Tourism and "Quality of Life" at the End of Franco's Dictatorship

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In the Spanish Constitution, “quality of life” appears several times as a fundamental value related to the economic and cultural wellbeing of citizens, protection of the environment, and participative democracy (León Jiménez). Yet the term is, in fact, an international conceptual chameleon that is found in contexts ranging from philosophy texts to the summaries of social indicators. The Canadian philosopher Storrs McCall, who was among the ones who noticed it early on, lamented in 1980:

Not only do we not know what quality of life is, we don't even know what category of thing it is. Is quality of life a state of mind or a state of society? Does its defini-
tion vary from individual to individual, from culture to culture, from geographical area to geographical area, or is it the same for all people everywhere? Is quality of life measurable, and if so why do there continue to be profound differences of opinion over which social indicators are relevant to its determination? (qtd. in Draper and Thomson 649)

The notion of quality of life acquired international popularity in 1972–1975 against the backdrop of the Western economic crisis and soon moved on to become a staple of biopolitics. The delegates to the first international meetings defined this new standard in relation to growth and the responsible use of resources. Yet in Spain, both concepts were deeply compromised. Growth had been the cornerstone of the 1960s development strategy known as the desarrollo that the Falangistas—the members of the Spanish fascist party supporting a “social state”—were now trying to combat. The resource management crisis (a product of the uncontrolled tourism boom of the 1960s) was the Falangistas’ main argument, but many supporters and opponents of Franco’s regime also backed this criticism. The essay analyzes how the “quality of life” debate unfolded during the final years of the regime and how that debate (and its resolutions and lack of resolutions) eventually made the category of “quality of life” central to Spain’s transition to democracy after Franco’s death in 1975.

**Tourism and the Domestication of Global Capital**

In Spain, discussions about “quality of life” were initially limited to the branch of industry that had produced the 1960s “desarrollista” boom: tourism. This gave the whole debate a paradoxical twist: in economically developed nations, the dream of a new life standard involved the very activity that Spaniards considered their major pollutant. In the end, tourism had to be rehabilitated because it was, after all, a biopolitical force necessary for the smooth operation of Spain’s dictatorial regime in the new global economy. Since 1961, the Spanish government had been making conscious efforts to “sell” tourism to the domestic population, mobilizing Spaniards as economically active yet politically idle subjects, as hosts and occasional guests (when there were not enough proverbial “Swedish girls [suecas]” to fill the bill). The hospitality business, erected into the nation’s homemade “Marshall Plan,” channeled the government’s desire to find a neoliberal path to “defascistization” (Payne 363–98): an economic liberation without political or personal liberties (Crumbaugh 15–39). Hence, in practice, tourism served as a vehicle or a pretext for an array of neoliberal policies rang-
ing from redistribution of land to promotion of unfair taxation schemes. While the rich were getting richer and the regional inequalities sharper (Martín Acena and Martínez Ruiz), officials used Spaniards’ growing purchasing power—called “nivel de vida” (level of life)—as a new way of legitimating the regime. So at the time my story begins, tourism was cherished as the cornerstone of a dictatorship whose claims to legitimacy were grounded in its services to Spaniards, “and not in its origins” (Sánchez Biosca and Rodríguez Tranche 422).

The “monoculture of sun” (as tourism was sometimes called), however, had powerful opponents in the government, and by 1969, Spain’s “European vacation” was over (Pack). Yet, even then, on the surface, things continued the same: Spain was still moving on to become a world leader in cement production, newspapers were replete with photographs of construction sites, and new airports popped up faster than new highways. In Spanish politics, this was the period when two conservative cabinets, led by the so-called technocrats that had closed the desarrollista “aperture” of 1961–1969, began to draft their plans for Francoism after Franco. Denouncing the “ideological pluralism on which party democracy is based,” Franco’s final years featured, in Paul Preston’s apt wording (48), “monochrome” governments: first grey (for the 1969–June 1973 cabinet) and later (June 1973–1974) blue.² Neither of the two, however, pretended to invoke the colors of the Mediterranean, but rather reflected the grey metaphorical “bunker” from which the ministers were preparing to defend the regime and the blue uniform of the Falange that was coming back to rule. In December 1973, ETA’s assassination of Admiral Carrero Blanco, the president of both governments and the designer of this “posthumous” Francoism project (Preston 48), would add the color of blood to the mix and usher in Franco’s last (1974–1975), still unreformed, cabinet (Suárez Fernández 423). In spring 1972, the police fired against the strikers at the shipyards in El Ferrol, Franco’s birthplace, and when the government threatened to apply military law, workers all over Galicia, the Basque Country, and Catalonia went on solidarity strikes (Preston 44). Ecology seemed the least of the government-sanctioned concerns; and the ones that were not sanctioned by the government did not enjoy easy coverage from the publishers scared by copious fines from censors. And yet, all of a sudden, in 1972–1973, sustainability and the environment became the talk of the day. The timing seemed right: Europe was beginning its long engagement with the “quality of life.” But here was a mystery: the government ministers were coming and going, Spain’s intellectuals in opposition and in internal exile were learning how to work around censorship, the clandestine militancy was on the rise, and yet what everyone in Spain and in the ideological underground had to say about the environment and quality of life sounded the same. Or did it?
In what follows, I will argue that these seemingly uniform statements reflected a debate about the forms that neoliberalism was taking under a regime trying to strike a hard balance between a fascist-type social ("national-syndicalist") state and an open-market global economy. The meaning of "quality of life" becomes much clearer if one approaches early 1970s Spain as a territory where global capital had to enter into contact with a nationally-bound political power that, in its turn, was pressured by its own regions seeking national sovereignty, semi-official and clandestine groups in opposition to its existence, and, finally, interest groups fighting for political influence: the technocrats linked to Opus Dei (a conservative Catholic organization) and the Falange. Since the 1960s, international investors into Spain had been mastering the lingo of tourism, Spain's first global industry. By the 1970s, however, it became clear to wider sectors within Spanish society that the government had been acting as these investors' direct partner, seeking occasional support from local bureaucrats and excluding national oligarchs and entrepreneurs. A large part of the 1970s debates about "quality of life" was these groups' way of demanding greater participation in this system, not to be confused with political opposition and the defense of the natural environment.

Roberto Roccu's recent work on globalization in national contexts, grounded in David Harvey's interpretation of neoliberalism, is relevant for understanding what was really at stake in the "quality of life" controversy. According to Roccu, for global capital to become acceptable in the territories that are on the receiving end, international financial operations have to find support among national oligarchs and adjust to their ways of doing business. Roccu distinguishes two stages in this process—"hybridization" and "domestication" (431-32)—whereby global capital acquires the forms and shapes recognizable to locals. While this mutual adjustment is taking place, and also after it is achieved, national authorities remain complicit with the policies of "dispossession" by which global capital expands: privatization of public assets, manipulation of crises, and state redistribution (Harvey, History 159-65, qtd. in Roccu 427). On the surface, the anti-tourism thread in Spanish discussions about "quality of life" could be explained by the growing awareness of these inequalities among different social groups: what Harvey calls a "broad alliance of the discontented, the alienated, the deprived and the dispossessed" (Harvey, Capital 240, qtd. in Roccu 424). However, although Spain's debut on the global arena indeed produced an alliance broad enough to cut through the harshest ideological differences and the opposing party affiliations, in my story, the discontented misunderstood dispossession and, with counted exceptions, forgot alienation. Tourism, chastised as a pollutant, was soon back to being disguised
as "leisure," one of the most seductive biopolitical illusions that alienated humanity has produced to console itself, to its governors' delight (Vilarós; Minca and Oakes 12–37). Spain is still under the spell of that leisure dream.

"Quality of Life": A Concept and a Tool of Policy-Making

At present, the undetermined meaning of the phrase has not prevented "quality of life" from becoming an economic and social indicator and a branch of research in disciplines as diverse as philosophy, public policy, health, and food sciences (Nussbaum and Sen; Phillips; Michalos; Quality of Life). Since 1991, the World Health Organization has been developing instruments to assess quality of life, which could allow researchers to compare the term's connotations across cultures (WHOQOL). The World Database of Happiness, directed by Ruut Veenhoven, of Happiness Economics Research Organization from Erasmus University in Rotterdam, names eleven academic journals dedicated to this and related concepts, and the number is growing (Journals on Happiness and Wider Quality of Life). Peter Draper and David Thomson (649) have counted that, in medical literature alone, the number of papers that use this term has doubled every five years since 1976; yet they found only two papers that used this phrase between 1965 and 1970. Researchers and politicians in Spain have remained conversant with "quality of life" research and have contributed their measurements to the European and global indexes (Moreno Jiménez and Ximénez Gómez; Casas; Fernández López et al.; Anderson). Since 2010, The Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) publishes a multi-lingual compendium on "quality of life" in the workplace from Europe and America (Anuario internacional). At a time when economists predict that the generations to come will be poorer and less educated than their parents, this seems to be the era of "quality of life." How did we get here?

Politically, the term emerged at the end of the 1960s in the context of the arms race. In 1969, while a draft of the disarmament treaty was debated in Helsinki, the head of the British delegation, Lord Chalfont, announced to the U.N. General Assembly that what was really at stake were the "quality of life in the future" and the question of whether humanity could prevent a nuclear disaster ("Segunda sesión de trabajo"). In March 1972, the unveiling of the results of MIT's Limits to Growth project (Meadows) commissioned by the Club of Rome unleashed a public debate about the overuse of resources and the impact of the environment on "quality of life." The issue quickly moved into international policy-making (Chomsky 118–25). In June of the same year, the Declaration
of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm identified the “wise” use of “man’s capacity to transform his surroundings” as a path toward improving what was now officially called “quality of life” and traced the first blueprint for creating “good life” compatible with “the enhancement of environmental quality” (United Nations Environmental Program Pre­amble 3, 6). The term “sustainable development” had not yet emerged (Giddens 61), and the dilemma formulated in the Club of Rome report sounded like a choice between growth, on one hand, and “quality of life,” on the other. For developing economies, that simply meant that the richer nations were attempting to infringe on their rights to develop. The Stockholm declaration reflected this unease, as well as the difficult compromise that was achieved: “Economic and social development is essential for ensuring a favorable living and working environment for man and for creating conditions on earth that are necessary for the improvement of the quality of life.” Such an ambiguous balance between expansion and wellbeing offered no guidance for a country such as Spain, whose politicians wanted to fit with their counterparts from the more-developed nations without ceasing to promote extensive development. This was the beginning of Spain’s long and complicated romance with “quality of life.”

In the following months, the definitions given to “quality of life” in the international arena split. In the European political lexicon, it became synonymous with environmental protection and care for resources. As Spanish observers reported from the European summit held in October 1972, the idea continued the region’s self-styling as, in the words of British Prime Minister Edward Heath, “una Europa para el pueblo, preocupándonos por la calidad de la vida y por el medio ambiente en que vivimos y trabajamos” (qtd. in “Hay, verdaderamente”) (A Europe for its people that cares about quality of life and the environment in which we live and work). At that meeting, a decision was made to adopt a European Community policy for the protection of the environment, leading to the first Environment Action Plan in 1973 (Scheuer 18).

At the same very time, however, work was underway in the United States focused on broadening the definition of “quality of life,” purging it from straightforward environmentalist connotations and transforming it into a set of measurable policy outcomes. In August 1972, a group of researchers and experts from the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the Booz-Allen Public Administration Services gathered in the Airlie House in Warrenton, Virginia, with a specific purpose: “disentangle the Quality of Life concept to the point where it has decision making relevance” (Environmental Protection Agency iii, italics in original). The symposium papers, published in 1973, contained a roadmap for transforming an individual’s sense of happiness into a
productive tool that policymakers could use. “Quality of life” was about to become a system of tasks and assessment instruments. The age of biopolitics had officially begun.

What meaning, then, did the Spanish regime support? Given the term’s neoliberal origins and “undoubtedly ‘bourgeois’ flavor” (Harvey, “Marxism”), it is hardly surprising that Franco’s government, still enjoying its honeymoon on the international stage, joined the “quality of life” choir. “Ni la expansión de la economía ni la lucha contra la contaminación son valores absolutos. No podemos olvidar que, por encima de cualquier otro, el objetivo general de la lucha contra la contaminación es salvaguardar la salud del hombre y mejorar su bienestar” (Neither economic expansion, nor the fight against contamination are absolute values. We cannot forget that, above any other target, the general aim of the fight against contamination is to protect human health and improve wellbeing), declared Laureliano López Rodo, a technocrat who had been in charge of Spain’s Development Plans since the late 1950s (“Destacada Intervención”), while addressing the 1972 Stockholm Conference. The striking part of López Rodó’s declarations was his attempt to represent development and environmental protection as relative values, subject to the needs of improving living conditions. This brought the Spanish government’s position close to that of the developing nations that were defending their right to expand. What did, then, “quality of life” mean for Spain? In Stockholm, López Rodó did not even use the term, mentioning instead the concept of “wellbeing.” Though appearing synonymous, “wellbeing” was a staple of the desarollista Newspeak of the 1960s, of which López Rodó was the prime designer; it referred to Spaniards’ growing purchasing power. Hence, for the domestic audience, López Rodó’s position promised no change of course.

Several months later, however, priorities shifted. Prior to the Stockholm meeting, Spanish experts had drafted a report for the Common European Market on the protection of the resources of the Mediterranean, and in November 1972, a conference on “Tourism and Ecology in [the] Western Mediterranean” was held in Madrid, in which López Rodó made closing remarks. Then it became clear that “quality of life” would figure firmly in Spain’s political future, with its meaning aptly adjusted to the government’s new needs. This was a double-faced “quality.” On the one hand, Spain was recognizing the European definition rooted in environmental responsibility. On the other hand, however, its leaders redefined “environment” to steer it away from controlled use of natural resources. López Rodó’s speech at that meeting demonstrated how easy it was to pay lip service to Spain’s neighbors’ concern for nature, while veiling the technocrats’ interest in continued expansion:
El tema del turismo y la calidad de vida es de los que encierran mayor fuerza ética.

Al abordar este tema, la primera dificultad con que nos encontramos es la de clarificar este concepto difuso y a veces, confuso de medio ambiente, es decir, todo ese conjunto de factores físicos, químicos, biológicos, estéticos y sociológicos que afectan el desenvolvimiento físico, mental y social del hombre.

Entiendo que la política para la mejora del medio ambiente ha de tener un carácter profundamente humanista. (Congreso de ecología y turismo del Mediterráneo 38)

(The issue of tourism and quality of life is one of those harboring the greatest ethical force. The first difficulty that one faces approaching this issue is the need to clarify the vague and sometimes confusing concept of environment, that is, the whole set of physical, chemical, biological, aesthetic, and sociological factors affecting man's physical, mental, and social development. I understand that the politics aimed at improving the environment ought to be profoundly humanistic.)

The Minister’s rhetoric, in reality, only meant to explain that contamination “no constituye, en la mayor parte de los países del mundo, un problema prioritario” (was not a primary problem for most countries) while development was, and that any environmental policy had to include tasks unrelated to nature, such as “un conjunto de bienes y servicios que deben ponerse a disposición de la comunidad para que ésta alcance el indispensable nivel de vida” (providing goods and services to allow the community to reach necessary life standards).

The idea that combining development with quality of life was a difficult, albeit mandatory, task became a formula used to insert the technocratic agenda into the post-Stockholm international climate without sacrificing growth. López Rodó summed it up as the need to “armonizar en una síntesis difícil, pero no imposible, el crecimiento económico con la calidad de la vida humana” (harmonize, in a difficult, yet not impossible, synthesis, economic growth and the quality of human life) at an Ibero-American summit in May 1973 (“El príncipe de España presidió”). Yet in order to signal a change from the previous philosophy focused solely on development and expansion, the technocrats had to explain how concern for the environment fit with the 1960s ideas of development and “wellbeing.” While the differences of opinion about the best way to proceed were admittedly strong enough to spur changes in the Development Plan Committee, López Rodó, the Committee’s leader, remained in place and
found an ingenious formula to explain the innovation: “Queremos que prime
sobre el puro crecimiento cuantitativo la mejora efectiva de la calidad de la vida” (“La política, de semana a semana”) (We want to put an effective improvement of quality of life above mere quantitative growth). There was still no explanation of what “quality of life” meant.

Amidst these uncertainties, tourism, which during the technocrats’ roaring 1960s had been conceptualized as a sure road to wellbeing, was called upon to show how development could be compatible with “quality of life.” Without questioning the positive monetary impact of tourism, Alfredo Sánchez Bella, Tourism and Information minister (1969–1973), now recast this industry as a new ecology. Although Sánchez Bella replaced in 1969 the main author of the tourism boom, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, he was also closer to the Opus Dei technocrats than to the Falange. His reframing of the “tourism or ecology” dilemma as “tourism and ecology,” where each part would support, and not contradict, the other, reflected an interpretation of “quality of life” that everyone could live with. Sánchez Bella’s solution to the tourist/environmentalist conundrum was ingenious: the industry that constituted the greatest threat to the environment was recast as the one most interested in environment protection. Greeting the delegates to the same 1972 “Tourism and Ecology” meeting in Madrid where López Rodó spoke, Sánchez Bella came close to a formula that could tie development with environmentalism:

De la misma forma que las aguas de la ribera mediterránea se van contaminando, el litoral se va cubriendo paulatinamente de un muro de cemento que amenaza con privarnos de la vista al mar . . . Y un elemental estudio sociológico del fenómeno turístico nos descubrirá, como una de sus motivaciones inmediatas, el anhelo de evasión de la opresión ciudadana: del cemento, hierro y asfalto, y de la búsqueda de espacios abiertos, horizontes distantes, panoramas verdes y reposados. En suma, el afanoso deseo de un horizonte distinto a aquel en que se desarrolla la vida ciudadana. Y lo que estamos en peligro de descubrir es esta diferencia, ya que el desorden en la construcción de instalaciones para recibir a las masas que se desplazan constituye un factor desequilibrador del medio ambiente que tiene (sic) a igualar el paisaje de destino con el de origen . . . (Congreso de ecología y turismo del Mediterráneo 13)

(Just as the waters of the Mediterranean shores are getting contaminated, the coast gradually becomes covered by a wall of cement threatening to deprive us of the view of the sea. . . . Even the most elementary sociological study of the tourism phenomenon would tell us that the strongest motivation for tourism is the desire
for an escape from urban oppression—from cement, iron, and asphalt—and the quest for open spaces, distant horizons, green and quiet panoramas. In sum, an intense desire for a horizon different from one in which urban life develops. And we may learn about this [diminishing] difference the hard way, because the disorderly construction of facilities for receiving the moving masses constitutes an unsettling factor for the environment, making the landscape in the destination indistinguishable from one's point of departure.

Yet the Minister's awareness of the human longing for "open spaces and distant horizons" did not translate into protectionism. Instead, his approach to nature sounded like advertising for a hair product: "Humanicemos el paisaje de nuevo con un adecuado uso del color, del volumen, del material" (Let us re-humanize the landscape with an adequate use of color, volume, and material), he exhorted his listeners (14). His words drew the future of environmental protection as a new branch of industry that would turn the cause of destruction into its remedy: "El progreso técnico, la máquina, son grandes responsables de la degradación. Utilicemos ambos para recuperar el control de la biosfera" (12) (Technological progress and the machine are the two forces responsible for degradation. Let us use both to recover the biosphere). With a postmodern simulacrum ex machina twist, the Spanish government’s environmental concerns only promised a return to machine-made nature.

This is how the environmentalist slogans were co-opted and convoluted by the government, which began to claim that the remedy to overusing the seaside could come in the form of more bucolic abuses such as hunting, fishing, and camping. Thus paradoxically, having described the undesirable consequences of tourism for the environment at the National Tourism Awards meeting in early 1973, Sánchez Bella went on to exalt the multimillion-peseta potential of "el turismo ‘au plen (sic) air’, de la acampada, del ‘camping’ y del 'turismo de los lagos’" ('plein air' tourism, staying in tents, ‘camping, and ‘lake tourism'). Having achieved the limit of coastal development, Spain was simply forced to unpack its wilderness to increase its tourism capacity. Tourism may well have been recast as an essential ingredient of "wellbeing" in peace with nature and without a view of the cement walls, yet its numbers-driven character was not about to change. In haste, Spain's advertising partners abroad commissioned articles on Spanish wild animals, fishing, and other activities beyond the sun and beach. In the next few months, the Dirección General de la Promoción del Turismo (Tourism Promotion Department) produced a series of posters under a common title "Environment Protection" showing the vistas of rivers and non-descript woods, sunsets, and autumn leaves. Although the series was obviously
made for expanding the list of Spanish destinations, it was also summoned to propagate the new meaning of tourism among the domestic audiences.

Newspapers lauded the program’s “preocupación trascendental y modernísima” (transcendental and utterly modern preoccupation) with exalting Spain’s beauty “en armonía con el medio ambiente y el hábitat turístico” (“Nueva serie de carteles”) (in harmony with the environment and tourism habitat). Yet what did “tourism habitat” really mean? Initially, it sounded like an oxymoron pointing at the need of naturalizing or humanizing tourism. Indeed, since 1972 politicians began to insert the words “human” and “humanistic” randomly into texts about tourism. At the congress on the Mediterranean, Gregorio López Bravo, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, called tourism a dangerous “human phenomenon” that can alter the “profundamente humano sistema de vida que hemos creado” (un fenómeno humano ... que debemos cuidar ... para evitar que pueda constituir un elemento de alteración del sistema de vida profundamente humano que siempre hemos procurado). Yet new language was already being forged that would soon make the word “tourism” obsolete altogether. Its environmentally friendly substitute was to be called “leisure”: “El turismo no es un muro de cemento, es la arquitectura del ocio”. (tourism is not a cement wall, it is the architecture of leisure), Sánchez Bella stated at the November 1972 Mediterranean meeting. This playful formula anticipated the future evolution of Spanish tourism that rebranded itself as the “leisure industry” conceptually in 1973 and factually in the late 1980s (Granados Cabezas). Crucially, by positioning tourism as leisure, Sánchez Bella made it clear that tourism itself set the standards for “quality of life” and could therefore not be discouraged or restricted.

In the final balance, in the Spain of 1972–1973, the idea of “quality of life” had become shorthand for a new program of “humanizing” development by redirecting it to previously neglected markets. Clearly, such an official environmentalism figured prominently in the courting ceremonies between “prepostfrancoist” Spain (to use Eduardo Mendoza’s coinage) and its global investors. The wedding, however, would have to wait and would not be yet officially announced. Tourism, the flagship of Spain’s development, now became a testing ground for the new approach, charged with offering productive models for a “quality” development. Suddenly, newspapers were filled with classist remarks about the “scum of Europe” bringing Spanish beaches down to their low standards of hygiene. Already in January 1973, in preparation for the meeting of British Tour Agencies in Mallorca scheduled for November, officials decided to shed the tired sun and beach panorama. The correspondents of La Vanguardia didn’t fail to notice the irony:
nada de playas pobladas de bañistas y sombrillas, nada de hoteles mastodónticos, nada que pueda suponer aglomeraciones y tumulto. Hay que presentar la Mallorca bucólica, apacible, tranquila e ideal para un descanso en cualquier estación del año. Hay que presentar rebaños de ovejas pastando en el verde campo mallorquín, mostrar los olivos centenarios y las calas solitarias que todavía quedan. ("Los agentes de viaje británicos")

Yet when the tour agents and British dignitaries eventually got to Mallorca, the leadership of Spain's Tourism Ministry had changed: in June 1973, the Tourism Minister Sánchez Bella who had envisioned the “leisure industry” model as a way of continuing expansion, was sacked. The turnover was peaceful, and the reasons for the firing were not announced. On the surface, the official language of tourism and its policies stayed the same as they had been under Sánchez Bella. However, extensive debates about “quality of life” were about to emerge, changing the course that Spanish environmentalism would take.

The Discontented and the Domesticated

Interestingly, even though there had always been opposition to tourism-driven development in Spain, nothing really changed until foreign investors began to suffer the consequences of the fuel crisis in 1972. Their dwindling support made the 1960s model of tourism, one that had allowed Spanish officials to work directly with foreign tour-operators that were funding (in amounts that were kept secret by the government) the construction of large hotels in exchange for future reservations, unviable. Stephen Danos of Centrehurst Limited (a British public relations agency), who was in charge of promoting Spain in the United Kingdom starting in 1963, remembered that in the 1960s “the most senior officials of the Ministry were available to the [tour] operators, either as a group, or individually. Various promises were made, which were hard to fulfill” (Danos, Hopkinson, et al.). In a proposal for a new public relations campaign drafted in October 1973, Danos shed light on the timing and the reasons for the changes that took place between the 1960s and 1973. In the summer of 1973, the eco-
onomic indicators made it clear that tour operators were no longer reliable. Unavoidably, the model was no longer viable, and the international “quality of life” buzz—a product of the same economic crisis that was hurting Spanish tourism—facilitated the shift. With the official meaning of “quality” still fluctuating, it was a time when different concepts began to clash around, and be tested on, the tourism industry. In hindsight, it is clear that the debates served a twofold purpose: the economic need to “domesticate” global investment and the political need to promote the Falangista-inspired social agenda against the tradition of desarrollismo. And even though there were plenty of people in the opposition or in the underground parties who talked about “quality of life,” they simply went for a neoliberal ride that the Spanish “discontented” were starting to enjoy, as we will see below.

Prior to 1973, Spanish tourism was organized in a way that worked well for large foreign investors, Spain’s landed aristocracy, banks, and the officials who used the boom for personal enrichment. Not only those Spaniards who did not take vacations or who would have been denied admission to the resorts, but also large numbers of business owners, felt excluded and united their voices against the hyper-development of coastal areas. In an article eloquently titled, “Spain: The Nightmare of Tourism,” the German magazine Der Spiegel explained that Spain’s tax system was giving incentives to the owners of large estates to lease or sell to foreign companies for building resorts. In Cerrado de Carderón, in the Málaga province, a Belgian-Dutch trust was developing the lands of the Count de Larios; in the Canary Islands, the lands of the Counts de la Vega Grande were leased to a German company. Banks from Spain’s industrial cities such as Banco de Bilbao or Banco Coca from Madrid also entered the development game. And there was definitely no shortage of trafficking of influence and corrupt officials. Der Spiegel cited an example of the Hotel “El Tope” in Puerto de la Cruz (Tenerife), built in a protected green area because the mayor, who also happened to be the owner of that hotel, reclassified the terrains. Basically, the boom entailed a de facto redistribution of land without a corresponding sharing of benefits. Unsurprisingly, then, the continuing over-development created growing discontent. Surprisingly, though, newspapers in Spain and abroad began to voice this discontent in unison precisely at the time when foreign tour operators failed.

To understand the ways in which the government used this opposition and the new meanings of environmentalism that emerged as the result, we must know more about Spain’s new business partners and their plans. The proposals drafted by Stephen Danos, the British public relations expert mentioned earlier, were clear: “Very often large numbers are synonymous with low prices” (Danos,
Hopkinson, et al.). The imperative was to provide a product whose higher costs could be explained to and rationalized by the consumer. And this is why environment became a crucial factor. The campaign that Danos designed in 1973 revolved around the notion of “good product.” In part, Spain’s advantage hinged on the problems of Spain’s neighbors, France (where Danos emphasized “sea pollution”) and Italy (whose reputation was hindered by a recent “heavy cholera outbreak”). Among the factors negatively affecting the image of Spain in Britain, Danos mentioned Spain’s similar issues such as “a) Medical. Cholera, typhoid and paratyphoid on several occasions; b) Organizational” (Danos, Hopkinson, et al.). Putting the plan into action, the following year Danos either commissioned articles or consulted their authors about Spain’s lesser-known areas and activities unrelated to sun and beach. Attuned to the interests of a middle-class audience wishing to move beyond the beach, he crafted a hedonistic image of Spain that combined pleasant climate and old culture, beaches and woods, urban anonymity and the promise of rural seclusion. Still, when it came to Spaniards themselves, Danos was an obvious supporter of the 1960s boom and considered it beneficial to all Spaniards. He wrote in a letter to his counterpart in Spain’s Tourism Ministry:

From time to time Spanish tourist authorities are attacked in the newspapers for the amount and quality of development which has been allowed to go on along various Mediterranean Coastlines.

It would be most helpful to me if I had available a counter argument to the critics who, if truth be known, think back nostalgically to the days when all the peasants were walking around barefoot, the people were poor and it was nice for the Englishmen who could buy a bottle of brandy for a few pennies. (Danos)

While he agreed with the technocrats and only opposed their attraction to the numbers of visitors instead of the quality of product, politically, Danos did not envision a system capable of facing this challenge as anything but a strong centralized state supporting niche development. As his proposal demonstrated, the guarantees of the “high quality” of the Spanish tourism product were “Control by the Spanish tourist authorities” and “Concentration of resorts making for easier control and transportation.” In other words, no political change or even economic liberalization was necessary to ensure a quality tourism product. The Falange politicians who thought that it was their moment to implement, finally, a “social state” could go along with that. However, both the foreign agents like Danos and the Falangistas underestimated the movement of
people conjured by the recent economic development who no longer wished to be mere consumers of government-made bounty and wanted to come closer to the source of it all.

The last two years of Franco's dictatorship were not a time of public agreement. Yet when it came to “quality of life,” almost everyone seemed to agree. The reason was simple: this blanket notion allowed the Falangista revivalists in the government to steer the environment debate in the direction that disarmed all possible opposition. Spanish entrepreneurs, of course, wanted the liberalization of economic activity—the opposite of the strong fascist “social state” providing benefits to its citizens. Those in communist and other similar opposition groups had their own ideal of “social state”—but they did not want Falange in it. The entrepreneurs demanded access to the power over resources and therefore criticized the government’s irresponsibility. The opposition criticized the government, citing the misuse of the environment as merely one of the regime’s thousand crimes against the Spanish people. So, official and dissident press alike ran articles predicting a tourism-borne ecological catastrophe. The dissident journal *Cuadernos para el diálogo* dedicated a special supplement to the problems of tourism in the Balearic Islands with a telling title: *El turismo: ¿un falso boom?* (Tourism, a Fake Boom?), written by the Guillermo Díaz-Plaja, a distinguished intellectual who has just become the dean at Barcelona's Escuela Universitaria de Estudios Empresariales. The no-less-critical *Cambio 16* featured a series of articles by a communist, “Felipe” (member of FLP: Frente de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Front)), Carlos de Zayas, focusing on the disastrous consequences of tourism. One of them announced its contents: “¡Vaya pulpo (el turismo)!” (What a flop [Tourism]!).

When foreign correspondents joined the choir denouncing the excesses of Spanish tourism policy, they found equally critical interlocutors among the mayors of coastal towns. José María Revente, the mayor of Benidorm, Emilio Puignau Nogier, the mayor of Cadaqués, and Cayetano Utrera Ravassa, the mayor of Málaga gave their testimonies to Henry Giniger for an article, “Spaniards question mass tourism,” for the *Herald Tribune* (1973) expressing their concern for the environment or denouncing the disastrous consequences caused by tourism. As Cayetano Utrera Ravassa, the mayor of Malaga, said, “the blue Mediterranean is becoming increasingly less blue off the bathing beaches.” Local business owners also joined in. Josep Ensesa Gubern, a Barcelona oligarch, called the Spain of excessive tourism development “the playground of Europe’s rabble” (Giniger). *Der Spiegel* quoted the President of Málaga’s Chamber of Commerce: “We cannot continue using tourism as a cover for the enormous boiling pot of our underdevelopment” (“Spanien: Alptraum Tourismus”).
The list of critics would be incomplete without the economists, scholars, and social scientists who also revealed the glaring deficiencies of Spain's tourism planning and its ecological consequences. The article in Der Spiegel mentioned above cited a whole series of studies, ranging from the economics of tourism in Malaga by Juan José Solá to the work on the destruction of agriculture in the Canary Islands by Jerónimo Saavedra, professor of labor law. Adolfo Drigani, the Argentinian journalist, cited "expertos y observadores" (experts and observers) who were afraid that many people would abstain from coming to Spain "por falta o inexistencia de una infraestructura adecuada (agua, saneamientos, sanitarios, etc.) en algunos lugares; [...] o por el creciente deterioro del medio, agresión urbanística, explotación y suciedad de playas y paisajes" (Drigani 28) (because adequate infrastructure [water, sanitation facilities, toilets] were, in some places, scarce or nonexistent [...] or because of the deteriorating environment, aggressive urbanization, plunder, and dirty beaches and surroundings).

It would appear that Spain's "discontented" were joining the environmentalist movement. Yet the real interests of these critics were various, and not all of them were "green" or even in solidarity with the "dispossessed." While the intellectuals opposing the regime wanted to lay bare its complicity with foreign capital, business owners interested in bringing foreign capital home demanded that the government authorize gambling. Differences of opinion due to class and ideological clashes were also matched by the diversity of regional claims: while all local authorities demanded a compensation for the export of their resources, the sense of dispossession was higher in Catalonia, where the tensions caused by tourism became a part of national self-determination. Hence, though everyone concurred that irresponsible development was bringing Spain to a catastrophe, not many critics would agree about the remedies.

Amidst this surprising accord between the "discontented" and the few intellectuals and administrators speaking on behalf of the "dispossessed," almost nothing was being said about alienation as the root of what was happening in Spain. A rare shot of skepticism came from Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, the writer who dismissed the whole debate about both nature and tourism. For Vázquez Montalbán (47–49), this was a pseudo-choice offered up by financiers in order to distract humanity from the real problem that was none other than the capital furnished by the financiers itself, fueled by the "irracionalismo patológico que explica la mística y la urgencia del weekend, del 'retorno a la naturaleza', de las vacaciones" (pathological irrationalism that explains the mystique and the necessity of a weekend, of "return to nature," of vacations). From that standpoint, the concerns about nature conservancy were from the outset compromised by the capitalist origins of the concept of "nature" itself and were
therefore to be rejected as a mere “ideología de la tregua que el hombre lobo concede a sus semejantes, igualmente hombre lobos” (47–49) (ideology of breather that a wolfman concedes to his fellows, who are wolfmen as well).

Voices of discord of a different kind came from the activists of animal protection—all of them women. As soon as the government officials began to mention nature in their speeches, Dolores Comas Marsans, then the vice president of the International Federation of Animal Protection, wrote a series of letters to the Tourism Propaganda officials, telling them about her work in Spain and abroad. Without asking for the officials’ support, she tried to educate the government that had just discovered environmentalism, introducing different definitions of nature and the environment and engaging the authorities in a dialogue (Comas Marsans). Carmen Alonso, writer and activist from Oviedo, was far less diplomatic in her attitude toward the official environmentalism that ignored the needs of animal protection: “Hoy los Gobiernos de todas las naciones promueven y apoyan campañas en pro de la naturaleza; en estas campañas no se incluye al animal doméstico (como si este no fuese también naturaleza)” (Alonso) (today the governments of all nations promote and support campaigns in defense of nature; in these campaigns domestic animals are not included [as if they were not a part of nature]). Had they been heard, these women could tell their “discontented” male comrades a few things about the alienation of humanity from nature.

The Triumph of “Quality of Life”

Once the question of who controlled the use of resources was taken out of the equation, very few could dispute the need for a development consistent with an improving “quality of life.” It was the Falange that dominated that debate. The Falangista intellectuals had kept a varying distance from things that Franco was doing in the 1960s. Some, like Dionisio Ridruejo, passed on into the opposition and found themselves in jail. Others stayed with the regime and became its commentators and occasional critics. Since the technocrats fell out of favor in 1969, the Falange’s role in the government was on the rise, and so was the importance of their opinions. In the early 1970s, one of the Falangistas’ most important causes became the defense of “quality of life” against the “quantity of possessions” (“Calidad de la vida”). Thanks to their efforts, the environment-based European definition of “quality of life” that initially triumphed in Spain was supplanted by a new, synthetic definition: an effect of a guided state policy, elaborated in the United States.
In the summer of 1972, while the delegates of the Stockholm Conference were debating the future of development, Franco’s old-time literary adviser Manuel Aznar sensed that a paradigmatic shift was approaching: “se presienta que los pueblos rectores de la evolución del mundo quieren organizar y aplicar todas las fuerzas de la ciencia y de la técnica de manera que sirvan de acrecentamiento de la ‘calidad de vivir’” (18) (one can feel that the nations who lead the world evolution want to organize and apply all forces of science and technology to raise the “quality of life”). Aznar wrote this in a preface to an ambitious publication: a coffee-table-sized album of bird’s-eye views of Spain with texts collected from Spanish writers, some of whom had only recently been officially rehabilitated. Although published by the Dirección General de Promoción del Turismo, this was, however, a volume in Spanish for the domestic market; after publication, all newspapers had to run a press release introducing the book and glorifying its relevance. Its main objective was to explain the 1970s version of tourism to the new generation of Spaniards, and Aznar was charged with finding, in the incoherent array of posttechnocratic policies, a unifying direction—or inventing it. He did so using the rancid colonial metaphor of a feminized land awaiting a conqueror: “La ‘calidad de vida’ ha de ser obra vuestra, españoles jóvenes. Ahí tenéis a España, aguardándoos. Miradla desde el tejado de las nubes, desde el alto cielo, y llegaréis mejor al entendimiento de vuestra empresa: más claramente alcanzaréis el horizonte de vuestra misión” (20) (“Quality of life” has to be yours, young Spaniards. Here is Spain, waiting for you. Look at her from the platform of clouds, from the high sky, to better grasp your task: to see clearly your mission’s horizon).

If the technocrats were trying to work around the European environmentalism in their version of “quality of life,” the Falangista thinkers such as Aznar relied on the visions of society coming from America. So Aznar’s prospects for Spain were grounded in the work of the futurists Herman Kahn, Anthony J. Wiener (1967), and Alvin Toffler (1970), who predicted that a technological revolution would spur a radical rupture with the past (18). The conclusions that Aznar derived from this fact, however, were closer to the 1930s dusty eschatology than to science fiction. If change was coming, he claimed, then the dream of a “social” state could come true because the growing economic prosperity would make spiritual pursuits relevant again:

El grito será, si no lo es ya, “conquistemos una vida de mayor plenitud”. Lo cual no equivale a pedir “mayor comodidad”, ni “más amplio confort”, ni siquiera “una riqueza más abundante” para un bienestar material más completo, sino que se pretende añadir a la vida valores más altos. “La calidad de vida” implica el retorno
a estimativas mucho más exigentes y a la reinvención de estímulos de cultura, de anhelos espirituales, de satisfacciones de los sentidos y de incitaciones morales que proyectándose sobre la personalidad del hombre lo exalten y enriquezcan.

(The war cry will be, if not yet, “let us conquer a life of greater plenitude.” It is not the same as asking for “enhanced convenience,” or “more comfort,” or even for a “greater prosperity” to achieve a more complete material wellbeing. It is, rather, about adding higher values to life. “Quality of life” implies a return to applying much stricter estimates and to reinventing cultural stimuli, spiritual quests, and a satisfaction of moral senses and challenges that would glorify and enrich the human personality onto which they are projected.)

Hence while Aznar’s version of “quality of life” polemically targeted the technocratic materialism, it was, nevertheless, no more nature-friendly than the machine simulated “biosphere” that tourism officials like Sanchez Bella were envisioning at that time. The only difference was that Aznar was essentially proposing a return to the Falangista 1930s ideal of a “new man.”

The Falangistas did not reject economic growth any more than their technocratic opponents: their anti-prosperity language simply reflected a need to harvest political benefits from the uneven distribution of income during the desarrollismo. A spiritually-enhanced concept of “quality of life” was a tool for achieving this goal. The interesting part of this story, however, is that the “quality of life” that the Falangistas put on Spain’s banners was consistent with the “eight social areas” of the policy elaborated by U.S. experts at the end of 1972: “health; education; employment; income; housing and physical environment; leisure and recreation; public safety and legal justice; and population” (Quality of Life 20). The Falangista debates took shape in the press at the same time when these tenets were being elaborated—the end of 1972—making it difficult to trace a direct connection. Yet the similarities between the “quality of life” as a bundle of quantifiable variables of relevance for policymakers and the Falangista idea of “quality” as a set of social programs are striking. So, too, are the differences between this line of thought and the European definition of “quality of life” that the Spanish technocrats were using. While European politicians defined “quality of life” as synonymous with a well-preserved environment, the new multi-factor definition reversed this relationship, making the human understanding of the environment inseparable from how “quality of life” was defined. The reports of the 1972 meeting in Virginia directly stated that “a wide range of policy issues, both domestic and international, that relate to the envi-
enronment may well be determined by considerations based on what man considers an adequate level of quality of life" (Quality of Life II-10, italics in original).

For the Falangista thinkers, this also became the foundational concept on which to ground their project of a "social state." Jesús Vasallo, a writer who at the time directed the Prensa del Movimiento, aptly summed up this position when he stated that neither "per capita rent," nor "el aumento de las unidades de consumo nos dirán nada en el orden del espíritu, si no mejoramos también la calidad de la vida del hombre. La educación, la sanidad, la cultura, el ocio, la formación profesional y un ambiente sano han de estar al alcance de todos. De lo contrario, podríamos dejar de llamarnos ya sociales" ("El reto del desarrollo regional") (the rising units of consumption would [not] tell us anything about the spiritual realm if we do not also improve the quality of human life, education, healthcare, culture, leisure, professional formation, and healthy environment have to be at everyone’s reach. Otherwise, we can stop calling ourselves "social [thinkers and politicians]"). With the rise of the new language, the technocrat tourism ministers found themselves alone in their attempts to reconcile development with the responsible use of resources because, outside of the tourism context, the environment did not seem to be an issue. "Quality of life," the triumphant concept, dominated Spain’s 1972 Economic Development Plan, gave sense to regional planning, and even merited its own convention: a National Biennial Quality Congress.

The same synthetic formula of "una justa distribución de la riqueza y del bienestar, de la cultura y del ocio, de la salud y de la calidad de la vida (a fair distribution of prosperity and wellbeing, of culture and leisure, of health and quality of life)," as José Utrera Molina, the Falangista President del Movimiento in Franco’s last (1974) government, had it ("Vivimos en una época de subversión total"), became the slogan of the dictatorship’s final years. In December 1974, looking at Spain’s Development Plan for 1975, Ramiro Campos Nordmann, a professor of economics who used to support technocratic expansion, concluded that “quality of life” defeated the desarrollismo when he stated that Spanish planners acquired a vision of "mayor bienestar con independencia del desarrollo por el desarrollo .... Hoy ya afortunadamente en nuestro país preocupa el medio ambiente sereno y la calidad de la vida, y en algunos casos, priman sobre otras consideraciones" (5) (a greater well-being independent of development for development’s sake. . . . Thankfully, today in our country tranquil environment and quality of life are what we care about—in some cases, above and beyond all other considerations). Campos Nordmann’s optimistic conclusion referred directly to the social policy of well-being coming from the United States: Paul Samuelson’s theory of “net economic product,” which Cam-
pos Nordmann characteristically translated as the "Bienestar Económico Neto" (net economic well-being).

In Franco’s Spain, the winning concept of "quality of life" was, therefore, a flexible notion that combined the Falangista ideal of social justice with the American approach to happiness as a social policy. It no longer had as its cornerstone the European standard of responsible use of environmental resources. The same strikingly ubiquitous development, however, can be traced in the rest of Europe and on all sides of the ideological spectrum. In 1974, French Socialist President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing created a post for a Minister of Quality of Life, a fact widely commented on in the Spanish press. More surprisingly, considering Spain’s specific historical conditions, the old-school antibourgeois thrust of the Falangista thinking stroke a note similar to the spirit of the communist opposition. In the Spanish underground, the Partido Socialista Unificado de Cataluña, the Catalan Communist Party that had not rejected Marxism-Leninism or followed Santiago Carrillo on the path to Eurocommunism, used very similar language to justify the need for a social revolution. The only difference was that Catalan communists had their own alienation to fight—they claimed national sovereignty for Catalonia:

La supresión de los vestigios feudales, la consecución de las libertades nacionales de Cataluña, la consolidación de la democracia, una profunda reforma de la enseñanza, de la sanidad, la mejora de la calidad de la vida, son objetivos urgentes que sólo podrán ser alcanzados mediante una revolución social que ponga las bases del socialismo, régimen basado en la socialización de los principales medios de producción y de cambio que permite abolir la explotación del hombre por el hombre. ("La situación política y las tareas del P.S.U.C.")

(The suppression of the remains of feudalism, the achievement of national liberties for Cataluña, the consolidation of democracy, a deep reform of education and health care, the improvement of quality of life are aims that can be achieved only through a social revolution establishing the foundations of socialism, a regime grounded in the socialization of the main means of production and exchange, that would end the exploitation of man by man.)

Indeed, not even the most radical ideological opposition could offer an alternative to the “quality of life” politics.

How did these changes affect tourism, the sector where the environmentalist definition of "quality of life" initially took off? There, too, the term was quickly recast as a social issue only marginally related to the environment. The
ability to offer pristine landscapes was, of course, important because it resulted in a more expensive tourism product. Yet the definition of “tourism” was departing from the meaning it had in the 1960s (the hospitality business) to become something that Spaniards could also consume: leisure. Fernando Llián, who succeeded Sánchez Bella as Tourism Minister in 1973, defined new tourism as “la posibilidad de escoger y disfrutar efectivamente del tiempo libre” (the possibility to choose and effectively enjoy free time) and a principal component of “quality of life” (“El Ministro de Información y turismo inauguró”). As leisure, tourism became a matter of social policy. In October 1973, the Dirección General de la Promoción del Turismo was replaced by a new structure, the Dirección General de la Ordenación del Turismo, a name that heralded that planning ideal. On the surface, its program was not too far removed from the tasks of the previous Ministry: raising the quality of tourism product and expanding the activity away from the coasts. On a deeper level, however, it signaled a new approach: the major factor affecting the nation’s wellbeing was now the tourism activity of the domestic population, rather than income from foreign visitors. “El desarrollo de un pueblo es paralelo al de su turismo interior (a nation’s development is parallel to that of her interior tourism),” stated the new General Director, Francisco Javier Carvajal, invoking the idea of the “social state” and proclaiming the need for “planteamiento diferenciado del turismo interior por edades, profesiones o incluso ‘deseabilidades’” (a differentiated approach to interior tourism by age, profession, and even “preference”) that would ensure that “cada cual encuentre el turismo justo que necesite” (“Nueva Dirección General de Ordenación del Turismo”) (everyone finds the type of tourism that they need). Regional planning, niche tourism, and leisure would survive beyond that short-lived government and Francoism itself and would become the three foundational blocks of Spain’s Transition.

Conclusions

The debates analyzed here had nothing to do with the “ecology of the poor” (coined by José Martínez Alier) or any other form of contestation normally associated with anti-capitalist activism. Rather, this was an official environmentalism that different pressure groups exploited for their own needs in order to secure their political or economic power while also prolonging Franco’s dictatorship beyond the life of Franco himself. This story of Spain’s environmentalism gradually subsumed under “quality of life” should therefore read as a cautionary tale about capitalism producing a puppet version of its enemy and a
script according to which the threats to humanity can be cured with more capitalism, provided it includes the interests of local businesses. It was this context of a late dictatorship that entrusted its economic stability to tourism that makes it so difficult for a present-day reader to tell a dissident from a loyalist. Some of the opinions reflected the positions of the supporters of the 1961–1969 desarrollo, losing power. Other views were backed by the social-corporate opposition to that experiment coming from the “camisas viejas.” Only the third, at the time the least visible, group inspired by the Communist and Euro-Communist programs uncovered the complicity between the regime, capital, and Spain’s territorial structure; but this group also used the policy outcomes coined in the United States.

Before Michel Foucault and his followers developed the notion of “biopolitics,” it was easier to understand the alienating effects of the official environmentalism than to find fault with “quality of life.” In Spain, it did not take long for the intellectuals to uncover environmentalism’s neo-liberal or “neo-capitalist,” as it was then called, thrust. One of the most radical denouncements was made in 1979. It belonged to Alfonso Pérez Agote Poveda (at present, professor of sociology at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid), who stated: “el peligro de una catástrofe producida por la ruptura del sistema ecológico desdibuja las contradicciones del sistema social. El enemigo—y el amigo a encontrar—es la Naturaleza... No es la catástrofe futura, sino el peligro actual de la catástrofe futura lo que funciona como integrador del sistema social.” (11) (The danger of a catastrophic rupture of the ecological system overshadows the contradictions of the social system. The enemy—and the future friend—is nature... It is not a future catastrophe, but rather the present danger of a future catastrophe that works as the social system’s integrating force).

As to “quality of life,” after Franco’s death it only acquired greater relevance. An early statement of the transitional government promised that:

el Gobierno dirigirá su política hacia los grandes objetivos sociales y económicos de conseguir para todos los españoles, incluso los hoy emigrados de la Patria, un puesto de trabajo asegurado; el reparto de las cargas y sacrificios de forma equitativa, pero con especial atención a protección de los más débiles; y la consolidación y avance de los niveles de bienestar y calidad de vida. . . . (“Declaración del gobierno” 2)

(the government will aim its policies at the grand social and economic objectives of achieving, for all Spaniards, even those who are today in immigration, a secure job; a distribution of obligations and sacrifices, paying special attention to
protecting the weakest; and consolidation and improvement of the levels of well-being and quality of life. . . .

The term's scope of usage also expanded. The Central Committee of Spain's newly-legalized Communist Party, the Partido Comunista Español (PCE), trumpeted the falling quality of life as a sign of an imminent social overturn; still, it used the language of the American policy indicators: "la enseñanza, la sanidad, la vivienda, el urbanismo, y, en general, la calidad de la vida" ("El PC rechaza el proyecto de pseudemocracia otorgada") (education, health care, housing, urban development, and quality of life in general). In the heat of the electoral campaign, PCE consistently cited "las mil deficiencias de la calidad de la vida bajo el capitalismo" (the thousand and one deficiencies in quality of life under capitalism) to bring out the voters (Martín 2). But it was hard to win a battle whose slogans appeared on everyone's banners. The sub-secretary for the interior market aspired to "una sociedad nueva y distinta que desea para todos iguales posibilidades y, por otro lado, una calidad de los productos creciente que permita satisfacer las aspiraciones permanentes y crecientes de mejora en la calidad de la vida" ("Los consumidores") (a new and different society that seeks for everyone equal opportunities and, on the other hand, an improving quality of products that could satisfy permanent and growing aspirations for improving quality of life). King Juan Carlos argued: "El verdadero progreso es irrealizable en la escala social, si no se perfecciona a calidad de la vida humana" ("Jornada de los reyes en Stuttgart") (the real progress is not realizable on a social scale if the quality of human life does not improve). Meanwhile, private companies and banks reformulated their statutes to add "quality of life" to their mission ("Hidroeléctrica Española"). During the debates about the draft of the 1978 Constitution, the article on the environment, centered on the notion of quality of life, suffered many amendments ("Numerosas enmiendas"). It is only logical, then, that the concept appears three times in the Constitution's final version and still has many supporters and believers today.

The analysis here of the "quality of life" ideologies helps to elucidate the complexities of the dictatorship's endgame. Yet crucially, the dialectic of Marxism, neoliberalism, and postfascism underpinning these debates did not evaporate after Francoism. Revealing the early steps of neoliberalism in Spain, these debates are still affecting the present-day understanding of life and the environment. The 1972–1975 version of environmental protection as tourism quickly became obsolete. Still, rather than lose relevance, tourism recast as "quality of life" became a lasting part of the Francoist heritage—or, shall we say, baggage—responsible for many values that were eventually ratified during the
Transition and Democracy and heralded, especially, by the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) trend of leftism. Among the values underpinned by such a pseudo-environmentalism we find, not only sustainability, but also and more ominously, beauty and leisure, which remained in the foundation of post-Franco politics of all political colors. We are still unwittingly suffering the consequences of that version of environmentalism.

Notes

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1. The year when Manuel Fraga Iribarne was appointed the Minister of Information and Tourism.


3. Conversely, the editor in Tenerife did not even understand the concept of the "defensa del entorno" and the advertising appeared under the military-sounding title "Turismo y la defensa del contorno" ("Más de siete millones de folletos"). Tenerife suffered from unsustainable tourism development, and the pun could have been intended.

4. Historians of the 1960s and early 1970s list Carlos de Zayas, the future PSOE Deputy for the Balearic Islands, as a "young socialist" and a PCE-infiltrated member of FLP (McDermott, 966, and Chust Calero and Broseta, 146).

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“Más de siete millones de folletos y dos millones de carteles, para la promoción del turismo español y defensa del contorno.” *El Día* (Tenerife), 14 April 1973.


