merely charitable response and a comprehensive one. As the approach adopted by JRS suggests, and Sommaruga argues, caritative assistance forms part of a whole; it defines a point of entry rather than a terminus that imposes an embargo on justice-related and political issues. While this approach may eschew direct political action, it neither denies the critical need for a comprehensive framework for assuming ethical responsibilities towards forced migrants, nor does it fail to recognize the advantages of a long-term focus over short-term and largely symbolic solutions.[21] Whether as a primary motivation or an operational principle for refugee assistance, "charity alone" hardly ever survives the lifespan of an emergency. Charity has an expiry date: generosity wanes in inverse proportion to the protraction and prolongation of refugee crises; aid progressively diminishes as donor fatigue or compassion fatigue sets in and grows.

I have chosen the term "angles of perception" to designate the foregoing approaches because, as I shall indicate later, they represent essentially complementary approaches

to forced migration that are more effective when integrated and coordinated rather than absolutized and compartmentalized.

Humanitarians and Military: Strange Bedfellows or Allies for Good?

Without denying the presence of socioeconomic and environmental factors, forced migration is almost always associated with armed conflicts. The refugee populations of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania can be accounted for by decades of political instability and armed conflicts in the neighboring countries of Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Burundi. This situation raises some ethical questions relative to the policies and practices of refugee-serving NGOs and churches. Divergent positions have emerged relating to the appropriate relationship between humanitarian actors and both political and military agents in the context of forcibly displaced people. This issue relates to some of the considerations raised above. Before looking at some of the positions, a few remarks are in order.

First, a military presence in refugee camps takes different forms. For example, in Adjumani, the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) has maintained, on occasion, some presence, especially at the height of the Lord's Resistance Army's campaign of terror against defenseless refugees and nationals in the early 2000s. In Tanzania the government has threatened to use military force to dislodge elements of Burundian rebel militias of Hutu extraction active in camps close to the border; it actually used the army to forcibly repatriate refugees and arrest political activists.[22] Anecdotal evidence indicates that besides low-level intimidation of refugees and recruitment of youth, rebel elements residing in camps extorted money from impoverished refugees, ostensibly to support the war effort and facilitate their speedy return to Burundi.

Second, a related question is the use of the police in the context of forced migration. When refugees cross the border, their first encounter with security operatives is with the police. Urban-dwelling refugees live in perpetual fear of harassment and intimidation by the police. Barbara Harrell-Bond writes that "another local institution that has direct contact with refugees from the moment they enter a country and throughout their stay is the police force. They play an enormously important role in determining the extent to which refugees' rights will be upheld."[23] If a country lacks a functioning legal and security framework or there is ignorance of the international refugee regime, the interaction between the police and refugees could result in atrocious consequences for the latter. This question, however, does not fall within the scope of this essay.[24]

Third, although refugee camps are nominally under the government of UNHCR, the overall administration falls under the jurisdiction of commandants appointed by the internal or home affairs ministry. They control access to camps, maintain security, and enforce discipline. A close observation of camp administration reveals the military style in which they are run. For example, the "Rules and Regulations" for Rhino Camp Refugee Settlement prohibit all meetings and public gatherings "save the usual religious congregations," except with the camp settlement commandant's (CSC) permission. Movement is strictly regulated; no refugee is allowed to leave the settlement without the CSC's written permission, which requires a clear statement of reason, destination,

and duration. The rule book concludes: "Like it, hate it; it works. And therefore adhere to it."[25]

One approach, typically advanced by military personnel, considers the use and presence of the military as benign and beneficial. The military's roles in their view are to support emergency or disaster relief efforts, to be used for so-called humanitarian intervention, and to deliver aid when the security situation precludes the presence of humanitarian workers. In these instances, Rupert Wieloch sees the military as a "force for good," with a proviso that it operate in close collaboration with civilian and humanitarian actors and, where possible, even be subject to their overall direction. Wieloch concludes that "NGOs who still deny that troops can do anything humanitarian at all are in danger of perpetuating ill-informed and out-of-date opinions."[26]

Some authors adopt a more cautious position and point to the clash of the humanitarian ethos (neutrality, impartiality, and independence) with that of the military ("*force for good*"). The possibility exists of the former becoming tainted and compromised by association with the latter, in particular if the military resorts to physical force.[27]

Besides the risk of compromising the principles of humanitarian action, refugee-serving NGOs face the question of whether and when having recourse to military or police force in the physical sense of the term becomes ethically tenable among displaced populations. It is important to avoid dogmatic and ideologically fixed positions because of the complexity of this ethical dilemma. Without ruling out its use a priori, given the unpredictability of refugee-causing armed conflicts with regard to timing or outbreak, scope, and intensity, "one can also hope," David Hollenbach has stated, "that military intervention to prevent or alleviate humanitarian crisis will be rare as well."[28]

A much more intractable problem occurs when elements of armed rebel militias and nonstate actors establish an amorphous but potentially lethal presence among civilian refugees, as was the case in the eastern DRC and western Tanzania. These groups compound an already ethically charged environment by reason of their lack of a clear objective or political agenda, their use of unconventional means, and the often ambiguous relationship between them and the civilian refugees. Clearly lacking the political power (that is, force) to separate belligerents and human rights violators from genuine refugees, and given the inability and unwillingness of the host state to assume this task, NGOs and churches face the added dilemma of whether to give or withhold aid. The key ethical question becomes whether *to engage or not to engage*. Either way, refugees stand to lose the most. To provide assistance in view of relieving short-term needs risks aiding and abetting the atrocities of "refugee warriors" who have infiltrated the camps and, therefore, prolonging the violence and crisis, which in the long run could generate more refugees. To withhold assistance in the short term in view of preventing long-term suffering caused by rebels in the camps risks compounding the present and real misery of refugees, who are manipulated and intimidated by the "refugee warriors." This second option resembles a calculated attempt t♦ starve out the refugee warriors, and it presupposes their inability to identify other sources of survival. This, however, is rarely the case. For example, in western Tanzania, Hutu rebels imposed a clandestine levy on refugees.[29]

On the use of the military, often the situation of insecurity in a refugee camp could necessitate their presence to protect humanitarian workers. This is understandable

where conflict is still occurring, but it raises questions where conflict has ceased and refugees direct their hostility at humanitarian workers. The underlying question relates to the relationship between beneficiaries of aid and givers of aid. Tension arises when refugees perceive humanitarian workers as exploiters profiting from the predicament of forced migrants.

As a general principle, we may assert that a great deal of sensitivity is required in the context of forced migration: an inordinate use of or association with the military could damage further the already brutalized psyche of refugees. Among refugee populations are to be found people who have experienced torture at the hands of armed groups or who have witnessed myriad atrocities inflicted on family members, relatives, and fellow refugees. A military presence constitutes a potential source of psychological trauma for such refugees.

Overall, the issues raised by the interaction between humanitarian NGOs and military actors in the context of forced migration require recourse to long-standing traditions of morality and ethics. I shall address this point below.

Finance and Accountability: Who Pays the Piper?

The term "humanitarian aid" evokes notions of altruism and philanthropy; it is construed as help freely given to a needy population—a true but barely functional notion of humanitarian aid. There is no such a thing as free aid; aid costs money. International agencies and NGOs devote a considerable portion of their time and energy to soliciting donations from multiple sources to guarantee both their institutional survival and humanitarian activities. The assertion that there is "no such a thing as free aid" is also true in another sense. Donors routinely impose strict conditions on the use of their funds in terms of various issues: Who gets the money? Where and how should it be spent? What may or may it not be used for? How must it be accounted for? Frequently, the relationship of dependency and asymmetry between NGOs and their beneficiaries parallels that between the NGOs and their donors. How and where to find sufficient money is a constant preoccupation of aid agencies. This preoccupation carries significant ethical implications for policies and practices of refugee-serving NGOs and faith-based organizations. Various factors affect and inform such ethical dimensions and implications.

UNHCR, the body responsible for overseeing the enforcement of the international refugee regime, does not command an automatic guarantee of funds from the constituent UN countries. The countries' financial obligation is essentially voluntary, which compels UNHCR to provide justification for increases in expenditure and circumscribes its freedom in applying donor funds to the crisis of forced migration. Loescher rightly asserts that "the most significant institutional weakness of the UNHCR is its dependence on voluntary contributions to carry out its programs."[30] As mentioned above, UNHCR engages in partnerships with various humanitarian organizations as "implementing partners," relying on them to operate programs partly funded by UNHCR. Examples include several partnerships between UNHCR and JRS: Radio Kwizera in Ngara; secondary education in Adjumani; and psychosocial programs in Kakuma. It is now commonplace for governments to channel bilateral aid either directly through

international NGOs or national aid agencies. One example is Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), which has been active in Ngara, providing health care and various forms of community services for refugees.

Donor Impact on Humanitarian Priorities

The conditions attached to the use of private and public funds can be ethically problematic. A donor's strategic interests come into play in various circumstances, with the result that while some "high-level" crises (like the refugee crisis in Kosovo in 1999) might either be particularly fancied or considered strategically important, other, "low-level" crises (like the refugee situation in Adjumani or Kakuma) suffer serious financial shortfalls. According to Lluís Magriñà, the international director of JRS: "The donors, particularly the private ones, prefer that their donations go to the refugees they see on television or that they have perhaps read about in the papers, in spite of the fact that occasionally, situations can arise when too much money and too many humanitarian agencies are directed towards one country that has generated media interest, resulting in a complete absence of resources in more needy areas."[31]

It is no secret that, as Loescher states, "UNHCR's dependence on voluntary contributions forces it to adopt policies that reflect the interests and priorities of the major donor countries. Politics and foreign policy priorities cause donor governments to favor some refugee groups over others."[32] Besides, it is not inconceivable that government agencies wielding substantial financial leverage would claim immunity to allegations of malpractice and corruption in their refugee work, albeit tacitly. Evidence suggests that while refugees in countries of the Global North can rely on far better aid and assistance than refugees in the Global South, where conditions of living hardly ever meet minimum standards required for safe and dignified living. Loescher reports that "according to one researcher, during the 1980s, individual refugees from the Ogaden, Cambodia, and Afghanistan received a sum of perhaps $10 to 20 per year; Angolan and Eritrean refugees received only about half this amount. On average, a Third World refugee received around 5 cents a day through the UNHCR during the last decade. In most cases this meager sum was supposed to cover not only food, water, and shelter, but also transport, logistical support, and medium- to long-term development assistance for both refugees and the host population."[33] This situation becomes more acute given the geographical shift of the refugee crisis, which began as a European problem, to poor countries mainly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

This consideration brings to the fore a critical ethical question: is one group of refugees more deserving of aid than another? A clear need exists to affirm the moral equivalence of all refugees, which would hold that no one refugee is more valuable than another, and that therefore, all refugees, irrespective of where they are, deserve equal treatment. David Hollenbach makes the same point earlier in the volume, echoing the views of Martha C. Nussbaum, in his analysis of "transnational good" and the duty to protect refugees and IDPs.[34] The quality of refugee protection, care, and assistance depends largely on how well donors follow this ethical principle.

In general, we can suppose that what affects UNHCR also affects humanitarian NGOs. The latter often face a thornier ethical issue, because they adopt ethical

perspectives vis-à-vis emergency relief based on the mandate received from their religious congregations (for example, JRS from the Society of Jesus) and church leadership (for example, Catholic Relief Services [CRS] from the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops). One concern relates to the sources of funds and whether or not these sources guarantee the NGOs' freedom with regard to the basic humanitarian ethos of the work with crisis-affected people. As with UNHCR, the choices that humanitarian NGOs face can be stark: "either become subservient to the policies of powerful donors or become immobilized."[35] It could mean the difference between conditioned engagement and radical nonengagement, either of which portends serious consequences for NGOs' institutional survival and for the intended beneficiaries of aid—in this case, refugees.

However, one can argue that NGOs, including faith-based organizations, remain free to solicit donations from whomever they want and, therefore, are immune to promoting, overtly or covertly, donor interests that may contradict their humanitarian goals or mission. As Kenneth Hackett, president and CEO of CRS, puts it, "we are not obliged to take money, and certainly we do not take funds for something we disagree with."[36] This principle seems undeniably correct, yet in reality, it might prove too challenging for a host of humanitarian organizations. An increasingly fierce competition among too many NGOs to tap a gradually shrinking pool of donations, such as is the case in refugee assistance, confronts them with a real temptation to alter or slant their identity and mission to suit the donors' strategic interests and conditions.

Formulaic repetition of clichés or mantras ("the one who pays the piper dictates the tune" or "an agency is only as independent as its source of funding") does not substitute for a critical analysis of this ethical quandary. We need to raise a different set of key questions that could elucidate the ethical implications at stake here. Given the foregoing considerations, the debate over accepting funds in controversial circumstances will depend on how the questions are framed and what factors are deemed primary:

- Do the urgent needs of crisis-affected people constitute an attenuating factor in the quest for donor funds when the donor's geostrategic interest conflicts with the principles and values of humanitarian organizations?
- Is there such a thing as tainted money when it comes to delivering mercy to people whose very survival depends on the limited available funds? In other words, does the end (delivering critical relief and assistance to crisis-affected people) justify the means (accepting funds from sources deemed to be morally compromised or compromising)?
- In light of the minimalist principle of "do no harm," what degree of harm would accepting or refusing funds cause or avoid, and how should this be measured?
- Whose interest is paramount: the donor's, the institution's, or the refugees'?
- Does an organization's decision to accept funds undermine its overall independence and moral responsibility to challenge publicly larger structural issues that relate to the conditions of beneficiaries of the funds? For example, if the funds are for refugee assistance, does the organization remain free to challenge donor countries and other sources whose politics and policy priorities might be aggravating on-the-ground realities relative to peace and security of refugees? "It is not enough," according to

Fr. Fred Kammer, "to feed more and more hungry families; we must also raise the
public question about why so much hunger persists . . . and how that condition
might be changed."[37]

- Does the opportunity created by particular sources of funding open up wider op-
portunities for engaging issues of critical importance to the welfare and well-being
of crisis-affected people such as forced migrants?

Establishing Ethical Accountability for Humanitarian NGOs

A somewhat related question to that of the financial accountability and independence
of humanitarian NGOs is the issue of ethical behavior, as much adverted to today as it
was ignored in the past. What norms of professional accountability should govern the
behavior of humanitarian agents in their interaction with crisis-affected people? How
should their behavior be ethically evaluated?

Recent revelations of gross abuses of crisis-affected people in refugee camps in the
DRC and Liberia implicate a cast of humanitarian agents (peacekeepers, UNHCR pro-
tection officers, various cadres of NGO staff), despite their professed commitment to
moral probity. The intricacies of power in the social context of refugees create an ideal
situation for abuse, intimidation, and impunity: "On the whole, we are dealing with the
groups that habitually occupy 'higher' positions [that is, 'big men'] in the social world
of the refugee camps."[38] As demonstrated by Harrell-Bond's phenomenology of power
in charitable giving, the underlying consideration here is that, in the context of forced
displacement, humanitarian agents wield real power over their clients, the exercise of
which can be debasing and inhumane.[39]

An often-repeated criticism of humanitarian organizations is their apparent reluc-
tance to adopt mechanisms of institutional and operational accountability, an attitude
that "can mask institutional or political goals which are unrelated to the needs of indi-
vidual refugees or displaced persons."[40] This charge may not be overstated, given the
fact that a growing emphasis on impact assessment, scrutiny, and evaluation has placed
humanitarian action under the spotlight and led to the emergence of "'a culture of eval-
uation' . . . a culture that is based on some common principles (such as a commitment
to transparency and the introduction of innovative evaluation techniques) and which
cuts across the institutional boundaries and turf wars that all too frequently character-
ize the international humanitarian system."[41] Several instruments and mechanisms of
institutional evaluation, regulation, and standards now exist or have gained renewed
significance.[42]

One instrument of special relevance to the purposes of this essay is the Sphere
Project, an interagency initiative that in 1997 adopted the *Humanitarian Charter and
Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*.[43] The *Humanitarian Charter* presupposes and
draws upon key international instruments and decades of experience in humanitarian
action. Of particular salience is the fact that these standards go beyond a simple evalu-
ation of financial accountability and adherence to stipulated goals and objectives; they
also address beneficiaries' concerns. Questions remain, however, about the standards'
binding force, independent monitoring of compliance, and the ground staff's overall
knowledge of these instruments.[44]

With respect to the *Humanitarian Charter*, for example, it is not inconceivable that, given the proclivity of humanitarianism for relieving clear and present suffering, NGOs would be strongly oriented toward identifying and providing the material needs of crisis-affected people: water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and site planning, and health services—what Loren Landau describes as using "kilograms, litres, or square meters" to "provide for humanity's basic animal functions" in his essay on self-settled refugees in urban environments.[45] Meeting these tangible conditions, however, ought not to absolve humanitarian organizations from their responsibility and accountability for some key ethical intangibles: respect for the dignity of crisis-affected people; prioritization of their interests; and consideration of their views and opinions. No charitable endeavor, no matter how noble, may substitute for the assurance, delivery of, and accountability for these ethical intangibles. On this question the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership might offer some useful correctives, precisely because it envisages with particular comprehensiveness the role of crisis-affected people in evaluating the quality of care and assistance provided by NGOs.[46]

One important ethical consideration that should inform the behavior of humanitarian organizations is the moral priority of crisis-affected people. This means that the primary goal of humanitarian action should be always to serve the interest of the beneficiaries. In other words, NGOs are morally accountable to the crisis-affected populations that they serve and on whose account they solicit donations. No initiative, no matter how laudable, can compensate for the subversion of this principle. This does not undermine the validity of humanitarian organizations' accountability to a variety of donors and to themselves as goal-oriented and objective-driven institutions.

It helps to keep in mind the simple reality that, notwithstanding their crisis-induced limitations, vulnerabilities, and disadvantages, beneficiaries of aid distribution can distinguish good NGOs from bad ones. As Koenraad Van Brabant has said, "Crisis-affected people themselves may also hold benchmarks, perhaps more implicit than explicit."[47] Thus, a corollary of the principle that humanitarian organizations are first and foremost morally accountable to their beneficiaries is the ethical imperative to adopt participatory models of assessment, evaluation, and standards, which empower crisis-affected people such as refugees to have a say about how their cause is being served by these organizations. Reluctance to solicit *and* consider the input of refugees leaves refugee-serving NGOs open to the charge of stereotyping refugees as helpless, dependent, and ignorant, effectively disempowering them.

The Way Forward: An Agenda for Advocacy

This chapter has identified key ethical issues relating to policies and practices of refugee-serving humanitarian organizations and faith-based organizations. The issues are more than just definitional; they raise substantial matters relative to ethical responsibilities toward forced migrants and the formulation of an effective framework for advocacy. In light of the foregoing considerations, the following priorities for advocacy suggest themselves.

A Holistic, or Integrated, Approach

Decades of debate over the meaning, scope, objective, and effectiveness of humanitarian action have produced unhelpful compartmentalizations. Given the ever-evolving phenomena of migration with regard to categories (forced or voluntary migrants), direction of flow (toward poor countries of the global South or toward rich countries of the global North), and causative factors (wars, natural disasters, ethnic tension, human trafficking, and so on), there is little hope of a simple consensus on the problem of defining forced migration. Again, the issues at stake transcend definitional niceties. The arguments have turned on whether forced migration is primarily a problem of ethics, technique, justice, politics, economics, culture, religion, or charity. This debate resembles that over the proverbial elephant (a trunk, a rope, a wall, a spear?)—an exercise in futility that portends little or no benefit at all for displaced populations. Even the briefest stint in a refugee camp reveals how messy the social context of humanitarian assistance can be—so messy, in fact, that it precludes absolutist, reductionist, and exclusivist conceptualizations, policies, and practices. A clear ethical imperative exists to think outside the box of entrenched positions, admit that no one approach suits all situations, and adopt a multisectoral strategy for advocating ethical responsibilities towards forced migrants. A multisectoral strategy recognizes the presence and validity of various refugee-serving actors, each of whom approaches the problem of forced migration from a unique perspective, possesses a comparative advantage, and makes meaningful contributions to the overall goal and duty to protect the rights of displaced people. Effective advocacy should seek to represent these constituent approaches or sectors as complementary aspects of a complex truth that function best when held together in a wider ethical synthesis.

Objective Needs and Subjective Voices

As indicated above, too often humanitarian actors cast displaced people in the mould of objects—victims of a calamity who need to be helped by generous and charitable outsiders. There is no denying the fact that displaced people are victims of gross violations of human rights. These violations are not only retrospective but ongoing. We must avoid the fallacy that refugees are merely objects of charitable concerns that constitute interesting statistics; rather, we must recognize that they are moral subjects—bearers or holders of rights, as William O'Neill demonstrates convincingly in his chapter in this volume on the rights of refugees and IDPs. Beyond material needs and wants, responsibilities towards forced migrants include ethical intangibles. It seems almost axiomatic that, as subjects of displacement, refugees ought to have a say in how their rights denied should be restored (for example, in exploring alternatives to traditional solutions of the refugee crisis) and ways of avoiding future violations of those rights (for example, global governance, an international refugee regime, and proactive, positive interventions). Abebe Feyissa and Rebecca Horn's firsthand account in this volume of the effects of long stays in refugee camps is a poignant demonstration of the value of listening to the voices of crisis-affected people like forced migrants. Thus, focusing on refugees as

subjects rather than objects ought to constitute an aspect of effective advocacy for a just treatment of forced migrants.

Expanded Ethical Framework and Communities of Discernment

Mervyn Frost argues convincingly the case for "thinking ethically about refugees."[48] The question then is, what ethics or ethical principles? Classical *operational* principles such as neutrality, impartiality, and independence have served well the cause of humanitarianism. But they are often confused with *ethical* principles. Effective advocacy needs to distinguish the two sets of principles. We begin with the assumption that the goal of humanitarian action, particularly in the context of forced displacement, is variously conceived of as preservation of the sanctity of life, defense of human dignity, and protection and promotion of human rights, all of which transcend narrow preoccupation with geopolitical sovereignty and national interest. In that case, the ethical principles that inform the effective attainment of this goal include more than just practical operational principles, identified by Weiss as "second order principles." Specifically ethical principles or categories, which are less discussed, except in closed religious circles, need to be explicitly incorporated into the overall agenda of humanitarian assistance. These principles are common good (assistance contributes to the attainment of just social conditions for forced migrants); lesser of two evils (assistance can entail options of asymmetrical consequences for victims of forced displacement); and double effect (assistance carries unintended consequences, not always beneficial to victims of forced displacement).

Each one of these principles is far too complex to be addressed in this relatively short essay. By way of illustration I offer a brief explanation of one of them (the principle of double effect) in the context of ethical responsibilities toward forced migrants.

Experience shows that refugee assistance does not always produce a univocal and unambiguous effect. While the intention or objective remains the alleviation of the refugees' suffering, assistance is not immune to other, less desirable and less salutary unintended consequences or results. Refugee-serving organizations need to take seriously into account the unpredictability of the refugee situation. This implies a readiness to execute some requisite ethical procedures rather than merely settling for operational convenience or expediency in their work. The kind of ethical procedure envisaged here involves weighing the intention and objective of alleviating the suffering of forced migrants against the unintended effect of unwittingly perpetuating refugee-producing factors such as conflict itself, for example, in particular instances where rebel elements who have infiltrated refugee camps also benefit from relief assistance meant for innocent civilian refugees. Although unintended, this less desirable, indirect effect may carry less moral weight when related to the weightier ethical responsibility of assisting and protecting forcibly displaced and vulnerable people.

A related scenario appears in cases where refugee-serving NGOs, particularly faith-based organizations, might be compelled to tolerate, cooperate with, or have recourse to the "*force* for good" provided by the military, for example, to protect humanitarian workers or dislodge refugee-warriors from civilian camps. As indicated above, the presence and use of the military can provoke some deleterious effects among

refugees. In the scenario under consideration, these concomitant effects are indirect and unintended, the more direct and intended good being the guarantee and delivery of critically needed aid to refugees in life-threatening situations. Thus, cooperation with the military, rather than amounting to an unequivocal endorsement of the use of force, appears as a necessary indirect evil effect, avoided when possible and morally permitted *only* when the intended direct and good effect, in this case protecting and saving the lives of vulnerable, crisis-affected people like refugees, outweighs the negative consequences in a proportionate way.

Making these choices is never easy, but attaining clarity about and determining how and where these ethical principles apply represent an important dimension of ethical responsibilities toward forced migrants among refugee-serving NGOs and require a new understanding of humanitarian organizations as "communities of discernment,"[49] committed to a just resolution of the crisis of forced migration. To suggest a communitarian discernment of ethical principles and policies among a disparate and often competing cast of organizations appears a daunting task. Perhaps herein lies a distinctive contribution of faith-based organizations, namely their ability to act as catalysts for the creation of ethical frameworks, guidelines, and consensus for advocacy, as in the Sphere Project, the international coalition on detention of refugees and asylum seekers, and the Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA) in Ethiopia.

Finally, it is helpful to distinguish genuine humanitarian crisis from surreptitious attempts to provide cover for political inaction or to promote harmful geostrategic interests and interventions. Effective advocacy operates within an expanded ethical framework and creates communities of discernment in promoting the cause of forced migrants.

Conclusion

The word "humanitarianism" delineates an overcrowded and intensely contested space—nowhere more so than in a refugee camp. It is not unusual for refugee-serving NGOs and churches to demarcate the physical space of a refugee camp into distinct spheres of interest and zones of operation. This can create multiple kinds and levels of tension and generate ethical dilemmas and quandaries. Many refugee-serving humanitarian organizations approach the crisis of forced migration from a faith perspective. A critical evaluation of their roles serves the important theoretical project of identifying some key ethical issues and establishing a framework for effective advocacy. This essay does not answer all the questions, but it allows us to make some remarks and suggestions about implications for advocacy; the justice versus charity debate in relation to forced migration; and the distinctive contribution of faith-based, refugee-serving organizations.

In the first place, advocacy delineates a long-term commitment extending beyond the lifespan of any humanitarian crisis. In this sense, advocacy constitutes the antithesis of the "CNN effect," which focuses on humanitarian crises for as long as audience ratings can be guaranteed. As an effective tool for conflict transformation, particularly in the context of forced migration, advocacy entails a watchfulness that monitors potential

flashpoints, devises and deploys early warning mechanisms, and assesses potential for the escalation of refugee-generating conflicts. We need, therefore, to conceive of advocacy in proactive rather than reactive terms. Herein lies an important ethical obligation for faith-based organizations for whom charity—often limited to relief assistance—carries more priority than promoting measures that diffuse tension and ensure de-escalation of refugee-producing conflicts. As mentioned above, charity can have a very short lifespan; it is more effective when integrated into proactive, long-term strategies on behalf of forced migrants.

The justice-charity debate opens up new vistas for advocacy and policy in relation to forced migrants. Of particular salience is the need to avoid hardening the divergent positions into normative, absolutist, and reductionist definitions. Adopting a charitable approach toward refugee assistance ought not to be a transient, selective, and superficial response but a comprehensive approach that equally promotes other aspects of refugee assistance, like long-term development and rehabilitation programs. On the other hand, perceiving and approaching refugee service from a justice perspective ought not to become a narrow and rigid focus on legalistic provisions or guarantees of basic human rights. On the present evidence, each approach has its limits.

In principle, a faith-based humanitarian organization like Catholic Relief Services admirably combines both perspectives, albeit the relationship sometimes can be fraught with tension and ambiguities—hence the need for flexibility in correlating both principles and perspectives.[50] Jesuit superior general Peter-Hans Kolvenbach underscores this point when he affirms that

> the Church discovered only very slowly that charity is not sufficient if there is no justice. What has to be done by JRS is not just charity but also justice. If you really love, you will do justice. You will not do justice out of justice, but out of love. That is quite difficult because if someone speaks only about justice, he could be terribly unjust. The Romans here already knew about this, that the best justice could become the most profound injustice. If you stick only to what is legal, juridical justice, you can come up with unjust measures. We see this in the way the immigrants, the refugees are treated by the laws in Europe. This is the reason that the Pope (John Paul II) and also Father Arrupe (founder of JRS) spoke about justice as the incarnation of love, the concrete way to love. . . . One can say charity just to do something but it is very clear all these people have their rights which need to be attended to. They have the right to go back to their country. They have the right to join in a just society. JRS is called to help do this, not out of legal or juridical motivations but out of Christian love.[51]

In general, it helps to recall that charity and justice represent wide principles, neither of which can be easily or completely exhausted in any given situation. Attaining some clarity about each particular perspective in relation to an organization's mandate constitutes a crucial methodological requirement, as is an acknowledgement of the interface between these principles, as demonstrated in this chapter. The upshot of this double dynamic is that, while respecting the focus of an individual internal mandate, which may place an accent on one or the other principle, advocacy can be enhanced via strategic alliances, partnerships, networks, and coalitions built on the relative strengths and

comparative advantages of the various cooperating organizations. A recent example is the JRS-led international coalition on detention of refugees and asylum seekers.

This brings us to the final remark. In light of the foregoing considerations and consistent with the central premise of this essay—that many refugee-serving NGOs are faith based and church related—some additional comments are in order on their distinctive contributions from the perspective of ethical responsibilities toward forced migrants. The aim, however, is not to isolate them and therefore impede their capacity to collaborate with secular NGOs.

Unsurprisingly, the mission and mandate of faith-based organizations are heavily informed by ethical and ultimately spiritual norms. Much has been said in this essay about the mission of JRS: accompaniment, service, and advocacy. These broad categories are generally underpinned and animated by ethical principles proper to the larger ecclesial community. Perhaps the best illustration of this is Catholic Relief Services, which defines itself as the official international relief and development agency of the U.S. Catholic community. As such, "the policies and programs of the agency reflect and express the teaching of the Catholic Church. At the same time, Catholic Relief Services assists persons on the basis of need, not creed, race or nationality."[52] The policies and programs of CRS, like those of JRS, "draw upon a rich tradition of Scripture and Catholic social teaching," a tradition that prioritizes recognizing the God-given basic dignity of each human person, advancing the value and equality of all human beings, promoting the common good, practicing a preferential option for the poor, and fostering solidarity and interdependence, among other principles.[53]

Although explicitly espoused and promoted by a religious organization, in reality these principles create a common platform and framework for far-reaching collaboration and partnership with other religious and secular groups. This collaboration is noticeable "in programs and projects which contribute to a more equitable society" rather than isolate the organization itself and exclude others from its operational ambit.[54]

Proximity and presence represent yet another distinctive feature of faith-based, refugee-serving organizations. As a quick tour of refugee camps in eastern Africa would reveal, the refugee situation there hardly qualifies as "high profile"; some of the refugee populations seem to count for little in the eyes of the international community. In this kind of situation, available evidence shows that faith-based organizations like JRS, TCRS, and LWF are more likely than secular organizations to focus on the needs of "forgotten" populations of refugees, in places like Rhino Camp, Adjumani, Kibondo, and others, trying in difficult circumstances with limited resources to respond to unmet needs.

Finally, international faith-based organizations find a ready constituency of local partners in realizing their goals and objectives. This is often facilitated by their access to a network of local church communities and church-related organizations with compatible or shared values. The advantages of this kind of local partnership are multiple. They include ensuring local participation, fostering local ownership, and guaranteeing the sustainability of various assistance, rehabilitation, and development projects beyond the temporal mandate of the initiating international organization, as demonstrated by the report in this volume on the work of Joint Commission on Refugees among the Burundian refugees in western Tanzania.

Notes

1. I have described and analyzed this phenomenon in my *From Crisis to Kairos: The Mission of the Church in the Time of HIV/AIDS, Refugees and Poverty* (Nairobi, Kenya: Paulines, 2005). Besides the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there is a plethora of international and governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations that occupy the highly populated humanitarian space of refugee assistance. See Gil Loescher, *Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 130–31; and Mark Raper, "Changing Roles of NGOs in Refugee Assistance," in *Refugees and Forced Displacement: International Security, Human Vulnerability, and the State*, eds. Edward Newman and Joanne van Selm (Paris: United Nations University Press, 2003), 350. How these humanitarian actors relate to UNHCR is the subject of ongoing debate. In the context of refugee assistance, most NGOs operate as "implementing partners" of UNHCR and assume responsibility for an estimated 50% of UNHCR's programs of assistance. Elizabeth G. Ferris, "The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the International Refugee Regime," in *Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights*, eds. Niklaus Steiner et al. (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), 125–26.

2. For example, World Council of Churches, "A Moment to Choose: Risking to Be with Uprooted People," Statement on Uprooted People, September 22, 1995; Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People, *Refugees: A Challenge to Solidarity* (Nairobi, Kenya: St. Paul Publications, 1992); *The Three Consultations of 1998 for a More Coordinated Pastoral Response of the Church in Africa to the Present Refugee Crisis: The Official Texts with Commentary* (Vatican City, 1999); All Africa Conference of Churches, *The Refugee Problem "A Time Bomb in Africa"* (Nairobi, Kenya: AACC, 1992); *Too Many, Too Long . . . : Refugees in Africa and the Churches' Response* (Nairobi, Kenya: AACC, n.d.).

3. Ferris, "The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations," 117–22.

4. Drew Christiansen, "Movement, Asylum, Borders: Christian Perspectives," *International Migration Review* 30, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 2.

5. Loescher, *Beyond Charity*, 130, see also 150; *The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 16–18.

6. Loescher, *Beyond Charity*, 151.

7. Mervyn Frost, "Thinking Ethically about Refugees: A Case for the Transformation of Global Governance," in *Refugees and Forced Displacement*, eds. Newman and van Selm, 129.

8. Barbara Harrell-Bond, "Can Humanitarian Work with Refugees Be Humane?" *Human Rights Quarterly* 24 (2002): 52–53. In this same article Harrell-Bond presents a critical phenomenology of "charitable giving" in refugee camps that, besides creating an asymmetrical relationship of power between refugees and humanitarian workers, debases human dignity.

9. Cf. Loescher, *The UNHCR and World Politics*, 3; World Council of Churches, "A Moment to Choose," 2–3.

10. Michel Agier and Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier, "Humanitarian Spaces: Spaces of Exception," in *In the Shadow of 'Just Wars': Violence, Politics and Humanitarian Action*, ed. Fabrice Weissman (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 298–304; Stephen John Stedman, "Conclusions and Policy Recommendations," in *Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering*, eds. Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 169–72.

11. Agier and Bouchet-Saulnier, "Humanitarian Spaces," 311–12; see also Ferris, "The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations," 131–32; Raper, "Changing Roles of NGOs," 356–57; Thomas G. Weiss, "Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action," *Ethics and International Affairs*

13 (1999): 13; Cornelio Sommaruga, "Humanity: Our Priority Now and Always: Response to 'Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action,'" *Ethics and International Affairs* 13 (1999): 26–27; Theresa Baldini, "The House of Prayer and Peace," in *Another Day in Paradise: International Humanitarian Workers Tell Their Stories*, ed. Carole Bergman (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2003), 164–70.

12. Jesuit Refugee Service, *God in Exile: Towards a Shared Spirituality with Refugees* (Rome: Jesuit Refugee Service, 2005), 108. Emphasis in original.

13. I make a distinction between "withness" (a discreet but active presence in connection with humanitarian assistance), as practiced by the JRS, and (in)direct "witness," or *témoignage* (explicit documentation of abuses in connection with political action), as practiced by Médecin Sans Frontières. See Eric Dachy, "Justice and Humanitarian Action: A Conflict of Interest," in *In the Shadow of "Just Wars*," ed. Weissman, 314–24; Joelle Tanguy and Fiona Terry, "Humanitarian Responsibility and Committed Action: Response to 'Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action,'" *Ethics and International Affairs* 13 (1999): 32.

14. Weiss, "Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action," 1–22.

15. Ferris, "The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations," 128.

16. Weiss, "Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action," 20–21; Tanguy and Terry, "Humanitarian Responsibility," 33; David Rieff, "Moral Imperatives and Political Realities: Response to 'Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action,'" *Ethics and International Affairs* 13 (1999): 35–42.

17. Sommaruga, "Humanity: Our Priority Now and Always," 24.

18. Ferris, "The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations," 129–31.

19. Mark Raper has described the usefulness of such an approach in the collaboration between the JRS and Human Rights Watch (HRW) in the specific instance of refugee camps in eastern Africa. "Changing Roles of NGOs in Refugee Assistance," 357–59.

20. Weiss, "Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action," 14.

21. Cf. David Hollenbach, "Humanitarian Crises, Refugees, and the Transnational Good: Global Challenges and Catholic Social Teaching" (unpublished paper prepared for the Expert Seminar, "Scrutinising the Signs of the Times and Interpreting Them in Light of the Gospel," Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Centre for Catholic Social Thought, Leuven, Belgium, September 9–11, 2004): 30–33.

22. See Liisa Malkki, *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 263 ff. In some cases, Tanzanian camp authorities have used the army to enforce payment of taxes imposed on refugees. Ibid., 121–28.

23. Harrell-Bond, "Can Humanitarian Work with Refugees Be Humane?" 83.

24. Ibid., 83–84.

25. "Rules and Regulations for the Settlements, Issued by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), Rhino Camp Refugee Settlement, March 2000" (photocopied).

26. Rupert Wieloch, "The Humanitarian Use of the Military," *Forced Migration Review* 18 (September 2003): 32, 33. The use of the military in heavy logistical operations such as emergency airlifts of large refugee populations and airdrops of food and relief materials would count as examples of the military acting as a "force for good."

27. See Antonio Donini, "Taking Sides: The Iraq Crisis and the Future of Humanitarianism," *Forced Migration Review* 19 (January 2004): 38. On military-civilian humanitarian issues, see Arthur C. Helton, *The Price of Indifference: Refugees and Humanitarian Action in the New Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 216–21; Ferris, "The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations," 133–34.

28. Hollenbach, "Humanitarian Crises, Refugees, and the Transnational Good," 32.

29. The ethical scenarios briefly presented here are dealt with extensively in Stedman and Tanner, *Refugee Manipulation.*

30. Loescher, *Beyond Charity*, 131; see also Helton, *The Price of Indifference*, 207–10.

31. *Refugees in the 21st Century: Can We Find a Solution?* (Barcelona: Cristianisme í Justicia, 2006), 26.

32. Loescher, *Beyond Charity*, 137.

33. Ibid., 136.

34. See David Hollenbach, "Humanitarian Crises, Refugees, and Transnational Good."

35. Ibid., 138.

36. Kenneth Hackett, "Public Funds, Catholic Mercy: Fulfilling the Promise of the Church in the World," Rome, Italy, November 21, 2003 (photocopied).

37. Quoted in ibid.

38. Agier and Bouchet-Saulnier, "Humanitarian Spaces: Spaces of Exception," 299; see Stedman "Conclusions and Policy Recommendations," 169.

39. Harrell-Bond also documents a variety of power relationships that degrade, stereotype, infantilize, and dehumanize refugees, in "Can Humanitarian Work with Refugees Be Humane?" 56 ff; cf. Malkki's idea of the "refugee camp as a 'technology of power,'" in *Purity and Exile*, 236–38.

40. Helton, *The Price of Indifference*, 210; Koenraad Van Brabant, "Benchmarks and Yardsticks for Humanitarian Action: Broadening the Picture," *Forced Migration Review* 17 (May 2003): 45.

41. Jeff Crisp, "Thinking Outside the Box: Evaluation and Humanitarian Action," *Forced Migration Review* 8 (August 2000): 5.

42. See Van Brabant, "Benchmarks and Yardsticks," 43–45.

43. The Sphere Project, *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response* (Geneva: The Sphere Project, 2004).

44. One senior staff member of a refugee-serving, faith-based NGO interviewed as part of the research for this chapter had never heard of The Sphere Project and the *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards.*

45. See Loren B. Landau, "Protection as Capability Expansion: Practical Ethics for Assisting Urban Refugees," in this volume.

46. Formerly known as the Humanitarian Accountability Project and Humanitarian Ombudsman Project. Available from http://www.hapinternational.org/en/ (accessed June 28, 2006).

47. Van Brabant, "Benchmarks and Yardsticks," 44.

48. Mervyn Frost, "Thinking Ethically about Refugees: A Case for the Transformation of Global Governance," 129.

49. I have borrowed this term from Drew Christiansen, "Sacrament of Unity: Ethical Issues in Pastoral Care of Migrants and Refugees," in *Today's Immigrants and Refugees: A Christian Understanding*, Office of Pastoral Care of Migrants and Refugees (Washington, DC: National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1988), 101–2.

50. See "Mission Statement," http://www.crs.org/about_us/who_we_are/mission.cfm (accessed December 26, 2006).

51. Address to Jesuit Refugee Service International Meeting, Santa Severa, Italy, May 25, 2006.

52. "Mission Statement," http://www.crs.org/about_us/who_we_are/mission.cfm.

53. "Guiding Principles," http://www.crs.org/about_us/who_we_are/what_we_believe.cfm (accessed December 26, 2006).

54. "Mission Statement," http://www.crs.org/about_us/who_we_are/mission.cfm.