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The main theological and religious positions of mainstream Protestantism in Europe and America were staked out by the first generation of Martin Luther and the second generation of John Calvin. Most reformation research has rightly concentrated on the first two generations, but recently American scholarship has started to examine the role of the third generation represented by Zacharias Ursinus and his contemporaries, the Shapers of Religious Traditions. This conference brings together many of the scholars who have contributed to that thrust—I was tempted to say younger scholars, but as I look around I note that most of us have acquired gray hair in the decade since we started publishing in this area.

It has always seemed to me that a major contribution of the third generation of reformers was their shift of theological method away from the strongly biblical theologies of Luther and Calvin toward the neoscholasticism of the Age of Protestant Orthodoxy, a period which stretched from the late sixteenth century well into the eighteenth century, and in places remained important even in the nineteenth century, for instance the Calvinism of the American Princeton School. In this shift the third generation played a transitional role, and Ursinus himself was deeply involved. My paper today is an attempt to trace that shift through a case study.

I think that in tracing this shift toward a more philosophical theology the two most revealing "topoi" are the arguments for the existence of God and for the immortality of the soul. In his recent monograph, *Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575-1650*, John Platt devotes a long section to Zacharias Ursinus' contribution to developing rational arguments for God's existence. According to Platt most of the arguments that Ursinus used in his *Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism* were borrowed from Philip Melanchthon, but Ursinus added some arguments of his own.[1] Several later generations of Dutch Reformed theologians repeated and developed these arguments. Platt comments, "... with Ursinus the philosophical arguments for God's existence achieve a status hitherto unknown in Reformation theology."[2]
In certain respects immortality is an even better test case for tracing theological method than is the existence of God. God's existence is everywhere assumed in Scripture, and the Epistle to the Romans (1: 19-21) assumes a certain natural knowledge of God. In contrast the immortality of the soul is found only obliquely in Scripture. Since Ursinus does not treat immortality as fully as he does God's existence, this paper is mainly concerned with three of his teachers, Melanchthon, Calvin, and Peter Martyr Vermigli, and with Girolamo Zanchi, his fellow theology professor at Heidelberg and Neustadt.

Belief in some sort of life after death is not universal, but it is extremely widespread.[3] Most primitive religions exhibit belief in an afterlife. In the three great religions of India, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism, the belief takes the form of the transmigration of souls. The three great revealed religions of the Middle East, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, all profess belief in the resurrection of the body. On the other hand the immortality of the soul as usually found in the western tradition, has another, largely philosophical origin. Plato, probably influenced by the Orphic mystery religion, argues for the immortality of the soul in several of his dialogues.[4] Plotinus also develops such arguments in the Enneads.[5] Many of the Church Fathers were strongly influenced by Platonism and Neo-platonism in this respect; for instance, two early tracts of St. Augustine, De Immortalitate Animae and De Quantitate Animae. The Church Fathers generally freed the doctrine of immortality from connection with the pre-existence or transmigration of the soul and aligned it with the biblical doctrine of the resurrection of the body.[6] Most of the Christian tradition has seen a strong affinity between the two beliefs, but some Christian scholars, notably Oscar Cullman, have argued that immortality and resurrection are antithetical, if not contradictory.[7]

One might expect that the medieval scholastic theologians, committed to a synthesis of theology and philosophy, would give a major role to the immortality of the soul, but this is not the case. Thomas Aquinas, although he believed in the soul's immortality, seems to have avoided the term, preferring incorruptability. He devoted far more attention to refuting Averroes and the unity of the intellect for all men than to elaborating proofs for immortality.[8] John Duns Scotus did not think that the soul's immortality could be demonstrated philosophically.[9]

Immortality became a major philosophical issue only with the revival of Platonism in the Renaissance, especially with Marsilio Ficino's
Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animae.[10] Opposition to Ficino's Platonism centered in the universities of northern Italy, especially Padua, where a secular Aristotelianism, strongly colored by the commentaries of Averroes, Simplicius, and Alexander of Aphrodisias—all hostile to personal immortality—was dominant.[11] This Paduan Aristotelianism was the background for the official definition of immortality, Apostolici regiminis, issued by the Fifth Lateran Council in 1513.[12] As so often, a church definition which was intended to settle a question had no such effect. In 1516 Pietro Pomponazzi, the leading northern Italian philosopher, published his Tractus de immortalitate animae.[13] Pomponazzi argued that immortality cannot be proved on rational or Aristotelian grounds but must be accepted by faith alone. Some have seen Pomponazzi's confession of faith as insincere; others accept its sincerity. Predictably his tract provoked a spate of refutations and defenses that reverberated throughout the sixteenth century.[14]

Pomponazzi carries us to the eve of the Reformation and Martin Luther. Luther had little use for the metaphysical arguments of the Aristotelians and their conflicting exegesis of the Greek and Arabic commentaries on Aristotle's De Anima. Luther's own position is interesting; he teaches psychopannychism—the belief that the soul sleeps from death until the general resurrection.[15] A priori psychopannychism might seem to have strong claims on mainstream Protestantism. There was Luther's support, the virtual silence of the Bible on the soul's immortality, and distinct polemical advantages: psychopannychism cut the ground from such Catholic doctrines as purgatory and the invocation of the saints. In the event, however, Luther's teaching found little echo except among some Anabaptists.[16] Rather it was the teaching of Melanchthon, the teacher of Ursinus at Wittenberg, that became the dominant view within Lutheranism.

Melanchthon deals with the soul's immortality at the end of his De Anima (1540), which Gerald Strauss has called "required reading for Lutheran theologians" and "a work accepted nearly everywhere in Lutheran circles as an authoritative statement of classical psychology."[17] Melanchthon's use of Aristotle in his De Anima involved him in a controversy with his fellow Wittenberg professor, Veit Amerbach. Although much of the De Anima is highly technical, the section on immortality is markedly religious and even pious. Melanchthon's scriptural case for immortality is more elaborate than his
philosophical proofs. He cites the usual proof texts: “Fear not those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul” (Mt. 10:28) and Christ’s words to the penitent thief, “This day you will be with me in paradise” (Lk. 23:43). Indeed he even adds a little sermon on the penitent thief as the type and model of the saved. He then briefly catalogues other standard New Testament verses that strengthen his case (Lk. 16:20ff., 1 Peter 3:9; Phil. 1:23; Lk. 20:38).[18]

For those of us for whom death is a dark land from which no traveler ever returns, Melanchthon’s first non-scriptural argument is a bit disconcerting: the apparition of ghosts (“spectra”). “I myself have seen some, and I know many men worthy of credit who claim that they have not only seen ghosts but have had long conversations with them.”[19] Melanchthon then attempts three philosophical proofs based on Plato and Xenophon. First, the soul does not take its origin from material elements, hence it does not perish with the death of the body. Material elements cannot give rise to universal concepts or the idea of God nor the differences between right and wrong. Melanchton’s second argument is ethical. In this life innocent men are killed by tyrants, yet the tyrants are not punished in this life. Assuming that there is a Providence, then there must be another life in which the good are rewarded and the evil punished. Finally Melanchthon argues that evil doers are afflicted by the pangs of conscience; but there must be another life, otherwise the sanction of conscience, a natural function, would be frustrated. But nature is never frustrated. Melanchthon then states that it would be a lengthy task to review the notions of all the philosophers but simply adds that Aristotle did not think that the soul perishes with the body. Melanchthon closes his De Anima with a prayer addressed to Jesus.[20]

After leaving Wittenberg Ursinus made a short visit to Calvin’s Geneva. Immortality was the subject of Calvin’s very first theological work, his Psychopannychia, whose manuscript dates back to 1534. Calvin circulated its manuscript among friends but did not publish it until 1542. This is not the place to discuss the reasons for its delayed publication.[21] Calvin’s treatise attacks Anabaptists who defend either psychopannychism (the sleep of the soul) or thnetopsychism (the belief that the soul dies with the body and then is recreated by God at the resurrection of the dead). Calvin coined the term psychopannychia; thnetopsychism is borrowed from St. John Damascene. There is no hint that Calvin wished to attack Luther in his tract, but George
Williams has suggested that Calvin also had Paduan rationalists, libertins and Michael Servetus in his sights.[22] I tend to doubt that Calvin had Paduan rationalists in mind. Calvin brings the philosophers up at the beginning of his treatise merely to give them the back of his hand: “But what the soul is, and whence it is, it is vain to ask of them [Plato and Aristotle] or indeed the whole body of the Sages. . .”[23]

Calvin’s treatise makes no attempt at a philosophical proof for immortality; the whole argument is scriptural, which is unlikely to have much impressed Paduan rationalists. Calvin’s treatise displays a remarkable command of scripture for an author of twenty-five who is writing his first work of theology, but Calvin was arguing a bad case; he accepts the Bible as a homogenous whole and lacks a sense of the development of belief in an afterlife between the early books of the Old Testament and the New Testament. His was an uphill flight since the Old Testament states several times that the soul dies with the body, while there are no very clear statements of the immortality of the soul as distinct from the resurrection.

Calvin’s treatment of the same question in the Institutes strikes a different note: the philosophers who were curtly dismissed in the Psychopannychia are now credited with developing arguments that “secular writers grandly extol and depict in more brilliant language.”[24] Despite the blindness of sin “the light has not been so distinguished in darkness that men remain untouched by a sense of their own immortality.”[25] For Calvin conscience is an undoubted sign of the immortal spirit. Moreover, “the knowledge of God sufficiently proves that souls, which transcend the world, are immortal.”[26] The powers of the human mind and the fact that the mind can conceive of God and angels and make moral judgments indicate an intelligence dwelling in the soul that transcends the bodily senses. Calvin even claims that sleep and dreams are “no obscure witness of immortality.”[27] Nevertheless Calvin’s quick summary of arguments for immortality is rhetorical rather than technical, and he goes on to criticize the philosophers generally with the exception of Plato for failing to affirm the immortality of the soul.[28] It is clear that Calvin’s real case for immortality rests on Scripture and that he is far more interested in the resurrection than in immortality.[29]

Although Ursinus was much interested in Genevan theology, he studied at Zurich where he came into contact with Heinrich Bullinger[30] and especially Peter Martyr Vermigli. Martyr was partly responsible
for Ursinus’s appointment to the chair of theology at Heidelberg in 1561. Martyr was certainly more closely attuned to the Italian discussions of immortality than most Protestant theologians. He took his doctorate at the University of Padua, the main center of these discussions, and his works show an easy familiarity with the conflicting interpretations of Aristotle that rejected personal immortality. Martyr denies that immortality can be proved philosophically, although he urges that it can be proved theologically from scripture. Perhaps to cover himself from criticism, he mentions that Tertullian and Gregory Nazianzen believed that Aristotle taught that the soul was mortal. Martyr admits that some philosophers (he mentions Socrates, Plato and Pythagoras) somehow came to a conviction of man’s immortality, but not by solid arguments. Martyr himself uses the standard scriptural and theological arguments to refute the psychopannychists. Before leaving Martyr, we should stress that his comments on immortality are scattered through his long treatise on the resurrection; immortality plays no major or autonomous role in his thought.

Ursinus takes up the resurrection in his Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism, question 57. His first subdivision of this question handles the immortality of the soul. He points out two groups that deny immortality, skeptical unbelievers (Epicureans and Sadducees) and Anabaptist psychopannychists. His proof for immortality is entirely scriptural. He makes no mention, much less an exposition, of a philosophical proof, nor does he mention any philosophers who have written on the topic. He does see the doctrines of immortality and resurrection as closely tied together: “Lastly the resurrection of the body presupposes the immortality of the soul, so believing in one, we also believe in the other. For as it is the same body which shall rise again, it is necessary that it should be fashioned by the same substantial form which it formerly had, which is the soul.” His development of this point obviously presupposes Aristotelian hylemorphism. In general, the tone and spirit of Ursinus’ treatment seems to me closer to Martyr than to the other theologians we are considering.

The last theologian we will take up is Girolamo Zanchi or Zanchius. Like Peter Martyr, he was an Italian Augustinian Canon who had studied at Padua. Converted by Martyr at Lucca, he lived as a Nicodemite for nine years in Italy before fleeing to Geneva. After a short period of studying with Calvin, he joined Martyr on the faculty of the famous
academy at Strasbourg. He taught there for a decade (1553-1563) before the entrenched Lutheran pastorate drove him out because of his Calvinist teaching on predestination. After a stint of pastoral work he replaced Ursinus at Heidelberg University in 1568. Together with Ursinus he was forced to leave Heidelberg when Ludwig VI Lutheranized the University. Together with Ursinus he taught in the Casimirum at Neustadt until his death in 1590.

With Zanchi’s tract on immortality we enter a new world, the world of full-blown Protestant scholasticism. Melanchthon, Ursinus and Zanchi all knew their Aristotle, and all four published either editions of or commentaries on Aristotle. Melanchthon’s role in reclothing Luther’s theology in scholastic form has long been famous or infamous, depending on the taste of the commentators.

Elsewhere I have traced in detail how Peter Martyr pioneered a cautious, limited accommodation between medieval scholasticism and Reformed theology.[38] Ursinus played a role in the same process, although on a more limited scale. According to John Platt, Ursinus’ use of Melanchthon’s proofs for God’s existence involves “the introduction of a much more decidedly scholastic manner.”[39] Nevertheless Martyr and Ursinus attempt no philosophical proofs for immortality, and they discuss it, as does Calvin, merely as an adjunct to the resurrection. This subsidiary locus of their discussion is worth stressing. Melanchthon takes up immortality as an independent topic and does give philosophical proofs, but these occupy less than three small pages.

In contrast Zanchi’s treatment of immortality is not tied to a discussion of the resurrection but is part of his extended treatment of the human soul and its powers, which is in turn part of his volume on God’s work in the six days of creation. In fact his section on the soul is much longer than Melanchthon’s whole *De Anima* (124 folio columns compared to 65 octavo pages).[40] Theoretically Zanchi’s treatment of immortality is only a single chapter (Chapter VIII, col. 638-678) but it is roughly as long as Melanchthon’s whole *De Anima*.

Its emphasis and distribution of material also set Zanchi’s treatment of immortality apart from the other theologians in Ursinus’ ambiance. At the beginning of his treatment Zanchi does give considerable space to a scriptural proof (col. 638-644),[41] and he returns at its end to refute rather briefly the scriptural arguments of the psychopannychists. [42] But the vast majority of Zanchi’s treatment is directed against
philosophical opponents, for whom biblical teaching was often of secondary concern.

Zanchi begins with two considerations extrinsic to the nature of the soul. First, if there is no afterlife, religion itself is meaningless. Secondly, citing Cicero, he argues that belief in immortality has been and is universal throughout the human race, hence it must be true and implanted in human nature. To show its universality he begins with near-eastern religions and then with the Greek writers and philosophers who uphold immortality. His treatment is very summary until he gets to Aristotle. He devotes seven folio columns to Aristotle, both because of the ambiguity of the texts and the central importance of Aristotle for the whole western philosophical tradition. For Zanchi to admit that Aristotle was hostile to immortality was to lose half the battle.

Aristotelian philosophy played a more important role in Zanchi's theology than in any other important Protestant theologian of the sixteenth century. Zanchi's first book, published shortly after he left Geneva, was an edition of Aristotle's *De naturali auscultatione*, to which Zanchi added a preface full of extravagant praise of the philosopher—"the best of all authors after God and the sacred scriptures, the best and most perfect Philosopher." One will look in vain for such statements in the massive volumes of Luther and Calvin. In all Zanchi examines fourteen passages from Aristotle's writings that touch on immortality (col. 646-652). He concludes that it cannot be shown that Aristotle held a view on immortality different from the earlier philosophers. Zanchi justifies this long excursus so that pious readers will have the evidence so that they can reply to claims that Aristotle taught the mortality of the soul. Zanchi's concern to enlist Aristotle for the cause of immortality contrasts sharply with his friend Peter Martyr Vermigli, who was equally well informed about Aristotle's writings and the Italian controversies on his teaching. Martyr makes no effort to "save" Aristotle, presumably because he felt that the Greek's texts were ambiguous or even hostile to personal immortality.

Having spent pages on Aristotle, Zanchi rounds off his argument that all nations agree on immortality by reducing Latin writers to a single paragraph and treating "Turks, Tartars, Russians, Indians, Persians and all other barbarian nations of the present "era" in two sentences.

After these preliminary reflections Zanchi gives twenty-five proofs for immortality. The first is the familiar ethical argument: an after-life is
required by divine justice to reward the good and punish the evil. His second and third arguments are variations on the ethical argument, that religious practices and divine wisdom would be in vain and frustrated without immortality. [48] One later argument also harks back to ethical considerations. [49] Another urges that the human composite, mortal in body but immortal in soul, is needed to fill out the great chain of being. [50] Zanchi’s remaining twenty arguments have a different, more metaphysical, character. [51] Six of them are based on the soul itself and its operations. [52] Three are based on the nature of the intellect [53] and six more on the operations of the intellect. [54] Finally five are based on either the will itself or on its operations. [55] Two of Zanchi’s arguments break down into multiple sub-arguments. [56] Obviously many of the twenty-five arguments depend on Zanchi’s preceding treatise on the soul, its faculties and their operations. [57]

Of the theologians we have considered, Luther denied immortality, while Martyr, Ursinus, and Calvin in the Psychopannychia defended it on scriptural grounds while avoiding philosophical proofs. Melanchthon and Calvin give summary proofs from reason, but they clearly subordinate their philosophical case to scripture both in principle and in practice. Only Zanchi breaks with his predecessors and foreshadows the direction the question took in later Protestant scholasticism when the philosophical argument became increasingly important. [58] One student of the question even writes of “immortality as the central truth of Christian Belief” in eighteenth century Protestant orthodoxy. [59]

The understanding of the soul in Melanchthon, Martyr, Ursinus and Zanchi is basically Aristotelian: for them it is the substantial form of the body. Calvin’s doctrine of the soul derives, after the Bible, from Plato. [60] It is a commonplace that for Christian thinkers who accept a Platonic soul, the great problem is not getting the soul out of the body at death but getting it into the body in the first place. Those with an Aristotelian doctrine of the soul have the opposite problem. The theologians treated here failed to see this very explicitly. Rather they assumed, along with most Renaissance thinkers, that Plato and Aristotle are generally in harmony. Their doctrine of the soul seems now Platonic, now Aristotelian, depending on convenience and the particular problem being dealt with. [61] It was Zanchi’s recapitulation and elaboration which brought some clarity to the question. Zanchi, although he may have had forerunners in Melanchthon and Martyr, thus
stands forth as the founder of Protestant scholasticism more than any other. Clearly he has been unduly neglected by historians of theology.

Notes

2. Ibid., 57.
4. Notably in the *Phaedo* and at the end of *The Republic* and of the *Gorgias*.
8. S. T. I, 75, 6; S. C. G. II, 55; Aquinas refutes Averroes in his *De Unitate intellectus*.
9. *Opus Oxoniense* 4, d. 43, qu. 2.
12. For the text of the decree, see Denzinger-Schometzer, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, (Barcelona, 1963), = 1440.
14. Di Napoli’s book mentioned in note 11 is excellent for the immortality controversy in Italy but is sketchy for the reverberations outside Italy, for which there is no satisfactory study. D. C. Allen has a chapter on the controversy in his *Doubt’s Boundless Sea*, (Baltimore, 1964), pp. 150-185. Although Allen also discusses the early seventeenth century, better for the later phases of the controversy are Ben Lazare Mijuskovic, *The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments*, (The Hague, 1974), 19-57 and John McManners, *Death and the Enlightenment*, (Oxford, 1981), 148-190. The immortality controversy even spilled over into popular literature; thus Thomas More has the Utopians, normally very tolerant, punish the denial of
immortality with death. Here is a sampling of books published in the controversy during the sixteenth century: Nicoletto Vernia, De unitate intellectus et animae felicitate, (Venice, 1505); Gasparo Contarini, De immortalitate animae adversus P. Pomponatium, (Bologna, 1518); Girolamo da Lucca, Apologia pro animae immortaliitate in Pietrum Pomponzium, ... (Milan, 1518); Bartolomeo Spina, Propugnaculum Aristotelis de immortalitate animae contra Thomam Caietanum, (Venice, 1519); Agostino Nifo, De immortalitate animae Libellus, (Venice, 1518); Crisostomo Javelli, Tractatus de animae humanae indeficentia, (Venice, 1536); Aonio Paleario, De animorum immortalitate Libri III, (Lyons, 1536); Pietro Nicolas da Faenza, Opus de immortalitate animorum, (Faenza, 1525); G. F. Pico della Mirandola, De animae immortalitate, (Paris, 1541); Girolamo Fracastoro, De immortalitate animae, (Venice, 1555); Juan Luis Vives, De anima et vita, (Lyons, 1555); Marco Natta, De immortalitate in his Opera, (Venice, 1564); John Woolton, Treatise of the Immortalitie of the Soule, (London, 1576); Claudius Auberius, De immortalitate, (Morges, 1586); Nicholas Nancellius, De immortalitate animae, (Paris, 1587); Jacob Colerus, De Animarum immortalitate, (Wittenberg, 1587); Pierre Crespet, Six livres de l'excellence, vie, mort et immortalité de l'âme, (Paris 1588); J. de Champaignac, Traité de l'immortalité de l'âme, (Bordeaux, 1596); Jean de Serres, De l'immortalité de l'âme, (Lyons, 1596); Giovanni de Fedeli, Anima immortale, (Venice, 1598).


19. Ibid., 368.


22. Williams, Radical Reformation, 585, and Balke, Calvin, 33.


24. Institutes, I, 15. 2.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., I, 15. 6.

29. Ibid., I, 15. 2; III, 25.

30. Ursinus was not as directly related to Bullinger as he was to the rest of the theologians treated here, but Ursinus did visit Bullinger in 1557 and 1560, and Bullinger's Decades influenced the Heidelberg Catechism: see Walter Hollweg, Heinrich Bullingers Hausbuch, Neukirchen, 1956), 238-241 and Visser, Ursinus,
Bullinger takes up the immortality of the soul in the tenth sermon of his fourth Decade, *The Decades*, (Cambridge, 1852), edited for the Parker Society by Thomas Hastings, 365-408. Bullinger claims that his treatment is scriptural rather than philosophical (365). The soul is immortal according to Bullinger, but he is content to build his proof for this against the Anabaptists from scripture. He even claims that the truth of immortality of the soul "is written and imprinted in the mind of all men" (385), and he lists the ancient who have taught immortality, starting with Trismegistus, Museus, Orpheus, and Homer. His list will not bear much critical examination, and he ignores inconvenient cases, e.g. Aristotle (385). His tone is summed up by "Therefore, omitting vain speculations and curious disputations, let us believe that there is a house prepared by the Lord of heaven for the souls being separated from their bodies. . ." (388). I have not seen Bullinger's *Quod animae a corporibus separatae non dormiant sed cum Christo in coelis vivant* of 1526. Perhaps we may add here the view of another Swiss Reformed theologian, Wolfgang Musculus: he refuses to deal with the immortality of the soul—the matter is obscure and gives rise to doubts: *Commonplaces*, (London, 1563), f. 12v. I have not seen Pierre Viret's *Exposition de la Doctrine de la Foi Chretienne* (Geneva, 1564), which devotes a section (813-836) to the soul and immortality.

33. *Ibid.* Proinde hoc principium quod assumitur, Animan post mortem perseverare incorruptam, cum dubium sit, nec pendet a per se notis ac perspectis in rerum natura; argumentum quod super eo extruitur, nutat, et pro fermo haberi non potest.
34. *Ibid.*, III, 16. 72
36. Martyr's tract on the resurrection was originally incorporated in his comments on 2 Kings 2. Curiously Martyr gives considerable attention to natural reasons for the resurrection, although he admits that these are suggestive and suasive rather than apodictic. Some of these arguments presuppose the soul's immortality or arguments for it; thus since the body and soul have sinned together in this life, justice requires that not only the soul but also the body should be punished in the next life: *Ibid.*, III, 15. 15-19; III, 15.5.
38. Donnelly, *Calvinism and Scholasticism*.
45. *Aristotelis de naturali auscultatione seu de principiis*, (Strasbourg, 1554), signature d6 (The book is unpaginated). Zanchi was by no means alone among sixteenth century scholars who urged that Aristotle believed in immortality.
Melanchthon made the same claim (De Anima, 371). So did the greatest of all sixteenth century neo-scholastics, Francisco Suarez, Opera omnia, (Paris, 1856), 3: 529 ff. (De Anima, ch. 11).

46. Zanchi, Opera. 3: 652.
47. Ibid., col. 653.
49. Ibid., col. 655, – 7.
50. Ibid., col 658, –11.
51. Ibid., col. 653-664
52. Ibid., – 4, 9, 10, 23, 24, 25.
53. Ibid., – 5, 8, 16.
54. Ibid., – 6, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17.
55. Ibid., – 18, 19, 20, 21, 22.
56. Ibid., – 12, 18.
57. Ibid., col. 554-638 for Zanchi’s treatment of the soul, its faculties and operations.
58. For instance in Johann Gerhard, Loci Theologici, (Berlin, 1870), III: 96-109, Tract De Morte. Even Gerhard’s tract is less philosophical than Zanchi’s. Burns, Christian Mortalism, remarks that in England it was only after 1640 that “the most prominent Christian mortalists supplemented their scriptural exegesis with philosophical arguments and provoked their opponents to answer them in both modes of discourse,” 140.