The Assumption of All Humanity in Saint Hilary of Poitiers' Tractatus super Psalmos

Ellen Scully  
*Marquette University*

Follow this and additional works at: [https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu](https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu)

Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons

**Recommended Citation**

[https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/95](https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/95)
THE ASSUMPTION OF ALL HUMANITY IN SAINT HILARY OF POITIERS’
TRACTATUS SUPER PSALMOS

by

Ellen Scully

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School,
Marquette University,
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

May 2011
ABSTRACT

THE ASSUMPTION OF ALL HUMANITY IN SAINT HILARY OF POITIERS’
TRACTATUS SUPER PSALMOS

Ellen Scully
Marquette University, 2011

In this dissertation, I focus on the soteriological understanding of the fourth-century theologian Hilary of Poitiers as manifested in his underappreciated Tractatus super Psalmos. Hilary offers an understanding of salvation in which Christ saves humanity by assuming every single person into his body in the incarnation. My dissertation contributes to scholarship on Hilary in two ways.

First, I demonstrate that Hilary’s teaching concerning Christ’s assumption of all humanity is a unique development of Latin sources. Because of his understanding of Christ’s assumption of all humanity, Hilary, along with several Greek fathers, has been accused of heterodoxy resulting from Greek Platonic influence. I demonstrate that Hilary is not influenced by Platonism; rather, though his redemption model is unique among the early Latin fathers, he derives his theology from a combination of Latin-influenced biblical exegesis and classical Roman themes.

Second, this teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity is a prominent part of Hilary’s entire theological system and so illustrates the unified nature of his theology. The implications of this aspect of Hilary’s thought expand into nearly every realm of his theology: in the course of this dissertation, I address the areas of soteriology, Christology, eschatology, ecclesiology and Trinitarian theology. Modern Hilary scholarship is defined by a method that approaches Hilary’s theology according to narrow and anachronistic categories of study and results in a negative appraisal of Hilary’s theological contribution. This dissertation, in working with a unified method, serves as a corrective to the standard scholarly approach to Hilary and offers a more positive evaluation of his theology.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Ellen Scully

I would like to thank the Marquette University Theology department for their help and support over the years, my board members—Dr. John Cavadini, Rev. Joseph Mueller, S.J., and Dr. Ralph Del Colle—for their patient and diligent reading, and especially my dissertation director Dr. Michel Barnes. Certainly in the process of writing this dissertation, Dr. Barnes taught me what good research looks like. I also am extremely grateful to my husband Jason Scully who served as my second pair of eyes for every part of this dissertation.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................................................. i

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1
   The Debate: Hilary’s Relationship to the Greek “Physicalist” Doctrine ............................................. 7
   Biographical Details of Hilary’s Life That Shed Light on the Debate .............................................. 14
   The Results of the Debate: Neglect of Hilary’s Teaching ................................................................. 23
   The Ramifications of Christ’s Assumption of All Humanity in Hilary’s Teaching ............................ 27
   The Trinitarian Implications ................................................................................................................. 30
   Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 31

CHAPTER 2: THE CONTEXT OF, AND INFLUENCES UPON, HILARY’S SOTERIOLOGY .................. 35
   Hilary’s Appropriation of Greek Philosophy ..................................................................................... 36
      Prior to his Exile ................................................................................................................................. 36
      After his Exile .................................................................................................................................. 41
   Hilary’s Relationship with Greek Theology ...................................................................................... 42
      Irenaeus and Athanasius .................................................................................................................. 42
      Origen and Eusebius of Caesarea .................................................................................................... 44
   The Influence of Latin Stoicism on Hilary’s Conception of the Unity of Humanity .......................... 53
   Latin Theological Context for Hilary’s Physicalist Model of Redemption ........................................... 57
   Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 65

CHAPTER 3: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HILARY’S CHRISTOLOGY AND SOTERIOLOGY .... 67
   Hilary’s Three-Stage Christology in the Framework of Philippians ................................................. 67
   “Christology” as a Double Category .................................................................................................. 76
   The Physicalist Model of Redemption in the Thought of Hilary ...................................................... 79
   The Physicalist Model in the *In Matthaeum*: Refutation of Platonic Influence ................................ 86
   The Physicalist Model in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* ................................................................. 91
   Latin Atonement Theory? The Importance of the Suffering and Death of Christ in Hilary’s Redemption Model ............................................................................................................... 93
   Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 101

CHAPTER 4: THE ASSUMPTION OF ALL HUMANITY ................................................................. 104
   The Prerequisite: The Anterior Unity of Humanity .......................................................................... 105
   The Pauline Adam-Christ Parallel ..................................................................................................... 107
   The New Unity in Christ’s Body .......................................................................................................... 115
   Christ the Mediator and the Double Creation of Man ....................................................................... 122
   Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 132
CHAPTER 5: ESCHATOLOGICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ASSUMPTION OF ALL HUMANITY ................................................................. 134
  The Contours of Hilary’s Eschatology .............................................................. 136
  Christ’s Inheritance ......................................................................................... 139
  1 Corinthians 15 as the Scriptural Frame for Hilary’s Eschatology ............... 143
  The Eternal Priesthood of Christ ..................................................................... 145
  The Resurrection of the Body: From Corruption to Incorruption ................. 150
  Salvation is of Both Body and Soul ................................................................. 153
  The Heavenly City of Jerusalem; The Celestial Zion ..................................... 157
  Heaven and the Divine Indwelling .................................................................. 160
  Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 160

CHAPTER 6: ECCLESIOLOGICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ASSUMPTION OF ALL HUMANITY ................................................................. 164
  The Development of Hilary’s Ecclesiology and its Dependence on the
  Assumption of All Humanity ........................................................................... 165
  The Relationship of Soteriology and Ecclesiology in the In Matthaeum .... 166
  The Role of the Church and Sacraments ......................................................... 168
  Ecclesial Images in the In Matthaeum .............................................................. 172
  The Younger Supplants the Elder in the Tractatus super Psalmos: The
  Universality of the Church ............................................................................. 176
  The Creation of Eve as Prefigurement of the Church in the Tractatus
  Mysteriorum and the Tractatus super Psalmos ............................................ 179
  The Church as Body of Christ in the Tractatus super Psalmos ..................... 183
  The Expansion of Hilary’s Christocentric Soteriology to Include the Holy
  Spirit ................................................................................................................ 192
  Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 197

CHAPTER 7: HILARY’S PATERCENTRIC THEOLOGY: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOTERIOLOGY AND TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY ...................... 199
  Hilary’s Trinitarian Vocabulary: Persona, Nomen, and Natura ................. 203
  The Place of the Holy Spirit in Hilary’s Trinitarian Theology ....................... 215
  The Eternal Relationship of the Father and the Son in the De Trinitate and
  the Tractatus super Psalmos ............................................................................ 217
  The Temporal Mediation of the Son ................................................................. 227
  The Implications of the Assumption of All Humanity in Hilary’s Trinitarian
  Theology: Seeing God ..................................................................................... 233
  Hilary’s Patercentric Theology ..................................................................... 239
  Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 245

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 248
  Hilary’s Teaching of Christ’s Assumption of All Humanity is Neither
  Imported from the East nor Inherited from the West ..................................... 248
  Hilary’s Teaching of Christ’s Assumption of All Humanity Demonstrates
  the Unified Nature of his Theological System .......................................... 249
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Standard Scholarly Perception of Hilary is Driven by a Divisive Method of Study</th>
<th>251</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A New (Unified) Method Leads to a New Perception</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What does Hilary Have to Offer?</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilary’s Contribution to the Historian</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilary’s Contribution to the Theologian</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BIBLIOGRAPHY | 260 |
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is centered on Hilary’s soteriological teaching in the Tractatus super Psalmos that Christ assumes all of humanity bodily in the incarnation.

In this introduction, first I will discuss the scholarly debate that swirls around this physicalist doctrine of Christ’s assumption of all humanity found both in Hilary and in several Greek Fathers.

Second, I will show that this debate, which has tainted the doctrine of Christ’s assumption of all humanity with the outmoded and disproven charge of heterodoxy, has led to a neglect of the presence and importance of this doctrine in Hilary’s christology, soteriology, eschatology and ecclesiology.

Third, I will address how scholarly rejection of the importance of Christ’s assumption of all humanity in Hilary’s soteriological system has led to a corresponding difficulty in synthesizing these aspects of Hilary’s thought with his Trinitarian theology.

Hilary has long been recognized for his Trinitarian contribution in the post-Nicene Arian controversy. He has traditionally been hailed as the “Athanasius of the West” for, like Athanasius, he is seen as the defender of Nicene orthodoxy. Yet, as far back as the middle ages and beyond, we find another stream of thought that accuses Hilary of heterodoxy, not as regards his Trinitarian theology, rather in respect to his christology and the redemption that comes to us through Christ.1 In this dissertation I will deal with Hilary’s problematic assertion that the incarnation is Christ’s assumption of all humanity. In brief, Hilary says that Christ does not simply assume a body or a nature like ours, but rather, in the incarnation Christ assumes all of humanity, that is, each one of us into his body. For Hilary, the incarnation is not just the taking on of flesh, it is

---

1 Most immediately troubling of Hilary’s statements concerning Christ are those dealing with his capacity for suffering and pain. Less than one hundred years after his death, Claudianus Mamertus (De Statu Animae, PL 53.752B) accused Hilary of undermining the truth of Christ’s passion and death. Bonaventure, Albert, and Thomas were likewise troubled and Hilary has in modern times suffered the charge of Docetism. See Carl Beckwith, “Suffering without Pain,” in In the Shadow of the Incarnation: Essays on Jesus Christ in the Early Church in Honor of Brian E. Daley, S.J, ed. Peter W. Martens (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 71-96. A second issue is that which will be the subject of this dissertation, namely, the relationship of the humanity of Christ with humanity in general. As we shall find later in this chapter, modern scholars believe incorrectly that Erasmus began the critique of Hilary’s theology on this topic. In fact, the critique did not begin until the nineteenth-century.
the taking on of all flesh: “…the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, indeed assuming into himself the nature of all human kind.”

This dissertation will be a historical investigation into the centrality of this incarnational premise of Christ’s assumption of all humanity in Hilary’s soteriological thought—which includes its natural extensions into the realms of eschatology and ecclesiology—and his Trinitarian theology. First, because of the history of accusations and misunderstandings connected with this incarnational theology, I will reevaluate the Greek and Latin aspects of, and precedents for, such a theology. This reevaluation will show that Hilary’s teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity is not the result of Platonic influence. Second, I will show that Christ’s “assumption of all humanity” is an integral part of Hilary’s christology and indeed renders coherence to his soteriology, eschatology and ecclesiology. Third, I will seek to synthesize this soteriological matrix with Hilary’s Trinitarian theology through this same incarnational premise of Christ’s assumption of all humanity. I will accomplish this project by working from the Latin text of Hilary’s *Tractatus super Psalmos*, with reference to his other works.

Because of the scholarly controversy—thought to have begun with Erasmus and culminating in the 19th-century—surrounding Hilary’s teaching on the incarnation, 20th-century scholarship on Hilary has been hesitant to engage with Hilary’s theology of

---

2 Hilary, *Tractatus super Psalmos* (henceforth *Tr. ps.*) 51.17 (CCL 61 104.5-6): …quia *Verbum caro factum est et inhabitauit in nobis*, naturam scilicet in se totius humani generis adsu mens…. See also *Tr. ps.* 51.16 (CCL 61 104.21): …naturam in se uniuersae carnis adsumpsit.... All Latin quotations of the *Tractatus super Psalmos* are taken from the three-volume critical edition by Jean Doignon in the *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina* published in 1997, 2002, and 2009 (CCL 61, 61A, 61B). The first volume contains the *Instructio Psalmorum* and psalms 1-41, the second volume psalm 118, and the final volume covers psalms 119-150. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. My style of translation is literal in order to make, as much as possible, the English transparent to the Latin, so that the reader can see through my translation to Hilary’s own words. Whenever possible, I have translated important Latin terms consistently with the same word into English.
Christ’s assumption of all humanity in the incarnation. Congar,\(^3\) Blasich,\(^4\) and Wild\(^5\) explicitly deny that Hilary teaches that Christ assumes all men in the incarnation. The studies of Doignon,\(^6\) Gastaldi,\(^7\) Galtier,\(^8\) Iacoangeli,\(^9\) Pelland,\(^10\) Anyanwu,\(^11\) Buffer,\(^12\) Fierro,\(^13\) and McHugh,\(^14\) whose purview should have included Hilary’s teaching on Christ’s assumption of all humanity, simply ignore the presence of this teaching in Hilary’s thought. Out of these, some simply do not mention this teaching (Gastaldi, Galtier, Pelland, Iacoangeli, McHugh), others allow that Hilary does indeed teach Christ’s assumption of all humanity but do not consider it worthy of much attention.

---


\(^12\) Thomas Buffer, *Salus in St. Hilary of Poitiers*, (Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 2002).


(Anyanwu, Buffer, Fierro), and Doignon remains silent on the issue, though his translation of the critical passage from the *In Matthaeum*—“Erat in Iesu Christo homo totus…”¹⁵—as “Il y avait en Jésus-Christ totalement un homme” seems to demonstrate his denial of the presence of this teaching in Hilary’s thought.¹⁶

There are several scholars who both realize the presence of, and devote some time to exploring, Hilary’s teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity. These include Burns,¹⁷ Ladaria,¹⁸ Mersch,¹⁹ Petorelli,²⁰ Orazzo,²¹ Lécuyer,²² Rondeau,²³ Charlier,²⁴ Colautti,²⁵ and de Margerie.²⁶ Of these, Burns is the only one to explore possible historical precedents for this aspect of Hilarian thought.²⁷ Nevertheless, in the works of

---

¹⁵ In Matt. 2.5 (SC 254 108.2-3).
²⁷ For a discussion of the debate concerning the presence of this teaching in Hilary’s work and its relationship (or rather, lack thereof) to Greek theological and philosophical thought, see Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 97-101.
all these authors, Hilary’s incarnational teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity is of secondary interest. As yet there remains no study primarily dedicated to this topic.

This silence does little justice to Hilary or the coherence of his doctrinal system. Any scholarly treatment of Hilary’s christology, soteriology, eschatology, or ecclesiology (that is, what I will call Hilary’s soteriological matrix) inevitably makes the same point: Hilary’s thought on these topics is so intricately connected that a treatment of one, of necessity, speaks about all the others. Christ’s assumption of all humanity is such a central soteriological point for Hilary that it is quite impossible to understand his soteriology without it. Moreover, I would argue that the assumption of all humanity serves as the tie between Hilary’s christology, soteriology, eschatology and ecclesiology. In brief, the assumption of all humanity (christology) entails the presence of each of us is in Christ’s body. The result of this presence is that Christ’s resurrection is our resurrection (soteriology) and his glorification is our glorification, divinization, and divine filiation (eschatology). Furthermore, the assumption of all humanity means that the Church is the body of Christ (ecclesiology). Hilary understands this equation between the Church and Christ’s body not in an analogical fashion but as a physical reality.

A reading of Hilary’s statements about Christ’s assumption of all humanity as Hilary’s assertion of the physical reality of the connection between Christ and humanity draws together his soteriology, eschatology, and ecclesiology into a cohesive whole. The key to understanding Hilary is recognizing the nuances of his conception of our incorporation in the body of Christ. If anything, Hilary is far less spiritual and far more physical than we have tended to give him credit for.
Understanding Hilary in terms of his teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity has another benefit. Not only does this angle give greater coherence to his soteriological matrix; it also manifests the unity of Hilary’s entire theological thought system by showing the unity between Hilary’s soteriology and his Trinitarian theology. While the previous generation of Hilary scholars focused on Hilary’s Trinitarian thought, the present generation is devoting most of its energy to his soteriological matrix. As yet there are virtually no unified presentations in Hilary scholarship of the whole of his theology. There is a working synthesis of Hilary’s christology, soteriology, eschatology and ecclesiology, but it is extremely rare to find a working synthesis of these areas of thought with Hilary’s Trinitarian theology.28

Hilary’s teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity ties the soteriological matrix into his Trinitarian theology by showing the historic realization of the Word’s eternal role as mediator of the Father. Only by assuming all humanity can Christ be the perfect mediator between God and all mankind.

Therefore, I have set myself the task of explaining Hilary’s theology of the incarnation as it is centered upon Christ’s assumption of all humanity. I seek to show that Christ’s assumption of all humanity is an integral part of Hilary’s soteriology and is also the premise that connects all the various aspects of Hilarian thought, including the Trinitarian.

English-language scholarship has for the most part been interested in Hilary’s Trinitarian theology and as a result has focused mainly on his De Trinitate, but there is

28 The one work that explicitly achieves a working synthesis of Hilary’s thought is Fierro, Sobre la gloria. Fierro uses the notion of glory to achieve this synthesis; I will use that of Christ’s assumption of all humanity.
developing in Europe an interest in both Hilary’s soteriological framework and, correspondingly, his *Tractatus super Psalmos*. Furthermore, because this incarnational model of the assumption of all humanity, though present in his earlier works, reveals itself most clearly in Hilary’s later work, the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, this work will serve as the center for my study of Hilary’s soteriology.

**THE DEBATE: HILARY’S RELATIONSHIP TO THE GREEK “PHYSICALIST” DOCTRINE**

Hilary’s christology departs from traditional Latin christology in that he regularly asserts that Christ assumes all of humanity. Progressively more misleading readings of a short, undeveloped thought in Erasmus’ preface to his edition of Hilary in 1523 have given rise to the belief that Erasmus begins a tradition of considering Hilary’s extended theory of the incarnation to be heterodox. Coustant, in his edition of Hilary’s works in 1693, cites this line of Erasmus: “Among other places, in the eighth book of the *De Trinitate*, he [Hilary] defends with great vehemence that we also are one with the Son and the Father by nature, and not by adoption or consensus alone.”29 Coustant, realizing that Erasmus’ critique is centered upon Hilary’s explanation in *De Trinitate* 9 of our unity with Christ in the Eucharist, nevertheless uses his response to Erasmus as the means to move into a theological explanation of our natural unity with Christ due to his assumption of all humanity. Coustant’s train of thought—more than that of Erasmus—is followed by

---

McMahon and Burns. Burns cites this same quotation from Erasmus and explains it thus: “Erasmus questioned the orthodoxy of Hilary for his alleged failure to distinguish Christ’s union with his individual humanity from his union with all men.” However, this is a misleading reading of Erasmus who is indeed worried about distinguishing between different kinds of unions—but precisely between the union of the Son with the Father and the union of the Son and the Father with us; Erasmus never mentions that Hilary does not specifically distinguish between the Son’s union with his own proper humanity and with all humanity: this is the impression a reading of Coustant will give, but is not from Erasmus himself. We must therefore conclude that the tradition of the critique ascribed to Erasmus by McMahon and Burns ought, at best, be ascribed to Coustant, writing one hundred and seventy years later.

A better documented tradition of critique is found with the German liberal Protestant scholars of the 19th-century. Beginning with Albrecht Ritschl in 1870, then followed by Wilhelm Herrmann in 1875, and Adolph von Harnack in 1889, these scholars direct against several Greek Fathers, most prominently Irenaeus, Athanasius,

30 See John McMahon, De Christo mediatore: Doctrina Sancti Hilarii Pictaviensis (Mundelein: Pontificia Facultas Theologica seminarii sanctae Mariae ad Lacum, Dissertationes ad lauream 15, 1947), 9; Burns, Christology in Hilary, 97.
31 Burns, Christology in Hilary, 97.
32 Albrecht Ritschl, A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, trans. H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macaulay (Edinburgh; T and T. Clark, 1900), 8, 524. Ritschl, like Harnack, is concerned that the “mystical doctrine of reconciliation” views the redemption of the human race as a sort of chemical-physiological process and in so doing neglects the aspect of the will which is fundamental for an understanding of reconciliation. Thus, he says that the understanding of the title “redeemer” of Christ “in the period of patristic theology…received an erroneous, purely dramatic, thoroughly non-ethical application” (4).
33 See Wilhelm Herrmann, Gregorii Nysseni sententiae de salute adipiscenda (Halle, 1875), especially 27-37.
34 Adolph von Harnack, History of Dogma 3, trans. Neil Buchanan (New York, 1961), 288-303. Harnack’s explanation of the theology of Gregory of Nyssa is quite clear and often quoted: “Christ did not assume the human nature of an individual person, but human nature” (297). Harnack views Gregory’s conception of this process of unity with the divine as problematic because it is strictly natural or physical rather than ethical.
Gregory of Nyssa and Cyril of Alexandria, the same accusation that Erasmus was believed to have leveled at Hilary. 35 They attribute to these Fathers a theory of universal incarnation that views redemption as an automatic physical transformation, resulting from Christ’s assumption and redemption of the general nature of the human race. 36 They view this understanding of redemption as wrong, for, eliminating any idea of moral transformation and thus reconciliation with God, it entails neither justification nor sanctification. Furthermore, von Harnack adds to this 19th-century critique of Greek physicalist doctrine by including the charge that this Christian heterodoxy is the result of Platonic influence. 37 Christ’s assumption of all humanity, he says, is understood by the Greek Fathers as Christ’s assumption of the idea of humanity, that is, universal or generic humanity. This “Greek” understanding of the incarnation is, as von Harnack argues, the

35 The critiques advanced by these theologians are discussed in Karl Holl, *Amphilochius von Ikonium in seinem Verhältnis zu den grossen Kappadoziern* (Tübingen and Leipzig: J. C. B. Mohr, 1904), 222-25; McMahon, *De Christo Mediatore*, 80-85; Jean-Pierre Jossua, *Le Salut: Incarnation ou mystère pascal, chez les Pères de l’Église de saint Irénée à saint Léon le Grand* (Paris: Le Cerf, 1968), 13-44; and Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 97-101. Jossua’s discussion is the most complete though each of these discussions is, unfortunately, marred by inaccuracy or poor citation. For example, Holl says that Ritschl follows Herrmann—despite Herrmann’s quotations of Ritschl’s earlier works. Nearly all McMahon’s citations of the German theologians being discussed are incomplete or incorrect. Burns, clearly following the work of Jossua, though with a discussion which is far inferior to his source, cites, as does Jossua, Ritschl’s entire volume, though Ritschl’s discussion of this matter is limited to a very few pages. Burns also seems to misinterpret the thrust of the German critique, believing it to be centered around ecclesiological ramifications, rather than seeing that it is an automatic physical redemption separated from any notion of the individual will that is feared.

36 Several scholars (for example Mersch, *Le Corps Mystique du Christ: Études de théologie historique*, Louvain: Meusem Lessianum, 1933, p. 348; and McMahon, *De Christo Mediatore*, 9) include Dorner in the list of scholars accusing Hilary of teaching that Christ assumes a general human nature. However, Dorner explicitly says the something different: “the Maurinist [Coustant] is right when he denies that Hilarius held Christ to have assumed merely the general nature of the human race, and not an individual human nature” (Isaak August Dorner, *History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, vol. 2, trans. D. W. Simon, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1889, 543.

37 For example, see Harnack, *History of Dogma*, 295-96: “…his [Athanasius’s] doctrinal ideas could only be held on the basis of Platonism. This is at once clear in the case of Gregory of Nyssa, who in some points strengthened the expositions given by Athanasius.”
source for the nearly identical teaching found in Hilary. Thus, here as earlier, the critique directed at the Greeks was immediately transferred to Hilary.

Several scholars have come to the defense of each of these Greek Fathers, seeking to show that this attribution of christological heresy is unwarranted. For example, Gross’ work on Athanasius and Gregory of Nyssa and Malevez’s work on Nyssa and Cyril of Alexandria have shown that these Fathers did posit and lend importance to the individual humanity of Christ. There has been a similar defense on Hilary’s behalf. For example, Beumer says that the assumption of the whole of humanity in Hilary’s work should not be understood as if Christ did not have an individual human nature. For Beumer, to say that Hilary asserts that Christ only has a general nature, which is identical to the totality of all men, is a misapprehension of Hilary’s teaching that contradicts many passages in Hilary’s works and certainly the clearest description of the incarnation which is given in De Trinitate 2.25: “but we needed that God should become flesh and dwell in us, that is, that by the assumption of the flesh of one, He might dwell within all flesh.”

38 Harnack, History of Dogma, 301: “The thought that Christ assumed the general concept of humanity occurs, though mingled with distinctive ideas, in Hilary, who was dependent on Gregory [of Nyssa].” The historical impossibility of Hilary being dependent upon Gregory, who was not raised to his see until after Hilary’s death, has done little to dissipate the force of Harnack’s charge. See also, Joseph Tixeront, History of Dogmas, vol. 2, trans. Henry. L. Brianceau (St. Louis: Herder, 1914), 292.

39 For example, Ritschl, Critical History, 8: “Hilary of Poitiers enables us to see this kernel of the ‘mystical-atonement doctrine,’ as, generally speaking, the so-called mystical form of religious ideas is wont to rest upon the reduction of relations which pertain to the will, to the forms of a natural process.” Though dealing obstensibly with Gregory of Nyssa, Herrmann also includes Hilary in his condemnation (Herrmann, Gregorii Nysseni sententiae, 30).

40 This work was begun by the German theologians Karl Holl, Amphilochius von Ikoniumin (1904), 222-25; and Johann Lenz, Jesus-Christus nach der Lehre des hl. Gregor von Nyssa (Trier: Verlag der Paulinus Druckerei, 1925), 84-87.


One of the causes of confusion surrounding Hilary’s incarnational teaching is the result of a codification of “Latin” and “Greek” soteriological systems. Hilary, though Latin in heritage, is usually placed on the “Greek” side due to his understanding of soteriology. The Greek theory, termed “physicalist” or “mystical,” lends so much weight to the hypostatic union and its transformative power that it places humanity’s key salvific moment in the incarnation. The centrality of the incarnation is complemented by the Greek soteriological emphasis on deification or divinization. In contrast to Greek emphases, the Latin theory, termed the “real” or “moral” theory of redemption, understands the key soteriological moment as Christ’s atoning death. This theory has a juridical, rather than a mystical, nature.43

The theology of the incarnation that Hilary shares with Irenaeus, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa and Cyril of Alexandria has been given various names, some with a more pejorative connotation than others. This understanding of Christ’s assumption of all humanity receives various titles including an “extended view” or a “universal theory” of the incarnation, or the “Greek physical” or “mystical” theory of redemption.44 Each of these terms, highlights an important aspect of the teaching concerning Christ’s assumption of all humanity and, I believe, should be recovered from the taint of heresy. For this reason, throughout the course of this work, I use all of them. However, I think the term “physical” theory of redemption or “physicalist” is perhaps the most apt for

---

43 For a discussion of these two different theories by advocates of this system of classification, see Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 57-65; and McMahon, *De Christo Mediatore*, 63-64.
44 For example, Wild (*The Divinization of Man*) prefers the term “physical”. Jossua speaks of the “théologie ‘Grecque’” (*Salut: Incarnation ou mystère pascal*, 13-44). In speaking about this theory in the case of Hilary, Burns (*Christology in Hilary*) speaks about Hilary’s extension of the incarnation while Mersch says that Hilary teaches an “incarnation collective et mystique,” (*Corps mystique du Christ*, vol. 1, 364). Ladaria (*Cristología de Hilario*) who is the most clear advocate of the presence of this doctrine in Hilary’s teaching avoids the history of controversy by referring to it as “la asunción de toda la humanidad.”
conveying the physicality of Hilary’s vision of our presence in the body of Christ. This term is the one most in need of rehabilitation: it was the favorite of the 19th-century Protestants used in a pejorative sense to show the physical and, according to their minds, therefore, automatic, nature of salvation in this theory of redemption. I propose to rehabilitate the terms “physical theory of redemption” and “physicalist,” seeking by them to convey the physicality of our incorporation into Christ’s body without including the 19th-century baggage of automatic salvation.

Furthermore, we shall see that though this teaching is most often associated with the Greeks, it is not, essentially, Greek. Hilary, a Latin, along with the Greeks Irenaeus, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa and Cyril of Alexandria, is one of the “big five” proponents of Christ’s assumption of all humanity. As with all generalizations, the systemization of Latin and Greek soteriologies is useful only to a point. The case of Hilary, a Latin with a “Greek” theology, is one example, and perhaps the most important, of the limits of this codification.

Hilary’s similarity to the Greek understanding of soteriology has caused some scholarly blunders concerning Hilary’s possible influences. Émile Mersch, in his standard 1933 study of the mystical body of Christ, curiously classifies Hilary as a Greek. While most scholars do not make Mersch’s mistake, the presence of this

45 For example, see J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 375, 377-86, 397. See also, Jossua, Salut: Incarnation ou mystère pascal, 13: “il se propose surtout de résumer les positions classiques en histoire des doctrines sur la soteriologie des Pères grecs à laquelle on associe en général saint Hilaire de Poitiers…”
46 A look at the table of contents of Émile Mersch, will show that Mersch’s treatment of Hilary takes place in Part II concerning the Greek Fathers, rather than in Part III on the Western tradition. He considers Hilary’s theology to be on the Greek trajectory and basically that of Athanasius: “Il reprend, sans qu’il l’ait su peut-être – mais qu’importe? – la théologie d’Athanase; il y ajoute même d’importants compléments, et ces compléments sont précisément ceux qu’on retrouvera plus tard chez Cyrille d’Alexandrie” (Corps mystique du Christ, vol. 1, 341). Despite this fault, Mersch’s book remains an excellent presentation of Hilary’s understanding of Christ.
physicalist doctrine in Hilary has led to a widespread assumption that Hilary, though Latin, is steeped in the Greek theological tradition. The 19th-century German critique, led by Harnack, of the physicalist doctrine of Christ’s assumption of all humanity stated that this doctrine is tied to Platonic influence. The result is that Platonism is still regarded as important for understanding the physical or mystical model of redemption. Scholars assume that demonstrating the presence of a physical theory of redemption in Hilary’s thought is equivalent to proving him a Platonist. While this may or may not be true for the Greek Fathers, it is certainly not true for Hilary. Several scholars have noted that Hilary, in sharing the belief in extended incarnation with the Greek Fathers, is at once more explicit and adamant about this teaching and not fully rationally reflective about it. Since Hilary lacks the level of rational reflection on how exactly Christ assumes all humanity that is found in the Greek Fathers, many scholars have carelessly used explanations of the latters’ theology as a fill-

---

47 Malevez, “L’Église dans le Christ,” 259: “Hilaire de Poitiers, Occidental tout nourri de théologie grecque….”

48 As noted before, see Harnack, History of Dogma, 296. See also comments concerning the Fathers’ use of Platonic vocabulary to express their conception of redemption, for example, Malevez, “L’Église dans le Christ,” 260: “l’idée de l’inclusion des hommes dans le Christ est conçue par les Pères Grecs en fonction du réalisme platonicien.” See also Tixeront, History of Dogmas, vol. 2, 150, who says that the unity of humanity with Christ is, with the Fathers, an expression based on the misuse of Platonic language: “…Athanasius at times speaks apparently as though Christ’s humanity had not been individual, but had embraced in fact that of all men. This is nothing but a misuse of the Platonic vocabulary, a misuse which is still more noticeable in St. Gregory of Nyssa.”

49 See, for example, two recent dictionary entries. Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, in “Redemption” in the New Dictionary of Theology, eds. Joseph A. Komonchak, Mary Collins, Dermot A. Lane (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1987), 836-857, says of the Greek or physical theory that “in connection with the Platonic doctrine of universals, this tradition views human nature as a concrete universal in which humans participate” (841). While Raymond Schwager in “Salvation” in the Encyclopedia of Christian Theology, vol. 3, ed. Jean-Yves Lacoste, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1421-1434, distinguishes between mystical and atonement redemption models, he characterizes these as models from the first or the second millennium of Christianity respectively, rather than as Eastern and Western. Of the model of the first millennium, we find the typical charge of Platonism: “Theologians of the first millennium emphasized the divine efficacy by understanding salvation first from the incarnation and including by way of analogy—against a Platonist background—the whole of humankind in the humanity of Christ” (1426).

50 For example, Malevez, “L’Église dans le Christ,” 259: Hilary “…est déjà plus explicite, mais lui non plus n’a pas raisonné jusqu’au bout sa propre pensée.”
in to understand Hilary’s thought.\textsuperscript{51} Lack of an adequate study of Hilary’s thought has led to a reading of him through the lens of Greek Platonism.\textsuperscript{52}

**Biographical Details of Hilary’s Life That Shed Light on the Debate**

Historical research has, in recent years, led to greater care in distinguishing between the pre-exilic and the post-exilic works and influences of Hilary. The general consensus for the dating of Hilary’s major works places the *In Matthaeum*, written before his exile, at 355 A.D.,\textsuperscript{53} the *De Trinitate*, generally considered to have been written during Hilary’s exile, between 356 and 360 (though the first three books may have been completed before his exile), and the *Tractatus super Psalms*, generally held to have been written after Hilary’s return from exile, between 364 and 367 A.D.\textsuperscript{54} Recently, in 2008, Patrick Descourtieux argues very briefly and with little evidence for a dating of Hilary’s psalm commentaries that places the beginning, if not the whole, of the writing during Hilary’s exile while he was in contact with Greek thought and especially Origen’s

\textsuperscript{51} Mersch, “*Corps mystique du Christ,*” often uses Athanasius or Cyril of Alexandria as means to understand Hilary. Jossua, “*Salut: Incarnation ou mystère pascal,*” 22-33, in his explanation of the major elements of the Greek theory, tries to show Hilary’s similarity to the Greeks on each point. Concerning what he terms the “insistence on the contact of divine and human in the hypostatic union,” Jossua says, “Chez saint Hilaire, ce sont les expressions formelles de contact qui sont les plus difficiles à trouver, mais plusieurs de ses textes sont difficilement intelligible sans cette idée” (25). He also attributes “a platonic conception of the common nature” to Hilary by referring to Hilary’s statements that Christ assumes the nature of all humankind: while this proves that Hilary has some idea of a common nature, it hardly proves that this idea is Platonic (23).

\textsuperscript{52} For example, Akannamdi Gerard Stephen Anyanwu, *Christological Anthropology in St. Hilary* says: “Apparently the holy Doctor, in this concept of the universality of Christ’s body, follows the Platonic pre-comprehension of a universal nature, prescinding however from the pre-gnostic and gnostic notions of a hypothesized humanity and Church…” (97).


\textsuperscript{54} A useful, though slightly outdated, table of the dating given for Hilary’s works by various scholars can be found in Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 24 no. 95.
Because Descortieux’s argument has little to recommend itself, the consensus dating ought to be preferred.

Hilary’s exile by Constantius in 356 led to his spending four years in Phyrgia in Asia Minor. While Mersch uses all of Hilary’s works interchangeably, saying simply that it is impossible for him to distinguish between what Hilary learned during his exile in Asia Minor and what he had already known before, the exigencies of historical scholarship now demand that Hilary’s Greek influences and classification with the Greek Fathers be historically as well as theologically proven. Greater historical precision is calling into question many of the assumptions that underlay Hilary’s classification with the Greek Fathers in the physicalist doctrine. Hilary, we now know, had very little contact with Greek theology or philosophy prior to his exile. Even during his exile, though he certainly came into contact with Greek theological influence, both contemporary and of the Origenian school, he underwent very little direct influence from Platonism.

In fourth-century France there were only two centers for higher learning: Autun and Bordeaux. Following the reasoning of H. D. Saffrey, one of the premier scholars on fourth-century Asia Minor Platonism, because of the eclipse of the schools of Autun at the beginning of the fourth-century and the rise of those of Bordeaux, it seems likely that


56 The standard reason given for Hilary’s exile is his anti-Arian defense of the Nicene faith. Recent scholarship has questioned this hypothesis. See, for example, Daniel Williams, “Defining Orthodoxy in Hilary of Poitiers’ Commentarium in Matthaeum,” *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 9 (2001): 151–171, who argues, chiefly from a study of the *In Matthaeum*, that Hilary knew nothing of the Arian controversies at the time of his exile. On the other hand, Pieter Smulders, *Hilary of Poitiers’ Preface to his* Opus *historicum: Translation and Commentary*, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, vol. 29 (New York: E.J. Brill, 1995), through a study of the *Opus historicum*, is much more willing to concede to Hilary considerable knowledge and savvy concerning the Arian intrigues even years before his exile.

Hilary received his education in rhetoric at Bordeaux. Bordeaux at that time provided instruction in Greek and Latin grammar and rhetoric; it did not teach philosophy. An older professor of grammar from Bordeaux installed himself in Poitiers at the time of Hilary’s youth. This professor, according to Saffrey, must have had enough students to support him, making Poitiers itself a scholastic center of some importance. Saffrey finds it likely, then, that Hilary, having commenced his studies in Poitiers, moved to Bordeaux when he was ready to profess from grammar to rhetoric. The course of studies in which Hilary would have participated at Bordeaux consisted of literary composition based upon the reading and the imitation of Latin rhetorical masters. The works of many of these masters, especially Virgil and Cicero, are philosophical as well as rhetorical, and thus the rhetoric student came into contact with a fair amount of philosophy. The philosophical thinking of Hilary’s early works can and should be understood as the result of his classical rhetorical education.

According to Jean Doignon, whose major contribution to Hilary scholarship has been the tracing of Hilary’s sources and influences, Hilary is one of the most classically

---

59 See Saffrey, “Saint Hilaire et la philosophie,” 249-50, where he discusses the curriculum at Bordeaux as demonstrated by the Commemoratio Professorum Burdigalensium of Ausonius (see Ausonii Opuscula, ed. C. Schenkl, MGH 5.2, Berlin: Weidmann, 1883, 55-71). Bordeaux was at this time something of a mini-Constantinople and the Panegyrici latini, given by Latin rhetors before the Byzantine emperors, show the fruit of the rhetorical culture of fourth-century Gaul.
60 Saffrey here again follows Ausonius’ lead in his Commemoratio (“Saint Hilaire et la philosophie,” 250).
62 Saffrey, “Saint Hilaire et la philosophie,” 251: “Voilà l’enseignement qu’Hilaire a reçu et, à mon avis, voilà aussi les éléments de philosophie que l’on peut trouver dans ses écrits.” Beumer, “De Eenheid der menschen,” 162-63, while more willing than Saffrey to allow some Greek influence, nevertheless also says that Hilary’s theological ideas concerning the unity of man with Christ are of such a nature that they can be understood without the help of Platonic philosophy. He says that it is difficult to determine if there are traces of Platonic thinking in Hilary. At most, he says, one should admit an indirect influence by way of the Greek Fathers.
trained of all Christian writers. Doignon attributes not only the greater part of Hilary’s philosophical training, but the entire structure and unity of Hilary’s early thought, to his classical rhetorical education. He says: “L’unité de pensée qui se dégage de l’œuvre écrite d’Hilaire dans la première période de son épiscopat est en relation étroite, croyons-nous, avec l’usage constant que fait Hilaire d’une rhétorique traditionnelle, appliquée aux sujets nouveaux que l’enseignement de l’Écriture et la réflexion des premiers théologiens et moralistes avaient introduits dans la littérature latine.”

Doignon also makes it clear that before his exile Hilary had no real knowledge of Greek. Hilary had only enough Greek to be able to make use of Greek-Latin lexicons. Even though Bordeaux had professors of Greek grammar, the state of Greek proficiency in Gaul had declined so much by the middle of the fourth-century that what Greek Hilary might have learned from these professors was limited and, quite likely, incorrect.

Hilary’s ignorance of the Greek language leads him to have no direct contact with Greek authors, or at least no traceable contact in his own pre-exilic works.

---

Doignon, Jean. *Avant l’exil*, 520: “Depuis Cyprien et Lactance, il est l’intellectuel chrétien qui a le plus pratiqué la littérature morale classique.”

Doignon, Jean. *Avant l’exil*, 518. See also ibid., 47: “Hilaire a été formé à Poitiers à ce que Jérôme appelle le « cothurne gaulois », c’est-à-dire à une eloquentia héritière de la tradition scolaire.”

Doignon’s discussion of Hilary’s knowledge of Greek in *Avant l’exil*, 173-78.

Doignon, Avant l’exil, 175: “On peut donc conjecturer avec vraisemblance qu’à Poitiers, avant l’exil, Hilaire ne possède guère plus que des listes de mots grecs consignées dans un lexique, les exploite pour émailler son texte d’hellénismes, comme ses devanciers, et lui donner une allure plus technique.”

Doignon, Avant l’exil, 173-74: “La présence de grammairiens grecs à Bordeaux, signalée par Ausone, n’empêche pas le grec d’y être parlé, de son propre aveu, incorrectement et sans raffinement, au moins au IVe siècle.”

Doignon, *Avant l’exil*, 22: “Nous prendrons la peine de montrer, par des analyses précises de textes, d’Origène surtout, -- analyses accompagnées de tableaux synoptiques --, qu’on ne trouve pas trace dans l’œuvre d’Hilaire, avant 356, de lectures directes d’auteurs grecs.” Doignon dates the Latin translation of Irenaeus’ *Adversus haereses* after Hilary and so Hilary’s inability to read Greek causes Doignon to also eliminate Irenaeus as a direct source for Hilary’s pre-exilic theology (ibid., 194-200). Irenaeus was known, however, certainly by Tertullian, Novatian, and Lactantius, and perhaps by Cyprian, allowing Irenaeus to indirectly influence Hilary through these Latin authors (ibid., 200). This is contrary to Lecuyer’s belief that Hilary’s understanding of priesthood and the unity of the human race derive from Irenaeus (Lecuyer, “Le sacerdoce royal,” 302-325). Burns agrees with Doignon’s assessment: “I agree with the main features of
What knowledge, if any, could Hilary have received concerning Greek philosophy through the medium of the classical Latin masters that were part of his educational curriculum? Through Cicero and Seneca, Hilary could very well have come into contact with a mediated form of Platonism. However, both Cicero and Seneca demonstrate the syncretism of Latin philosophy begun with Antiochus: Platonism, Stoicism, and Aristotelianism are viewed by many as fundamentally compatible. 69 Thus, though Cicero considers himself primarily a Platonist, he often uses Stoicism to support and develop Platonic doctrines. 70 Likewise, though Seneca is primarily a Stoic, in his Epistulae ad Lucilium 58 and 65, he deals with philosophical questions from an essentially Platonic point of view. 71 Hilary’s contact with Platonism, if he had any at all, was indirect and mediated through the Roman rhetors and philosophers who were syncretising the Platonic system with that of Stoicism and Aristotelianism.

During Hilary’s exile, he came into contact with Origen’s work. 72 The influence that Origen then has upon Hilary’s writings, especially upon the Tractatus super Psalmos, is a subject we will deal with in the next chapter. What interests us here is

Doignon’s case on Hilary’s sources: Hilary does not depend directly on the work of Origen for the Commentary on Matthew; Hilary is influenced by his predecessors within the Latin traditions; the principal influence is Tertullian. My only criticism of Doignon’s case is that he fails to acknowledge adequately the contributions of other Latin sources such as Novatian and the possible impact of oral traditions. He also fails to appreciate the originality of Hilary.” Burns suggests Victorinus of Pettau as another possible source for Hilary not considered by Doignon (Christology in Hilary, 44).

70 For Cicero’s self-definition as a Platonist, see Gersh, Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism, 67; Cicero, Pro Murena 63. For Cicero’s combination of Stoicism and Platonism, see Gersh, ibid., 71-72.
71 See Gersh, Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism, 180.
72 Antonio Orazzo, “Ilario di Poitiers e la universa caro,” 401, no. 16 says: “E’ comunemente accettata l’influenza di Origene su Ilario nei Tractatus. Ilario ha potuto conoscere l’originismo negli anni dell’esilio.” See especially Émile Goffinet, L’Utilisation d’Origène dans le commentaire des Psautres de saint Hilaire de Poitiers, Studia Hellenistica 14 (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1965). While this study is partially marred by its faulty attribution to Origen of works now deemed to come from the hand of Evagrius, nevertheless, Goffinet manifestly demonstrates that Hilary has familiarity with the genuine writings of Origen on the psalms. Goffinet’s work is analyzed in greater detail in Chapter 2.
whether or not Hilary—who had not been trained in, or directly influenced by, Greek Platonism prior to his exile to Phrygia in Asia Minor in 356 by Constantius—had any contact with Greek Platonism during this Eastern exile. The Platonism of the fourth-century is not a monolithic movement or philosophy but can be divided into different schools: Rome, Asia Minor, Athens and Alexandria. Each of these schools has its own distinctive character. For example, whereas the Neoplatonic school of Rome is led by Plotinus, who is a philosopher for whom reason controls all knowledge, Asia Minor is the home of the school of Iamblichus (d. 325). Iamblichus began in Syria, moved to Apamea, and finally to Antioch, where he wrote the *De mysteriis*, which is a refutation of the Plotinian rationalism set forth by Porphry. Iamblichus accomplishes this refutation through recourse to non-rational knowledge of God, that is to theurgy, oracles, magic and the like.73

Hilary never explicitly speaks about this Asian Platonism of the Neoplatonic school of fourth-century Asia minor. It seems impossible that he would know nothing about it, because of the quantities of its disciples, but he seems to be uninterested in this kind of philosophy.74 Moreover, we can assume that it was his personal contact with practitioners of this kind of magical philosophy that led to Hilary’s reaction of critique against philosophers.75 Most of Hilary’s critiques of philosophers can be found in his *Tractatus super Psalmos*, which furthers the conclusion that Hilary’s first contact with philosophy in its own right (that is, not as a part of his study of rhetoric) was during his

---

75 See Saffrey, “Saint Hilaire et la philosophie,” 255-57, for a number of citations from Hilary in which he is critiquing philosophy or philosophers.
exile. That he criticizes philosophy shows that Hilary was unimpressed with the Asian
Platonism he met in Phrygia.  

Hilary’s rhetorical education in fourth-century Gaul thus produces a man well-
educated in the works of the classical Latin rhetors—Virgil, Seneca, Cicero—whose
works were not without philosophical thought. Seneca and Cicero, in particular,
participated in a philosophical milieu that syncretized Platonism with Stoicism and
Aristotelianism. By the time Hilary writes the *In Matthaeum* in 355, he has also read and
appropriated the works of his Christian theological predecessors: we find the omnipresent
influence of Tertullian and a moderate influence of Cyprian. However, at the time of
the *In Matthaeum* Hilary’s work shows no direct traces of Greek Platonic influence or the
influence of Greek theologians. Hilary’s exile in Phrygia serves as his first opportunity
for direct appropriation of Origen. Likely, it is also his first opportunity for direct
appropriation of Greek Platonism. However, the Neoplatonic school of fourth-century
Asia Minor, the theurgic school of Iamblichus, apparently holds little appeal for Hilary:

---

76 Hilary’s attitude against philosophy is not only a refusal of the pseudo-philosophy he observed in Asia
Minor, but also a liberation from the limits of pure reason which he considers insufficient for the problem
of God. The Arians suffered from these limits—Hilary sees them as having compromised the faith by
giving philosophy priority to scripture—but Hilary wants theological research to be based on the study and

77 The influence of Latin theologians on Hilary’s thought will be discussed at greater length in the next

78 The Greek theologian whose influence has been most widely posited is Origen. Doignon does an
extensive study of parallels and divergences between Hilary’s *In Matthaeum* and Origen’s
*Commentariorum series in Matthaeum* (see excursus II, pp. 545-55 in *Avant l’exil*), and concludes that in
78% of the cases the exegesis of Hilary is done completely independently of that of Origen. The 22% of
cases that demonstrate a resemblance, Doignon believes ought to be understood without positing a
dependence of Hilary on Origen (ibid., 178). Hilary does depend upon Tertullian, who shares exegetical
similarities with Origen. However, Doignon shows that these similarities between Origen and Tertullian
are more readily explained by their exploitation of the same exegetical sources (including Irenaeus, Philo
and Hippolytus) in their common aversion to Marcionism than by a direct influence of Origen upon
Tertullian. As a result, Doignon says of Hilary’s appropriation of Origen via Tertullian: “Hilaire, qui
dépend en droite ligne de Tertullien, n’est occasionnellement avant l’exil l’héritier d’Origène que par un
jeu d’intermédiaires” (ibid., 185).
Hilary’s new experience of Asian Neoplatonism leads to a greater hostility to “the philosophers” and does not seem to lead to an appropriation of its thought.

Hilary’s heritage of Latin philosophy and theology should lead to a reevaluation of the physicalist doctrine. Scholarship has already moved away from the original critique that the physicalist doctrine of redemption is the result of (Neo)platonism masquerading as Christianity. The present position is that (Neo)platonism provides the necessary system (through a theory of universals or Forms) that allows for a rational understanding and explication of what the Fathers perceive as the revealed truth of the saving power of the incarnation.\(^79\) However, the Latin Platonists’ version of Plato’s theory of the Forms with which Hilary may have come into contact is altered significantly by its contact with Stoicism. In Chapter 2, we will explore the details of the Stoicized Platonism of Cicero and Seneca. I will only note here that the Forms, which for Plato have ontological existence as separate subsistent principles have become, in their Latin, syncretised version, thoughts internal to the mind of God.\(^80\) This understanding of Platonic Forms, the only understanding Hilary could have appropriated, is incompatible with a belief that Christ could have been the “Form” of man. For Christ to have the Form of man, Forms would have to be existents external to God’s mind, which they were not in Latin Platonism.

\(^79\) See Malevez’s argument concerning Gregory of Nyssa in “L’Église dans le Christ.” Malevez says that the Platonism of Gregory is not a doctrine of collective incarnation. Gregory does affirm the reality of universal ideas but this affirmation serves his intellectual structuring of the Pauline teaching on the mystical body of Christ.

\(^80\) See Gersh, *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism*, 153: “The view that the Forms dwell in or are sustained by the mind is a deviation from Plato which is of great significance for the future development of the Platonic tradition. Plato’s Forms had been separately subsistent principles which were the objects but not the subjects of intellection, whereas the theory in these Ciceronian texts stresses the essentially intellective character of the Forms.... The cause of this transformation of Plato’s doctrine is once again clearly the intervention of the Stoics, for their common concepts are intellective in precisely this way and, when combined with the universals of Plato’s thought, will produce a Form-concept of the kind described by Cicero.”
Hilary’s teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity is not dependent on Platonism, for Hilary has no knowledge of the Greek Platonic theory of the Forms that could be compatible with this teaching, and the Latin Platonic theory of the Forms, which he did know, is incompatible with it. The result is that Hilary’s physicalist understanding of redemption that believes that Christ saves all through his incarnation by assuming all in his incarnation, has no necessary relationship to Platonic thought. Platonism’s tie to this teaching must be seen as, at most, accidental.  

This brief study of influences allows us to draw a few conclusions. The *Tractatus super Psalmos* shows Greek theological influence (namely Origen) but no distinctive unmediated Greek philosophical influence. The *In Matthaeum* shows no Greek influence except for what could be coming indirectly through Tertullian and the Latin philosophers of Hilary’s education, particularly Cicero and Seneca. Hilary’s teaching that Christ assumed all of humanity is omnipresent in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. However, I will show that it is not absent from the *In Matthaeum*. Thus, we may conclude that Hilary begins to teach that Christ assumes all humanity independently of Greek theological or philosophical influences. If Hilary is to be classified among the Greek Fathers as a proponent of physicalist doctrine, this classification is only true insofar as his teaching

---

81 Christ’s assumption of all humanity is based upon a conception of a previous unity of humanity that Christ can then assume. However, we will see that whereas Gregory of Nyssa explains this unity of humanity by his affirmation of the universal idea of humanity, Hilary does not so much explain as simply point to this prior unity of humanity in Adam. See Antonio Orazzo, introduction to *Commento ai Salmi*, 55: “Ilario non si mostra interessato a fondare dal punto di vista speculativo l’idea di totalità o di collettività, ma l’assume dalla Scrittura, in un contesto di storia salvifica: il dramma del peccato d’origine e la sentenza di morte, che ne segue, riguardano tutto il genere umano; similmente, la vita e la salvezza definitiva si ot tengono per mezzo di uno solo e si riversano quindi su tutti gli uomini.”

82 See, for example, *In Matt.* 4.12 (SC 254 130.3-9): Ciuitatem carnem quam adsumpserat nuncupat, quia, ut ciuitas ex uarietate ac multitudine consistit in habitantium, ita in eo per naturam suscepti corporis quaedam uniuersi generis humani congregatio continetur. Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congregatione fit ciuitas et nos per consortium carnis suae sumus ciuitatis habitatio. In Chapter 4 I will provide examples of this doctrine of Christ’s assumption of all humanity in the *In Matthaeum* and the *De Trinitate* in the course of examining its role in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. 
resembles theirs. Besides Scripture itself and contact with Greco-Roman philosophy widely understood, Hilary does not share the particular theological and philosophical heritage of the Greek physicalists.

THE RESULTS OF THE DEBATE: NEGLECT OF HILARY’S TEACHING

We have found that there is a traditional acceptance in scholarship that any idea of an extended incarnation is the result of an infiltration of Platonism into Christianity and is therefore heretical.\footnote{There are really two issues here: 1) the perceived link between the physicalist doctrine and Neoplatonism, and 2) the belief that Christianity is true Christianity only if it is pure of any philosophical contamination. The first issue is what we are dealing with here. The second, I hope, is an opinion which we can now, seeing that it reveals more about its own proponents than about the Christianity of the Fathers, lay to rest.} This acceptance has led many Hilary scholars to argue that Hilary’s statements concerning Christ’s assumption of all humanity are rhetoric or exaggeration or are meant to signify the effects of the incarnation—which are universal—and not to describe the incarnation itself. We find a widespread dismissal of the possibility that Hilary actually believes that Christ physically assumed all of humanity in the incarnation. For example, in response to \textit{In Matthaeum} 19.5, where Hilary speaks of that “Christ, who assumed the body of us all, and by the condition of the assumed body was made a neighbor to each of us,” \footnote{\textit{In Matt.} 19.5 (SC 258 94.15-17): …Christum, qui omnium nostrum corpus assumpsit, et unicuique nostrum assumpti corporis conditione factus est proximus…} P. Wild, the author of the still-standard 1950 work on divinization in the work of Hilary, asserts: “The fact that although Christ took our body, He is no more than a neighbor to us indicates that Hilary means merely that Christ assumed a body exactly like ours and of the same race of Adam when he says that Christ
assumed our body.” Thus, Wild reads Hilary as teaching that the Word “assumed a man (hominem), not men,” and so one man is elevated in the incarnation and all other humans “are not taken up directly in the Incarnation but only by participation in the elevation of their brother, Christ.” Wild is uncomfortable with reading Hilary’s teaching on the incarnation as teaching a physical connection between Christ and humanity partly because he is aware of the connection that has been drawn between Hilary’s teaching and the Platonic critique leveled at the Greek Fathers.

Wild is clear that direct Greek influence upon Hilary must be restricted to after his exile. However, this limitation of Greek influence, combined with his attempt to hold to the distinction between Greek and Latin soteriologies, makes Wild very reluctant to interpret any text in the pre-exilic *In Matthaeum* as referring to anything beyond the individual humanity of Christ.

However, as Paul Burns, in his 1981 study on Hilary’s pre-exilic christology, notes, Wild is refusing to recognize an important feature of Hilary’s christology and his concern for historical accuracy is counteracted by his failure to investigate the background of Hilary’s Latin theological and secular heritage, that contain elements that could contribute to the theme of an extended incarnation. Burns allows that Wild is

---

85 Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 60.
86 Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 65.
87 Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 63. See also *ibid.*, 65: “If then the Word did not become physically incarnate in all men, and if on the other hand His assumption of our flesh is not to be reduced to a mere figure of speech, what then did Hilary mean by saying that the Word assumed the nature of all flesh? First of all Hilary seems to mean that the Word assumed a perfect human nature which was to be perfectly divinized at His Resurrection. Secondly, we are to share in that divinization by being conformed to Christ’s glorious human nature, by being divinized like Him at our resurrection.”
89 Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 99. See also Akannamdi Gerard Stephen Anyanwu’s critique of Wild in *Christological Anthropology in St. Hilary*, 190, no. 64. Anyanwu says that Wild overlooks “the basic doctrine of Hilary, namely that Christ is both the ‘Exemplum’ and consummation of humanity.”
more historically accurate than Coustant and Mersch, who make the opposite mistake—that is, while allowing an extended understanding of the incarnation to Hilary, they are not sufficiently sensitive to the historical context of Hilary’s texts and, in particular, the importance of the exile. Burns’ work opens the study of Hilary’s teaching on the universal extension of the incarnation to new directions. Prior to Burns’ work the connection between a teaching of extended incarnation and Greek theology and philosophy remained unquestioned. On one side are those, such as Coustant and Mersch, who believe Hilary teaches an incorporation of all men in the incarnation, and thus likewise read Greek exilic influences into Hilary’s entire corpus. On the other side are those like Wild who, in limiting Greek influence also feel bound to limit the extension of the incarnation. Burns shatters this paradigm by providing Latin influences that could account for the presence of this theme in Hilary.

Hilary’s education, which included more rhetoric than formal philosophy, demands that we look seriously at Latin secular traditions as sources for his understanding of the incarnation that extends to include all of humanity. Hilary’s says, “did believe and teach that the Son assumed universal humanity, by virtue of which he is the true vine.”

Burns asserts that both Coustant and Mersch read Hilary as teaching a universal incorporation of all men. However, they support this reading in Hilary’s *In Matthaeum* by reference to his *Tractatus super Psalmos*. Burns believes that the “themes in the Commentary [*In Matthaeum*] must be understood against their appropriate background and not according to later developments affected by factors unknown to Hilary at the time of the composition of the Commentary,” *Christology in Hilary*, 100, no. 50. Albert Charlier in “L’Église corps du Christ,” likewise criticizes Mersch’s lack of distinction between Hilary’s pre- and post-exilic works (ibid., 452).

This is not to say that Burns is the first to study Hilary’s works chronologically with an effort to read each in its proper context. For instance Charlier, “L’Église corps du Christ,” 452, explicitly outlines his method as such a chronological study. He, like Burns, finds in the *In Matthaeum* that Hilary does indeed teach that “par son incarnation, le Christ a assume une nature humaine et l’humanité tout entière” (457). What Burns accomplishes that Charlier does not is an exploration of the possible Latin sources for such a teaching.

Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 135: “Hilary extends the use of traditional incarncational language to include all mankind. Christ takes up (*adsumere*) the whole of mankind. There is no need to appeal to Greek traditions to account for this concept in the Commentary [*In Matthaeum*].”
extended sense of the body of Christ reflects Pauline influence but is also reinforced by other elements in the Latin traditions inherited by Hilary. Burns shows secular Latin uses of the terms *corpus*, *ciuitas*, and *congregatio* that extend the definitions of these words to express a unity of the human race. For example, Cicero has a notion of *ciuitas* that includes the whole universe: gods and mankind. These terms, and their extended use expressing a unity of humanity, were picked up by Christian Latin writers such as Tertullian, Cyprian, and Lactantius. Burns concludes that Hilary uses both the biological model of Paul and the social model of secular Latin traditions to present a

---


94 For example, *De natura deorum* 2.154 (in *De Natura Deorum; Academica*, trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library [New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1933], 270-272): Est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum domus aut urbs utrorumque…. See Burns *Christology of Hilary*, 106.

95 Tertullian uses “ciuitas” to speak of Christ’s building of the Church, as, for example, in *Aduersus Marcionem* 3.23(ed. A. Kroymann, in *Tertulliani Opera, pars 1: Opera Catholica; Aduersus Marcionem*, CCL 1 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954], 540.3-7): Abstulit enim dominus sabaoth a iudaea et ab hierusalem inter cetera et prophetam et sapientem architectum, spiritum scilicet sanctum, qui aedificat ecclesiam, templum scilicet et domum et ciuitatem dei. In *Apologeticum* 39.1-2 (ed. E. Dekkers, in *Tertulliani Opera, pars 1: Opera Catholica; Aduersus Marcionem*, CCL 1 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954], 150.4-6), Tertullian uses both “corpus” and “congregatio” to speak of the unity of believers: Corpus sumus de conscientia religionis et disciplinae unitate et spei, foedere. Coimus in coetum et congregationem facimus, ut ad deum quasi manu facta precautionibus ambiamus.


97 Lactantius is very interested in the “city” as an eschatological reality. See, for example, *Divinæ institutiones* 7.26.1 (in *Opera omnia*, ed. Samuel Brandt, CSEL 19, [Prague: F. Tempsky, 1890], 665.8-13): sed idem, cum mille anni regni hoc est septem milia coeperint terminari, soluetur denuo et custodia emissus exibit atque omnes gentes quaer tunc erunt sub dicione iustorum concitabit, ut inferent bellum sanctae ciuitati, et colligetur ex omni orbe terrae innumerabilis populus nationum et obsidebit et circumdabit ciuitatem.
notion of the body of Christ that extends to include all of humanity. Further study of Hilary’s relationship to both Greek and Latin philosophy and theology will be the topic of Chapter Two of this dissertation.

**The Ramifications of Christ’s Assumption of All Humanity in Hilary’s Teaching**

Scholarship on Hilary must heed the chronology of Hilary’s works in order to account for the different influences that can be found in each work. It is quite impossible, for example, to cite Greek philosophical influence in the *In Mattheum*. However, static accounts of Hilary’s theology that have ignored the chronology are motivated by, and serve as witnesses to, the real unity and continuity of Hilary’s thought, which differs more in emphases than in content between the *In Mattheum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. This continuity of thought means Christ’s assumption of humanity is understood by Hilary in a physical fashion as much in the *In Mattheum* as in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. Hilary’s unity of thought is demonstrated in the intertwining of his christological thought with his soteriology, eschatology, ecclesiology and even Trinitarian theology. The ramifications of Christ’s assumption of all humanity spread

---

98 Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 108. Orazzo, “Ilario di Poitiers e la universa caro,” 399-419, continues in the line Burns marks out. In his study of central terms to Hilary’s teaching of the incarnation, Orazzo turns not only to Hilary’s theological predecessors, but to classical Latin usage. Thus for *ciuitas* he directs his reader, on p. 406, to E. Albertatio’s *Studi di diritto romano*. See Chap. 2 for an extended discussion of Hilary’s relationship to Latin Stoicism.

99 Ladaria (*Cristología de Hilario*, 296-97) follows Paul Galtier (*Saint Hilaire de Poitiers; Le premier docteur*, 26-42) in asserting that Hilary remains substantially faithful to himself in his christological doctrine throughout his writing career. Doignon (*Sur Matthieu*, 22-23) asserts the continuity between Hilary’s exegetical and doctrinal works. Doignon, as well as Charles Kannengiesser (“L’exégese d’Hilaire,” in *Hilaire et son temps: Actes du Colloque de Poitiers*, [Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1968], 136), follows Gastaldi (*Hilario de Poitiers exégeta*, 77-93), who shows that Hilary’s vocabulary, and thus thought, remains remarkably consistent throughout his exegetical works.
into the entire system of Hilary’s thought and a study of these ramifications will be the 
subject of Chapters Three through Seven of this dissertation. Chapter Three shows the 
relationship between Hilary’s christology and his soteriology. Chapter Four explains 
exactly what Hilary means when he says Christ “assumes all humanity” and shows how 
this theology is the result of a specific exegesis of the Pauline Adam-Christ parallel. 
Chapters Five and Six show how Hilary’s eschatology and ecclesiology (respectively) are 
based upon, and incoherent without, his belief that Christ assumes all of humanity bodily in the incarnation.

The body (corpus) of Christ is the locus of our salvation. This fact leads Hilary’s 
eschatology, as we shall see in Chapter Five, to have very strict contours, contours that 
take full shape in the Tractatus super Psalmos. Jesus Christ is himself the reign of 
God: there is no other human fulfillment than Jesus himself and participation in his 
life. For Hilary there are three terms that describe our glorified life: we are co-heirs, 
con-corporal, and co-participators with the Son. Christ configures us to himself so as to 
make us sons of God. Once we have been configured to Christ, and become sons as 
Christ is Son, then the Father can reign in us as he does in Christ: it is our filiation in 
Christ, who is the kingdom, which allows Christ to give us to the Father as the 
kingdom. Christ handing the kingdom over to the Father is nothing other than the 
result of the assumption of all humanity: he is the kingdom and he assumes all humanity into the kingdom through his body.

---

100 Hilary’s eschatological thinking follows the lines of 1 Cor. 23-28. A very good explanation of Hilary’s interpretation of this Pauline theme can be found in two articles by Pelland: “‘Subiectio’ du Christ,” and “Thème biblique du Règne.”
101 See Tr. ps. 68.25, where Hilary says that Christ has taken on the humanity of all so that all can participate in his divinity.
102 See, for example, Tr. ps.126.17 (CCL 61B 76.15-17): ut, quia fructus uentris factus ipse est, merces quoque eius gentium fiat hereditas, et hereditas ipsa sint filii.
Christ’s assumption of all humanity defines Hilary’s ecclesiology, the subject of Chapter Six, in that the body of Christ extends in Hilary’s thought to become the Church.\(^\text{103}\) For Hilary, this is not a metaphor but a physical reality based upon Christ’s assumption of all humanity in the incarnation and brought to fruition through his resurrection into glory. Hilary’s understanding of the Church is, largely, an eschatological vision. The Church is our hope, the heavenly Zion in which we seek to dwell, the body of Christ in which we hope to participate. The assumption of all flesh can only be understood in the vision of resurrection into the reign of Christ, which is his body, which is the Church—although Hilary does not fully explicate this concept until the *Tractatus super Psalmos*.

However, the Church is also a present reality in Hilary’s thought, and one result of his equation between the Church and the body of Christ is that Hilary considers that the objective salvific unity with the assumed humanity of Christ can be blocked in its realization by individual human infidelity. Salvation is not automatic by the mere fact of the incarnation (which is one of the concerns with the “physicalist” theory of the incarnation). We must somehow insert ourselves into the objective reality of the assumption and salvation of all humanity through faith and the sacraments, that is, through the Church. The Church is the body of Christ and if salvation is in Christ’s body it must also be in the Church.\(^\text{104}\) And since Christ is the kingdom of God and the heavenly Jerusalem, so too is the Church.

---

\(^\text{103}\) He is certainly following Pauline metaphors here, for example *Tr. ps.* 128.9 (CCL 61B 94.12-14, 14-17): *Ecclesiam autem esse corpus Christi, cuius inuicem membra sumus, apostolus testis est…cuibas sancta uius lapidibus in fundamento prophetarum et apostolorum aedificata.* See also *Tr. ps.* 60.5.

\(^\text{103}\) See *Tr. ps.* 51.17 where Hilary says the reign of Christ is open to all by nature (which we now share with Christ in his body) but closed to some through infidelity.

\(^\text{104}\) See for example, *Tr. ps.* 121.5.
THE TRINITARIAN IMPLICATIONS

Christ’s assumption of all humanity also has Trinitarian implications, which we will explore in Chapter Seven, that again point to the unity of Hilary’s thought. For example Paul Galtier, recognizing the importance of christology in Hilary’s thought, says that Hilary’s *De Trinitate* could have just as easily been named *De Incarnatione*. For Hilary, the incarnation is the historic realization of the Word’s eternal role as mediator of the Father. Only by assuming all humanity can Christ be the perfect mediator between God and all mankind. Christ’s mediation in the dispensation glorifies his humanity (and all humanity present in him) with the divine life and likewise offers his, and all, humanity to the Father. Hilary is interested in showing the reference of christology and soteriology to the Father: the essential aspect of salvation is the *adcessus* to the Father.

The mediation of the dispensation is the temporal perfection of the Son’s eternal role as mediator. The Son’s role as revealer of the Father goes beyond the temporal constraints of creation. The Son is the revealer of the Father in eternity: for Hilary this is what eternal generation means. It is the eternal generation of the Son that reveals the Father as he truly is: precisely *Father*. The birth of the Son is the heart of Hilary’s *De Trinitate*, but the focus on the birth is not actually a focus on the Son at all; it is, for

---

105 Galtier, *Hilaire de Poitiers: Le premier docteur*, 111: “Ce qu’on appelle son *De Trinitate* en devient un *De Incarnatione*... Tout au moins, le mystère du Fils de Dieu fait homme y occupe-t-il une large place.”

106 See *Tr. ps.* 60.6 (CCL 61 195.9-10): ...per quem...sitque omnibus adcessus ad Patrem. See also *Tr. ps.* 150.2, 150.1, and 118 Gimel, 3.
Hilary, the only way of knowing the Father as he truly is. We must know the birth so that we can know the Father. Hilary’s theology begins and ends, always, with the Father.\(^{107}\)

Hilary’s understanding of the centrality of the Father does not appear only in his Trinitarian theology. Just as his Trinitarian theology in itself points the way to the dispensation, in that the Son is, from all eternity, the revealer of the Father, so Hilary’s incarnational theology returns full circuit to the Father. Despite Hilary’s emphasis on our eschatological conformity with Christ which makes us concorporal and coheirs with him, the real reference of our glorification is not Christ but the Father. Salvation, like revelation, is through the Son, but its origin and goal is the Father. Salvation is knowing the Father in the most profound way possible, knowing him as Father because we are sons.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation focuses on Hilary’s conception of Christ’s assumption of all humanity. In the course of this work I will offer many examples of places where Hilary speaks about the presence of humans in Christ’s body. Scholars have largely either overlooked or misunderstood the presence, and indeed centrality, within St. Hilary of Poitier’s thought of what is often termed the Greek “physicalist” doctrine of the incarnation and what Hilary describes as Christ’s assumption of all humanity. Recent

---

\(^{107}\) The place of the Holy Spirit in Hilary’s Trinitarian theology will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. For now I will mention only that for Hilary, the whole actualization of the Holy Spirit, before and after the incarnation, is part of the unique mediation of Christ, begun in creation and fulfilled in the incarnation, or better in the resurrection. The only monograph on Hilary’s pneumatology is Louis Ladaria, *El Espíritu Santo en san Hilario de Poitiers*, (Madrid: Eapsa, 1977).
scholarship has discredited the centuries-long charge of heterodoxy leveled at the physicalist doctrine of the incarnation; nevertheless, something of the taint remains. This taint, tied with the confusion surrounding Hilary’s appropriation of Greek teaching, has led to the unfortunate neglect of Christ’s assumption of all humanity in Hilary’s teaching. Yet Christ’s assumption of all humanity is an integral part of Hilary’s soteriology and is an idea that connects all the various aspects of Hilarian thought, including the Trinitarian, where Hilary has always unanimously been lauded as a defender of orthodoxy.

In this chapter I have argued for the presence of this teaching throughout Hilary’s corpus. In arguing for the presence of the teaching of an extended incarnation in Hilary’s *In Matthaueum*, coupled with the historical argument against Hilary’s appropriation of Greek thought before his exile, this chapter has demonstrated that the physicalist doctrine is not limited to the Greeks nor does it have any necessary link to Platonic philosophy, as has been supposed. In fact, sufficient supports for Hilary’s teaching can be found in the Latin rhetorical writings that dominated Hilary’s educational formation. We will explore these influences, along with those of Hilary’s Latin theological predecessors, further in the next chapter.

There is a historical tradition of reading these statements in a more spiritual or metaphorical way than I will offer in this dissertation. I believe that these statements should be read as asserting the real, physical presence of humans in Christ’s body. Unfortunately for us, Hilary never instructs his listeners or readers in how to interpret his statements. As a result, we must with the assumption that the valid interpretation of Hilary’s statements concerning the presence of humans in Christ’s body is the interpretation that is most consistent with Hilary’s wider theology.
The value of interpreting Hilary’s theology of the incarnation as asserting the physical presence of humanity in Christ’s body lies in its utility for understanding Hilary’s theological project. In this dissertation, I use a physical understanding of Christ’s assumption of all humanity as a lens with which to view Hilary’s entire theology. The detailing of these ramifications, the subject of Chapters Four through Seven of this work, will show that the end result of viewing Hilary through the lens of a physical understanding of his statements concerning Christ’s assumption of all humanity is a picture of Hilary’s theology as a rich, consistent, logical, and unified thought system. Scholars who have repudiated this lens find Hilary’s theology to be less rich, less consistent, less logical, and less unified. This perception of Hilary’s theology results in Hilary being accorded a relatively small place in the history of theology.

If the final arbiter of the validity of interpretation is in the end result, then there is true value in understanding Hilary’s teaching concerning Christ’s assumption of all humanity in a physical way.

Nevertheless, we should not, as readers, overlook the real ambiguity that is present in Hilary’s theology. There is the initial ambiguity of whether to read Hilary as intending a physical or a spiritual presence of humanity in Christ. If one decides—as I do—on a physical presence, there is a further ambiguity in the mechanism for this presence. How can all humans be present in Christ’s body? Is every human body in the historical, incarnate body of Christ and, if so, how does this presence actually work? How can Christ be a particular person if he has, in some sense, every other human within him as part of his own constitution? How can humans be both in Christ and in their own

---

108 These scholars include the liberal Protestants of the nineteenth-century, and more modern Hilary scholars such as Blasich, Wild, and Wickham.
bodies? Hilary offers very few guidelines as to how to answer these questions.

However, the incompleteness of Hilary’s theology and this unanswered ambiguity are, as frustrating as they are, real virtues. These loose strands are what made Hilary an interesting and useful resource to those who followed him.
CHAPTER 2

THE CONTEXT OF, AND INFLUENCES UPON, HILARY’S SOTERIOLOGY

This chapter will address Hilary’s philosophical and theological sources and the possible precedents for his teaching that Christ assumes all of humanity into his body. In four parts this chapter will study Hilary’s relationship to: 1) Greek philosophy prior to and after his exile, 2) Greek theology, 3) Latin philosophy in the form of Stoicism, and 4) Latin theology. This study will demonstrate that although several Greek Fathers have a teaching similar to Hilary’s concerning Christ’s assumption of all humanity, Hilary neither derived his teaching from them nor shared their philosophical and theological sources. Rather, Hilary derived this teaching from his Latin education, despite the existence of not a single direct precedent. Hilary’s teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity is neither imported from the East nor inherited from the West.

This chapter will focus on the philosophical and theological sources for Hilary’s incarnational theology of Christ’s assumption of all humanity. Hilary’s theology in this respect bears such a resemblance to that of many of the Greek Fathers that Hilary is often classified with Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa and Cyril of Alexandria as an exemplar of the Greek “physicalist” doctrine of the incarnation (as opposed to the Western “atonement” theory). However, this resemblance, which has led many to classify Hilary with the Greeks, is not easily explained. Historical studies are starting to insist that Hilary in fact had little to no contact with, or knowledge of, Greek theology or philosophy prior to his exile in 356 A.D. In his post-exilic Tractatus super Psalmos, written between 364 and 367 A.D., Hilary manifests a definitive interest in Christ’s assumption of all humanity. However, even Hilary’s earliest work, the pre-exilic In Matthaeum, written in 355 A.D., already shows the presence of this teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity, though it was written when he had little to no familiarity with Greek theology or the Platonic philosophy that is said to underlie this theory. The greatest influences on Hilary’s thought seem to have been attained during his classical
education and thus are those of Latin philosophy, most notably Stoicism. Stoic thought already contains in its terminological use of *uniuersitas* a conceptualization of a unified humanity gathered in the universal city. Hilary brings this idea and its Stoic terminology into the Christian realm. Hilary’s classical education did not preclude contact with Latin theology. While Hilary is deeply indebted to Latin theology, particularly Tertullian, there is little Latin theological precedent for Hilary’s teaching concerning Christ’s assumption of all humanity. However, in Gregory of Elvira we may perhaps find another fourth-century proponent of this physicalist redemption model. This chapter will comprise four parts considering Hilary’s relationship to 1) Greek Philosophy prior to and after his exile, 2) Greek theology, 3) Latin philosophy in the form of Stoicism, and 4) Latin theology.

**HILARY’S APPROPRIATION OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY**

**Prior to his Exile**

Hilary, as we have said, received a classical education, first in Poitiers and then later in Bordeaux. The question we have to pose is: what knowledge of Greek philosophy, if any, could Hilary have received through the medium of the classical Latin masters that were part of his educational curriculum? Whole-scale translations of Greek philosophy are rare in his time and place. However, bits and pieces of Greek philosophy are certainly found in Latin writers.109 For example, Cicero translates a number of

---

109 See also the list of early Latin translations of Plato given by Raymond Klibansky, *The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages* together with *Plato’s Parmenides in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (Munich: Kraus International Publications, 1981), 22: He says Cicero had a version of the *Protagoras* that was, however, known only to a few learned men. Cicero also translated part of the *Timaeus*. Apuleius translated the *Phaedo*. There are many single passages of Plato in Cicero and others.
passages from Plato, Epicurus and Xenophon. I will reproduce the list of these translations found in J. G. F. Powell’s study of Cicero’s translations from Greek.\textsuperscript{110} In the left hand column are the passages in Cicero’s corpus; on the right are the references to his Greek sources.

\begin{tabular}{l}
\textit{Timaeus} = Plato, \textit{Timaeus} 27d-47b \\
\textit{Tusc.} 3.41-2 = Epicurus, \textit{περὶ τέλους} (in Diogenes Laertius 10.6) \\
\textit{Fin.} 2.21 = Epicurus, KD 10 (in Diogenes Laertius 10.142) \\
\textit{Tusc.} 1.97-9 = Plato, Apol. 40c-42a \\
\textit{Tusc.} 1.53-4 (= Rep. 6.27, see below) = Plato, Phaedr. 245c-246a \\
\textit{Tusc.} 5.34-5 = Plato, Gorg. 470d \\
\textit{Tusc.} 5.36 = Plato, Menex. 247e-248a \\
\textit{Tusc.} 5.100 = Plato, Epist. 7.326b-c \\
\textit{Div.} 1.60-1 = Plato, Rep. 9.571c-572b \\
\textit{Orat.} 41 = Plato, Phadr. 279 \\
\textit{Leg.} 2.45 = Leg. 12.955e-956b \\
\textit{Cato Maior} 79 = Xen., Cyrop. 8.7.17 \\
\textit{Fin.} 1.68 = Epicurus, KD 28 (in Diogenes Laertius 10.148) \\
\textit{Fin.} 2.96 = Epicurus, KD 28 (in Diogenes Laertius 10.22) \\
\textit{Rep.} 1.66-7 = Plato, Rep. 8.562c \\
\textit{Off.} 3.38 = Plato, Rep. 2.359d-360b \\
\textit{Leg.} 2.67-8 = Plato, Leg. 12.958d-e \\
\textit{Cato Maior} 59 = Xen. \textit{Oecon.} 4.20f \\
\textit{ND} 1.45 = Epicurus, KD 1 (Diogenes Laertius 10.139) \\
\textit{Fin} 1.57 = Epicurus, KD 5 (Diogenes Laertius 10.140) \\
\textit{Fin} 1.63 = Epicurus, KD 15 (Diogenes Laertius 10.144) \\
\textit{Rep.} 6.27 = Plato, Phaedr. 245c-246a \\
\textit{Cato Maior} 6-9 = Plato, Rep. 1.328e-330a \\
\end{tabular}

Despite the length of this list, these passages treat few philosophical issues, namely only

1) the soul and 2) virtue. Concerning the soul, Cicero twice cites passages that argue that

\footnotesize{Chalcidus’ version of the first part of the \textit{Timaeus}, possibly completed about 350, was ignored by authors of the period. Other possible sources include Victorinus’ translation of Plotinus and Porphyry, Seneca’s letters, especially \textit{Ep.} 58 and 65 on the ideas; Aulus Gellius’ \textit{Noctes Atticae}; Valerius Maximus’ collection of memorable facts and sayings; Apuleius’ \textit{De Platone et eius dogmate} and \textit{De Deo Socratis}; and remarks in Macrobius’ \textit{Saturnalia} and especially his Commentary on the \textit{Somnium Scipionis}, which contains a comparison of Plato’s and Cicero’s philosophy.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{110} J. G. F. Powell, “Cicero’s Translations from Greek,” in \textit{Cicero the Philosopher}, ed. J. G. F. Powell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 279-280. Powell also further distinguishes between acknowledged quotations and passages that are freely adapted or summarized.}
the essence of the soul is self-motion, which is both animate and eternal. He also uses Plato’s account of the three parts of the soul (reason, irrational appetite, and anger), and Xenophon’s description of the immortal soul shackled by the flesh. Concerning virtue, Cicero uses Plato to argue against Epicurus that virtue alone (without need of external goods) leads to happiness. Other than these few statements—and the Timaeus, which we will discuss shortly—Cicero’s translations of Greek texts import very little Greek philosophy into the Latin realm.

To understand the Latin teaching of the Platonic theory of the “Forms,” we will look briefly at Cicero’s translation of Timaeus 28a. Plato’s Greek text is this: ὅτου μὲν οὖν ἀν ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταυτὰ ἔχον βλέπων ἀεί, τοιοῦτῳ τινὶ προσχρωμένος παραδείγματι, τὴν ιδέαν καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἀπεργάζηται…. Cicero translates this section into Latin as: Quocirca si is qui aliquod munus efficere molitur eam speciem, quae semper eadem, intuebitur atque id sibi proponet exemplar…(Timaeus 2).

There are two points of interpretation to be made here. The first regards the demiurge:

115 Cicero’s translation includes only sections 27d-47b of Plato’s Timaeus.
where Plato has simply “δηµιουργός” (the demiurge), Cicero paraphrases as “is qui aliquod munus efficere molitur” (he who sets himself to carry out a task). As Lévy says, “Cicero’s translation expresses some subjectivism, because he does not say efficit but molitur efficere.”\(^{116}\) The will of the demiurge and the accomplishment of his will are separated temporally in Cicero’s translation where they are not in Plato’s original: this space between will and accomplishment allows the possibility of constraint. The second point concerns the “pattern”: Plato says “τοιούτῳ τινι προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι ἀπεργάζηται” (the demiurge produces according to some such a pattern). The pattern or paradigm of Plato is a reality that has existence independent of the demiurge’s production. Cicero’s translation undermines the ontological reality of this pattern for he says that the demiurge “id sibi proponet exemplar” (places it before himself as an exemplar). The pattern is something that the demiurge controls, something that he brings to mind at will. Cicero’s translation of the Timaeus, then, is a Stoicized version of Plato’s myth of creation. Of particular interest to us is that Plato’s realm of intelligibles as the pattern for the created world subtly shifts through Cicero’s translation to become a mental construct of the demiurge.\(^{117}\)

\(^{116}\) Carlos Lévy, “Cicero and the Timaeus,” in Plato’s Timaeus as Cultural Icon, ed. Gretchen Reydams-Schils (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 104. Lévy notes that Cicero confuse Plato’s hierarchical distinction between the noetic world and nature and, in general, has trouble conceptualizing the world of intelligibles as anything beyond nature (Lévy, 104). See also p. 100: “Whereas we still have difficulties with understanding the Platonic concept of the Demiurge, this problem was certainly even more complex at the time of Cicero, when Stoic immanence, the Epicurean rejection of any theory of a created world, and the New Academy’s refusal to perpetuate Platonic theories all were serious obstacles to the understanding of the demiurgic creation. Cicero’s difficulties concerning this concept are evident….” The result of Cicero’s immanent Stoicism is that his demiurge is constrained by nature and that the “pattern” of creation, rather than being the realm of forms as ontological existents, is a mental image in the mind of the demiurge.

\(^{117}\) Gersh comes to the same conclusion in his study of four other Ciceronian texts: Acad. 33, Orat. 7, Orat. 101, and Tuscalan Disputations 1.57-58 (Loeb 66-68). He says, “the view that the Forms dwell in or are sustained by the mind is a deviation from Plato which is of great significance for the future development of
In the Latin milieu, Plato’s theory of the “Forms” is influenced by Stoicism. Any “theory of Forms” that Hilary would have known could only be a Stoic-influenced version. The attribution of a Platonic theory of Forms or universals to Hilary’s teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity falls flat upon a study of the Stoic transmission and appropriation of the Platonic theory. Plato is charged by the Stoics with hypostasizing universals into “somethings” while the Stoics instead call them “quasi-somethings” to designate that universals do not have real existence but are only “concepts,” that is, figments of the human mind.\(^{118}\) For Plato the Forms are existents independent of mind, whereas the Stoics, as we have seen already from Cicero’s translation of the *Timaeus*, convert “Forms” into “ideas,” and these ideas now depend upon the mind thinking them; they have no external, real existence of their own. This same teaching can be seen in Seneca’s presentation of Platonic causes: when he deals with the formal cause, he specifically speaks of “ideas” and refers to them as conceptions in the mind of God:

To these four Plato adds a fifth [cause], - the pattern, which he himself calls the "idea"; for it is this that the artist gazed upon when he created the work that he had decided to carry out. Now it makes no difference whether he has this pattern outside himself, that he may direct his eyes to it, or within himself, conceived and placed there by himself. God has within himself these patterns of all things, and the numbers and the measures of all things that are to be done are comprehended by his mind; he is filled with these shapes that Plato calls the "ideas," - immortal, immutable, not subject to decay.\(^{119}\)

---


According to the Latin conception of the Forms or, more properly, ideas, a physical instantiation can not, by definition, be an instantiation of the universal idea because the ideas have no real external existence of their own.

Hilary’s understanding of Platonic Forms, through the Stoic lens of his education, would in no way be open to the concretization of a universal Form in the person of Jesus Christ for two reasons. Plato’s really existent “Forms” have been converted into mind-dependent “ideas” by the Stoics. The “ideas” have no real existence outside of the mind of God. Hilary’s understanding of Christ’s assumption of a real, physical, person, is quite different from the assumption of a mental construct.

After his Exile

Hilary’s Tractatus super Psalmos, written after his exile, between 364 and 367 A.D., shows an increased interest in Christ’s assumption of all humanity. This theme was present, if not prominent, in the pre-exilic In Matthaeeum. The question is: does Hilary’s increased interest in Christ’s assumption of all humanity arise from his contact with Greek thought, or is this increased interest the natural trajectory of his thought? I will deal with this question at length in Chapter 3 where I show that Hilary’s physicalist
redemption model—despite what has become the standard scholarly view since Harnack—is absolutely independent of any Platonic influence. Rather, Hilary develops the traditional Latin exegesis of the Adam-Christ parallel in a specific and unique way to come to his understanding of humanity’s presence in the incarnate body of Christ.

Hand in hand with Hilary’s increased interest in Christ’s assumption of all humanity is his increased attention to eschatology. We see in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* that these two themes become inextricably connected, though it is unclear whether one proceeded the other in Hilary’s interest. However, the consensus concerning Hilary’s eschatology is that, though there is occasional Alexandrian influence, it remains a quite typical Latin eschatology. Hilary’s eschatology in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* remains relatively uninfluenced either by Origen or Greek philosophy. If Hilary’s understanding of Christ’s assumption of all humanity is bound to his eschatological vision, his thoroughly Latin eschatology leads us to believe his is a similarly Latin soteriology.

**HILARY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH GREEK THEOLOGY**

**Irenaeus and Athanasius**

Strangely enough, while nearly every scholar on Hilary deals with the question of Origen’s influence, the influence of other Greek theologians, such as Irenaeus and Athanasius, especially on the post-exilic Hilary, remains relatively unstudied. Certainly,

---

future research in this area would be of great service. Doignon argues for a late dating of the Latin translation of Irenaeus’ placing it between 381 and 430. Only if this translation was completed at the beginning of this window is it even possible for Hilary to have read it before the writing of the *Tractatus super Psalms* in 364-367. Doignon further argues that, as Hilary’s knowledge of Greek prior to his exile was non-existent, Irenaeus can be eliminated as a direct source at least for Hilary’s pre-exilic theology. However, Irenaeus was known certainly by Tertullian, Novatian, and Lactantius, and perhaps by Cyprian, which would have allowed Irenaeus to influence Hilary indirectly through these Latin authors. On the other hand, Lécuyer argues that Hilary’s understanding of priesthood and the unity of the human race, in both the *In Matthaeum* and the *Tractatus super Psalms*, derives from Irenaeus. However, Lécuyer advances his argument solely on the basis of his perception of a similarity of ideas between Irenaeus and Hilary without any documentary proof that would demonstrate direct contact. Doignon’s position of denying the direct influence of Irenaeus, at least for the pre-exilic Hilary, must be preferred. Further study is necessary to demonstrate whether Hilary came into contact with Irenaeus’ works during or after his exile.

Despite the general conclusion that Hilary’s condemnation and exile in 356 were the result of his defense of Athanasius, as yet there is no scholarship that conclusively demonstrates a direct influence of Athanasius on Hilary. On the contrary, Williams

---

124 Jean Daniélou (“Saint Hilaire, évêque et docteur,” in *Hilaire de Poitiers: Évêque et docteur* [Paris : Études Augustiniennes, 1968], 17) argues that Hilary knew Athanasius (in addition to Origen, Marcellus, Basil of Ancyra and Photius). He footnotes Smulders who, unfortunately, does not back him up, but, citing similarities and differences between Hilary and Athanasius, Smulders suggests that it might be more
rules out any direct influence at least on the pre-exilic Hilary of Athanasius’ *Contra Arianos*, a work that he wrote while exiled in the West during the early 340s. Ayres pronounces ignorance while Hanson concludes that it is best to assume that Hilary never had direct knowledge of Athanasius’ works but picked up some Athanasian ideas during his exile through discussion with Eastern pro-Nicenes such as Marcellus and Basil of Ancyra. Knowledge of some of Athanasius’ teachings could have come to Hilary through his association with Eusebius of Vercelli. Eusebius participated in the Synod of Alexandria of 362 that produced the *Tomus ad Antiochenos*, written by Athanasius.

**Origen and Eusebius of Caesarea**

There continues to be significant debate concerning the depth of Hilary’s debt to Origen. However, a few points are clear. First, as we noted in the previous chapter,
Hilary had no knowledge of Origen’s theology prior to his exile. Second, during or after his exile, Hilary had some contact, either direct or indirect, with some of the works of Origen.

Studies concerning Hilary’s relationship to Origen have centered upon verbal parallels between the exegetical works of Hilary and Origen. The conclusion of these studies is that Hilary was not influenced by Origen in his commentary on Matthew but was influenced by him for his Psalm commentaries. Doignon’s comparison of the Commentaries on Matthew by both Hilary and Origen leads him to conclude that at the time Hilary wrote the In Matthaeum, he had not yet been influenced by Origen. The work of Émile Goffinet showing the parallels between Hilary’s Tractatus super Psalmos and Origen’s various commentaries on the psalms, despite serious methodological flaws, convincingly demonstrates Hilary’s dependence on Origen in his Instructio and in his commentaries on Psalms 1, 2, 9, 13 and 14. The work of Alice Whealey on a fragment on the Psalms called the De Magistris catena, first attributed to Hippolytus, then to Origen in 1884 by Jean-Baptiste Pitra, helps to clarify Origen’s influence on Hilary’s

128 Doignon argues that whatever similarities there are between Hilary and Origen in Hilary’s pre-exilic In Matt., they are not the result of direct contact. Rather, Hilary is dependent upon Tertullian who, while not subject to the direct influence of Origen, uses many of the same sources as Origen in their common aversion to Marcionism: principally Irenaeus, but also Philo and Hippolytus (Avant l’exil, 183-5).

129 Émile Goffinet, Utilisation d’Origene. Goffinet’s study attributes the Palestinian chains to Origen; however, the work done by von Balthasar, Rondeau, and Mühlenberg have shown that these commentaries derive from Evagrius of Pontus, not Origen. See Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Die Hiera des Evagrius.” Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 63 (1939): 86-106; 181-206; Marie-Josèphe Rondeau, “Le Commentaire sur les Psaumes d’Évagre le Pontique,” Orientalia Christiana Periodica 26 (1960): 327-348; Ekkehard Mühlenberg, Psalmenkommentare aus der Katenenüberlieferung, vol 1 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter), 1975. The index of Mühlenberg is especially helpful for separating the Evagrian material from that published under the name of Origen in Migne (PG 12, 17, 23). For analyses and critiques of Goffinet’s study, see Rondeau, ibid.; Gastaldi, Hilaro de Poitiers exégeta, 49-51; Charles Kannengiesser, “Exégese d’Hilaire,” 133.
Instructio. Following Pierre Nautin, she distinguishes between two different psalm commentaries written by Origen. Origen’s first commentary, which was only on the first 15-25 Psalms and was the product of his youth in Alexandria, was written between 222 and 230 A.D. The second, more extensive commentary was written in Caesarea between 246 and 247 A.D. She concludes that Hilary used only the prologue from Origen’s earlier Alexandrian commentary for his own Instructio, but he followed this prologue very closely.

György Heidl’s study on Origen’s influence on Augustine includes an appendix concerning Hilary’s relationship to Origen’s commentary on Genesis, specifically concerning the theme of the double creation of man. Through a complicated process of cross comparisons with several texts, Heidl comes to the dubious conclusion that Hilary’s Tractate on Psalm 129 derives from a no-longer-extant Latin compilation of Origen’s Commentary on Genesis, done by Novatian as a help for his own De Trinitate.

---

130 Alice Whealey, “Prologues on the Psalms: Origen, Hippolytus, Eusebius,” Revue Bénédictine 106 (1996): 234-245. In 1884, Jean-Baptiste Pitra (Analecta Sacra spicilegio Solesmensi, vol. 2 [Frascati, 1884], 403-404, 428-435) argued that the bulk of this catena was taken from one of Origen’s works on the psalms. He made this argument because it shows numerous parallels with the prologue of Hilary’s Tr. ps. However, Pitra was not careful in noting which elements of the catena do not belong to Origen and so his point that there are so many parallels between the catena and Hilary was ignored by later scholars.


132 In addition to these two commentaries, the Alexandrian and the Caesarean, Origen delivered a series of homilies on the psalms, ca. 239-242. He may also have written a series of notes, or scholia on the psalms. See Craig Blaising and Carmen Hardin, Psalms 1-50, Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture: Old Testament 7 (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2008), xix.


135 Heidl believes that Gregory of Elvira also relied on this compilation (see Heidl, Origen’s Influence, 120). Unfortunately, Heidl’s work suffers from his method of comparison. Heidl uses the Tractatus Origenis as the standard to which he compares both Hilary’s Tr. ps. 129 and Novatian’s De Trinitate 6.5-7.3. From these comparisons, he argues that both Hilary and the author of the Tractatus Origenis depend upon Novatian’s hypothetical translation and compilation of Origen, which he then used in the writing of
Heidl compares Hilary’s *Tractatus super psalmos* 129.3-6 with the Latin *Tractatus Origenis de libris sacrarum scripturam*, discovered by Batiffol-Wilmart and published in 1900. These 20 homilies were attributed to Origen, and the translator has long been considered to be Gregory of Elvira. Heidl, against the standard scholarly position, argues for the unlikeliness of this attribution. Heidl concludes, based on the obvious parallels between Hilary’s *Tractatus super psalmos* 129 and *Tractatus Origenis* 1, that both these sources are indebted to Origen’s interpretation of Gen. 1-3 as the double creation of man. Heidl argues that neither Hilary nor the author of the *Tractatus Origenis* knew enough Greek to read Origen in the Greek; rather, they both relied upon a previous Latin compilation of Origen’s text. Heidl proposes that Novatian is the author of this Latin compilation of Origen. Heidl believes that Gregory of Elvira also relied on this proposed compilation accomplished by Novatian.

Unfortunately, Heidl’s work suffers from his method of comparison. Heidl uses the *Tractatus Origenis* as the standard to which he compares both Hilary’s *Tractatus super psalmos* 129 and Novatian’s *De Trinitate* 6.5-7.3. From these comparisons, he argues that both Hilary and the author of the *Tractatus Origenis* depend upon Novatian’s *De Trinitate*. However, Heidl does not compare Hilary with Novatian for the reason that there is no textual comparison to be made: Novatian’s *De Trinitate* demonstrates anti-anthropomorphic argumentation; Hilary’s *Tr. ps.* 129 is concerned with double creation. The posited relationship of dependence of Hilary upon Novatian regarding Origenian interpretation finds its only support in the later *Tractatus Origenis*, which includes both Novatian’s anti-anthropomorphism and Hilary’s double creation: both of which supposedly derive from Novatian’s hypothetical translation of Origen. Heidl offers two arguments against the standard attribution. First, Heidl says that this translation seems to depend upon Rufinus’ translation, which would put the date of this work after 404, when Gregory would have been in his nineties, if alive at all. Second, if Rufinus’ translation incorporated an earlier Latin translation and this earlier translation was what was used by Gregory, there is still a problem of terminology, namely the *Tractatus Origenis* makes no use of the post-Nicene terminology characteristic of Gregory’s *De Fide*. See Heidl’s Appendix 3: Some Traces of a Latin Compilation of Origen’s Commentary on Genesis, (*Origen’s Influence*, 237-272).

---

136 Heidl, *Origen’s Influence*, 289.
138 Heidl, *Origen’s Influence*, 120
hypothetical translation and compilation of Origen, which he then used in the writing of his *De Trinitate*. However, Heidl does not compare Hilary with Novatian for the reason that there is no textual comparison to be made: Novatian’s *De Trinitate* demonstrates anti-anthropomorphorphic argumentation; Hilary’s *Tractatus super psalmos* 129 is concerned with double creation. While Heidl argues that both Novatian’s *De Trinitate* and Hilary’s *Tractatus super Psalms* derive from Novatian’s hypothetical translation of Origen, the posited relationship of dependence of Hilary upon Novatian regarding Origenian interpretation finds its only support in the later *Tractatus Origenis*, which includes both Novatian’s anti-anthropomorphism and Hilary’s double creation. Heidl is not able to show in Hilary’s own writings any direct Origen influence.

In the case of Hilary’s *Tractatus super Psalms*, there is another question related to the influence of Origen, namely the possible influence of the *Commentarii in Psalms* by Eusebius of Caesarea. While Hilary’s years of exile in the East undoubtedly improved his ability with the Greek language, Jerome observes that Hilary’s grasp of Greek was poor and therefore he had his secretary, Heliodore, assist him in translating Origen. Doignon agrees that even after his exile, Hilary only had a rudimentary knowledge of Greek. Furthermore, in his 61st epistle, in which he attributes to Hilary a translation of Origen’s Psalm commentaries, Jerome also attributes to Eusebius of Vercelli a now-lost Latin translation of Eusebius of Caesarea’s Psalm commentary.

---

141 See Jerome, *Epistula* 34.5 (ed. Isidore Hilberg, CSEL 54 [Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1996], 264). Jerome here accuses Heliodore, not Hilary, of mistranslating Origen in Hilary’s *Tr. ps*.
143 Jerome, *Epistula* 61.2 (CSEL 54 577.12-17): si hoc crimen est, arguat ur confessor hilarius, qui psalmorum interpretationem et homilias in iob ex libris eius, id est ex graeco, in latinum transtulit, sit in
Eusebius of Vercelli, like Hilary, was exiled, though Eusebius went to Syria, Cappadocia and finally Upper Egypt, while Hilary went to Phrygia. After their return from exile, Eusebius and Hilary traveled together (towards the end of 362) in Gaul, Italy and east as far as Sirmium promoting the pro-Nicene cause. If Eusebius of Vercelli indeed translated the *Commentarii in Psalmos* by Eusebius of Caesarea, he would have done so during his exile or after (before his death in 371) making it likely that Hilary would have had knowledge of, and perhaps access to, his friend’s work.

Nevertheless, rarely is the possible Latin translation of Eusebius of Caesarea’s Psalm commentary taken into account in the study of influences for Hilary’s *Tractatus super Psalmos*. Newlands, one of the few to mention the possibility of Eusebius of Vercelli’s translation, argues that Hilary’s *Tractatus super Psalmos* “is often nearer to Eusebius of Caesarea than to Origen” and that “Hilary’s use of Origen probably comes through Eusebius on the psalms.”

Gastaldi, on the other hand, argues that the points of contact between Eusebius and Hilary come from their shared source of Origen and not from direct contact. However, Gastaldi himself notes that lack of textual material from Origen limits textual comparison between Hilary and Origen and, in particular, in very few places can texts from all three authors—Hilary, Eusebius of Caesarea, and Origen—culpa eiusdem confessionis uercellensis eusebius, qui omnium psalmorum commentarios hereticorum hominibus uertit in nostrum eloquium, licet heretica praetermittens optima quaeque transtulerit. Eusebius is accused of translating the psalm commentary of “his namesake.” In *De viris illustribus* 96, Jerome clarifies that this “namesake” is Eusebius of Caesarea.

---

144 See Ayres, *Nicea and its Legacy*, 178.
146 Gastaldi, *Hilario de Poitiers exégeta*, 76. Gastaldi presents a more in-depth study of the commentaries of Eusebius of Caesarea than Newlands, including several helpful tables comparing the text of Hilary’s *Tr. ps.* with Eusebius of Caesarea’s commentary (see 58-76). Gastaldi notes, for example, that in some psalms Hilary and Eusebius have up to 25 of the same Scriptural citations, however, they use these citations differently. Eusebius also customarily presents several different interpretations of each Scriptural text, while Hilary prefers to work with just one.
be lined up. Gastaldi therefore is very hesitant about his judgment that the commentaries of Hilary and Eusebius are related indirectly. Gastaldi also did not take into account the possibility that Hilary might have had access to a Latin translation of Eusebius’ commentary.

The issue of Hilary’s dependence upon Origen is further complicated with regard to Hilary’s methodology of Scriptural exegesis. There are several different opinions regarding Origen’s exegetical influence in this area. First, several scholars argue that Hilary’s division, in the *Tractatus super Psalms*, between exegesis according to the letter and according to the Spirit, as well as his acknowledgement that, at times, there is no literal meaning to the text, demonstrates that Hilary’s method of exegesis is in the Alexandrian tradition of allegory and Hilary derives his method from Origen.\(^{147}\) However, as Simonetti, Kannengeiser, and Burns all note, the exegetical method that Hilary “inherits” from Origen both predates Origen (in Philo, for instance) and can be found independent of Origen’s influence (as in Hippolytus).\(^{148}\) Second, Hilary’s method of exegesis remains consistent between the *In Matthaeum* and the *Tractatus super Psalms*. Goffinet believes that Hilary is able to appropriate from Origen’s Psalm commentary so freely because Origen’s exegesis was very similar to what Hilary was

---

\(^{147}\) See, for example, Orazzo, *Commento ai Salmi*, 25. However, in his extensive study of Hilary’s exegesis Gastaldi (*Hilariò de Poitiers exègeta*, 74), argues that Origen’s influence is seen more clearly in Hilary’s *literal* exegesis than in his allegorical. Casamassa slightly alters the argument by saying that Hilary is practicing in the *Tr. ps.* the same allegorical exegesis that he already demonstrated in the *In Matt.*, with, however, greater prominence of the literal sense resulting from contact with Antiochene, not Alexandrian, exegesis (Antonio Casamassa, “Appunti per lo studio del ‘Tractatus super Psalms’ di S. Ilario,” *Studia Anselmiana* 27-28 (1951): 237).

already doing. Third, however, in both the *In Matthaueum* and the *Tractatus super Psalms*, Hilary’s conception of *ordo*, as the structuring principle of Scripture that guides and unifies interpretation is uniquely his own and sets him apart from Origen’s clear demarcations between the different levels of Scripture. Doignon finds that Tertullian already uses *ordo*—signaling the divine intention behind biblical facts—as a guiding principle to combat the dualism of Marcion. Burns adds that Hilary’s use of *ordo* has Stoic precedents. Hilary’s movement of exegesis between literal and spiritual senses, then, is possibly Latin rather than Alexandrian. The fact that Hilary’s exegesis is accomplished on a spiritual level as well as on a literal level does not, in itself, point to the influence of Origenian exegesis. Hilary’s method of reading Scripture according to the divine order finds its precedents in Latin, rather than Alexandrian exegesis.

---

149 See Goffinet, *Utilisation d’Origene*, 163-165.
150 See Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 45-55. See also Jean-Louis Lemaire, (“Histoire et exégèse dans l’*In Matthaueum* d’Hilaire de Poitiers,” in *Penser la foi: Recherches en théologie aujourd’hui; Mélanges offerts à Joseph Moingt*, ed. Joseph Doré and Christoph Theobald [Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1993]), who argues that *ordo* is the concept that makes Hilary’s exegesis “realist,” that is, typological rather than allegorical (like Origen). Doignon argues that in the *In Matthaueum*, Hilary has a method of exegesis completely different from that of Origen (*Avant l’exil*, 178-9). Kannengiesser takes the opposite view, namely, that Hilary’s realist exegesis based on *ratio* was well suited to Origen’s spiritual interpretation, allowing Hilary to easily appropriate it (Kannengiesser, “Exégèse d’Hilaire,” 137). De Margerie considers Hilary’s method of discerning the “ordo intelligentiae,” that is, his notion that the sequence of facts points to an inner intelligence or plan, one of Hilary’s major exegetical principles, present in both the *In Matt.* and the *Tr. ps.* (*Latin Fathers*, 51-52).
153 The position of Thomas Torrance represents a fourth, rather far-fetched option, namely that Hilary was greatly influenced by Origen and Alexandrian exegesis early on but then distanced himself and rejected its basic presuppositions in his later works (Thomas Torrance, “Transition to the West: The Interpretation of Biblical and Theological Statements According to Hilary of Poitiers,” in *Divine Meaning: Studies in Patristic Hermeneutics* [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995], 392).
154 Though it must be noted that Hilary’s and Origen’s commentaries on Matthew are the only extant patristic commentaries on that gospel that exegete according to the spiritual sense.
A more fruitful avenue of exegetical similarity between Origen and Hilary is found in the prosopological exegesis Hilary employs in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. But Origen is the first to systematically apply all the elements of pagan prosopological exegesis to the Psalter, namely, 1) the identification of the speaker, 2) use of the argument of “fittingness” to attach discourse to a character, 3) combination of prosopology and typology, and 4) use of technical vocabulary. Hilary takes his foundation for prosopology from Tertullian, but develops it in line with the systematic method of Origen. Nevertheless, our understanding of all exilic influences, both philosophical and theological, must keep in mind the work of Gastaldi showing the consistency of Hilary’s vocabulary throughout his writing career. Through his extensive study, Gastaldi shows that there are only three words in the *In Matthaeum* completely absent in the *Tractatus*

---


157 Rondeau shows (*Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2, *Exégèse prosopologique*, 323) that Hilary’s prosopological use of the word “persona”, reflects Tertullian’s use of *persona* to show a real distinction of subjects in the Godhead (against the Sabellians). Hilary uses *persona* in a Trinitarian context to distinguish between the Father and Son as two different, speaking subjects. This use reflects Tertullian’s formula: “the speaker and person spoken of and person spoken to cannot be regarded as one and the same” (see Tertullian, *Aduersus Praxeum* 11.4 [ed. A. Kroymann and E. Evans, in *Tertulliani Opera, pars 2: Opera Montanistica*, CCL 2 (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954), 1171.34-35]: non posse unum atque eundem uideri qui loquitur et de quo loquitur et ad quem loquitur). See Chapter 7 for a fuller discussion of *persona*, the prosopological method, and Hilary’s relationship to Tertullian on these issues.

158 Rondeau, *Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2, *Exégèse prosopologique*, 38. Rondeau argues that even if Hilary comes to different theological conclusions than Origen, he is still using the same method. Hilary’s manner of deciphering the speaker according to the category of “fittingness” (83) is reminiscent of Origen, who criticizes Celsus for attributing to Christians things which are not fitting (51).

super Psalmos and only four words in the Tractatus super Psalmos that are not present in the In Matthaeeum.\textsuperscript{160} Gastaldi notes that work has already shown that Hilary’s technical expressions in the In Matthaeeum are directly in line with the tradition of Latin rhetoric.\textsuperscript{161} The continuity of these expressions throughout Hilary’s writing career seems to indicate that Greek influence never significantly altered Hilary’s predominantly Latin framework.\textsuperscript{162}

THE INFLUENCE OF LATIN STOICISM ON HILARY’S CONCEPTION OF THE UNITY OF HUMANITY

The Latin version of the Platonic theory of Forms is incompatible with Hilary’s teaching that Christ assumes all of humanity in his incarnation. However, other ideas in the Latin philosophical tradition are compatible with, and were perhaps formative of, Hilary’s vision of Christ’s assumption of all humanity.\textsuperscript{163} In particular, the Stoic concept of uniuersitas seems to be influential on Hilary’s thought.\textsuperscript{164}

For Hilary, the human race enjoys a prior unity that makes it apt to be assumed, as one entity, by the Son. Hilary signals his belief in this unity through his use of the christological use of the term, which already has currency in Stoicism, uniuersitas.\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{160} See Gastaldi, Hilario de Poitiers exégeta, 88-89.
\textsuperscript{161} See Gastaldi, Hilario de Poitiers exégeta, 90.
\textsuperscript{162} This framework includes spiritual exegesis for which Hilary had a complete vocabulary before his exile (see Gastaldi, Hilario de Poitiers exégeta, 90).
\textsuperscript{163} See Burns, The Christology in Hilary, 103-108, for a discussion of the Latin philosophical precedents of Hilary’s understanding of Christ’s assumption of all humanity through the incarnation.
\textsuperscript{164} See Pettorelli, (“Thème de Sion,” 213-214), who argues that Hilary’s use of uniuersitas takes up this Stoic theme.
\textsuperscript{165} We should note that Hilary’s christological use of uniuersitas is rather limited to four passages in his corpus: see In Matt. 11.3, De Trin. 11.16, Tr. ps. 54.9 and 64.4. Burns argues that for Hilary, while uniuersitas, corpus, and ciuitas are all terms that signify a unity of the human race, only uniuersitas points to a unity that is not initiated by Christ and is prior to him and encompasses the whole human race. When
For the Stoics, the *uniuersitas* is the universal city, the city of God and men. Though Hilary does not use *uniueristas* frequently in a christological context, when he does he shows that he has Christianized this Stoic city. Because Christ “is made the flesh of all of us” he is the meeting place of God and men; in Jesus is the assembly of all of humanity, the *uniuersitas*,¹⁶⁶ for his body is the “city” of the Stoics.¹⁶⁷

In his forthcoming work on Hilary’s *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Burns, like Petorelli, shows that Hilary’s use of “city” as the universal home of humanity and God is an expansion of the Stoic theme.¹⁶⁸ Burns considers the “city” to be Hilary’s “master metaphor.”¹⁶⁹ In *De Natura Deorum*, Cicero presents “the world as a common home or city of gods and people.”¹⁷⁰ In *De Finibus* Cicero again says that the world “is like a

---

¹⁶⁶ *De Trin. 11.16, Tr. ps. 54.9 and 64.4. See Petorelli, “Thème de Sion,” 222.
¹⁶⁷ Petorelli says that in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary presents Jesus as the assembly of all of humanity, the *uniuersitas* (“Thème de Sion,” 222). See Malcolm Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). Schofield uses Cicero’s argumentation from *De natura deorum* 2.3 (Loeb 124) as an example of Stoic understanding of the “cosmic city”: “The fundamental premise is the proposition (1) that it is true of men and gods alone that by use of reason they live in accordance with justice and law. This proposition is taken to license the inference that (2) men and gods form a community or a city. It is then assumed (3) that the location of this city is the universe itself” (64-65). See also Burns’ treatment of the Stoic conception of the city in *The Christology in Hilary*, 106.
¹⁶⁸ See Burns, “Hilary of Poitiers’ *Tractatus*,” 69-75.
¹⁶⁹ See Burns, “Hilary of Poitiers’ *Tractatus*,” 75.
¹⁷⁰ Cicero, *De Natura deorum* 2.154 (Loeb 270-272): Restat ut doceam atque aliquando perorem, omnia quae sint in hoc mundo, quibus utantur homines, hominum causa facta esse et parata. Principio ipso mundus deorum hominumque causa factus est, quaeque in eo sunt ea parata ad fructum hominum et inventa sunt. Est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum domus aut urbs utrorumque; soli enim ratione utentes iure ac lege vivunt. Schofield introduces his presentation of the Stoic conception of the
common city or state of men and gods, and each one of us is part of this world...”\(^{171}\)

From the theme of the our citizenship in this city, Cicero outlines the natural disposition
of humanity that is oriented toward common interest: “we are naturally disposed towards
the gathering of men and towards fellowship and community of humanity.”\(^{172}\) Seneca
picks up this theme of global citizenship.\(^{173}\)

The Stoic conception of universal fellowship in the cosmic city depends upon the
rational nature that is shared by both gods and men. For example, Cicero says:

> Therefore, since there is nothing better than reason, and this exists in both man and god,
> the first association of man with god is in reason. But those who have reason in common
> also have right reason in common; and since that is law, we men must also be considered
to be associated with the gods in law. But further, those who have law in common have
justice in common. And those who have these things in common must be held to belong
to the same city.\(^{174}\)

Reason is proper to the nature of both gods and men and the possession of a rational
nature is the requisite for citizenship in the cosmic city.\(^{175}\) We see in this passage how

---

\(^{171}\) See Cicero, *De Finibus* 3.19.64: Mundum autem censent regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi
communem urblem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex
quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus.

\(^{172}\) Cicero, *De Finibus* 4.2.4 (Loeb 304): natosque esse ad congregationem hominum et ad societatem
communitatemque generis humani.

\(^{173}\) Seneca, *De Otio* 4.1, in *De Otio; De Brevitate uitaee*, ed. G. D. Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 39: Duas res publicas animo complectamur, alteram magnum et vere publicam qua
di atque homines continentur, in qua non ad hunc angulum respicimus aut ad illum sed terminos civitatis
nostre cum sole metimur, alteram cui nos adscripti condicio nascendi... Also *De Otio* 6.4 (41): nos certe
sumus qui dicimus et Zenonem et Chrysippum maiora egisse quam si duxissent exercitus, gessissent
honores, leges tulissent; quas non uni ciuitati, sed toti humano generi tulerunt. See also his *Epistulae
Morales* 28.4 (Loeb vol. 1, 200): Cum hac persuasione vivendum est: “non sum uni angulo natus, patria
mea totus hic mundus est.”

\(^{174}\) Cicero, *De legibus* 1.23 (in *De Re publica, De Legibus, Cato Maior de senectute, Laelius de amicitia*,
ratione melius, eaque <est> et in homine et in deo, prima homini cum deo rationis societas; inter quos
autem ratio, inter eodem etiam recta ratio {et} <communis est; quae cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati
homines cum dis putandi sumus; inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos communio iuris est. Quibus
autem haec sunt {inter eos communis} <8> et ciuitatis eiusdem habendi sunt.

\(^{175}\) See Schofield’s explanation of Cicero’s understanding of reason in *De legibus* 1.23 (Powell 168-169):
Schofield, *Stoic Idea of the City*, 69-74. Schofield explains that the Stoics reject the idea that the authority
Cicero moves from reason to justice: in his descriptions of this common city, Cicero’s description of the citizens’ participation in reason always leads to ethical injunctions—reason leads ultimately to social obligation. In the end, it is the social virtue of justice that is found only in men and gods and so it is that virtue that binds men to gods.

The Stoics understand the unity of the members of this city not as a gathering of many, but as a single totality. According to Pettorelli, the best way of understanding this totality—which is not an abstract but a concrete reality—is as a body. For example, when Hilary in Book 2 of the *De Trinitate*, speaks of the “body of the uniuersitas of humanity” he is accomplishing two things: 1) he is highlighting this Stoic conception of unity; 2) he is going even one step further than the Stoics. Whereas they understood the unity of the universal city from shared reason to be such that its members were joined into something *like* a body; Hilary now takes all abstraction out of this scenario. The members of this city are not like a body, they are a body; they are the concrete body of the particular person Jesus Christ.

---

of law is external, that is, that it comes from the state. Rather, they insist that law derives its authority from right reason, from, as we would say, individual good conscience. However, that Stoic argumentation makes it difficult for Cicero to show how reason can serve as the basis for unity: just because two people share right reason does not, in and of itself, mean they form a community. See also, Cicero, *De Officiis* 1.153 (trans. Walter Miller, Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913], 156-158) where Cicero gives wisdom, namely the knowledge of those things concerned with the bonds between men and gods, pride of place.

176 Schofield, *Stoic Idea of the City*, 72, 73: “So the reason which men and gods have in common is not simply prescriptive reason without further qualification. It is prescriptive reason instructing them how to treat each other as social animals….It follows that the Stoic idea of a city is nothing but an idea of a community founded on common acceptance of social norms.” See also *De officiis*, 1.153: …illa autem sapientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia, in qua continetur deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos; ea si maxima est, ut est, certe nesse est, quod a communitate ducatur officium, id esse maximum.

177 Cicero *De legibus* 1.25 (Powell 170.2-8): ex quo efficitur illud, ut is agnoscat deum, qui unde ortus sit, quasi recordetur. Iam vero virtus eadem in homine ac deo est, neque alio ullo in genere praeterea; est autem virtus nihil aliud nisi perfecta et ad summum perducta <natura>; naturalis est igitur homini cum deo similitudo. Quod cum ita sit, quae tandem esse potest propior certiorve cognatio?


179 *De Trin.* 2.24 (CCL 62 60.7-9) : perque huius admixtionis societatem sanctificatum in eo uniuersi generis humani corpus existeret.
It is fair to say that the Stoic description of the universal bond of humanity and
gods as a “city” is developed in Hilary’s understanding of the relationship of humanity,
each to another and to God in the body of Christ. However, Hilary argues an entirely
different reason for this fellowship. Hilary, as we saw, uses the Stoic conception of
uniuersitas to place the universal city in Christ’s body. However, in his emphasis on the
body of Christ as the basis for unity in the city, Hilary does not follow the Stoics in
seeing reason as the ultimate basis for fellowship in this city. Also unlike the Stoics,
Hilary does not use the metaphor of the common city always as the springboard for a
discussion of ethical imperatives. Our participation in the city of Christ’s body is as often
a demonstration of Christ’s power to draw all humanity into himself in the incarnation as
it is a prescription for moral rectitude.

If philosophy provides the terminology and impetus for Hilary’s teaching that
Christ assumes all of humanity in the incarnation, the philosophy in question is Stoicism
not Platonism. Stoicism provides a base for seeing humanity as a unified entity who, as a
single totality, live together with the gods in a “city.” Hilary both Christianizes and
concretizes this conception by specifically calling this city of all humanity the body of
Christ.\textsuperscript{180}

\textbf{LATIN THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT FOR HILARY’S PHYSICALIST MODEL OF REDEMPTION}

\textsuperscript{180} See \textit{In Matt.} 4.12 (SC 254 130.3-9): Civitatem carnem quam adsumperat nuncupat, quia, ut civitas ex
varietate ac multitudine consistit habitantium, ita in eo per naturam suscepi corporis quaedam universi
generis humani congregatio continetur. Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congregacione fit civitas et nos per
consortium carnis suae sumus civitatis habitatio.
Hilary combines the Stoic conception of the city of all humanity with a particular literal method of reading Paul to achieve his unique Christian understanding of the incarnation as Christ’s assumption of all humanity into his body. Hilary is not the only Latin theologian to use terminology that seems to point to a physicalist doctrine of redemption. For example, Tertullian says “we are all made to live in Christ.”

However, the significance that Pauline thought and language play in Hilary’s own theology, combined with his unique development of Pauline theology, lead Hilary to be the only Latin author to consistently argue that Christ physically assumes all humanity in the incarnation and to present a theological system that thoroughly and coherently bears out the implications of this physical understanding. For example, Hilary, throughout his career, becomes increasingly more insistent that the Church is the physical body of Christ. The community of believers who make up the Church, according to this logic, exist as part of the physical body of Christ. On the contrary, Tertullian explicitly says that Paul’s analogy of the Church as the body of Christ is figurative, and that Christians, as the Church, are only in Christ’s body in a metaphorical sense. While Tertullian is one of the greatest influences on Hilary’s thought, he does not provide a theological

---

181 Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem 5.9.5 (CCL 1 689.13): ... in christo uiuificamur omnes...  
182 For the significance of Paul in Hilary’s thought, see Wilhelm Wille who, in his study of Hilary’s In Matthaeum (Studien zum Matthäuskommentar des Hilarius von Poitiers [Hamburg, 1969], 103-108), shows that Hilary refers to Paul fifty times in the Commentary on Matthew—far more than to any other Scriptural source (barring Matthew himself).  
183 Tr. ps. 125.6 (CCL 61B 62.24-26): Ipse est enim ecclesia, per sacramentum corporis sui in se uniuersam eam continens.  
184 Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem 5.19.6 (CCL 1 722.18-7): Sicubi autem et ecclesiam corpus christi dicit esse - ut hic ait adimplere se reliqua pressuram christi in carne pro corpore eius, quod est ecclesia -, non propterea et in totum mentionem corporis transferens a substantia carnis. Nam et supra reconciliari nos ait in corpore eius per mortem, utique in eo corpore, in quo mori potuit, per carmen mortuus et non per ecclesiam, plane propter ecclesiam corpus commutando pro corpore, carnale pro spirituali.
precedent for this aspect of Hilary’s understanding of Christ’s assumption of all humanity.\(^{185}\)

Cyprian is another possibility as a Latin source for Hilary’s understanding of the incarnation as Christ’s assumption all of humanity into his body, for Cyprian is the first Latin theologian to say that Christ “bore us in himself.” However, Cyprian’s emphasis with this phrase is quite different from what we find with Hilary: while Hilary’s understanding of the presence of humanity in Christ leads him to center his theology (in particular, soteriology, ecclesiology, and eschatology) in the physical body of Christ, Cyprian understands this presence of humanity as a demonstration for the need for both unanimity within the Church (“God, the teacher of peace and concord, who taught unity, thus wished one to pray for all, just as He Himself bore all in one”\(^{186}\)) and the unity of believers with Christ accomplished in the Eucharist:

For because Christ, who bore our sins, also bore us all, we see that people are understood in the water, but in the wine the blood of Christ is shown. But when water is mixed with wine in the chalice, the people are united to Christ, and the people of the believers is bound and joined to Him in whom they believe. … Whence nothing can separate the Church…from Christ…\(^{187}\)

---

\(^{185}\) However, certain theological elements that Hilary brings to bear on this understanding of the incarnation and its effects—for example in anthropology and Trinitarian theology—do find their source in Tertullian. In anthropology Tertullian mediates the Stoic view of cooperation between body and soul (see Chapter 4 for a greater treatment). Tertullian’s two-stage logos theory is influential on Hilary’s early Trinitarian theology and consciously rejected later (see Chapter 7).


\(^{187}\) Cyprian, *Epistula* 63.13 (CCL 3C 406.227-407.231, 233-235): Nam quia nos omnes portabat Christus qui et peccata nostra portabat, uidemus in aqua populum intellegi, in uino uero ostendi sanguine Christi. Quando autem in calice uino aqua miscetur, Christo populus adnatur et credentium plebs ei in quem creditit copulatur et iungitur….Vnde ecclesiam…nulla res separare poterit a Christo…. The copenetration of Christ in us and us in Christ appears most strikingly in Cyprian’s discussion of the Eucharist. See also *Epistula* 69.5 (CCL 3C 476.107-477.109): Nam quando dominus corpus suum panem uocat de multorum granorum adunatione congestum, populum nostrum quem portabet indicat adunatum…
The union of Christ with the people is the result of two things: 1) on the part of Christ, he joins himself with the people in the incarnation where he bears both the people and their sins; 2) on the part of the people, they join themselves to Christ by believing in him. Through the incarnation and faith, the people of the believers, namely the Church, becomes inseparable from Christ.

Cyprian, like Hilary, speaks of our resurrection and our eschatological reign in Christ: “For since he himself is the resurrection, because we rise in him, so too he can be understood as the kingdom of God, because we are to reign in him.” However, whereas for Hilary, both the place and the cause of humanity’s unity, each with another and as a whole to God, is always the body of Christ, Cyprian envisions the place of our unity more specifically and practically as the Church and offers several different causes for this unity. Cyprian does speak of the “people being glued together into a unified body” but this glue is “concord.” “Concord” and “unanimity” are two terms that, for Cyprian, describe the unity of the Church and it is the job of the bishop to preserve this unanimity of concord. The bishops, as ministers of the sacraments, “hold the unity of the Church.” For this reason, the unity of the Church finds its focal point in the

---

188 Cyprian, *De Dominica oratione* (CCL 3A 97.227-229): Nam cum resurrectio ipse sit, quia in ipso resurgimus, sic et regnum Dei potest ipse intellegi, quia in illo renaturi sumus.
190 Cyprian, *Epistula 69.5* (CCL 3C 477.115-116): …ecclesiae unitatem tenere. For bishop’s sacramental power of unity, see, for example, *Epistula 69.5* (CCL 3C 476.105-107): Denique unanimitatem christianam firma sibi atque inseparabili caritate conexam etiam ipsa dominica sacrificia declarant. See also *Epistula 72.1* (CCL 3C 523-24) concerning baptism.
bishop: “There is one God and one Christ, and one Church, and one Chair founded on Peter by the word of the Lord.”¹⁹¹

Cyprian’s eschatological vision of unity is based on his practical understanding of the Church where unity is found in the physical person of the bishop. Both Hilary’s eschatology and ecclesiology, however, remain consistently focused on the body of Christ. While Hilary’s understanding of the presence of humanity in Christ leads him to center his theology (in particular, soteriology, ecclesiology, and eschatology) in the physical body of Christ, Cyprian understands this presence of humanity in Christ as a demonstration for the need for unanimity within the Church:

Though there seems to be no direct Latin precedent for Hilary’s physicalist model, we have still to ascertain whether Hilary is a fourth-century anomaly or whether this physicalist model of redemption based on Christ’s assumption of all humanity is characteristic of the Latin theology of the late fourth-century. Chromatius of Aquilae, raised to his bishopric some twenty years after Hilary’s death, and so another representative of Latin fourth-century theology, seems to reflect Hilary’s thought when he says that “Christ took from us what is ours so that he might give to us what is his.”¹⁹² However, the immediate context of Chromatius’ statement is that of revelation (not salvation or divinization): Christ becomes man as a means to “give to us what is his”, namely to reveal his invisible divinity. Furthermore, Chromatius has a specific anti-Apollinarian agenda to show that Christ assumed the whole human person. For example,

¹⁹¹ Cyprian, Epistula 43.5 (CCL 3C 511.76-79): Deus unus est et Christus unus et una ecclesia et cathedra una super Petrum domini uoce fundata.
he says that in Joseph’s dream, “[the angel] clearly declares that the Son of God, perfect
God, has taken up perfect man, that is not only a body, but also a soul…for it was
necessary that the Lord take up both so that he might save both.” Chromatius’
emphasis is not that Christ takes up every man but that he take up a whole man, body and
soul. Chromatius further distances himself from Hilary’s theology by giving primary
importance to Christ’s death, rather than the incarnation, as the moment of salvation. The
death of Christ, according to Chromatius, saves us both by its sacrificial nature and its
triump over the devil. Chromatius, then, serves not as another Latin representative of
the “Greek” physicalist model but rather as a representative of the traditional soteriology
of fourth-century Latin theology, what is termed the “moral” or “juridical” model.

The nearest Latin counterpart to Hilary as regards his teaching of Christ’s
assumption of all humanity is Gregory of Elvira (made bishop c. 357-359). Gregory at
times appears to have at least the rudiments of a physicalist model of redemption teaching
Christ’s assumption of all humanity. Furthermore, word for word parallels between
Gregory’s Tractatus origenis 1 and Hilary’s Tractatus super Psalms 129.4-6
demonstrate that there is some sort of direct contact between Gregory of Elvira and
Hilary. While the most likely scenario is that Gregory read Hilary’s Tractatus super

193 Chromatius, Tractatus in Matthaeum 7.1 (CCL 9A 224.3-6, 18-19): In eo quod dixit angelus ad ioseph: mortui sunt qui quarebant animam pueri, manifeste declarat filium dei, perfectum deum, perfectum hominem suscepisse, id est non solum corpus sed et animam….necessario Dominus utrumque suscepit, ut utrumque salvaret.
194 See Jossua, Salut: Incarnation ou mystère pascal, 156.
195 For the sacrificial nature of the death of Christ, see, Chromatius, Tractatus in Matthaeum 7.2 (CCL 9A 225.38-39): …sacrificium sui corporis obtulit pro nostra salute. For triumph over the devil, see Chromatius, Tractatus in Matthaeum 7.2 (CCL 9A 225.53-55): …et Dominus ac Saluator noster per suscepti corporis sacramentum leonem diabolum, extensis in cruce manibus, interemit. Jossua argues that Chromatius has no trace of the “Greek” perspective, namely the salvific effect of the union of natures in the incarnation (Salut: Incarnation ou mystère pascal, 152).
Psalmos, because the dating of nearly all of Gregory of Elvira’s works remains uncertain, it is possible that the influence went in the other direction. Further study on the parallels between Gregory and Hilary could help date Gregory’s works and shed light on the relationship between the two theologians.

Gregory of Elvira’s works offer interesting phrases and themes that bear some resemblance to Hilary’s physicalist model of redemption. However, Gregory’s thought in this area seems to be less thoroughly developed than Hilary’s. For example, Gregory says that “the Lord assumed into himself everything that is common (summam generalem) to the human body.” And again he says that “the Lord put on (induere) the body of the human race (humani generis).” Whether, indeed, he understands this in a physical fashion as Hilary does, and whether he extends this understanding of the incarnation into his entire theological system, remains to be discovered. Gregory does

197 Gregory wrote the first edition of *De fide* in 360, and the second in 363. Francis Buckley (*Christ and the Church according to Gregory of Elvira* [Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964], 163-165) argues that Gregory’s exegetical works were written after the *De fide*. Buckley bases his argument upon what he perceives as a more advanced ecclesiology present in these works as compared to the *De fide*. However, the lack of a developed ecclesiology in the *De fide* may be more the result of ecclesiology being, at best, a secondary interest in this work than of its earlier composition in relation to the exegetical works.


199 Gregory of Elvira, *Tractatus Origenis* 19.13 (CCL 69 139.104-109): Ceterum tityo extractus hab igne semustulatus, non percombustus ostenditur; corpus enim illut humani generis, quod ex protoplastorum transgressione et crimenhum flamma fuerat adustum, hoc induit dominus et quasi tityonem semistulatum a gehennae incendio liberauit….
teach explicitly that the Church is the flesh of Christ. Ladaria’s studies on the Adam-Christ parallel in both Hilary and Gregory of Elvira show that while Hilary uses the Adam-Christ parallel to develop his soteriological theme of the unity of all humanity in Adam unto death and in Christ unto life, Gregory does not develop this parallel as groundwork for presenting a unified humanity that can be assumed by Christ in the incarnation.

When Gregory of Elvira speaks of the incarnation, one of his favorite terms is “induere.” The same use is found in Eusebius of Vercelli, another of Hilary’s contemporaries and one with whom Hilary corresponded and even travelled. But while “induere” has currency within the fourth-century as a term for the incarnation, Hilary breaks with this tradition. Hilary does use induere, and frequently, to speak about baptism or our eschatological transformation but in his entire corpus, he uses it only once to refer to the incarnational assumption of humanity. Rather than induere, Hilary

---

200 See, for example, Gregory of Elvira, *In Canticum Canticorum libri quinque* 4.26 (CCL 69 205.191-193): Vnum sunt enim christus et ecclesia, quia erunt inquit duo in carne una, id est deus et homo.


202 For a list of Gregory’s use of induere, see Ladaria, “Gregorio de Elvira,” 692.


204 Hilary’s one use of induere to refer to the incarnation is in *Tr. ps.* 9.3 (CCL 61 74.9-16): Est enim occultum, Deum salutis humanae causa non in caelisti gloria et claritate nominis sui adfuisset, sed formam humani corporis ex communi originis genere induisse, sed exitisse ex uirgine et editam esse, absque nascendi initio procreatam. For Hilary’s use of induere to refer to baptism, see *De Trin.* 8.8. For induere referring to spiritual conversion (casting off the old man and putting on Christ) see *De Trin.* 12.48, and *Tr. ps.* 129.6. For induere as speaking about our eschatological transformation, see *Tr. ps.* 135.5.
begins the Latin tradition of using *adsumere* to speak about the incarnation.²⁰⁵ Hilary believes that Christ not only *clothes* himself with humanity, but the incarnation’s assumption of humanity culminates in the eschaton where Christ *assumes* humanity even *into* his own divinity.

Hilary’s break with the language of his fourth-century contemporaries manifests, I would argue, the novelty of his thought—though Hilary offers no recognition of novelty in either theology nor language. Hilary consciously rejects the standard use of *induere* to speak of the incarnation and instead appropriates *adsumere*, a verb that previously had only been used to speak of the ascension. In this nuance of language, we will see that Hilary’s idea of the incarnation differs from that of his contemporaries.

**CONCLUSION**

As has been argued by Doignon and Burns, Hilary’s pre-exilic influences are limited to Latin theology, principally Tertullian, and Latin philosophy, primarily Stoicism. Greek influence, either philosophical or theological, remains quite limited before his exile and is always mediated: in the case of philosophy, through Stoicism; in theology, largely through Tertullian.²⁰⁶ During or after his exile, there is little evidence verifying the influence of anything other than the psalm commentaries of both Origen and Eusebius of Caesarea—the first in Greek, the second possibly in the Latin translation

²⁰⁵ We will talk more about Hilary’s use of *adsumere* in Chapters 5 and 7. See Doignon, “‘Adsumo’ et ‘adsumptio’.”

of his colleague Eusebius of Vercelli. Direct influence of any of Origen’s other works or
the writings of Irenaeus or Athanasius remains unsubstantiated. Likewise, as we
established in Chapter 1, the Neoplatonism of fourth-century Asia Minor was of little
interest to Hilary.

Hilary’s teaching on Christ’s assumption of all humanity finds some impetus in
Stoicism’s use of “uniuersitas” and conception of the universal city. Likewise, some of
Cyprian’s language points in the direction of the unity of all humanity in Christ.
Nevertheless, without proven evidence of Athanasian influence, we must conclude that
Hilary’s theology of Christ’s assumption of all humanity is neither imported from the
East nor inherited from the West, but is an unprecedented development in Latin theology.
Further study on Gregory of Elvira will show whether he is a second fourth-century Latin
proponent of a physicalist model of redemption premised on Christ’s assumption of all
humanity and whether he came to this teaching through the same confluence of
influences as we see in Hilary or as a result of direct contact with Hilary.
CHAPTER 3
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HILARY’S
CHRISTOLOGY AND SOTERIOLOGY

This chapter will situate Hilary’s teaching on Christ’s assumption of all humanity within his christological and soteriological frameworks.

First, I will discuss Hilary’s christology and his use of the Scriptural framework of Philippians 2 to illustrate three distinct stages in the Son’s existence.

Second, I will discuss the relationship between christology and soteriology in general and in the case of Hilary. I will conclude that Hilary’s soteriological model based upon Christ’s assumption of all humanity is fully coherent with several different christological models.

Third, I will outline six major elements of the physicalist theory of redemption in order to demonstrate first, that Hilary does indeed teach a physicalist theory of redemption based upon Christ’s assumption of all humanity, and second, that Hilary, in manifesting a physicalist theory not based upon Platonic influence, calls for a reassessment of the scholarly understanding of this model of redemption.

Fourth, I will explore the presence of the more typical Latin atonement theory of redemption in Hilary’s soteriological framework. I will show that Hilary does teach the saving power of Christ’s death but this teaching is dependent upon the overarching framework of a physicalist redemption model emphasizing the incarnation and the resurrection of Christ as key salvific moments.

HILARY’S THREE-STAGE CHRISTOLOGY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF PHILIPPIANS 2

Hilary has a dynamic understanding of christology structured by the framework of Philippians 2.6-11 and especially the notions of forma dei and forma serui.1 Hilary’s

---

1 Hilary’s three stage christology in the context of the forma dei – forma serui of Philippians 2 can be found in Tr. ps. 2.27, 68.25, 126.17, 131.7, 138.5, 138.19,21-24, 143.7. See the useful section “Philippians 2 as a Hermeneutical Guide,” in Mark Weedman, The Trinitarian Theology of Hilary of Poitiers (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007), 130-135. Weedman says later that “the key to understanding Hilary’s christology is to recognize the weight he gives to Philippians 2.6-7 as the Christological proof-text” (137). Weedman argues that Hilary’s use of Philippians 2 in the De Trinitate has precedents neither in Hilary’s earlier work nor in the Latin tradition (161-163). Hilary only quotes this section of Philippians once in the In Matthaeum (In Matt. 16.11). Burns concurs and adds that neither can a precedent be found in the extant work of Origen (Burns, “Hilary of Poitiers’ Tractatus,” 189). Both Weedman and Burns suggest that Hilary’s treatment of Philippians 2 depends upon its use by Homoiousians, particularly Basil of Ancyra (Weedman, 161-168; Burns, 125-134, 189). However, the Ancyran texts use the language of “image” from Colossians 1.15, “form” from Philippians 2. 6-7 and “likeness” from Romans 8.3 to emphasize the distinctiveness of the Son against potential modalist interpretations associated historically with Sabellius and later with Marcellus of Ancyra and his student Photinus. Hilary, on the contrary, uses forma dei to highlight the unity and equality between Father and Son rather than distinction (see Weedman, 158-166; Burns, 128).
christology, as Grillmeier has noticed, prefers to use the three stages of the logos to make predicative distinctions rather than the static two natures. These three stages are preexistence (God), mortal life (God and man), and resurrected life (God and man).

Hilary outlines these stages often in the course of the Tractatus super Psalms. In his commentary on the second Psalm he says:

For when he said soon you will see the son of man sitting at the right hand of power (Mt. 26.64), he showed that time in which the son of man, who is both Christ and the Son of God, would be worthy of sitting with God: so that that which is then son of man—namely he who before was Son of God, and then also was son of man—should be born for the perfection of the Son of God: that is, for resuming and granting the glory which, while being in the body, he asked of the Father, to his eternal body through the power of the resurrection. For he who was in the form of God received the form of a slave. And he asks that the glory of God, in which he remained, be received by this form of a slave, saying: Father, glorify me with you with that glory which I had with you before the world came to be (Jn. 17.5).

In this section, Hilary wants to convey two main points. The first is that there is a unity of subject: it is the second person of the Trinity who is the actor in this movement between Son of God and son of man, between the form of God and the form of a slave.

Because it is the Son of God who becomes son of man, the reception of the glory of God and the sitting at God’s right hand are not something new to him nor something received for the first time. The second point balances the first: though the glorification is not something new to the Son of God, it is new to the Son of God now existing as the son of

---

3 Ladaria outlines these three stages in Cristología de Hilario, 3; in the context of Phillipians 2: 70-80.
4 Tr. ps. 2.27 (CCL 61 56.6-16): …cum enim ait: A modo uidebitis filium hominis sedentem ad dextris uirtutis, tempus quo filius hominis, qui et Christus et Dei Filius est, consessu Dei dignus esset ostendit, ut, qui antea Dei Filius, tum quoque et hominis filius esset, id quod tum hominis filius est ad perfectum Dei Filium, id est ad resumendam indulgendamque corpori aeternitatis suae gloriam per resurrectionis potentiam gigneretur, quam gloriam a patre corporeus reposcebat. Qui enim in forma Dei erat, formam serui acceperat; et acceptae huic formae serui gloriam Dei, in qua mansit, expostulat dicens: Pater, clarifica me apud te ipsum ea claritate quam habui, priusquam mundus esset apud te (Jn. 17.5). See Ladaria’s discussion of this passage in Cristología de Hilario, 243-246.
5 The forma dei and forma serui represent what Tertullian terms the first and second advents. See, for example, Tertullian, Aduersus Marcionem 3.7.3 (CCL 61 516.21-22): Quae ignobilitatis argumenta primo adventui competent, sicut sublimitatis secundo….
man; it is not new to the \textit{forma dei}, but it is new to the \textit{forma serui}. The glory he receives is the glory he had before, but he never had it before in the form of a slave.

Hilary uses the language of generation and birth to speak of the resurrection and the beginning of this third stage in the existence of the second person of the Trinity precisely because there is something \textit{new} here.\textsuperscript{6} Hilary explains that the resurrection, which is the Son’s return to what he was before time, is something new for the existence he has in time, that is, for the person Jesus Christ: “but being born to that which he was before time, nevertheless, he is born in time to be that which he was not.”\textsuperscript{7} Just as the incarnation is the birth of the Son of God into the son of man—in that he moves from the form of God to the form of man—so the resurrection and glorification is the birth of the son of man into the Son of God. With this birth of the resurrection a birth, as Hilary says, “has happened in time which is new but not strange.”\textsuperscript{8} However, the circle of the dispensation is not perfectly symmetrical: when the \textit{forma dei} finally returns to \textit{forma dei} at the resurrection it brings with it something new: the \textit{forma serui} which is glorified before God so that God might see it too as his Son.\textsuperscript{9} For the end to be exactly like the beginning, the body and the nature of humanity would have to be left behind. This is not,

\textsuperscript{6} Hilary speaks of Christ’s resurrection as a birth, \textit{a natiuitas}. Hilary uses \textit{natiuitas} in the \textit{Tr. ps.} to refer to the Son’s incarnation, his resurrection/glorification, and even his baptism, but he does not uses this term to speak of his eternal generation (for which he most often uses \textit{genitus}). In this avoidance of the term \textit{natiuitas} to speak of the eternal generation of the Son in the \textit{Tr. ps.}, Hilary shows a change from the \textit{De Trin.} where \textit{natiuitas} is the normal designator for the Son’s eternal generation. However, in both the \textit{De Trin.} and the \textit{Tr. ps.}, Hilary, unlike Lactantius, for example, never speaks of two births (\textit{natiuitas}), or a two-fold birth, to refer to Christ’s eternal generation and his incarnation. See Lactantius (\textit{Divinae Institutiones} 4.8.2 [CSEL 19 295.9-13]): \textit{qui cum esset a principio filius dei, regeneratus est denuo secundum carmen. quae duplex natiuitas eius magnum intuitit humanis pectoribus errorem circumfudit que tenebras etiam quis qui eurae religionis sacramenta retinebant.}

\textsuperscript{7} \textit{Tr. ps.} 2.27 (CCL 61 56.24-57.1): Sed nascens ad id quod ante tempora fuit, id tamen in tempore nascitur esse, quod non erat.

\textsuperscript{8} \textit{Tr. ps.} 2.33 (CCL 61 63.7-8): \textit{...fique sub tempore noua nec tamen inuisita natiuitas...}”

\textsuperscript{9} See, for example, \textit{Tr. ps.} 67.8 (CCL 61 266.23-24): Sed hos omnes de \textit{sepulcris} Dominus, qui in filios Dei regenerantur, \textit{eduxit}. See also \textit{Tr. ps.} 126.16 (CCL 61B 75.13-14): \textit{Nam merces eius hereditas est et hereditas filii sunt.}
however, what happens in Hilary’s model: the transformation of the body and nature of humanity is the reason behind the entire dispensation. For this reason, the *forma serui* is not to be discarded but to be transformed. ‘‘Even if the only-begotten Son of God has always reigned, he has not always reigned in the body.’’\(^{10}\) It is the Son’s reigning in his body—that is, in humanity—that is the final end of the incarnation.

Hilary uses the term *forma* in two different ways, and understanding the distinction between the two is necessary for understanding Hilary’s conception of the incarnation.\(^{11}\) Hilary uses both understandings of *forma* in his attempt to understand the nature of the incarnate God in his commentary on Psalm 68:

> For coming into the form of a slave he emptied himself of the form of God. For the one who can exist in the form of man while remaining in the form of God could not, however, be destroyed as form of God so that only the form of a slave remain. He is both emptying himself of the form of God and assuming the form of man, because that emptying of the form of God is not the death of the heavenly nature….\(^{12}\)

For the most part, *forma* refers not to nature but to the fundamental condition of the respective natures, that is, glory, power and majesty for the *forma dei*, humility and infirmity for the *forma serui*. Hilary says in this passage: “form and aspect and face and image do not differ in their meaning.”\(^{13}\) In this way, when Christ takes on the *forma serui*, the condition of humility that it entails is incompatible with the condition of glory which is the *forma dei*: he must empty himself of the *forma dei*, namely, estrange himself

\(^{10}\) Tr. ps. 65.13 (CCL 61 242.1-2): Vnigenitus enim Dei Filiu etsi regnauit semper, non tamen semper regnauit in corpore.

\(^{11}\) See Paul Galtier’s excellent article: “*Forma Dei.*”

\(^{12}\) Tr. ps. 68.25 (CCL 61 311.3-8): In forma enim serui ueniens euacuauit se ex Dei forma. Nam in forma hominis existere manens in Dei forma qui potuit, aboleri autem Dei forma, ut tantum serui esset forma, non potuit. Ipse enim est et se ex forma Dei inaniens et formam hominis adsumens, quia neque euacuatio illa ex Dei forma naturae caelestis interitus est….

\(^{13}\) Tr. ps. 68.25 (CCL 61 311.16-312.17): Forma et uultus et facies et imago non differunt.
from the paternal glory. However, though the Son can empty himself of divine glory, he can never empty himself of his divine nature. Hilary also, we see in this passage, uses *forma dei* or *forma serui* to refer to the divine or human nature as such. In this way, Hilary consistently maintains that even in his emptying, Christ never loses the *forma dei*, that is the nature of God. Hilary’s different uses of *forma* explain his apparently contradictory assertions both that Christ empties himself of, and remains in, the form of God.

According to Hilary’s first use of *forma*, the exaltation of the *forma serui* into the *forma dei* is not a change from human to divine nature. It is a change in the *habitus*, the condition, of the existence of this nature. As Iacoangeli, in his studies on Hilary’s vocabulary, explains: humility is the “habitus” or condition of the earthly human life. Man ceases to be characterized by humility and infirmity and instead is a participant in the glory and majesty of the *forma dei*. The glorification of humanity is the intention of the incarnation and the *profectus*, or progress and perfection, of man is the inversion of the abasements of the Son. Hilary speaks of humanity’s *profectus* as the reward (the *praemium* or *merces*) of the Son’s humility.

Each stage of the Son’s existence receives ample treatment in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. The first stage provides the scene for Hilary’s Trinitarian explanations. The

---

14 *De Trin.* 9.39 (CCL 62A 413.27-414.29): glorificaturus eum apud se Pater erat, quia gloriae suae unitas per oboedientiam dispensationis exccerserat

15 *Tr. ps.* 2.41 (CCL 61 66.15-17,21-22): … ut corruptibilium corporum in incorruptionis gloriae resurrectio non interitu naturam perimat, sed qualitatis condicione demutet…. Fit ergo demutatio, sed non adfertur abolitio.

16 Roberto Iacoangeli, “‘Sacramentum Carnis, Sanguinis, Gloriarum’,” 513-515. He says that Hilary, in accordance with Latin tradition, usually uses *habitus* in the sense of condition or state: “Ilario nella maggior parte dei casi fa uso di questo termine nel senso pieno di condizione, stato, pur impregnando anche nell’ampiezza dei significati, con cui ricorre nella tradizione latina” (513). See also “Linguaggio soteriologico in Ilario,” 127-130.
Son is eternally generated of the Father,\textsuperscript{17} which makes the Father greater than the Son,\textsuperscript{18} though the Son is one nature (\textit{una natura}) with the Father,\textsuperscript{19} and has the same substance of the divinity (\textit{non dissimilis aut differens a se substantia divinitatis}),\textsuperscript{20} and the same power (\textit{inseparabilis uirtus})\textsuperscript{21} as the Father. There is no interval of time between the Father and the Son.\textsuperscript{22} Hilary speaks of the Son as the revealer of the Father,\textsuperscript{23} and though he often speaks of the Son as the right arm, Word, wisdom and power of the Father,\textsuperscript{24} he shows hints of having a doctrine of common operation.\textsuperscript{25} The Father and Son are one God, one God from one God,\textsuperscript{26} and both in one.\textsuperscript{27}

The second stage of the Son’s existence is the incarnate life of our Lord Jesus Christ. Discussions of this stage provide the basis for Hilary’s understanding of the saving dispensation. Here we find discussions of Christ’s weakness and suffering,\textsuperscript{28} and it is in this context that Hilary lays out his teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity into his body. The incarnation is the beginning of something new both for humanity and for the Son.\textsuperscript{29} For humanity it is the beginning of hope for it is the beginning of participation in the divine life. For the Son, the incarnation is the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17} \textit{Tr. ps.} 2.23.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} See \textit{De Trin.} 9.54-56.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} \textit{Tr. ps.} 2.10 (CCL 61 43.5-7): Qui enim per genuinam Patris et Filii secundum se legitimam que naturam in gloria diuinitatis unum sunt....
  \item \textsuperscript{20} \textit{Tr. ps.} 122.7 (CCL 61B 39.19-20):....non dissimili scilicet aut diferente a se substantia divinitatis in utroque.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} \textit{Tr. ps.} 122.2 (CCL 61B 36.12-13): Sed non nunc de inseparabili uirtute Patris et Filii sermo est.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} \textit{Tr. ps.} 63.10 (CCL 61 231.14):... nullo a Patre interuallo temporis separatum...
  \item \textsuperscript{23} \textit{Tr. ps.} 134.7.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} \textit{Tr. ps.} 63.10, 118 Teth 9, 118 Iod 10, 137.15.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} \textit{Tr. ps.} 135.13, 91.4.5-8.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} \textit{Tr. ps.} 134.8.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} \textit{Tr. ps.} 61.9 (CCL 61 203.18): ...in uno utrumque...
  \item \textsuperscript{28} \textit{Tr. ps.} 53.10, 55.2, 68.17, 138.3.
  \item \textsuperscript{29} See \textit{Tr. ps.} 2.33 (CCL 61 61.20-25): Et in gloria Dei Patris hodie genitus nascitur, id est, in manentem antea Dei formam per praemium mortis formae serulis adsumptio honestatur; fitque sub tempore noua, nec tamen inusitata natuitas: cum ad resumendam gloriam Dei patris, qui ex forma Dei forma serui erat repertus, primogenitus ex mortuis nascetur.
\end{itemize}
assumption of a non-divine created nature, which is infirm, weak and sinful as well.

Despite accusations of being a Docetist, Hilary makes two points about the reality of the Son’s humanity. First, Hilary is clear that the Son participates in all that is human in a manner that is not natural but willed on account of the dispensation:

He both prayed and suffered everything which pertains to humanity….He hungered, thirsted, slept, was exhausted, fled from the gathering of the impious, was sorrowful, wept, suffered and died. And in order that he might not be able to be understood to be subjected to all these things by nature but rather from the assumption, having fulfilled all these things, he rose.

But he took up our infirmities for the sake of the salvation of the human race on account of the will of the Father, because he came not to do his will, but the will of him who sent him, that is, the Father.

Christ’s incarnation and his assumption of all humanity, and all the weakness that pertains to humanity, are accomplished for the purpose of bringing about humanity’s participation in the divine life. Second, Hilary says quite explicitly in De Trin. 9.38 that the incarnation brings about an obstacle to the unity of the Father and the Son. The assumption of humanity separates the Son in some way from the Father because what the Son has assumed shares neither the same nature nor the same glory with the Father as the Son’s own divine nature does.

Hilary’s increasing eschatological interest in the Tractatus super Psalmos leads to a corresponding interest in explaining and outlining the third stage of the Son’s existence.

---

30 For example, R. P. C. Hanson in Search for the Christian Doctrine of God is amazed at the reluctance of other scholars to admit that Hilary “was nakedly Docetic,” (501). Further discussion on Hilary’s “Docetism” can be found later in this chapter.
31 Tr. ps. 53.7 (CCL 61 134.9-10, 9-16) : Omnia, quae hominum sunt, et oratu et passus est….esuriuit, situit, dormiuit, lassatus fuit, impiorum coetus fugit, maestus fuit et fleuit et passus et mortuus est. Et ut his omnibus non natura, sed ex adsumptione subjectis esse posset intellegi, perfunctus his omnibus resurrexit.
32 Tr. ps. 68.9 (CCL 61 298.1-3): autem infirmitates nostras ad salutem generis humani ex paterna uluntate suceperit, quia non voluntatem suam facturus uenerit, sed uluntatem eius, qui se miserit, Patris.
The resurrection and glorification of Christ are the fulfillment of the work begun in the incarnation. This third stage contains the definitive participation of humanity in the immortal glory of divine reign and sonship. As we shall see in the next chapter, in the Tractatus super Psalmos, Hilary outlines the end of the dispensation in the framework of 1 Corinthians 15 to show that Christ’s handing over of the reign and subjection to the Father are expansions and indeed the accomplishment of the incarnation.

The third stage is also the resolution of the Trinitarian obstacle presented in the second stage, namely the incarnation. The glorification changes man’s habitus: he ceases to be characterized by humility and infirmity and instead is a participant in the glory and majesty of the forma dei. In this way, the glorification of the assumed humanity, the forma serui, resolves this divide of the Son from the Father because it allows all of humanity, including Christ’s own, to enter into a new relationship with the Father: that of son.34

However, this obstacle to the relationship between the Father and the Son presented in the incarnation and resolved in the glorification is a subject that, while discussed quite explicitly in the De Trinitate, is implicit at best in the Tractatus super Psalmos. Hilary’s eschatological interest at the time of the Tractatus super Psalmos is motivated more strongly by soteriological concerns and less by the Trinitarian concerns that dominate the De Trinitate. The Tractatus, with regard to the incarnation and glorification, is concerned primarily to show these actions of the Son of God to be the unique and effective implementation of God’s will to save humanity. In this context, Hilary makes clear that the incarnation entails for the Son a loss of glory; his resurrection

34 See De Trin. 9.38-41. See also Ladaria’s discussion in Cristología de Hilario, 236-37.
and glorification are a resumption of his prior glory, now shared by humanity as well. Hilary’s interest is centered on the end of this process—the glorification of humanity—rather than the temporary results of the means—namely the presentation and removal of an obstacle to divine unity.

Thus, for Hilary there are three stages in the Son’s filiation, and he clarifies these stages nearly always through Phil. 2.6-11 and the *forma dei - forma serui* imagery (or, as often happens, he continues to speak about *forma dei* and *forma serui* with no explicit reference to its source in Philippians). The only begotten Son of God is in the *forma dei* and he chooses, in the dispensation, to take on the *forma serui* (which, as Hilary never tires of saying, does not entail a loss of his divine nature and power). The *forma serui* is Hilary’s shorthand for speaking of the Son of God’s assumption of all of humanity in all its weakness, though not its sin. Christ “truly bears us in the form of a slave, though he is free from the sins and vices of a human body: so that we are indeed in him through his generation from a virgin, but our vices are not in him.”

In his resurrection, Christ returns to the *forma dei* in all its fullness but he brings with him something new: the *forma serui*, which is glorified before God so that God might see it too as his Son. Hilary most often speaks of the glorification of the *forma serui*, that is, of humanity, as the transformation from the *infirmitas* and *mortalitas* typical of human nature to the *gloria* and *immortalitas* of the divine nature.

---

35 *De Trin.* 10.25, (CCL 62A 479.4-480.1): gerens quidem nos per formam serui, sed a peccatis et a uitiis humani corporis liber: ut nos quidem in eo per generationem uirginis inessemus, sed nostra in eo...uitia non inessent.
“CHRISTOLOGY” AS A DOUBLE CATEGORY

At this point it is necessary for us to deal with the relationship that Hilary’s christology has with the physical or mystical model of redemption which I am arguing is the dominant, though not exclusive, redemption model in Hilary’s *Tractatus super Psalmos*. Obviously christology is tied to soteriology: the way Christ saves is related to the way in which he became man. However, there is not a one-to-one correspondence. Each type of christology does not have its own model of redemption to which it is tied inextricably and to the exclusion of all other models. Rather, there is a certain fluidity, which is perhaps underappreciated in scholarship, that allows christological and soteriological models to overlap. For example, a logos-sarx christology can accompany any of the classic redemption models: physical, ransom, or sacrifice. These redemption models rarely appear singly; the Fathers are distinguished one from the other by their emphasis on one model over another, not by the exclusive presence of a single model in any of them. For example, Athanasius’ logos-sarx christology leads to the predominance of the physical theory, though he does not lack the other two. However, Gregory of Nyssa’s logos-anthropos christology also leads to the predominance of the physical theory of redemption. And Ambrose uses a logos-anthropos christology to support a soteriology that emphasizes both the sacrificial interpretation of Christ’s death and its power as ransom from the devil. Therefore, as far as our standard classifications of

---

christological and soteriological models are concerned, there is no absolute connection to be made between any single christological model with any single redemption model.

One of the reasons behind this lack of direct correlation between christological and soteriological models is that the modern notion of “christology” actually encompasses two distinct categories of thought. We use christology to mean discourse or theory that depicts, or gives an account of, the incarnate Son of God. Inasmuch as it deals with the Son of God, christology both presupposes and determines Trinitarian thought. Inasmuch as it deals with the incarnation of this Son of God, christology both presupposes and determines soteriology. Of course, these are interrelated categories—that is just the point: christology is a merging point of Trinitarian thought and soteriology. As obvious as this point is, it has not been given sufficient attention. In the realm of Hilary scholarship, many of the standard doctrinal evaluations evaluate Hilary’s christology solely in Trinitarian terms. Thus Smulders in 1944 treats the doctrine of the incarnation within the chapter dealing with the properties that distinguish the Father from the Son.\(^3^9\) In this context, the primary christological issues are the relationship between the two natures of Christ and the nature of Christ’s sufferings because these issues have Trinitarian implications. This manner of treating Hilary’s christology has long dominated scholarship, from Giamberardini in 1947,\(^4^0\) to R. P. C. Hanson in 1988.\(^4^1\)

\(^3^9\) Smulders, *Doctrine trinitaire*, 195-206.
\(^4^0\) Gabriel Giamberardini, “De Incarnatione Verbi secundum S. Hilarium Pictaviensem,” *Divus Thomas* 50 (1947): 35-56. Giamberardini seeks to show Hilary’s essential similarity to later dogmatic teachings of the Church and to defend his orthodoxy in cases where such similarity seems to be lacking. He deals with questions such as the following: whether it was the Holy Spirit proper (or the Word) who was the working agent in the incarnation, whether Mary is properly mother of God, whether Christ possesses perfect humanity and perfect divinity, whether he is one person in two natures, whether he suffered, whether God abandoned him on the cross, etc.
\(^4^1\) In his section entitled “Hilary’s Doctrine of the Incarnation,” *Search for the Christian Doctrine of God*, 492-502) Hanson deals with Hilary’s teaching on the emptying of Christ (and how to defend against
The theological explanations that this type of scholarship offers concerning Hilary’s christology should not be considered necessarily, by reason of its method, wrong.\(^{42}\) However, it must be appreciated that a christological discussion done in light of Trinitarian concerns sheds light only on the Trinitarian aspects of christology. It goes without saying that none of these scholars has mentioned Hilary’s teaching concerning Christ’s assumption of all humanity and his physicalist model of redemption, because these are ideas that are principally related to Hilary’s teaching regarding the salvation of men, not the Trinity. The distinction, though at times useful, is artificial: Hilary himself would hardly say any teaching about Christ applies to the Trinity but not the salvation of men or vice versa. Modern classification has, however, made these distinctions, though it has not systematically followed through on them.

Recent studies of Hilary’s christology done in a more soteriological context show a change in the course of the scholarly discussion.\(^{43}\) The previous generation’s concerns about the relationship between the natures of Christ and the manner of his suffering have lost their dominance. Instead, there is a greater interest in the soteriological implications of Hilary’s christology including its eschatological and ecclesiological ramifications.

The wider point is that christological models are not tied each to its own model of redemption because christology encompasses more than soteriology: christological formulations largely find their motivation in Trinitarian theology or soteriology.\(^{44}\)
Clarifications concerning the Word made flesh are necessary either to explain the manner of our salvation or to delineate the relationship between the Father and the Son. The duality of purpose leads to the apparently strange phenomena that much of a theologian’s christology is accidental to his model of redemption; other aspects are accidental to his Trinitarian thought.

**The Physicalist Model of Redemption in the Thought of Hilary**

With the previous discussion in mind, we are led to ask: is Hilary’s teaching concerning Christ’s assumption of all humanity properly christology or soteriology? Christ’s assumption of all humanity is an account of the incarnation (christology) that pivots into a specific understanding of redemption (soteriology). Hilary’s redemption model is our present topic of discussion, and it is this physicalist model of redemption that Hilary shares with several of the Greek Fathers. This redemption model defines only one aspect of the underlying christology: Christ must assume not only a single human life, but all of humanity into himself. This necessary aspect of the assumption of all humanity can, as we have seen, be paired with several differing christologies since other aspects of christological formulation are largely accidental as far as this redemption model is concerned. Scholarly explanations of Hilary’s christology as logos-sarx,\(^{45}\)

---

\(^{45}\) See Williams, “Defining Orthodoxy.” Williams argues that at least in the \emph{In Matthaeum} Hilary is working with a logos-sarx christology. “But Hilary himself is working from an inconsistent (and perhaps unconscious) “logos-sarx” perspective, and it is clear that he does not have a developed theology to deal with the present challenges by making a functional distinction between the human and divine in Christ” (170). This analysis is seconded by Weedman who argues that the logos-sarx christology of the \emph{In Matthaeum} is superseded by a christology based on the \emph{forma deiforma serui} dialectic of Philippians 2. See Weedman, \emph{Trinitarian Theology of Hilary}, 158.
logos-anthropos, or spirit-christology, speak little, if anything, to the presence of the physicalist redemption model in Hilary’s thought. These disagreements are outside of the scope of this work.

The scope of this work, however, does necessitate an exploration of whether this physicalist model of redemption is indeed present within Hilary’s thought. While many have assumed its presence (Harnack, Mersch) others have denied it either explicitly (Wild) or simply through neglect (Fierro, Galtier, Doignon, and many others). I lay out here the definition of this Greek physicalist theory given by Jean-Pierre Jossua. I shall demonstrate the presence within Hilary’s teaching of each characteristic of this theory, barring the first of Platonic dependence, outlined by Jossua.

Jossua lists six elements that generally make up what he terms the “Greek theory.”

1. A Platonic conception of a general or common nature that is present in Christ by concomitance with his humanity.
2. An insistence on the contact of the divine with the human in Christ.
3. The idea of immediate consequences resulting from this union for the entire “nature,” that is, for all of humanity.
4. A “dynamic” soteriological value attributed to the incarnation that affects individuals in non-automatic manner.
5. The dependence of divinization and the sacraments upon the birth of Christ.
6. The conception of the baptism of Christ as a regeneration of our common nature.

The first point, being the most complicated, we shall leave to the last. All the other elements can be found in Hilary’s thought.

---

46 See Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, vol. 1: “So Hilary has a christology of divinization and union within the context of the ‘Word-man’ framework and in this respect comes close to Gregory of Nyssa” (312).
47 See Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 69, where he outlines Hilary’s use of the word *spiritus* to delineate the divine power in Christ. Burns makes clear this is only one aspect of Hilary’s christology.
48 See Chapter 1 for a more complete list of scholarship on Hilary’s understanding of the incarnation as Christ’s assumption of all humanity.
2. Hilary insists on the contact of the divine with the human in Christ through his teaching of humanity’s presence in Christ’s body. For example, he says: “the Word became flesh, because while once we were alienated and enemies of his perception on account of our bad deeds, now we are reconciled in the body of his flesh. Therefore we are in Christ through the union of the assumed flesh….”\(^5^0\) The union (coniunctio) of flesh enables contact between the Word of God and humanity. Furthermore, we are “in Christ” on account of, and through, the flesh that Christ assumes in the incarnation. Christ, as Hilary says elsewhere, “…constitutes us in the body of his flesh.”\(^5^1\)

3. Hilary shows that the body of Christ is the point of human contact with the divine by making it the place of all human transformation. The incarnation, seen as the assumption of all humanity, has immediate consequences upon not just Christ’s individual humanity, but the entire human race. In the De Trinitate, Hilary says that “he [the Son of God] received the nature of flesh in himself when he was made man of a virgin, and through the fellowship of this conmingling, the body of the entire human race might be sanctified in him.”\(^5^2\) The entire human race is sanctified through the incarnate body of Christ at the very moment of the incarnation. Through the analogy of the vine, Hilary shows that all of humanity, through the incarnation, comes to have Christ as its origin and root: “He assumed into himself the nature of all flesh, through which, having been made the true vine, he held in himself the origin of all branches.”\(^5^3\) In using the

\(^{5^0}\) Tr. ps. 91.9 (CCL 61 329.13-16): quia Verbum caro factum est, quia, cum aliquando essemus alienati et inimici sensus eius in factis malis, nunc autem reconciliati sumus corpora carnis eius. Ergo per coniunctionem carnis adsumptae sumus in Christo,…

\(^{5^1}\) Tr. ps. 125.6 (CCL 61B 62.24):....constituens nos in corpore carnis suae.

\(^{5^2}\) De Trin. 2.24 (CCL 62 60.6-9): homo factus ex uirgine naturam in se carnis acciperet, perque hujus admixtionis societatem sanctificatum in eo uniuersi generis humani corpus existeret.

\(^{5^3}\) Tr. ps. 51.16 (CCL 61 104.20-22): …naturam in se uniuersae carnis adsumpsit, per quam effectus uera uitis genus in se uniuersae propaginis tenet.
analogy of a plant, Hilary speaks of our unity with Christ as something that is, in a certain way, organic or natural. The consequences of such a unity are immediate, that is, requiring no other mediation. For example, because our resurrection is in Christ’s body, not only is his resurrection a prefigurement of our future resurrection, Christ’s resurrection is in some way itself our resurrection. These immediate consequences of the incarnation upon humanity have, historically, been the source of accusations against Hilary’s orthodoxy. As we saw in Chapter one, Ritschl, Herrmann, and von Harnack were concerned that Hilary had turned redemption into an automatic physical process that excluded the working of the will.

4. The consequences of the incarnation are, for Hilary, immediate; they are not for this reason automatic. Though the act of the will is secondary to the ontological reality of unity with Christ, it still plays into Hilary’s understanding of salvation. Again using the analogy of the vine, Hilary explains that lack of faith can sever individuals from the unity that all have with Christ as a result of the incarnation. Belief is necessary to continue the relationship of participation in Christ’s body that already exists as the result of the incarnation:

Therefore, if some will merit through faith in the embodied God to remain in the nature of the body assumed by God, they will be washed so as to bear eternal fruits from themselves: this is because it is necessary that the branch that remains in the vine should have the nature of the true vine. But he who is incredulous of God born in a body, even if he also remains believing, nevertheless he will lack the fruits of his faith and he will be

---

54 See Charlier, “L’Église corps du Christ.” Charlier believes there is an evolution in Hilary’s thought. In the In Mattheum, the union of men with Christ is envisaged essentially on the level of the incarnation. There are two aspects to this: 1) Christ assumed all of humanity; 2) he accomplishes in his body all the mysteries of our salvation (baptism, death, resurrection, etc.). In his later works, Hilary becomes conscious of the progressive nature of this union: 1) Christ’s redemptive actions (and not simply the fact of the incarnation) effect and bring about this union; 2) it can be refused through disbelief; 3) it is ratified through faith, baptism and Eucharist; 4) it is only fully realized in our glorification; 5) the Church has a role in this incorporation into Christ. The evolution of Hilary’s understanding of the effects of Christ’s assumption of all humanity as regards the necessity or usefulness of the Church will be dealt with in Chapter 6.
cut off either on account of his infidelity or on account of the uselessness of the fruits of unbelievers.\textsuperscript{55}

The assumption of humanity into God is the divine act that has the immediate consequence of rendering all of humanity branches of the true vine. However, those branches that do not bear fruit will be cut off from the true vine, that is to say, those who do not believe in God’s assumption of humanity are cut off from their natural unity with God, which was the gift given to all in the incarnation.

5. The efficacy of the sacraments and the possibility of divinization depend upon Christ’s incarnation. The waters of baptism are able to begin the heavenly reign in us because they have been consecrated through contact with the incarnate Christ: “But both the body and name of our creation were assumed by him, and though he did not need the washing, nevertheless, the purifying water of our cleansing had to be sanctified through him.”\textsuperscript{56} For Hilary, the Eucharist is a mirror image of the incarnation. The incarnation is Christ taking us into himself and the Eucharist is us taking Christ into ourselves.\textsuperscript{57}

Membership in the Church is connected to salvation because the Church, as Christ’s body, is the extension of the incarnation. Hilary goes so far as to say that those who separate themselves from the incarnation in the form of the body of the Church are

\textsuperscript{55} Tr. ps. 51.16 (CCL 61 104.12-18, commenting on John 15.1-8): Si qui igitur per fidem corporati Dei manere in natura adsumpti a Deo corporis merebuntur, hi \textit{emundantur in fructus aeternos ex se adferendos}, quia necesse est ut naturam \textit{uerae uitis propago intra uitem manens} teneat. At uero qui incredulus nati in corpore Dei fuerit, uel si et credens \textit{maneat} fructibus suae careat, \textit{eradicabitur} aut ob infidelitatem aut ob inutilitatem \textit{fructuum} negatorum. See also Tr. ps. 65.11 (CCL 61 241.10-13): …per eum uia nobis caelestis regni et in nouae generationis lauacro possessio aeternorum corporum inchoatur, aquis ipsis baptismo Domini consecratris.

\textsuperscript{56} In Matt. 2.5 (SC 254 109.9-110.1): Sed adsumptum ab eo creationis nostrae fuerat et corpus et nomen, atque ita non ille necessitate habuit abluendi, sed per illum in aquis ablutionis nostrae erat sanctificanda puration.

\textsuperscript{57} See De Trin. 8.13 (CCL 62A 325.7-13): Si enim uere \textit{uerbum caro factum est}, et uere nos ubrum carmem cibo dominico sumimus, quomodo non naturaliter manere in nobis existimandus est, qui et naturam carnis nostrae iam inseparabilem sibi homo natus adsumpsit, et naturam carnis suae ad naturam aeternitatis sub sacramento nobis communicandae carnis admiscuit?
handed over to the devil: “For those who are cast out from the body of the Church, which is the body of Christ, are as foreigners and strangers from the body of God and are handed over to the domination of the devil.”\textsuperscript{58}

6. As we have seen already in the previous point, Hilary understands the baptism of Christ as a regeneration of all humanity because of its tie to the incarnation.\textsuperscript{59} Through the language of Son of God and son of man, Hilary shows that Christ’s baptism is the moment that human beings, the son of man, become adopted sons of God.

For he who is born man of the virgin, was also then the Son of God, but he who is the son of man, the same one was the Son of God, but he [the son of man] was born again from baptism and then was the Son of God, so that he was born both into the same thing and into something different; but it is written, when he ascended from the water: you are my Son; today I have begotten you. However, since, according to the generation of the man then being renewed, he also was born into a perfect Son of God, [this verse] is fitting to both the son of man and the Son of God in baptism.\textsuperscript{60}

The son of man is not one man but all men. As Hilary says in his commentary on Psalm 65, Christ’s baptism is a moment of joy for all, because Christ’s baptism in the Jordan affects not just Christ’s human nature, but all human nature; all are healed by Christ’s baptism. “Therefore this is what is signified [in the verse]: we will rejoice there in him. In the coming of the Lord and his baptism in the Jordan, these things were fulfilled by

\textsuperscript{58} Tr. ps. 118 Ain 5 (CCL 61A 151.16-18): Qui enim ab ecclesiae corpore respuuntur, quae Christi est corpus tamquam peregrini et alieni a Dei corpore dominatui diaboli traduntur.

\textsuperscript{59} For a more detailed discussion of Hilary’s understanding of baptism, along with a comparison to Chromatius, see Chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{60} Tr. ps. 2.29 (CCL 61 57.3-58.11): Nam qui natus ex uirgin e homo est, erat et tum Dei Filius, sed qui filius hominis est, idem erat et Dei Filius, natus autem rursum ex baptismo et tum Dei Filius, ut et in idipsim et in aliud nascetur; scriptum est autem, cum ascendisset ex aqua: Filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te. Sed secundum generationem hominis renascentis tum quoque ipsa Deo renascetatur in Filium perfectum, ut hominis filio ita et Dei Filio in baptismate comparato.
means of the healing of all. For this reason, *they will rejoice there*, pertains to the Jordan.\textsuperscript{61}

Even Wild, who is the scholar who most vociferously denies that Hilary teaches Christ’s assumption of all humanity, is quite ready to accept the presence of elements two through five in Hilary’s thought, though he does so in a manner that disconnects them from the premise of Christ’s assumption of all humanity.\textsuperscript{62} Hilary, he says, teaches the effect of the incarnation on all, regardless of whether the incarnation assumes all or just one. He comments on *In Matthaeum* 2.5: “Hilary may mean that God sanctified all men by the assumption of one man, the Christ. Or he may mean (less probably, it seems) that God sanctified all men by assuming them all somehow in Christ. In either case, however, the Word does sanctify all men by the mere fact of His becoming man.”\textsuperscript{63} Wild acknowledges the immediate consequences of the incarnation. Having eliminated the possibility of the presence of humanity in the body of Christ, Wild is unable to provide a rationale which would explain how the consequences of the incarnation are immediately applied unto the sanctification of all men.

Wild’s understanding deprives the incarnation of much of its saving force. As a result, Wild relies heavily on the role of faith and the sacraments in salvation. Wild notices the presence of Jossua’s elements three and four in Hilary’s thought, giving them

\textsuperscript{61} *Tr. ps. 65.11* (CCL 61 241.29-31): Hoc ergo illud est quod significatur: *Ibi laetabimur in ipso*. Quae in adventu Domini et Iordanis baptismo et infirmitatum omnium curatione expleta sunt. Quod autem *ibi laetabimur*, ad Iordanem pertinet.

\textsuperscript{62} Wild’s dissertation is premised upon the similarity between Hilary’s teaching and the “Greek” model: “Saint Hilary teaches a doctrine similar to the ‘physical’ theory” (Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 58). Wild devotes only one paragraph to the idea that the physical theory of the Greek Fathers outlines an assumption of all humanity in the incarnation (see Wild, 16). Wild rightly argues that the Fathers have been vindicated from teaching a “pantheistic Incarnation of the whole human race” (16). He does not consider the possibility of a non-pantheistic assumption of all humanity and so excludes it from his conception of the physical theory.

\textsuperscript{63} Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 60.
perhaps too much prominence. Wild notices the clear connection between the incarnation and baptism in Hilary’s thought: “In fact so closely united in Hilary’s mind are the saving properties of the incarnation and Baptism that he puts them down as a double cause of man’s sanctification: ‘…hominem et assumptione sanctificans et lavacro’ (In Matt. 2.5).”

Wild also portrays faith and the sacraments as the individual appropriation of the general effect of the incarnation: “These four: faith, Baptism, honor and the Eucharist, seem to bestow directly on the individual Christian what is given in general to all by the Incarnation.” Yet again, however, in denying a teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity, Wild misunderstands the framework of the physicalist theory of redemption and eliminates Hilary’s understanding of the manner in which the incarnation bestows salvation generally.

The Physicalist Model in the In Matthaeum: Refutation of the Claim of Platonic Influence

We have shown the presence of each of the elements outlined by Jossua as characteristic of the “Greek theory” in Hilary’s thought—excepting the first. We have also shown that even Wild, who denies Christ’s assumption of all humanity, accepts the presence of these other elements in Hilary’s thought. However, though he recognizes the similarity between Hilary’s thought and the “Greek” physicalist model of redemption in many aspects, Wild refuses to admit the presence of the necessary incarnational premise of this model in Hilary’s thought. Jossua points to the premise of the physicalist Greek model in his first element—namely, a Platonic conception of a general or common

---

64 Wild, Divinization of Man, 93.
65 Wild, Divinization of Man, 82.
nature. There are more subtleties here than either Jossua or Wild realize. Despite Wild’s effort of denial, the physicalist model of redemption depends upon the idea that Christ assumes all of humanity. When this teaching is viewed through the lens of Platonism, Christ’s assumption of all humanity is perceived as the assumption of a Platonic-type common or general nature (the Form of man). Hilary, however, teaches Christ’s assumption of humanity in a way that is not Platonic and neither does he conceive of this assumption in terms of a common or general nature. Hilary, in clearly demonstrating all other of the main points of the Greek or physicalist model of redemption as well as a teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity, calls into question the standard scholarly assumption that there is a necessary relationship between Platonism and this redemption model.

There are two separate issues related to Jossua’s first point (a Platonic conception of a general or common nature): the first surrounding “common nature,” the second concerning Platonic influence.

Does Hilary teach that Christ assumes a common or general nature? Certainly, as we saw in Chapter one, this is the belief of von Harnack and Ritschl. On the opposite side, in an effort to affirm the individual personality of Christ’s human nature, Wild explicitly denies that Christ’s assumption of the nature of humanity means anything other than Christ assuming an individual nature like ours. Hilary uses phrases that can be seen as pointing to a conception of a common or general nature. For instance, he says the Word assumes the “nature of all humankind” or “the nature of all flesh.” These

---

66 Wild, *Divinization of Man*, 60.
67 Tr. ps. 51.17 (CCL 61 104.5-6): …quia Verbum caro factum est et inhabituit in nobis, naturam scilicet in se totius humani generis adsumens…
statements must, however, be read in context of other statements in which he
demonstrates that this “nature of all humankind” that Christ assumes is not a single
general nature, but a nature that includes the multiplicity of humanity. “The nature of all
humankind” taken up by Christ is a nature that includes, individually, each human person
as becomes clear when Hilary speaks about Christ’s body as containing the universal
Church: “For he himself is the Church, containing in himself the universal Church
through the sacrament of his body.” 69 Christ’s body, being the Church, is also the
temple—the bustling place of all the commerce of sacrifice—of the city of Jerusalem, an
image that pictures the presence of many in Christ’s body, not just one.” 70

Is Hilary’s idea of Christ’s assumption of all humanity Platonic? The short
answer to this question is “no.” Hilary’s teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity
derives from his appropriation of the Bible and Latin theology and philosophy. This
“Greek” or physicalist redemption model within Hilary’s thought has been assumed to be
Platonic because Hilary’s theology has been read through the lens of Greek theology,
where this model does seem to largely owe to Platonism. I will argue that in the
Tractatus super Psalmos this physicalist theory of redemption is not the result of Platonic
influence. Though at the time of the writing the Tractatus super Psalmos, Hilary has
already had, during his exile, the opportunity to appropriate Eastern theology and
philosophy, I have argued in the first chapter that Hilary’s contact with Platonism during

68 Tr. ps. 51.16 (CCL 61 104.20-22): …naturam in se uniuersae carnis adsumpsit, per quam effectus uera
uitis genus in se uniuersae propaginis tenet. See also De Trin. 2.24 (CCL 62 60.6-12): ut homo factus ex
uirgine naturam in se carnis acciperet, perque hujus admixtionis societatem sanctificatum in eo uniuersi
generis humani corpus existeret: ut quemadmodum omnes in se per id quod corporeum se esse uluit
conderentur, ita rursum in omnes ipse per id quod ejus est inuisibile referetur.
69 Tr. ps. 125.6 (CCL 61B 62.24-26): Ipse est enim Ecclesia, per sacramentum corporis sui in se uniuersam
eam continens.
70 Tr. ps. 64.2 (CCL 61 221.12-14): Sion mons quidem Hierusalem adiacens est; sed montem hunc eiusque
nomen atque etiam urbis ipsius ecclesiam, quae corpus est Christi, nuncupatam semper accepmus…
his exile was with that Asia-Minor branch of Platonism that was highly theurgical and apparently unsavory to Hilary. Hilary did not appropriate this Platonism in his thought, nor did he need to in order to present a teaching on Christ’s assumption of all humanity and a physicalist doctrine of redemption. Prior to our exploration of this model in the *Tractatus super Psalms* I can show that Platonism was not necessary to Hilary’s teaching by demonstrating that this physicalist model of redemption was already present in Hilary’s theology, prior to his exile and contact with Greek theology, in the *In Matthaeum*. Hilary’s teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity in his post-exilic *Tractatus super Psalms* is an expansion of the same theme already present in his pre-exilic *In Matthaeum*.

The clearest and most obvious presence of the teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity in the *In Matthaeum* occurs in Book 4, where Hilary says:

> He calls the flesh that he had assumed a city because, as a city consists of a variety and multitude of inhabitants, so there is contained in him, through the nature of the assumed body, a certain assembly of the whole human race. And thus he becomes a city from our assembly in him and we become the dwelling of this city through consort with his flesh.\(^\text{71}\)

Christ’s body is a city that contains the assembly of the human race. Hilary says this in a quite straightforward fashion. We humans dwell in this city of Christ’s body. Christ does not assume a single form or idea of humanity, but the multitude of all individual persons. The unity of each person with Christ is accomplished through consort with his flesh; that is, each person participates in the flesh of Christ by dwelling within it.

Another, more contested passage is found in Book 2:

\(^{71}\) *In Matt.* 4.12 (SC 254 130.3-9): *Ciuitatem carnem quam adsumpserat nuncupat, quia, ut ciuitas ex uarietate ac multitudine consistit habitantium, ita in eo per naturam suscepti corporis quaedam uniueri generis humani congregatio continetur. Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congregacione fit ciuitas et nos per consortium carnis suae sumus ciuitatis habitatio.*
There was in Jesus Christ the whole humanity (or “a complete man”: *homo totus*) and so the assumed body as a servant of the Spirit, completed in itself the entire sacrament of our salvation.\textsuperscript{72}

The understanding of this passage hinges upon the interpretation of the words “*homo totus,*” which can be translated as either “the whole humanity” or “a complete man.”\textsuperscript{73}

Mersch, to support his belief that Hilary teaches an extended incarnation, translates *homo totus* as if it were rendering *omnis homo,* that is, “every man”: “tout homme.”\textsuperscript{74} Wild, while he does not comment on this passage, in general prefers to interpret *homo* strictly as Christ’s individual humanity in order to avoid any extension of the incarnation into humanity.\textsuperscript{75} Doignon, similar to Wild, translates *homo totus* as “totalement un homme.”\textsuperscript{76}

In Book 19, a passage that has been used as textual evidence for the argument against Christ’s assumption of all humanity, in the context, is able to support such an extended incarnation:

\[\ldots\text{this [young man who represented the Jews] pursued to the death of the Cross the Christ who assumed the body of us all and by reason of the assumed body became a neighbor to each of us.}\textsuperscript{77}\]

Christ, in assuming the body of us all, becomes a neighbor (*proximus*) to each one of us.

The term “neighbor” according to scholars such as Wild and Blasich, suggest that Christ is assuming a body like ours and this assumption and the similarity between his body and ours leads him to become as a neighbor—someone extremely close, yet remaining a

\textsuperscript{72} In Matt. 2.5 (SC 254 108.2-5): Erat in Iesu Christo homo totus atque ideo in famulatum Spiritus corpus adsumptum omne in se sacramentum nostrae salutis expleuit.

\textsuperscript{73} See Burns’ comment on the translation of *homo totus* (*Christology in Hilary,* 100). Charlier asserts that Hilary intentionally makes use of the ambivalent “homo totus” to express both that Christ was a perfect (whole) man and that every man was in Christ (Charlier, *L’Église,* 456).

\textsuperscript{74} See Mersch, *Corps mystique du Christ,* vol. 1, 346.

\textsuperscript{75} Wild, *Divinization of Man,* 60.

\textsuperscript{76} SC 254, p. 109.

\textsuperscript{77} In Matt. 19.5 (SC 258 94.15-17): Hic Christum, qui omnium nostrum corpus assumpsit, et unicuique nostrum assumpti corporis conditione factus est proximus, usque in poenam crucis persecutus est.
separate person—to us.78 Yet this quotation, in the context of the pericope of the rich young man, begins with Hilary relating the precept given to this man by Christ: “He is commanded to love his neighbor just as himself…”79 I argue that the young man is told to love his neighbor as himself because Christ, in taking to himself the body of all of us, takes the neighbor truly into himself: the neighbor connotes not distance but identification of self. This text from the In Matthaeum, used by both Wild and Blasich as a major textual support for their denial of Christ’s assumption of all humanity, can be read in a manner consistent with, and supportive of, Christ’s assumption of all humanity/ 

THE PHYSICALIST MODEL IN THE TRACTATUS SUPER PSALMOS

These passages in the In Matthaeum demonstrate that Hilary teaches, occasionally if not consistently, Christ’s assumption of all humanity before he had any possibility of a direct knowledge of Greek Platonism that has not undergone the Latin syncretization with Stoicism. The occasional presence of this teaching in the In Matthaeum grows into a substantial presence in the Tractatus super Psalmos. This substantial presence of Christ’s assumption of all humanity in the Tractatus super Psalmos is connected, as I will show in Chapter 5, to Hilary’s growing interest in eschatology. This interest requires Hilary to be much more intentional and systematic about his teaching of Christ’s

---

78 Wild is quite clear in his commentary on this passage: “The fact that although Christ took our body, He is no more than a neighbor to us indicates that Hilary means merely that Christ assumed a body exactly like ours and of the same race of Adam when he says that Christ assumed our body” (Divinization of Man, 60). Blasich uses the imagery of neighbor to explain all instances of Hilary’s teaching that Christ assumes the nature of humanity (“Risurrezione dei corpi,” 76). This understanding, unfortunately hamstrings Blasich’s argument concerning the resurrection of the body in Hilary’s thought. For example the last line of his article—“È Gesù Cristo, il Verbo che assume un corpo simila al nostro, che porta il nostro corpo nella sua risurrezione; consegna al Padre il suo regno, il Popolo di Dio, la Chiesa.” (90) —raises the question: how does Christ carry our body in the resurrection if it is only a body “similar to ours,” not our body itself?

79 In Matt. 19.5 (SC 258 94.14): Proximum tamquam se amare praeceptus est....
assumption of all humanity than he was previously in the *In Matthaenum* and even the *De Trinitate*.

The statements concerning Christ’s assumption of all humanity become both more frequent and less ambiguous in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. For example, Hilary compares Christ to the true vine: an analogy whose success depends upon the presence of all humanity in this vine:

> He assumed into himself the nature of all flesh, through which, having been made the *true vine*, he held in himself the origin of all branches.\(^80\)

Christ, as the vine, is able to be the origin of all branches, because he has assumed the nature of all into himself. Hilary explains John’s prologue and the meaning of the “Word was made flesh” with a clear statement of Christ’s assumption of all humanity:

> …*the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us*, indeed assuming into himself the nature of all human kind…\(^81\)

We see in both these quotations from the *Tractatus super Psalmos* that Hilary speaks of the incarnation as Christ’s assumption of the nature of “all flesh” or “all humanity,” phrases that seem to point back to the Platonic generic view of humanity.\(^82\) However we shall see that Hilary’s emphasis on Christ’s assumption of a single nature does not do away with the collectivity we found in the *In Matthaenum*. The *In Matthaenum*’s vision of the city finds a place in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, though it gives way to Hilary’s preferred image of the Church:

---

\(^80\) *Tr. ps.* 51.16 (CCL 61 104.20-22): …naturam in se uniuersae carnis adsumpsit, per quam effectus *uera uitus* genus in se uniuersae *propaginis* tenet.

\(^81\) *Tr. ps.* 51.17 (CCL 61 104.5-6): …quia *Verbum caro factum est et inhabituit in nobis*, naturam scilicet in se totius humani generis adsumens…

\(^82\) Hilary uses the word “flesh” synonomously with “humanity.” Hilary clarifies in *Tr. ps.* 64.4 that he uses the term flesh, according to Scriptural custom, to mean humanity: *Humani generis uniuersitatem scriptura sub carnis nomine designat*…(CCL 61 223.3-4).
For he himself is the Church, containing in himself the universal Church through the sacrament of his body.\textsuperscript{83}

Therefore, we are in Christ through union with the assumed flesh…\textsuperscript{84}

As in the \textit{In Mattheum}, the unity of each person with Christ is accomplished through the association of the flesh; however the \textit{consortio} (consort) of the \textit{In Mattheum} has been strengthened to \textit{coniunctio} (union). Hilary’s increased emphasis on Christ’s assumption of a unified human nature in the \textit{Tractatus super Psalmos}—which never does away with his understanding of multiplicity and individuality in the body of Christ—is the result of a more cohesive and extensive understanding of the unity of humanity, a unity that preexists and forms a necessary condition for Christ’s assumption of all humanity.

\textsc{latin Atonement Theory? The Importance of the Suffering and Death of Christ in Hilary’s Redemption Model}

The typical schema for Greek and Latin redemption models proposes, as we have seen, that the Greek model focuses on the transformative power of the incarnation and resurrection, while the Latin model, by contrast, emphasizes the atoning power of Christ’s death. I have argued that Hilary’s soteriology is based upon a non-Platonic “Greek” physicalist model of redemption. However, Hilary, in keeping with the larger Christian tradition, also speaks about the salvific power of Christ’s sufferings and death. We shall see that though Hilary acknowledges the importance of the passion and death of Christ for the salvation of humanity, he integrates these moments into his overarching

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Tr. ps.} 125.6 (CCL 61B 62.24-26): Ipse est enim Ecclesia, per sacramentum corporis sui in se uniuersam eam continens.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Tr. ps.} 91.9 (CCL 61 329.15-16): ergo per coniunctionem carnis adsumpta sumus in Christo…
physicalist model of redemption. Hilary’s soteriology, and even his entire theological system, is coherent only in light of his physicalist model of redemption.

Hilary integrates the sufferings and death of Christ into his physicalist model of redemption by viewing these moments of Christ’s life in light of the incarnation and resurrection, respectively. The passion of Christ is an extension of the emptying of the incarnation; it is the result of Christ’s true assumption of the forma serui. Christ’s death is both the continuation of this descent of the incarnation and suffering and, on the other hand, is the necessary prelude to the resurrection.

Hilary’s presentation of the relationship between the sufferings of Christ and his impassibility has received much scholarly attention and some critique. The criticism of Harnack, who accused Hilary of docetism, have led to a number of studies vindicating and nuancing Hilary’s teaching concerning the relationship of the two natures in Christ and the manner of the participation of each in suffering. For our purposes, the manner of Christ’s suffering is rather unimportant; we need only know that Hilary both attributes

85 Harnack, History of Dogma IV, 140-148; see especially footnote 2 on page 140. Hilary’s position on the suffering of Christ centers upon his use of the key terms patior and doleo: the former can be applied to Christ, the latter cannot. See also R. P. C. Hanson, Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 501. A good refutation of the Docetism charge can be found in Mark Weedman, “Martyrdom and Docetism in Hilary’s De Trinitate,” Augustinian Studies 30.1 (1999): 21–41. Weedman says that “within the context of Hilary’s theological and philosophical tradition, it was not necessary for Christ to be human as other humans” (40). Indeed, the key to understanding Hilary’s statements concerning Christ’s suffering (or lack thereof) is to realize that “Hilary's description of Christ’s human body anticipates his explanation of how Christ's humanity functions for human salvation. Christ's sinless body prefigures the nature of human bodies after they have been transformed and resurrected” (22). Beckwith offers a similar evaluation: “Christ’s humanity, then, is not less human because he suffers without pain; rather, according to Hilary’s anthropology and moral psychology, he is more truly human because his soul is properly and perfectly ordered toward that which is true and good” (“Suffering without Pain,” 86).

86 See, for example, Raphaël Favre, “La Communication des idiomes dans les œuvres de saint Hilaire de Poitiers,” Gregorianum 17 (1936): 481-514; Burns, Christology in Hilary, 83-87; Smulders, Doctrine trinitaire, 202-206. Both Burns and Favre have highlighted Hilary’s distinction between pati and dolere: the first is the experience of a physical blow, while the second is consciousness of the blow. Hilary lets Christ experience the first, but he denies that Christ experiences the internal anguish of the second. They both demonstrate that this distinction, and Hilary’s method of locating Christ’s sufferings within a human psychology, is influenced by Stoic psychology (Burns, 89; Favre, 490-491).
suffering in some way to the person Jesus Christ and acknowledges this suffering as
salvific. 87 Hilary does indeed do both these things. He says: “It must be understood that
Christ was subjected to sufferings not on account of a necessity of nature but rather on
account of the sacrament of human salvation…” 88 Christ both undergoes (subdere)
sufferings (passioni) and does so for human salvation.

Christ’s sufferings after the Last Supper can contribute to the redemption of
humanity because these sufferings are an extension of the suffering entailed in the
incarnational assumption of the forma serui. 89 Hilary, as we have noted, sees the
incarnation and the resurrection as parallel movements: the descent of Son of God into
the form of a slave is the movement opposite to the ascent of this form of a slave into the
form of God. Suffering is an attribute of the forma serui, for this reason, whenever the
words of the psalm are the words of Christ concerning his own suffering, Hilary says
Christ is speaking as a man. 90 As a result, Hilary understands the exaltation to be
dependent upon the descent: the lower Christ descends into the infirmity and humility of
human nature, the higher he can raise this human nature into the glory of the divine
nature. Hilary emphasizes that “the reason for exalting above the heavens was that
humility, descending all the way to the depths of the earth, was assumed.” 91 The passion

87 See Favre’s summary of Hilary’s teaching on the suffering of Christ specifically in the Tractatus super
Psalmos, in “Communication des idiomes,” 500, 514. See also Orazzo, Salvezza in Ilario, 62-64.
88 Tr. ps. 53.12 (CCL 61 137.4-5): non ex naturae necessitate potius quam ex sacramento humanae salutis
passioni fuisse subditus intellegendus est….
89 Buffer makes the same point by saying that the incarnation and the passion are two aspects of a single act
of obedience (Salus in St. Hilary, 172).
90 For example, Tr. ps. 55.2 (CCL 61 155.8-13): Erit ergo sermo inter Dau id ipsum et hominem Iesum
Christum temperatus, ut, quia infirmitates omnium portauerit et peccatorum nostrorum frequentor et uoce
sit usus et lacrimis, extra contumeliam Dei sit et affectus et sermo qui hominis est. See Rondeau,
91 Tr. ps. 66.6 (CCL 61 163.13-164.15): …hinc exaltandi super caelos causam significans exitisse, quod
descendendi usque in inferiora terrae humilitas esset adsumpta.
of Christ and his death represent the lowest depths of Christ’s descent into human nature. The exaltation of Christ, and humanity in him, is the direct result of this descent.

Hilary generally integrates the salvific power of the suffering of Christ into the schema of the physicalist model of redemption in which Christ’s assumption of all humanity into his body in the incarnation culminates in his glorification of this humanity in his resurrection. Christ’s sufferings, then, are undergone not for his own sake, but for the sake of humanity and, particularly, for the sake of the “sacrament of divine communion.” The rationale for the necessity and the efficacy of the passion is the same as that of the incarnation: Christ lowers himself into the suffering of human nature to raise human nature to the glory of divine nature. Christ’s descent into the infirmity of human nature, that is, into suffering and death, has salvific power for humanity because we are all in his body by virtue of the incarnation and through faith we choose to be integrated even more deeply in his body. According to Hilary, the psalmist has been made a concorporeal participator in Christ and so can say that it is the infirmity of his (the psalmist’s) flesh that Christ both bears in his passion and exalts into heaven.

Christ’s death, then, is sometimes viewed by Hilary as the final moment in the downward trajectory of emptying and humility entailed by the assumption of the forma serui. At other times Hilary regards the death of Christ as the necessary prelude to the resurrection. Within his physicalist model of redemption, Hilary includes a teaching of

---

92 See Tr. ps. 68.17 (CCL 61 305.8-15): Et quia propter inimicos suos haec perpetienda sibi fuerant, per quae humanae saluti atque aeternitati consulebat, huius beneplaciti temporis testatur adfectum dicens: Improperium expectauit cor meum et miseriam, desideratas sibi esse huius temporis significans passiones secundum illud diuinæ communionis sacramentum: Desiderio concupiui hoc manducare, quia in his passionis suae desideris beneplaciti temporis consistebat effectus.

93 Tr. ps. 66.7 (CCL 61 164.1-6): Omnis autem hic profectus non naturae diuinæ, sed infirmitati hominis optatur, quia se per adsumptionem carnis in caelestibus conlocandum propheta non nescit, quippe cum corporales et participes effecti simus in Christo Iesu. Et idcirco haec ad carnis suae infirmitatem, quae et in passionibus domini uexanda et super caelos esset exaltanda, conexuit;...
satisfaction that he ties to the death of Christ. On the one hand, Hilary expands Tertullian’s satisfaction theory of repentance and good deeds by using satisfaction to apply to Christ’s death.\textsuperscript{94} However, unlike Tertullian, he consistently denies the possibility of satisfaction in the Christian life. Tertullian often speaks of the satisfaction individual Christians, as sinners, need to render to God.\textsuperscript{95} Hilary only uses satisfaction to speak about works done under the Law.\textsuperscript{96} Satisfaction for Hilary is a reality of the old dispensation that is overcome by Christ. At times, Hilary speaks of the concept of satisfaction negatively: it is the arrogation of God’s grace.\textsuperscript{97} Since satisfaction is necessarily tied to the Law, Hilary rarely speaks of it in relationship to the life of the

\textsuperscript{94} Tertullian never uses satisfaction to describe Christ’s death, however he does say that the death of Christ is “the whole weight and fruit of the name ‘Christian’,” (\textit{Adversus Marcionem} 3.8.5 [CCL 1 519.23-24]: Totum Christiani nominis et pondus et fructus, mors Christi) because Christ was “sent in order to die” (\textit{De Carne Christi} 6.6 [ed. A. Kroymann, in \textit{Tertulliani Opera, pars 2: Opera Montanistica}, CCL 2 (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954), 884.37-38]: At vero Christus mori missus). Furthermore, though in itself, sacrifice has nothing to do with \textit{satisfacio}, Tertullian does say that “it was fitting for him to become a sacrifice for all the nations” (\textit{Adv. Jud.} 13.21): Hunc enim oportebat pro omnibus gentibus fieri sacrificium. See Kelly, \textit{Early Christian Doctrines}, 177, for a brief summary of Tertullian’s teaching regarding the concept of satisfaction. Harnack states that while Tertullian was the first to say that humans must “satisfy God,” Cyprian is the first to apply satisfaction to Christ himself (\textit{History of Dogma}, vol. 3, 311-312). Though there is no proof supporting Harnack’s claim concerning Cyprian—neither did Harnack provide citations nor have later scholars been able to find the concept of Christ rendering satisfaction to God in any of Cyprian’s writings—it continues to exert considerable influence. For example, while Turner notes in a footnote that he has not found satisfaction applying to Christ in Cyprian, in the body of his text he reproduces the assertion of Harnack (H. E. W. Turner, \textit{The Patristic Doctrine of Redemption: A Study of the Development of Doctrine during the First Five Centuries} [London: A. R. Mowbray, 1952], 98). Dunn, in his recent article on Tertullian’s soteriology makes the same argument with a footnote to Turner—Dunn seems to read the text but not the footnotes of his source (Geoffrey Dunn, “A Survey of Tertullian’s soteriology,” \textit{Sacris Erudiri} 42 (2003): 68).

\textsuperscript{95} See, for example, Tertullian, \textit{De Paenitentia} 5.9 (ed. J. Borleffs, in \textit{Tertulliani Opera, pars 1: Opera Catholica: Aduersus Marcionem}, CCL 1 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954], 328.32-329.35: Ita qui per delictorum paenitentiam instituerat domino satisfacere, diabolo per aliam paenitentia paenitentiam satisfaciet erit que tanto magis perosus domino quanto aemulo eius acceptus. See also \textit{De Paenitentia} 6.4 (CCL 1 330.20-22): Hoc enim pretio dominus veniam addicere instituit, hac paenitentiae compensatio redimendam proponit inipunitatem.

\textsuperscript{96} For example, \textit{Tr. ps.} 126.1 (CCL 61B 66.12-16): Dignum est enim ut miserabilem populi casum et impietati eius debitam poenam et post longae seruitutis sufficiencem peccatis graubuis satisfactionem et misericordem in eos dei indulto reditu voluntatem secundum prouidentiae scientiam prophetae spiritus praeliquat.

\textsuperscript{97} See \textit{Tr. ps.} 142.12 (CCL 61B 251.10-252.15): Et competens illa humanae urecundiae professio est, ut, quod per Spiritum Dei in terram rectam deducendus sit, id non meriti esse sui arroget neque per satisfactionem proprii obsequii id sibi postulet, sed totum hoc ad clariandicum in se Dei nomen expectet, ut propter honorem Dei nominis \textit{in terra recta} esse statuatur.
Christian. Only once in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* does Hilary explain the life of Christ, and especially the events of his passion, in terms of satisfaction. Christ, as the fulfillment of the Law, is the last person to render satisfaction to the Lord: “Clearly he did and said all things so that he would be seen to satisfy the religion of the sacrament.”

Likewise, only once does Hilary outline the manner of Christ’s satisfaction: in his commentary on Psalm 53, Hilary speaks of Christ’s passion and death as a sacrifice. The sacrifices offered according to the Law by the Jews were imperfect for two reasons: 1) since they were required, even when the sacrifices were performed properly they were offered under duress and not freely; 2) these sacrifices were offered again and again because by their very nature they could be neither permanent nor continuous. Christ offers his own body as a sacrifice and his sacrifice is perfect because 1) he does so freely, for, since he offers the sacrifice for the sins of others and not his own, he offers voluntarily; 2) it is the sacrifice that needs no repeating:

Therefore, he offered himself to the death brought about by curses so that he might dissolve the curses of the Law by voluntarily offering himself as a sacrifice to God the Father so that through the voluntary sacrifice he might destroy the curse which was added on account of the guilt of sacrifices that were both necessary and intermittent.

Christ’s sacrifice is the one sacrifice that actually has the power of satisfaction. After Christ, “satisfaction” no longer exists, because satisfaction is a category of the Law. Sacrifice continues to exist but only in a new form: the sacrifice of praise.

---

98 *Tr. ps.* 131.4 (CCL 61B 113.4-5): *Certe ita gessit et locutus est omnia, ut sacramenti religioni satisfacere uideretur.* Hilary says this in the context of Christ’s vow to the Father to save humanity: see *Tr. ps.* 131.4 (CCLB 114.19-20): *Impium et profanum docens esse, si non omnia, quae erga humanam salutem Patri uouisset, expleret.*

99 *Tr. ps.* 53.13 (CCL 61 138.10-14): *Maledictorum se ergo obulit morti, ut maledictum legis dissolveret, hostiam se ipse Deo patri voluntarie offerendo, ut per hostiam voluntariam maledictum, quod ob hostiae necessariae et intermissae reatum erat additum, solueretur.* See also Orazzo on Hilary’s conception of the sacrifice of Christ and the priestly function of this sacrifice (*Salvezza in Ilario*, 66-68). The priestly role of Christ will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 4.
But the gospel confession is that in him [Christ] is both the end of the Law and the sacrifice of praise in such a way that the sacrifice of thanks and praise was anticipated (\textit{praefero}) by the blood of sacrifices and the oblation that came to an end.\textsuperscript{100}

Hilary takes little from the “legal model” of Tertullian. He does not see Christian life in terms of satisfaction, rather he explicitly excludes the principle of satisfaction from Christian life by tying satisfaction definitively to the Law. Christ’s satisfaction of the Law is the satisfaction to end all satisfactions. However, though satisfaction ends with the Law, sacrifice pertains to life under the Law and life in Christ. Christ’s sacrifice does not end all sacrifice, but instead alters its nature: his sacrifice is the last sacrifice of blood. The perfection of Christ’s sacrifice transcends the Law by being voluntary (because it is not personally necessary) and ceaseless (for it is the permanent nature of the Son’s obedience that culminates in the cross). The sacrifice of praise that is the proper Christian sacrifice is also unfettered by the demands of the Law because it too is voluntary—for it is Christ’s sacrifice not that of the Christian that renders satisfaction—and without ceasing—for it is a permanent attitude of the heart.

Christ’s death as the perfect sacrifice that ends the satisfaction demanded by the Law is a victory. However, Hilary locates Christ’s definitive triumph over the powers of sin and death in the resurrection, rather than the death.\textsuperscript{101} Hilary never denies the salvific power of Christ’s death—and will go so far as to say “Christ has conquered by dying.”\textsuperscript{102} Nevertheless, Hilary understands Christ’s death as a condition for his salvific rising from the dead. For example, he says:

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Tr. ps.} 68.26 (CCL 61 312.1-3): \textit{Esse autem in eo finem legis et sacrificium laudis euangelica confessio est, ita ut, hostiarum sanguine et oblatione cessante, sacrificium gratiae laudisque praelatum sit.}

\textsuperscript{101} See Blasich, “Risurrezione dei corpi,” 80: “L’insistenza sull’elemento positivo della morte di Cristo, documenta l’organicità della visione di Ilario. E in questo senso deve essere preso lo stretto rapporto che egli intesse tra morte e risurrezione di Cristo, e il rapido immediato passaggio tra i due eventi, considerati nella loro unità significante.”

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Tr. ps.} 55.1 (CCL 61 154.15): qui moriendo uicerit.
Therefore, the Lord, in taking up our sins and suffering for us, was struck, so that in him who was struck all the way to the infirmity of the cross and death, health might be restored to us through [his] resurrection from the dead.\textsuperscript{103}

Hilary here is commenting on Deut. 32.39: …there is no God before me. I will kill and I will give life; I will strike and I will heal.”\textsuperscript{104} Clearly in Deuteronomy both striking and healing are the prerogatives of God alone. Hilary applies these prerogatives to Christ and while he retains the active voice for “heal” he changes to the passive for “strike.” Christ does not strike in order to heal; he \textit{is stricken} in order to heal. There is a temporal sequence to these events: first striking, then healing. Christ is stricken before he heals, that is, he dies before he rises and saves. Christ’s death, then, is the preface to the healing of humanity accomplished in the resurrection.

Hilary integrates Christ’s death into the overarching physicalist schema of incarnation and resurrection by locating the salvific power of the death of Christ not in the death per se but in Christ’s role as “firstborn of the dead.” Christ’s defeat of death is not in his death but in his resurrection where he “leads captivity captive” and receives the people as his inheritance.\textsuperscript{105} By understanding the power of Christ’s death according to his role as firstborn of the dead, Hilary places Christ’s death into his three-stage christology within the framework of Philippians 2.6-11.

And generated today in the glory of God the Father, he is born, that is, the assumption of the form of a slave is honored into the form of God that was before through the reward for his death: and thus a new but not nevertheless strange birth takes place in time, since

\textsuperscript{103} Tr. ps. 68.23 (CCL 61 309.1-3): \textit{Percussus ergo est Dominus peccata nostra suscipiens et pro nobis dolens, ut in eo usque ad infirmitatem crucis mortisque percusso sanitas nobis per resurrectionem ex mortuis redderetur.}

\textsuperscript{104} Hilary quotes this verse in 68.22 (CCL 61 309.15-17): \textit{Videte, uidete quia ego sum, et non est Deus praeter me. Ego interimam et ego iuificabo; percutiam et ego sanabo.}

\textsuperscript{105} See Tr. ps. 67.19 (CCL 61 275.15-276.20): Dehinc \textit{dona in hominibus} accepit, cum primogenitus ex mortuis de se ipse testatur dicens: \textit{Dominus dixit ad me: Filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te. Posce a me, et dabo tibi gentes haereditatem tuam, et possessionem tuam terminos terrae (Ps. 2.7,8). Accepit ergo dona in hominibus, gentes scilicet in hereditatem; in quibus in sancto in altum primogenitus ex mortuis capta captivitatem, conscendit.}
he, who from the form of God was found in the form of a slave, is born as the firstborn of the dead in order to resume the glory of God the Father.\textsuperscript{106}

The reward for Christ’s death is the movement of the \textit{forma serui} (i.e., humanity) into the glory of the \textit{forma Dei}. Christ is the firstborn of the dead because in association with the \textit{forma Dei}, the \textit{forma serui} is lifted up to partake in the glory of divine life.

The integration of the saving power of Christ’s suffering and death into Hilary’s physicalist model of redemption is the necessary prerequisite for Hilary’s statements concerning humanity’s participation in the suffering, death, and resurrection of Christ.

We are able to co-suffer, co-die, and co-rise with Christ only because he assumed all humanity into his body in the incarnation.\textsuperscript{107} It is because we are “taken up in the birth of the Lord through the fellowship of the body” that we “are saved in the cross if [we] believe.”\textsuperscript{108} The consummation of our assumption by Christ, begun in the incarnation and tested in his suffering and death, is his resurrection and glorification, in which humanity, present in his body, finds its own resurrection and glorification.\textsuperscript{109}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

Christology is not identical with soteriology. Christology is a category with connections to both Trinitarian theology and soteriology. As a result, many christological

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Tr. ps.} 2.33 (CCL 61 61.20-25): Et in gloria Dei Patris hodie genitus nascitur, id est, in manentem antea Dei formam per praemium mortis formae seruils adsumptio honestatur; fitque sub tempore noua, nec tamen inuisitata natuitas: cum ad resumendam gloriam Dei patris, qui ex forma Dei forma serui erat repertus, primogenitus ex mortuis nascetur.

\textsuperscript{107} For our participation in Christ’s suffering and death, see \textit{Tr. ps.} 56.8 and 118 Samech 13. The place of the Holy Spirit in Hilary’s understanding of human salvation will be addressed in Chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Tr. ps.} 121. 8 (CCL 61B 30.3-6): Ille Israel a Domino in Pharao uindicatus, in mari ablatus...in natuitate a Domino per consortium corporis susceptus, in cruce si crederet salutatus.

\textsuperscript{109} For our resurrection and glorification in the resurrection and glorification of Christ, see \textit{Tr. ps.} 56.9 and 67.6.
categorizations (for example logos-sarx or logos-anthropos), are able to be paired with several different redemption models. In keeping with a redemption model that focuses on humanity’s assumption into divine life, Hilary’s christological teaching highlights the dynamic movement of the dispensation in which the Son of God, through his emptying and glorification, moves through three temporal stages—preexistence (God), mortal life (God and man), resurrected life (God and man). Within this movement, Hilary clearly teaches that Christ assumes and glorifies all of humanity in his body.

Hilary’s physicalist model of redemption is that which is more commonly found among the Greek Fathers and is thus often termed the “Greek” model of redemption. Hilary includes aspects of the “Latin” or “atonement” model, such as emphasis on the salvific power of Christ’s suffering and death, but he integrates them into the larger framework of the physicalist model. Hilary demonstrates in his teaching all the major elements that Jossua asserts belong to the physicalist model, except one. The one element that is missing in Hilary’s teaching is the Platonic conception of a general nature. The lack of Platonic influence in an otherwise typical physicalist model of redemption makes Hilary’s teaching an enigma that calls for a reevaluation of the scholarly assumption of a necessary connection between Platonism and the physicalist model.

In Hilary we have the representative of a Latin physicalist model of redemption, one which differs from the Greek paradigm largely in terms of its source: Hilary’s soteriology has no connection to Platonism but rather results, as we shall see in the next chapter, from the development of Latin tradition and a specific exegetical understanding of the Pauline Adam-Christ parallel. Hilary’s teaching supports a view that the
connection between Platonism and the physicalist model is accidental rather than necessary.
CHAPTER 4
THE ASSUMPTION OF ALL HUMANITY

The fourth chapter of my dissertation will focus on Hilary’s doctrine of Christ’s assumption of all humanity. I will explain in detail, with reference to the Tractatus super Psalmos, both the meaning of this teaching and its importance within Hilary’s soteriological framework. I will show that this teaching is already in the pre-exilic In Matthaeum, though it gains importance exponentially in the Tractatus super Psalmos.

For Hilary, Christ is able to assume all of humanity because humanity is already unified in Adam. Nevertheless, individuals are able to remove themselves from this human unity and from the body of Christ if they choose.

The larger picture of Christ’s assumption of all humanity is salvation history and the love of God manifested in it. In his search to understand the power of Christ’s salvation to affect men of every time and place, Hilary consistently returns to a remembrance of God’s history with humanity. This is a history of love, forbearance, and mercy.

Nothing is more lovable to God than man…. God founded the world with a word, but man is made with deliberation: not by a word, but by a planned action….man is turned over to his free will and established as lord of the world, free from all things….after sin, man was preserved for mercy….and man himself, through the sacrament of birth according to Jesus Christ, was assumed into him.¹

The culmination of God’s mercy towards humanity is the sacrament of our salvation, the incarnation of Jesus Christ. Hilary understands this mystery of the incarnation as Christ’s assumption of a body and of a whole human life that contains, at the same time, the bodies and the whole lives of all human beings. We see in this passage that “man” (homo) is the consistent grammatical subject of God’s workings. When Hilary says: “after sin, man (homo) is preserved for mercy” (that is, the mercy that is to come later at

¹ Tr. ps. 134.14 (CCL 61B 151.3, 4-5, 7-8, 9, 13-14): nihil amabilius Deo homine est…. Mundus uerbo constitit, homo autem cum consilio efficitur, non uerbo, sed opere cogitato…voluntati suae permititur, liber ab omnibus mundi Dominus constituitur…post peccatum misericordiae reseruatur…Hic ipse per sacramentum natiiutatis secundum hominem Iesum Christum adsumptus in eum est.
the incarnation), he means all humanity, not just one man, is preserved. So too, not just one man, but all humanity is assumed in Christ. The body of Christ becomes the physical locus of our salvation because we are, in a manner at once mystical and physical, in that very body.

Hilary’s understanding of soteriology is thus very direct, with no need of a transference from the humanity of Christ to every individual member of humanity, because the humanity of Christ contains every human person. We are saved because the body of Christ is resurrected and the human nature of Christ—in which we are contained—is raised to sit at the right hand of the Father. To be more precise, our resurrection and our glorification do not happen because of Christ, but in Christ. Hilary’s understanding of salvation, based on his physicalist theory of redemption, that is, his understanding of Christ’s assumption of all humanity, relies less on the necessity of a transfer between the salvation that is won by Christ and that which is subsequently given to us than on the identification between Christ’s human nature and all of humanity, such that everything that the human nature of Christ experiences, we experience as well, precisely in eo.

THE PREREQUISITE: THE ANTERIOR UNITY OF HUMANITY

Christ’s assumption of all humanity posits a unity of humankind. This is a unity that preexists the incarnation and is the necessary condition for the possibility and efficacy of the incarnation. If there were no preexisting unity of humanity, the incarnation and the resurrection would have affected only the person Jesus but would

---

2 As I said in Chapter 2, this unity of humanity in Hilary’s thought has precedents in Stoic sources.
have had no mechanism for extending their salvific effect into the entire human race.

The universal possibility of salvation is a result of Christ’s assumption of humanity as a whole, an assumption that depends upon there being a unified humanity able to be assumed.

The premise of a unity of humanity anterior to the incarnation is necessary for any physicalist theory of redemption and thus is an element not only of Hilary’s thought but also of Greek purveyors of this doctrine. Malevez, in his study on Gregory of Nyssa, shows that Gregory conceives of the human species, even prior to the incarnation, as the body of a living being. It is because we are a single body that divine contact at one point has an effect on all points. Malevez explains Gregory’s conception of human unity prior to the incarnation as dependent upon the belief in universal ideas, that is, upon a Platonic understanding of Christian truth. It is not my task here to argue Gregory’s case, but I bring up Gregory, and Malevez’s understanding of him, to demonstrate an aspect of the physicalist theory that, long considered the result of Platonic influence, can be, and is, in the case of Hilary, a Christian reading of Scripture.

Though human unity is a necessary premise for a physicalist understanding of the incarnation, the incarnation itself brings about a new level of human unity. Through the incarnation, Christ becomes the author of a new and superior union, a union that leads to our resurrection and glorification with each other and in him. We will find that Hilary envisions these two stages of human unity through the two figures of Adam and Christ.

4 Malevez “Église dans le Christ,” 279: Malevez seeks a new understanding of Gregory’s Platonism. He shows that Gregory does not hold the doctrine for which he has been accused of Platonism, namely, that of collective incarnation defined by Christ’s assumption of a universal nature (as opposed to a particular nature). Malevez, relocates Gregory’s Platonism to the belief in universal ideas that underlies the conception of a unity of humanity prior to the incarnation.
The unity of humanity is first clearly manifested in Adam, but due to Adam’s actions, it becomes a unity unto sin. The unity instituted by Christ corrects and improves human unity so that it is now a unity unto the good. In this way, unity is both the premise and the result of the incarnation.

**The Pauline Adam-Christ Parallel**

In Hilary, this anterior unity of humanity is clearly tied to revealed truth: it is the unity of all men in Adam. Hilary often refers to our origin in Adam; this is an origin that has two different faces. As descendents of Adam, we are inheritors both of the promise of Eden and the malediction of the Fall. For example, commenting on Psalm 145, Hilary says:

*I will praise the Lord in my life: for this life, which now exists through the infirmities of the body, is not [the prophet’s] life. Indeed such life, which is not life but death, began from Adam but it was not begun with Adam.... Therefore, in this life, such as was first founded in man, [the prophet] will praise God.*

From Adam we have both life and death: the benevolence of God’s creation and the results of sin. In the course of the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary uses Adam more to represent our common origin in sin than to recall the common origin of our life in him. The result of our common origin of sin in Adam is that “death has equal dominion over all: its law is common to the nature of every body.”

While Hilary will also use Adam to represent our prelapsarian common origin in foundational goodness, he prefers to use

---

5 *Tr. ps.* 145.2 (CCL 61B 279.8-11, 280.12-14): *Laudabo Dominum in uita mea.* Non enim ea uita, quae nunc est per infirmitates corporis, sua est. Ab Adam namque ista coepit, non cum Adam inchoata est, quam non uiam, sed mortem esse...In hac ergo uita sua Deum, qualis primum in homine est instituta, laudabit.

6 *Tr. ps.* 118 Samech 7 (CCL 61A 144.8-145.9-10): Mors aequaliter dominatur uniuersorum; in omnium corporum naturas commune ius illi est.
Christ as the representative for this state, for Christ, the heavenly Adam, is our promise of return, and more, to this goodness.

Hilary says that “our totality (uniuersitas) in the first parent of parents, Adam, is shown by the word ‘land,’”\(^7\) and:

Truly it is this land, the land of Adam, which, criminal through the attraction of food, is cursed. Therefore, all those similar to the earthly Adam render cursed fruits to their land. But the one who is configured to the heavenly Adam has innocent fruit for their land.\(^8\)

Hilary uses land (terra) as a metaphor for the body; body as the spiritual sense of the land cursed because of Adam’s sin in Genesis. Our bodies, first configured to Adam and so suffering his curse, now may be configured to Christ. The parallel between Adam and Christ is a recurrent theme in the *Tractatus super Psalms*.\(^9\) This parallel between Adam and Christ is such that, for Hilary, if all of humanity is in Adam, then all humanity is in Christ. Luis Ladaria has written two articles concerning this theme in Hilary’s *In Matthaeum* and his *Tractatus super Psalms*.\(^10\) Hilary uses this Adam-Christ parallel to develop some of his soteriological themes, in particular the unity of all humanity in

---

\(^7\) *Tr. ps.* 65.4 (CCL 61 237.5-6): uniuersitas nostra ex terra in primo Adam parente genitorum...monstratur.

\(^8\) *Tr. ps.* 66.7 (CCL 61 257.13, 258.18-21): Verum hic Adae terra, quae per inlecebram cibi erat criminosa, maledicitur....Omnis ergo terreno Adae similis hos maledictos fructus terrae suae reddit, ceterum qui iam caelesti Adae configuratur, habet innocentem terrae suae fructum....

\(^9\) The parallel between Adam and Christ, derived from 1 Cor. 15, is a common theme in Patristic writings. See, for example, Tertullian, *Aduersus Marcionem* 5.9.5 (CCL 1 689.12-15): Quodsi sic in christo uiuificamur omnes, sicut mortificamur in adam, quando in adam corpore mortificemur, sic necesse est et in christo [corpore] uiuificemur. Ambrosiaster, *In Epistulam ad Romanos* 5.21 (Commentarius in epistulas Paulinas, pars 1, ed. Heinrich Vogels, CSEL 81 [Vienna: Hoelder-Picheler-Tempsky, 1966], 189.12-13): … aeternae vitae heredes futuri per Christum, sicut fuerant perditioni obnoxii per Adam. Chromatius says that the second Adam wished to conquer in those ways in which the first Adam was overcome: His enim modis secundus Adam uincere uoluit, quibus primus Adam fuerat superatus (Chromatius, *Tractatus in Matthaeum* 14.2 [CCL 9A 252.53-54]). See also Tertullian, *De Resurrectione mortuorum* 53 (ed. J. Borleffs, in *Tertullian Opera*, pars 2: *Opera Montanistica*, CCL 2 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954], 998-1000).

\(^10\) Ladaria notes that Hilary demonstrates a heavy Pauline influence and this use of the Pauline Adam-Christ parallel demonstrates only one instance of his debt to Paul (“Adán y Cristo: Un motivo soteriológico del *In Matthaeum*,” 443). Although Ladaria mentions that Hilary frequently uses the Pauline parallel between Adam and Christ, Hilary only once makes direct mention of the Pauline text which motivates him: see Ladaria, “Adán y Cristo en los *Tractatus super Psalms*,” 97.
Adam unto death and in Christ unto life. Ladaria highlights the pericope of the paralytic (Matt. 9.2-8, *In Matthaeum 8.5*), in which Hilary explains that the paralytic symbolizes Adam, and in him all humanity, who is brought to Jesus to be cured.11

Indeed in the paralytic, the totality (*uniuersitas*) of the peoples is offered to be healed, and the very words of curing must be considered. It is not said to the paralytic: “be healed;” nor: “get up and walk;” but: “Be constant, my son, your sins have been remitted of you.” In the one, Adam, the sins of all the peoples are remitted...he is called son because he is the first work of God, and to him, out of kindness, the sins of the soul are remitted and indulgence granted for the first transgression. For we do not accept that the paralytic had committed any [personal] sin....12

The unity of humanity that Hilary bases in Adam is manifested here in a unity in sin. Hilary’s commentary on this pericope depends upon the presupposition of humanity’s unity in sin: without this unity, Jesus’ healing of the paralytic could in no way symbolize his healing of the sins of all. Hilary uses the parallel between Adam and Christ to show the transformation of the unity of humanity from the unity in sin in Adam into a definitive unity in the good in Christ.13

Hilary’s soteriology, then, has its foundation in protology. Hilary does not explain this foundation, rather he presupposes it as revealed truth.14 Salvation history shows that humanity is unified to such an extent that both its fall and its salvation each

---

11 Orazzo, in dealing with this pericope, nuances the paralytic’s position as representative of the *uniuersitas hominum*. He asserts that the paralytic does not represent all of humanity but only that section of humanity that realizes its sinfulness and comes to Christ in order to be cured and saved (“Ilario di Poitiers e la *universa caro* assunta dal Verbo nei *Tractatus super Psalmos*.” *Augustinianum* 23 [1983]: 408). Chromatius is even more explicit than Hilary in equating the paralytic with Adam; see Chromatius, *Tractatus in Matthaeum 44.4* (CCL 9A 414.78-80): Pro huius ergo paralytici salute id est populi gentilis, uel certe Adae qui auctor humani generis esse cognoscitur... For Hilary’s use of “uniuersitas,” see the discussion in Chapter 2 and Pettorelli, “Thème de Sion,” 230, no. 61.

12 *In Matt.* 8.5 (SC 254 198.1-6.7-10): Iamque in paralytico gentium uniuersitas offertur medenda et curationis ipsius erba sunt contienda. Non dicitur paralytico: Sanus esto; non dicitur: Surge et ambula; sed dicitur: *Constans esto, fili, remissa sunt tibi peccata tua* (Matt. 9.2). In Adam uno peccata uniuersis gentibus remittuntur...hic filius nuncupatur, quia primus Dei opus est, huic remittuntur animae peccata et indulgentia primae transgressionis ex uenia est. Non enim paralyticum pecasse aliquid accepius...

13 Ladaria shows the importance that the physical body of Christ has in this picture (“Adán y Cristo: Un motivo soteriológico del *In Matthaeum*,” 455): “En su cuerpo la humanidad errante vuelve al paraíso del que Adán la había apartado.”

14 See Ladaria, *Cristología de Hilario*, 90.
depend upon a single protagonist: Adam and Christ respectively. Following Paul in Romans 5, Hilary says: “From one man came unto all the sentence of death and the labor of life…but now through one man unto all has abounded the gift of life and the grace of justification.” Christ is the new Adam, the founder of a unity that leads to life rather than death.

The result of human unity in Adam’s sin is the *humilitas* or *infirmitas* of human nature of which Hilary speaks often in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. The weakness of human nature is demonstrated in its actual choices to sin. However, the cause of this weakness is its sinful condition, a condition that precedes actual individual sin. Drawn by the body towards the earth, human nature has, since Adam’s fall, become profoundly unstable; it is characterized by an instability of the will that now suffers different attractions and pulls—a constant oscillation between what one should do and what one wishes to do—which then darken the intellect, rendering it blind to knowledge of God. The great evil of the human condition is that it is characterized by a shifting and changing nature. Every sin, inasmuch as it causes man to depart from the one reality beyond change, namely God, increases this inquietude. While eternal fluctuations are the fitting

---

15 See Orazzo, “Ilario di Poitiers e la *universa caro*,” 408-09.
16 *Tr. ps.* 59.4 (CCL 61 185.2-3, 4-5): ex uno in omnes sententia mortis et uiteae labor exiit…nunc autem per unum in omnes donum uiteae et iustificationis gratia abunduit.
17 While instability is part of the reality of fallen human nature, personal sin worsens the condition. Hilary distinguishes between our human condition of sin and our personal and actual sins. For example, Hilary explains that Esau was hated by God “for this, namely knowingly sinning, rather than for that, namely being generated according to the necessity and nature of sin” (*Tr. ps.* 57.3 [CCL 61 168.6-8]: …ipso potius hoc sciente quam aliquo ad necessitatem genito naturamque peccati).
19 Hilary shows a fascination with this theme such that the antithesis between human instability and divine stability can be seen in nearly every psalm commentary and is often the subject of rhetorical embellishment. Hilary, recently returned from exile and perhaps reflecting on the instability of his own life, demonstrates a real longing for the steadfastness that God promises to his saints. See, for example, *Tr. ps.* 1.19-20, 2.13, 52.11-12.
punishment for the impious. Hilary says that the just find in God “the safe and secure port” who keeps them from the fate of the impious, that is, being tossed about, in this life and the next, as dust.

Hilary is quite clear that the lowliness of being generated according to the necessity and nature of sin is not man’s created state, but his fallen state: it is the result of Adam’s sin that has been passed on to us. The passing of this sin occurs through the transmission of flesh and is a part of human generation. Hilary explains this passage of sin in his commentary on Psalm 135, verse 8, where he explains why the daughter of Babylon is called miserable:

The whole verse revolves around this unhappy flesh of our confusion and perturbation, which, according to historical faith, is generated from the fathers of confusion [namely, Babylon] since all flesh is the daughter of previous flesh …. Therefore, this, namely the flesh of all, is the miserable daughter of Babylon.

Sin, having gained entrance into humanity through Adam, has brought humanity to a lamentable condition. This condition is passed on to each generation through the flesh. As sin exiled Adam from his original condition, Hilary refers to the prophet David as “an exile because of the crime of the first parent Adam.” David, often a representative for humanity, “knows that he is born under the origin and law of sin,” and thus he is an exile from Eden, an exile from original innocence, an exile from the promise of

---

20 See *Tr. ps.* 54.19.
22 See *Tr. ps.* 1.19.
23 *Tr. ps.* 136.13 (CCL 61B 180.13-16, 18-19): Ad infeliciem enim illam confusionis et perturbationis nostrae carnis sermo omnis reuertitur, quae secundum historiae fidem ex confusionis patribus genita est, quia omnis caro superioris carnis est filia…. Haec ergo *misera Babylonis est filia*, id est caro omnium.
24 Tertullian also argues that every soul, by reason of its birth, has its nature in Adam and is therefore both unclean and actively sinful: *Ita omnis anima eo usque in adam censetur, donec in christo recenseatur, tantius immunda, quamdiu recenseatur, peccatrix autem, quia immunda, recipiens ignominiam et carnis ex societate* (Tertullian, *De anima* 40 [CCL 2 843.1-4]).
25 *Tr. ps.* 136.5 (CCL 61B 174.9): in crimine primi parentis Adae exulem.
26 *Tr. ps.* 118 Tau 6 (CCL 61A 201.4--5): Scit sub peccati origine et sub peccati lege esse se natum.
immortality. In David, we see that all of humanity together has fallen. Indeed, Hilary notes that David believes that “no one of the living can be without sin.”\(^{27}\) Because of Adam we have lost what was originally given to us in Adam. In this way, Adam is the symbol of humankind in both the created and the fallen state.

Ladaria has illuminated a subtle shift of emphasis in Hilary’s use of the parallel between Adam and Christ between the *In Matthaueum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos*.\(^{28}\) In the *In Matthaueum*, as we saw in the pericope of the paralytic, this parallel is centered on sin: Jesus Christ heals and saves us from the consequences of Adam’s sin.\(^{29}\)

However, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Ladaria shows that Hilary develops the parallel based upon God’s original design for man. Here Adam is not just the first sinner (in contrast to Christ), but a type of Christ, and as such, the first Father. Commenting on Psalm 118, Hilary says: “In the beginning the truth of the words of God is this: that the new man, regenerated in Christ, may finally live as eternal according to the image of the eternal God, that is, of the heavenly Adam.”\(^{30}\) Christ is the realization of the original design of the Father, for in him humanity can give the fruits that God desired from Adam in the beginning, and the image of God is the image of Christ, who is the heavenly one of which Adam is the type. In the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary begins to look back to Adam and the beginning not just to see what needs to be overcome and undone through the working of Christ, but also now with an eye that at once looks further back and

\(^{27}\) *Tr. ps.* 118 He 16 (CCL 61A 57.12-13): Propheta in corpore positus loquitur et neminem uiuentium scit sine peccato esse posse.

\(^{28}\) Ladaria, “Adán y Cristo en los *Tractatus super Psalmos*,” 120-22.

\(^{29}\) As Ladaria says: “Jesús une a todos los hombres en el bien, en su cuerpo la humanidad errante vuelve al paraíso del que Adán la había apartado” (“Adán y Cristo: Un motivo soteriológico del *In Matthaueum*,” 455).

\(^{30}\) *Tr. ps.* 118 Resch 10 (CCL 61A 192.13-16): Sic in principio uerborum Dei uiertas est, ut nouus homo, regeneratus in Christo, uiuat deinceps secundum aeterni Dei, id est caelestis Adae imaginem iam aeternus.
further forward to the original paradisiacal design of the Father to be realized in the eschaton. In the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, the emphasis shifts from our initial unity in Adam to our eschatological unity in Christ. 31 This is a unity that focuses on returning to, and furthering, the initial unity that God ordained unto the good in Adam—that is, the unity of being created according to the image of God—rather than on correcting the unity in sin attained through Adam’s fall.32

For Hilary, Christ’s assumption of all humanity is the logical development of the unity of humanity in Adam that Hilary, in accordance with tradition, understands as outlined in Scripture. Though differing in their conception of the results of Adam’s sin, and thus the nature of redemption, the majority of Fathers, East and West, held a conception of human unity in Adam such that Adam’s Fall, in some way, affects all.33

31 See Ladaria, “Adán y Cristo en los *Tractatus super Psalmos*,” 121.
32 See Tr. ps. 118 Resch 10 (CCL 61A 192.3-5): Hoc super hominem principium uocis est Dei, cum ad imaginem interminatae aeternitatis originis nostrae exordium conderetur. This point is also made by Guillermo Colautti (*Figuras eclesiológicas*) in the context of ecclesiology. Colautti argues that Hilary identifies the body of Christ with the Church and further with humanity as a whole. This identification of all humanity with the Church is not actually founded in the incarnation, rather it is founded even before creation; it is present in creation through Christ, in the unity of all in Adam’s sin, and in the history of Israel; it is not made fully manifest until the incarnation and does not reach its perfection until the resurrection and, finally, the recapitulation (Colautti, 267). Thus, according to Collauti, Hilary’s doctrine of the assumption of all humanity follows upon, and is not the basis for, his understanding of the unity of all humanity, which is the Church. However, as we will see later in this chapter, at times, Hilary presents the Church as the unity of all humanity, at other times he is clear that the Church contains not all humans but only some.

Far from developing a Platonic theory of a general nature of humanity, Hilary simply follows and expands this tradition and the, again commonplace, Pauline Adam-Christ parallelism of Romans: that as death came through one man, Adam, so life comes through one man, Christ. The Adam-Christ parallel is pervasive in patristic thought and is often accompanied by language that seems to support a physicalist theory of redemption: Tertullian, for example, says “We all live in Christ just as we are all killed in Adam.” Hilary follows the logic of this tradition in a specific way: if all of humanity is somehow present in Adam so as to be affected by his sin, Hilary concludes that all of


34 For example, Rom. 5.18 is clearly in the background of Tr. ps. 59.4 (CCL 61 185.1-6): Et haec quidem non magis ad Israel quam ad universitatem humani generis aptata sunt, quia ex uno in omnes sententia mortis et uitaes labor exit, cum dicunt est: Maledicta terra in operibus tuae (Gen. 3, 17), nunc autem per unum in omnes donum uitaet et iustificationis gratia abunduit, ut quorum terra maledicta est, horum nunc conforma Deo corpora sint. If there is a philosophical precedent for Hilary’s thought here, it is Stoicism not Platonism. In the verse from Tr. ps. 59.4 quoted above, Hilary wants to clarify that God’s words “I will strike down and I will heal” apply not to Israel but to the entirety of the human race (uniuersitas humani generis) because the entire human race from one is cursed and in one is healed. In his insistence on speaking of the entire human race (humani generis), and his view that humanity, before the grace of Christ, is cursed by death and labor, Hilary has Stoic precedent—in both language and position. “Humani generis” has a history in Stoic writing. Cicero, for example, says that the similarity of the human race is as remarkable in perversities as it is in proper behavior. See Cicero, De legibus 1.31 (Powell 173.5-6): Nec solum in rectis, sed etiam in pravitatibus insignis est humani generis similitudo. Seneca also demonstrates this dreary view of human nature, speaking of humanity’s difficulty in choosing the good and its predilection for vice and error. For humanity’s difficulty in choosing the good, see Seneca, De Constantia sapientis 4.3 (in Four Dialogues, ed. C. D. N. Costa [Warminster: Aris & Phillips Ltd., 1994], 104): Rem difficilem optas humano generi, innocentiam; et non fieri eorum interest qui facturi sunt, non eius qui patri ne si fiat quidem potest. Seneca, Ad Lucilium epistulae morales 71.15 (Loeb vol. 2, 80-82) where he quotes Cato discussing the fate of humanity to be damned to mortality: Itaque ut M. Cato, cum aevum animo percuterret, dicit: ‘omne humanum genus, quod est quod quae erit, morte damnatum est: omnes, quae usquam rerum potiuntur urbes quae que alienorum imperiorum magna sunt decora, ubi fuerint, aliquando quarequet et vario exitii genere tollentur: alias destruent bella, alias desidiae pax que ad inexitiam versa consumet et magnis opibus exitiosa res, luxus.’ The human race is, in summary, full of vice and error; see Seneca, Ad Lucilium epistulae morales 108.13 (Loeb vol. 2, 238): Ego certe cum attalum audirem in vita, in errores, in mala vitae perorantem, saepe miseritus sum generis humani et illum sublimem altiorem que humano fastigio credidi. We find this conception of human unity expressed in the same language by both the Stoics and Hilary, that is, with the language of “humani generis.” We also find the Stoic negative vision of this unity reflected in Hilary’s understanding of the unity of humanity in sin (in Adam) prior to its unity in good (in Christ).

35 Tertullian, Aduersus Marcionem 5.9.5 (CCL 1 689.13-14): … sic in christo iuuificamur omnes, sicut mortificamur in adam…
humanity must somehow be present in Christ so as to be affected by his resurrection to eternal life; and for Hilary, this presence of humanity in Christ is a physical presence. Tertullian, though he says “we all live in Christ”, does not intend to mean that we are all physically present in Christ’s body: this is, however, exactly what Hilary does mean. The language of Tertullian, unlike that of Hilary, is metaphorical or spiritual. Hilary’s teaching on Christ’s assumption of all humanity is surprising not, as scholarship would suggest, for its development without Greek influence. Rather the surprise is that while the unity of humanity in Adam was common parlance in patristic thought, the development of this concept to the physical unity of humanity in Christ was, at least among the Latins, quite rare.

THE NEW UNITY IN CHRIST’S BODY

The original unity of humanity, though first recognized in Adam and the universal results of the Fall, is centered and dependent upon not Adam, but Christ. Hilary understands that mankind is created “ad imaginem,” that is that man is created “according to the Image,” namely Christ himself.36 Every human being is created in Christ and according to Christ, and thus original unity, though seen in Adam, is actually centered in Christ. Unity, both that found in the incarnation and that of creation, has to do with relationship to Christ. The incarnation embodies this original unity of humanity into

36 See Tr. ps. 118 Iod 7 (CCL 61A 92.3-5): Non Dei imago, quia imago Dei est primogenitus omnis creaturae; sed ad imaginem, id est secundum imaginis et similitudinis speciem. Man is not the “image of God:” this title is reserved for Christ. Rather man is made “according to the splendor of the image and likeness of God.”
unity in Christ’s body: “because we are all one body in Christ.”

In the incarnation, the manner of human unity becomes a physical unity in the body and nature of Christ.

When Christ assumes our nature and our infirmities in the incarnation, he binds himself to us in a very intimate way. Since Hilary insists that Christ’s assumption of flesh is the assumption of the flesh of all of us, the divine Word enters into a union not simply with his own human nature, the person Jesus, but with the human nature of each of us. The incarnation introduces all of humanity into a physical unity with Christ.

Therefore, God is marvelous in his saints whom, when he has conformed them to the glory of his body, he will assume even into the unity of paternal majesty through him who is the mediator, since the Father is in him though nature, and he is in us through the fellowship of the flesh…

This physical unity of humanity with Christ accomplished in the “fellowship of the flesh,” unifies us with the Father through the mediation of Christ’s natural unity with him. In the De Trinitate, in the context of the Eucharist, Hilary says that because humanity’s unity with Christ is a unity based on the flesh (as opposed to the will), it is also a “natural unity” (naturalis unitas). However, in the Tractatus super Psalinos, while Hilary continues to emphasize the physical and fleshly nature of humanity’s unity with Christ, he no longer speaks of this unity as “natural,” perhaps in an effort to distinguish more clearly between the unity of Father and Son and the unity of Son and humanity. The closest Hilary comes to using the terminology of natural unity in the

37 Tr. ps. 118 Phe 11 (CCL 61A 167.6-7): quia omnes unum corpus sumus in Christo…
38 Tr. ps. 67.37 (CCL 61 291.8-11): Mirabilis ergo in sanctis Deus est, quos, cum conformes gloriae corporis sui fecerit, per se, qui mediator est, etiam in unitate paternae maiestatis adsumet, dum et in eo per naturam Pater est et ille rursum per societatem carnis in nobis est….
39 See De Trin. 8.13-16.
40 In the Trinitarian sphere, a standard way of defining the relationship of the Father and the Son is to say they share a natural, as opposed to a volitional, unity. Hilary uses in the De Trin. similar terminology for the relationship between the Son and humanity. Wild, in his discussion of Hilary’s use of the language of natural unity to describe our relationship with the Son in De Trin. 8 (Divinization of Man, 108-111), notes that the only orthodox way of understanding Hilary here is to say that he is speaking analogously of the
Tractatus super Psalmos is in his use of the Johannean metaphor of the vine, where he says: “it is necessary that the branch that remains in the vine should have the nature of the true vine.” Nevertheless, the human nature, which before was alienated from God, has been taken up by Christ and even made a part of him through the incarnation. Participation in the kingdom of Christ is a possibility that did not exist prior to the incarnation. Christ, in assuming all humanity to himself, offers this possibility to all humanity without exception. Indeed, Hilary says Christ wishes and wills the salvation of all: the eternal life of all flesh is the inheritance Christ asks of the Father. Every human being now born, because of his very human nature—the nature that Christ assumed—is conformed to the body of Christ and, through this mediation, is assumed into a unity with the paternal glory, that is, into participation in divine life. Unity with God is now an ontological fact that precedes any individual’s act of the will.

The ontological fact of our physical union with Christ in the incarnation is only part of what is needed for salvation. The new ontological existence of each person, accomplished universally by Christ’s assumption of all humanity, needs to be ratified by unity of the Father and the Son and of our unity with Christ. But Hilary himself gives no indication that he is using an analogy here. Wild, however, maintains that “He insists that our unity with God is a true and natural one. Nevertheless he never says that the natural unity that binds us to God is the same as that which binds the Father and the Son together” (Divinization of Man, 108). The lack of the language of “natural unity” in the Tractatus super Psalmos could demonstrate Hilary’s acknowledgement of the ambiguity of its use in the De Trinitate.

41 Tr. ps. 51.16 (CCL 61 104.14-15, commenting on John 15.1-8): … necesse est ut naturam uerae uitis propago intra uitem manens teneat. Cyprian also uses the metaphor of the vine; however, he uses it to show the relationship of the faithful to the Church. See, for example, Cyprian De ecclesia catholicae unitate 5.9: Ecclesia quoque una est quae in multitudinem latius incremento fecunditatis extenditur. Quemodo…rami arboris multi sed robur unum tenaci radice fundatum…. While Hilary understands the vine metaphor in a physical fashion, Cyprian understands it more metaphorically: the unity of the faithful to one another and to the Church is, as we saw in Chapter 2, the unity of wills, namely concord or harmony (see Cyprian, De Ecclesiae catholicae unitate 23 [CCL 3 266.562-64]: Vnus deus est et christus unus, et una ecclesia eius et fides una, et plebs in solidam corporis unitatem concordiae glutino copulata).

42 See Tr. ps. 2.31 (CCL 61 58.2-3, 58.8-59.10): Accepit ergo hereditatem gentium, quam poposcit. … Haec ergo hereditas eius, ut omni carni det uitam aeternam, ut omnes gentes baptizatae atque doctae regenerentur in uitam….
personal adherence to Christ through faith and a participation in the life and death of Jesus through the sacraments.\textsuperscript{43} The new unity with Christ depends upon his assumption of all into his body, but also upon faith, for “we who have believed in Christ are one.”\textsuperscript{44}

Participation with Christ needs to extend beyond the flesh to include a participation in the characteristics or qualities of Christ: “whoever persists in justice, will participate in him [Christ], because he himself is justice; whoever persists in truth, will participate in him, for he himself is truth.”\textsuperscript{45} Hilary speaks both of the universality of the salvation obtained through Christ’s assumption of our flesh and of the necessity of a personal reception of, and participation in, this new life offered in Christ.

Therefore, we are in Christ through the union of the assumed flesh: and this is the sacrament of God hidden from the ages and generations in God, which is now revealed to his saints, that we are coheirs, concorporeal beings and co-participators of his promise in Christ. Therefore, through the union of flesh, an entrance is opened to all in Christ, if they put off the old man and nail themselves to his cross, and if, having put off from themselves those things that they did before, they are buried with him in baptism unto life, and nail their flesh with its vices and concupiscences to his cross so that they might enter into the consort of the flesh of Christ.\textsuperscript{46}

In his flesh, Christ has opened an entrance to the divine life for all, and he has further paved the way to God through nailing himself, and the sins of all, to the cross and through passing from death to life. All may pass through the doorway that his body

\textsuperscript{43} See Orazzo, “Ilario di Poitiers e la \textit{universa caro},” 415-16. Orazzo speaks about the two different planes of Hilary’s thought regarding the assumption of all humanity in Christ: the ontological and the soteriological. Christ, he says, assumes all of humanity, which allows every human being without exception, prior to any individual choice, to have a “natural” union with him. This is the ontological plane of Hilary’s use of “adsumere.” But there is also a soteriological plane that intersects with and completes the ontological level: in order for this natural union to be salvific there are two requirements for each individual: he must believe in God made man and he must be fruitful, that is, act according to this belief.

\textsuperscript{44} Tr. ps. 127.4 (CCL 61B 82.2-3): qui in Christo crediderimus, unum esse.

\textsuperscript{45} Tr. ps. 118 Heth 16 (CCL 61A 81.7-9): Et particeps eius, quisque in iustitia manet, quia ipse iustitia est; particeps eius erit, quisque in ueritate persistit; ipse est enim ueritas.

\textsuperscript{46} Tr. ps. 91.9 (CCL 61 329.15-24): Ergo per coniunctionem carnis adsumptae sumus in Christo; et hoc est sacramentum Dei absconditum a saeculis et generationibus in Deo, quod nunc reuelatum est sanctis eius, esse nos coheredes et concorporales et coparticipes pollictionis eius in Christo. Patet ergo uniueris per coniunctionem carnis aditus in Christo, si exuant ueterem hominem et cruci eius adfigant, et ab his quae ante gesserunt in baptismo eius consepeliantur ad uitam, et, ut in consortium Christi carnis introeant, carnem cum uitiis et concupisciientis adfigant.
offers, but to be truly a coheir, concorporeal being, and co-participator with Christ, we must willingly participate in this way, this path, that Jesus paved to God. As a result, in many passages of the *Tractatus super Psalmos* we find Hilary speaking about those who will receive eternal punishment.\(^{47}\) These people have rejected the participation in Christ that was theirs by nature.

Hilary explains the relationship between the universal ontological change effected by the assumption of all humanity and the subsequent individual choice to participate in, or enact, this divine reality in his commentary on Psalm 51, where he introduces the text from the Gospel of John: “I am the true vine and you are the branches” (Jn. 15.1-8) to comment on the nature of our unity with Christ:

> Therefore, if some will merit through faith in the embodied God to remain in the nature of the body assumed by God, *they will be washed so as to bear eternal fruits* from themselves: this is because it is necessary that *the branch that remains* in the vine should have the nature of the *true vine*. But he who is incredulous of God born in a body, even if he also *remains* believing, nevertheless he will lack the *fruits* of his faith and *he will be cut off* either on account of his infidelity or on account of the uselessness of *the fruits* of unbelievers.\(^{48}\)

Hilary presupposes in this passage that the assumption of humanity into God is the divine act that renders all of us branches of the true vine. However, some branches bear fruit and some do not in accordance with each one’s faith or unbelief. Those branches that do not bear fruit will be cut off from the true vine, that is to say, those who do not believe in the incarnation are cut off from their participation in the divine nature which was the gift given to all in the incarnation. In this way, Hilary preserves both the universality of

\(^{47}\) See *Tr. ps.* 118 Gimel 18 (CCL 61A 35.1-2): Peccata obprobrio sunt digna; et idcirco peccatores exsurgent in obprobrium aeternum.

\(^{48}\) *Tr. ps.* 51.16 (CCL 61 104.12-18, commenting on John 15.1 ff): Si qui igitur per fidem corporati Dei manere in natura adsumpti a Deo corporis merebuntur, *hi emundantur in fructus aeternos ex se adferendos*, quia necesse est ut naturam uerae uitis propego intra uitem manens teneat. At uero qui incredulus nati in corpore Dei fuerit, uel si et credens *maneat*, *fructibus* tamen fidei suae careat, *eradicabitur* aut ob infidelitatem aut ob inutilitatem *fructuum* negatorium.
Christ’s assumption, with its promise of salvation and divine participation, and the necessity of faith, works, and adherence to the embodied God for the fulfillment of this promise.

Hilary, throughout the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, wants to emphasize the universality of the salvation that is the result of Christ’s assumption of all humanity. Universality does not mean every person is saved; Hilary explicitly denies such a position. But the salvation of Christ is universal in that it is offered not just to the Jewish people but to all peoples. Hilary says that “*the name of God is sweet* not to one people alone (and to an irreverent people at that), but now to all peoples and tongues.”

The special access to God, which in earlier days was the sole possession of the Jews, is now offered to everyone regardless of race, tribe, nation, or time. It is only in Christ and because of Christ that all people can praise God. Christ’s assumption of all humanity is the key to the fulfillment of the texts in the Old Testament that call for universal praise for God.

However, Hilary’s desire to demonstrate the universal power of Christ’s assumption of humanity leads to a confusing use of images. Hilary often identifies the body of Christ with all humanity. At other times he identifies the body of Christ with the Church. The Church, though, is not equivalent to humanity but rather a selection of it. The Church is that part of humanity that has, through faith and baptism, died and risen with Christ and so will possess eternal life. On the one hand, there are several

---

49 *Tr. ps.* 134.6 (CCL 61B 146.6-8): *Dei nomen suaue est*, non uni tantum genti atque ipsi inreligiosae, sed omnibus iam gentibus atque linguis. See also *Tr. ps.* 66.5 (CCL 61 256.5-7): per eum in uiam uiae omnes gentes terram inhabitantes dirigantur, relictio idolorum errore, ad cognitionem Dei eruditae. Also *Tr. ps.* 67.33.

50 *Tr. ps.* 124.3 (CCL 61B 52.14): beata illa dominici corporis ecclesia.
affirmations in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* that in Jesus is the assembly of all of humanity, the *uniuersitas*.\(^1\) Man finds immortality in union with the body of Christ. This immortality leads to the resurrection of all without exception. On the other hand, Hilary repeatedly says that while every man is resurrected, some are resurrected to life and some to judgment. Not every man accepts the immortality offered in the body of Christ. Hilary uses the image of all of humanity as the body of Christ when he wishes to emphasize the universality of salvation. When he seeks, instead, to emphasize the positive requirements of faith, sacraments, and good works for union with Christ, he uses the image of the Church as the body of Christ. While Hilary’s use of these images seems contradictory, the variety simply displays the pastoral nature of Hilary’s preaching that matches content to hearers.

The incarnation is the beginning of a new unity of humanity, a unity that exists in the very body of Christ and that is a unity unto life rather than the unity unto death which had been the lot of humanity since the fall of Adam. In making the body of Christ the hinge of the whole movement of salvation, Hilary gives salvific weight to the words “*corpus*” and “*caro*.\(^2\) The body of Christ is the location of salvation, for this is the place where divinity meets humanity and human soul meets human body in a therefore better way; in particular, this is the place where the Son of God meets all of humanity and takes it to himself so that he may take it to the Father. Some people choose to remove themselves from the body of Christ, and thus salvation. These people, according to

---

\(^1\)For example, *Tr. ps.* 54.9 (CCL 61 146.8): uniuersitatis nostrae caro est factus. See also, *Tr. ps.* 2.31, 59.4, 64.4, and 143.6. See Pettorelli, “Thème de Sion,” 222.

\(^2\) See Orazzo, “Ilario di Poitiers e la *universal caro*,” 399-419.
Hilary, have separated themselves from the body of Christ on earth, that is, the Church. The point for Hilary is that there is no salvation outside of the body of Christ. Our hope is not simply because of Christ but in Christ.

In the first section of this chapter, we explored the parallel between Adam and Christ in Hilary’s thought. One of Hilary’s conclusions from this parallel is that just as all of humanity is in Adam and affected by Adam’s sin unto death, so all of humanity is in Christ and is affected by his death and resurrection unto life. In this section we have described Hilary’s vision of the new unity that humanity has found in Christ’s body. This unity is a unity of nature that precedes, though it also demands, individual acts of the will. In the next section, we shall discuss some of the effects of this new unity in Christ’s body.

CHRIST THE MEDIATOR AND THE DOUBLE CREATION OF MAN

The perfection of the Son’s mediation is in the incarnation when, in his very own body, he mediates between humanity and divinity, but Hilary emphasizes that the Son has always been the mediator between the Father and humanity. Creation was in and through the Son. Hilary also sees him as the primary mediator in salvation history,

---

53 See *Tr. ps.* 121.5 (CCL 61B 29.11-14): Dissidentes autem a coetu sanctorum et se ab ecclesiis corpore peccatis, fastu, litibus separantes *participationem* sanctae istius domus non habent, quia *participatio* ciuitatis huius in id ipsum est. Hilary goes so far as to say that those who separate themselves from the body of the Church are handed over to the devil; see *Tr. ps.* 118 Ain 5 (CCL 61A 151.16-18).

54 See, for example, the list of texts cited by Saffrey concerning Hilary’s condemnation of philosophers including *Tr. ps.* 1.7, 61.2, 63.5, 63.9, 65.7, 144.4, and 148.3 (“Saint Hilaire et la philosophie,” 255-57).

55 See *De Trin.* 4.6 (CCL 62 105.4-11): Nuit enim unum Deum *ex quo omnia*, nout et unum Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum *per quem omnia*, unum ex quo et unum per quem, ab uno uniuersorum originem,
which, until the incarnation, was the history of God’s interaction with the Jews. It is the Son who mediates between God and the Jews because he is the giver of the Law: “the Lord is the mediator of God and men, in whose hand through the angels, as is said [in the scriptures], the Law was offered.” And now, finally, in the incarnation, Christ perfects his mediation and becomes our high priest by mediating between divinity and humanity in his very own body. His assumption of all humanity is the condition for the perfection of this mediation. The incarnation assures that the human person Jesus Christ does not have to act merely as a stand-in or representative for all of humanity. In his body, Christ contains all of humanity whom he can present, individually and as a whole, to the Father. We will return to a quotation we looked at before:

per unum cunctorum creationem. In uno ex quo auctoritatem inmascibilitatis intellegit, in uno per quem potestatem nihil differentem ab auctore ueneratur: cum ex quo et per quem...communis auctoritas sit. See also Tr. ps. 63.10 (CCL 61 218.1-219.2): Iam si fidem haereticus destruet, Dei Filium semper fuisset cognoscet, nullo a Patre intervallo temporis separatum ipsum esse uerbum, uirtutem, sapientiam Dei, humilis mundi opificem fuisse, hunc prima mundi crimina diluuo abluisse, hunc Moysi legem dedisse, hunc in prophetis fuisse et per eos ingentia illa corporationis et passionis suae sacramenta cecinisse, hunc in corpore resurgentem caducae carni claritatem spiritalis gloriae intulisse et in naturam diuinitatis suae terrenae corruptionis absorbuisse primordia.

56 Tr. ps. 67.18 (CCL 61 275.14-16): mediator Dei hominumque sit dominus, in cuius manu per angelos, ut dictum est, lata lex fuerit. We see Hilary’s vision of Christ’s permanent role as mediator in Tr. ps. 118, where Christ is portrayed as the bringer of the new Law: Tr. ps. 118 Mem 10 (CCL 61A 124.14-16): … et gloriem noui eius latoris legis expectant in exordio sui iam ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei constitutum. Origen’s commentary on this verse also designates Christ as a bringer of a new Law (Marguerite Harl, La Chaîne palestinienne sur le psaume 118 (Origène, Eusèbe, Didyme, Apollinaire, Athenase, Théodoret), Sources chrétiennes 189, 190, [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1972], 354-355).

57 See Lécuyer’s discussion of the priestly mediation of Christ in “Sacerdoce royal.” For the perfection of Christ’s mediation in the incarnation see “Sacerdoce royal,” 308. See Tr. ps. 149.3. Cyprian also envisions the incarnation as Christ’s mediation between divinity and humanity: Cyprian, Quod idola dii non sint 15 (CSEL 3.1 31.14-17): hunc igitur comitamur, hunc sequimur, hunc habemus itineris ducem, lucis principem, salutis auctorem, caelum pariter et patrem quaerentibus et credentibus credentibus pollicentem. Tertullian uses the language of exchange to speak of the mediation of Christ: Christ is the “sequester,” the guardian of a deposit. See Tertullian, De Resurrectione mortuorum 51.2 (CCL 2 994.11-16): Hic, sequester dei atque hominum appellatus ex utriusque partis deposito commisso sibi, carnis quoque depositum servat in semetipso, arrabonem summae totius. Quemadmodum enim nobis arrabonem spiritus reliquit, ita et a nobis arrabonem carnis accepit et vexit in caelum, pignus totius summae illuc quandoque redigendae. Note that Tertullian’s understanding of Christ’s mediation makes it clear that the Son does not assume each human being, rather the Son “preserves in himself the deposit of the flesh as an earnest of the whole sum.” Lécuyer, “Sacerdoce royal,” 306.
Therefore, God is *marvelous in his saints* whom, when he has conformed them to the glory of his body, he will assume even into the unity of the paternal majesty through him who is the mediator, since the Father is in him through nature, and he is in us through the fellowship of the flesh.59

Christ mediates through the unity of nature he shares both with the Father and with humanity. We see in this passage the centrality of Christ’s body as itself the physical place of mediation. Access to the Father is “in him,” and thus we attain to divine participation in the fellowship of Christ’s flesh and the conformation to his body.

The joining of heavenly and earthly natures in Christ’s assumption of all humanity serves not only to unify man with God, but also to unify the heavenly and earthly natures within the human person himself.60 The human person is a microcosm and contains within himself divine and earthly natures (soul and body, respectively). The assumption of the flesh of humanity is the means by which Christ brings both body and soul to eternal life.61 As Christ unifies humanity with the Father in his body, so he reharmonizes in his body the divine soul and earthly body put out of order within us by sin. In each human person, we find a mirroring of Christ’s cosmic mediation.

Hilary firmly believes that the human person is a composite being made up of two natures that differ in character because they are the result of a double creation of humanity.62 Hilary supports this double creation of humanity with his reading of Genesis 1-3. Hilary explicitly details humanity’s double creation in two places in the *Tractatus*

---

59 *Tr. ps. 67.37* (CCL 61 291.8-11): *Mirabilis ergo in sanctis Deus est, quos, cum conformes gloriae corporis sui fecerit, per se, qui mediator est, etiam in unitate paternae maiestatis adsumet, dum et in eo per naturam Pater est et ille rursum in nobis est.

60 Orazzo (Salvezza in Ilario, 183-184): “L’antropologia dei *Tractatus* obbedisce ad un movimento evolutivo che « raccoglie in unità » quell’uomo che portava in sé un dualismo originario, in cui poi trovava le radici il dramma profondo tra l’uomo interiore e l’uomo esteriore di cui parla S. Paolo a più riprese.”

61 See *Tr. ps. 61.2* (CCL 61A 199.43-47): *Quid enim ultra ignorationi anxietatique hominum est relictum, cum aeternitas animae et corporis, id est totius hominis praedicetur, cum adsumptio atque susceptio terrenae nostrae carnis a Deo sub sacramento magnae huius pietatis ostensa sit...*

super Psalmos: 118 Iod 6-8 and 129.4-6. Both Heidl and Goffinet assert that Hilary’s teaching of the two-fold creation of man derives from Origen. Likewise, they both base their claims (Heidl with respect to Tr. ps. 129.3-6 and Goffinet with respect to Ts. ps. 118 Iod 3-5) on a comparison between Hilary and Origen’s Homilies on Genesis. However, it is far from certain that Hilary read Origen’s Homilies on Genesis. The only text of Origen’s that we are certain Hilary read is Origen’s psalm commentaries.

When we compare Hilary’s argument in Tr. ps. 118 Iod 3-6 with what is revealed about Origen’s argument in his commentary on Psalm 118 by the catenist of the Palestinian chain, we find that while both do teach a double creation of man, they do so with different arguments making the direct dependence of Hilary on Origen for the double creation of man unlikely. Hilary begins with the psalm verse “Your hands have made me and prepared me.” The “hands” of this verse lead Hilary to a reflection on the privileged position of humanity since only man was made by the hands of God. Hilary then continues to show the two stages of creation in Genesis: the first, in Genesis 1, when God says, “Let us make man according to our image and likeness,” is the creation of the soul; the second, in Genesis 2, is the creation of the body by the hands of God. The catenist of the Palestinian chain says that, in his commentary on this verse, Origen teaches a two-fold creation of man, by applying the two verbs of the psalm verse to the two steps of creation: God created (ποιεω) the soul and then fashioned (πλασσω) the

---

63 Heidl, Origen’s Influence, 273-289.
64 Goffinet, Utilisation d’Origene, 123-125.
65 See the discussion of Hilary’s debt to Origen in Chapter 2.
66 See Harl, Chaîne palestinienne, 305.
67 Tr. ps. 118 Iod 3 (CCL 61A 90.6): Manus tuae fecerunt me et praeparaverunt me.
body. Hilary and Origen both teach a double creation based on the language of this passage, but they focus on entirely different aspects of the psalm in question: Hilary reflects on “hands,” while Origen distinguishes between the two verbs “create” and “fashion.”

Other possible precedents for Hilary’s teaching of a two-fold creation of man include Chalcidius, Cicero, and Tertullian. Two-stage creation can be found in Chalcidius’ commentary to his translation of the first part of Plato’s *Timaeus* in 321. Chalcidius refers to the argument of Philo who speaks of the creation of an incorporeal human being first, which only later became corporal:

> What then was that heaven and earth that God established before the rest? Philo considers them to be incorporeal and intelligible essences, ideas and exemplars as much of this dry earth as of the firmament. After all, he says, also in the case of man, first an intelligible and archetypal exemplar of the human race was made by God and then afterwards corporeal man.

Cicero, on the other hand, speaks of the two-step creation of humanity according to the opposite order of body, then soul: first the seed of the human race was scattered over the earth, then this seed is enriched by the divine gift of souls. Despite the different ordering, Cicero’s explanation that this gift of souls gives us a familiar (*genus vel stirps*) relationship with the gods could be behind Hilary’s description of the soul as exhibiting

---

68 See Harl, *Chalne palestinienne*, 118 YODH v. 73 (SC 189 a 305.10-12).
70 Cicero, *De legibus* 1.24 (Powell 169.8-18): Nam cum <ea quae> de natura hominis quaeritur, disputari solent, nimimum ita sunt ut disputantur: perpetuis cursibus conversionibus <que> caelestibus exitisse quandam maturitatem serendi generis humani, quod sparsum in terras atque satum divino auctum sit animorum munere, quom que alia, quibus cohaerent homines, e mortal genere sumpserint, quae fragilia essent et cadua, animum esse ingeneratum a deo: ex quo vere vel agnatio nobis cum caelestibus vel genus vel stirps agnosci potest.
several divine qualities, since it is made according to the image of God. Tertullian, like Cicero, has the reverse order of Hilary: first the flesh is made, then it becomes animated by a soul. This order of creation leads Tertullian, in his use of the Adam-Christ parallel in De res. carnis 53, to focus on flesh, since it is created prior to soul, as the category that unites Adam and Christ and makes them both man. Though Tertullian’s account of creation differs from Hilary’s, Tertullian uses his account to come to an understanding of the Adam-Christ parallel that is similar to Hilary’s in its concentration on the flesh. Christ is the last Adam because he is a man, but Adam was a man even before he was ensouled: for this reason, Christ is the last Adam in his flesh alone.

The Latin precedents of a double creation of humanity show two similarities to Hilary’s teaching in the Tractatus super Psalmos. Until greater evidence is brought forth concerning Hilary’s appropriation of Origen’s Homilies on Genesis, we ought to assume Hilary’s influences on this subject are those of his Latin predecessors rather than Origen.

---

71 See Tr. ps. 129.6 (CCL 61B 102.5-7): Ergo ad imaginem Dei homo interior effectus est rationabilis, mobilis, mouens, citus, incorporeus subtilis, aeternus, quantum in se est, speciem naturae principalis imitator.

72 Tertullian, De Resurrectione mortuorum 53.12 (CCL 2 999.40-45): Sed cum et christum nouissimum adam appellat, hinc eum recognosce ad carnis, non ad animae resurrectionem omnibus doctrinae uribus operatum. Si enim et primus homo, Adam, caro, non anima, qui denique in animam [uiuam] factus est, et nouissimus Adam, Christus, ideo adam quia homo, ideo homo quia caro, non quia anima.

73 In his study on Origen’s influence on Augustine, Heidl includes an appendix concerning Hilary’s relationship to Origen’s commentary on Genesis, specifically concerning this theme of the double creation of man. Through a complicated process of cross comparisons with several texts, Heidl comes to the dubious conclusion that Hilary’s Tractate on Psalm 129 derives from a no-longer extant Latin compilation of Origen’s Commentary on Genesis, done by Novatian as a help for his own De Trinitate (Heidl, Origen’s Influence, 237-298). See Chapter 2 for a more extensive critique of Heidl’s work.
Hilary teaches that man’s soul was created first, and the body was added later: these two were then joined together through God’s breath.\textsuperscript{74} In his commentary on Psalm 129, Hilary explains:

For he [God] did not make the body when he made man according to the image of God. Genesis teaches that the dust was taken up and the body formed long after man had been made according to the image of God, and then it was made into a living soul through the inbreathing of God, that is to say, the earthly and heavenly natures were joined together by a certain bond of inbreathing.\textsuperscript{75}

In \textit{Tractatus super psalmos} 118 Iod, Hilary pairs man’s two-fold creation with the two different divine creative acts in Genesis: the first when God says “let us make man in our own image,”—of which he says, “This is the voice of God upon man in the beginning when the beginning of our origin was founded according to the image of his unending eternity”\textsuperscript{76}—the second when God takes dust from the earth and forms man.\textsuperscript{77} In the first act, God makes the soul from nothing, in the second, he takes already existent earth and then forms or prepares it into the body.\textsuperscript{78} It is the two stages of man’s creation that, according to Hilary, even prior to sin, explain the difference between the inner and the outer man of which Paul speaks. The outer man is formed of earth and shares the characteristics of earth. The inner man, by contrast, made according to the image of God,

\textsuperscript{74} Rondeau (“Remarques sur l’anthropologie,” 200-201) clarifies that while Hilary here speaks of three steps in creation, corresponding to soul, body and spirit, in fact he retains a bipartite conception of man, namely soul and body, with the spirit serving only as the bond between the two.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Tr. ps.} 129.5 (CCL 61B 102.6-12): Non enim, cum ad imaginem Dei hominem fecit, tunc et corpus effecit; Genesis docet longe postea, quam ad imaginem Dei homo erat factus, puluerem sumptum formatumque corpus, dehinc rursum in animam uiuente m per inspirationem dei factum, naturam hanc scilicet terrenam atque caelestem quodam inspirationis foedere copulatam.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Tr. ps.} 118 Resch 10 (CCL 61A 192.3-5): Hoc super hominem principium uocis est Dei, cum ad imaginem interminatae aeternitatis originis nostrae exordium conderetur.

\textsuperscript{77} See \textit{Tr. ps.} 118 Iod 6.

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Tr. ps.} 118 Iod 7 (CCL 61A 93.13-15): Primum ergo non accepit, sed fecit; secundo non primum fecit, sed accepit et tum formavit uel praeparavit.
is “rational, mobile, moving, quick, subtly incorporeal, and eternal,” in this way, imitating the form of its maker.\textsuperscript{79}

The result of humanity’s double creation is that man is a composite being of two natures: “for there is one nature of the human soul just as there is one nature of earthly flesh.”\textsuperscript{80} These two natures have different origins and different tendencies, yet they share a common destiny.\textsuperscript{81} Man, from his institution, is a composite creature with a lower and higher nature, unlike God who is eternal and therefore not composite.\textsuperscript{82} However this composite foundation, while it served to distinguish man from God, was not in its institution something negative. These two natures were designed by God to be ordered such that the body serves the soul: “the institution of man is contained in two natures, namely of soul and body, the first of which is spiritual, the other earthly, and this inferior material is suited to the work and operation of that stronger nature.”\textsuperscript{83}

Hilary’s understanding of the relationship of body and soul reflects the Stoic belief that the two are compatible and complementary rather than the Platonic understanding of opposition.\textsuperscript{84} Echoes of the Stoic understanding of the relationship of spirit and matter can be found in Latin authors such as Cicero, Seneca, and Claudius.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[79] Tr. ps. 129.6 (CCL 61B 102.5-7): Ergo ad imaginem Dei homo interior effectus est rationabilis, mobilis, mouens, citus, incorporeus subtilis, aeternus, quantum in se est, speciem naturae principalis imitator.
\item[80] Tr. ps. 122.8 (CCL 61B 39.9-10): natura una est animae humanae, sicuti et terrenae carnis una natura est.
\item[81] See Rondeau, “Remarques sur l’anthropologie,” 205.
\item[82] Hilary says that whatever is composite is not eternal because it has a beginning. See also Tr. ps. 129.4.
\item[83] Tr. ps. 129.4 (CCL 61B 101.4-8): …primum meminisse debet hominum institutionem naturis duabus contineri, animae scilicet et corporis, quarum alia spiritualis, alia terrena est, et inferiorem hanc materiam ad efficientiam atque operationem naturae illius fuisset potioris aptatam.
\item[84] This is the conclusion of Burns (“Hilary of Poitiers’ Tractatus,” 174) and Petorelli (“Thème de Sion,” 228-229). Durst, I believe incorrectly, concludes the opposite, namely that Hilary has a Platonic dualistic conception of the divide between soul and body, to the extent that the soul is trapped in the body, in both the In Matt. and the Tr. ps. (Durst, Eschatologie des Hilarius, 21). Fierro likewise concludes that Hilary’s anthropology is Platonic (Fierro, Sobre la gloria, 334). However, Hilary’s emphasis on the resurrection, and especially on the corporeality of the resurrection, is thoroughly un-Platonic.
\end{footnotes}
This theme is also mediated to Hilary through Tertullian. For example, in De anima 5, Tertullian cites the Stoics Cleanthes and Chryssipus to argue for the relationship of cooperation between the soul and the body. In the In Matthaenum, Hilary follows these arguments for cooperation between body and soul even as far as attributing corporality to the soul as the Stoics and Tertullian do. However, by the time of the Tractatus super Psalmos, he regards souls as purely spiritual in accordance with the two-fold creation of man: soul from spirit, body from earth.86

The human being was created as a harmonious joining of complements.87 This harmony was upset with the introduction of sin.88 Now the body oversteps its given role and leads the soul downwards towards its own earthly concerns. The new situation is that “the nature of our body brings us into every course of crime and the assault of human cupidities compels us into this way.”89 Humanity’s two natures are no longer harmoniously ordered to the good, rather they are antagonistic, with the soul still seeking spiritual things but more often than not dragged down to the things of this age. The

86 See Durst, Eschatologie des Hilarius, 24. For the soul as corporal, see In Matt. 5.8 (SC 254 158.14-15, 17-20): Nihil est quod non in substantia sua et creatione corporeum sit…. Nam et animarum species siue obtinentium corpora siue corporibus exsulantium corpoream tamen naturae suae substantiam sortiuntur, quia omne quod creatum est in aliquo sit necesse est. Compare to Tertullian De carne Chr. 11: Omne quod est, corpus et sui generis. Nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est. For Hilary’s later rejection of the corporality of the soul, see Tr. ps. 129.4 where Hilary argues that the soul is the part of man that is made in the image of God and since God is not corporal neither is the soul.
87 See Antonio Peñamaría de Llano, La Salvación por la fe: La noción “fides” en Hilario de Poitiers. Estudio filológico – teológico (Burgos: Ediciones Aldecoa, 1981), 167: “…el desgarro que actualmente experimenta el hombre en su intimidad, es algo que no le acompaña desde su origen y que le abandonará algún día, es decir una realidad humana que tiene historia.”
88 See Iacoangeli, “Linguaggio soteriologico,” 127: Just as the soul provides the mediation between man and God, so the body provides the mediation between man and the world. But this is a dangerous mediation, for the terrestrial world easily leads to sin. Hilary says it is not the body, but the will, that is responsible for sin. Nevertheless, it is the body that provides the powerful incentive towards evil because to the body are attributed the negative aspects of man’s earthly life: humilitas, infirmitas, corruptio, mors.
89 Tr. ps. 118 Mem 8 (CCL 61A 123.2-4): Natura corporis nostri fert nos in omnem criminum cursum, et humanarum cupiditatum impetus in hanc nos uiam cogit.
antagonism between body and soul does not lead to a division between the two, but to a shared destiny, no longer to the good, but to the bad.

The task of the Christian is to try to recreate the original harmony of body and soul within himself so that once again the lower body is guided by, and serves, the higher soul in such a way that the whole person is directed towards the good. This is a process that only has success in and because of Christ. For Hilary, this means that Christ reinstitutes in man the original composite harmony of body and soul and even goes further to make a single, unified, new man. In this way, Christ is our peace:

For our Lord Jesus Christ, in taking away all our stains and sins, made as the apostle says *the two one* (Eph. 2:14), and according to the same apostle, he [Christ] made the inner man and the outer man into one man in order that he—making peace so that he might found in himself one new man out of two—might reconcile both to God in one body. Therefore we are not combined, but united....

Christ’s harmonizing of the heavenly and the earthly in his sinless body, is, because of our presence in his body, a reharmonizing also of the heavenly and the earthly in each one of us. This unification of the human person begins in this life—in our ability to will what we ought and to pursue the good—and is completed in our resurrection. For “after the transformation of the resurrection, the nature of our earthly body will be made more glorious.” This new, more glorious nature remains human but now partakes in the simplicity of the divine nature. Through Christ, humanity comes to have a greater

---

90 See *Tr. ps. 118 Mem* 13 (CCL 61A 126.4-7): *Nostrum ergo est modo utilis organi corpora nostra in coaptatos et concinentes modos temperare, ut non uia dilligamus, ut non uirtutes bonas oderimus, ut unicuique nos generi decenter atque utiliter coaptemus.*

91 *Tr. ps. 140.7* (CCL 61B 235.7-12): *Dominus enim noster Iesus Christus omnes inmunditias nostras et peccata auferens fecit, secundum apostolum, *utramque unum* (Eph. 2:14), et secundum eundem, ut duos conditer in se in unum nouum hominem, faciens pacem, ut reconciliaret ambos Deo in uno corpore, internum scilicet hominem et externum fecit unum. Non ergo combimamur, sed unimur....

proximity to God than Adam had: man is no longer made according to the image of God, he comes to be the image of God.\textsuperscript{93}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

Hilary’s understanding of salvation, based upon his incarnational theology of Christ’s assumption of all humanity, is direct. Christ does not win salvation and then pass it on to the whole human race. Because every human person is present in Christ’s body, the resurrection and glorification of Christ is itself the salvation of humanity.

The presence of every person in Christ depends upon an understanding of the unity of the human race. Hilary bases this unity in Adam and has a very developed theology of the Pauline Adam/Christ parallel: we are all in Adam unto death and in Christ unto life. Hilary follows Latin tradition in developing this parallel but his understanding is far more physical than his theological predecessors or counterparts. Hilary takes a new theological step in understanding our presence in Christ as a physical presence.

Christ’s assumption of all humanity creates a physical unity of every person with Christ. This is the entrance to salvation. However, an individual can exercise his will to separate himself from this unity and bar the door to his salvation. For those who do not separate themselves from Christ, the unity created in the assumption of all humanity has effects that are begun in this life. Human proximity to the divine through its presence in Christ’s flesh begins the process of salvation. Christ serves as the perfect mediator: in bringing each human person together with the divine in his own body, Christ also unifies the fleshly and the spiritual natures within each person.

Nevertheless, the consummation of all the effects of Christ’s assumption of all humanity awaits the eschaton. The assumption of all humanity is an assumption unto salvation and awaits the day of salvation to be fully perfected. Christ assumed all of humanity in order to change the destiny of all humanity. It is to this destiny that we now turn.
CHAPTER 5
ESCHATOLOGICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF
THE ASSUMPTION OF ALL HUMANITY

The fifth chapter will discuss the relationship of Hilary’s eschatology to his incarnational principle of Christ’s assumption of all humanity. The body of Christ is the locus of our salvation. This fact leads all the aspects of Hilary’s eschatology in the Tractatus super Psalmos to have strict reference to the physical body of Christ. As Hilary uses Philippians 2 to frame his christology, so he uses 1 Corinthians 15 to frame his eschatology. Human eschatological life takes place eternally in the glorified body of Christ: there is no stage when humanity is finally able to bypass the Son and participate in the Father directly.

The increased attention to Christ’s assumption of all humanity that Hilary manifests in his later works, especially the Tractatus super Psalmos, comes hand in hand with an increased eschatological emphasis.\footnote{Fierro notices a connection in Hilary’s thought between an increasingly soteriologically motivated christology and an eschatological teaching of transformation. He says that the idea that Christ will transform our body of humility, conforming it to his body of glory, does not appear in the In Matthaeum; it appears in the De Trinitate in Book 9, when the christology leans towards soteriology, and virtually dominates the Tractatus super Psalmos. See Fierro, Sobre la gloria, 218.} This is not coincidental. Christ’s assumption of all humanity has clear eschatological ramifications. An emphasized teaching of this incarnational principle requires eschatological exploration; conversely, Hilary could not study eschatology without clarifying and solidifying his redemption model.

We can see this intrinsic connection between Christ’s assumption of all humanity and eschatology through Hilary’s use of the term \textit{adsumere}.\footnote{For an excellent study of \textit{adsumere} in the thought of Hilary, see Doignon, “‘Adsumo’ et ‘adsumptio’.” Orazzo also analyzes this term in “Ilario di Poiitiers e la universa caro,” 409-14.} In Scripture and in the early Latin patristic tradition \textit{adsumere} was rarely used to speak about the incarnation, but was reserved to the ascension.\footnote{The patristic Greeks have a whole set of terms specifically to designate the incarnation (usually formed around \textit{σάρξ}, \textit{σώμα}, or \textit{ἄνθρωπος}, e.g. \textit{σάρκωσις}). However, the Latins customarily use approximate periphrases (\textit{induere corpus}, etc.). The Latin \textit{incarnari/incarnatio} is a late word, beginning with Marius Victorinus (and found twice in Hilary). See Doignon, “‘Adsumo’ et ‘adsumptio’,” 126-129.} The use of \textit{adsumere} to refer to the incarnation is first found...
in Novatian who uses it three times in his *De Trinitate*. Adsumere is taken up by Hilary as his preferred term for designating the incarnation. After Hilary, adsumere becomes a common term for Latin theologians to speak about the incarnation: it is found frequently, for example, in Jerome and Augustine. Hilary easily makes the move from using adsumere exclusively for the ascension to using it as a designation for the incarnation because in his theology the ascension is so tied in with the whole mystery of the dispensation (incarnation, passion, resurrection) that he can use the same term for both incarnation and ascension. The incarnation is man “assumed” by Christ. The ascension is Christ “assumed” by the Father. The Father, in “assuming” Christ, “assumes” also the man Christ has assumed. The ascension is, in Hilary’s thought, a prolongation of the incarnation. The unity of these two mysteries of the dispensation allows Hilary to use adsumere for the incarnation.

Hilary’s use of adsumere is occasional in the *In Mattaeum* but becomes standard by the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. This development parallels Hilary’s increased attention to both eschatology and the assumption of all humanity. In Hilary’s use, the word adsumere itself ties together the two primary moments of the dispensation—the incarnation and the ascension/glorification—and thereby shows that Hilary sees soteriology and eschatology as intrinsically connected.

---

4 Novatian, *De Trinitate* 13 (in *Novatiani Opera*, ed. G. F. Diercks, CCL 4 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1972], 33.30), 21 (CCL 4 53.38), and 24 (CCL 4 59.44). However, Tertullian knows “sumere carnem” but not adsumere as a distinctively Christian word. See Doignon, “‘Adsumo’ et ‘adsumptio’,” 127.
5 See Doignon, “‘Adsumo’ et ‘adsumptio’,” 123-124.
7 See Doignon’s table in “‘Adsumo’ et ‘adsumptio’,” 131. According to Doignon, Hilary uses “adsumo” or “adsumptio” to speak of the incarnation 17 times in the *In Matt.* and 115 times in the *Tr. ps.*
THE CONTOURS OF HILARY’S ESCHATOLOGY

In his monograph on Hilary’s eschatology, Durst concludes that, in his eschatology, Hilary is a traditional Latin thinker. Durst argues that contact with the East during Hilary’s exile, especially Origen, did not strongly affect Hilary’s eschatology. There are a few problems with Durst’s conclusion. First, Durst posits substantial Greek influence on Hilary prior to his exile: he presents Hilary as having, already in the pre-exilic *In Mattheaum*, an anthropology that is affected by Platonic dualism in which the soul is trapped in the body. Furthermore, Durst purports to show that Hilary’s understanding of death and resurrection are expansions of his anthropological dualism. If Hilary’s anthropology is based on Greek philosophy, it is hard to understand how Durst can say his eschatology is traditionally Latin. Second, while Durst acknowledges Hilary’s teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity, he does not see this as a defining element of Hilary’s eschatology that distinguishes him from his Latin forebears. On the contrary, we will find that Hilary’s eschatology is profoundly shaped by his understanding of Christ’s assumption of all humanity in the incarnation. As a result, Hilary’s eschatology, like his theology of the incarnation, while not Greek, is distinctive in Latin patristic theology.

---

9 See Durst, *Eschatologie des Hilarius*, 21, referring to *In Matt.* 11.5.
10 See Durst, *Eschatologie des Hilarius*, 139, where he explains Hilary use of the disparate elements of Platonic dualism, Stoicism through Tertullian, and Origen to develop his anthropology.
12 Daley’s presentation of Hilary’s eschatology is somewhat confusing on this point: he says both that Hilary’s eschatology is the first Latin appearance of Greek soteriology and divinization eschatology and that Hilary relies mainly on Tertullian and Cyprian (“Die Eschatologie des Hilarius von Poitiers,” in *Eschatologie in der Schrift und Patristik*, ed. Brian Daley with Josef Schreiner and Horacio E. Lona, Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte 4.7 [Freiburg: Herder, 1986], 163, 161).
Hilary’s eschatology is based upon his understanding of the incarnation. Christ has assumed all of humanity in his body, making his body (corpus) the locus of our salvation. In this way, the resurrection and the glorification of Christ are not only a type or a model of ours to come, but are, in some mysterious fashion, our resurrection and glorification as well, for our resurrection and glorification are accomplished in Christo.

Since our resurrection and glorification are accomplished in Christ rather than merely because of Christ, Hilary uses three terms to describe our glorified life: we are to be coheirs, concorporeal beings, and co-participators with the Son.\textsuperscript{13} Our resurrected life is to be accomplished in Christ and so with Christ. This participation in Christ is necessary for us to come to the Father; as Hilary says, “They shall appear before God in no other way than in the Holy One of whom it is said he who sees me sees also the Father (Jn. 14.9).”\textsuperscript{14} For Hilary, access to the Father is attained only through the Son’s body. Furthermore, this arrangement is not temporary: the Son does not bring us to the Father in whom we can then participate directly. The Son is eternally the mediator between humanity and the Father. For Hilary, the eschatological outcome of this eternal mediation is our eternal participation in the paternal glory in and through the body of the Son.

\textsuperscript{13} Hilary uses this constellation of terms from Ephesians 3:6 very frequently. For example, see Tr. ps. 138.30 (CCL 61B 209.5-6): …esse gentes coheredes et concorporales et coparticipes policitionis eius in Christo. See also Tr. ps. 60.6, Tr. ps. 68.14 and Tr. ps. 91.9. Becoming coheirs, concorporeal, and coparticipators is the mystery which has not been made known in other generations but has now been made known in Christ (see especially Tr. ps. 138.30 and 91.9).

\textsuperscript{14} Tr. ps. 62.4 (CCL 61 207.12-14): Sed in sancto Dei non aliter adparebunt deo quam secundum illud: Qui me vidit, vidit et patrem.... Hilary, in commenting here on of Ps. 62.3 which says “sic in sancto apparui tibi,” is offering an interpretation which is based on the grammatical ambiguity of “sancto.” The “sancto” which is usually taken as neuter referring to holy place (i.e. the temple), Hilary reads instead as masculine, referring to the Holy One (i.e. Christ).
The fact that the resurrection of our individual bodies is still to come does not separate us from the body of Christ. Human nature, as we discussed in the previous chapter, is a nature characterized in this life by its habitus of humility and infirmity. Furthermore, “The stain of human flesh, through the custom of sin mixed in the flesh, cannot be wholly abolished except through a transformation of nature.” Our resurrection is a transformation of our very nature—not from human into something else, but from our infirm condition to a glorious condition. Hilary never tires of speaking of the time when our corruption will be absorbed into incorruption and our infirmity will be transformed into the glorious nature of Christ’s body. Hilary understands the effecting of this transformation in a very physical way: we can only be transformed by contact with that which is itself transformed. There is no transformation without contact with Christ’s body. This contact is, however, eternally assured by Christ’s assumption of all humanity in his incarnation. The body that the Son takes to himself is a body that contains, in some fashion, each of us. Since he never discards this body, he never severs direct physical contact with each of us in and through the medium of his body.

Hilary’s explanation of Colossians 2.10 in De Trinitate 9.8 has led to a scholarly understanding of Hilary in which our participation in Christ is a temporary participation. At some point we will move from being “in him” to being “in our own resurrected bodies.”

For, as the fullness of the Godhead is in Him, so we have received of that fullness in Him, nor does he indeed say: “You have received of that fullness,” but: ‘In him you have

\[15\] Tr. ps. 142.13 (CCL 61B 252.2-4): labes carnis humanae per admixtam in se uiiorum consuetudinem aboleri penitus nisi cum naturae demutacione non possit.

\[16\] This is a very common theme. See for example, Tr. ps. 1.18 (CCL 61 31.8-10): … non demutacione incerta, non in natura infirma, cum incorruptio corruptionem et aeternitas infirmitatem et forma Dei formam terrenae carnis absorbuerit.

\[17\] See, Tr. ps. 118 Nun 10 (CCL 61A 133.11-12): … ut corpus adsumptum in gloria Dei patris maneret....
received of that fullness (Col. 2.10), because all those who have been or are to be reborn through the hope of faith into eternal life now have received of that fullness in the body of Christ, while later on they themselves will no longer receive of that fullness ‘in him’ but in themselves, at that time of which the Apostle says: Who will transfigure the body of our lowliness in conformity with the body of his glory (Cf. Phil. 3.21).  

The classic reading, begun by Coustant, sees the time “in eo” as an interim state in which the separated soul dwells in Christ’s body, a time that is then surpassed by the resurrection of our individual bodies in which we then dwell “in ipsis” (outside of the body Christ) eternally.  

Coustant has connected these two stages with the two reigns: the first is the kingdom of the Son, the second is the kingdom of the Father.  Wild, while he reads the time “in eo” as this life, and “in ipsis” as after death, follows Coustant in connecting these two successive periods with the kingdom of the Son and the kingdom of the Father.  

Coustant’s reading has been rejected by authors such as Fierro and Pelland.  

Despite their rejection of Coustant’s understanding of Hilary’s eschatology, neither Fierro nor Pelland offer an opposing reading of this passage.  They do, however, offer citations from the Tractatus super Psalmos in which Hilary offers no hint of a time after which we will be “in ipsis” rather than “in eo.”  For example:

---

18 De Trin. 9.8 (CCL 62 378.11-17): Ut enim in eo diiunitatis est plentitudo, ita nos in eo sumus repleti. Neque sane ait: ‘estis repleti,’ sed: in eo estis repleti. Quia per fidei spem in uitam aeternam regenerati ac regenerandi omnes nunc in Christi corpore manent repleti, replendis postea ipsis non iam in eo, sed in ipsis, secundum tempus illud de quo apostolus ait: Qui transfigurabit corpus humilitatis nostrae conforme corporis gloriae suae.  


20 See Wild, Divinization of Man, 98-100.  

21 Fierro rejects Coustant’s reading because he believes Coustant bases his entire understanding of Hilary’s eschatology upon the distinction between the kingdom of the Son and the kingdom of the Father, a distinction that Fierro sees as marginal in Hilary’s writings.  Fierro says that the glory proper to the flesh of the saints is no different from that which they have in the body of Christ: thus the two stages are not markedly different (see Fierro, Sobre la gloria, 200).  Pelland rejects Coustant’s reading because he believes there is no basis in Hilary’s works to support a reading of a separated soul.  Furthermore, Pelland also notes that Hilary presents different stages of the history of salvation which are not reducible to the kingdom of the Son/kingdom of the Father distinction that Coustant presents (See Pelland, “Thème biblique du Règne,” 670-72).
Therefore, if the entire hope of our rest is in the body of Christ, and since we must rest in the mountain, we can not understand “mountain” as anything other than the body that he took up from us, before which body he was God and in which he is God and through which he has transfigured the body of our humiliation making it conformed to the body of his glory (Cf. Phil. 3.21), if, that is, we have nailed the vices of our body to his cross so that we may rise in his body.\footnote{Tr. ps. 14.5 (CCL 61 84.25-31): Si ergo requiei nostrae spes omnis in Christi est corpore et, cum in monte sit quiescendum, montem non aliud possumus intellegere quam corpus quod suscipit e nobis, ante quod Deus erat et in quo Deus est et per quod transfigurauit corpus humilitatis nostrae conformatum corpori gloriae suae, si tamen et nos uita corporis nostri cruci eius conixerimus, ut in eius corpore resurgamus. Both here and in De Trinitate 9.8, Hilary makes use of Philippians 3.21 with one important difference: here, as elsewhere in the Tractatus super Psalmodia, Hilary has “transformauit,” the perfect tense, rather than the future “transformabit,” which he used in De Trinitate 9.8 and which is the tense found in the Greek and most Latin versions of Philippians. Hilary uses this change of grammatical verb tense to make a theological point: the future condition of transformation and conformation to Christ’s body is already begun in the incarnation. See Burns, “Hilary of Poitiers’ Tractatus,” 11; Doignon, “Comment Hilaire de Poitiers a-t-il lu et interprete le verset Philippiens 3.21;” and Fierro, Sobre la gloria, 219-223. For other examples of “transformauit” in Hilary’s quotation of Phil. 3.21, see Tr.ps. 1.15, 14.5, 91.9, and 124.3-4.}

Our rest in the body of Christ is our rising in his body. Hilary here points to no other hope that could supersede, either in terms of time or beatitude, this hope of resurrection and rest in Christ’s body.

I would argue that De Trinitate 9.8 does offer evidence that at the time of writing the De Trinitate, Hilary did not consistently teach that human life exists only and eternally in the body of Christ. However, in the Tractatus super Psalmodia, Hilary offers no statement similar to that of De Trinitate 9.8, where he implies that humans, at some point of the eschaton, will exist outside of the body of Christ. On the contrary, there are several places in his psalm commentaries where Hilary indicates that human eschatological existence is entirely in Christ.\footnote{See, for instance, the example offered by Fierro and Pelland: Tr. ps. 13.4.} In Tractatus super Psalmodia 62.4, commenting on the psalm verse 62.3, which says “sic in sancto apparui tibi,” Hilary makes use of the grammatical ambiguity of the word “sancto” to advocate eternal dwelling in Christ’s body. The “sancto” which, in its literal sense, refers to the neuter
holy place (i.e. the temple), Hilary reads instead as masculine, referring to the Holy One (i.e., Christ): he explains the verse thus: “They shall appear before God in no other way than in the Holy One of God of whom it is said he who sees me sees also the Father (Jn. 14.9).” Hilary’s understanding of Christ as the temple, the very place of humanity’s contact with God, allows him to read “sancto” in this psalm verse as the masculine Christ, who is himself the temple. Hilary also inserts two very important words in his explanation of the verse, namely non aliter (no other way). Whereas the verse simply says, “I will appear in the Holy place/One,” Hilary glosses it as “They will appear in no other way (non aliter) than in the Holy One.” Hilary inserts non aliter to make human presence before the Father exclusively dependent upon existence in the temple of Christ’s body. There is “no other way” to come to the Father except in and through Christ. In this passage in the Tractatus super Psalmos, Hilary explicitly denies the human eschatological existence apart from Christ’s body that he implied in De Trinitate 9.8

In the Tractatus super Psalmos, not only does Hilary explicitly deny the possibility of human eschatological existence apart from the body of Christ as we saw in the quotation above, but his favorite vocabulary for describing human eschatological life depends upon existence in Christ’s body. Hilary’s favorite way to speak about human eschatological life in the Tractatus super Psalmos is to make use of the constellation of terms from Ephesians 3:6: we are to be coheirs, concorporeal beings, and co-participators with Christ. In his commentary on Psalm 9, Hilary says: “…we are coheirs,

24 See, for example, Jerome’s Commentariorum in Hiezechielum 13.44 (ed. Francisci Glorie, CCL 75 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1964], 651.1336-37) where he explains “sancto” as “templum deii.”
25 Tr. ps. 62.4 (CCL 61 207.12-14): Sed in sancto Dei non aliter adparebunt deo quam secundum illud: Qui me vidit, vidit et patrem....
26 For example, see Tr. ps. 138.30 (CCL 61B 209.5-6): esse gentes coheredes et concorporales et conparticipes polliciationis eius in Christo. See also Tr. ps. 60.6, Tr. ps. 68.14 and Tr. ps. 91.9.
concorporeal beings and co-participators of his promise in Christ. Therefore, through the union of flesh, an entrance [to this promise] to all is opened in Christ.”²⁷ Hilary structures this passage to show that our existence as coheirs and co-participators with Christ depends upon the middle term (concorporeal), that is, upon our existence in Christ’s body.²⁸ The second sentence of this quotation parallels and explains the first: the “association of the flesh”—namely, being “concorporeal” with Christ—is “our entrance…to God’s promise in Christ”—namely that we shall be coheirs and coparticipators with Christ. The gift of eschatological existence and adoptive sonship depends upon the continued presence of humanity in the body of Christ. Hilary then, by the time of the Tractatus super Psalms, views human eschatological life as a life of corporeality with Christ: it is an eternal existence in Christ’s body.

CHRIST’S INHERITANCE

Christ, as eternal Son of the Father, receives an inheritance from the Father; we, who as coheirs and coparticipators are made sons in the body of Christ, are beneficiaries of this inheritance. In the course of the Tractatus super Psalms, Hilary speaks a number of times of Christ’s inheritance: “the holy ones, now asleep and awaiting resurrection are the inheritance of the Lord.”²⁹ Christ’s inheritance is his reception of the faithful. Hilary speaks of Christ’s inheritance as the reward and the result of the incarnation: “And the reward of him who desired to be fruit of the womb through his birth from the virgin is

²⁷ Tr. ps. 91.9 (CCL 61 329.18-20): … esse nos coheredes et concorporales et comparticipes pollicitationis eius in Christo. Patet ergo uniueris per coniunctionem carnis aditus in Christo.
²⁹ Tr. ps. 126.16 (CCL 61B 75.3-4): sancti scilicet dormientes et resurrecturi sedentes hereditas domini est.
that his *inheritance* be the nations whom he has generated into *sons* through faith.\(^{30}\)

This “reward” is the result of the incarnation in that Christ receives as his eternal inheritance the body that he assumed never to put down again. In this body is all of humanity—or, in light of what was said in the previous chapter, all of humanity that has ratified its inclusion in Christ’s body through faith and the sacraments—and by being in Christ’s body, humanity becomes what Christ is: sons of God. The one who is generated as Son, generates as sons those whom he joins to himself in and through his body.

I CORINTHIANS 15 AS THE SCRIPTURAL FRAME FOR HILARY’S ESCHATOLOGY

Participation in Christ’s body generates humans into sons of God. The incarnation, understood as the assumption of all humanity, provides the means for this necessary participation that Hilary terms Christ’s inheritance. Christ’s body is the locus for human transformation, both in the case, as we have seen, of Christ’s inheritance, and in the case, to which we shall now turn, of Christ’s kingdom. As Hilary’s christology is framed by Philippians 2, so the eschatology in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* revolves around 1 Corinthians 15.21-28, which serves to provide the outline and the consistent reference point for Hilary’s understanding of the end of the dispensation.

*For since all die in Adam, so also all are vivified in Christ, but each in his order: Christ, the first-fruits, then those who are of Christ, who have believed in his coming. Then will come the end, when he will hand over the kingdom to God the Father after he has destroyed every principality and power. For it is fitting for him to reign until he puts all enemies under his feet, for God has subjected everything under his feet. Death is the last enemy destroyed in him. But when it says that everything has been subjected to him,*

\(^{30}\) *Tr. ps. 126.16* (CCL 61B 76.19-21): *Et haec eius *merces* est, qui ex uirgine nascendo *fructum uentris* esse se uluit, ut ei gentes, quas in *filios* per fidem generaret, *hereditas* sit. *See also Tr. ps. 67.8* (CCL 61 266.19-20,23-24) where Christ’s generation of men into sons of God is portrayed as the movement from the living death of angering God, to life: *Sunt enim multi in uiuentibus mortui…. Sed hos omnes de *sepulcris* Dominus, qui in filios Dei regenerantur, *eduxit.*
"everything" does not include him who subjected everything to him. Then he will be subject to him who has subjected all things to him so that God may be all in all.\textsuperscript{31}

The framework of 1 Cor. 15.21-28 proposes two movements: 1) the handing over (\textit{traditio}) of the kingdom from the Son to the Father, and 2) the subjection (\textit{subiectio}) first of all things to the Son, then of all things, including the Son, to the Father.

Giles Pelland has written two articles on the subject of Hilary’s understanding of the reign or kingdom and the “subjection” of Christ of which these verses of Corinthians speak.\textsuperscript{32} Pelland emphasizes the polemical nature of Hilary’s exegesis of these verses.\textsuperscript{33}

However, Hilary’s exegesis of these verses of 1 Corinthians in the \textit{Tractatus super Psalmos} not only accomplishes a Trinitarian polemic against the two opposing sides of Arians and Sabellians as Pelland argues, but also outlines a constructive and necessary piece of Hilary’s understanding of eschatology as the fulfillment of the dispensation begun in the incarnation.

The subjection of Christ and the handing over of his kingdom to the Father are the necessary fulfillments of the process begun in the incarnation of assuming humanity into the divine life. For Hilary, these movements demonstrate not so much a truth about the relationship between the Father and the Son as the purpose and manner of fulfillment of

\textsuperscript{31}This is the citation of 1 Cor. 15.21-28 found in \textit{Tr. ps.} 9.4 (CCL 61 75.6-16): \textit{Quomodo enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes unificantur, unusquisque autem suo ordine: primitiae Christus, deinde qui sunt Christi, qui in aduentu eius crediderunt; deinde finis, cum tradiderit regnum Deo Patri, cum euacuauerit omnem principatum et potestatem. Oportet enim illum regnare, donec ponat omnes inimicos sub pedibus suis; Deus enim omnia subiecit sub pedibus eius. Nouissima inimica deuicta est in eo mors. Cum uero dixerit: omnia subiecta sunt absque eo qui subiecit illi omnia, tunc ipse subiecutus erit illi qui sibi subiecit omnia, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus.} Hilary does not cite the text of 1 Corinthians in an absolutely consistent manner. Citations and/or references to these verses can be found in \textit{Tr. ps.} 9.4, 52.1, 60.5, 65.13, 118 Lamed 8, and 148.8 and \textit{De Trin.} 11.8.

\textsuperscript{32}Pelland, “‘Subiectio’ du Christ;” “Thème biblique du Règne.”

\textsuperscript{33}Pelland says Hilary is arguing, at the same time, against the opposing positions of Arius and Marcellus of Ancyra (‘‘‘Subiectio’ du Christ,’’ 423, no. 1).
the entire dispensation.34 They are the means of our glorification and incorporation into
the divine majesty: they are not a forced external subjection of the inferior Son to the
superior Father. Since our eschatological future is accomplished entirely in the body of
Christ, the Son’s subjection will not reduce him to dependence; his handing over the
kingdom is not his own ceasing to reign, and neither can the Son simply disappear into
the Father at the end:35

“The Lord is close to all who call upon him” (Ps. 144.18). Therefore, this hymn is proper
to those who will approach God, who, through this blessed reign of the holy Jerusalem,
are nearest to the eternal kingdom, who, after the kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ will,
cross over into the kingdom of God the Father where the Lord co-reigns, as the apostle
teaches…. (1 Cor. 15. 24-28). Therefore this is the people approaching to the kingdom
of God the Father through the kingdom of the Son of God. Thus, the Lord, about to hand
the kingdom over to God the Father, reigns, and he is not about to lose the power of
reigning, but he is about to hand us, who are his reign, over to God the Father unto a
kingdom. The handing over of the kingdom is our advancement, so that we who will be
in the kingdom of the Son may also be in the kingdom of the Father, worthy of the
kingdom of the Father because we will be worthy also of the kingdom of the Son; when
we are in the kingdom of the Son, then we will be nearest to the kingdom of the Father.36

34 See also Ladaria’s article: “‘Dispensatio’ en S. Hilario de Poitiers,” Gregorianum 66 (1985) 429-455.
35 Hilary, like all fourth-century Nicenes, saw the theology of Marcellus of Ancyra to be the real threat in
the time after the council of Nicea. See the excellent article by Michel Barnes, “The Fourth Century as
Trinitarian Canon,” in Christian Origins: Theology Rhetoric and Community, eds. Lewis Ayres and Gareth
that it “begins with a divine Monad and ends with that Monad restored: in the time between the initial  and
final divine Monad – that time know as the oeconomia – is the temporary activity of the divine as Son and
Spirit. Marcellus’ theology was captioned – at least by his opponents – by the slogan that the reign of the
Son would come to an end, just as his separate existence would come to an end. The desire to condemn
Marcellus’ infamy left its trace in the Creed of 381, where the belief is affirmed (pace Marcellus) that the
Son’s ‘kingdom will have no end’. The unstated corollary is that neither will the Son’s separate existence
‘have an end’” (52). For a study of Hilary’s use of 1 Cor. 15.24-28 to refute Marcellan theology, see John
McHugh, Exaltation of Christ in the Arian Controversy (Shrewsbury: Pontificia Università Gregoriana,
1959), 16-26.
36 Tr. ps. 148.8 (CCL 61B 302.10-15, 21-28): Prope est Dominus omnibus inuocantibus eum (Ps. 144.18).
Illis ergo proprius hymnus est, qui Deo propinquabunt, qui per hoc sanctae Hierusalem regnum beatum
aeterno regno proximi post regnum Domini Jesu Christi in regnum Dei Patris Domino conregnante,
transibunt, apostolo docente….Hic ergo populus est propinquans regno Dei Patris per regnum Filii Dei
proximus. Regnat itaque Dominus traditurus Deo Patri regnum, non regni potestate cariturus, sed nos, qui
regnum eius sumus, Deo Patri traditurus in regnum. Regni traditio nostra prorecto est, ut, qui in regno
Filii erimus, in regno quoque simus et Patris, digni per id regno Patris, quia digni regno erimus et Filii,
proximi tum Patris regno, cum filii erimus in regno.
We are members of the kingdom of Christ by being in Christ’s body. Christ handing the
kingdom over to the Father allows us to enter into a new relationship with the Father, but
this new relationship does not change our relationship with Christ which is based on our
participation in his body; rather this new relationship with the Father depends upon a
continuance of our participation in the Son’s body.

The continuance of our participation in Christ’s body is the reason that Christ
does not cease to reign. As Hilary says above, handing over the reign to the Father does
not mean that the Son ceases to reign. Rather, Christ co-reigns with his inheritance, those
whom he has made coheirs of the kingdom through their assumption in his incarnation:
“But when he hands the kingdom to God the Father, he himself will co-reign in those,
who are kings.”

This co-reign of Christ with the saints is a reign that will never cease: Hilary says that David praises God “on account of the glory of the eternal reign, by which
he himself [Christ] will reign with the saints co-reigning.”

The eternal reign of Christ gives us our eternal hope; for an eternal reign needs those in whom to reign eternally.

The subjection of Christ is Christ’s gift of himself (and of humanity with him) to
the Father and into the Father’s glory. It is a necessary part of the handing over of the
kingdom. Like the traditio, the subiectio belongs to the dispensation. The subjection of
the end is the final movement of Christ’s assumption of all humanity by his emptying in
the incarnation.

---

37 Tr. ps. 60.5 (CCL 61 194.14-15): Sed cum tradiderit regnum Deo Patri, conregnabit is ipsis, qui reges sunt.
38 Tr. ps. 144.2 (CCL 61B 269.1-3)…hic ob aeterni regni gloriam, qua sanctis conregnantibus ipse regnabit, laus deo prophetae confessione cantetur….
39 See Tr. ps. 144.16 (CCL 61B 275.17-19): …regni gloria in aeternitate dominatus est, dominatus aeternitas eos necesse est habeat, in quos agatur aeternus.
40 Hilary uses two verbs to speak of Christ’s emptying: exinanio and euacuo. For examples of Hilary’s use of exinanio see Tr. ps. 2.33, 67.6, 67.21, 118.10, 124.3, and 126.17. For euacuo, see Tr. ps. 142.2 and
humility of our infirmity, has returned to the heavens carrying us back, and is about to offer a gift to God…

Christ’s return to heaven and his subjection, like his emptying, is not a change or diminishment in Christ’s divine nature; it is a change in the *habitus*, not the nature of the Son. The emptying of Christ is a passage from *forma Dei* to *forma servitii*; the final subjection is the reverse movement from *forma servitii* to *forma Dei*, in which the corruptibility of the assumed man is made incorruptible. The subjection of Christ fulfills the plan of God’s will because it achieves the subjection of all that he is—and all that is within him (namely all humanity), and perhaps more importantly, all of the present conditions of humanity (namely infirmity and death)—to the incorruptibility of God. “God will be all in all when the infirmity of the assumed man is absorbed into the divine nature by the subjection of obedience.” The subjection is essentially the assumption of Christ and of all of humanity with him into the glory of God. The two movements of emptying and subjection center upon the body that is assumed. Christ’s emptying is a taking on of the corruptible in the form of the assumed body; the subjection is the transformation of this body from corruptible to incorruptible.

Jesus Christ is himself the reign of God. There is no other human fulfillment than Jesus himself and participation in his life: this, as we have seen, explains Hilary’s favorite three terms for describing our future. We will be heirs with Christ, sharing a body with

---

143.7. Hilary’s use of these words is largely limited to verbal and participial forms: he never uses the noun *exanimatio* and only uses *euacuatio* twice in the course of the *Tractatus super Psalmodios*.
41 *Tr. ps.* 58.6 (CCL 61 175.1-3): Hic ergo solus currens direxit, qui, infirmitatis nostrae humiliata susceptible, egressus caelos, regressus ad caelos, qui reuehens nos secum oblaturusque Deo munus…
42 Pelland argues that Hilary situates the mystery of both the *euacuatio* and the *subiectio* on the level of the body that Christ assumed. He asserts that Hilary here demonstrates a Stoic model for how the transfiguration of the body happens. A change in the quality of the nature leads to a change in the mode of being without a change in the being itself (“Subiectio’ du Christ,” 425-29).
43 *Tr. ps.* 9.4 (CCL 61 75.24-26): …sitque Deus omnia in omnibus, cum subiectione oboedientiae in diuinam naturam humanae adsumptionis absorbeatur infirmitas…
Christ and participating with Christ: each has the Latin prefix co-. Christ configures us to himself so as to make us sons of God. Hilary, as we have seen, describes this configuration to Christ as the Son’s inheritance: that we become sons is actually the result of his request and of the desire that motivated his assumption of humanity and his passion. Once we have been configured to Christ, then the Father can reign in us as he does in Christ. Within the framework of 1 Cor. 15, it is our filiation in Christ, who is the kingdom, that allows Christ to give us to the Father as the kingdom. Christ handing the kingdom over to the Father is nothing other than the final stage of the assumption of all humanity: he is the kingdom and he assumes all humanity into the kingdom through his body. He hands this kingdom over to the Father just as he hands everything he is to the Father because he has received it from him.

**THE ETERNAL PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST**

Christ’s reign is the exercise of his mediation, that is, his priesthood, between humanity and the Father. Because Christ never relinquishes his humanity, nor ceases to reign, Christ’s priesthood is truly eternal. Christ’s heavenly priesthood consists of two things: 1) offering the Father his humanity (and in it the whole human race); 2) restoring man to the royalty he lost in the Fall. Christ makes us kings with whom he co-reigns in the Father’s kingdom.

Jesus Christ is the one person in all of history who is able to fulfill the Law by making the sacrifices it calls for. Only he is entirely free and able to sacrifice his whole

---

44 cohæredes, concorporales, conparticipes.
45 See the discussion on sacrifice in Hilary’s thought in Chapter 3.
self. Hilary says in his commentary on Psalm 53 that the sacrifices of animals were not voluntary, that is, done with a completely free will, because these animals were offered by those who, having violated the Law, were under the sentence of malediction. All of us were under this sentence of malediction until Jesus became this curse for us and nailed it, in himself, to the cross. “This he did once for all, offering himself as a sacrifice to God (Heb. 7.27), in order to redeem the entire salvation of humanity by the oblation of this holy and perfect sacrifice.” This is the one and only sacrifice that fulfills the Law, for it is the one free sacrifice. However, the incorporation of all humanity into Christ’s body makes us offerers as well of the one true sacrifice that he offered. Because, in his body, we have participated in the only acceptable sacrifice of the Law, we are enabled, in a lesser and less perfect way, to offer our own sacrifices.

It is only in Christ and as co-reigners with Christ that we become able to sacrifice truly to God. As reigners over the kingdom, we possess a certain royalty. We become, in Hilary’s words, “kings.” This kingship originally allowed Adam to reign over the whole universe, now it helps us rule over our carnal nature and sin. Our reigning with Christ is the power that in this life allows us to dominate sin; we become “Kings, not of peoples, but of the earth, that is each one is king over his own body when the reign of sin ceases in him.” Furthermore, our reigning has a priestly function because it is offering ourselves as a living sacrifice to God and allowing ourselves to become his temple. In

---

46 See Tr. ps. 53.13 (CCL 61 138.1-4).
47 Tr. ps. 53.13 (CCL 61 138.18-20): Hoc enim fecit semel se ipsum offerens hostiam Deo (Heb. 7.27), omnem humani generis salutem oblatione sanctae huius et perfectae hostiae redempturus.
48 See Orazzo’s discussion of the sacrifice of Christ as the one free sacrifice in Salvezza in Ilario, 65-68.
49 Tr. ps. 137.12 (CCL 61B 187.8-9): ...reges non gentium, sed terrae, id est sui uniuscuiusque corporis regem desinente a se regno peccati. See also Tr. ps. 135.6 (CCL 61B 165.13-15): Reges sunt, in quos non regnat peccatum, qui dominantur corporis sui, quibus est iam huius subditae et subiectae sibi carnis imperium; and Tr. ps. 67.30.
this way, royalty and priesthood are connected for Christ and for us. Priestly unction is Christ’s communication of this royal divine power to his humanity and, in it, all humanity.\(^50\)

In Christ we are made kings eternally. Reigning as kings is, in this life, the ability to rule over our own bodies and so offer ourselves as sacrifices to God—an offering that is only possible because we participate, in Christ’s body, in his one true sacrifice. Christ’s communication of royalty to humanity, however, is mainly an eschatological reality. The resurrection of Christ is the possession, by his humanity, and so by all of humanity, of all the privileges of divinity. We become, in Christ, the reign of Christ. Christ’s reign has a mediating function, for, as we have seen, his reign is the means through which he brings his inheritance, namely humanity, to the Father and the Father’s reign.

**THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY: FROM CORRUPTION TO INCORRUPTION**

Hilary envisions the end of the dispensation according to 1 Corinthians 15.28: God will be all in all. Christ’s assumption of all humanity in the incarnation is, essentially, the incorporation of humanity into his kingdom. This incorporation entails humanity’s participation in divine sonship and the participation in the paternal glory that this entails. This incorporation also brings about a transformation of human nature itself. The transformation of human nature is achieved primarily at the moment of resurrection, though its fulfillment is not achieved until the final handing over of the kingdom when God will be all in all.

In his masterful, and now standard, study, *Sobre la gloria en San Hilario*, Alfredo Fierro has demonstrated the importance of “glory” as a category for integrating Hilary’s thought. Hilary gives a partial definition of glory in *De Trinitate* 8.12: honor (translating the δόξα of John 17.22) is “the form or the dignity of nature.” Fierro explains that Hilary understands glory to have a two-sided meaning: glory is both nature and appearance. Glory is a particular attribute of the divine that connotes light and splendor, but it also signifies the sum of all the divine perfections in that it is identified with the nature of God. When man is glorified, he receives divine splendor and all the other realities with which it is tied, most notably life and spirit. Glory, because it is a divine reality is, for men, a purely eschatological reality: therefore the earthly man is inglorious.

The defining characteristics of this life, and principally of this body, are to be done away with “then, when the infirmity of bodies, that is, their fall and tears, is taken away; then, when incorruption will devour corruption; then, when immortal power will

---

51 Fierro argues that Hilary’s teaching concerning glory is a systematic argument with four main points: 1) Glory constitutes a reality of the divine order that corresponds to the Father and is communicated to the Son in its plentitude. 2) When the Son is made man, his human flesh is able to participate in this divine reality at the moment of Christ’s glorification. 3) Christ will make us participators in his glory by configuring our bodies to his glorious body. 4) Then we will be able to see God face to face and contemplate the glory of God. See Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 85.

52 *De Trin.* 9.12 (CCL 62 324.15) : honor naturae species aut dignitas.

53 Fierro says that there is a two-fold notion of glory in the Bible. The first is glory as incorruptible light that we hope to contemplate (both in this life and the next). The second is glory as incorruption that is communicated through Christ to men in order to renovate them into glorious ones themselves. Fierro says that Origen has both these aspects in his theology but Ambrose focuses exclusively on the first and Hilary focuses heavily, though not entirely, on the second (Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 182-3).


absorb death; then when God will be all in all.\textsuperscript{56} The earthly form has the main attributes of \textit{humilitas, infirmitas, corruptio,} and \textit{mors.}\textsuperscript{57} These are the particular attributes of the body in this life. However, the soul, though itself of a heavenly nature, is marked by the body in which it dwells so that it too partakes of these attributes. The entire human person, therefore, needs to be transformed. Since the moment of transformation is the resurrection, and the qualities of corruption and death pertain properly to the body, Hilary often speaks of the transformation of human nature principally in terms of the transformation of the body that now is corruptible, humble, and infirm, but shall be changed into the glory of incorruptibility.

The resurrection of corruptible bodies into the glory of incorruption does not destroy the nature through annihilation, rather it changes the nature with respect to the state of its condition….Therefore, a change happens, but it does not bring about a destruction. And when that which it was rises into that which it was not, it has not lost its origin, but it has progressed towards honor.\textsuperscript{58}

Hilary is adamant that this transformation does not entail the destruction of human nature.

In order to understand how Hilary envisions this non-destructive transformation of human nature, we should recall Hilary’s conception of the incarnation and exaltation of the Son of God. \textit{Forma} provides the category for understanding Christ’s incarnation and resurrection: the Son is able to move from \textit{forma dei} to \textit{forma serui} while retaining

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Tr. ps.} 55.12 (CCL 61 159.15-18): …tum, cum infirmitas corporum detrahetur, id est lapsus et lacrimae, tum, cum corruptionem incorruptio deorabit, tum cum mortem potestas immortalis absorbet, tum cum sit Deus omnia in omnibus.
\textsuperscript{57} Fierro lists these attributes and shows that these are the reverse of glory and eternal life. Fierro also argues that unlike most of the Fathers who cite 1 Cor 15.42-4,53 for these attributes, Hilary uses Phil. 3.21. See Fierro, \textit{Sobre la gloria}, 55. See also Iacoangeli’s listing of these four attributes and his description of Hilary’s use of \textit{humilitas} and \textit{infirmitas} in “Linguaggio soteriologico,”126-132. For Hilary, \textit{humilitas} is directly tied to humanity’s origin from earth (\textit{humus}), and so \textit{humilitas} is humanity’s essentially earthly condition. Whereas \textit{humilitas} is a relatively neutral term, \textit{infirmitas} has much more negative weight. \textit{Infirmitas} points both to our creation from earth and our fallen condition: our infirmity is signaled, for example, in the \textit{fragilitas} of the will and the \textit{corruptio} and \textit{mors} of the body.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Tr. ps.} 2.41 (CCL 61 66.15-17.21-23): Ut corruptibilium corporum in incorruptionis gloriam resurrectio non interitu naturam perimit, sed qualitatis condicione demutet…. Fit ergo demutatio, sed non adfertur abilitio. Et cum id quod fuit in id quod non fuit surgit, non amitis originem, sed profecti ad honorem.
\end{flushright}
his divine nature and power because Hilary is using *forma* to refer not to nature but to the fundamental condition of the respective natures. Likewise, the movement from *forma serui* to *forma dei* for both Christ and all humanity in his body is again not a change from human to divine nature but a change in the *habitus*, the condition, of the existence of this nature; it is a change in what the nature *has* not what it *is*. Man remains man but ceases to be characterized by humility and infirmity and instead is a participant in the glory and majesty of the *forma dei*. In the quotation above, Hilary does not use the term *forma*; however, he seeks to convey the same meaning when he speaks about the change affecting not the nature itself but the “state of its condition” (*qualitatis condicione*). The change affects human nature not by changing it into a different nature but by altering its mode of existence: humanity moves from corruption to incorruption, glory, and honor.59

**Salvation is of Both Body and Soul**

Hilary speaks of the transformation of human nature in bodily terms not only because this transformation is tied to the resurrection but also because it is our entrance into the glory of the divine *habitus*, an entrance that is obtained only in and through the body of Christ. Christ conforms us to himself, making us coheirs of the kingdom and offering us divine filiation. This conformation occurs in the place of our meeting with the Son of God, that is, in his body.

This is the entire praise that is in his saints: that he drove off the corruption of flesh and blood from them, that they have been reformed according to the image of their creator,

---

59 This movement from corruption to glory is the purpose of the incarnation and is rendered by Hilary, as we see in the above quotation, with the word “*profectus*” or “*proficio*”. Fierro says that in Hilary *profectus* means the benefit and progress that glory effects on the flesh and that is signified by salvation. This is a favorite term of Hilary but is common among other Latin theologians to express what is in Greek προκοπή: the progress toward divine perfection (*Sobre la gloria*, 205).
that they have begun already to be conformed to the glory of the body of God, that they are filled unto the whole fullness of God.  

Hilary speaks of reformation into God’s image and our conformation to Christ, with all that it entails for the whole human person, in terms of our conformation to his body. Nevertheless, Hilary occasionally clarifies explicitly that salvation is of both body and soul: “But we who have been instructed in spiritual teachings know that the salvation of both soul and body is given by God…”

Salvation is of both body and soul, but Hilary feels a special need to argue for the salvation of the body to counter those who disparage the body and envision salvation for the soul alone. In his commentary on Psalm 62, Hilary explains the verse—my soul has thirsted for you, as simply as does my flesh—by showing that soul and body alike need salvation and alike are able to receive salvation. It can seem, he says, that whereas the soul, always reaching upwards to its divine origin, can be saved, the body, dragging downwards to its origin in earthliness and vice, cannot be saved.

And indeed the mind of each one is directed to the knowledge and hope of eternity by a sort of natural instinct, because to judge that our souls have a divine origin is, as it were,
innate and impressed on all. For the mind recognizes in itself no small kinship with heavenly things. However, on the other hand, these earthly bodies, which are hardened with a disposition toward vices, while they are infected by those vices by which they are as it naturally delighted, have no hope of being able to attain the heavenly consortium and gift. It is as if the vices of the body, to which it is attracted, do not infect the nature of the soul, or as if although the delight of the body flows into the mind, the body does not pull the mind down with it to the affect of the mind. But the condemnation of pleasure must fall upon both because the pleasure is in both. But we who have been instructed in spiritual teachings know that the salvation of both soul and body is given from God, if, after the grace of the regeneration, the sense of the body is imbued with the joy of the mind, that is, if we will have conquered not according to the flesh, but according to the spirit. For the works of the spirit and the flesh, according to the apostle, are distinguished by the zeal either for vices or continence. Therefore it is difficult, though entirely right, to hope for the eternity of the body just as the eternity of the soul.\(^{64}\)

Christian teaching shows us that we cannot maintain a pure soul imprisoned in a vice-ridden body. The unity of the human person does not allow such a division, nor does the nature of salvation. To a pure soul, logically, salvation would be a right. But, Hilary says, we know that salvation is given as a gift from God. The notion that the soul is naturally divine and will return to its origin renders void the dispensation. So too does the notion that the body is naturally degraded and is incapable of salvation. In such a picture, the incarnation has nothing to do with the salvation of either soul or body because the soul needs no saving and the body can never be saved. To believe and to teach that the body can be made eternal is something that Hilary perceives as particularly difficult for us because it is easy to place the blame for all sins on the body. This difficulty is all the more reason, in Hilary’s mind, to insist upon the salvation and the

\(^{64}\) *Tr. ps.* 62.3 (CCL 61 206.9-23): Et quidem uniuscuiusque mens ad cognitionem spem que aeternitatis naturali quodam fertur instinctu ueluti insitum impressumque omnibus sit diuinam inesse nobis animarum originem opinari, cum non exiguam caelestis in se generis cognitionem mens ipsa cognoscat. Porro autem terrena haec corpora, quae ad uitiorum concreta materiam sint, dum his quibus quasi naturaliter delectantur infecta sunt, desperant sibi consortium munusque caeleste, quasi non et animae naturam uitia corporis, quibus oblectatur, inficiant aut, cum delectatio corporis redundet ad mentem, non et mentem se cum corpus retrahat ad oblecturenis adfectum.Necesse est autem ut in eadem condenmatione sit ululpatis, quod in eadem est ululpati. Sed nos spiritalibus doctrinis eruditi scimus et animae et corporis salutem a Deo esse donatam, si modo post regenerationis gratiam mentis gaudiis sensus corporis imbuatur, id est si non secundum carmenu, sed secundum spiritum uixerimus, quia spiritus carnis que opera secundum apostolum uitiorum et continentiae studiis distinguitur. Arduum autem, sed maxime uestrum est aternitatem ita corporis ut animae sperare.
glorification of the body.\textsuperscript{65} He shows here the temptation to believe in the salvation of soul apart from body. No one, however, shown the salvation of the body would doubt that the soul was included in such a gift.

In eternal life the body will not be destroyed, rather it will cease from its earthly condition and become spiritual: the saints will see “the flesh of their nature transformed into the substance of eternal salvation.”\textsuperscript{66} As we noted in the previous chapter, Hilary’s double creation narrative leads him to see the creation of the human being as a harmonious joining of complements. This harmony was upset with the introduction of sin, but is renewed and surpassed in the resurrection. There will still be both body and soul, and thus a certain duality, but Hilary highlights the unity that will exist between the body and soul because they will have a communion of nature: spiritual nature.\textsuperscript{67} Christ’s joining of the heavenly and the earthly in his sinless body, is, because of our presence in his body, a joining also of the heavenly and the earthly in each one of us. The transformation of our nature in the resurrection allows human nature to partake in the simplicity of the divine nature.

\textsuperscript{65} Nevertheless, some scholars are troubled by what seems an imbalance in Hilary’s theological system. See, for example, Fierro who recognizes that for Hilary, unlike for Origen or Eusebius of Caesarea, our conformity to Christ centers in the corporal. This centrality, Fierro says, gives Hilary some strengths: most notably that the resurrection of the body is always a central part in Hilary’s theology. But on the other hand, according to Fierro, this centrality gives Hilary some weaknesses, the greatest of which is that the preeminence of the soul in the makeup of the individual is not reflected in Hilary’s presentation of the individual’s eschatological fulfillment in which the glorious transformation applies largely to the body with little talk about the soul (Sobre la gloria, 253-54). Critiques of Hilary’s strangely exclusive treatment of the resurrection of the body are ironic in light of the accusations of docetism that we saw in Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{66} Tr. ps. 143.18 (CCL 61B 264.21-22): naturae suae carnem in aeternae salutis substantiam transformatam esse.

\textsuperscript{67} See Fierro, Sobre la gloria, 275-76.
THE HEAVENLY CITY OF JERUSALEM; THE CELESTIAL ZION

Hilary’s development of the Stoic theme of the universal city, discussed in Chapter 2, influences his use of the biblical figure of the city of Jerusalem. In the Tractatus super Psalmos, Jerusalem often serves as the scriptural prompt that leads Hilary of Poitiers to speak about heaven and eschatological life. Hilary’s exegesis of the psalms relies on his belief that “the psalms do not speak about things of their time alone nor are they fitting only to the ages in which they were written, rather the word of God, which is itself most useful for the progress of each age, advises all who come into life.”

Jerusalem, the source and center of Israel’s devotion and hope, is then, for Hilary, the center of Christian hope as well: Hilary says that in the psalms, “The prophet puts forth Jerusalem as the beginning of his joy…because having been received in Jerusalem he will be immortal after having been mortal; he will be mixed in with the gathering of the companies of the angels, he will be received into the reign of the Lord to whose glory he will be conformed.” Since Hilary also says that “the entire hope of our rest is in the body of Christ,” human entrance to the heavenly Jerusalem depends not only on conformation to the body of Christ but existence in the body of Christ.

---

68 Tr. ps. 1.19.4 (CCL 61B 5.11-15): Psalmi enim non sui tantum temporis res enuntiant neque in eas solum aetates conueniunt, quibus scripti sunt, sed uniuersis, qui in uitam uenirent, Dei sermo consuluit, uniuersae aetati ipse aptissimus ad profectum.
70 Tr. ps. 1.14.5 (CCL 61 84.25-26): ergo requiei nostrae spes omnis in Christi est corpore. Chromatius also connects Jerusalem with the body of Christ, though, unlike Hilary, he explicitly understands the relationship of Jerusalem to the body of Christ as typological. See, for example, Chromatius, Tractatus in Matthaeum 24.3 (CCL 9A 312.99-102): Neeque, inquit, per Hierosolymam, quia ciuitas est magni Regis, id est typus corporis Christi, quod est spiritalis illa et caelestis ecclesia. However, Chromatius does say that the Church is properly called the city of Christ: …ecclesiam suam, quae proprie Christi ciuitas nuncupatur (Tractatus in Matthaeum 43.7 [CCL 9A 409.131]).
association with the body of Christ, Jerusalem is both the earthly Church (which we will
discuss at greater length in the next chapter) and our eschatological goal.

Though Hilary most often refers to Zion and Jerusalem together as the heavenly
destiny of humanity, at times he distinguishes between the two to show that human nature
has a special place in the heavenly Jerusalem. Humans have the honor, not available to
the angels, of living not only in the heavenly Jerusalem but on Mt. Zion, the place of the
temple of that city.

When Hilary explicitly distinguishes between Jerusalem and Mt. Zion, he does so
in a consistent fashion based on the geography of the physical city of Jerusalem. Mt.
Zion is, geographically, the temple hill. Hilary associates the temple with the Church,
which is, according to St. Paul, the body of Christ. In his commentary on Psalm 64,
Hilary says: “Mt. Zion indeed is near Jerusalem; but we have always accepted that this
mountain and its name mean this city’s Church, which is Christ’s body…. ” Hilary
associates Mt. Zion with Christ and, specifically, his body. Mt. Zion is the body of
Christ, the holy temple or Church of the heavenly Jerusalem.

In addition, Hilary uses the etymology of the name Zion to explain that Zion is the
body of Christ in which humans exist. Zion is “speculatio,” that is, a lookout. We look
at (speculare) our eschatological future in Mt. Zion, the body of Christ. Hilary says:

For although Zion, is the little hill associated with the temple that was in Jerusalem,
nevertheless it is called “lookout” according to the translation of the word from Hebrew
into Latin and Greek. Therefore, we look at our hope and our life in this body of the
Lord, in which he was resurrected from the dead, in which he sits at the right hand of
power, and in which he is in the glory of God the Father.

71 Tr. ps. 64.2 (CCL 61 221.12-14): Sion mons quidem Hierusalem adiacens est; sed montem hunc eius que
nomen atque etiam urbis ipsius ecclesiam, quae corpus est Christi, nuncupatam semper accepius….
72 For Mt. Zion as the body of Christ in which humans dwell, see Tr. ps. 124.3.
73 Tr. ps. 68.31 (CCL 61 316.7-12): Sion enim, licet colliculus templo, quod in Hierusalem fuit, iunctus sit,
tamen secundum interpretationem ex hebraeo in latinum graecumque sermonem speculatio dicitur. In hoc
Anytime Hilary uses the word “look” he is playing on the etymology of Zion. Zion, the temple mount, as Hilary says, is the place in which we look at our hope and our life, and our life, according to Hilary, is in the body of Christ. This body is the hope of humanity because it is by Christ’s assumption and redemption of a human body that humanity is saved. Humans, then, are to dwell in Mt. Zion, the body of Christ, the temple of the heavenly Jerusalem.

Heavenly Jerusalem and Mt. Zion are Hilary’s figurative and Scriptural manner of speaking about our eschatological future in the body of Christ.\(^74\)

It is fitting that we remember the apostolic words that we who believe in our Lord Jesus Christ have come to Mt. Zion and the heavenly Jerusalem (Heb. 12.22). In his glorious body, which has been transformed into heavenly glory, we look upon the honor of our hope since our body should be conformed into the glory of his body.\(^75\)

In expanding the understanding of Jerusalem to include Jerusalem as the heavenly city of our hope, and Mt. Zion to signify the temple of the Lord’s body, Hilary is not simply “spiritualizing” these realities. Hilary never forgets that the words of the Scripture speak of Jerusalem and Mt. Zion as physical realities.\(^76\) Jerusalem, as the city of the temple, was the place to which the Jews would go up to meet God, for the temple was the place of mediation. The temple (and its location on Mt. Zion) remains the place of mediation that it always was and, for Hilary, the one true and eternal place of mediation is the body of Christ.

---

\(^74\) See also *Tr. ps.* 13.4 and 118 Koph 12.
\(^75\) *Tr. ps.* 128.9 (CCL 61B 94.7-13): … dicti apostolici meminis se nos conuenit, ad montem Sion et Hierusalem caelestem accessisse nos in Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum credentes (Heb. 12.22): in cuius glorifico corpore, quod in caelestem gloriam transformatum est, spei nostrae honorem specularum, humilitatis nostrae corpore in gloriam corporis sui conformando.
\(^76\) Hilary’s association of Mt. Zion and Jerusalem, for example, depends upon their physical proximity.
HEAVEN AND THE DIVINE INDWELLING

Jerusalem is our heavenly home, and Mt. Zion is the place of Christ’s eternal mediation. Mt. Zion is Christ’s glorified body in which we are to dwell forever. However, we already are the dwelling of the city of Christ’s body as a result of his assumption of all humanity. As Hilary said in the *In Mattheum*,

He calls the flesh that he had assumed a city because, as a city consists of a variety and multitude of inhabitants, so there is contained in him, through the nature of the assumed body, a certain assembly of the whole human race. And thus he becomes a city from our assembly in him and we become the dwelling of this city through consort with his flesh.77

Christ’s body is the city of all humanity. Hilary often speaks of the reverse side of this relationship: not only do we dwell in Christ, but Christ and, through Christ, the Father dwell in us.78 For example, Hilary says that the Son of God is the heaven in which the Father dwells.

Therefore, let us seek what the dwelling place of the Lord is. Surely it is that of him, who said: *For the Father is in me, and I am in the Father* (Jn. 10.38); and again: *I and the Father are one* (Jn. 10.30); and about whom it was said: *God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself* (1 Cor. 5.19): the Son in whom the Father lives through the same power of nature being worthy and sufficient …Therefore, God lives in this heaven, a worthy dwelling place of his majesty and divinity.79

---

77 *In Matt.* 4.12 (SC 254 130.3-9): Ciuitatem carnem quam adsumpserat nuncupat, quia, ut ciuitas ex uariatete ac multitudine consistit habitantium, ita in eo per naturam suscepti corporis quaedam uniuersi generis humani congregatio continetur. Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congregatione fit ciuitas et nos per consortium carnis suae sumus ciuitatis habitatio.

78 See also *Tr. ps.* 67.17, in which Hilary uses the image of Christ as Mt. Zion to speak of the Son as God’s chosen dwelling place.

79 *Tr. ps.* 122.2 (CCL 61B 35.6-36.11, 18-20): Quaeramus ergo, quae habitatio Dei sit, nempe eius qui dixit: *Pater enim in me, et ego in Patre* (Jn. 10.38); et rursum: *Ego et Pater unum sumus* (Jn. 10.30), et de quo dictum est: *Deus in Christo erat mundum reconcilians sibi* (2 Cor. 5.19), digno et sufficiens Filio, in quo Pater per eamdem naturae habitet uirtutem... *In hoc ergo caelo Deus inhabitat*, digno maiestatis suae et diuinitatis habitaculo.
The Son is eternally the dwelling place of the Father for the nature of the Son’s generation is such that “the unbegotten God, begetting the only-begotten God, remains, by the very property of generation, in him whom he begot.”

In the incarnation, not only does the Son, in assuming all humanity, become our dwelling place, but he also dwells in us. The proper dwelling place of God is in heaven. Christ, in making us heavenly in his body, transforms us into worthy dwelling places for himself and the Father.

Therefore, if we who have been mud in Adam are now heavenly in Christ and Christ dwells in us, then through Christ’s dwelling in us, that one [the Father] also dwells in us, for his dwelling place is Christ dwelling in us.

The Son makes us heavenly and incorruptible so that we are worthy dwelling places for God. Yet the Son is the eternal mediator: Christ serves as the mediator through whom or in whom the Father dwells in us. The Father dwells only in the heaven that is his Son begotten with the same power of nature. Apart from Christ, we cannot be dwelling places of the divine. The Son, in conforming us to himself, allows us also to become heavens in which the Father, in him, can dwell.

---

80 *Tr. ps.* 122.2 (CCL 61B 36.14-16): …Et Deus innascibilis, unigenitum Deum gignens manet in illo, quem genuit proprietate generandi.

81 In *De Trinitate* 8.13-17, Hilary emphasizes the Eucharist as the privileged means of Christ’s indwelling in believers by distinguishing between us dwelling in Christ which is the result of the incarnation, and Christ dwelling in us which is the result of reception of the Eucharist. However, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* what little Hilary says about the Eucharist is related to the theme of the Eucharist as an eschatological preparation: he does not return to the idea of Christ’s indwelling through the Eucharist. See Wild, *The Divinization of Man*, 111-13, and *Tr. ps.* 64.14 and 135.15.

82 *Tr. ps.* 122.3 (CCL 61B 36.13-17): Ergo si, qui in Adam limus fuimus, nunc caelestes sumus in Christo et Christus habitator est nostri, per habitantem Christum in nobis etiam ille quoque habitator est nostri, cui est *habitans* in nobis Christus habitatio.

83 See also *Tr. ps.* 118 Lamed 4 (CCL 61A 110.15-16): In his enim tamquam in caelo uerbum Dei permanent.
CONCLUSION

The details of Hilary’s eschatology depend heavily upon his understanding of the incarnation as Christ’s assumption of all humanity. The end of the dispensation, Christ’s subjection and handing over of the kingdom, are understood by Hilary as the fulfillment of the process of assuming humanity into the divine life that was begun in the incarnation. Hilary’s eschatology, shaped by 1 Corinthians 15.21-28, envisions humanity itself as the kingdom of God, a kingdom whose place, literally, is in the body of Christ. For this reason, our hope is entirely centered in this body: Christ is the longed-for Jerusalem, he is heaven itself—and as he also conforms us to what he is, we too become heavens. Our hope and our peace remain always in the body of Christ; there is no time when humanity is finally able to bypass the Son and participate in the Father directly. We become the Father’s kingdom because the Son subjects himself to the Father and we are in the Son. We are transformed into worthy dwelling places of God, but still the Father dwells in us only through the Son. Christ enables us to become what he is, but this is a transformation that depends upon our contact with Christ. Our eternal transformation is secured through our eternal participation in Christ’s glorious body.

Typically, the moment of primary relevance in the physicalist model of redemption is understood as the incarnation.84 Hilary’s eschatology depends upon this redemption model that teaches Christ’s assumption of all humanity. Yet while it is not incorrect to say that the moment of primary relevance in Hilary’s model of redemption is the incarnation, it is even more accurate to say that the moment of primary relevance for

84 See the discussion in Chapter 1. See also Phillip Wild, Divinization of Man, 57-65; McMahon, De Christo Mediatore, 63-64; and Jossua, Salut: Incarnation ou mystère pascal, 22-23.
Hilary is Christ’s glorification. In Christ’s glorification, we are glorified and raised to be sons of God. Perfect fulfillment still awaits the end and Christ’s subjection and handing over of the kingdom, but in Christ’s glorification the incarnation bears its intended fruit.
CHAPTER 6
ECCLESIOLOGICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ASSUMPTION OF ALL HUMANITY

The sixth chapter will focus on Hilary’s understanding of the Church as the body of Christ. For Hilary, this is not an analogy but a physical reality based upon Christ’s assumption of all humanity in the incarnation and brought to fruition through his resurrection into glory. Salvation, from its beginning in the incarnation to its end in glorification, is in Christ’s body. The temporal Church is the place for the working out of this salvation for it is the place of deeper integration into Christ’s body. It is within his ecclesiology that the Holy Spirit finds his most important role in Hilary’s theology, for the integration of individuals into the Church of Christ’s body is accomplished by the Holy Spirit.

The eschatological fulfillment of humanity takes place in the body of Christ. It is begun in Christ’s assumption of all humanity in the incarnation and accomplished in our eternal dwelling in the temple of Christ’s glorified body. Between the beginning and the end stands the Church, which, as the body of Christ, is the temporal extension of the incarnation and the preparation for the final glorification. We noted in the previous chapter that in the Tractatus super Psalmos, there is an increased attention to both eschatology and Christ’s assumption of all humanity. In Hilary’s theology these are twin themes because eschatology is the supratemporal extension of Christ’s assumption of all humanity. Ecclesiology too has much greater prominence in the Tractatus super Psalmos than in Hilary’s earlier works for a similar reason: the Church, as body of Christ, is the temporal extension of the assumption of all humanity. Hilary includes the Holy Spirit within this temporal process of human sanctification. As Hilary expands his understanding of salvation to include growth in the Church, he also allows room for the working of the Holy Spirit unto this end. With the unity of these three themes in the Tractatus super Psalmos—incarnational theology (in the manner of Christ’s assumption
of all humanity), ecclesiology, and eschatology—Hilary demonstrates a remarkably coherent physicalist doctrine of redemption.

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF HILARY’S ECCLESIOLOGY AND ITS DEPENDENCE ON THE ASSUMPTION OF ALL HUMANITY**

The development of Hilary’s ecclesiology from the *In Matthaueum* to the *Tractatus super Psalmos* is described by Albert Charlier.¹ Charlier advances the argument that Hilary’s ecclesiology evolves throughout his career towards a realization that our unity with Christ, founded in Christ’s assumption of all humanity in the incarnation, is a progressive unity that depends upon our participation in the faith and sacramental life of the Church.² For our purposes, Charlier’s study is especially interesting in its method. Although his explicit purpose is a study of Hilary’s ecclesiology, Charlier begins with the study of a different theme: the union of humanity with Christ.³ According to Charlier, Hilary develops this theme of humanity’s union with Christ apart from ecclesiological considerations until his final works, the *Tractatus mysteriorum* and the *Tractatus super

---

¹ Charlier, “L’Église corps du Christ.”
³ In the *In Mattheum*, according to Charlier, the union of men with Christ is envisaged essentially on the level of the incarnation. There are two aspects to this: 1) Christ assumed all of humanity; 2) he accomplishes in his body all the mysteries of our salvation (baptism, death, resurrection, etc.). In the *De Trinitate* our incorporation is founded on the incarnation but is achieved through faith, baptism and the Eucharist. Our union with Christ is explicitly extended vertically to the Father and horizontally to other men. Charlier says that already by the first three books of *De Trinitate*, Hilary has all these themes in place: 1) Christ is unified to all humanity in the incarnation, 2) the union of God and man takes place in the body of Christ, 3) the effects of this incorporation are our sanctification, divinization and adoption as sons of God. What Hilary does not yet have is a treatment of the role of the Church in our union with the body of Christ and in our divinization. In the *Tractatus super Psalmos* and the *De mysteriis*, Hilary explicitly talks about the role of the Church in this union. Charlier says that Hilary began with the intuition that we are all incorporated into Christ (immediately) on account of the incarnation. Little by little, Hilary becomes conscious of the progressive nature of this union: 1) Christ’s redemptive actions (and not simply the fact of the incarnation) have something to do with it. 2) It can be refused through disbelief. 3) It is ratified through faith, baptism and Eucharist. 4) It is only fully realized in our glorification. 5) The Church has a role in this incorporation into Christ. See Charlier, “L’Église corps du Christ,” 475-477.
Psalmos. The body of Christ, which Hilary recognizes as the place of God’s union with humanity as early as the In Mattheum, is not theologically tied to the Church until Hilary’s later writings.

The importance of the Church in the Tractatus super Psalmos must be seen in light of his understanding of the incarnation. In the Tractatus super Psalmos, as Hilary both emphasizes and nuances his understanding of Christ’s assumption of all humanity in the incarnation, he accords a correspondingly greater role to the Church.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF SOTERIOLOGY AND ECCLESIOLOGY IN THE IN MATTHAEUM

The soteriology of Hilary’s In Mattheum has met with scholarly criticism that judges it to be inconsistent and not sufficiently christological. Fierro has asserted that in the In Mattheum, Hilary’s soteriology models our glorification not on Christ but on the angels and is not, therefore, sufficiently christocentric. Burns softens, but does not eliminate, Fierro’s critique by saying that Hilary does link the theme of spiritualization of the body to Christ, however he does not do so fully or consistently. Burns highlights In Matt. 18.6 as the key passage in which Hilary links the three elements of man, angels and Christ (Christology in Hilary, 130).

---

4 Fierro, Sobre la gloria, 281. See also Burns’ response to this critique (Christology in Hilary, 128-129). Orazzo (Salvezza in Ilario, 184) has a slightly modified version of Fierro’s critique: he believes that Hilary has the same principle of salvation in both In Matt. and Tr. Ps.—namely the unification of soul and body—but he changes the end goal. In the In Matt. the body will be transformed according to the spiritual nature of the soul. In the Tr. Ps., the body will be transformed, but now according to the glory of Christ’s body. According to Orazzo, this shift in the Tr. ps. unifies, for the first time, christology and anthropology.

5 Burns highlights In Matt. 18.6 as the key passage in which Hilary links the three elements of man, angels and Christ (Christology in Hilary, 130).
“only a minimal role.”6 According to both Fierro and Burns, Hilary rectifies this weakness in his later writings by incorporating his soteriological models more consistently into a christological context.7

The inconsistent christological emphasis of the soteriology of the *In Mattheum* is, I suggest, the result of the limited presence of a teaching on Christ’s assumption of all humanity. In Chapter 4 I argued that Hilary already teaches Christ’s assumption of all humanity in the *In Mattheum*. However, in the *In Mattheum* the presence of this teaching is occasional, and its role limited, as opposed to his consistent use of Christ’s assumption of all humanity as a predominant theme that we find in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. Hilary does not demonstrate a firm, consistent, incarnational theology in the *In Mattheum*, and as a result he uses there different, sometimes poorly integrated, soteriological models.

Later in life, as Hilary becomes more insistent on Christ’s assumption of all humanity bodily in the incarnation, his soteriology becomes increasingly coherent and christocentric in its emphasis on the body of Christ such that it undergoes two changes. First, the model of our eschatological transformation shifts from the angels to Christ. Second, the emphasis on the theme of the spiritualization of the body shifts. Whereas in the *In Mattheum* Hilary stresses the aspect of spiritualization to the point that he lacks an adequate treatment of the corporeal dimension,8 in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, there is a heavy emphasis on the body, for salvation is seen as complete conformity to, and incorporation into, the body of Christ. Consequently, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*,

---

6 Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 135.
7 This incorporation, according to both scholars is tied to Hilary’s use of Philippians 3.21 in his later works. See Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*, 281, and Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 135.
8 See Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 131.
Hilary dwells on the physical aspect of our salvation, namely the transformation of our bodies from corruptibility to incorruptibility.

However, even where Hilary’s soteriology in the *In Matthaenum* is a development of the incarnational principle of Christ’s assumption of all humanity, there is the surprising lack of an extension of this principle into ecclesiology. \(^9\) Since the assumption of all humanity logically entails a soteriological model in which salvation is understood as integration into the divine life, the incarnation, in which Christ takes all of humanity into his body, is already a participation in divine life. We saw in Chapter 1 that one of the main accusations of the nineteenth-century German scholars was that Hilary’s understanding of the incarnation, led to a system in which salvation is the automatic result of the incarnation regardless of personal choice or behavior. In the *In Matthaenum* Hilary’s understanding of Christ’s assumption of humanity emphasizes the automatic, ontological change in humanity that is the universal and immediate result of the incarnation. Hilary’s understanding of the effects of the incarnation in the *In Matthaenum* leaves little room for the Church as an instrument of salvation: if salvation has already occurred, it does not need to be worked out in the Church.

**The Role of the Church and Sacraments**

In the *De Trinitate* and, more fully, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary begins to balance this “automatic” nature of salvation with the process of human sanctification.

---

\(^9\) Burns asserts that the extension of the incarnation to all men is never directly associated with ecclesiology in the *In Matthaenum* (*Christology in Hilary*, 113).
Hilary comes to understand salvation (that is humanity’s union with God in the body of Christ) as less automatic and more gradual, leaving room for the Church as the temporal locus for growth into Christ.

Hilary’s understanding of a more gradual salvation in his later works leaves more room for the sacraments. For example, concerning baptism, in the *In Matthaeum* Hilary’s treatment of this sacrament is found in his commentary on Christ’s baptism (*In Matt. 2.5*). He says:

In Jesus Christ there was all humanity and therefore, a body having been assumed as a servant of the Spirit, he accomplished in himself the whole sacrament of our salvation….and so he had no need of being cleansed, but purgation in the waters of our cleansing had to be sanctified by him…And so although according to the testimony of the prophet he did not need to be washed, he fulfills the sacrament of human salvation by the authority of his example: sanctifying man by the assuming and the washing.\(^\text{11}\)

Hilary here argues that Christ’s baptism was done for our benefit. Christ’s baptism has two effects: 1) it sanctifies the water of our baptism; and 2) it baptizes his body, namely us, for Christ “accomplished in himself the sacrament of our salvation.” The sacrament of baptism is seen in terms of the incarnation and Christ’s action of being baptized serves to baptize humanity. In this system there is little theological need for individual baptism.

While apparently similar, Hilary’s understanding of baptism differs from that of his late fourth-century Latin counterpart Chromatius, for whom Christ’s baptism 1) sanctifies the water, and 2) is an example for us.

For it is right that what someone teaches another to do, he ought first to begin. Therefore, because the Lord of the human race had come as a teacher, he desired to teach by his own example what had to be done, so that as students follow their teacher, so the servants

---

\(^{10}\) For Hilary’s increasing perception of the progressive nature of humanity’s union with God, see Charlier, “L’Église corps du Christ,” 451-477.

\(^{11}\) *In Matt. 2.5* (SC 254 108.2-5, 108.10-110.12, 110.16-19): Erat in Iesu Christo homo totus atque ideo in famulatum Spiritus corpus adsumptum omne in se sacramentum nostrae salutis expleuit….Atque ita non ille necessitatem habuit abluendi, sed per illum in aquis ablationis nostrae erat sanctificanda purgatio….Atque ita et prophetae testimo in lauacro non eget et exempli sui auctoritate humanae salutis sacramenta consummat hominem et adsumptione sanctificans et lauacro.
should follow the Lord. Therefore, he deigned to be baptized first because he was going to give a new baptism for the sake of the salvation of the human race and the remission of sins, not so that he, who alone had never sinned, might cast out [his own] sins, but so that he might sanctify the waters of baptism for the washing away of the sins of believers.\textsuperscript{12}

Chromatius’ understanding of the sacrament is based on exemplarism because his understanding of the incarnation, unlike Hilary’s assumption of all humanity, makes all Christ’s actions, accomplished in a single human, models for the actions to be completed by all humanity.\textsuperscript{13} Even when Hilary begins to temper his understanding of baptism in the \textit{Tractatus super Psalmos}, he always sees Christ’s baptism primarily as efficacious rather than exemplary because of his understanding of the incarnation. Hilary’s belief that Christ contains all humanity allows him to understand the baptism of Christ as, in some ways, efficacious for all humanity.

The dependence of both Hilary and Chromatius’ understandings of baptism on their respective conceptions of the incarnation is demonstrated in the interpretation Buffer gives to Hilary’s treatment of Christ’s baptism in the \textit{In Matthaeum}.\textsuperscript{14} Buffer understands Hilary’s incarnational theology to be like Chromatius’: namely that Christ assumes a single human nature that does not contain within it all humanity. As a result, Buffer believes that Hilary’s treatment of baptism is identical to Chromatius’: both understand Christ’s baptism to be an exemplar for ours. Buffer, commenting on \textit{In Matthaeum} 2.5, turns the word “exemplum” into the key for reading the whole passage. Buffer’s translation of “homo totus” as “a complete nature” rather than “all humanity”

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{12} Chromatius of Aquileia, \textit{Tractatus in Matthaeum} 12.1 (CCL 9A 244.24-245.32): Iustum est enim ut quod quis docet alterum facere, prior incipiatur. Quia igitur magister dominus humani generis uenerat, exemplo suo docere voluit quid esset faciendum, ut discipuli magister, serui dominum sequerentur. Quia ergo nouum baptismum daturus erat ad generis humani salutem et remissionem peccati, prior ipse baptizari dignatus est, non ut peccata deponeret, qui peccatum solus non fecerat, sed ut aquas baptismi sanctificaret ad diluenda peccata credentium.

\textsuperscript{13} See Jossua, \textit{Salut: Incarnation ou mystère pascal}, 154-155.

\textsuperscript{14} See Buffer, \textit{Salus in St. Hilary}, 31-34.
\end{footnotesize}
and his insistence on exemplarism, unfortunately serve to make the passage’s emphasis on the sanctification of humanity—which does not need to wait for individual baptism but which is already attained in the incarnation and Christ’s own baptism (hominem et adsumptione sanctificans et lauacro)—illogical. If, as Buffer argues, Christ is only the perfect man and not all men, his baptism affects only his human nature and not the nature of all humanity.

However, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary continues to speak of Christ’s baptism as sanctifying the waters of our baptism, but he no longer speaks of our baptism being effected in Christ’s own baptism. There is a greater recognition that Christ’s baptism sanctifies, rather than replaces, individual baptism:

…our way into the heavenly kingdom begins with the washing of new generation and the possession of an eternal body for these very waters have been consecrated by the baptism of the Lord.\(^{15}\)

Our entire salvation is not accomplished in Christ’s baptism, rather Christ’s baptism paves the way for our baptism which itself is only the beginning of our way into the heavenly kingdom. Hilary elucidates further steps along this way into the heavenly kingdom in his commentary on Psalm 118, where he says that our baptism in the waters consecrated by Christ awaits the fulfillment of baptism by the Holy Spirit and a life lived free of sin.\(^{16}\) In his *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary understands the salvation of individuals as a progressive process—begun and fulfilled in the body of Christ—that requires both individual faith and the work of the Holy Spirit.

---

\(^{15}\) *Tr. ps. 65.11 (CCL 61 241.10-13): … uia nobis caelestis regni et in nouae generationis lauacro possesso aeternorum corporum inchoatur, aquis ipsis baptismo Domini consecratis.*

\(^{16}\) *Tr. ps. 118 Gimel 5 (CCK 61A 28.7-29.12): Est ergo, quantum licet existimare, perfectae illius emundatio puritatis etiam post baptismi aquas reposita, quae nos sancti spiritus sanctificet audentu, quae iudicii igne nos decoquet, quae per mortis iniuriam a labe morticinae et societate purgabit, quae martyrii passione deuoto ac fidelis sanguine abluet.*
ECCLESIAL IMAGES IN THE *IN MATTHAEUM*

There are two major changes between the *In Matthaeum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos* that affect Hilary’s ecclesiology. The first is that as Hilary teaches Christ’s assumption of all humanity more consistently in his later works, the centrality of the body of Christ serves to organize and unify his thought. Soteriology becomes christocentric because our salvation happens, from beginning to end, in the body of Christ. The role of the Church in Hilary’s thought expands, for Hilary understands the Pauline teaching about the Church as the body of Christ in an increasingly physical fashion. The second major change between the *In Matthaeum* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos* is that Hilary integrates the Church into the process of salvation by understanding the incarnation as the beginning rather than the fulfillment of the process of integration into the divine life. Hilary’s understanding of salvation and also of the Church becomes more eschatologically focused. 17

The body of Christ is already for Hilary in the *In Matthaeum*, the place of the union between Christ and humanity and thus the place of integration into the divine life.

We can refer again to a text we have studied several times: 18

He calls the flesh that he had assumed a city because, as a city consists of a variety and multitude of inhabitants, so there is contained in him, through the nature of the assumed body, a certain assembly of the whole human race. And thus he becomes a city from our assembly in him and we are the dwelling of this city through consort with his flesh. 19

---

17 Both Doignon (*Hilaire de Poitiers: Disciple*, 167) and Michael Figura (*Das Kirchenverständnis des Hilarius von Poitiers*, Freiburger theol. Studien 127 [Freiburg: Herder, 1984], 154-158) assert that Hilary’s conception of the Church in the *In Mattheaum* does not have an eschatological dimension.

18 See Chapters 3 and 5.

19 *In Matt. 4.12* (SC 254 130.3-9): Ciuitatem carnem quam adsumperat nuncupat, quia, ut ciuitas ex uaretate ac multitudine consistit habitantium, ita in eo per naturam suscepti corporis quaedam uniuersi
Christ’s body is the city in which all humanity dwells. Furthermore, Hilary says that Christ accomplishes our salvation in this body:

In Jesus Christ there was all humanity and therefore a body having been assumed as a servant of the Spirit, he accomplished in himself the whole sacrament of our salvation.\footnote{In Matt. 2.5 (SC 254 108.3-5): Erat in Iesu Christo homo totus atque ideo in famulatum Spiritus corpus adsuntum omne in se sacramentum nostrae salutis expleuit.}

However, only once in the \textit{In Matthaeeum} does Hilary connect this place of salvation, namely the body of Christ, with the Church.

For why was it important to swear by heaven, the seat of God, to swear by earth, the footstool of his feet, to swear by Jerusalem, a city which was soon to be destroyed on account of the insolence and sins of its inhabitants? Was it not because it [Jerusalem] was founded as a pre-formation of the Church, that is the body of Christ, which is the city of the great king?\footnote{In Matt. 4.24 (SC 254 144.11-12): Quid enim momenti erat iurare per caelum Dei sedem, iurare per terram scabellum pedum eius, iurare per Hierusalem urbei ob insolentiam et peccata inhabitantium destruendam, cum præsertim in praeformationem Ecclesiae, id est corporis Christi, quae magni regis est ciuitas, esset constituta? Chromatius makes exactly the same connection (see Chromatius, \textit{Tractatus in Matthaeeum} 24.3 [CCL 9A 311-312]).}

Hilary clearly calls the Church the body of Christ in this text. However, in this context he is trying to make a point about swearing oaths, not about the Church.

At no point in the \textit{In Matthaeeum} does Hilary attempt to enlarge upon the image of the Church as the body of Christ, and it is clear that, as yet, this connection has no major role in Hilary’s thought. Instead, he has two favorite images for the Church in the \textit{In Matthaeeum}, both of which support the unified theme of the commentary, namely, the transference of salvation from the Jews to the gentiles.\footnote{Burns acknowledges this as the main theme of the \textit{In Matthaeeum} (Christology in Hilary, 48). See also Newlands, \textit{Study in Theological Method}, 78: “The focal point of the movement from the law to faith which is the main theme of the work, is, as we have seen above, Jesus Christ himself.”} Hilary’s monothematic exposition is supported by his use of the dialectic between the Law and faith, the Jews...
and the gentiles, the synagogue and the Church, and unbelievers and believers. Hilary’s favorite image for the Church in the In Matthaeum is, by far, that of the Church as a ship. This image allows Hilary to emphasize that, unlike Israel, the Church is open to all peoples and depends on faith rather than lineage. The image of the Church as a ship, prevents Hilary from identifying the Church with the body of Christ because Jesus is not himself the boat but rather one who steps in or out of the boat. Hilary’s second image is his consideration of various women of the Bible—for instance, Rachel, the Queen of the South and the daughter of the Canaanite woman—as prefigurations of the Church. In the case of the Queen of the South, and the daughter of the Canaanite woman, these women, as Church, represent the Gentile faith as opposed to Jewish Law and unbelief.

Hilary’s ecclesiology in the In Matthaeum is determined by his focus on the historical stages of salvation: in this view the final stage begun at the incarnation is the Church, which supplants the Jews. While this historical emphasis remains an aspect of Hilary’s ecclesiology in the Tractatus super Psalmos—especially in his image of the younger supplanting the elder, which we will discuss later in this chapter—Hilary’s later works consider salvation historically but also supra-historically, that is eschatologically.

---

23 See Newlands, *Study in Theological Method*, 56-57.
24 About one third of Hilary’s references to the Church in the In Matthaeum follow the analogy of the Church as a ship: see In Matt. 7.9, 7.10, 8.1, 8.4, 13.1, 14.9, 14.14, and 15.10. Chromatius also frequently uses this analogy: see his *Tractatus in Matthaeum* 41.3, 42.5-6, 52.5. The image of the Church as a ship is quite common in the third-century (for example, in Origen, the Didascalia, and Cyprian).
25 See In Matt. 4.24 (SC 254 188.6-10): Ecclesia enim instar est nauis - et plurimis locis ita nuncupata est - quae, diversissimi generis et gentis vectore suscepta, subiecta est omnibus et uentorum flatibus et maris motibus, atque ita illa et saeculi et immundorum spirituum uexatur incursibus. See also In Matt. 15.10 (SC 258 46.20-22): Et quia omnibus diebus uitae nostrae nobis cum Dominus manet, nauem, id est Ecclesiam, credentium plebe comitatus ingreditur.
26 See In Matt. 1.7 (Rachel), 12.20 (Queen of the South), and 15.4,6 (daughter of Canaanite woman).
27 Hilary does not use the image of Rachel to juxtapose faith and Law, but she still serves to put Christians in a favorable light and Jews in an unfavorable light. See In Matt. 1.7.
This eschatological emphasis in turn makes Hilary’s ecclesiology more christocentric because the end of salvation is now seen as eternal life in Christ’s body.

The ecclesiology of the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, which is a consistent system centered in Christ’s body, is a later development of the incarnational principle of Christ’s assumption of all humanity that is found in all Hilary’s works, even the pre-exilic *In Matthaeum*. However, the most recent monograph on Hilary’s ecclesiology, the work of Guillermo Colautti, makes the opposite argument: Colautti argues that the doctrine of the assumption of all humanity follows upon, and is not the basis for, Hilary’s understanding of the unity of all humanity, which is the Church. 28 Hilary does, as Colautti suggests, understand in the *In Matthaeum* that there is a unity of humanity which preceeds the incarnation. Colautti’s mistake is in thinking that Hilary identifies this unity of humanity with the Church in his early works: he does not, in fact, as we have seen, make this identification until later. While Colautti argues that Hilary’s understanding of the Church preceded and inspired his understanding of the incarnation as Christ’s assumption of all humanity, Colautti’s textual support for the “privileged” theme of Hilary’s ecclesiology—that is, the Church as the body of Christ—nearly all come from the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. 29 If Colautti is correct, as I believe he is, that Hilary’s primary

---

28 Colautti argues that for Hilary, the Church, existing as the unity of humanity and the body of Christ, is one of the first designs of the Father. To fulfill this design Christ both mediates in creation and assumes all of humanity in the incarnation. This identification of all humanity with the Church is not actually founded in the incarnation according to Colautti, rather it is founded even before creation, is present in creation through Christ, in the unity of all in Adam’s sin, and in the history of Israel. This identification of humanity with the Church is not made fully manifest until the incarnation and does not reach its perfection until the resurrection and the final glorification (Colautti, *Figuras Eclesiológicas*, 267).

29 See Colautti, *Las Figuras Eclesiológicas*, 213, where he says that the conception of the Church as the body of Christ is the point of convergence for all Hilary’s ideas and ecclesiological figures. It is worth noticing that in his chapter on this “privileged” image (*Figuras Eclesiológicas*, 213-259), Colautti has very little to say about the *In Matthaeum*: Hilary’s ecclesiology does not find its central image until the *Tractatus super Psalmos*. The *In Matthaeum* displays Hilary’s awareness of the unity of humanity and the assumption of all humanity in the incarnation, but, while Hilary may use other ecclesiological images, in
image for understanding the Church is the body of Christ, he cannot then be correct that
Hilary’s full understanding of the Church precedes his perception of the incarnation as
Christ’s assumption of all humanity.

THE YOUNGER SUPPLANTS THE ELDER IN THE TRACTATUS SUPER PSALMOS:
THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE CHURCH

Hilary’s understanding of the Church in the In Matthaeum was conditioned by his
historical understanding of salvation in which the age of the Church succeeds the age of
the Jews. Hilary’s images of the Church in the In Matthaeum invariably supported the
dialectic of synagogue vs. Church, Law vs. faith, Jews vs. gentiles, etc. While Hilary’s
vision of salvation becomes wider and more eschatological in the Tractatus super
Psalmos, he continues in his belief of historical stages in God’s plan of salvation.
However, he has an entirely new set of images to convey the dialectic of Jews vs.
gentiles and his end is to show the universality of the offer of salvation in this new age of
the Church.

While Hilary uses the image of the younger supplanting the elder in both the In
Matthaeum and the Tractatus super Psalmos he uses it for different purposes in these two
commentaries. The image of the younger supporting the elder is an image from anti-
Jewish polemic and in the In Matthaeum, Hilary uses this image to support his own anti-
Jewish argument. However, in the Tractatus super Psalmos, Hilary repurposes this
image to show the move from Jewish particularism to universality.

the In Matthaeum he has yet to solidly identify the unity of all humanity with the Church through the
medium of Christ’s body.
In order to show the universality of salvation and of the Church, Hilary is quite fond of using the image of the younger who supplants the elder to designate the election of the Church in the *Tractatus super Psalmodis*. Salvation no longer depends on Jewish lineage but on the lineage of Christ (which everyone now has as a result of the incarnation), and participation in Christ on earth, namely the Church. In his commentary on the verse “Ephrem is the strength of my head,” Hilary changes the word “strength” (*fortitudo*) to “assumption” (*adsumptio*).

The holy one is the head of the whole body of Christ, therefore the “assumption of his head is Ephrem” because against the order of generation, in Ephrem being put before manassah, the younger is placed before the elder to present the sanctification of the Church. Therefore, Ephrem is the assumption of his head, that is, in Ephrem, Scripture prefigurs the people, or rather the Church that is assumed in the body.

Hilary still uses this verse to show that the preference of the younger, Ephrem, over the older, Manassah, is a prefigurement of the preference of the Church over the Jews. But his change of the word *fortitudo* to *adsumptio* allows him now to tie this preference of the Church into the incarnation. The “Church” is not simply the body of people who believe in Christ, but rather the “Church” here signifies the people who were *assumed* into Christ’s body in the incarnation.

---

30 Hilary also uses this theme of the younger supplanting the elder as a guide for a typological interpretation of Old Testament events based upon the distinction between law and truth. See *Tr. ps. 118 Zade 7-8.*

31 In *Tr. ps. 59.6 (CCL 61 187.4-5)*, Hilary quotes the verse as *Ephraem fortitudo capitis mei*…. When he proceeds to comment on the verse in 59.9 (CCL 61 188.1), he says “Ephraem autem adsumptio capitis eius….”

32 *Tr. ps. 59.9 (CCL 61 188.8-189.14)* : …omnis sanctus caput est corporis Christi, idcirco adsumptio capitis eius Ephrem est, quia contra generationum ordinem ad praeferendam ecclesiae sanctificationem in praelato Ephrem et postposito Manasse minor maiori est antelatus. Adsumptio itaque capitis sui est Ephrem, id est populi quem in Ephrem praefiguravit, uel potius ecclesia in corpus adsumitur.

33 Hilary’s interpretation of *santo suo* in *Tr. ps. 59.6 (CCL 61 186.2-187.11)* also introduces the incarnation as means of demonstrating the preference of the younger to the elder.
Hilary paradoxically uses this theme of the preference of the younger over the elder to highlight the universality of the Church. Hilary especially dwells on the figure of Jacob, as the archetype of the younger who receives the inheritance of the elder.

The name of God is sweet, not only to one people, itself irreligious, but now to all peoples and tongues. For [God] chose for himself Jacob, who supplants his elder brother, buys the primogeniture with food and the desperation of venal person, seizes the benediction…and, after his struggle, sees God and is named Israel. For first he was Jacob and then Israel. Let us think of the body of the Church, which holds in itself, through a difference in faith, both Jacob and Israel. And this gathering supplants the people of the law by faith, receives its primogeniture and steals its benediction…

The Church is the younger brother who takes the inheritance from his elder brother, the Jews. But as we can see by the way Hilary began this passage, this supercessionism is not intended to limit the inheritance to the Church, but rather, it opens the inheritance to all those who are part of the Church, that is, in potential at least, to every single person. Every person, taken into the body of Christ at the incarnation, can, through faith, remain in this body and receive the inheritance and the benediction of the firstborn. For the Church, though the younger in relation to the Jews, is the firstborn in Christ because it lives by faith instead of by observance of the Law.

The image of the supplanting younger brother is, like all of Hilary’s images for the Church, primarily an eschatological vision. Like Jerusalem, the younger brother Jacob, renamed Israel, is made to be the place of our eternal hope.

The will of God is peculiarly in Jacob and Israel: not in that Israel nor in that Jacob who bear this name in a bodily sense, as a kind of consolation for their noble descendents, but that Jacob who supplanted the elder, who bought the primogeniture with his hope of

---

34 Tr. ps. 134.6 (CCL 61B 146.6-15): Dei nomen suave est, non uni tantum genti atque ipsi inreligiosae, sed omnibus iam gentibus atqui linguas. Iacob enim sibi elegit maiorem natu supplantatem, ementem primitias cibo et desperatione uenalis, abripientem benedictionem...deinde post luctam deum uidentem et Israhel nuncupatum. Ante enim Iacob est et sic Israhel. Circumsipiamus ecclesiae corpus, quae in se per differentiam fidei et Iacob et Israhel habet. Et hic coetus populum legis fide supplantat, primitias eius accipit, benedictionem eius diripit....
eternity, whose name is Israel on account of his seeing God, who himself is Jerusalem and the city of peace…

Jacob is only truly Israel, and younger can only supplant the elder, if his hope is eternal. The Jews sought to be “Jacob” according to a lineage that was physical to the exclusion of eschatological. The Church does not lack physical lineage: it is truly Jacob according to physical lineage in Christ. However, the Church’s lineage in Christ, while physically Jacob, is also eschatologically Jacob, for Jacob succeeded his brother on account of his “hope of eternity,” and he himself sees God and, as Israel, is “Jerusalem and the city of peace”: this Jacob/Israel is Christ himself and so the Church. Jacob’s eternal hope, then, is the hope of existing eschatologically in Christ.

The Church as Jacob is both a Church in history and a Church whose foundation and end is outside of history. The historic understanding of the Church found in the In Matthaeum, is expanded in the Tractatus super Psalmos where Hilary, in placing the foundation of ecclesiology in the body of Christ, presents a consistent christocentric and eschatological ecclesiology.

THE CREATION OF EVE AS PREFIGUREMENT OF THE CHURCH IN THE TRACTATUS MYSTERIORUM AND THE TRACTATUS SUPER PSALMOS

While, in the Tractatus super Psalmos, Hilary’s references to the Church are brief and scattered amongst various commentaries, in the Tractatus mysteriorum, written

35 Tr. ps. 147.7 (CCL 61B 295.8-296.13): Peculiaris haec in Iacob et Israhel dei uoluntas est: non in eum Israhel neque in eum Iacob, qui hoc corporis nomen ad solatum ueluti generosae in se stirpis amplectitur, sed eum Iacob, qui subplantauit priorem, qui primogenita spe aeternitatis emit, cui Israhel Deum uidendo cognomen est, qui ipse Hierusalem et pacis est ciuitas….

36 For Hilary’s eschatological use of Israel as the image of the Church, see also Tr. ps. 134.21 (CCL 61B 156.16-20): Hic est Israel, cui terrae beatae huius contingent hereditas, cui conglorificati in Domino terreni corporis sui erit aeterna possessio. Hoc Christianis est proprium, qui hoc in se nomen incolume per caelestis imaginem usque ad finem retinerint.
around the same time as the *Tractatus super Psalms*, Hilary has a small section
dedicated to the Church. It will be useful for us to look at this section before we proceed
to a study of Hilary’s ecclesiology in the *Tractatus super Psalms*. In the *Tractatus
mysteriorum* Hilary reads the Genesis creation of Eve as a prefiguration of the Church.

> For when the Lord, who made male and female, said that she was of bone of his
> [Adam’s] bones and flesh of his flesh, the Lord himself announced through Adam that
> which was to be wholly accomplished in Adam….for since the Word was made flesh, the
> Church also was a member of Christ…. Hilary ties the creation of Eve to the birth of the Church. Eve’s birth from the rib of
> Adam is a type of the Church’s birth from the body of Christ. As Hilary draws out the
> prophetic and figurative nature of Eve’s creation, he demonstrates a tension that we have
> already seen in his thought. Humanity’s existence in the body of Christ, that is, the
> Church, is both a present and an eschatological reality. As a present reality, the Church
> depends upon the incarnation, as we see in this passage; as a future reality, it depends
> upon the resurrection.

For this reason, Hilary also speaks of the creation of Eve as a type of the
resurrection: Adam’s sleep is a prefiguration of Christ’s three days in the tomb and the
manner of Eve’s creation prefigures the manner of our resurrection.

---

37 The standard view for the dating of the *Tractatus mysteriorum* is to place its composition in the last few
years of Hilary’s life contemporaneous with the completion of the *Tr. ps. :* 364-367 AD. Brisson and Feder
see in the fuller passages at Psalms 138.4 and 146.12, which deal with “sufferings of the patriarchs and
Moses” and “the flight of the raven,” references back to the *Tr. mys.* They thus believe that Hilary
composed the *Tr. mys.* between his commentaries on Psalms 138 and 141 (see S. Hilarit Episcopi
Pictaviensis Opera Pars IV, ed. Alfred Feder, CSEL 65, [Vienna: F. Tempsky, 1916], xiv; Hilaire de
Éditions du Cerf, 1967], 13, no. 2). See the summary of scholarship in Burns, “Hilary of Poitiers’
*Tractatus,*” 5-6.

38 Surprisingly, Cyprian, known for his ecclesiology, never uses Eve as a figure for the Church. Cyprian’s
view of Eve is rather low: she is, for him, representative not of the Church but of meddlinng and destructive
women (see Michael Fahey, *Cyprian and the Bible: A Study in Third-Century Exegesis* [Tübingen: J. C. B.
Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1971], 559).

39 *Tr. mys.* 1.3 (SC 19 p. 78): Cum enim haec Dominus, qui fecit masculum et feminam, dixerit, quod ex
os ossis eius os et ex carne ipsius caro (est), locutus ipse per Adam id, quod totum in ipso Adam erat
factum….Cum enim uerbum factum sit caro et ecclesia membrum sit Christi…. 
For in this [the sleep of Adam and the creation of Eve] the faith and the order of the resurrection of the body are contained. Indeed in the creation of the woman dust is not taken hold of, nor is earth formed, nor is an inanimate material aroused into a living soul by the inspiration of God, but the flesh is added to the bone and the perfection of the body is given to the flesh and spiritual vigor follows upon the perfection of the body. This is the order of resurrection....

While Adam’s creation demonstrates the creation of humanity, Eve’s creation manifests the resurrection of humanity. Eve, unlike Adam, is not created from dust, rather her creation builds upon a previous creation, in the same way that the resurrection of believers builds upon the creation of the Church. When Adam awakes, he recognizes Eve as “bone of his bones.” In the same way, Hilary says that when Christ, the heavenly Adam, wakes from the sleep of his passion, he recognizes the Church of resurrected believers as bone of his bones. Eve, then, is a prefiguration of the eschatological, risen, Church.

In the Tractatus super Psalmos, Hilary twice, in Tr. ps. 52.16 and 138.29, makes the same use of Adam’s words concerning the creation of Eve in Genesis 2—“bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh”—as he did in the Tractatus Mysteriorum to refer to the

---

40 Tr. mys. 1.5 (SC 19, p. 82)...in eo enim corporeae resurrectionis fides et ratio continetur. Namque in creatione mulieris non iam limus adprehenditur neque terra in formam describitur neque Dei inspiratione in animam uiuentem materies inanimis commouetur, sed ossi caro adrescitet et carni perfectio corporis datur et perfectionem corporis uigor spiritualis insequitur. Hunc resurrectionis ordinem.... See also Jean Doignon, “Deux approches de la résurrection.” Doignon emphasizes that for Hilary the creation of Eve from the bone of Adam is viewed much more as a work of resurrection than as a work of creation (ibid., 6). In this, Doignon believes Hilary follows Tertullian. See also the explanation of de Margerie, Latin Fathers, 71-73.

41 Tr. mys. 1.5 (SC 19 84): Agnoscit ergo post somnum passionis suae caelestis Adam resurgens (de) ecclesia suum os, suam carnem non iam ex limo creatam neque ex inspiracione ugetatam, sed adrescentem ossi et in corpus ex corpora spiritu aduolante perfectam. Tertullian uses a similar image in De anima 43 (CCL 2 847.62-65): Si enim adam de christo figuram dabat, somnus adae mors erat christi dormituri in mortem, ut de iniuria perinde lateris eius uera mater uiuentium figuraretur ecclesia. Tertullian and Hilary’s contemporaries such as Zeno of Verona and Gregory of Elvira, focus on the image of Christ’s wounded side, and the blood and water that flow out of it, as the source of the Church. See Zeno, Tractatus 1.3.10.19-20 (ed. B. Löfstedt, CCL 22 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1971], 28.157-29.175); Gregory of Elvira, Tractatus Origenis 15.13 [CCL 69 115]). Hilary, by contrast makes little of this image. Furthermore, Figura argues that while Hilary follows the traditional line of interpretation that viewed Eve’s creation from Adam’s side as a figure of the Church, he adds a new eschatological element in viewing Eve’s creation as a figure of the Church of the resurrection (Figura, Das Kirchenverständnis des Hilarius, 121).
creation of the Church. In *Tr. ps.* 138.29, Hilary comments on the verse “my bone, which you made in secret, was not hidden from you,” saying:

Both prophetic and apostolic authority attest that the bone of Christ is the Church. For while the apostle treats Adam and Eve according to those things which are said in Genesis, he says, “Now this is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh,” and to expand this saying he has added, “This is a great mystery, but I speak of Christ and the Church.”

Here, as in *Tr. ps.* 52.16, Hilary connects “bone of my bones” with Paul’s commentary in Ephesians 5:32 that these things refer to the mystery of Christ and the Church. Hilary made the same connection in the *Tractatus Mysteriorum*. From these three references, it seems that Hilary’s manuscript of Ephesians has Gen. 2:23 (this is bone of my bones...), rather than the usual Gen. 2:24 (therefore a man leaves his father and mother and clings to his wife, and they become one flesh) as the Old Testament verse that Paul proclaims “the mystery of Christ and the Church.”

---

42 *Tr. ps.* 138.29 (CCL 61B 208.3-4): *Non est occultatum os meum a te, quae fecisti in occulto.*

43 *Tr. ps.* 138.29 (CCL 61B 208.4-209.9): Os Christi ecclesiam esse et prophetica et apostolica auctoritas est. Nam cum secundum ea, quae in Genesi dicta sunt, de Adam atque Eua apostolus tractaret, ita ait: *hoc nunc os de ossibus meis et caro de carne mea* ad expositione dicti huius adiecit dicens: *Hoc mysterium magnum est, ego autem dico in Chirsto et in ecclesia.*

44 In *Tr. mys.* 1.3 (SC 19, 77-78) Hilary cites the entire verse of Gen. 2:23 as the subject of Paul’s comment: “Hoc nunc os de ossibus meis et caro de carne mea, haec uocabitur mulier, quia de uiro suo sumpta est, et erunt duo in carne una.” Hic nihil mihi laboris est; apostolus enim, cum huius ipsius prophetiae meminisset, ait: “Hoc mysterium magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et in ecclesia.”

45 In the five times Hilary cites Eph. 5:30-32 in his corpus (In Matt. 19.2, 22.3, *Tr. mys.* 1.3, and *Tr. ps.* 52.16 and 138.29) he never shows any knowledge of Gen. 2:24 being a part of this passage. Either Hilary’s theology, focused on the Church as the physical body of Christ leads him to pass over Ephesians’ quotation of Gen. 2:24, or his version of Scripture, lacking Gen. 2:24, is one of the factors leading him to such a strong assertion of the bodily connection between Christ and the Church. Several Old Latin manuscripts add “os de ossibus eius et caro de carnis eius” to the end of Eph. 5:30. In addition several manuscripts for Eph. 5:31 have only “et erunt duo in carne una.” Hilary’s manuscript could conceivably have run: “...os de ossibus eius et caro de carnis eius; et erunt duo in carne una. *Hoc mysterium magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et in ecclesia.*” However, Hilary never quotes even the shortened version of Eph. 5:31, (namely Gen. 2:24: “et erunt duo in carne una”), in his discussions of Eph. 5:30-32. I judge it more likely, therefore, that Hilary’s manuscript of Ephesians does not contain Paul’s quotation of Gen. 2:24, and his emphasis on the Church as the body of Christ in part derives from his reading of this passage. Tertullian, on the contrary, has Gen.2:24 as the citation in Ephesians. See, for example, Tertullian, *Aduersus Marcionem* 3.5.4 (CCL 1 513.2-514.5): “...et suggerens Ephesius quod in primordio de homine praedicatum est relicuuro patrem et matrem et futurus duobus in unam carnem, id se in Christum et ecclesiam agnoscre. See also Tertullian, *De monogamia* 5.7 (ed. E. Dekkers, in *Tertulliani Opera, pars 2: Opera Montanistica*, CCL 2 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1954], 1235.44-52), where the mystery of Christ and the Church is that of marital monogamy.
have motivated his understanding both of the Church as body of Christ and of humanity’s integration into Christ as an integration into his body. For Hilary, following his version of Paul’s letter to the Ephesians, the mystery of Christ and the Church is the physical, bodily connection between the two: the Church is bone of Christ’s bones.

THE CHURCH AS BODY OF CHRIST IN THE TRACTATUS SUPER PSALMOS

Paul’s influence on Hilary’s ecclesiology is also found in Hilary’s use of Paul’s teaching on the Church as the body of Christ.\(^{46}\) The image of the Church as the body of Christ, because it finds its origin in Pauline thought, is omnipresent in Patristic thought.\(^{47}\) However, Hilary’s use of this image is different from the common use. For example, Tertullian believes that the Church is metaphorically the body of Christ:

But wherever [the apostle] says that the Church is the body of Christ—as here he declares that he fills up in his flesh what is lacking of the afflictions of Christ for the sake of his body, which is the Church (Col. 1.24)—he is not, therefore, in every passage, transferring the naming of the body away from the substance of the flesh. For he says above that we are reconciled in his body through his death(Col. 1.22), namely, in that body in which he was able to die; that is, he was dead as regards the flesh and not as regards the Church: clearly [he died] for the sake of the Church by exchanging body for body, fleshly for spiritual.\(^{48}\)

\(^{46}\) See, for example, *Tr. ps.* 68.7, 118 Nun 4,124.3, 125.6, and 128.9. See also Orazzo’s list (*La Salvezza*, 97).


\(^{48}\) Tertullian, *Aduersus Marcionem*. 5.19.6 (CCL 1 722.18-3): Sicubi autem et ecclesiam corpus christi dicit esse - ut hic ait adimplere se reliqua pressurarum christi in carne pro corpore eius, quod est ecclesia -, non propertea et in totum mentionem corporis transferens a substantia carnis. Nam et supra reconciliari nos ait in corpore eius per mortem, utique in eo corpore, in quo mortui potuit, per carnem mortuus et non per ecclesiam, plane propter ecclesiam corpus commutando pro corpore, carnale pro spirituali.
Tertullian here shows the difference between two uses of the word “body” in Scripture. The first use is tied to the physical substance of flesh and the second is not. Tertullian argues that Paul’s declaration of the Church as the body of Christ is an example of the second use of term “body” because it does not depend on the physical substance of the flesh. The “body” of the Church is not a fleshly body that consists of arms, legs, and innards.

However, the distinction between physical and non-physical referents is not so clear for Hilary as it is for Tertullian. While, when you look at the Church, you do not see arms, legs, and innards, Hilary insists that there still is a connection between Christ and the Church that is tied to the physical substance of the flesh of Christ. Hilary agrees with Tertullian that Scripture speaks about the body in different ways. Sometimes the body of Christ is the physical body in which Christ was born, suffered, died, and rose from the dead. However, when Scripture speaks about the body of Christ in other ways, it does not necessarily, as Tertullian said, offer a connection that excludes the true substance of Christ’s flesh. These uses of the body are not, according to Hilary merely spiritual or metaphorical. The body of Christ, is not, in its most basic sense the Church. Yet the Church is this body in a way that is both spiritual and, in a mysterious fashion, physical.

As we saw in Chapter 5 with reference to heaven, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, the Church as body of Christ becomes the premier dwelling place of God, the place of the temporal and eternal relationship of God and humanity. Hilary speaks often of dwelling places using the image of the house or the city. The importance of the image is that the dwelling place is the place where God and man meet: it is the physical place of their
relationship. God dwells in heaven, but he also dwells in Jerusalem, in Mt. Zion, in the Church, and in the saints. The incarnation unites all these places and images into one: the body of Christ. The body of Christ is the perfect dwelling place of the Father. Christ’s body is also, because of the assumption of all humanity, the dwelling place of humanity. The body of Christ is the new tabernacle, the new temple, the new Mt. Zion and the new heaven because it is the true and perfect meeting place of God and man. While Hilary continues to use all these images—especially as, in his Tractatus super Psalmos, they are often the scriptural impetus for his commentary—the body of Christ becomes the privileged image of the place of God’s dwelling and meeting with man and, as such, is the Church. The Church is God’s dwelling place on account of its physical connection (and identification) with the body of Christ.

The image of the Church as the body of Christ is the image of the Church found most often in the Tractatus super Psalmos, and Hilary uses it to tie his ecclesiology into his soteriology and eschatology. The centrality of the body—the physical body of Christ, which, both as the Church and as our eschatological home, contains all humanity—is the defining feature of these three aspects of Hilary’s thought. Hilary’s comment on the

---

49 Compare with Chromatius who says that the Church is properly called the city of Christ: …ecclesiam suam, quae proprie Christi ciuitas nuncupatur (Tractatus in Matthaeum 43.7 [CCL 9A 409.131]).
50 For God dwelling in Christ as in heaven, see Tr. ps. 122.3.
51 Orazzo (Salvezza in Ilario, 95) argues that Hilary’s extended conception of body derives from Origen. Origen’s ontology says true being is being that has reached its end/goal, thus the Church, and not Christ’s individual body, is the true body of Christ because the Church is a more perfect realization of the goal of salvation of humanity. Orazzo is incorrect in deriving Hilary’s extended conception of the body from Origen: as we have shown, Hilary manifested this teaching in the pre-exilic In Matthaeum. However, Origen’s ontology may have been a factor leading Hilary to connect Christ’s body to the Church more consistently in his post-exilic works.
52 See Tr. ps. 52.18 (CCL 61 126.13-15): Haec caro [Christi] et Sion et Hierusalem est, ciuitas nobis pacis et speculatorium nostrum. Hinc salutaris, hinc Iesus. See also Tr. ps. 13.4, 64.2.
psalm verse, “When the Lord prevented the captivity of Zion, we were like people consoled,” declares that the true Zion is the Church.\textsuperscript{53}

\[\text{Tr. ps. 125.6 (CCL 61B 61.17-18): } In auertendo Dominum captiuitatem Sion facti sumus sicut consolati.\]

...[God] is renewing us into new life and transforming us into a new man, constituting us in the body of his flesh. For he himself is the Church, containing all things in himself through the sacrament of his body. For it was not Zion before it was liberated; but this, which has been liberated, is Zion.\textsuperscript{54}

The Zion that is liberated by the Lord is not the city of the Jews but the Church, for liberation depends exclusively upon the body of the Lord. Christ is the Church because he contains it in his body, and it is only in his body that we are renewed into new life and transformed. In this passage Hilary uses the Scripture prompt of Zion to speak about the Church—as the sacrament of Christ’s body—and soteriology and eschatology—as the process of incorporation into Christ that renews and transforms us.

Zion is a scriptural prompt that nearly always leads Hilary to discussions of Christ and eschatology.

It is clear that the apostle indicates that Christ is the foundation, through which that blessed Church of the Lord’s body, whose foundation is Christ, is indicated by “mountain”….Therefore, we accept that the “mountain” in Daniel (Dan. 2.34-35) is the Lord, [moving] from mountain into stone and back from stone into mountain….because of the infirmity of the flesh he was emptied from mountain into stone; because of the glory of the passion he was made a mountain out of stone: the supereminent and lofty mountain, in whom we see ourselves through the assumption of our flesh and body.\textsuperscript{55}

\[\text{Tr. ps. 125.6 (CCL 61B 62.23-26): } \ldots\text{nos in uitam nouam renouans et in nouum hominem transformans, constituens nos in corpore carnis suae. Ipse est enim ecclesia, per sacramentum corporis sui in se uniuersam eam continens. Non erat Sion ante, quam liberaretur; sed Sion est, quae liberata est.}\]

\[\text{Compare with Gregory of Elvira, Tractatus Origenis 20.12 (CCL 69 144.87): } \ldots\text{ipse est corpus integrum totius ecclesiae}\]

\[\text{Tr. ps. 124.3 (CCL 61B 52.12-15, 20-21, 52.25-53.28): } \ldots\text{et non ambiguus est apostolum fundamentum Christum significasse, per quod beata illa dominici corporis ecclesia, cuius fundamentum est Christus, significari uidetur in monte. Sic ergo montem Dominum in Daniele accipimus, ex monte in lapidem et rursum ex lapide in montem, propter infirmitatem carnis et monte in lapidem exinanitum, propter gloriam passionis ex lapide rursum effectus in montem, mons supereminens et excelsus, in quo ipsi nosmetipsos per adsumptionem carnis nostrae corporisque specularumur.}\]
Christ, in the form of God, is the mountain; emptying himself into the form of the slave he becomes merely a stone. Yet this stone is the foundation of the “blessed Church of the Lord’s body.” Through his passion and resurrection, Christ becomes once again the form of God and so once again the mountain. Only now, because of the assumption of the flesh, the mountain is our eschatological hope, the place in which “we see ourselves,” our eternal dwelling. Through the equation of the mountain with both Christ and the Church, Hilary’s explanation here includes his incarnational doctrine of Christ’s assumption of all humanity, our eschatological hope in Christ’s body, and our present existence in the Church of Christ’s body.

The Church, like the body of Christ, is a reality that came into being in time but is destined for the age beyond all time. Since Christ is the foundation stone of the Church, those in the body of Christ likewise become living stones for the building of the Church.

For we are built, according to blessed Paul, upon the foundation of the prophets and apostles, in whom the testimonies of God have been founded unto eternity, where that heavenly and royal holy city of Jerusalem is built. This city is the house of the multitude of angels and of the first-fruits of the elect, and its foundations are living stones and precious gems, living, rising, and reigning in Christ, who is blessed forever.

We see that Hilary again connects the Church with eschatology. The Church is here the holy city of Jerusalem. The Church is the community of believers, but Hilary lays special emphasis on the believers who are already in heaven: the “multitude of angels” and the

56 Commentary on this passage from Daniel (Dan. 2.34-35) can be found in many Patristic authors. See, for example: Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 3.21.7 (SC 211 420); Cyprian, Ad Quirinum 2.16-18 (ed. R. Weber, in Sancti Episcopi Opera, pars 1, CCL 3 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1972], 51-57); Hippolytus, In Danielem 2.13 (Commentaire sur Daniel, ed. Maurice Lefèvre, Sources chrétiennes 14 [Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1947], 144-146); Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem 3.7.3 (CCL 1 516). See also Ladaria, Cristología de Hilario, 251.

57 Tr. ps. 118 Koph 12 (CCL 61A 185.22-186.28): Aedificamur enim secundum beatum Paulum super fundamentum prophetarum et apostolorum, in quibus testimonia Dei fundata sunt in aeternum, ubi exstructur caelestis illa et regia ciuitas sancta Hierusalem, quae domus angelorum frequentiantium et electorum primituorum est, cuius fundamenta sunt uiui lapides pretiosaeque gemmae in Christo uiuentes, resurgentes, regnantes, qui est benedictus in saecula saeculorum.
“first-fruits of the elect.” While Hilary says elsewhere, following Ephesians 2:19, that “we also are citizens of the company of saints and members of the household of God,” Hilary stresses here that the living stones are those who “live, rise, and reign in Christ.” Just as the incarnation was paving the way for its fruition in the glorification, so the earthly Church is a preparation for the eschatological Church, the heavenly Jerusalem.

The “blessed Church of the Lord’s body” continues temporally what was begun in the incarnation: the assumption and the assimilation of humanity into divine life. As we saw in the previous chapter, our eschatological hope is eternally in the body of Christ. Likewise, Hilary’s image of the Church as the body of Christ shows that our temporal hope is also in Christ’s body.

Hilary’s soteriological vision of incorporation into divine life, including, as it does, life in the temporal Church, is not, as we have seen, automatic. While the incarnation wrought an ontological change in every single human person, this change still needs the growth and transformation that results from personal adherence to Christ and participation in the life of his body the Church. Hilary is clear that it is faith, rather than the incorporation into Christ’s body that all experience as a result of the incarnation, that decides our eschatological fate:

…he shows that in Zion is the dwelling of those who love the name of the Lord, so that the election might be according to piety rather than lineage (genus)….

Faith outside the Church is considered impossible by Hilary. The impious and heretics have separated themselves from the Church and, since the Church is the body of Christ, they have separated themselves from Christ himself. Hilary goes so far as to say that

---

58 _Tr. ps._ 121.2 (CCL 61B 27.10-11): nos quoque ciues sanctorum et domestici Dei sumus.
59 _Tr. ps._ 68.33 (CCL 61 317.3-5) : ...eorum habitationem in Sion esse demonstrat, qui nomen Domini diligant, ut pietatis magis sit, non generis electio….
“Those who are cast out of the body of the Church, which is the body of Christ, just as foreigners and aliens from the body of Christ, are handed over to the domination of the devil.”

The Church has an interesting role in Hilary’s theology: it is, at the same time, exceedingly important and relatively ignored. Membership in the Church, which is membership in the body of Christ, serves both as an extension of the incarnation and as a foretaste of our eschatological hope. Hilary’s understanding of the Church as the midpoint in the progressive incorporation of humanity into Christ, begun in the incarnation and to be completed at the end of time, makes the Church a prominent feature in any discussion of soteriology or eschatology, as we have seen. However, the Church as an actual historical institution occupies little of Hilary’s attention in the Tractatus super Psalmos. There is some discussion of the sacraments—Eucharist and baptism especially—but there is little about Church polity or hierarchy, and unity is a theme that Hilary deals with mystically (we are all in the one body of Christ) rather than practically.

There is a tension inherent in Hilary’s incarnational theology of Christ’s assumption of all humanity. Since the incarnation has already drawn all humanity into Christ’s body, the “when” of individual salvation is unclear. We have already mentioned that Hilary moves from a more automatic view of salvation to one that is gradual and takes place in the Church. Yet there are many places in the Tractatus super Psalmos that

---

60 Tr. ps. 118 Ain 5 (CCL 61A 151.16-18) : Qui enim ab ecclesiae corpore respuuntur, quae Christi est corpus tamquam peregrini et alieni a Dei corpore dominatui diaboli traduntur.

61 See Orazzo’s treatment of the Church as an extension of the incarnation in, Salvezza in Ilario, 77-140.

62 For the Eucharist, see Tr. ps. 64.14, and 135.15. For baptism, see, for example, Tr. ps. 118 Gimel 5, and Samech 6 where Hilary, setting baptism in an eschatological light, insists that even after baptism we await the perfect washing.
speak of our salvation as if it has already happened in Christ’s resurrection. There is also a tension as regards the “where” of individual salvation. The place of salvation is the body of Christ, and the Church is the body of Christ, but there is confusion as to the manner in which the Church is this body. Is the Church Christ’s temporal body—an extension of his earthly body—or is it Christ’s eschatological body—a participant already in our future hope? The assumption of all humanity does not resolve these tensions, rather it forces them. These tensions in fact manifest Hilary’s dependence on the incarnational principle of Christ’s assumption of all humanity as the premise for his soteriology, eschatology, and ecclesiology.

As a result, Hilary’s eschatological focus generally leads him to identify the temporal Church with the supratemporal body of Christ, however, at times he is careful to distinguish the two. For instance, when Hilary speaks of the heavenly Jerusalem as “that to which we ascend through our house of the Church and of gathering,” the heavenly Jerusalem is not identical to the earthly Church, rather it is attained through the Church. As we saw earlier, Hilary speaks of Christ, in the form of God, as a mountain. The Church, in that passage, shows its connection to both the forma dei and the forma serui of Christ. The Church is the mountain, but a mountain founded on Christ’s humble form of a stone. In another place, Hilary distinguishes between the mountain, which is the eschatological or heavenly reality, and the tabernacle, which is the temporal reality. He says: “Therefore, the first and greatest step for those who are ascending to heaven is to dwell in this tabernacle…because from it is access to the mountain…”

---

63 Tr. ps. 133.2 (CCL 61B 140.14-15): ad quam per hanc ecclesiae et conuentus nostri domum scanditur.
64 Tr. ps. 14.4 (CCL 61 83.1-2, 11): Primus itaque et maximus gradus est ad celestia ascendentibus habitare in hoc tabernaculo…quia ex eo in montem esset ascensus….
clearly distinguishing between the mountain and tabernacle: though they both partake in
the body of Christ, nevertheless, because one ascends from one to the other, they are not
identical.

Though present reality is not identical to future reality, Hilary feels the need to
show the unity that exists between these two realities: they are both, he insists, the body
of the one Christ. Hilary’s distinction between the temporal Church and the
eschatological Church serve to show that the one is on the path to the other. This
distinction, while important, must not outweigh understanding the Church—in its
temporal or eschatological form—as the body of Christ. In the previous citation, Hilary
was careful to show that the Church, as tabernacle, is merely the entrance to the
eschatological mountain of Christ. In his commentary on the Psalm verse “mountains
surround it [Jerusalem], and the Lord surrounds his people, now and forever,”65 Hilary,
far from differentiating, rather, identifies the mountain with the Church:

For since we read that the Church, that is the Lord in the body, is signified by
“mountain,” and since we find the mountains of God exulting and rejoicing—for it is
written: the mountains have rejoiced as rams (Ps. 113.4)—how can we understand
mountains as having signified something other than those who, glorious beyond earthly
nature, exult already in the glorious things of God?66

Individuals are capable of being “mountains” once they participate in the eschatological
reality. In so doing they become like the angels whom Hilary describes as mountains in

Tr. ps. 120.4.67 The Church, like its individual believers, is largely seen by Hilary in light

65 Tr. ps. 124.5 (CCL 61B 54.2-4): Montes in circuitu eius, et Dominus in circuitu populi sui ex hoc et
usque in saeculum.
66 Tr. ps. 124.5 (CCL 61B 54.6-11): Cum enim et montem significari ecclesiam, id est Dominum in corpore
legimus, et inueniamus montes Dei exultare atque laetari—scriptum enim est: montes exultauerunt ut
arietes—quomodo possimus montes non eos significatos esse intellegere, qui super terrenam naturam
gloriosi iam in Dei rebus exultant?
67 Tr. ps. 120.4. See also Tr. ps. 118 Sameck 8-9, where Hilary says we become like the angels.
of the future. The Church is defined by its participation in the body of Christ and, through this body, in the life of the Trinity.

Hilary’s eschatological interest in the Church does not make him insensible to the daily demands of living a Christian life. Large parts of the *Tractatus super Psalmos* are dedicated to moral exhortation. Hilary never tires of denouncing long lists of vices and encouraging their opposing virtues.\(^{68}\) Living in the body of Christ is a process of increasing conformity to Christ and the qualities of Christ: “whoever persists in justice, will participate in him [Christ], because he himself is justice; whoever persists in truth, will participate in him, for he himself is truth…”\(^{69}\) However, since virtue is a process of increasing participation in Christ, Christian living in the Church is eschatologically oriented and motivated.

**The Expansion of Hilary’s Christocentric Soteriology to Include the Holy Spirit**

As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, as Hilary progresses through his career, he comes to see salvation (that is humanity’s union with God in the body of Christ) as less automatic and more of a gradual process. Hilary consciously makes room in his physicalist model of redemption for temporal human transformation. The place of this transformation, as we have seen, is the body of Christ, namely the Church. The one who

---

\(^{68}\) See, for example, *Tr. ps.* 118 Mem 13, where Hilary catalogues vices and virtues. For example: Diligamus ergo iustitiam, modestiam, frugalitatem, misericordiam, et oderimus rixas et ebrietates, caedes, superbias, stupra, cum quibus necesse et diabolum oderimus (CCL 61A 126.14-17).

\(^{69}\) *Tr. ps.* 118 Heth 16: (432.12-14): et particeps eius, quisque in iustitia manet, quia ipse iustitia est: particeps eius erit, quisque in veritate persistit, ipse est enim veritas….
brings about this transformation is the Holy Spirit. Hilary dilates the moment of salvation, then, to make room for both the Church and the working of the Holy Spirit.

In the early books of the *De Trinitate*, Hilary gives the Holy Spirit the special role of “gift.”

70 When called upon to defend the existence of the Holy Spirit as one to be believed in with the Father and Son, Hilary argues that we know that the Holy Spirit exists because we receive him: “And indeed I think there should be no discussion of whether [the Holy Spirit] exists. He exists since he is given, accepted, and obtained.”

The Holy Spirit is the gift of the divine to humanity. Because we receive him, we know the Holy Spirit exists, but Hilary does not make significant effort to show the Holy Spirit as an existant distinct from the Father and the Son. He calls the Holy Spirit “this third thing,” but then is unconcerned when Father or Son is also called Holy Spirit. Hilary’s definition of the Holy Spirit as gift shows that his thought concerning the Holy Spirit is largely within the realm of salvation history.

However, Hilary’s concept of the Holy Spirit as gift is also what allows the Holy Spirit to be distinguished from Hilary’s other, and sometimes confusing, uses of the word

---

71 *De Trin*. 2.29 (CCL 62 64.4-6): Et quidem puto an sit non esse tractandum. Est enim, quandoquidem donatur accipitur obtinetur.
72 *De Trin*. 2.30 (CCL 62 65.1-5) : Manere autem hinc quosdam in ignorantia adque ambiguitate existimo, quod hoc tertium, id est quod nominatur Spiritus sanctus, uideant pro Patre et Filio frequenter intelligi. In quo nihil scrupuli est: siue enim pater siue filius et spiritus sanctus est. The term “Holy Spirit” in Hilary’s writings sometimes refers to the Holy Spirit proper and sometimes refers to the Father or the Son (who are both Spirit and holy). Smulders argues that the fact that Hilary uses the one term spiritus to designate different things, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit proper, does not mean that he in fact confuses these things and is binatarian as Loofs, Turmel and Beck say (*Doctrine trinitaire*, 271-273). See also Giamberadini’s discussion of Hilary’s use of spiritus (“De Incarnatione Verbi,” [1947]: 35-56, 37-40).
73 Another example of the Holy Spirit’s role in salvation history is Hilary’s occasional ascription of the words of Scripture to the voice of the Holy Spirit who helps revelation come to all peoples. See *Tr. ps*. 13.5 (CCL 61 79.7-13): Omnibus igitur gentibus reuelatum est et ab omnibus cognitum est. Et rursum in psalmis Spiritus sanctus exclamat: *Cantate Domino canticum nouum, quia mirabilia fecit. Ostendit Dominus salutare suam, in conspectu gentium reuelauit iustitiam suam* (Ps. 97.3) et rursum: *Adnuntiate in gentibus gloriaem eius et in omnibus populis salutare eius* (Ps. 95.3) et rursum: *Ostende nobis, Domine, misericordiam tuam et salutare tuae da nobis* (Ps. 84.8). See also *Tr. ps*. 9.1.
“spiritus.” Hilary uses *spiritus* with three different meanings. First, the term designates the divine nature: God is Spirit, thus both the Father and the Son are called *spiritus.*

Second, it refers to the divine nature in Jesus in contraposition to his human nature (*spiritus* is opposed to *carnis*). Third, *spiritus* is the Holy Spirit as the third person of the Trinity. What makes Hilary’s pneumatology confusing—the different applications of the word *spiritus*—is, according to Ladaria, also what makes it interesting. Ladaria argues that Hilary’s use of the single word *spiritus* to signify these three different realities is his demonstration of the intrinsic relationship that exists between all its distinct significants: Father, Son and Holy Spirit can all, according to Hilary, be called “Holy Spirit” because they are all holy and are all spirit.

---

74 According to Jn. 4:24, God is Spirit. Hilary, using this text from John as his starting point, says God is Spirit four times in the *De Trinitate* and once in the *Tractatus super Psalms.* See *De Trin.* 2.31, 7.14, 7.30, 12.8 and *Tr. ps.* 129.3. *Spiritus* as a synonym for divine substance has a long history in Western theology; see Burns, *Christology in Hilary,* 69-73.

75 The question of whether Hilary has a pneumatic christology continues to be actively debated among scholars. Ladaria presents a good summary of the issue in *Espíritu Santo en san Hilario,* 89-111. Ladaria follows Simonetti’s classification (the basis of his article “Note di cristologica pneumatica”) of the different kinds of pneumatic christology found in the early authors:

1) Spirit is the divine nature of the preexistent Christ.
2) Spirit is the personal name of the preexistent Christ.
3) A confusion between the Holy Spirit and the preexistent Christ centered especially in Luke 1:35. Options 2 and 3 are problematic for Trinitarian theology because they basically lead to binitarianism. Thus, pneumatic christology is sometimes tied to binitarianism (as, Ladaria says, is the case for Lactantius: *Espíritu Santo en san Hilario,* 97). On the other hand, Ladaria brings forth Tertullian as a representative for a theology which demonstrates both the second and third types of pneumatic christology while making clear Trinitarian professions. Although Simonetti argued that some of Hilary’s texts belong to the third category, Ladaria disagrees. Ladaria asserts that in the *In Matt.* when Hilary calls Jesus *spiritus* or even *spiritus sanctus,* Hilary is simply contrasting the spirit and the flesh, or the divine and the human in Christ. Despite Ladaria’s defense, and a clear distinction in *Tr. mys.* between the Son and the Holy Spirit in the incarnation, other passages, such as *De Trin.* 2.24 explicitly define the overshadowing of the Holy Spirit in the incarnation as the overshadowing of the power of the Son. See also the discussion in Burns, *Christology in Hilary,* 70.

76 See *De Trin.* 2.30 (CCL 62 65.1-5) : Manere autem hinc quosdam in ignorantia adque ambiguitate existimo, quod hoc tertium, id est quod nominatur Spiritus sanctus, uideant pro Patre et Filio frequenter intellegi. In quo nihil scrupuli est: siue enim pater siue filius et spiritus sanctus est. See also Ladaria, *Espíritu Santo en san Hilario,* 328: “…debemos concluir que no hay confusión entre las diversas acepciones de la palabra «Spiritus» e incluso «Spiritus sanctus» en san Hilario. Dios es espíritu, el Hijo es espíritu desde toda la eternidad, espíritu y carne desde su encarnación, y es el que otorga a los hombres el don del Espíritu Santo, «tercero» en la Trinidad.”
Hilary’s understanding of *spiritus* as essentially the divine *uirtus* informs his conception of the relationship of the Father and the Son, of the Son’s participation in divinity during his incarnational life, and of the nature of our integration into the divine life. *Spiritus* has all the notions of infinitude, immensity, simplicity, eternity, strength, life, impulse: it is the *uirtus* or nature of God. The Son fully participates in this *spiritus* or *uirtus* from all eternity for he is one nature and one power with the Father. The incarnation is an emptying of the form—that is the state of glory—but not the nature of God, as we discussed in Chapter 3. Having emptied himself and come to live in the humble state of humanity, the *forma serui*, Christ lacks the divine glory. He—that is, essentially his humanity—receives this glory fully only in the resurrection and ascension. In the resurrection, the Son of God gives to his lowly humanity full possession of the divine spirit (*spiritus*) so that Christ, God and man, may be fully glorified and worthy to sit at God’s right hand.

There is a strict correlation between Christ, his spirit, and the gift of the Holy Spirit: when the glory of the resurrected Christ fills the earth, then the Holy Spirit is diffused over all flesh.

---

77 For example, *De Trin.* 7.27 (CCL 62 294.13-15): *Totum in eo quod est unum est, ut quod Spiritus est, et lux et uirtus et uita sit; et quod uita est, et lux et uirtus et Spiritus sit.*


79 For the Son as one nature and one power with the Father, see *De Trin.* 7.18 (CCL 62 279.6-7): *Adque ita in natura eadem est, cui eadem omnia posse naturae sit.* For the Son as participating in the divine *spiritus*, see *De Trin.* 3.4 (CCL 62 75.4-5): *… quia ut Spiritus Pater, ita et Filius Spiritus…*

80 See *Tr. ps.* 68.25 (CCL 61 311.3-8): *In forma enim serui ueniens euacuauit se ex Dei forma. Nam in forma hominis existere manens in Dei forma qui potuit, aboleri autem Dei forma, ut tantum serui esset forma, non potuit. Ipsa enim est et se ex forma Dei inaniensi et formam hominis adsument, quia neque euacuatio illa ex Dei forma naturae caelestis interitus est…*

81 The process of human glorification, including Christ’s divine nature glorifying his human nature (and so all humanity in that human nature) is the topic of Chapter 5. See also Ladaria, *Espíritu Santo en san Hilario*, 327.
… in the same way that all are established in him through his wanting to corporeal, so he himself will again return into all through that element of him that is invisible.\(^{82}\)

The invisible element of Christ is his divine spiritus. The invisible means of the implantation of Christ in the hearts of men is also the work of the Holy Spirit. The gift of the Holy Spirit is the integration of humanity into the divine; it is humanity’s possession of the divine spiritus.\(^{83}\)

The Holy Spirit, then, participates in the unique mediation of the Son.\(^{84}\) Hilary speaks of the Holy Spirit as God’s gift (donum) to humanity. We can also look at Hilary’s understanding of the gift of the Holy Spirit as the other side of Christ’s assumption of all humanity: both these things accomplish the integration of humanity into the divine life. Hilary’s understanding of the effects of Christ’s assumption of all humanity altered somewhat in the course of his life: Hilary came to understand these effects as gradual, allowing the Church a necessary part in the progressive appropriation of the gift offered in the incarnation. The Holy Spirit is a significant actor in Hilary’s progressive model of redemption, for the Holy Spirit is both the gift of the divine spiritus and the gift that makes us more receptive to this spiritus: “…unless the soul of man has

\(^{82}\) De Trin. 2.24 (CCL 62 60.9-12) : … quemadmodum omnes in se per id quod corporeum se esse uoluit conderentur, ita rursus in omnes ipse per id quod eius est inuisibile referretur.

\(^{83}\) See De Trin. 2.35 (CCL 62 71.15-72.3): Munus autem quod in Christo est omne omnibus patet unum. Et quod ubique non deest, in tantum datur, in quantum quis uolet sumere, in tantum residet, in quantum quis uolet promereri. Hoc usque in consummationem saeculi nobis cum, hoc expectationis nostrae solacium, hoc in donorum operationibus futurae spei pignus est, hoc mentium lumen, hic splendor animorum est. Hic ergo Spiritus sanctus expetendum est, promerendus est, et deinceps praeceptorum fide adque observatione retinendus. See also Ladaria, Espíritu Santo en san Hilario, 158.

\(^{84}\) Burns notes that Hilary seems to attribute a fuller role to the Holy Spirit in the Tractatus super Psalmos than he had in his earlier Commentary on Matthew. Burns argues that in the Tractatus super Psalmos, Hilary connects the Holy Spirit to the Word’s inherent ordo and its universal impact. See Burns, “Hilary of Poitiers’ Tractatus,” 57-60.
drunk the gift of the Spirit through faith, although it will have a nature made to understand God, it will not have the light of knowledge.”

**CONCLUSION**

Hilary’s ecclesiology in the *Tractatus super Psalmod* is consistently tied both to his incarnational theology of Christ’s assumption of all humanity and to eschatology. All three of these subjects are centered in the body of Christ. Hilary’s primary understanding of the Church is as the body of Christ. Because the Church is Christ’s body, it is an extension of the incarnation and a reality that, while now existing in time, is destined to be beyond time. The destiny of the Church, like that of the physical body of Christ, is to be glorified and to reign at the right hand of the Father. The Church’s position in time is explained by Hilary with the analogy of the younger son supplanting the elder. The Church has taken the birthright and the election of the Jews. However, Hilary’s supercessionist vision is not exclusionary. One of Hilary’s main critiques of the Jews is that they limit salvation to those of the proper lineage. The Church, on the other hand, as the body of Christ, includes all humanity: all now have the proper lineage if only they will accept it and continue in Christ’s body through faith and the sacraments. Salvation, from its beginning in the incarnation to its end in glorification, is in Christ’s body. The temporal Church is the place for the working out of this salvation for it is the place of deeper integration into Christ’s body. The integration of individuals into the Church of Christ’s body is accomplished by the Holy Spirit, for he, as the divine *spiritus*, is the gift

---

85 *De Trin.* 2.35 (CCL 62 71.11-14): “…animus humanus nisi per fidem donum Spiritus hauserit, habebit quidem naturam Deum intellegendi, sed lumen scientiae non habebit.
of this *spiritus* to us. Since Christ already waits in heaven for the measure of his body to be filled, the Church’s existence is neither fully in this world or the next: its eyes are fixed on its own eschatological fulfillment.
Chapter seven will synthesize Hilary’s soteriological matrix with his Trinitarian theology by showing how, for Hilary, the incarnation is the historic realization of the Word’s eternal role as mediator of the Father.

I will proceed in this chapter, first, with an explanation of Hilary’s idiosyncratic use of the important technical terms in Trinitarian discourse, namely *persona*, *nomen*, and *natura*.

Second, I will note the place of the Holy Spirit in Hilary’s Trinitarian theology.

Third, I will explain Hilary’s understanding of the relationship of the Father and the Son. The Son is the revealer of the Father. Both Hilary’s Trinitarian theology and his soteriology are Patercentric. In the incarnation, the presence of all humanity in Christ’s body initiates a revelation that consists of direct contact between divinity and every person. This contact allows us not only to know God as Father, but to be transformed by this knowledge into sons of the Father.

Discussion of the Trinity is logically prior to discussion of salvation history in as much as the eternal precedes the historical. However, the previous chapters of this dissertation have paved the way for understanding Hilary’s conception of the eternal relationship of the Father and the Son. We have learned in the previous chapters that for Hilary, the body of the incarnate Son of God (which contains all of humanity), is the center of everything that has to do with creation and the dispensation. As we have seen, Hilary is adamant that transformation of the human person happens only in the body of Christ, whether that body is the temporal body of the Church or Christ’s eternal glorified body in which we will exist for all eternity. In summary, our study of Hilary’s soteriology, eschatology, and ecclesiology have shown that Hilary envisions salvation history as an upward movement for humanity, a movement taking place always in the body of Christ, in which humanity comes to participate in divinity. Hilary’s eschatology is precise: at the end, the Son will hand the kingdom over to the Father, that is to say, we
who exist eschatologically in the Son will be taken into the Father, as well, though still and always in the Son. The pinnacle, then, of the upward movement of salvation is the Father, though, as we have seen, the mediatory role of the Son is never bypassed.

The purpose of this chapter is to outline, by no means exhaustively, the general aspects of Hilary’s understanding of the eternal relationship of the Father and the Son and secondly, to show the connection in Hilary’s thought between this eternal relationship and the economic realm of salvation. We will find that Hilary’s model of the relationship of the Father and the Son is essentially that of revelation. As revelation approaches humanity, Hilary firmly holds that divine revelation should lead to human transformation. The incarnation, as the greatest revelation, is also the greatest transformer of humanity.

As we shall see, Hilary believes that Christ’s assumption of all humanity in the incarnation is the means by which Christ reveals God to all and so opens all to transformation.

Hilary has a soteriological system that consistently upholds his Trinitarian theology. This upward movement of salvation, accomplished through Christ, that ends at the Father, is, for Hilary, a reflection of the eternal relationship of the Father and the Son in which the Son is the eternal mediator of the Father.\footnote{For Hilary, all revelation of the Father comes through the Son: we know the Son first, and, through him, the Father second (see De Trin. 2.6 [CCL 62 43.29-31]: Et quia Patrem nemo nouit nisi Filius, de Patre una cum reuelante Filio qui solus testis fidelis est sentiamus.) Albeit in a different context, namely in his argument against Marcion for the unity of Scripture and salvation history, Tertullian argues for a very different “order” (\textit{gradus}) in which the Father always comes before the Son, both in terms of generation and in terms of human recognition: we know the Father before we know the Son. See Tertullian, \textit{Aduersus Marcionem} 3.2.2 (CCL 1 510.13-15): \ldots principlaes gradus non sinit postierius agnosci, patrem post filium et mandatorem post mandatum et Deum post Christum.} Hilary, in both his soteriology and his Trinitarian theology, spills a lot more ink speaking about the mediator, namely the Son, than the mediated, namely, the Father. Yet it is clear that Hilary considers that
all our focus on the middle term of the Son is for the sake of the beginning and the end, namely, the Father. The purpose of the Son is the Father.

The Holy Spirit also participates in the upward movement of salvation that ends in the Father. The Holy Spirit is the divine “gift” who both prepares the way for the Son’s incarnation and spreads its effects. The work of the Holy Spirit is integrated into the revelation and mediation of the Son. Hilary has been criticized of binitarianism because he never uses the term *persona* to speak of the Holy Spirit. We will find, in our discussion of Hilary’s Trinitarian vocabulary, that neither does Hilary use *persona* as titles for the Father and Son. Nevertheless, it is certainly true that Hilary’s Trinitarian theology is largely a treatment of the relationship of the Father and Son.

Hilary’s Trinitarian theology, in both the *De Trinitate* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, can be simplified to contain three points (which we will explain at greater length in the course of the chapter). First, the Son is the same as the Father. Second, the Son is different from the Father. Third, the Son reveals the Father by both his sameness and his difference. (1) Hilary argues that the Father and the Son share the same substance, power, honor and glory. Since the Son is from the Father, he receives what the Father is. (2) However, the names “Father” and “Son” are names that, at the simplest level, point to a difference between the two. “Father” and “Son” define relationship: a Father can only be a Father to his Son; he is not Father, for example, to himself. Likewise, a Son is distinguished from his Father by his begottenness; a Son cannot be his own Son. For Hilary, as we shall see, the names Father and Son “are applied to

---

2 As we will see later, Hilary says that the Son must be confessed to be one *(unum)* with the Father, but not one *(unus)* with the Father. Through his grammatical use of *unus* and *unum*, Hilary shows a consistent awareness of both the sameness and difference of the Father and the Son: *(De Trin. 7.31)* [CCL 62 299.34-35]: …per natiuitatem et generationem uterque potius unum confitendus sit esse, non unus.)
divine things in accordance with the understanding of their nature.”

3 The names “Father” and “Son” applied to God (that is, whom we would term the first person of the Trinity), and God (the second person), truly define something about the nature of each and the relationship of the two. (3) The Son from all eternity thus has a specific role to fulfill: he is the revealer of the Father. Because his temporal work is a fulfillment of his eternal role, Hilary says “the greatest work of the Son was that we might know the Father.”

4 In order to truly reveal the Father, the Son must reveal both his own sameness with the Father and his difference from the Father, for each of these tells us something true about the Father. We will see that Hilary considers the Son’s eternal generation the revelation par excellence of both the Son’s sameness with and difference to the Father because it reveals both his nature and his relationship to the Father.

5 With creation, the Son’s temporal revelation and mediation begins, for now the Son has someone to whom he can reveal the Father. The incarnation is the temporal perfection of the Son’s eternal role of revealer of the Father. For Hilary, the universal effect of the mediation of the incarnation is dependent upon Christ’s assumption of not one man only, but of all humanity. Christ, beginning in the incarnation, integrates us into his body so that the glorification of his humanity is the glorification of all humanity. Christ’s body is the place of salvation, both now, in the Church, and eschatologically, in his glorified body, where we will eternally participate in divine life.

---

3 De Trin. 3.22 (CCL 62 94.18-19): Secundum naturae intelligentiam nomina diuinis rebus aptata sunt.

4 De Trin. 3.22 (CCL 62 93.3-4): Adquin hoc maximum opus Fili fuit, ut Patrem cognosceremus. See also Tr. ps. 137.7 (CCL 61B 185.14-21) : Est autem et nomen aliud deo, quod in evangeliis cognoscimus, Domino dicente: Pater, uenit hora, honorifica Filium tuum, ut Filius honorificet te; et post multa alia sequitur: Manifestauit nomen tuum hominibus. Et quod nomen esset, superius ostendit dicens: Pater, uenit hora, honorifica Filium tuum. Huius ergo nomen adorat, qui et secundum legem Deus Abraham et Deus Isaac et Deus Iacob sit et secundum evangelia unigeniti Dei Pater est.

5 See Smulders’ discussion of the Son’s generation in Doctrine trinitaire, 140-178.
HILARY’S TRINITARIAN VOCABULARY: PERSONA, NOMEN, AND NATURA

In the Adversus Praxeas, Tertullian uses the Latin word *persona* to distinguish between the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. Though Tertullian never actually used the formula commonly credited to him—*unus substantia in tribus personis*—he does use *persona* in the nominative case as a term or title to distinguish between the Father, the Son, and the Spirit.\(^6\) In the narrative of Genesis, he says:

> It is because the Son, a second person (*persona*), his Word himself, was already attached to him—and a third person (*persona*), the Spirit in the Word—that he [the Father] said in the plural “Let us make” and “ours” and “to us.”\(^7\)

Novatian, like Tertullian, uses *persona* for the Father and the Son, though, unlike Tertullian, he does not use it for the Holy Spirit.\(^8\)

While Hilary is certainly aware of this Latin tradition of the technical usage of *persona* within the Trinitarian realm, Hilary does not use use *persona* as a predicative nominative serving as a title for each of the members of the Trinity.\(^9\) In Hilary’s entire

---

\(^6\) There is remarkably little embarrassment about the false attribution of this proto-Chalcedonian formula. For example, Evans says: “*Una substantia in tribus personis*, an expression with which Tertullian is commonly credited, sufficiently represents his position, for though *tres personae* does not seem actually to occurs, it is certainly there by implication” (Ernest Evans, trans., Tertullian’s Treatise Against Praxeas [London: S.P.C.K., 1948], 36).

\(^7\) Tertullian, Adversus Praxeas 12.3 (CCL 2 1173.12-14; Evans 101.29-31): quia iam adhaerebat illi Filius, secunda persona, sermo ipsius, et tertia, Spiritus in sermone, ideo pluraliter pronuntiavit « faciamus » et « nostram » et « nobis ».

\(^8\) In the twenty-four occurrences of any form of the word *persona* in Novatian’s work, not one is in reference to the Holy Spirit. He does, however, clearly use *persona* in a Trinitarian context in the nominative case as a technical term of ontological weight to distinguish between the Father and the Son. For example, see Novatian, De Trin. 27.3-4 (CCL 4 64.11-16): …non unitatem personae sonat. Vnum enim, non ‘unus’ esse dicitur, quoniam nec ad numerum refertur, sed ad societatem alterius expromitur. Denique adicit dicens sumus, non ‘sum’, ut ostenderet per hoc, quod dixit ‘sumus’, et ‘pater’, duas esse personas.

\(^9\) Hilary, we shall see, prefers a prosopological use of *persona*. Tertullian also uses *persona* prosopologically, which is why Rondeau says Hilary’s Trinitarian use of this word is in line with Tertullian (see Rondeau, Commentaires patristiques, vol. 2, Éxégèse prosopologique, 324-326). Likewise, Tertullian’s formula in Adversus Praxeas 25.1 (CCL 2 1195.9; Evans 121.10): Qui tres unum sunt, non
corpus I have been able to find only a single use of *persona* in the nominative case to refer to the Father and the Son: "the Father and the Son are not one in person but one in nature and they are both true God." Hilary does use *persona* in both the *De Trinitate* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos* in a Trinitarian context but he intentionally does not (with the single exception noted above) use *persona* in accordance with the tradition laid in place by Tertullian in which *persona* is a technical term with ontological weight.

However, there are two common uses of *persona* in the *De Trinitate*. The first is the idea of “distinction of persons” by which term Hilary signals whatever is two (or three) in the divine, rather than one (like substance or power). “Person” in this context is always found in the genitive (*personae* or *personarum*) and is paired with words like

---

11 *De Trin.* 5.10 (CCL 62 160.8-9): …Pater et Filius non persona sed natura unus et uerus Deus uterque est. On the one hand, Smulders (*Doctrine trinitaire*, 287-288) argues that Hilary never uses *persona* in the *De Trinitate* to designate the Father and the Son. On the other hand, Lewis Ayres states, “At a number of points in the *De Trinitate* Hilary pairs *natura* and *persona*, but only after book 3” (Lewis Ayres, *Nicea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004], 183). This statement is problematic for a two reasons. First, other than this single example from *De Trin.* 5.10, Ayres is unable to offer any other demonstration of Hilary’s use of *persona*. Second—again apart from this example—Hilary does not pair *natura* and *persona*. Ayres is not the only one to make this mistake. Simonetti, likewise, believes Hilary pairs the two terms (Simonetti, *La Crisi Ariana nel IV secolo*, Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum 11 [Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1975], 300, 305), and Simonetti, working more closely with Hilary’s theology, exemplifies what happens when Hilary’s technical terminology is misunderstood. Simonetti’s misunderstanding of Hilary’s use of *persona*, we shall see, leads him to believe Hilary is essentially a binatarian.

12 In the most recent monograph on Hilary’s Trinitarian theology—Weedman’s *Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*—a cursory look at the index reveals numerous references to “nature” and “name,” but “person” does not even show up on the index. This omission reflects, to some extent, Hilary’s own thought and terminology: the term that reflects the multiple of the divinity as opposed to the singular of the divinity represented by “nature” is, in Hilary’s writings, more likely to be “name” than “person.” However, Weedman seems to have been blinded by Smulders’ assessment of “person” in Hilary’s Trinitarian theology because, while it may not be the parallel term to “nature,” Hilary does have other Trinitarian uses for it.

13 Smulders only recognizes the first of these (*Doctrine trinitaire*, 287-289). Rondeau corrects his mistake (Rondeau, *Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2, *Exégèse prosopologique*, 325).
significatio, distinctio or discretio. For example, in trying to explain why the Son should be given the apparently subordinationist title of “angel of God,” one of his explanations is that “He is called angel of God so that the distinction of persons might be absolutely clear. For he who is God from God, is also an angel/messenger of God.”¹⁴ Whatever distinction exists in the Godhead, is a distinction of persons, not a distinction of substance or kind in the Godhead: “[the Lord] distinguishes the one dwelling in him from he in whom he dwells, nevertheless only by a distinction of persons not of kind.”¹⁵

Hilary’s second, and dominant, use of persona is within a prosopological context.¹⁶ In this use persona is a metaphysical subject who can be an “I” talking to a “you.”¹⁷ In interpreting scripture, Hilary always asks: Who is speaking, to whom is this being spoken, and, about what or whom is this spoken? Questions like these, especially in exegetical works like the Tractatus super Psalms, but also in the De Trinitate, inasmuch as it is centered around scriptural exegesis, highlight the dramatic actors of Scripture. Hilary uses this prosopology to distinguish between the Father and the Son and the Spirit. Indeed attributing Scripture passages to the wrong divine speaker is often

¹⁴ De Trin. 4.23 (CCL 62 126.23-25): Vt personarum distinctio absoluta esset, angelus Dei est nuncupatus. Qui enim est Deus ex Deo, ipse est et angelus Dei.
¹⁵ De Trin 4.40 (CCL 62 145.16-18): …habitantem ab eo in quo habitet discernens, personae tamen tantum distinctione, non generis
¹⁶ Rondeau’s study of the prosopological method in Hilary’s exegesis is a masterful work that lends insight into both historical and doctrinal areas (Commentaires patristiques, vol. 2, Exégèse prosopologique, 35-125, 323-364). For the historical: while use of the prosopological method is commonplace in patristic exegesis, it is for the most part limited in scope and technical proficiency: only Origen and Hilary practice prosopology as a technical science according to the rules of pagan drama (72-74). According to Rondeau, prosopology is one of the greatest proofs of Origenian influence on Hilary. As for the doctrinal, Rondeau highlights the christological clarifications that an understanding of Hilary’s prosopology offers to the reader. Especially important is what we will see later: when Hilary uses the formula ex persona hominis or ex perona domini he is not saying that there are two different “persons” of Christ (the man and the Son) who are speaking but that Christ has two different modes of being in keeping with his two different natures (333-340).
the source of heresies. Hilary’s prosopological use of persona is almost always introduced by the formula “ex persona….”

The first insight that Hilary’s use of persona gives us into his Trinitarian theology regards the place of the Holy Spirit in Hilary’s theology. Beginning with Harnack’s accusations of binitarianism, there have been two consistent difficulties with the place of the Holy Spirit in Hilary’s theology. The first is that Hilary uses spiritus to refer to several different realities, only one of which seems to refer to a distinct hypostasis; the second is that Hilary does not use the word persona to designate the Holy Spirit. As we noted in the previous chapter, several useful studies on Hilary’s use of spiritus have served to help clarify this decidedly difficult aspect of Hilary’s vocabulary and thought. However, the most recent studies have advanced little in understanding the pneumatological significance of Hilary’s use of the word persona. Simonetti concludes that Hilary provides ample evidence of the Holy Spirit’s actions ad extra and so, in this economic sense, can easily be labeled a Trinitarian. However, in the intra-divine

---

18 See, for example, De Trin. 5.32 concerning the words of Isaiah 65.1-2 (CCL 62 184.1-8): Haec si stultitia adque inpietas heretica ad fallendum ignorantes simpliciores que dicta esse ex persona Dei Patris mentietur, ne in Deum Filium dicti huius intellegentia suscipi positi, audiat mendacii sui ab apostolo et doctore gentium reatum, omnia haec ad sacramentum passionis dominicae et evangelicae fidei tempora praedicante, tum cum infidelitatem Israel aduentum Domini in carmem non intellegentis exprobrat.
19 See the discussion in Chapter 6.
20 Friedrich Loofs (“Hilarius,” in Realenzyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, ed. J. J. Herzog, vol. 8 [Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1900], 60) recognizes that Hilary does distinguish the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, but implies that this is an impersonal distinction. His argument is followed by Joseph Turnel (Histoire des dogmes, vol. 2 [Paris: Rieder, 1932], 183): “Hilaire, après l'exil tient le Saint-Esprit pour un don, mais il lui refuse la personnalité.” R. P. C. Hanson likewise argues that Hilary sees the “Spirit as possessing distinct existence from that of the Father and the Son,” though “he tended to see the Spirit as an impersonal influence rather than as God encountered in a personal mode…” (Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 503). In the end, Hanson says, “We cannot precisely call Hilary a Trinitarian theologian…” (ibid., 505).
relations, Simonetti believes that Hilary is more properly termed a binitarian.\textsuperscript{22} The major problem with Hilary’s presentation of the Holy Spirit, according to Simonetti—and the problem that makes Hilary in some sense binitarian—is that he does not describe the Holy Spirit with the term \textit{persona}.\textsuperscript{23}

As we have seen, while Hilary uses the word \textit{persona} in a Trinitarian context, he does not use it in the nominative case as a technical term of ontological weight to distinguish between the Father and the Son.\textsuperscript{24} Hilary distinguishes between Father and Son most characteristically with his use of the words “one,” “two,” and “other,” or “another.” He says that the “two are not one (\textit{unus}), rather the one (\textit{alius}) is in the other (\textit{alius}), because there is not something other (\textit{aliud}) in either of them.”\textsuperscript{25} By far Hilary’s preferred terminology for distinguishing between the Father and the Son is to say that they are one neuter thing, \textit{unum}, but not one masculine thing/person, \textit{unus}. Hilary uses \textit{unus} and \textit{unum} consistently and technically.

Thus in God the Father and God the Son neither will you name together two gods—because the two are one (\textit{unum})—nor will you proclaim a single God—because the two are not one (\textit{unus})... so that on account of the birth and generation, the two must rather be confessed as one (\textit{unum}), not one (\textit{unus}).\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{22} In many respects, Ladaria’s monograph agrees with Simonetti’s conclusion, though Ladaria thinks that this unhappy conclusion can be avoided if we approach Hilary’s teaching concerning the Holy Spirit not from the dogmatic-Trinitarian point of view but from that of salvation history with an eye to the Holy Spirit’s role in it. From here we will find that Hilary has a clear and coherent teaching regarding the Holy Spirit (see Ladaria, \textit{Espíritu Santo en san Hilario}, 24-25).

\textsuperscript{23} Simonetti highlights the problem of Hilary’s failure to use “\textit{persona}” in reference to the Holy Spirit (“Note di Cristologica pneumatica,” \textit{Augustiniaum} 12 (1972): 230).

\textsuperscript{24} Simonetti, however, criticizes Hilary’s failure to use \textit{persona} to speak of the Holy Spirit because he does not recognize that Hilary’s use of \textit{persona}, even for the Father and Son, is limited: “il termine tecnico \textit{persona}, adoperato per il Padre e il Figlio, non è mai applicato allo Spirito santo” (“Note di Cristologica pneumatica,” 229).

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{De Trin.} 3.4 (CCL 62 75.13-14) : Non duo unus, sed alius in alio, quia non aliud in utroque.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{De Trin.} 7.31 (CCL 62 298.21-24, 299.34-35): Ita in Deo Patre et Deo Filio neque duos connominabis deos, quia unum uterque sunt; neque singularem praedicabis, quia uterque non unus es... ut per natuïtatem et generationem uterque potius unum confitendus sit esse, non unus. For other examples of Hilary’s use of the terminology of \textit{unus/unum}, see \textit{De Trin.} 1.17 (CCL 62 17.13-18.19); Sed nos edoci diuinitus neque duos deos praedicare neque solum, hanc evangeliici ac profetici praecornii rationem in confessione Dei Patris et Dei Fili adferemus, ut unum in fide nostra sint uterque non unus, neque eundem utrumque neque
Hilary says, then, that the Father and the Son are “unus et unus” (one and one, that is two different masculine subjects of predication) or “non unus” (that is, not one masculine subject of predication) but he intentionally does not say that they are each a *persona* or together *personae*.

In this context, the fact that Hilary does not use *persona* to refer to the Holy Spirit says absolutely nothing about whether Hilary considers the Holy Spirit a definite, personal being distinct from the Father and the Son. The point is that Hilary’s vocabulary, and his prosopological use of *persona*, in which *persona* is not the counterpoint to substance or nature as it is in both earlier (Tertullian), and later formulations, neither requires or allows *persona* to be the technical qualifier for divine personhood: either of the Father, Son, or Holy Spirit.

The second insight that Hilary’s use of *persona* offers us into his Trinitarian theology is what we have just discovered: for Hilary *persona* is not the paired term, the opposite, so to speak, of *natura* or *substantia*. Part of the difficulty in understanding Hilary’s Trinitarian theology is that his use of technical terminology is not consistent

---

27 See Rondeau, *Les Commentaires patristiques*, vol. 2, *Exégèse prosopologique*, 329: “…il ne trace pas une frontière rigide entre *persona* et *natura*....”
either with the tradition or within his writings. As we have seen, Hilary consciously
distances himself from the technical use of *persona* in the Latin tradition. Furthermore,
Hilary’s use of the term *persona* is even more complicated than what we have just
outlined. *Persona*, as we have said, is generally used prosopologically by Hilary. One
result of this is that *persona* does not mean “person” in our sense (as in a complete
human subject), but only “subject” or “speaker.” Therefore, Christ can speak from two
different *personae: ex persona hominis (assumpti)*\(^{28}\) or *ex persona domini.*\(^{29}\) Hilary is not
saying that there are two complete “persons” in Christ, but that Christ has two modes of
speaking according to his two different natures, divine and human. Ironically, then,
while *persona* rarely means what we would understand as “person,” it can occasionally
signal “nature.”

To make things more complicated, Hilary’s use of *natura* is likewise multivalent
and depends upon his understanding of the relationship between name (*nomen*) and
nature (*natura*). On the one hand, Hilary professes that “the Father and the Son are of
one name and nature in an identical kind of divinity.”\(^{30}\) On the other hand, Hilary
says that “the names [plural] of the nature” are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.\(^{31}\)
Hilary proposes a distinct format for applying names to God in which he shows some
signs of awareness of the different positions and debates concerning name theory. He

---

\(^{28}\) See, for example, *Tr. ps.* 138.5 (CCL 61B 194.2-3): *Omnis enim nunc in exordio ex persona eius hominis, quem adsumpsit, oratio est.…* For *ex persona hominis* see *Tr. ps.* 54.2. For *ex persona formae seruilis*, see *Tr. ps.* 53.4.

\(^{29}\) See, for example, *Tr. ps.* 64.16 (CCL 61 232 10-11): *Dictum enim est ex persona Domini: Spiritus Domini super me.…* For *ex persona Filii* see *Tr. ps.* 1.1.

\(^{30}\) *De Trin.* 7.8 (CCL 62 267.6-268.8): *unius nominis adque naturae in indissimilis genere diiunitatis Patrem et Filium esse.* See also *De Trin.* 5.20 (CCL 62 171.17-19): *Aut quae in utroque naturae diversitas est, ubi eiusdem naturae unum adque idem nomen est?*

\(^{31}\) *De Trin.* 2.5 (CCL 62 41.10-13): *…et editis prout in urchis habelimus dignitate adque officio Patris Fili Spiritus sancti, non frustrentur naturae proprietatibus nomina, sed intra naturae significationem nominibus coartentur.*
seems to support a naturalist name theory with statements such as: “The name expresses the nature”\textsuperscript{32} or the “name designates nature.”\textsuperscript{33} Hilary believes that there is a correspondence between names and the natures designated by these names.\textsuperscript{34} He argues against the conventionalist position that believes names have no tie to nature other than conventional imposition. The conventional position robs us, in Hilary’s mind, of our very basis for understanding and belief: “If I do not believe names, if I do not understand the nature from the words, I ask what ought to be believed or understood? There is no other indication left to me.”\textsuperscript{35} Hilary is particularly interested in defending, as we have said, the names “Father” and “Son.” If the sonship of the Son is the result of adoption and not nature, then, Hilary says, the names Father and Son “are useless,” and we accept “Christ as God from name but not from nature.”\textsuperscript{36} A belief that the names Father and Son are conventional makes these names “pretenses,” and “things spoken rather than proper.”\textsuperscript{37} Throughout the De Trinitate Hilary maps out how eternal generation is the only way to preserve the reality—that is, the natural, rather than conventional, connection—between the names and the nature of the Father and the Son.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{32} De Trin. 6.44 (CCL 62 249.10-12): Nomen naturam loquitur, ueritatem proprietatis enuntiat, fidem confessio testatur.
\textsuperscript{33} De Trin. 7.9 (CCL 62 268.6): Aut numquid nomen non naturae significatio est? Et quia contradictio omnis ex causa est, nunc hic negandi Dei quaero causam.
\textsuperscript{34} See De Trin. 2.5 (CCL 62 41.11-13): non frustrentur naturae proprietatibus nomina, sed intra naturae significationem nominibus coartentur.
\textsuperscript{35} De Trin. 6.25 (CCL 62 226.28-30): Si non credo nominibus, si naturam uocabulis non intellego, quid credendum et intellegendum sit quaeo. Non mihi relinquitur alia suspicio.
\textsuperscript{36} De Trin. 8.3 (CCL 62A 315.26-27):… ut Deus Christus ex nomine potius quam ex natura sit. De Trin. 6.31 (CCL 62 228.29-30): Quid infertur hodie calumniar, ut adoptio nominis sit, ut mendax Deus sit, ut nomina inania sint?
\textsuperscript{37} De Trin. 6.42 (CCL 62 247.17-18): Sin uero simulata omnia sunt et potius nuncupata quam propria….
\textsuperscript{38} See Weedman’s chapter on the “Name and Birth of God” for a discussion of the relationship between Hilary’s name theology and his theology of birth and his debt, for both of these categories, to homoiousian theology (Weedman, Trinitarian Theology of Hilary 136-156).
Hilary presents, then, a naturalist naming theory for a very reduced number of names: “Father,” “Son,” “Holy Spirit,” “God,” “unbegotten,” “only-begotten,” “Word,” “Wisdom,” and “Power.” However, neither does Hilary demonstrate knowledge of the details of the ancient language debates, nor does he take this natural theory of names to its logical conclusion, as does Eunomius. For Eunomius, since “names designate essences,” different names, such as Father and Son or unbegotten and begotten, witness to different essences.

During his exile in the East, Hilary was at the Council of Seleucia in 359 where Aetius and Eunomius were present, and Hilary in fact had an exchange with the “Anomoians” at this conference. In addition, Aetius’ work, the Syntagmation, is early enough that Hilary might have encountered it. Hilary certainly encountered a natural

---

39 De Trin. 2.5 (CCL 62 42.26-29): Posuit naturae nomina Patre m Filium Spiritum sanctum.
40 De Trin. 5.24 (CCL 62 176.15-19) : …ut ad salutarem confessionem in Patre Deo et in Filio Deo Deus semper ostensus, naturae uritatem ipso naturae nomine edoceret, cum lex Deum utrumque significans ambiguitatem non relinqueret uritatis.…
41 De Trin. 2.21 (CCL 62 57.12-14) : …confessionem que Patris et Fili, ingeniti et unigeniti, inenarrabilem et excedentem complexum omnem et sermonis et sensus teneamus adque adoremus.…
42 De Trin. 6.39: (CCL 62 244.12-14): Filium enim et unigenitum cognominans, suspicionem paenitus adoptionis execeuit, cum uritatem nominis unigeniti natura praestaret.
43 De Trin. 7.11 (CCL 62 270.2-4): Verbi enim appellation in Dei Filio de sacramento natiuitatis est, sicuti sapientiae et uritutis est nomen.…
44 For example, when A. A. Long assesses Platonic and Stoic theories of name-giving, he distinguishes five basic positions: moderate conventionalism, radical conventionalism, formal naturalism, etymological naturalism, and phonetic naturalism (A.A. Long, “Stoic Linguistics, Plato’s Cratylus, and Augustine’s De dialectica,” in Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age, ed. Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005], 43). Hilary displays none of these in De Trinitate. For Hilary, the name Deus (or Pater or Filius) does not denote the perceptible form of God, nor does its etymological analysis provide insights to God’s ineffable nature, nor does the sound of the name capture the properties of God.
46 Eunomius, Apologia 18 (SC 305 270.17-18): παρηλλαγμένων τῶν ὀνομάτων, παρηλλαγμένας ὀμολογεῖν καὶ τὰς οὐσίας.
47 See Contra Constantium 12-14.
theory of names at work within the Trinitarian controversies, but he seems to be rather unaware of the dangers inherent in this theology despite the examples given to him by the Anomoians. 

Hilary employs the natural theory argument “the name reveals the nature” in a rather simple and naïve way.

---

49 In *De Trin.* 7.17 (CCL 62 278.22), Hilary argues that the equal divinity of the Father and the Son can be derived from the name and the nature of the Son: …exaequatio illa per nomen naturamque Fili…. Weedman contends that Hilary’s theology of name “owes nothing to his Latin heritage,” “belongs to a tradition of Trinitarian thought that existed exclusively in the East,” and is one of “his most original and important contributions to Latin Trinitarian theology” (Weedman, *Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*, 136, 144). Though Weedman is correct that the category of “name” had not been central in previous Latin Trinitarian theology, Hilary is not the only fourth-century Latin author to argue for some sort of a naturalist name theory. Hilary shares this conviction with Chromatius, who criticizes Ebion and Photinus for their understanding of the names of Father and Son: …cum paterni nominis uritas sine uera et legitima Filii natuitate esse not possit…. (Chromatius, *Tractatus in Matthaeum* 50.3 [CCL 9A 448.119-120]).

50 Weedman claims that Hilary became aware of the potential danger of the claim “the name reveals the nature” sometime between the writing of *De Trin.* 7 and *De Trin.* 12 (Weedman, *Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*, 180). Though this claim begins Weedman’s 8th Chapter, he proceeds to talk surprisingly little about name theology throughout the chapter and certainly offers little proof of Hilary’s “new awareness.” Weedman does, however, argue (following Beckwith) that the apophatic strand present throughout the *De Trin.*—where Hilary speaks about the limitations of human language and analogies—is a later addition, inconsistent with the positive assertion that “the name reveals the nature.” These apophatic insertions, according to Weedman, are the result of Hilary’s late recognition of the danger of naturalist name theory (Weedman, ibid., 186). However, a study of the *Tractatus super Psalmos* shows that Hilary continues to employ, though with far less frequency, naturalist name theory in this post *De Trin.* work. See, for example, *Tr. ps.* 62.4 (CCL 61 207.12-20817): Sed in sancto Dei non aliter adparebunt Deo quam secundum illud: *Qui me uidit, uidit et Patrem* atque illud: *Ego et Pater unum sumus*, quia in Filii et natura et nomine aeternae naturae ac nominis significatio continetur: apparens Filio uel susceptus a Filio Patri adparebit in Filio. While Hilary may have discovered surprisingly late in his career that natural name theology was not the knock-down argument he had assumed and so found other lines of argument—including that of God’s infinity as Weedman suggests—Hilary never abandons the natural name theory found especially in books 2 and 6 of the *De Trinitate.*

51 Weedman believes that Hilary owes his theology of name and nature to Basil of Ancrya (Weedman, *Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*, 106-107, 150-156). Weedman presents Hilary as the heir of Basil’s argumentation against Eunomius’ name theology. However, in his presentation of the debate between Eunomius and Basil, Weedman addresses only the question of which names were considered appropriate for the first and second persons: Father and Son according to Basil, Unbegotten and Begotten for Eunomius. He neglects Eunomius’ philosophical point that within a naturalist name framework, the different names Father and Son or Unbegotten and Begotten point to different essences. Basil, unlike Hilary, completely rejects this understanding of language where names indicate essence or nature. In *Contra Eunomium* 2.9, Basil says there are two categories of names—one presents the thing itself, the other indicates a connection—and neither category of names penetrates to the essence of the thing named. Names present qualities, not natures. For this reason, the names Peter and Paul, indicate not that Peter and Paul have different natures (one human and the other something else) but rather the names present different individual characteristics: Ὁ μέντοι οὐχ ὑποστάσεως τινος ἐννοοῦν ἑμποκείμενον, ἀλλὰ μόνην τὴν πρὸς ἔτερον σχέσιν ἀποσυμβαίνει, τούτῳ οὐσίαν εἶναι νομοθετεῖν πῶς ἤ τις ἀναφέρεται παραπληξίας ἐστί; Καίτοι γε μικρὸν ἐμπρόσθεν ἐδείκτηκεν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν, ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἀπολελειμμένα τῶν ὄνομάτων, κἂν τὰ μᾶλλον δοκῇ ὑποκείμενον τι δηλοῦν, οὐκ αὐτὴν παρίστησι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἰδιόματα δὲ τινὰ περὶ αὐτήν ἀφορίζει (Basil of
Hilary’s simplified name theory leaves the question how many names and how many natures does God have? The answer is, in Hilary’s typical fashion, both consistent and yet obscure. As we have seen, God may have several, though not unlimited, natural names (that is names that have more than mere conventional weight). However, Hilary is absolutely consistent in his conviction that though there may be multiple divine names, there is only one divine nature. Hilary does not say “names of the natures (plural)” but “names of the nature (singular).” Hilary specifically repudiates any understanding of the multiple divine names that would lead to a belief in multiple divine natures.

However, the consistency of Hilary’s insistence on a single divine nature is rendered obscure by the different senses with which he understands *natura*.

Hilary uses *natura* in two different senses. For example, *natura* is that which the Father and the Son share. However, the names Father and Son are natural names that say something true about each of their natures. Fatherhood and generation are the Father’s *natura*, obviously something he does not share with the Son—so how is it that the Father and the Son have the same *natura*? The answer is that sometimes Hilary uses *natura* as an equivalent to *substantia*: it is the underlying divine “stuff” common to all the members of the Godhead. For example, in his commentary on Psalm 144, Hilary places *natura* and *substantia* in apposition as the reasons whereby the Father and the Son are one:

---

52 De Trin. 2. 5 (CCL 62 41.10-13): …et editis prout in uerbis habebimus dignitate adque officio Patris Fili Spiritus sancti, non frustrentur naturae proprietatibus nomina, sed intra naturae significationem nominibus coarentur.

53 See De Trin. 8.2 (CCL 62A 314.18-19): … nec natuiitas perfecta diuersarum naturarum nomina in diis duobus admitteret. In this way, he argues against the use of natural name theory by the Anomoians.

54 In the *De Synodis*, Hilary equates *substantia* and *natura* but distinguishes both these from *essentia*, which seems to lack the concrete quality of the former two. See *De Synodis* 12. See also the discussion in Weedman, *Trinitarian Theology of Hilary*, 103-104, and Simonetti, *Crisi Ariana*, 305.
on account of the similitude of substance and the property of nature, the one is in the other
and both are one (unum)….55 At other times, in talking about one of the Trinity, for
example, the Son, he uses “nature” to refer not just to the divine “stuff” but to the entirety
of the Son’s divine way of being. In this way natura includes all the particularities that
we would usually associate with persona. For the Son these particularities include
especially his existence as generated, with all the attributes that accompany this
generation: not only the special application of the names “Word,” “Wisdom,” and
“Power,”56 but also the superiority of the Father (without the inferiority of the Son by
nature).57 As with persona, Hilary never explains to his reader that he has different uses
of natura, nor does he forewarn before his frequent switches between the two.

Hilary uses the technical signifiers “persona,” “nomen,” and “natura” in a way
that is unique to him and, in some instances, consciously different from his theological
predecessors. Furthermore, Hilary uses each term in multiple ways. If we insist on
understanding Hilary’s use of technical terminology as rigid and univocal, we will render

55 Tr. ps. 144.3 (CCL 61B 269.3-4): ... ex substantiae similitudine ac proprietate naturae alter in altero sit et
ambo unum sint.... For other examples of substantia and natura being used interchangeably, see Tr. ps.
122.7 (CCL 61B 39.19-20): …non dissimili scilicet aut differente a se substantia diuinitatis in utroque.
Tr. ps. 131.22 (CCL 61B 127.5-15): At quomodo intelligitur, Ponam super sedem meam, et: Sedebunt super
sedem tuam, nisi quod per concordem et non dissimilem a se in nascibilis unigenitique naturam et Pater in
Filio, et Filius in Patre est deitatis in utroque nec genere nec voluntate dissidentem substantiam, cum paterna
majestatis gloria Unigenito congenita sit? Atque ob id sedem Filii, sedem suam Pater nuncupat: quia et ex
se et in gloria indemnabilis diuinitatis sue unigenitus et ursus Deus natus sit nec contumeliam
communicatum cum eo sedem sentiat, cui ex se genito in naturae similitudine nulla diuersitas est. Tr. ps.
138.17 (CCL 61B 201.15-202.22): Est enim maior Pater Filio, sed ut pater Filio, generatione, non genere:
Filius enim est, et ex eo exuit. Et licet paternae nuncupationis proprietatis differat, tamen natura non differt.
Natus enim a Deo Deus non dissimilis est a gignente substantia. Non potest ergo ad eum ex quo est. Nam
quamuis alter in altero per uniformem ac similem eiusdem naturae gloriam maneat, tamen ei ex quo genitus
est non exaequari in eo uidetur posse, quod genuit. Tr. ps. 138.35 (CCL 61B 212.17-21): Est namque
genitus ex eo, non est in eo nouae creationis aliena natura. Virtute filius est, diuinitate filius est, substantia
filius est, generatione filius est. Opera testantur, potestates loquentur per naturae progenesis in Filio Patrem
esse, et per legitimae originis substantiam Filium in Patre esse.

56 See De Trin. 7.11.
57 De Trin. 9.56 (CCL 62A 436.7-9): Natiuitas Fili Patrem constituit maiorem. Minorem uero Filium esse
натiuitatis natura non patitur.
his theology completely incomprehensible. Hilary uses *persona* prosopologically, where, at least in christological discussions, its meaning is often closer to what we would understand as “nature” than “person.” He consciously avoids following in the footsteps of Tertullian and Novatian, who use *persona* in the nominative case to distinguish between Father and Son (and Holy Spirit, in the case of Tertullian). To accomplish the task that *persona* plays for Tertullian and Novatian, Hilary most often uses a grammatical distinction between neuter and masculine genders: the Father and Son are *unum* but not *unus*. *Nomen* and *natura* are tied together by Hilary’s modified naturalist name theory: certain names, such as Father and Son, indicate the essence of the thing spoken of. This is despite Hilary’s recognition that the single divine nature can be referred to by many names. An understanding of Hilary’s use of these three terms is necessary for any discussion of his Trinitarian theology.

**THE PLACE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT IN HILARY’S TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY**

Following the brief note already made concerning Hilary’s theology of the Holy Spirit in connection with his Trinitarian use of *persona*, I wish to add two more short points. Hilary’s pneumatology, not unexpectedly for his time, is eloquent about the economic working of the Holy Spirit and rather silent regarding immanent Trinitarian relations. First, Hilary insists that we must believe in the Holy Spirit along with the Father and the Son and confess him along with the Father and the Son.  

58 See the doxology at Tr. *ps.* 143.23 (CCL 61B 267.32-34): Ipsi gloria, laus, honor, uirtus, imperium. Patri in Filio, Filio in Patre et in sancto Spiritu et nunc et semper et in omnia saecula saeculorum. Amen. See also De *Trin.* 2.29.
Hilary says that “it is not necessary to speak of the Holy Spirit.” In this explicit profession of the Holy Spirit accompanied by relative silence concerning the Holy Spirit in his Trinitarian theology, Hilary differs little from his contemporaries. Second, Hilary does not so much lack a theology of the Holy Spirit as place it almost entirely within the realm of salvation history. We have already addressed the way in which Hilary consciously makes room in his soteriological system for temporal growth of believers into Christ. This temporal growth takes place within the Church and is the work of the Holy Spirit. The whole actualization of the Holy Spirit, before and after the incarnation, is part of the unique mediation of Christ, begun in creation and fulfilled in the incarnation, or better, in the resurrection.

In intra-Trinitarian relations and even in creation, there is no real differentiation between the “spiritus dei” in these contexts and the Father and Son. This spirit is often simply a manifestation of the omnipotent energy of God. In the realm of salvation history, the Holy Spirit’s role is directly tied to Christ’s. The Holy Spirit prepares for the incarnation and, as the “donum” of Christ, spreads its effects. The Holy Spirit, he who is “given and possessed and of God,” is the heavenly gift who guides us in understanding. In the time before the incarnation, he is the inspirer of the prophets;

59 *De Trin.* 2.29 (CCL 62 64.3): Loqui autem de eo non necesse est.
60 See Luis Ladaria’s excellent study: *Espíritu Santo en san Hilario.* Ladaria chooses to study’s Hilary’s theology of the Holy Spirit not from the dogmatic-Trinitarian point of view but from that of salvation history. From the vantage of salvation history, Ladaria argues, Hilary manifests a clear and coherent teaching regarding the Holy Spirit. Ayres goes so far as to say that Hilary’s “account of the Spirit’s role is, however, entirely economic” (*Nicea and its Legacy*, 185).
62 Ladaria, *Espíritu Santo en san Hilario*, 270-271, 334-335. Hilary’s most systematic theology concerning the Holy Spirit centers upon his understanding of the Holy Spirit as gift. This role as gift seems to be the “personal character” of the Holy Spirit.
63 *De Trin.* 2.29 (CCL 62 65.21): …est et donatur et habetur et Dei est.
after the incarnation he is the gift of Christ in which he communicates the divine life to believers.

The work of the Holy Spirit is integrated into the one mediation of the Son. In his incarnational assumption of all humanity, the Son takes us all into his body and makes us sons in the Son. In so doing, he perfects his revelation of the Father by making the Father not only a Father but truly our Father. The Holy Spirit works to help each person accept the gift of divine life offered universally in the incarnation. In this way the Holy Spirit mediates and spreads the unique mediation of the Son.

However, Hilary’s scant and ambiguous intra-Trinitarian discussions of the Holy Spirit limit positive description of his understanding of the Holy Spirit’s eternal relationship to the Father and the Son. As a result, I have placed my study of the Holy Spirit within the realm of salvation history, and specifically in the previous chapter on ecclesiology, rather than here in the discussions of the eternal relations of the divine persons. This placement more adequately reflects Hilary’s own treatment of the Holy Spirit.


For Hilary, humanity is led to consideration of the eternal relationship between the Father and the Son by the temporal relationship of the incarnate Christ with his Father. Hilary, like all the Fathers, does not see a radical disjunction between what, in modern times, we term the immanent and the economic Trinity. It is self-evident to Hilary that the temporal interactions we witness between the Father and Christ are true,
though perhaps analogous, representations of the eternal interaction between the Father and the Son. Furthermore, Hilary reasons that since Scripture tells us that the Son is the only revealer of the Father, a study of the Son is the only way we have of knowing the Father.

Since no one knows the Father except the Son (Matt. 11.27), let us think of the Father together with the Son who reveals him and is the only faithful witness. Knowledge of the Father is necessary for salvation. Therefore, the relationship between the Father and the Son is the basis of humanity’s access to the Father.

What does the Son reveal about the Father? Hilary gives two answers. First, the Son reveals what the Father is. That is, the Son reveals the nature and the power of the Father. The Son reveals what the Father is by being the same thing himself. The Son, then, has the same nature (understood as substance) and power as the Father. Second, the Son reveals who the Father is. The Son reveals who the Father is by his difference from the Father: he is the begotten Son and his begottenness points to the begetter Father. The name “Father” truly reveals something about the person of the Father. The Son’s begetting from the Father, therefore, reveals the truth of the names Father and Son. The what and the who of the Son reveal, by his sameness and difference to the Father, the what and the who of the Father.

Because our understanding of who and what the Father is depends upon our understanding of who and what the Son is, the De Trinitate focuses on the Son and defending the nature of the Son from heretical attack. Book 7 of the De Trinitate reveals this motivation: Hilary treats at length John 14:9: “he who has seen me has seen also the

---

64 De Trin. 2.6 (CCL 62 43.29-31): Et quia Patrem nemo nouit nisi Filius, de Patre una cum reuelante Filio qui solus testis fidelis est sentiamus.
Father.” In the concluding sections of this book (7.40-41), Hilary gathers together numerous Johannine texts that delineate the Son’s role as revealer of the Father in order to advance the argument that seeing the Son is also seeing the Father only if “God is in God and God is from God.”65 These two motifs taken together serve to protect both the sameness and the difference, the unity and the distinction, between the Father and the Son. “God in God” safeguards the identity of substance, and power between the Father and Son. “God from God” provides more clearly for the distinction between the two, namely the difference between Father and Son.

These two motifs—God in God and God from God—and Hilary’s use of them to delineate all the major propositions of his Trinitarian theology, are the subject of a brief but insightful article by Christopher Kaiser.66 Kaiser limits himself to the De Trinitate; however, since the Tractatus super Psalmos also contains, in a less systematic fashion, all the main propositions of Hilary’s Trinitarian theology, Kaiser’s explanation can be applied to the Tractatus super Psalmos, as well. The coinherence implied in the unitive account (x in x) of “God in God” supports Hilary’s assertion of the full, ontological unity between Father and Son. For example, in the De Trinitate Hilary says “the two are not one [person] (unus), but one is in the other, because there is nothing different in either of them.”67 The substance and power of the Father and the Son are the same, though the Father and Son, as persons of the Trinity are not the same. The etiological account (x

65 De Trin. 7.41 (CCL 62 310.17): Deum in Deo esse et ex Deo Deum esse. The Johannine texts that Hilary uses concerning the Son’s role as revealer of the Father include Jn.14:11: Credite mihi, quoniam ego in Patre et Pater in me; Jn. 14:8: Ostende nobis Patrem; Jn. 14:9: Qui me uidit, uidit et Patrem. Other John texts in this passage include Jn. 10:30: Ego et Pater unum sumus; Jn 14:10: Ego in Patre et Pater in me.
67 De Trin. 3.4 (CCL 62 67.13-14): Non duo unus, sed alius in alio, quia non aliud in utroque.
from $x$) of “God from God” also supports the unity of nature and power. For example, in the Tractatus *super Psalmos*, Hilary asserts, “one from one and both are one, with no difference or dissimilarity in the substance of divinity between them.” However, the etiological account, “God from God,” also provides for a distinction of persons more readily than “God in God.”

By confessing the Father, [the apostolic faith] has confessed the Son; when it believes in the Son, it has believed also in the Father, because the name of the Father contains the name of the Son in itself. For there is no Father except though the Son, and the designation of the Son is the demonstration of the Father because there is no Son except from the Father.

The generation of the Son from the Father distinguishes two entities, “Father” and “Son.” Hilary is adamant that the names “Father” and “Son” are true designators. Because the Son is from the Father, there are two persons: “We must confess that the two [Father and Son] are one thing (*unum*), not one [person] (*unus*)”.

Hilary’s Trinitarian logic to this point, combining an etiological account ($x$ from $x$) and a unitive account ($x$ in $x$) to explain both the sameness and the difference between the Father and the Son, is common in Latin Trinitarian theology. For example, Tertullian, in section 8 of his *Aduersus Praxeans*—which deals with the same combination of Johannine passages (John 14:9-11 and John 10:30) as the passage from Hilary’s *De Trinitate 7.41* that we just examined—presents a series of images for thinking about the relationship of the Father and the Son. These images—of root and shoot, spring and

---

68 *Tr. ps.* 122.7 (CCL 61B 39.19-20) : …*unus ex uno et ambo unum, non dissimili scilicet aut differente a se substantia diuininitatis in utroque. See also *De Trin.* 7.15 (CCL 62 276.18-20): *Quis porro dubitabit, quin indifferentem naturam natuuitas consequitur? Hinc enim est sola illa quae eure esse possit aequalitas: quia naturae aequalitatem sola possit praestare nauiitas.* See also *Tr. ps.* 122.2, where Hilary mentions the “inseparable power” of the Father and Son, and *Tr. ps.* 131.22, where he speaks of the “same substance of deity” in the Father and the Son.

69 *De Trin.* 7.31 (CCL 62 298.26-30): *Confitendo Patrem confessa Filium est; credens in Filium credit et in Patrem: quia et nomen Patris habet in se Fili nomen. Non enim nisi per Filium Pater est, et significatio Fili demonstratio Patris est: quia non nisi ex Patre sit Filius.

70 *De Trin.* 7.31 (CCL 62 299.35) : *unum confitendus sit esse, non unus.*
river, sun and beam—show two important things about this relationship according to Tertullian: the Father and Son are two things, the one an offspring of the other (x from x), but they are also conjoined and undivided (x in x). 71

The distinctiveness of Hilary’s Trinitarian theology depends upon the centrality of the category of birth for both the etiological and unitive accounts. 72 Birth is the category that contains all the other characteristics of the Son, namely name, nature, power, and confession. 73 Each of these other characteristics only shows one facet of the reality. Name, for example, shows the difference between Father and Son, while nature points to their unity. Hilary uses birth as the category that best accounts for both unity and difference for birth shows both equality of nature and distinction of persons. 74

Birth gives meaning to both the equality and the differences implied in the titles “Father” and “Son” and “unbegotten” and “only-begotten:”

---

71 Tertullian, Aduersus Praxean 8.6 (CCL 2 1168.35-39; Evans 97.11-15): igitur secundum horum exemplorum formam profiteor me duos dicere Deum et sermonem eius, Patrem et Filium ipsius: nam et radix et frutex duae res sunt sed coniunctae, et fons et flumen duae species sunt sed indivisa, et sol et radius duae formae sunt sed cohaerentes. In this section, Tertullian also demonstrates a theology similar to Hilary’s concerning the names “Father” and “Son:” he says that the Word of God has received the name Son “in an exact sense” (97.9). However, Simonetti notes that one of the ways in which Hilary follows Novatian in contrast to Tertullian is regarding the use of the traditional images of sun, fire, and fountain to describe the relationship of Son to Father: Tertullian uses these images while Novatian and Hilary do not (Manlio Simonetti, “Ilario e Novaziano,” Rivista di cultura classica e medioevale 7.2 (1965): 1034-1047, 1047).

72 Weedman says that Hilary’s theology of “name” and “birth”—an adaptation of Basil of Ancyra’s theology—is Hilary’s most original and important contribution to Latin Trinitarian theology (Weedman, Trinitarian Theology of Hilary, 136). It must be noted however, that while Hilary uses the term “natuitas” in the De Trin. to speak of the Son’s birth, i.e., his eternal generation, in the Tr. ps. he substitutes the term “genitus” for “natuitas” to speak of the Son’s eternal generation and reserves “natuitas” for the Son’s other “births,” i.e., his incarnation, glorification, and even baptism. Nevertheless, Weedman’s point, that the category of eternal generation is central in Hilary’s Trinitarian theology, remains true even in the Tr. ps.

73 See De Trin. 7.16 (CCL 62 277.20-26) : … ut quia Deum esse Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum Dei Filium nomine natuitate natura potestate professione didicissemus, demonstratio nostra gradus singulos dispositionis propositis percurreret. Sed natiuitatis id natura non patitur, quae in se et nomen et naturam et potestatem et professionem sola conplectitur. Sine his enim natiuitas non erit, quia in se haec omnia nascendo continet.

74 For birth as proof of equality of nature, see De Trin. 7.15 (CCL 62 276.19-20): … naturae aequalitatem sola possit praestare natiuitas. For birth as distinguisher of persons, see De Trin. 7.20 (CCL 62 282.23-24): Neque aliter potuit aut debutit Filius a Patre distinguui, quam ut et natus esse….  

---
There is one from one, God from God. The unbegotten does not admit of another, so that there would be two, nor does he admit that he is not God because there is one (unus) only-begotten. There are not two unbegottens, nor are there two only-begotten. In that which each one is, he is one. While the only-begotten does not have an equal neither does the unbegotten admit an equal, and neither does the only-begotten God subsist from any other than the unbegotten God.\footnote{Tr. ps. 134.8 (CCL 61B 147.11-148.16): Vnus ex uno, Deus ex Deo est. Non recipit alterum in nascibilibus, ut duo sint; nec admissit, quod est unus unigenitus, ne Deus sit. Non sunt duo in nascibilibus, non sunt duo unigeniti. In eo unusquisque quod est, unus est. Dum parem nec unigenitus habet, nec in nascibilis admissit neque unigenitus Deus ex alio quam in nascibli Deo subsistit.}

Generation ensures to Father and Son both full divinity and distinctiveness. They are, in Hilary’s language, each one (unus) God, though they are not together two gods.

While in the In Matthaem Hilary followed Tertullian’s two-stage logos theory to explain the relationship of the Father and the Son, dependent upon the analogy of the prolatio uerbi, he consciously rejects it in his post-exilic writing.\footnote{Williams argues that Hilary employs a two-stage logos model in the In Matt. ("Defining Orthodoxy," 151–171, 160).} Tertullian says that just as a word can exist interiorly in the mind before, or even apart from, its exterior expression in speech, so the divine logos was generated and existed in the mind of God before he was birthed, that is, exteriorized as a distinct person.\footnote{See, for example, Tertullian, Aduersus Praxean 5.4 (CCL 1164.21-24; Evans 93.25-28): Nam etsi Deus nondum sermonem suum miserat, proinde eum cum ipsa et in ipsa ratione intra semetipsum habebat, tacite cogitando et disponendo secum quae per sermonem mox erat dicturus.} However, Hilary rejects Tertullian’s model:

…why do you complain of what follows: And the Word was with God? Did you hear “in God” [rather than “with God”] in order to understand it as the utterance of a concealed thought?... For it says, And the Word was God. The sound of a voice ceases as does the voicing of a thought. This Word is a thing, not a sound; a nature, not an utterance; God, not emptiness.\footnote{De Trin. 2.15 (CCL 62 52.16-18, 52.23-53.24-26): …de sequenti quid quaereris: Et uerbum erat apud Deum? Numquid audieras “in Deo,” ut sermonem reconditae cognitionis accipers?...Dicit namque : Et Deus erat uerbum. Cessat sonus uocis et cogitationis eloquium. Verbum hoc res est, non sonus; natura, non sermo; Deus, non inanitas est.}

In rejecting Tertullian’s analogy of the word, Hilary also rejects its conclusion, namely, that the Son’s generation and birth are two sequential steps, one before time and one in
time. Rather, Hilary treats generation and birth as identical, and so follows Novatian in seeing both generation and birth as before time.\(^79\)

Hilary’s account of the Son’s birth is linked to his understanding of the names “Father” and “Son” within the context of the eternity of God. As we have seen, Hilary believes that the name designates the nature.\(^80\) In this case the names of “Father” and “Son” require a process of generation in which the Son is begotten of the Father.

For both are the one God:\(^81\) not because one is divided in two, or because each is himself God, as if the name alone, and not the nature of begetting, might have made Father and Son.\(^82\)

The nature designated by “Father” and “Son,” in both cases is a nature defined through the process of generation. A Father is not a Father until he has begotten children. Likewise a son does not exist until he has been begotten of a Father. Hilary emphasizes eternity as a divine quality.\(^83\) Since God is eternal, if the Son is God, he too must be eternal. Furthermore, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, the eternity of the Son depends not only on his sharing in the eternal divine nature but on his eternal generation: “…he himself, by the birth of his infinite eternity, inasmuch as he has been generated from

---

\(^79\) Novatian argues that the relationship of Father and Son demands that the Son be not only generated, but also born before time (See Novatian, *De Trin.* 31.3-7 [CCL 4 75-76]). Smulders (*Doctrine trinitaire*, 82-83) and Burns (*Christology in Hilary*, 76-80, 134) argue that Hilary does not fully integrate Novatian’s insight until his later works and so in the *In Matthaeum* still has a two-stage approach to the Son’s generation. Simonetti and Doignon disagree. See the discussion in Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 76-80. See also Simonetti, “Ilario e Novaziano.”

\(^80\) *De Trin.* 7.9 (CCL 62 268.6): Aut numquid nomen non naturae significatio est?

\(^81\) Or: “for the one and the other are each God” (Deus enim unus uterque est).

\(^82\) *Tr. ps.* 122.7 (CCL 61B 39.16-17): Deus enim unus uterque est, non quod unus diuisus in duos sit aut uterque ipse sit, ut nuncupatio sola fecerit Patrem et Filium, non natura gignendi.

\(^83\) Burns argues that Hilary recognized “eternity” as an essential divine attribute as early as the *In Matthaeum*. See Burns, Hilary of Poitiers’ *Tractatus*, 120, where he cites *In Matt.* 31.2: Deus autem sine mensura temporum semper est et qualis est, talis aeternus est. Aeternitas autem in infinito manens, ut in his quae fuerunt, ita in illis quae consequentur extenditur, semper integra, incorrupta, perfecta, praeter quam nihil quod esse possit extrinsecus sit relictum.) However, in the *In Matthaeum*, Hilary says the Son is eternal, not, as he will argue later, because he is eternally generated, but rather because he receives the divine nature, which is eternal (Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 76).
eternity, continues to be.” Furthermore, Hilary argues that since God is immutable, and since God only becomes a Father upon the generation and birth of the Son (contra the two-stage logos theory), we must profess that there was no time before this generation and birth, rather that the Son is generated and born eternally.

The birth will announce nothing other than the Father, nor will the Father announce anything other than the birth. For this name or nature permits nothing else to be between them. Either the Father is not always Father if the Son is not always the Son, or, if the Father is always the Father, the Son is also always the Son, because however much time is denied to the Son so that he is not always Son, that much time is lacking to the Father so that he is not always Father. The result of this is that although he is always God, he is not always the Father in that infinity in which he is God.

For Hilary, the eternity of God means that the names “Father” and “Son” must be eternally applicable since they are names that truly tell us about the nature, which is eternal for each of them. Because of the ontological weight of these names, we can not apply them to God sometimes but not always. If there was once no Son, God was once not Father. Therefore, the Son must always be Son, which means he must be both generated and born from eternity. For if the Father is to have the infinity essential to his divinity, he must always be Father; that is, he must eternally generate his Son.

---

84 Tr. ps. 2.23 (CCL 61 54.26-27): ipse ille infinitae aeternitatis suae ortu, ut ab aeterno genius, esse persistit. Despite such clear statements as early as De Trin. 2, Weedman is convinced that not until book 12 of the De Trinitate does Hilary use “infinitas” as a developed concept or as part of his anti-Homoian polemic (The Trinitarian Theology of Hilary, 182). Weedman’s overall point concerning eternity is, however, to be taken quite seriously: the argument for eternal generation has shifted in the course of the De Trinitate. In De Trin. 7, the name “Father” itself provides the defense for eternal generation; in De Trin. 12, it is no longer the name but the eternity of the Father that defends eternal generation (ibid., 187).

85 For the immutability of God, see, for example, Tr. ps. 2.13 (61 45.24-46.26) : Ipse est, qui, quod est, non alundes est; in sese est, secum est, a se est, suus sibi est et ipse sibi omnia est carens omni demutatone noutiatis, qui nihil aluid, quod in se posset incidere, per id quod ipse sibi totum totus est, reliquit.


87 For a very good account of Hilary’s developing understanding of the concept of generation in Hilary’s Trinitarian theology, see chapters 6 and 8 of Weedman, Trinitarian Theology of Hilary, 136-156, 180-195.
Smulders has shown Hilary’s conviction that the prologue of John—In the beginning was the Word (In principio erat  Tiến bửu)—shows the eternity of the Son. Hilary focuses on the imperfect tense of “esse” in this verse. This tense shows that at whatever beginning we might imagine, the Word was, which means he was already existing. To underline the eternity of the Son in a way that does not need temporal terms such as “already” or “before,” Hilary introduces a periphrastic phrase—est ergo

erans—that, until the recent Corpus Christianorum critical edition, was rejected because it runs counter to the rules of grammar. Hilary says the Son “is and therefore was being with God.” In this short verse, Hilary shows with two predicates that the Son’s “being” has a permanent character. First, Hilary creates the neologism “erans,” a participle modeled on the imperfect tense, in order to convey that the Son is always already being and having been before any beginning we can conceive. Second, the Son is “apud Deum,” he is “with God,” namely the Son’s eternal existence is always an existence of relationship to his begetter.

The names “Father” and “Son” imply a hierarchy (of begetting at least) between the natures they signify, that the unity of nature, guaranteed by the name “God” applied to both the Father and Son, denies. Just as the names “Father” and “Son” point to a proper nature, so too the name “God.” Hilary says that if the Son is given the name “God,” he is recognized as possessing the nature of God: he is true God.

Either the Son of God is true God in order to be God, or, if he is not true God, then he can not even be that which God is. Because if the nature is not present, the name does not fit

89 See Smulders, “Bold Move,” 121-122, for a discussion of editorial rejection and manuscript evidence for “est ergo erans.”
90 De Trin. 2.14 (CCL 62 51.6-7) : Est ergo erans apud Deum....
Nevertheless, though the name “God” applied to both Father and Son means that they share the same divine nature, Hilary teaches that the names “Father” and “Son” imply a difference, and, indeed, a hierarchical difference, between the two.

For the Father is greater than the Son, but the Father is greater than the Son in regard to generation and not kind. For the Son is and has come forth from the Father. And although the property of the word “Father” is different [from that of “Son”], nevertheless the nature does not differ. For God born of God he is not dissimilar to his begetter’s substance.

Hilary seeks to affirm both that the Father is greater than the Son and that they share the same substance and therefore are equally God.

Eternal generation is crucial for Hilary’s entire thought system for only eternal generation can account for the unity, the difference, and even the hierarchical difference between Father and Son. The Son is the revealer of the Father in eternity; for Hilary this is what eternal generation means. The infinite and eternal manner of his generation allows the Son both to understand the Father perfectly and to be the perfect image of the Father.

Indeed the Son will reveal the Father to whomever he wills, but...the knowledge of his infinity is proper to him alone who, according to the perfect plenitude of his origin, is himself the image of infinity.

The eternal generation of the Son safeguards the equality of substance and power between Father and Son, for “there is no birth except from the property of the nature.”

---

91 De Trin. 5.14 (CCL 62 163.11-15): Aut Deus uerus est Filius Dei, ut Deus sit; aut si non est uerus Deus, non potest etiam id esse quod Deus est : quia si natura non sit, naturae non competit nomen, si autem naturae in eo nomen est, non potest ab eo urertas abesse naturae.

92 Tr. ps. 138.17 (CCL 61B 201.15-19):  Est enim maior Pater Filio, sed ut Pater Filio, generatione, non genere; Filius enim est et ex eo exiuit. Et licet Paternae nuncupationis proprietas differat, tamen natura non differt. Natus enim a Deo Deus non dissimilis est a gignente substantiae.

93 Tr. ps. 134.7 (CCL 61B 147.6-7, 8-10): Et Filius quidem Patrem, si cui uluerit, reuelabit, sed…Cognitio ergo infinittatis huius ei soli erit propria, qui secundum perfectam originis suae plenitudinem ipse imago est infiniti.
Eternal generation also allows the names of “Father” and “Son” to be true names. In being the eternal Son, the Son reveals the eternal Father. Eternal generation, in essence, allows the Son to reveal both what and who the Father is.

THE TEMPORAL MEDIATION OF THE SON

The previous section sought to follow Hilary’s logic as it moved from temporal examples to a contemplation of the eternal nature and relationship of the Father and the Son. In this section we will follow Hilary as he moves in the opposite direction to show how the eternal relationship of the Father and Son defines their interaction with creation. While this may seem to us to be circular logic, Hilary does not assume a disjunction between the eternal relationship of the Father and the Son and its temporal manifestation; rather, since he assumes they are mutually revelatory, he is free to move in either direction between temporal and eternal.

The Son’s eternal role as revealer of the Father also finds temporal expression throughout creation history. The Son, as revealer of the Father, is mediator of the Father in everything that has to do with creation. All things, from creation to salvation, begin with the Father but are accomplished through the Son. The Son is the actor in salvation history:

Even if a heretic destroys the faith, he knows that the Son of God has always existed, that he, the Word, Power and Wisdom of God, is separated from the Father by no interval of time, that he was the creator of the world and the founder of man, that he washed away the first crimes of the world with the flood, that he gave the Law to Moses, that he was in the prophets and through them foretold those great sacraments of his incarnation and

94 De Trin. 7.14 (CCL 62 274.13-14): …natiuitas non nisi ex proprietate naturae sit…
passion, that he, rising in the body, has brought the clarity of spiritual glory to fallen flesh and has absorbed the origin of earthy corruption into the nature of his divinity.\footnote{Tr. ps. 63.10 (CCL 61 218.1-219.2): Iam si fidem haereticus destruet, Dei Filium semper fuisse cognoscet, nullo a Patre intervallo temporis separatum ipsum esse uerbum, uirtutem, sapientiam Dei, hunc mundi opificem fuisse, hunc et hominis conditorem, hunc prima mundi criminu diluio abluisse, hunc Moysi legem dedisse, hunc in prophetis fuisse et per eos ingentia illa corporationis et passionis suae sacramenta cecinisse, hunc in corpore resurgentem c aducae carni claritatem spiritalis gloriae intulisse et in naturam diuinitatis suae terrenae corruptionis absorbuisse primordia.} The Son’s mediation in the creation of the world is the beginning of the universal mediation of Christ in the work of salvation that continues in his interactions with the patriarchs and finds its culmination in the resurrection of his incarnate body.\footnote{See, for example, De Trin. 12.46-47.} In Books Four and Five of the De Trinitate, where Hilary adduces Old Testament and New Testament proofs, respectively, for the mediation of Christ in the creation of the world, he often makes the distinction, based on 1 Corinthians 8:6, between the Father from whom (\textit{ex quo}) are all things, and the Son through whom (\textit{per quem}) are all things.\footnote{See Ladaria, Cristología de Hilario, 6-11. Other key scriptural texts for Hilary’s treatment of the mediation of the Son in the creation include Prov. 8:22, Jn.1:3, and Col. 1:16.} For the Church knows the one God \textit{from whom are all things}, and she knows also our one Lord Jesus Christ \textit{through whom are all things}, one from whom and one through whom, the origin of all from one, the creation of all through the other. In the one “from whom,” she understands the authority of unbegotenness; in the one “through whom” she venerates the power that differs in no way from its author, since there is a common authority between the one from whom and the one through whom.\footnote{De Trin. 4.6 (CCL 62 105.4-11): Nout enim unum Deum \textit{ex quo omnia}, nout et unum Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum \textit{per quem omnia}, unum ex quo et unum per quem, ab uno uniuersorum originem, per unum cuncitorum creationem. In uno ex quo auctoritatatem innascibilitatis intellegit, in uno per quem potestatem nihil differentem ab auctore ueneratur: cum ex quo et per quem...communis auctoritas sit.}

The Father is the source of all things (\textit{ex quo}) but all things come to be through the Son (\textit{per quem}). This is an economic meaning of mediation. Hilary makes a similar distinction when dealing with the text of Genesis 1:6-7. Hilary demonstrates that the text
of Genesis “He spoke and it was made,” shows two agents in creation, the one who
speaks, namely, the Father, and the one who makes, namely, the Son.99

Hilary’s distinction of two agents in creation—the Father who commands, and the
Son who enacts the Father’s commands—supports two different types of Trinitarian
argumentation, both of which appear in his work.100 At times in the De Trinitate, though
not in the Tractatus super Psalmos, Hilary teaches that the Son is the enactor of the
Father’s commands because he is the Power of the Father, with “power” understood as an
exclusive title of the Son. In this neo-Nicene logic, the Father’s Power, unlike our power,
which is an interior quality, is a being that is distinct from the Father himself.

For although in us, word, wisdom, and power are a work of our interior movement, with
you there is the absolute generation of a perfect God who is your Word, Wisdom, and
Power.101

In this line of argument, there can be no time in which the Son does not exist because
then there would be a time when the Father was without his Power. Hilary says that if he
should ever teach “that you the Father were ever without your Wisdom, Power, and
Word, my Lord Jesus Christ,” he would be exalting the weakness of human

99 See De Trin. 4.16. This is an example of Hilary’s use of prosopology, which becomes a much more
important tool for him in the Tractatus super Psalmos. See Rondeau’s excellent treatment of prosopology
in both the East and West with special emphasis on Origen and Hilary in Commentaires patristiques, vol.
2. Exégèse prosopologique. Compare also to Tertullian’s treatment of Gen. 1 in Aduersus Praxeum 12.6
(CCL 2 1173.35-36), where he, too, distinguishes between the speaker and the doer: …habes duos, alium
dicentem ut fiat, alium facientem.
100 I follow Michel Barnes’ classification of power theologies. For an explanation of the different types of
“power theologies,” including neo-Nicene and pro-Nicene, in the fourth-century, see Michel Barnes,
Barnes, neo-Nicene theology presents the Son as the power of God and argues that the Son is co-eternal
because God can never be without his power. Pro-Nicene theology argues that God is one power in the
sense that God is one substance. See also Lewis Ayres’ reservations concerning Barnes’ classification and,
specifically, the possibility of distinguishing neo-Nicene theologies in Nicea and its Legacy: 239-240.
101 De Trin. 12.52 (CCL 62A 622.12-15): Namque cum uerbum et sapientia et uirtus in nobis interioris
motus nostri opus nostrum sit, tecum tamen perfecti Dei, qui et uerbum tuum et sapientia et uirtus est, absoluta generatio est.
understanding and would be propagating “stupidity and impiety.”

The Son must be eternal for the Father to be eternally powerful.

More often, and exclusively in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary sets forth a pro-Nicene argumentation that emphasizes that the divine power and work are one; in fact, the unity of the divine power is a proof of the unity of the divine nature. Hilary continues to insist that the Son as divine Wisdom and Power is a distinct, subsistent being, but he clarifies that the qualities of wisdom and power continue to exist in the Father as well. The distinction between speaker and doer, according to this line of argument, serves to distinguish the persons more properly than the work. In fact, Hilary argues that the work is proper to both Father and Son. In the *De Trinitate* he says:

> For, in what he says, the Father is the cause, while the Son, in what he does, arranges what has been said is to be done. But the distinction of persons is made in such a way that the work should be referred to both.

This is similar to his words in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*:

> But he who was arranging is both generated and born from him with whom he was arranging. However, since the works of the Son are the works of the Father and since the Father was working in the Son, for this reason he said: *The Father, who is in me, is doing his works* (Jn. 14:10), and again: *I do the works of the Father* (Jn. 10:37), the Father alone was working by working through the one whom he generated.

---

102 *De Trin. 12.52* (CCL 62A 622.3-9): Neque in id umquam stultitiae adque inpietatis erumpam, ut omnipotentiae tuae sacramentorumque arbiter hunc infirmitatis meae sensum ultra infinitatis tuae religiosam opinionem et significatam mihi aeternitatis fidem erigam, ut te aliquando sine sapientia et  uirtute et verbo tuo unigenito Deo Domino meo Iesu Christo fuisse praeeminiam.

103 See Barnes, “Consensus Doctrine,” 215-217. Barnes sees Hilary’s power theology as pro-Nicene. However, while this is the dominant power theology in Hilary’s later works, Hilary’s use of both neo-Nicene and pro-Nicene power theologies, at least in his earlier works, reveals his position, historically, in the time period where neo-Nicene theology was ceding to pro-Nicene theology.

104 See *De Trin. 7.11-12*.

105 *Tr. ps. 135.13* (CCL 61B 169.6-10): Sed qui disponebat, ab eo, cum quo disponebat, et genus et natus est. Cum autem opera Filii opera patris sint et Pater operetur in Filio et per id enim quod ait: *Pater, qui in me est, ipse opera sua facit* et rursum: *ego opera Patris facio*, solus operatur in eo et per eum operando, quem genuit.
The Son arranges those things that the Father commands. However, the Father works in and through the Son so that the work is that of both Father and Son.107

The Son’s doing of the Father’s commands proves that there is an equality of nature between Father and Son because “he, to whose nature it belongs to be able to do all the same things, is in the same nature.”108 The differing roles in creation do not point to a difference in divinity between the Father and the Son but to the difference in person. In his role as the orderer or the doer of what the Father says is to be done in creation, the Son reveals both his possession of divine power (and so his equality of nature with the Father), as well as his distinction from the Father as a distinct agent. The Son’s role in creation also demonstrates his role in the order of revelation: the Son is to be the mediator of the Father.

Hilary is careful to use the same verbs to designate the creative activities of both the Father and the Son so that the Son is not seen as a secondary or inferior actor in the work of creation.109 For example, Hilary uses parallel constructions of the central verbs of working or doing (operari and facere) to show the application of the verbs to both Father and Son: “because he [the Father] was working in [the Son] working;”110 “everything which the Father does, the Son also does likewise.”111 Likewise, Hilary uses the verb disponere (to arrange), used in Proverbs 8:30 in reference to Wisdom, for the Son, though in such a way as to include the Father. “But he who was arranging was both

---

107 For a similar treatment of the works of the Father and the Son centered upon Jn. 5:17-19, see De Trin. 7.16-19 and Tr. ps. 91.4-7.  
108 De Trin. 7.18 (CCL 62 279.6-7): “Adque ita in natura eadem est, cui eadem omnia posse naturae sit.”  
109 Hilary gives the name “Creator” to Christ: Per Dominum enim Christum creat a omnia sunt, et idcirco ei proprium nomen est ut creator sit (De Trin. 12.4 [CCL 62A 581.3-4]).  
110 De Trin. 7.17 (CCL 62 278.17-18): …quia ipse in se operaretur operante. See also Tr. ps. 91.4 (CCL 61B 325.23-25): Verum cum in omnibis Christus operetur, eius tamen opus est qui operator in Christo…  
111 De Trin. 7.18 (CCL 62 279.8-10): …ut omnia quae Pater facit, eadem omnia similete faciat et Filius.
generated and born from him with whom he was arranging. The works of the Son are the works of the Father and the Father works in the Son and through him.\footnote{Tr. ps. 135.13 (CCL 61B 169.6-8) : Sed qui disponebat, ab eo, cum quo disponebat, et genitus et natus est. Cum autem opera Filii opera Patris sint et Pater operetur in Filio...} Having used the verb suggested by Proverbs, Hilary immediately returns to his preferred verb of creation, and the one more easily shared by Father and Son, operari: “the Father alone works by working in and through him whom he generated.\footnote{Tr. ps. 135.13 (CCL 61B 169.9-10): ...solus operatur in eo et per eum operando, quem genuit.} Hilary applies other verbs of creation—creare, firmare, ornare—more loosely, sometimes to the Son, sometimes to the Father, without the same sort of attention to parallel construction. For example, in his commentary on Psalm 149, Hilary applies firmare, and ornare to the Father.\footnote{Tr. ps. 149.1 (CCL 61B 303.1-6): Superior psalmus omnem creationum diuersitatem ad laudem dei creatoris est adhortatus; et ordo a caelestibus coeptus cuncta terrae ac maris et aeris animantia percucurrit uniuerso quoque genere aetatum, sexuum, potestatum ad honorem debitae confessionis admonito, ut gloriam eius, qui se ad uitam animasset, firmasset, ornasset, pius gratiarum sermo celebraret. See also Tr. ps. 91.4 (CCL 61 324.1-4): Et haec quidem magna Dei opera sunt, caelum continere, solem cum astris ceteris luminare, semenets terrae incrementa sufficere, hominem firmare, animam reprouehere, sed longe his maiora opera perfecta sunt.} In Psalm 118 Nun, the pair firmare, and ornare are now applied to the Son.\footnote{Tr. ps. 118 Nun 10 (CCL 61A 133.19-21): Caelum ex praecepto Dei ipse firmuit, mundum ex paterno jussu in hanc speciem tanti decoris ornuit, terram et quae in ea sunt creavit.} Christ’s mediation in revelation continues throughout salvation history. It is the Son who mediates between God and the Jews because he is the giver of the Law: “the Lord is the mediator of God and men, in whose hand through the angels, as is said in the scriptures, the law was given.”\footnote{Tr. ps. 67.18 (CCL 61 275.14-16): ...mediator Dei hominumque sit dominus, in cuius manu per angelos, ut dictum est, lata lex fuerit.} Hilary has the traditional view that all manifestations of God in the Old Testament are manifestations of the Son, for they are imperfect types of the incarnation.\footnote{Ladaria, Cristologia de Hilario, 11-22 (see especially note 35 on page 11, where he gives several references to this argument in Latin tradition). Hilary is following in the traditional line of Latin theology, not broken until Augustine, that argues that whenever Scripture says that God is seen, God the Son is seen. Tertullian, for example, citing the passage that “no man can see God and live” says that the Father is...}
The Father certainly is not visible to anyone but the Son. Therefore, who is this who was seen and kept company among men? Certainly our God is a God who is both visible and tangible among men is our God. … For there is one mediator of God and men (1 Tim. 2:5), God and man, the mediator both in the giving of the Law and the assumption of the body.  

The Son is the only mediator between the Father and humanity; he is “the face of God.” The Father is invisible to all but the Son. The God who is visible to us is the Son as he makes himself visible, in the Old Testament theophanies, and even able to be touched, in the incarnation, so that we might see and approach the Father in him. As we can see in this quotation, it is in the incarnation, when the Son of God becomes man and so able to mediate between divinity and humanity in his own body, that the Son’s mediation in creation arrives at its perfection.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ASSUMPTION OF ALL HUMANITY IN HILARY’S TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY: SEEING GOD

The incarnation is, as I mentioned above, the perfection of the mediation between God and humanity. For Hilary, it is only Christ’s assumption of each and every member of the human race that makes the incarnation the perfect mediation because only this universal assumption of humanity allows a direct contact between God and every human person. If Christ had assumed a particular individual human nature only—one that did invisible while the Son is visible (see Tertullian, Adversus Praxeum 14 [CCL 2 1176-77], Adversus Marcionem 5.19.3 [CCL 1 721]). See also Gregory of Elvira, De Fide orthodoxa contra Arianos 86-87 (ed. Vincent Bulhart, in Gregorius Iliberritanus, Faustinus, Luciferianus, CCL 69 [Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1967], CCL 69 243-244). For the theophanies as imperfect types of the incarnation, see Tertullian, Marc. 5.19; Gregory of Elvira, Tractatus Origenis 3.1-2 (CCL 69 19-20).


119 See Tr. ps. 142.9 (CCL 61B 250.5-6): “…facies Dei, qui utique Christus est, qui imago Dei inuisibilis est…..”
not contain all of humanity—the divine nature would have come into contact with one man only. The Son’s eternal role of revealer of the Father has, as we have seen, two components: the Son reveals what the Father is (namely, the divine nature and power), and who the Father is (namely, Father) by his sameness and his difference with the Father. In the temporal realm, the Son must reveal both these components to humanity in particular. Revelation to humans must be a revelation specifically adapted to human reception.

The Son’s revelation to humanity, therefore, is a revelation that addresses the two-fold nature of humanity. In the context of the question of who sees God and how God is seen, Scripture says both that no one may see God and live and its seeming opposite, that the pure of heart shall see God.

But [the prophet who wrote this psalm] remembers the words of God: *No man will see my face and live* (Ex. 3:20) …Nevertheless, he remembers this beatitude reserved for the faith, by which is said: *Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God* (Matt. 5:8). Therefore, since he knows that it is said in the law that no would see the face of God and live, and it is clearly said in the gospel beatitude that all those who are pure in heart shall see God, [the prophet] has expressed the longing of his desire with the restraint of perfect modesty when he says: *I pray with my whole heart [to see your] face*… He knows that the glory of God is invisible to the fleshly eyes.

Hilary says that the prophet recognizes that seeing God is something that is not done with the eyes: “And now since he knows that this is impossible for these eyes of the body, he

---

120 See the discussion in Chapter 4. *Tr. ps.* 129.4 (CCL 61B 101.4-8): …*primum meminisse debet hominum institutionem naturis duabus contineri, animae scilicet et corporis, quorum alia spiritualis, alia terrena est, et inferiorem hanc materiam ad efficientiam atque operationem naturae illiusuisse potioris aptatam.*

121 *Tr. ps.* 118 Heth 7 (CCL 61A 75.4-5, 7-13, 15-16): *Sed dictum meminit a Deo: Nemo hominum uidebit faciem meam et uiuet… meminit tamen hanc fidei beatitudinem reservari, qua dicitur: Beati mundo corde, quoniam ipso Deum uidebunt.* Itaque cum in lege sciat dictum quod nemo faciemi Dei uideat et uiuat, et ex evangelica beatitudine non ambigat omnes mundo corde Deum esse uisuros, perfectae modestiae temperamento cupiditatem desiderii su sui elocutus est dicens: *Deprecatus sum faciem tuam in toto corde meo… Scit invisibilem esse carnalibus oculis gloriam Dei.* Goffinet argues that Origen, like Hilary, makes the connection between the desire of the psalmist and the beatitude of Matt. 5.8 (Goffinet, *Utilisation d’Origene*, 121-122). However, Harl’s work on the Palestinian chain shows that it is Didymus, not Origen, who makes this connection (Harl, *Chaîne palestiniennne*, SC 189 280-283).
desires it wholly with his heart.”122 The heart and not the eyes is the instrument for seeing God’s glory.

Hilary, however, does not say that the bodily eyes can see nothing of God; rather, revelation is offered to both the eyes and the heart, the physical and the spiritual. While it is impossible for the eyes to see the invisible nature of God, the incarnation makes it possible for us to know God, both by the sight of the God who has made himself visible, and by his words and works.123

Therefore, the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, has described the God whom no one has seen. Either destroy what the only-begotten has described, or believe the God who is seen….124

In taking a physical form the Son is seen and makes the Father seen as well. Seeing Christ leads to belief in Christ; hearing Christ leads to belief in his words that teach us not only of himself but also of the Father.

The Son’s visibility in the incarnation makes the Father visible as well for the Son’s visible works point to the invisible divine nature. The works of the Son reveal the works of the Father because they are the works of the Father. The physical eyes perceive the works. The pure heart may now discern the invisible divine nature through these works.

The heart may perceive from the visible works the divine power that pertains to Father

---

122 Tr. ps. 118 Heth 8 (CCL 61A 76.13-14): Et nunc quia id impossibile istis corporis oculis sciat esse, totum istud corde desiderat.
123 Compare with Chromatius of Aquilea (Tractatus in Matthaeum 2.1 [CCL 9A 202.31-22]): Sed quia in diuinitatis suae gloria Verbum Deus uideri non poterat, assumpsit carnem uisibilem ut diuinitatem inuisibilem demonstraret.
124 De Trin. 5.34 (CCL 62 187.1-3) : Deum itaque nemini uisum unigenitus Filius qui in sinu Patris est enarravit. Aut dissolue uisum unigeniti enarrationem, aut Deum crede qui uisus est….
125 Tr. ps. 138.35 (CCL 61B 212.22-25): Pater uidentur in Filio et uidentur non per inuisibilis nobis naturae contemplationem, sed per operum admirationem… Filii enim opera opera Patris sunt… See also Tr. ps. 138.8 (CCL 61B 197.27): …et sermone et opera Dei in se Patris gloriam praedicabat.
and Son equally. It may also perceive something of the eternal relationship of Father and Son, wherein the Son does what the Father commands.

The category of sight is limiting in that it necessitates a distance between the perceiver and the perceived. However, for Hilary the sight of God collapses this distance because it brings the perceiver into the perceived. Concerning the perception of God by the pure of heart, Hilary says: “…those who are worthy of seeing God will take on glory from the seeing of glory.” The deeper perception of God, which moves from visible to invisible, is transformative, such that seeing the glory of God is entrance into this very glory. The desire to see God is the desire to receive the glory of God.

The incarnation, understood specifically as Christ’s assumption of all humanity, opens up a new arena for revelation, one that eliminates the distance between perceiver and perceived and so transforms the perceiver in conformity with the perceived. The incarnate Christ is an object of sight for the bodily eyes. This sight also is the entrance to the deeper perception of the heart, as we have seen. Both the eyes and the heart still perceive God as an external object. However, the incarnation also allows for a perception of God in which there is no distance between man and God. The assumption of all humanity allows for direct contact between the invisible divine nature and every single human person. Hilary says that this direct contact is the foundation of our understanding of God.

126 Tr. ps. 118 Heth 8 (CCL 61A 76.7-8): qui digni sunt conspectu Dei gloriam ex conspectu gloriae esse sumpturos.
127 Gilles Pelland (“Gloriam ex conspectu gloriae (Hilaire, Tr ps 118, heth, 8),” Gregorianum 72 [1991]: 758) shows that vision of glory invests the see-er himself with glory. In Hilary’s framework of glory, Pelland says the Son has two roles. First, he makes us able to see glory. Then, because of the nature of glory we just alluded to, he helps us participate in glory. For these two roles, see Tr. ps. 67.19 (CCL 276.23-24): …ad cognitionem Dei consortiumque esse deductas…
Hilary says not only that human understanding is limited, but that in fact human nature is defined by this limitation of understanding.

For since God could not be known by man except by means of the assumed man—because our nature could not know the unknowable except through our nature, and man is defined by this manner of understanding—then it is necessary that man be defined by this, namely that he has known God in the one in whom he is conformed to God, because such is the allotment of this knowledge given by grace.\textsuperscript{129}

Our nature knows God only “through our nature,” that is, “in the assumed man,” Jesus Christ. Hilary is insistent that there are no intermediate steps between the divinity of Christ and each individual person: to be properly called “man,” each of us has to know God and be conformed to God “\textit{in} the assumed man.” That is to say, each member of humanity, in order to be fully human, has to receive the revelation of God and the conformation to God that can be attained only in Christ. We find again the centrality of Christ’s body in Hilary’s theology.

Hilary’s Trinitarian emphasis on the Son’s mediation in the revelation of the Father here merges with his vision of human transformation and conformation to the divine nature. Christ’s assumption of all humanity into his body in the incarnation, is the hinge of these two systems. Through the assumption of all humanity, the Son presents himself to be known not by one man only but by all humanity, for all are brought into contact with him. Our knowledge of God is directly connected to our conformation to God.\textsuperscript{130} Since conformation happens in the body of Christ, our knowledge too is attained in that body. Only through the assumption of all humanity, and the possibility of

\textsuperscript{129} Tr. \textit{ps}. 143.8 (CCL 61B 259.25-30): Si enim cognitus fieri Deus homini nisi adsumpto homine non potuit, quia incognoscibilem cognoscere nisi per naturam nostram natura nostra non potuit et per hanc cognitionem homo deputatur, necesse est ut in id deputetur, in quo Deum ipse congnouit, scilicet ut conformis Deo fiat, quia haec sit deputatio cognitionis indultae.

\textsuperscript{130} See \textit{De Trin}. 11.39 where Hilary says that we will see God only once we have been transformed into the kingdom of God. Being made into the kingdom of God is here understood as being conformed to the glory of Christ’s body.
universal direct contact with Christ’s body, does knowledge of God and conformation to God become possible for all.

For Hilary, human knowledge of God’s nature is achieved only through direct physical and spiritual contact with this nature. This contact, and the knowledge attained thereby, is transformative: contact with the divine nature glorifies our nature. Our existence in Christ’s body is not only knowledge about the divine, but experience of the divine. This experience, when accompanied by faith and sacramental participation, leads to the physical and spiritual glorification of the human person so that “it might be gained by man that he should be God.”

Christ’s assumption of all humanity gives to every person the direct contact with God that is necessary for transformation. For this reason Hilary says: “The greatest work of our Lord Jesus Christ, only-begotten Son of God, was to render man, after he had been taught divine knowledge, worthy of the dwelling place of God.”

Revelation entails transformation and Hilary assigns transformation, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, to the body of Christ.

Salvation, that is, our being drawn into the divine life, happens only in the body of Christ, temporally in the Church and eschatologically in Christ’s glorified body.

---

132 See Fierro, Sobre la gloria, 184: “En la misma línea de ‘corporeidad’ de la gloria, se halla uno de los pensamientos favoritos de Hilario: el cuerpo de Cristo incluye a todos los hombres, y, por eso, en su gloria seremos todos glorificados. Esta inmersión de la humanidad entera en la carne del Señor, explica perfectamente el porqué de nuestra clarificación y su carácter cristiforme.”
133 Tr. ps. 131.6 (CCL 61B 116.1, 3-5): Domino nostro Iesu Christo, unigenito Dei Filio...hoc opus maximum fuit, ut hominem ad scientiam duinam eruditum dignum habitaculo Dei redderet.
134 Pelland makes a very interesting point on this topic (“Gloriam ex conspectu gloriae,” 758-759). He notices (following Doignon), that Hilary’s citation of 2 Cor. 3:18 follows neither the Vetus latina nor the Vulgate: Nos, inquit, omnes reuelata facie gloriam Dei expectantes in eandem ipsam transferemur a gloria in gloriam, sicut a Domini spiritu (118 Heth 8 [CCL 61A 76.10-12]). Where the Vetus and Vulgate have speculantes, Hilary has expectantes. Hilary’s framework of glory, centered on the “glory to glory” of 2 Cor. 3:18 is not simply a visually speculative system, but a system of progressive spiritualization where humanity is being transformed. The manner of our transformation is conformation to Christ’s glorious body. Glory is a matter of transformation and transformation is essentially conformation to Christ.
Hilary’s increased attention to Christ’s assumption of all humanity in the *Tractatus super Psalmos* leads him to become more insistent on the eternal mediation of Christ in the salvation of humanity. Buffer notes that in the *In Matthaeum*, Hilary defines our eschatological salvation as communion with the divine nature. In the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, Hilary specifies that our communion is with Christ in his risen glory.\(^{135}\) Christ’s assumption of all humanity makes his body the locus of salvation and the place of our communion with God.

**HILARY’S PATERCENTRIC THEOLOGY**

The *De Trinitate* and the *Tractatus super Psalmos* share an obvious emphasis on the Son of God: the *De Trinitate* is written to defend the equality of the Son with the Father, while the *Tractatus super Psalmos* emphasizes the divine *ordo* of the words of Scripture such that, as Hilary says in the *Instructio*, every word is about Christ.\(^{136}\)

But it must not be doubted that those things that are said in the psalms ought to be understood according to gospel prediction, so that no matter what person the spirit of prophecy has spoken through, nevertheless, everything should be referred to the knowledge of the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ—his incarnation, passion and reign—and the glory and power of our resurrection.\(^{137}\)

Yet it is somewhat misleading to say that Hilary’s focus is on the Son. The *De Trinitate* emphasizes the eternal generation of the Son for two reasons. First, eternal generation establishes the Son’s position as true God. Second, as we showed earlier in the this

\(^{136}\) For Hilary’s understanding of *ordo*, the divine order of Scripture, see Burns, *Christology in Hilary*, 47-65. Though Burns’ study concerns the *In Matthaeum*, Hilary’s conception of *ordo* remains consistent throughout his exegetical career.
\(^{137}\) *Instr. ps.* 5 (CCL 61 5.1-6.6): Non est uero ambigendum ea quae in psalmis dicta sunt secundum evangelicam praedictionem intelligi oportere, ut ex quacumque libet persona prophetiae spiritus sit locutus, tamen totum illud ad cognitionem aduentus Domini nostri Iesu Christi et corporationis et passionis et regni et resurrectionis nostrae gloriae uirtuemque referatur.
chapter, accepting eternal generation is necessary for understanding what and who the Father is. Understanding the generation of the Son is the only way of knowing the Father as he truly is. Both of Hilary’s reasons for emphasizing eternal generation in the *De Trinitate* refer the Son to the Father. Thus, the main emphasis in the *De Trinitate* leads attention to the Father. Hilary’s approach can therefore be called Patercentric.

Hilary’s understanding of the Son’s mediation in the temporal order is also patercentric. The saving dispensation fulfilled in the incarnation is the temporal aspect of the Son’s eternal revelation of the Father. Though Hilary says, in the *Tractatus super Psalmos*, that every word of the psalms is about the coming of Christ, the emphasis is not on the figure of Christ himself but rather on Christ as him “through whom…there is an access for all to the Father.” It is true that Christ assumes all of humanity so that we may receive in our turn what he is. However, as we saw in our study of Hilary’s eschatology, the essential point is not that we might be like Christ, but that we might come to share Christ’s relationship with the Father. Hilary is quite specific that salvation consists in knowing the Father in the most profound way possible, that is, salvation is knowing him as Father because we are sons: “The Lord has *led out from their sepulchers* all those who are regenerated into sons of God.”

---

138 *Tr. ps.* 60.6 (CCL 61 195.9-10): ...per quem... sitque omnibus adcessus ad Patrem.
139 For salvation as oriented toward the Father, see, for example, *Tr. ps.* 148.8 (CCL 61B 302.10-15, 21-28): *Prope est Dominus omnibus inuocantibus eum* (Ps. 144.18). Illis ergo proprius hymnus (Ps. 148.14) est, qui *Deo propinquabant*, qui per hoc sanctae Hierusalem regnum beatum aeterno regno proximi post regnum Domini Iesu Christi in regnum Dei Patris Domino conregnante, transibunt, apostolo docente....Hic ergo *populus* est *propinquans* regno Dei Patris per regnum Filii Dei proximus. Regnat itaque Dominus traditurus Deo Patri regnum, non regni potestate cariturus, sed nos, qui regnum eius sumus, Deo Patri traditurus in regnum. Regni traditio nostra prouectio est, ut, qui in regno Filii erimus, in regno quoque simus et Patris, digni per id regno Patris, quia digni regno erimus et Filii, proximi tum Patris regno, cum filii erimus in regno...
140 *Tr. ps.* 67.8 (CCL 61 266.23-24): *Sed hos omnes de sepulcris Dominus, qui in filios Dei regenerantur, eduxit.*
is through the Son, but it is from the Father and is a coming into the Father’s glory as sons.

Christ’s assumption of all humanity, including all its weakness, is the means whereby the Son mediates between humanity and the divine nature in his own body. This mediation has negative results on the Son’s relationship with the Father. Hilary emphasizes in Book 9 of the De Trinitate that this assumption separates the Son in some way from the Father because what he has assumed shares neither the same nature nor the same glory with the Father as his own divine nature does. The incarnation entails something of an estrangement between the Father and the Son because the assumption of the flesh, and all its weakness, is accomplished and experienced by the Son but not by the Father. Hilary tries to capture the pathos of this situation with his language of forma dei and forma serui. Though the Son never loses his divine nature, the assumption of a human nature is, in a real way, the loss of the forma dei because it is the loss of his participation in the divine glory: while the Father and Son continue to share the divine nature, the Son no longer shares in the divine glory.

---

141 See, for example, De Trin. 9.38 where Hilary says quite explicitly that the incarnation brings about an obstacle to the unity of the Father and the Son (CCL 62A 412.24-26): quia dispensationis nouitas offensionem unitatis intulerat, et unitas, ut perfecta antea fuerat, nulla esse nunc poterat, nisi glorificata apud se fuisse carnis adsumptio. See Ladaria’s discussion of this division between Father and Son caused by the assumption of human nature in the incarnation in Cristología de Hilario, 73-74.

142 De Trin. 9.38 (CCL 62A 411.5-7): …sed hanc carnis adsumptionem ea cum qua sibi naturalis unitas erat Patris natura non senserat…

143 See De Trin. 9.39 (CCL 62A 413.26-414-36): Vt enim in unitate sua maneret ut manaserat, glorificaturus eum apud se Pater erat, quia gloriae suae unitas per obedientiam dispensationis exsererat; scilicet ut in ea natura per glorificationem rursus esset, in qua sacramento erat diuinae nativitatis unitus, esset que Patri apud semetipsum glorificatus; ut quod apud eum ante habebat, maneret, neque alienaret ab eo formae Dei naturam formae seruiis adsumptio; sed apud semetipsum glorificaret formam serui, ut maneret esse Dei forma: quia qui in Dei forma manaserat, idem erat in serui forma.

144 Recall Hilary’s multivalent use of forma discussed in Chapter 3. For the most part, forma refers not to nature but to the fundamental condition of the respective natures, that is, glory, power and majesty for the forma dei; humility and infirmity for the forma serui. In this way, when Christ takes on the forma serui, the condition of humility which it entails is incompatible with the condition of glory which is the forma dei: he must empty himself of the forma dei, that is, estrange himself from the paternal glory. Though the Son
This separation from the Father has both negative and positive soteriological implications. Negatively, the body and the humanity of Christ serve as an impediment to salvation precisely because the *forma serui* is not consubstantial with the Father and so the humanity of Christ is not, by nature, transparent to the divinity. The humanity in and of itself does not reveal God; it is Jesus Christ’s mode of acting, his divine power—displayed in his works and miracles—that reveals his unity with the Father and thus the Father himself. Positively, the *infirmitas* and *humilitas* of human nature become, in the incarnation, the privileged locus of salvation. Christ’s body is the place where humanity is integrated into the divine and so is the point of access to the Father. Hilary says that “the entirety of the dispensation was this: that now the whole Son, indeed man and God, through the indulgence of the paternal will, would be in the unity of the paternal nature…. The foreignness of the *forma serui* to the Father’s nature is what necessitates its glorification. Humanity must be glorified so that the Son, now forever bonded to humanity, can be in complete unity with the Father again.

The glorification of the assumed humanity, the *forma seruí*, is the resolution of this divide from the Father. The resurrection has a Trinitarian dimension in that it can empty himself of divine glory, he can never empty himself of his divine nature. Hilary also, however, uses *forma dei* or *forma serui* to refer to the divine or human nature as such. When Hilary uses *forma* in this way, he maintains that even in his emptying, Christ never loses the *forma dei*, that is the nature of God.

For example, *De Trin.* 3.15 (CCL 62 86.6-7): Dei Filius homo cernitur, sed Deus in operibus hominis existit. *De Trin.* 2.28 (CCL 62 64.3-5): Tantum illud in uniueris uirtutum et curationum generibus contuendum est, in carnis adsumptione hominem, Deum vero in gestis rebus existere. See Ladaria’s discussion, centered almost entirely around Hilary’s *In Matthaeum*, on Christ’s revelation of his divinity through the divine power of his miracles (Ladaria, *Cristología de Hilario*, 135-154). For example, *De Trin.* 9.38 (CCL 62A 412.9-12): Sed summa dispensationis haec erat, ut totus nunc Filius, homo scilicet et Deus, per indulgentiam paternae voluntatis unitati paternae naturae inesset….

See Ladaria, *Cristología de Hilario*, 219-264. For the concept of glory in Hilary’s theology, Fierro’s work is still unsurpassed. Fierro argues that Hilary’s teaching concerning glory is a systematic argument with four main points. 1) Glory constitutes a reality of the divine order which corresponds to the Father and is communicated to the Son in its plentitude. 2) When the Son is made man, his human flesh is able to participate in this divine reality at the moment of Christ’s glorification. 3) Christ will make us participators
repairs Christ’s estrangement from the Father. The reparation of this estrangement is also the beginning of a new relationship for humanity with the Father.

…the newness of the dispensation had brought about an obstacle to unity, such that now there could be no unity, where before it had been perfect, unless the assumed flesh were glorified with him.\textsuperscript{148}

This glorification repairs the breach between Father and Son because now Christ’s humanity is \textit{forma dei}.\textsuperscript{149} It allows Christ’s humanity and, in it, all of humanity, to be glorified and enter into a new relationship with the Father, that of sonship. Only as sons will we receive the full revelation of who and what the Father is; therefore, revelation is only fully accomplished in the body of Christ. Revelation, as we have seen, transforms. Revelation and glorification, then, are two sides of the same coin. Glorification is reception of full revelation; full revelation eliminates the barrier between perceived and perceiver. We find that, in both the \textit{De Trinitate} and the \textit{Tractatus super Psalmos}, glorification is assumption into the glory of the Father’s nature. In Book 9 of the \textit{De Trinitate}, Hilary says:

\begin{quote}
And when, after the birth of man and having been glorified in man, he again shines forth in the glory of his own nature, God glorifies him in himself, when he is assumed into the glory of the Father’s nature, of which he had emptied himself through the dispensation.\textsuperscript{150}
\end{quote}

In his comment on the 138\textsuperscript{th} Psalm, we find a nearly identical passage:

\begin{flushleft}
in his glory by configuring our bodies to his glorious body. 4) Then we will be able to see God face to face and contemplate the glory of God (see Fierro, \textit{Sobre la gloria}, 85). Fierro also makes a distinction between resurrection and glorification (though he acknowledges that Hilary does not consistently maintain this distinction): resurrection is to be glorified; glorification is to be glorified specifically in the Father (ibid., 146-149).
\end{flushleft}

\textsuperscript{148} \textit{De Trin.} 9.38 (CCL 62A 412.24-26) :… dispensationis nouitas offensionem unitatis intulerat, et unitas, ut perfecta antea fuerat, nulla esse nunc poterat, nisi glorificata apud se fuisset carnis adsumptio.
\textsuperscript{149} Hilary does make a clear distinction between the glory of Christ and our glory: to be made totally God pertains only to Christ. See the explanation in Fierro, \textit{Sobre la gloria}, 158.
\textsuperscript{150} \textit{De Trin.} 9.41 (CCLB 418.48-51): Et cum post natiuitatem hominis glorificatus in homine, in naturae suae rursum gloriam clarescit, in se eum Deus clarificat, cum in naturae paternae gloriam, ab ea per dispensationem euacuatus, adsumitur.
And he is again in the glory of God the Father, that is, when the form of the servant, progresses into the glory of him in whose form he was remaining before, that is, when the nature of corruption has been absorbed through the perfection of incorruption.151

The Son is glorified in the Father, namely he is assumed into the glory of the Father’s nature. When these texts are read in light of Hilary’s teaching concerning Christ’s assumption of all humanity, we see that they speak not of Christ only, but also of humanity, every individual of which is now present in the body of Christ. Humanity, in Christ, is assumed into the glory of the Father’s nature. Flesh, which in the forma serui only expressed Christ’s human condition, becomes, in the form of God, the image, expression, and reflection of God. The Son’s role in the dispensation is to be the means of our relationship with the Father.152

The Son’s role as instrument or mediator of humanity’s relationship with the Father reflects the Son’s eternal relationship with the Father. The Father is greater in that he is the generator; he is the source and the end of all things. Nevertheless, the Father shares all that he is with the Son through generation. Though the Son receives, he receives all. Integration into the body of Christ and participation in his divine nature is participation in full divinity. However, just as the Son, himself true God, is yet also defined by his relationship to the Father, so also glorified humanity, existing in the body

151 Tr. ps. 138.19 (CCL 61B 202.11-14): Et rursum in gloria Dei Patris est, forma uidelicet seruili in gloriam eius, cuius in forma ante manebat, proficienete, corruptionis scilicet natura per perfectum incorruptionis absorta. Proficienete is a form of proficiere: according to Fierro, this is a favorite term of Hilary but is common among other Latin theologians to express προκοπή, the Greek word, used first by Athenagoras and then commonly, to express a progress toward divine perfection. For Hilary it means the benefit and progress that glory effects on the flesh and which salvation signifies. The “profectus” of glory has as its object a better nature, because glory is the “form or dignity of nature” (see Fierro, Sobre la gloria, 205, 217). See also Buffer, Salus in St. Hilary, 186.

152 See Fierro, Sobre la gloria, 176: “El ser humano de Cristo tiene la función de hacer sensible y accesible a los hombres la luz y la gloria de Dios.”
of Christ, participates fully in divinity by looking toward, and being defined by, its relationship with the Father.

Our discussion in Chapter Five of Hilary’s use of the word *adsumere* sheds light on the patercentric nature of Hilary’s soteriology. Hilary, we saw, expands the range of the word *adsumere* to include the incarnation in addition to its traditional theological use in reference to the ascension. The incarnation, in Hilary’s thought, is man “assumed” by Christ. The ascension is Christ “assumed” by the Father. The Father, in “assuming” Christ, “assumes” also the man Christ has assumed. The incarnation and the ascension are each, in Hilary’s thought, a prolongation of each other.¹⁵³ *Adsumere* highlights the two movements of salvation. The first is the movement of kenosis in which the Son moves from the glory of the Father to existence as man. The second, which is the reverse of the first, is the movement of glorification: humanity, in the Son, moves into the glory of the Father.¹⁵⁴ Hilary’s soteriological model is one in which Christ participates in humanity so that humanity may participate in him, not as an end in itself, but as the only means of knowledge of, and relationship with, the Father; for no one knows the Father but the Son—and those who have been made sons in the Son.

**CONCLUSION**

Hilary’s theological system is patercentric. This centrality of the Father is consistently born out in Hilary’s Trinitarian theology and in his soteriological system,

---

¹⁵³ See the discussions of the semantic range and theological import of *adsumere* in Hilary’s work in Orazzo, “Ilario di Poitiers e la *universa caro*,” 409-414, and Iacoangeli, “‘Sacramentum Carnis, Sanguinis, Gloriarum’,” 523-524. Hilary’s use of the same word—*adsumere*—for the two mysteries of the incarnation and the ascension shows his theological unification of the two.

¹⁵⁴ See also Doignon, “‘Adsumo’ et ‘adsumptio’.”
including eschatology and ecclesiology. Hilary’s apparent focus on the Son is the necessary means to the beginning and the end, namely the Father. The Son has no other purpose than to reveal the truth of the Father and to bring creatures into union with the Father. The Son fulfills his role in several ways.

1) As the eternal Son he reveals the eternal Father.
2) He is the mediator in the act of creation and so reveals the Father as the ultimate origin of all things.
3) He accomplishes the revelation of the Father to humanity, first through his interactions with Israel: giving the Law, inspiring the prophets, etc.
4) The most perfect mediation of the Father to humanity is accomplished in the incarnation. For Hilary, this is the best way because it requires no other mediation than the Son himself, that is, it does not require the Law or the prophets etc. It is Christ’s assumption of all humanity that is the real perfection of the incarnation, because there is no extra step as there would be in a system where Christ assumes an individual human nature with a two-step result: first his individual nature is glorified and saved; second there is a transference of this salvation and glorification to all other individuals.\(^{155}\)

Hilary’s desire to eliminate this extra step between Christ and the salvation of all individuals is one of the reasons we cannot say his theology of the incarnation is Platonic.

If Christ assumed the universal form of humanity, this universal form would be glorified

\(^{155}\) Buffer’s presentation of Hilary’s conception of salvation is marred precisely because he does not assimilate Hilary’s teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity; rather he presents Hilary as teaching a two-step salvation: first Christ, then the rest of humanity. In this presentation Christ is primarily an exemplar: “…Jesus Christ is the exemplar of human salvation. The mysteries of salvation, first accomplished in his death and resurrection, are the pattern for the fulfillment of those same mysteries in believers” (Buffer, Salus in St. Hilary, 179). Because Buffer portrays Hilary’s Christ as an exemplar and teacher, he understands salvation as dependent upon faith, and the Church primarily as a transmitter of saving knowledge (211-222).
in Christ’s glorification, but then the glorification of individuals would come, not directly from Christ, but through this universal form.

The mediation of the incarnation is so perfect that it becomes the eternal way for us. Our presence in Christ’s body gives us contact with, and so knowledge of, the Son and leads us to contact with, and knowledge of, the Father. We can never bypass the Son and be in direct contact with the Father because the end reflects the beginning, and if the Son becomes nonessential in the end, then he is also nonessential in the beginning.

We see then that Hilary’s soteriology and Trinitarian theology are perfectly balanced, one reflecting the other. For Hilary’s soteriology there is only one road—the Son—that leads only one place—the Father. This salvific movement in the Son toward the Father reflects the Father’s eternal revelation of himself through the Son.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

This dissertation has dealt with Hilary’s controversial redemption model in which Christ saves humanity by assuming every single person into his body in the incarnation. Because of a misinterpretation of his understanding of Christ’s assumption of all humanity, Hilary, along with several Greek Fathers, has been accused of heterodoxy resulting from Platonic influence. In the course of my dissertation, I demonstrated that Hilary is not influenced by Platonism; rather, though his redemption model is unique among the early Latin Fathers, he derives his theology from a combination of Latin-influenced biblical exegesis and classical Roman themes. The implications of this aspect of Hilary’s thought expand into nearly every realm of his theology: I addressed the areas of soteriology, christology, eschatology, ecclesiology and Trinitarian theology. I have sought to make two points in this dissertation. First, Hilary’s teaching concerning Christ’s assumption of all humanity is a unique development of Latin sources. Second, this teaching is a prominent part of Hilary’s entire theological system and so illustrates the unified nature of Hilary’s theology.

HILARY’S TEACHING OF CHRIST’S ASSUMPTION OF ALL HUMANITY IS NEITHER IMPORTED FROM THE EAST NOR INHERITED FROM THE WEST

Hilary’s redemption model, and specifically his teaching that Christ assumes all of humanity in the incarnation, is neither inherited from the West nor imported from the East. Even though Hilary is the only Latin theologian (with the possible exception of his
contemporary Gregory of Elvira) to have this soteriological model, Hilary’s teaching is thoroughly Latin in that it is his personal, theological development of Latin sources.\footnote{Furthermore, though Hilary is almost immediately after his death considered a Father and read as an authority, his distinctive redemption model is not appropriated except, perhaps, by Gregory of Elvira. Even Augustine, who uses Hilary’s \textit{Tractatus super Psalmos} for his own \textit{Ennarationes in Psalmos}—and is, according to Burns, the best reader of Hilary’s Psalm commentaries (see Burns, “Hilary of Poitiers’ \textit{Tractatus},” 27-28 as well as the Epilogue)—does not assimilate Hilary’s model of Christ’s assumption of all humanity into his own theological system. We await a future comparative study of the Psalm commentaries of Hilary and Augustine to know whether Augustine is even aware of this aspect of Hilary’s thought.}

While similar teaching existed in the East, Hilary’s teaching does not derive from Eastern influence whether theological or philosophical (in the form of Platonism). I have shown, through a historical study of Hilary’s education, his knowledge of Greek, and the status of Latin Platonism, as well as through textual study of Hilary’s pre- and post-exilic works, that before Hilary had access to Greek theology or philosophy, he was teaching Christ’s assumption of all humanity.

The uniqueness of Hilary’s teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity and the mystery of his independent development of a teaching that in every other author is dependent upon different sources (most notably the works of the Platonists) is cause enough for a study on this aspect of Hilary’s teaching. Furthermore, Hilary’s teaching on Christ’s assumption of all humanity is more than a curious side note in Hilary’s theology. However Hilary originally developed this teaching, it becomes, throughout his career, a more and more integral piece of his entire theological system. The physicalist redemption model dependent upon Christ’s assumption of all humanity is not only present in Hilary’s thought, but becomes determinative of his thought.

\textbf{HILARY’S TEACHING OF CHRIST’S ASSUMPTION OF ALL HUMANITY DEMONSTRATES THE UNIFIED NATURE OF HIS THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM}
Study of Hilary’s teaching on Christ’s assumption of all humanity is both a
neglected and a fruitful entrance into Hilary’s entire theological system in that it provides
a window into the matrix of interconnectedness among all areas of Hilary’s thought.
From the beginning of Hilary’s theological reception until the present day, there has been
little recognition of the presence and prominence of this teaching in Hilary’s thought.
However, throughout the dissertation I have shown that this overlooked teaching
influences all the major areas of Hilary’s theological system.

In accomplishing the analytic act of breaking down Hilary’s theology into the
components of christology, soteriology, eschatology, ecclesiology, and Trinitarian
theology, I have striven to achieve a synthesis and a demonstration of the unified nature
of Hilary’s entire theological system. Prior to this dissertation, there exists only one other
work that offers a unified approach to Hilary’s theology.² Hilary scholarship has long
been content to break his theology into chunks and the result of this method is a distinct
sense that each segment of Hilary’s theology is unaffected by the others. So Hilary’s
Trinitarian theology is discussed with little notion of his soteriological system or vice
versa.

However, through my study of Hilary’s teaching concerning Christ’s assumption
of all humanity, I have found that Hilary’s teaching is unified. As a result, an academic
presentation of Hilary that denies or ignores the unified nature of Hilary’s theology is not
being true to its source. This ostensibly soteriological teaching cannot even be fully
explicated without delving into Trinity, eschatology, ecclesiology, etc. In this

² Alfredo Fierro, *Sobre la gloria*. 
dissertation, I have shown that, for example, a study on Hilary’s ecclesiology must take into account Hilary’s presentation of the Church as the body of Christ. To understand this presentation we would have to look at what Hilary means by the body of Christ. As we now know, Hilary’s understanding of the body of Christ is as a body that physically contains all humanity in a relationship that is only fully fulfilled in the eschaton. This eschatological fulfillment of humans in Christ’s body is the eschatological Church, a Church that manifests the eternal Trinitarian relationship of the Father and the Son, for the Son is the eternal mediator between God and his creation. Ecclesiology contains soteriology, eschatology, and Trinitarian theology in Hilary’s thought. The same is true for all the other areas; they are not self-sufficient. To separate Hilary’s theology into the traditional doctrinal areas is to render it incoherent.

THE STANDARD SCHOLARLY PERCEPTION OF HILARY IS DRIVEN BY A DIVISIVE METHOD OF STUDY

There is a standard scholarly opinion about the value of Hilary’s theology that, until recently, has dominated the field, namely, that Hilary’s only theological contribution is in the field of Trinitarian theology. On the basis of this rather exclusive interest, Hilary receives two different distinctions in the realm of modern scholarship. Hilary is most often considered either traditional—and therefore important only as a historical marker—or hopelessly incomprehensible, a muddle of East and West, joined by sloppy language. These two designations—that Hilary is historically unimportant and that he is incomprehensible—are coupled together in a recent commentary on Hilary’s theology by Lionel Wickham:
Yet Hilary’s doctrine of God, and most of his own arguments, would have looked crude to his Greek contemporaries, did appear irrelevant to Augustine and always receive apologetic qualification from the modern historians who mention them…. The culminating De trinitate is a work whose incoherences…are matched by obscurity of expression.”

The most disturbing thing about Wickham’s presentation of Hilary’s theology is that Wickham is himself the author of a book on Hilary. Hilary scholars are the first to undercut their chosen field.

These rather low perceptions of Hilary’s theological contribution are based on, and driven by, a method of studying Hilary. In this method, Hilary’s theology is divided according to the categories of modern systematic theology. There are, as a glance at any bibliography of Hilary scholarship will demonstrate, studies of Hilary’s ecclesiology, his soteriology, his eschatology, and predominantly his Trinitarian theology. With this method of study, it is inevitable that Hilary’s theology becomes either traditional or unintelligible. Either Hilary is historically uninteresting because we insist on categorizing his theology according to modern judgment and assimilating him to his peers—in so doing eliminating all his individuality—or we recognize Hilary’s individuality only to throw up our hands at Hilary’s “incomprehensibility” because we no longer know how to classify or study him.

This low perception of Hilary exists even despite his famous title as “The Athanasius of the West,” a name given to him by the German scholar K. Hase in 1836. However, Hase’s title for Hilary shows the nineteenth-century German, not the modern,

---

3 Lionel Wickham, review of The Trinitarian Theology of Hilary of Poitiers by Mark Weedman. Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 60.2 (2009): 330-331. See also Carl Beckwith, who says that scholars “struggle to assess Hilary’s own contribution to the history of Christian thought,” and “are reluctant to credit Hilary with his own theological and exegetical creativity” (Beckwith, Hilary of Poitiers on the Trinity: From De Fide to De Trinitate [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008], 210).
perception of Hilary’s theological contribution. In the classic German doctrinal histories, Hilary is the Western counterpart to Athanasius: the promoter and protector of Nicea. However, the title “Athanasius of the West” for Hilary has recently lost scholarly, if not popular, impetus. Furthermore, “Athanasius of the West” is not as praiseworthy designation as it once was. Scholarship is demonstrating that Athanasius’ historical influence is much smaller than initially supposed. As Athanasius is stepping down from his role as the post-Nicea theological giant in the East, Hilary seems to be losing his role as the corresponding giant in the West. As scholarship brings to light more of the smaller theologians of the late fourth-century, Hilary’s Trinitarian theology no longer seems so distinctive. Hilary is certainly distinct from Tertullian and Novatian, on the one hand, and Augustine, on the other, but as his own contemporaries receive more scholarly treatment, Hilary’s Trinitarian theology is seen to have several parallels. Therefore, Hilary’s title as “Athanasius of the West” does little to raise the modern scholarly perception of his historical contribution.

A NEW (UNIFIED) METHOD LEADS TO A NEW PERCEPTION

This dissertation is intended as a corrective to modern scholarly perceptions of Hilary. This perception, as we have said, is based on a method of studying Hilary. This dissertation is the result of the conscious application of a different method. It is not

---

5 For example, Harnack says of Hilary: “He was the first theologian of the West to penetrate into the secrets of the Nicene Creed, and with all his dependence on Athanasius was an original thinker, who, as a theologian, far surpassed the Alexandrian Bishop” (History of Dogma, vol. 4, 73).

surprising that this different method leads to a remarkably different, and more positive, perception of Hilary’s theological contribution.

Instead of dividing Hilary’s thought according to modern codifications of theology (for example, into Trinitarian theology or soteriology), I use a method that begins with a single idea found in Hilary’s *Tractatus super Psalmos*—namely that Christ assumes all of humanity into his body at the incarnation—and I trace this idea wherever it takes me. As we have seen, this idea led me into the supposedly distinct areas of soteriology, ecclesiology, eschatology, and Trinitarian theology. In the course of this dissertation, I have shown that Hilary’s theology does not neatly divide into these categories. Any division of Hilary’s thought needs to accomplished according to a criterion that comes from Hilary’s own thought, not from modern systematics.

My method of pursuing a single idea throughout Hilary’s theological corpus results in a new appreciation of Hilary’s theological contribution. First, we need to question our exclusively Trinitarian interest in Hilary. I show that Hilary’s teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity influences his Trinitarian understanding, and yet this teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity is often relegated to the realm of soteriology. This sort of relegation has made scholars blind to the presence of Christ’s assumption of all humanity as a unique aspect, not only of Hilary’s soteriology, but of his Trinitarian teaching. Hilary’s Trinitarian theology is impoverished when it is studied according to the modern systematic classification.

Furthermore, my study of Hilary found him neither historically uninteresting nor incomprehensible. Hilary has been considered historically uninteresting because scholars have systematically denied to Hilary the presence of unique or historically unexplained
thoughts. In the first chapter of this dissertation, I dealt with the history of scholarly
denial that has accompanied the theological presence of Hilary’s teaching concerning
Christ’s assumption of all humanity. For the sake of “protecting” Hilary from heterodoxy
or out of genuine confusion as to its origins, the scholarly pattern is to deny that Hilary
teaches that Christ assumes all of humanity. I would argue that Hilary’s teaching that
Christ assumes all of humanity is among the most interesting of Hilary’s theological
contributions. When this contribution is denied him, Hilary becomes, not surprisingly,
much less historically interesting.

Hilary’s perceived incomprehensibility is often simply a question of vocabulary.
Hilary has a style of writing that is not reader-friendly because he has a tendency to use
technical vocabulary in a way that allows, and even fosters, several meanings for each
term. Furthermore, Hilary makes no effort to signal to his reader which of his meanings
he is using at any given time. However, difficulty does not equal incomprehensibility.
More vocabulary studies are needed to aid in understanding of Hilary’s theological
project. The vocabulary studies we have are of limited usefulness because they follow
the method I delineated above that divides Hilary’s theology into modern systematic
areas. The trick to understanding Hilary’s Trinitarian use of the term *persona*, for
example, is to look at his prosopological use of *persona* to refer to the two “natures” of
Christ. Understanding Hilary’s technical use of *persona* in the Trinitarian realm depends
upon his technical use of *persona* in the exegetical and christological realms. The point
is that, notwithstanding the difficulties of Hilary’s theology—of which there are
several—much of the “incomprehensibility” of Hilary’s theology can be alleviated
through a wider and less divisive appropriation of his thought.
WHAT DOES HILARY HAVE TO OFFER?

Studied properly, Hilary, is neither historically uninteresting nor incomprehensible. The question is: What does Hilary offer? This is a question that needs to be addressed in two different ways. More, and more sympathetic, study of Hilary is valuable both to the historian and to the theologian.

Hilary’s Contribution to the Historian

As historians, we are always seeking greater historical accuracy. I will offer three points to consider. First, Hilary’s reception history indicates that Hilary was considered almost immediately as one of the doctors and Fathers of the Church. To say, as we read in Wickham, that Hilary was irrelevant to his successors, including Augustine, is simply false. Second, Hilary sheds light on the theology of his contemporaries. Third, with his teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity in the incarnation, Hilary offers to the West a unique theological insight. An account of the theology of the fourth-century must include not only Hilary’s Trinitarian theology but also his soteriology in order to be complete.

First, the immediate reception of Hilary illustrates the historical weight of Hilary’s theology upon his successors. Augustine has the highest regard for Hilary and his theology. He calls Hilary a “distinguished doctor of the Church”\(^7\) and says that Hilary

“must be venerated.”

Obviously, Augustine recognizes that Hilary made significant theological contributions to the Church. Augustine’s veneration makes no sense if Hilary is historically insignificant or unintelligible, rather it is historical evidence that Hilary’s theology was significant—and significantly influential to Augustine, among others.

Second, Hilary sheds light on his contemporaries. In the course of this dissertation concerning Hilary’s teaching on Christ’s assumption of all humanity, I came into contact with the, as yet unaccounted for, parallels between Hilary and Gregory of Elvira. A study of Hilary also may contribute to greater understanding of Gregory of Elvira and to the historical question of the dating of his *Tractatus origenis*. Gregory is the only other Latin author who has hints of a teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity. Furthermore, word-for-word parallels between Gregory’s *Tractatus origenis* and Hilary’s *Tractatus super Psalmos* manifests direct appropriation. Greater study of both Hilary and Gregory is needed to show the direction of this appropriation. I can only imagine that Gregory of Elvira is not the singular example of the clarification that can be gained in the studies of other fourth-century theologians through comparison with Hilary.

Third, in this dissertation, I have shown that Hilary has at least one theological insight—that Christ assumes all of humanity bodily in the incarnation—that he shares with no other Latin theologian. In this teaching, Hilary is not just a representative of the fourth-century West; rather, he adds something distinctive to the Western tradition. A historical account of the theology of the fourth-century must include Hilary’s teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity. Hilary’s teaching of Christ’s assumption of all

---

8 Augustine, *Contra Iulianum* 2 (PL 44 col. 678.44): et ideo uenerandus hilarus. Augustine also speaks highly of Hilary’s exegetical skills (*De Trinitate* 6.10): et quia non mediocris auctoritatis in tractatione scripturarum et assertione fidei uir exstitit, (hilarius enim hoc in libris suis posuit)…

9 See Chapter 2 for a more lengthy discussion of the parallels between Hilary and Gregory of Elvira.
humanity is a new take on the Latin tradition; for this reason it is of historical interest. In particular, why Hilary developed this understanding and why no one else took him up on it (except perhaps Gregory of Elvira) are two questions that should pique historians’ curiosity.

_Hilary’s Contribution to the Theologian_

Hilary’s teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity opens up a new panorama for soteriology in the Western Church, one which can also aid in the ecumenical effort. The teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity is unique to Hilary among the Latins but common among the Greek Fathers. Though Hilary does not use the term “divinization” to speak of the manner of human redemption, it should be clear that Hilary’s physicalist redemption model shares nearly all but name with a divinization model. Harnack includes the doctrine of divinization in his critique of the Hellenic corruption of the original purity of Christianity.¹⁰ The divinization model of redemption—taught by several Greek Fathers, recently given new life by Vladimir Lossky, and a pillar of the Orthodox Church—is, according to the logic of those who still follow Harnack’s theory, a corruption of true Christianity. However, Hilary’s teaching of Christ’s assumption of all humanity with its corresponding mystical, physical, or divinization-type model of redemption, is independent of Platonism and nearly all Greek influences. Hilary’s divinization model is not Hellenic and so cannot, by modern

¹⁰ Divinization is the result of the “progress of Christian Hellenism,” (Harnack, _History of Dogma_, vol.2, 10).
Harnackians, be rejected as such.\textsuperscript{11} In this way Hilary gives the favored understanding of redemption in the Orthodox Church new feet to stand on. Hilary’s teaching of divinization also offers Western Christians an entrance into this redemption model through one of their own. In all this, study of Hilary can assist ecumenical efforts between Eastern and Western Churches.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

Hilary offers something useful to the modern scholar. Hilary is a clear historical marker in the changing theologies of the post-Nicene Church. He is also a historical quandary in his development of a unprecedented Latin soteriology. The difficulty of Hilary’s theology, noticed by Hilary scholars old and new, is a far cry from incoherence. In searching for coherence, modern Hilary scholarship must not satisfy itself with breaking Hilary into bits easily palatable to our modern ways of thinking. The wealth of Hilary’s theology will only come to light when his theology is presented as the systematic whole that he envisioned.

\textsuperscript{11} Except, of course, insofar as Hilary follows Paul.
HILARY OF POITIERS

TREATISE ON THE PSALMS:


ON THE TRINITY:


COMMENTARY ON MATTHEW:


TREATISE ON THE MYSTERIES:


MINOR WORKS:


OTHER PRIMARY SOURCES


**SECONDARY SOURCES**


———. “Note sul Commento a Matteo di Ilario di Poitiers.” *Vetera Christianorum* 1 (1964): 35-64.


