Title

Revenue Sharing and Within-team Payroll Inequality in Major League Baseball

Document Type

Article

Language

eng

Format of Original

6 p.

Publication Date

2015

Publisher

Taylor & Francis (Routledge)

Source Publication

Applied Economics Letters

Source ISSN

1350-4851

Abstract

Using data from the 2000 to 2012 Major League Baseball seasons, this article investigates how changes to revenue sharing in the 2007 collective bargaining agreement altered within-team payroll inequality. Results indicate that inequality within teams decreased after the 2007 bargaining agreement. This reduced inequity is concentrated among those teams that were already experiencing relatively higher levels of inequality. This indicates that changes to revenue sharing should help increase competitive balance within the league. Additionally, the reduction in inequality occurs only among hitters and not pitchers. These results highlight how collective bargaining can have heterogeneous effects on groups of workers despite there being no requirement of differential treatment.

Comments

Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2015): 80-85. DOI.