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Social Justice and Common Good: What Are They For?

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What Are They For?

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There is beauty in this world and there are the humiliated. We must strive, as difficult as it may be, not to be unfaithful to either one.

—Albert Camus (paraphrase)

Are the categories social justice and common good an untroubled heritage or an obsolete disadvantage for the development of CST?¹ Does their silence on culture weaken them in the face of postmodern circumstances bringing the importance of cultures to the fore? Would an alternative formula such as sociocultural justice be preferable because it indicates a link with culture and more clearly implies a common good inclusive of a cultural dimension in and beyond social, economic, and political structures? Are they permanent, immobile residents in the lexicon of CST? Is there room in CST for conceiving and formulating the significance of culture in and for a just social order?

Inquiry toward an answer will focus on a specific set of documents. The documents make up the literature of official papal and episcopal CST (collected in a volume such as O’Brien and Shannon’s Catholic Social Thought), plus subsequent papal
encyclicals, statements from episcopal conferences, and the synchronic *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church.* The aim is not an encyclopedic survey of documents or a distillation of what can be proposed as basic themes but rather raising a plausible hypothesis about a missing element in CST.

Testing basic terms and concepts in a given field of discourse can be fruitful for more reasons than conceptual precision that improves verbal definitions. In this case, problematizing the language and conceptuality of social justice and the common good looks to their relationship with culture. Is there a link between the concepts of a common good owed to Aquinas and renewed after Leo XIII's *Aeterni Patris* and ambient cultures? Broaching this topic presupposes that almost eighty years of usage since *Quadragesimo Anno* have not so woven the language of social justice into CST that entertaining possible revision threatens to unravel the whole fabric.

**Terms at Issue**

In 1931 social justice was new to papal social teaching but had already appeared in the mid-nineteenth century from theologian Luigi Taparelli D'Azeglio. In 1937 Pius XI clarified social justice in *Divini Redemptoris* as pertaining, first of all, to the economic order. Each individual, whether employer or worker, had an obligation to contribute to a common good in the economic realm. But making a contribution depended on the prior fact that, as Pius XI put it, “each individual in the dignity of his human personality is supplied with all that is necessary for the exercise of his social functions” (*Divini Redemptoris*, no. 51). The wealthy and powerful had means at their disposal that equipped them for “exercise of . . . social functions.” So emphasis fell on what would bring about conditions—a just wage, lessening unemployment, decent working conditions, freedom to organize, reform or transformation of the economy to insure a proportionate redistribution of wealth—enabling workers to exercise their social functions.
Social justice adapted Aquinas's idea of general justice, also called legal justice insofar as laws promote it, to modern conditions. General justice concerned obligations to the common good of society incumbent on its individual members: "The virtue of a good citizen is general justice, whereby the person is directed to the common good." General or legal justice was about people's actions in relation to a common good, not just to each individual's good. What is the common good? According to Gaudium et Spes, the common good "embraces the sum of those conditions of social life by which individuals, families, and groups can achieve their own fulfillment in a relatively thorough and ready way" (no. 74). Contributing to and benefiting from these "conditions of social life" is a matter of general or social justice, which, like any kind of justice, is other directed. An orientation beyond an individual, family, or group to the common good can be immanent in all manner of virtuous acts, including distributive and commutative justice. Social justice, then, has the first and defining aspect of being an active contribution to the common good of temporal society.

Why disturb this language? Identifying the provenance of the question will clarify the direction of the reflection. Asking about the longevity of categories stems from commitment to CST and to a Christian social agenda. The question does not express aversion to movements, ideas, labors, initiatives, organizations, and people inside and outside the church seeking social justice. Far from it and to the contrary. Stating admiration for Scandinavian social democracies and for a social approach to democracy in Germany and France can prevent confusion between interrogating standard items in the vocabulary of CST and a retrograde resistance to the meanings and referents of social justice and common good. Still, why interrogate those items? Are they not doing just fine? Do they not stand more in need of popular communication, explanation, reception, and application than of theoretical reexamination? From what specific grounds does an interrogation arise?

The starting point for a sense of something problematic, some doubts about the advisability of sustaining the language of social
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justice and the common good, was conversation with two eminent professors. Both John Atherton, emeritus from the Department of Religions and Theology at the University of Manchester and former Canon Theologian of Manchester Cathedral, and George Newlands, emeritus dean of the Faculty of Divinity at the University of Glasgow, wondered, each in a distinct way and for different reasons, about a modern Christian social agenda continually formulated in the familiar vocabulary of social justice and common good.

Professor Newlands wasn't sure about social justice and the common good as an axis for a wide, ecumenical social agenda. Instead, it might be more productive for theological reflection, in systematics too and not only in social ethics, to make a turn to human rights. The human rights agenda invites consensus across the churches, fosters dialogue with non-theological disciplines, and grounds cooperation between Christian and other groups dedicated to human rights. Systematic theology, in addition to Christian social ethic, can enrich Christian commitment to human rights by expounding how human rights involve Christology and theological anthropology as premises. A turn to human rights can give new life and new language to a fatigued social justice agenda.

Two themes threaded through Professor Atherton's doubts about social justice and the common good. One, taking account of Manchester as the epicenter of the Industrial Revolution, and within a framework of critical analysis of defects in capitalism and a proposal for transforming them, was a distancing from insufficient admission, whether by Britain's old and new Labor Party or by Christians committed to social justice, of material benefits from capitalism. The other was concern about dangers to minorities in advocating the common good as a basic principle in a pluralistic society. Atherton shares this misgiving with Iris Marion Young, and both are close but not identical to John Rawls's liberal critique of a common good to which John Coleman has responded.

The two professors' friendly doubts interrupted social justice language for a project I tentatively had titled "Christ and
Social Justice.” Their unexpected views were welcome. They planted an interesting doubt. Eventually the question detached from the conversations and took on a life of its own, so that I am not seeking to reconstruct their views in order to reply to them but to answer a question they stimulated.

Once embarked on reconsidering the language of CST, another problem surfaced. Social justice had connotations in CST that it lacked when a topic for philosophy and the social sciences. When the same terms mean different things in two different realms of discourse, equivocation occurs and communication fails. David Miller states, “In the writings of most contemporary political philosophers, social justice is regarded as an aspect of distributive justice.” The editors of a recent, valuable anthology observe that “issues of social justice, in the broadest sense, arise when decisions affect the distribution of benefits and burdens between different individuals or groups.”

To be sure, benefits and burdens go beyond the economics into society and the political order.

CST has a concept of social justice broader and subtler in several respects. CST does not simply incorporate the results of one or another academic discipline because it looks to what can be called the overall health of a society. Social health—whether flourishing or declining, serving its people well or ill—depends on a loosely coordinated but interrelated functioning of social, economic, cultural, religious, and political institutions. John Rawls called these the “major institutions” of a society, and designated their cumulative interaction the “basic structure” of a society. Social health is a society’s basic structure in a condition of flourishing, gauged by the well-being of the most vulnerable, marginalized, and poor. The criteria and processes of distribution are at stake as well as the quality of the outcome in terms of the dignity and flourishing of the person.

Finally, faith keeps the virtue of social justice with reference not only to moral values, norms, actions, virtues, and a just social order, but also to human dignity and the meaning of the human. And as with the whole of morality, faith locates social justice within the divine/human relationship. In fidelity to the
divine/human relationship, CST keeps conscience and knowledge accountable to God, revelation, and lived faith in full respect for the human and civil right to religious liberty. Religious liberty matters because in a pluralist society not all accept a tie between religion and social justice.14

Clearly, common good and social justice carry important, defensible content that can be put into dialogue with other usages. However, interdisciplinary dialogue, dialogue among religious groups, and entry by faith-based groups into public life all would benefit from maximum clarity and agreement on terminology. The fact of different meanings in different discourses raises a question about formulation. Are the terms social justice and common good commonly understood in their variant meanings in different kinds of discourse? Might it be advisable and productive to find substitutes for these terms that could travel across discourses more easily? Pius IX had no qualms about leaving behind Aquinas's "general justice" by introducing "social justice."

From these several kinds of misgivings emerges a larger problematic that goes beyond the language of CST. Has CST taken adequate account of cultural context generally, and in particular has CST opened its invaluable content to theories and understandings of culture? For the sake of discussion, then, I propose that social justice and the common good be put into the position of being under reexamination to see whether they helpfully meet new conditions. A maximum or a minimum outcome is possible. A maximum conclusion will be to modify, revise, or abandon the language of social justice and common good. A minimal conclusion will be to retain the familiar language with new insistence on its inseparability from culture.

**Public Theology**

Of course, political and liberation theologies already have coined new descriptive and normative languages for much of what CST promotes under headings of social justice and common good.
And yet, beside liberation and political theologies another ecumenically potent current of social theology has emerged, a descendant of practical theology called public theology.\textsuperscript{15} Public theology has absorbed an option for the poor from liberation theology and engages in socio-critical analysis somewhat in line with political theology,\textsuperscript{16} and like them, public theology too considers privatized religion an unacceptable status quo. Public theology also typically proceeds on the principle of a conditional, critical, continually examined grant of legitimacy to both democracy and capitalism.\textsuperscript{17} Its goal is authentic and effective Christian participation in a democratic polity in the situation of a predominantly middle-class economy.

Contrarily, two schools of thought, Radical Orthodoxy, associated with John Milbank, and perspectives championed by Stanley Hauerwas, object strenuously to any such grant of legitimacy to modern nation-states and so renounce public theology. The critique extends all the way to protesting the distinction and priority of civil society to the state. William T. Cavanaugh from the Hauerwas school abhors the fact that "political theology" and "public theology" have assumed the legitimacy of the separation of the state from civil society, and tried to situate the Church as one more interest group within civil society.\textsuperscript{18} This line of thought has something but not everything to contribute in dialectical tension with public-theological endorsing of, for example, laws, institutions, and policies protective of the human and civil right to liberty in matters of religion, and with seeking the reform not the eradication of capitalism.

Kenneth and Michael Himes quote David Hollenbach's well-received statement that public theology represents an "effort to discover and communicate the socially significant meanings of Christian symbols and tradition" in the form of "theological reflection which examines the resources latent within the Christian tradition for understanding the church's public role."\textsuperscript{19} In succinct fashion the Himeses confirm that "public theology wants to bring the wisdom of the Christian tradition into public conversation to contribute to the well-being of the society."\textsuperscript{20}
“Public theology,” states Lutheran theologian Robert Benne, “refers . . . to the engagement of a living religious tradition with its public environment—the economic, political, and cultural spheres of our common life.” Benne explains that a religious tradition’s knowledge “interprets the public world in the light of the religious tradition. It may be used to persuade the world of the cogency of its vision of how things ought to be in the public spheres of life.” An important way in which churches (as distinguished from individual bishops, pastors and lay leaders) engage in public theology is by publishing or in some other manner communicating their distinctive, official positions on public matters.

CST, irreducible to social ethics, belongs to this mode of public theology by which a church tradition interprets the public world. Contrarily, Benne as an individual academic theologian puts the highest priority not on church teaching about public matters but on individuals forming their own personal responses instructed by participation in word and sacrament without reference to official statements, public positions, and policies such as CST.

Theologians have taken up public theology in reference to facts, interpretations, practices, and theories that start at regional levels yet have a scope that opens to national and international realities. The concerns of public theology in the modes of both church teaching and academic theology inspire the ensuing discussion of CST. It has to be admitted that only a few efforts in academic public theology have addressed the reality of cultures. By and large, public theology from individual theologians no less than CST has focused on social practice.

Critical review of social justice and common good with an eye to culture will be an indispensable consideration for CST on one condition. That condition has to do with emergent realizations of how economic, political, and social structures involve a people’s culture. Insofar as the traditional social question on the ground has been changing in the direction of a higher priority for culture, to that extent CST has to take greater theoretical account of culture, even to the point of reexamining familiar CST vocabulary.
Though not the only factor raising the profile of culture, thought about economic globalization involves practical and theoretical attention to many cultures touched by globalization. Globalization, a topic on the agenda of CST, stirs an interest in cultures insofar as mobility of capital, technology, labor, and ideals affects local mores, traditional relationships, and world views. 27 I agree with Kenneth Himes that to counteract a false universalism built into globalization CST must “shift its focus: whereas in the past CST had been primarily directed at issues of economics and secondarily of politics, the new context of globalization will force the tradition more to issues of culture and identity.” 28 At the same time, I do not think the issue of culture can be tied to the question of cultural identity for persons, groups, or a society except on the premise that identity can be mixed, and need not be “pure.”

Then too, pluralist societies increasingly pose the problem of some members, groups, or nations that are being excluded from access to full participation in economic and political life because cultural differences predefine and pre-position them as marginalized, as second-class citizens. Benedict XVI’s Caritas in Veritate speaks about international development facing “the prospect of a world in need of profound cultural renewal” (no. 21) and recognizes that there are “immaterial or cultural causes of development and underdevelopment” (no. 22).

Marginalization also flows from racism. Postulating several races distinguished by skin color and a few facial features is a cultural habit of perception, not biological, genetic fact. Racism is a cultural bias that blocks full access to participation in social, economic, and political life. 29 A society cannot then receive the contribution from a racial minority to economic and political life. But access to an economy and to citizenship does not necessarily eradicate racism, because racism infects a culture first of all. Overcoming assignment of some members of a society to second-class citizenship because of perceived cultural apprehension of racial differences involves changes in culture, not just adjustments in economic, social, and political institutions. The Pontifical Council of Justice and Peace adverts to a cultural
dimension in racism in referring to a partial remedy, education that belongs to the realm of culture. ³⁰

May it not be timely to think about revising or moving beyond social justice and the common good as if they were separate from cultures? One alternative, without discarding distinctions among the economy, social cohesion, and political institutions, is to envision a flourishing culture as part of the goal for which a just social order exists. Culture is that for whose sake social justice is sought. A just social order is the means, a people flourishing in their cultural activities is the end. ³¹ Beginning in prayerful gratitude for CST supports projecting a possible line of its development. Comparison of that possibility with postconciliar CST begets ideas and judgments with a critical edge. Critical is not hostile. Nonetheless, respect for transparency advises setting forth a guiding hermeneutical principle.

From Above or from Below?

CST has drawn upon scripture, tradition, reason, and historical experience in developing an ongoing, faith-based response to the modern “social question” broadly understood. Paul Misner and Marvin Krier Mich, among others, have detailed the historically knowable contribution of a multitude of local pastoral and lay initiatives to the emergence of CST, at least since Rerum Novarum. ³² As Lonergan observes, the good is always concrete. I infer that this means the social good is also local, grassroots, historically situated, and if formulated, then in a given language. Like the good and the social good, so too suffering is always concrete, in all people to some extent, yet at times more grievous in some individuals and groups with names and addresses. Not surprisingly, then, “social Catholicism” has taken its rise in response to human suffering of various kinds and has generated organized local lay and pastoral initiatives in the church’s grassroots.

Consequently, there is reason to agree with John Coleman in approving Gordon Zahn’s proposal that the official writings of
CST, including postconciliar CST, be read "from below" as responses to prior Catholic social movements, and I would add again, as responses to peoples' suffering, which evoked the movements in the first place. Yet, and noting Coleman's refusal to dismiss CST, there also is reason to think that CST documents published "from above," besides whatever original theoretical or pastoral thought they add to content "from below," also contain three new meanings that have to do less with how CST comes about than with its role and impact in the church. Supposing the extreme that all content in CST came from prior social movements so that papal and episcopal CST simply ratified material "from below," even then the three new meanings would justify reading CST "from above" as well as "from below."

One new dimension of meaning has to do with further testing of various local, regional, or national movements against the background of the whole international church seen "from above" and in light of a practical tie to the tradition of apostolic authority. Official approval of ideas and practical orientations originating "from below" lends increased credibility to their positive connection with the word of God, the Holy Spirit, scripture, tradition, and reason. Papal and episcopal CST, not always a main source of new ideas, exercises a maximum degree of responsibility for conserving the heritage of gospel faith and ecclesial structures so that what survives testing can be widely and confidently received throughout the church as valid appropriation and application of scripture and tradition.

Somewhat similarly, during Vatican II the worldwide episcopacy as well as popes John XXIII and Paul VI tested and approved the direction of liturgical, biblical, and lay apostolic renewals already under way. Conciliar debates and votes of approval for the documents incorporated some already developed theological themes. The prior initiatives and theological perspectives thereby came onto a new level of authorization "from above" that approximated (at least in principle) a panoptic appreciation for insights arising in many local churches, peoples, nations, languages, cultural contexts, and emergent situations
in the whole, international church. The episcopate and the Petrine office carried out what is a little like an official (from above) substantiating of what (from below) had been a strong working hypothesis.

What also accrues to content received "from below" is participation in what Bernard Lonergan designated an "effective function of meaning."\textsuperscript{36} The sources of meaning are all conscious acts and their intended contents, both transcendental and categorical. Meaning is often associated with symbols and interpretations, ideas and definitions, values and decisions, truths and history. Lonergan distinguishes an effective from a cognitive function of meaning. Effective meaning is operative not explanatory; it is not primarily a grasp of intelligibility, a judgment of truth, or an appreciation of a good.

Effective meaning resides in intelligent directives, commands, persuasion, and coordination of human activities whether, for example, by CEOs and shift foremen of mining companies, political leaders at all levels, producers and directors of films and plays, the chief engineer on a construction project, or the pilot of an airliner. Authorized directives guide cooperative actions toward agreed purposes not attainable without coordinated activity by many individuals. The communication of directives does not occur in grunts and idiosyncratic gestures but in words and physical expressions functioning as carriers of common meaning that function toward producing economic, civic, and political effects from human work. Work is "meaning-full" activity. There is meaning apart from theory, proposition, and definition.

An emergency situation illuminates the distinction between cognitive and effective functions of meaning. The captain of a fire brigade on the scene of a blazing apartment house coordinates and directs actions among trained firefighters toward the socially agreed, foreknown purposes of saving lives and extinguishing the conflagration. Without exercise of directive authority by the on-site captain, each firefighter could well act according to a different plan, or none, for rescuing the residents and fighting the fire. Under pressures of time, seeking a
consensus or a multiplicity of uncoordinated efforts would spell disaster. So there has to be someone in charge to coordinate the whole effort. The captain is the one who strategizes and deploys the resources.

The resources include technology. Now the captain may or may not grasp the physics and chemistry in the diffusion of heated gases and the rates of oxidation in various building materials. The degree of scientific comprehension will not matter apart from training and experience. It is enough that the captain knows how to put personnel and material resources to the best use. That too belongs to cognitive meaning. The act of communicating directives and work carried out according to them are meaning in a primarily effective function that manifests practical intelligence. Putting theoretical and practical cognitive meaning to work invests communicating directives and the work with effective meaning. Communicating the directives and the work are meaningful human activities whose full intelligibility does not reduce to prior ingredients. Meaning functions effectively in the captain's communicating of directives and in the organized activities they guide.

By analogy, CST receives prior content "from below," like the fire captain's prior theoretical and practical knowledge from sources beyond himself. When CST subsumes and communicates preexisting content in publication "from above," then the ideas and practical orientations "from below" are drawn into an effective function of meaning apart from any new cognitive meaning a pope or his writing assistant may add, which again may be substantial. The summing up, arranging, and communicating of content "from below" invests it with new effective meaning. It has become meaning operative in an authoritative guiding influence, somewhat like effective meaning in a fire captain's communication to fire fighters directing and coordinating their efforts. Content that had been cognitive and locally effective meaning enters into an internationally effective function of meaning.

Now, adding an effective function of meaning in CST to papal verification of authenticity to Christian sources results in a
reevaluation of supposing an antagonism defines the difference between reading "from above" and "from below." Instead, neither vantage point excludes the other. They differ and generate varying perspectives but are not locked into irreconcilable conflict. They can be conceived as two interpretative perspectives on CST derived from differing positions within the church as institution. Tension, not contradiction, characterizes their co-possibility as situated modes of attention to CST. A dialectic obtains not a synthesis but contraries able to be complementary. Reading from both vantage points sets in motion an interaction between local or regional origins "from below" and international reception of CST "from above."

CST and Culture

Arguably theology is undergoing a turn to culture.③ To what has theology been turning? What, that is, has CST been ignoring? A definition of culture represents an option among alternatives. The church at Vatican II, the academy, and individual theologians have jettisoned a classicist ideal of culture as one timeless universal achievement in the Christian West that serves as a normative gauge for degrees of human realization by which to measure all other societies and cultures in all eras and places. In this view the evolved West is the future of all peoples, the end of their progress and the end of histories. That ideal and definition are no longer an option for the church, CST, or theology.

By contrast, a typically modern or empirical idea of culture comes from anthropology, has footings in observation and research, differentiates culture from nature, sees a culture as humanly constructed, varying from one bounded social group to another, embracing the totality of a group's way of life, and shaping members of that group. A culture is a synchronic, unitary whole of interrelated parts guided by the "meaning dimension of social life" that forms social behaviors and produces a social order on the basis of "a community of meaning."④ Staking no
claim to the universal normativity of any culture, yet presupposing a common humanity able to be disengaged from the weight of a heritage or tradition, this idea is an option.

At Vatican II the church made an option for this ideal and definition. The option was not out of the blue. Sporadic remote preparation took place in the form of new insights on evangelizing. For example, a 1659 directive from the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith had urged bishops in China not to import France, Spain, or Italy, just the faith. That appreciation of a difference between faith and a European nation’s reception of it broadened to become the principle of not identifying the gospel with Western cultures. The eighteenth-century distinction and ensuing practices opened a Western door to the spiritual giftedness of non-Western cultures and religions, eventually evident in Vatican II’s *Nostra Aetate*.

More proximate to Vatican II, Allen Figueroa Deck points out, popes from Leo XIII to Pius XII were the very portals through which an anthropological concept of culture entered Catholic social thought. Vatican II firmly held to a modern idea of culture. For instance, *Gaudium et Spes* commented that in cultures, “different styles of living and different scales of values originate in different ways of using things, of working and self-expression, of practicing religion and of behavior, of developing science and the arts, and of cultivating beauty” (no. 53). Figueroa Deck judges that Vatican II made an anthropological concept of culture the “integrating or architectonic principle for understanding the church’s mission and social teaching today.” Paul VI’s *Evangelii Nuntiandi* and John Paul II’s *Redemptoris Missio*, as well as postconciliar theologies of mission bear out this assessment. Inculturation of the gospel in each cultural context, in light of a modern idea of culture, became a theological mainstay.

For example, in discussing inculturation Marcello De Carvalho Azevedo exemplifies a postconciliar option for the modern idea of culture. Culture, he states, is “the set of meanings, values, and patterns which underlie the perceptible phenomena of a concrete society, whether they are recognizable on
the level of social practice . . . or whether they are carriers of signs, symbols, meanings and representations, conceptions and feelings that consciously or unconsciously pass from generation to generation.”

Social practice here includes material culture and technology, along with social, economic, and political activities.

His analysis of culture began to go beyond the absence of historical process in the modern idea of culture by describing signs, meanings, feelings, and concepts transmitted from one generation to the next. His idea of culture had merit, and I worked with it in a 1993 discussion of social justice as cultural change. But there are limits to the modern concept of culture, and subsequent critiques have expanded on them to the point of advancing a more complicated, postmodern notion of culture(s) that leaves the theological ideal of inculturation in a condition as problematic as an unqualified modern idea of culture has become.

The modern, anthropological idea of culture was, critiques pointed out, inattentive to historical process; conceived a culture as an unchanging, internally consistent whole; presumed a consensus on it within it; ignored human agency in how a culture was socially regulative; and treated each culture as a self-contained social monad ideally impervious to influences from other cultures. The postmodern anthropological idea complicates the modern idea by closer and more detailed reference to historical processes. In each culture contentious, heterogeneous, decentralized, internally contradictory ideals, meanings, and practices continually shift in degrees of consolidation and interact with other cultures.

Negotiating meanings involves a struggle for power but not necessarily coercion. The personal and social result is that cultural identity has been conceived as a “hybrid, relational affair, something that lives between as much as within cultures.” Creoles, exiles, expatriates, and mestizos/as become exemplars of this kind of cultural identity. “Pure” identities are not suspect, are not received as necessarily descriptive or normative. Cultural and personal identities can be too solid, too fixed, too complete,
over-determined by memories, functioning as negations of others. Postmodern ideas on culture dissolve an assumption that an educated elite can define its culture for everyone, once and for all. Along with suspicion about a clear, solid definition of a "pure" identity in any culture comes respect for sometimes messy, vulgar, often inspired popular culture as a primary zone in which faith and a culture meet.

Analyses

Nevertheless a distinction made by Azevedo and by Lonergan too deserves continued acceptance despite trailing a modern ideal of culture. Each distinguishes two levels or components in a culture. The two levels are not a class-based division between an aristocracy and commoners, 

proles

and an elite, but a function-based differentiation. The first level or component consists in people's activities participating in the everyday operation of the main institutions (economy, state, family, schools, and so on) of a society. Azevedo calls these activities "social practice," and I will keep this phrase. Social practice is where social justice does or does not come to personal and public structural realization.

Still, Bernard Lonergan offers an understanding of the second level of a culture better able to understand social justice not only embedded in social practice but also in front of it as a goal. "In front of" means the world projected by affirmation of social justice and the common good, and more broadly by CST. The second level of culture, the reflexive component, lies beyond and in front of attainment of social justice.

Lonergan analyzes culture as the common meanings of a society as a continual resultant from a communicative process that arises in common experience. However, interfering group biases, organized obtuseness, and other obstacles beset the interplay in and between each of these steps so that nothing is automatic. To the contrary, cultural common meanings exist only in a contentious dialectic between progress and decline. Common meanings constitutive of a society are not a fixed, permanent set
whose only historical dynamism is to pass from generation to
generation. Instead, a culture is common meanings in constant
circulation from personal and historical experience of major and
minor events that may be celebrated in song, all the way to col-
llective decisions that mark turning points, and then back again
to experience, halting often to assimilate whatever historical
events (for example, the end of an empire) intervene to chal-
lenge common societal self-understandings previously held (for
example, Western classicism, non-Western subalternity).

True, Lonergan sometimes describes common meaning as if
there is a settled consensus within a group or society and in that
respect has a modern idea of culture. However his larger analy-
sis of meaning releases his idea of culture from modern limits.
He treats meaning as a dynamic, historically contingent process
with plenty of conflict ing elements that are fodder for the
method of a theological specialty he names dialectic. His atten-
tion to the complex nature and historically concrete dialectic in
the common meaning that constitutes any society’s culture gives
Lonergan’s account affinity with postmodern ideas of culture as
a contested, internally diversified process of producing and cir-
culating meanings within any group, society, or subculture.

Like Azevedo, Lonergan divides culture into two elements.
The first coincides with Azevedo’s “social practice,” conceived
as sets of common meanings, values, images, commitments, and
motives operative in a particular people’s ordinary social, eco-
nomic, political, and technological activities. Lonergan parts
company over the second level or component of culture, which
does not coincide with Azevedo’s “signs, symbols, meanings and
representations . . . that pass from generation to generation.”
Lonergan includes “scientific, scholarly, philosophic and theo-
logical understanding of the everyday.” This is the reflexive
level of culture inhabited by the natural and social sciences, phi-
losophy, humane letters, history, and critical studies of all sorts.
Humane learning, the sciences, philosophy, and critical studies
of everyday meanings and values occur on the reflexive level.
This seems to be the locale of the fine arts too.
Azevedo captures well the difference between social practice and the rest of a folk culture, but his second level of culture does not deal adequately with whatever exceeds folkways or a common-sense heritage. So I will adopt Lonergan’s “reflexive culture” as the second level of a culture, keeping Azevedo’s “social practice” for the first.

Robert Doran emphasizes interaction between the two levels or components of culture, everyday social practice and reflexive culture. His account of culture proceeds from Lonergan’s integral scale of ascending values: vital, social, cultural, personal, religious. Personal, cultural, and social values are realized in a tension between two poles. The personal subject exists and develops in dialectic between the limits of neural exigencies and self-transcendence in modes of intentional consciousness. Culture exists and develops in dialectic between constitutive cosmological and anthropological meanings. Society as community exists and progresses in a dialectical tension between intersubjective spontaneity and the acts and products of practical intelligence. The social order, economy, and political organization of a society come from practical intelligence.

Society’s everyday operations, shaped by more and less social and distributive justice in providing conditions within which people can attain vital values (nutrition, clothing, shelter, health, vigor, and a capacity for physical action), are infused with cultural meanings. The culturally infused social operations are culture as social practice. Social practice is culture as operative, constituting, embodied, inherited, and taken for granted in acts and structures of a social, economic, technological, and political sort.

How can social practice be shaped by and then come to embody social justice? Doran notes that the reflexive level of a culture can influence cultural meanings operative in social practice. In fact, a crucial nexus obtains between social practice and reflexive culture. Changing social practice toward a more just order depends significantly on meanings from the reflexive level of culture entering into the polity. One sort of influence on social practice that reverses unjust conditions comes from “prolonged...
and difficult theoretical and scientific work.\textsuperscript{57} But only a cultivated interiority can maintain a creative tension between practicality and intersubjective spontaneity essential to a successful social order. A flourishing society has a communal integrity, the outcome of suppressing neither practical intelligence (political, economic, technological) nor intersubjective spontaneity (friends, family, neighbors, groups with common interests) but keeping both alive and interactive at the same time. The reflexive level of a culture tends to subvert ethnocentrism and nationalism that can be carried along and instantiated in practicality and intersubjective spontaneity.

Applying Doran’s analysis, social justice pertains to practical intelligence as the source and sustenance of institutions and structures. Moreover, the cultural values in general of a healthy society are constituted by the operative assumptions resulting from the pursuit of the transcendental objectives of the human spirit: of the beautiful in story and song, ritual and dance, art and literature; of the intelligible in science, scholarship, and common sense; of the true in philosophy and theology; and of the good in all questions regarding normativity.\textsuperscript{58}

The cultural values, the operative assumptions, and their origin in human self-transcendence are present in social practice and on the reflexive level of culture.

Members of a society active on the reflexive level originate the interpretative perspectives, critical standards, new ideas, and future prospects that lead to reshaping the structural products of practical intelligence. For social practice to become socially just, then, may well and on a case-by-case basis depend on keeping practical intelligence in economic activities, political activities, use of technology, and social interactions open to theoretical, artistic, scientific, philosophical, theological meanings flowing from freedom, autonomy in inquiry, and creativity on the reflexive level of culture. This allows practical intelligence to stay actively in tension with intersubjective spontaneity with-
out overwhelming it. From time to time one task of practical intelligence in its political office is to mediate these reflexive meanings into the polity to shape policies that affect the economy and the use of technology.

So a first step in social analysis is to see how open the acts and products of practical intelligence are to meanings from reflexive culture. Checking practicality on whether it is open or closed represents an indirect, long-term approach to social justice that underscores the essential role of culture, especially reflexive culture, in a society’s common good. A society that has given over its social order, its social practice, so completely to a closed practicality and so to a predominantly instrumental outlook, will not be moved easily, if at all, to regard as a valid goal persons, their well-being, and the structures that foster well-being for all members of society.

There is a possible hyper-pragmatic blindness that inverts right order by seeing and acting as if the economy and polity ought to be served rather than serve, since persons and their well-being already have been predefined as means instrumental to practical ends such as producing and consuming as, it would be thought, legitimately manipulated citizens. In such a condition reflexive culture is marginalized and deprived of public influence.

Then art, philosophy, and theology along with the natural and social sciences, humane learning, and scholarship are all measured, for example, exclusively by their utility to the operations of a free-market economy and democratic polity. To the extent that this sort of situation prevails, to that extent advocacy of a just social order involves clarifying the danger of allowing market forces to be understood as if they were processes as natural, inalterable, and universal as gravity.

However, Doran’s analytic concepts need one clarification. His concept of practicality seems to be equivalent to instrumental reason, techné, its products, and attainments. Practicality, he points out, needs to be receptive to theory and reflexive culture because intentional consciousness also has to do with intelligibility, value, truth, beauty, and the whole human good. But beyond
that valid point it needs to be said that the nature of practicality also encompasses what traditionally was designated *phronesis* (prudence) and *poésis* (art). Canny prudential judgments expressed in attitudes and sayings, creativity in artisanal crafts, popular art, and music belong to what Lonergan and Doran identify as intersubjectivity in tension with instrumental reason. They locate acts and outcomes from *phronesis* and *poésis* in intersubjective spontaneity not in practicality. But just that locating seems to me to surrender practicality to instrumental reason by accepting an exclusion of *phronesis* and *poésis* from practicality.

Practicality, then, has its own internal dimensions beyond instrumental reason and has its own source of spontaneity. That slight adjustment in the meaning of practicality allows locating the point of origin for what the field of cultural studies calls popular culture in practicality. Popular culture is not folk culture. The milieu and communication of popular culture are mass media, not generation-to-generation tradition. This means that hopes for advancing more just social practice have to listen to, take account of, and learn from popular culture as well as from reflexive culture. Instrumental reason as practicality also has to come to respect ideas, values, and feelings expressed by *phronesis* and *poésis* in popular culture.

That clarification of Doran’s analysis permits refinement of the inquiry up to this point. CST by and large has ignored how movement toward just social practice depends on two factors, reflexive culture “from above” and popular culture “from within” practicality. Social practice is where social justice comes to realization. Yet CST considers neither the reflexive level of culture nor popular culture as potential sources of change toward social justice. The humanism espoused by CST holds a still vacant place for reflexive culture, it is true, but less clearly for popular culture.

**Observations**

A first observation comes in the form of grateful recognition that in promoting social justice and a common good, CST
consistently has taught about culture as social practice, albeit without adverting to this as a mode of culture. At the same time, CST and Catholic thought generally have not addressed the idea and reality of cultural postmodernity extensively because of preoccupation with affirming religious transcendence in integral humanism and integral development.

What does it mean and why is it important to point out that CST ignores the cultural dimension of social practice, reflexive culture, and popular culture? That is, it is not enough that Paul VI, John Paul II, and Benedict XVI steadfastly have protested against understanding the human person and the development of peoples (progressio) in terms purely of economic and political structures justly arranged. The protest implies prior affirmation of ulterior human dimensions. Yet typically, reference to the ulterior dimensions has taken the form of a defining and irreplaceable witness to religion, apart from discussion of the reflexive level of culture or of popular culture. The reflexive level, not to mention popular culture, plays, for example, but a relatively minor role in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church.

True, the Compendium as a whole presents many principles supportive of a just social order as embodying cultural meanings and of reflexive culture as fulfillment of a just social practice. For example, there is a central affirmation of the dignity of the human person, a starting point in “integral and solidary humanism”; a reference to Paul VI’s idea of “development” as having an important cultural dimension; attention to the human person; and recognition that culture involves the “integral perfection of the person and the good of the whole of society.” Culture turns up in the Compendium as a basic dimension of human social existence, but science, art, and humane learning are situated in perspectives of evangelizing strategies, of refuting philosophical errors, and of correcting ethical shortcomings.

There is little or no celebration of unpredictable creativity and no engagement with postmodern cultural conditions of pluralism internal to most societies. Culture emerges as a troubling
realm not fully identical with economic, political, and social life that somehow is indivisible from those dimensions. Nevertheless, the *Compendium* hints at a larger intuition about the importance of the symbolic part of reflexive culture for CST. A full-color photographic reproduction of Ambrogio Lorenzatti’s 1338–39 *Allegory of Good Government* graces the front, spine, and back of the volume. Might the maxim against judging a book by its cover be ignored in this case?

Social Catholicism in the form of liberation theology has not ignored cultural contexts and world views in addressing the situation of the poor, or that political theology did not arise from, address, and develop theoretical antidotes to a contextual problem of authoritarianism. These and other currents “from below” aside, CST “from above,” with notable exceptions in Asian and African bishops’ conferences, has not advanced too far in elucidating how a just social order embodies and also provides support for a particular culture, particularly the reflexive component. Postconciliar CST has attended to culture as social practice but not much to a just social practice as embodying cultural meanings and even less in reference to reflexive culture or popular culture. More common is a binary contrast between those who exalt immanent economic, political, and social realities and the church’s defense of a transcendent, constitutive human relationship with God. The only absence CST usually points to in secular discussions and plans for social, political, and economic development is an absence of religion due to a closed and truncated secularism that denies human and divine transcendence. There seems to be no intrinsic reason why CST may not initiate analysis and discussion on the cultural finality inherent in social, political, and economic social practice.

**Finality toward Reflexive Culture**

Finality is an immanent tendency toward an end, goal, or outcome that completes and perfects whatever has the tendency. In an Aristotelian four-cause analysis, that end or outcome is the
final cause in addition to material, efficient, and formal causes of an entity's natural activities that express what it is. A society can be thought of as enough like an entity to bear the asking of a question about what it is for, to what does it tend, what is its final cause? And a commonly accepted answer in CST is that the finality of a society lies in the flourishing of its members as persons. Social justice and common good in a society are not entities but states of affairs, institutional arrangements, and qualitative ingredients of a society. So social justice and the common good share in a society's finality toward the human flourishing of its members.

But social injustice in the day-to-day operation of institutional arrangements prevents that flourishing for all or some. Accordingly, social justice measured by the common good shares in and promotes the end of a society, which is the flourishing of its members. This means that social justice and the common good are not complete ends in themselves, though to be achieved they must be sought. Yet they remain intermediate to an end beyond themselves that they do not and cannot produce. They have society's end, human flourishing, as their final cause, so they have a finality in fostering and tending toward that social goal.

Consequently, discussion now shifts to what could be called a modified eudemonistic perspective on social justice and the common good. The reason for shifting is to highlight incompleteness in social justice and a common good taken by themselves as if comprising a self-contained agenda. Both are for something beyond themselves, human flourishing, or to use a phrase preferred by Atherton, "human well-being," or a phrase from Pope Benedict XVI's *Caritas in Veritate*, "transcendental humanism." Social justice and a common good are part of that picture, not the whole of it.

Now, a eudemonistic ethic attends to the way choices mold a person or society. Besides a direct object in matters external to the person or society, choosing has an interior effect in forming an individual or a social character. To act in accord with social justice, to participate in the major institutions of a society, to
promote a common good that makes a contribution possible from all—these result in an individual's habit of justice and in a society having a shared ethos of social justice. This interior effect correlates with external effects in the public life of a society. The interior effect is the eudemonistic aspect of social justice and the common good. Social justice, like any virtue, can be appreciated as its own reward insofar as persons becoming socially just persons participate in a just social order that fulfills a person's and a society's capacity to become and to be just.

Modification of this perspective consists in emphasizing that the virtue of social justice prepares for further modes of virtue and a range of public effects above and beyond the economic and the political. Those capacities, modes, and effects lie in the realm of culture, above all in reflexive culture. Artists, poets, playwrights, novelists, musicians, academic specialists and teachers, researchers, scientists, philosophers, the best journalists all exemplify this range of further, cultural effects. A modified eudemonistic ethic looks to intrinsic connections between practices and institutions realizing the virtue of social justice and activities of a cultural sort. This pertains both to those whose commitment to solidarity leads them to promote social justice likely to benefit others more than themselves and those seeking social justice as redress for their own suffering.

Those bringing about justice find in a just economic and political order not the fullness of life but a platform for cultural activity, starting with family life, friendships, neighbors, education, and in some societies a folk culture. Their exercise of social justice through participation in the main institutions of a society opens onto broader and deeper realizations of their own and others' human existence and dignity. Social justice underlies and facilitates but is not the substance of those further realizations. This is all to say that access by the poor, marginalized, and vulnerable to participation in economic, social, and political life—a goal or end of social justice—is not an end in itself. Nor is a character formed in social justice a complete, self-sufficient point of human arrival. Access to and growth in culture is part of what justice serves but cannot produce.
Conclusion

Social justice in social practice is not a complete end in itself but is a way station to fuller individual and social self-realization. Of course, social justice cannot be a means if it has not first been an end sought and attained to some degree. But all social practice and no reflexive culture would have made even Jesus in his humanity a dull boy, not the vibrant, topical, attractive, liberating, and whole-making public figure to whom the New Testament bears witness. Social justice is a means toward cultural creativity in and beyond economic activities. That finality belongs to social justice as an inner momentum toward humane living characterized by being more than having (though having enough allows for fuller realization of being).

Nor is a society's "common good" an end in itself. A substantive, effective, and normative common good remains a set of conditions ("the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment more fully and more readily,"\textsuperscript{68}) facilitating but not automatically producing people's exercise of personal freedom in cultural creativity and a humane life. The 	extit{Catechism of the Catholic Church} teaches that the common good "should make accessible to each, what is needed to lead a truly human life: food, clothing, health, work, education, culture, and so on" (no. 1908).\textsuperscript{69} Culture at the level of both social practice and reflexive culture belongs to the common good of a society.\textsuperscript{70} This is an important affirmation of education and culture over and above food, clothing, health, and work. Apparently, the 	extit{Catechism} distinguishes social practice (food, clothing, health, and work) from the reflexive level of culture (education and culture) and does not refer to popular culture. The distinction has not incited further teaching on influence from the reflexive part of culture on social practice.

The 	extit{Compendium} explains that the common good is not an "end in itself; it has value only in reference to attaining the ultimate ends of the person and the universal common good of the
whole of creation.” This forthright assertion nevertheless also elides attention to reflexive culture as a distinct zone short of the ultimate ends of the person (God, mediated in religion) and yet not comprised within social, economic, and political structures. A Compendium description of social justice (“Social justice concerns . . . the social, political, and economic aspects and, above all, the structural dimensions of problems and their respective solutions”) contains no reference to culture.

Both “social justice” and a “common good,” then, are incomplete attributes of a “good life,” of human flourishing or human well-being. The role of reflexive culture as opposed to the distinctly religious and eternal has been tacit rather than extensively addressed in a constructive way. Popular culture has been marginalized. Small yet frequent critiques of negative features in contemporary cultures (materialism, relativism, consumerism, and so forth) do not add up to an engagement with either reflexive or popular culture, or for that matter with the cultural dimension of social practice.

Insofar as social justice and a common good are operative in a society, they embody some of that society’s common meanings and thereby constitute social practice in a cultural dimension. But they both share finality toward an ulterior temporal good that is popular and reflexive culture. As real but partial signs and instruments of inherently social realizations of human dignity, they have an immanent tendency toward facilitating that further cultural dimension. If that finality can be conveyed in the language of social justice and the common good, then well and good; explanation of those terms in their intrinsic orientation beyond themselves in culture will suffice. But if not, then they may need revision or conceptual genetic engineering like that occurring in altering Aquinas’s general justice so it became social justice.

Again thankfully, CST has borne constant witness to a vision of humanity, a theological anthropology not confined to social, economic, and political capacities, activities, and structures, and in so doing conceives social, economic, and political realities in reference to a human meaning, a “transcendental humanism”
(Populorum Progressio, no. 16; Caritas in Veritate, no. 18) both open to God and possessed of its own kind of human transcendence. Catholic personalism permeates CST. Clarity on the significance of the person individually and in social existence has led to CST arranging in right order relations among immanent social, political, and economic structures.

Notes


5 Aquinas remarks that “the rightness of other moral virtues is not determined apart from the frame of mind of the person acting,” adding that justice has its rightness “even abstracting from the temper in which it
is done” [qualiter ab agente fiat], Hollenbach, vol. 37, Summa Theologiae 2a2ae, Q. 57, art. 1.


7 Hollenbach explains and applies general or social justice to the split between affluent suburbs and struggling inner cities in “Poverty, Justice, and the Good of the City,” chap. 7 in The Common Good and Christian Ethics, 173–211, esp. 190–200.


14 Shivesh C. Thakur argues against religious concern for social justice because “religion’s ultimate goal, namely the transcendental state of spiritual salvation or liberation . . . must regard earthly matters as ‘ultimately inconsequential’” (Religion and Social Justice [New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996], 44). In When Love Is Not Enough: A Theo-ethic of Justice (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2002), Mary Elsbernd and Reimund Bieringer comment in relation to the Johannine portrayal of embodiment that “if bodies matter, justice has to be concerned about concrete, tangible realities” (65). As the Presbyterian Church USA said in a 1954 statement of theological principles for social action, “Religion is about life in its wholeness” (Presbyterian Church USA, “Theological Basis for Social Action . . . 1954 statement,” chap. 1 in Compilation of Social Policy).

15 “The relationship between the concerns of practical theology and the category of ‘public theology’” was the main theme for the 2003 International Academy of Practical Theology at Manchester University, as explained by Elaine Graham and Anna Rowlands, editors of the proceedings, in Pathways to the Public Square: Practical Theology in an Age of Pluralism (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005), 3.

16 John de Gruchy adverts to a transition from the languages of European political theology and Latin American liberation theology to public
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theology once apartheid officially ended in South Africa. Then theology, beyond advocating emancipatory participation in abolishing apartheid, acquired not only a task of seeking faith's light on active participation in a pluralist democracy, nor only of legitimating democracy, but of bringing "a vision that pushes democracy towards a greater expression of what we believe is God’s will for the world.” See John W. de Gruchy, “From Political to Public Theologies: The Role of Theology in the Public Life of South Africa,” in Public Theology for the Twenty-first Century: Essays in Honour of Duncan B. Forrester, ed. W. J. Storrar and A. R. Morton, 45–62 (London: T&T Clark Ltd, 2004), 59.

17 Sebastian Kim, editor of the International Journal of Public Theology, says that “public theology is a deliberate use of common language in a commitment to influence public decision-making, and also to learn from substantive public discourse. It involves academic theologians in developing categories that are capable of affecting the ethical conscience of the political community. Public theology is an engagement of living religious traditions with their public environment the economic, political, and cultural spheres of common life” (Editorial, International Journal of Public Theology 1, no. 1 [2007]: 1-2).


22 Ibid., 8.

23 De Gruchy remarks that "it is necessary to talk now about public theologies, rather than a public theology, both within the global postcolonial context and within our new multicultural democracy in South Africa” ("From Political to Public Theologies," 56).


26 See a proposal for a cultural approach to social justice in Joseph P. Fitzpatrick, SJ, "Justice as a Problem of Culture," *Catholic Mind* 76 (1978): 10–26. My summation of his approach to an option for the poor: "J. Fitzpatrick had approached this theme in arguing that, 'the heart of the problem of justice is culture,' because judgments on an acceptable amount of food, the way to dress, and decent dwelling-places have a cultural aspect. Customs, manners, relationships, attitudes toward family, work, and the future all have cultural meanings and values. In regard to economic arrangements therefore, it becomes necessary to ask, 'what do they mean in terms of human interests, in terms of human destiny, in terms of what human life means?'" (Hughson, *The Believer as Citizen*, 111).


28 Kenneth Himes, "Globalization with a Human Face: Catholic Social Teaching and Globalization," *Theological Studies* 69, no. 2 (June 2008), 281.


10 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, *Contribution to World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance* (Durban: August 31–September 7, 2001): "The international community is aware that the roots of racism, discrimination and intolerance are found in prejudice and ignorance, which are first of all the fruits of sin, but also of faulty and inadequate education."


34 Some recent applications of CST include Thomas Massaro, SJ, Living Justice: Catholic Social Teaching in Action (Franklin, WI: Sheed and Ward, 2000); and John P. Hogan, Credible Signs of Christ Alive: Case Studies from the Catholic Campaign for Human Development (Lanham, MD: Sheed and Ward, 2003). Helpful studies are Charles E. Curran, Catholic Social Teaching 1891–Present: Historical, Theological, and Ethical Analyses (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002); Elsbernd and Bieringer, When Love Is Not Enough; and Kenneth Himes, Modern Catholic Social Teaching.
35 It is no longer inside information that at papal request Oswald Nell-Breuning, SJ, drafted much of Quadragesimo Anno. with Pius XI adding material on a corporatist economy. Nell-Breuning brought “social justice” from the work of his mentor, Heinrich Pesch, into Quadragesimo Anno.
37 See Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1997); and Brown, Davaney, and Tanner, Convergence on Culture.
38 Tanner, Theories of Culture, 32.
39 Ibid., 36–37. Tanner associates this presupposition with “the Enlightenment project of freeing human society from the dead weight of tradition or custom” (37).
42 Ibid., 257.
43 For example, positive connections between (a modern idea of) culture and mission are evident in Paul VI’s Evangelii Nuntiandi and John Paul II’s Redemptoris Missio (see Bevans and Gros, Evangelization and Religious Freedom).
45 Hughson, The Believer as Citizen, 108–12.
46 Tanner, Theories of Culture, chap. 3.
48 Davaney, in Brown, Davaney, and Tanner, Convergence on Culture, 57–58.
49 See Virgilio Elizondo, Galilean Journey: The Mexican-American Promise (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), and a later modification of


53 Ibid., 301–2.


55 See Robert Doran, _Theology and the Dialectics of History_ (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), esp. chaps. 4, 11, and 16; and idem, _What Is Systematic Theology?_

56 Lonergan, _Method in Theology_, chap 2, section 2 on feelings and section 3 on the notion of value.

57 Doran, _Theology and the Dialectics of History_, 98.

58 Ibid., 98–99.

59 Ibid., 359–77.

60 Ibid., 359–60.

61 Paul VI remarked that “development . . . cannot be restricted to economic growth alone. . . . It must be well rounded; it must foster the development of each man and of the whole man” (no. 14). John Paul II stated that “development that does not include the cultural, transcendent, and religious dimensions of man and society . . . is even less conducive to authentic liberation” (_Sollicitudo Rei Socialis_, no. 7). John Paul II’s _Laborem Exercens_ included “scientific or artistic” activities in the category of work (no. 18).

62 John Paul II launched the Pontifical Council for Culture in 1982. The Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace produced the _Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church_. The beautiful book cover notwithstanding, there is little to suggest collaboration on the _Compendium_.

64 Ibid., no. 98, 45.
65 Ibid., nos. 105–59, 49–70.
66 Ibid., no. 556, 242.
67 Ibid., “Cover Art,” unnumbered flyleaf following p. 446. Also see the Pontifical Council for Culture publication “Via Pulchritudinis: Privileged Pathway for Evangelization and Dialogue,” available on the Vatican website.
68 Compendium, no. 164, 72, quoting Gaudium et Spes and other sources.
70 The UN Declaration on Human Rights states that “(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits” (art. 27). Vatican II speaks about “a right to culture” and a duty to develop oneself and to so assist others (Gaudium et Spes, no. 60).
71 Compendium, no. 170, 75.
72 Ibid., nos. 201, 89–90.