The Arms Scandal of 1870-1872: Immigrant Liberal Republicans and America’s Place in the World

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On February 20, 1872, future president James A. Garfield wrote in his diary that Senator Carl Schurz had just made “the most brilliant senatorial speech of his life.” That was no small compliment, given Schurz’s renown as an orator. He had begun public speaking in 1848, rousing restive Germans as a student revolutionary. When the uprisings failed the following year, he moved to the United States, where he quickly learned English and went on to much greater acclaim. Abraham Lincoln praised his work on the stump in 1860, rewarding him first with a position as United States minister to Spain and later with a commission as a brigadier general in the Union army. After the Civil War, Schurz turned his rhetorical talents to the cause of black suffrage. It was as a Radical Republican as well as a leader of German Americans that Schurz was selected to represent Missouri in the Senate in 1869.

Although historians of Reconstruction are familiar with Schurz’s career, the performance that caught Garfield’s eye in 1872 usually escapes their attention. Schurz was demanding an investigation into the War Department’s sale in 1870 and 1871 of surplus rifles to E. Remington & Sons, a New York firm under contract with the French government. In anticipation of a good afternoon’s entertainment, foreign diplomats, residents of the capital city, and representatives from the House crowded into the Senate chamber. With the galleries packed to capacity, senators passed a motion to allow women to listen from the cloakrooms, and when that proved insufficient, the spectators squeezed onto the floor, flanking Vice President Schuyler Colfax. According to the Chicago Tribune, Schurz’s speech elicited “an interest and an attendance almost unprecedented in the recent history of Senatorial debates.”

Schurz’s audience listened attentively for three hours while he accused the War Department of violating American law regarding neutrality and breaching the statutes governing the drawdown of U.S. armories. He exhibited a firm
command of the details of a complicated case—proxy buyers and specially manufactured ammunition added to the intrigue"—while driving home a few main points. The neutral status of the United States was at issue because the transactions had occurred at the height of the Franco-Prussian War, which arrayed all of the German states except Austria against their longtime enemy to the west. A few days before the big speech, Schurz had quoted a petition sent to him in the winter of 1870-71 by a group of immigrants who had complained that American weapons were "killing our brothers and relatives." Now he stressed that all Americans should be worried if "this great American Republic of ours understands and interprets her good faith and her neutral duties only upon a strictly cash principle!" It would have been bad enough if all the profits had gone into government coffers, but Schurz suspected that bribery was behind the abuses.

The arms scandal was one of many such exposés in the era of Crédit Mobilier, "Boss" William M. Tweed, and the Whiskey Ring, but it stood apart in injecting immigrant politics and international comparisons into the Liberal Republican critique of the administration of Ulysses S. Grant. Schurz's public condemnation of the arms deal drew meaning from changing patterns of German-American self-identification during the period of the Franco-Prussian War and German unification, and it represented new ideas about how the United States related to—and compared with—other countries. As essays in this volume by Caleb Richardson and Julia Brookins also show, immigrants had interests quite particular to their position in the United States, but they maintained emotional ties to their homelands and brought transnational perspectives to the often illiberal and violent project of creating, defending, and governing nation-states. Schurz had previously held German governments up as negative examples, but he now accompanied his censures of American behavior with admiring descriptions of certain aspects of German administration. Simultaneously, he pushed to professionalize the American civil service along the lines of its British and Prussian counterparts. Approaching this international scandal with attention to German-American politics facilitates a recasting of the Liberal Republican movement and the political culture of the 1870s in general.

Historians agree that although the Liberal Republicans were unsuccessful in unseating Grant in 1872, their campaign to limit the federal government, reform the civil service, and reconcile northern and southern whites held profound implications. Liberal Republican proposals would of course affect the status of African Americans in the South, the concern around which Reconstruction historiography has revolved. Several historians have disputed the idea that racism
was the movement’s driving force, observing that leading Liberal Republicans expressed no more hostility toward African Americans than their Republican adversaries and that Liberal Republicans generally appreciated the achievement of formal equality before the law. The new party’s leaders did, however, associate black voters with corruption and what they deemed excessive government involvement in the economy. Such prejudices were evident in their conservative misgivings about governance under Grant and their forward-looking interest in expert-led reform. In reality, it is difficult to isolate racism from other motives. Explaining the Liberal Republican movement therefore requires recapturing the subtle reordering of priorities that defined a group that coalesced, briefly, in opposition to another party then identified with African American rights.

Examining the arms scandal contributes to the task of explaining the Liberal Republican shift by positioning it internationally. The reform ethos of the Liberal Republicans heralded a new style of transnational comparison in which Americans became more comfortable drawing political inspiration from European sources. It also partook of the rising interest in administration around the world. Informed by their optimism for the future of the German Empire, the immigrants whom Schurz represented took up the issue of exemplary bureaucracy with a gusto that opened the way for the subordination of black voting rights as a political priority.

For scholars interested in understanding the United States in a transnational perspective, German-American Liberal Republicans help bridge the historical gap between the antislavery Forty-Eighters—refugees of the Revolutions of 1848—and the public intellectuals educated in German universities in large numbers after 1870. Historians have already integrated German immigrants into the burgeoning literature that traces how foreign ideas, events, and people influenced the American antislavery impulse and connects the U.S. Civil War to efforts to consolidate nation-states around the globe. Historians such as Daniel T. Rodgers and Andrew Zimmerman have also described how Germany featured in the late nineteenth century’s promiscuous transnational sharing of interrelated ideas of empire, race, labor control, business regulation, and social safety nets in an industrializing world. In showing that events overseas reverberated in American political culture during the intervening period of Reconstruction, this chapter builds on the work of historians such as Philip M. Katz, David Prior, and Gregory P. Downs. Most ambitiously, it gestures toward the contours of Thomas Bender’s sweeping argument about global connections and contexts in *A Nation Among Nations: America’s Place in World History*. Although actors at the time could not know it, the arms scandal marked a moment when ambitions
to secure "freedom in an age of nation-making" were yielding to struggles over how to administer government in an era of industrialization. 19

A brief survey of the activities of the German Forty-Eighters before 1870 shows that initially their transnational politics added momentum to the Republican efforts to extend the federal protection of black rights. Settling mainly in the North, they had converted their passion for German unity and individual rights into hostility toward slavery and support for the Union war effort. As Republican politicians, the exiles aspired to lead all of the 1.3 million odd German immigrants who made the United States home by 1860, but they ran up against the diversity of their community. 20 Members of the substantial Catholic minority and residents of eastern states were especially likely to remain loyal Democrats. Nonetheless, Forty-Eighters attained standing among German Americans who were trying to define a place for themselves in a new country. At the same time, they won influence among Anglo-American Republicans who believed that immigrants were vital swing voters in tightly contested Midwestern elections. 21

German immigrants also owed their prominence in the Republican Party to the sense that their German connections granted them special insight into the United States. Before the rise of the Liberal Republican movement, Schurz and other Forty-Eighters in the Republican Party went out of their way to compare the country favorably to European states. They used their first-hand knowledge of states under dynastic rule to reinforce the ubiquitous Republican trope that slave societies resembled backward aristocracies. 22 Although the Forty-Eighters certainly believed that slavery stood in the way of their chosen land realizing its own ideals, they held that it represented, as Schurz said in 1859, "the last depositories of the hopes of all true friends of humanity." 23

During the 1860s, German-American Republicans used international comparison and appeals to ethnic superiority differently than Schurz would in 1872. Inspired by the spirit of 1848, they popularized the idea of the "freedom-loving German" who had been thwarted in Europe but crossed the Atlantic to stand against slavery. A St. Louis editor wrote on the eve of the Civil War that German Americans held a unique "mission" in the "present crisis" because they were "filled with more intensive concepts of freedom, with more expansive notions of humanity than most peoples of the earth." 24 While such conceits could hardly stand up to scrutiny, they were nonetheless powerful. 25 They guided moderate German Republicans toward black rights, and even German-American Democrats in the North began to embrace such ethnic claims. They were quicker than their native-born colleagues to come around to emancipation and, later, black suffrage. 26
After the war, leading German-American Republicans used their transnational credentials to provide important encouragement to the laws and constitutional amendments that promoted African American rights. Having completed his military service by the summer of 1865, Schurz famously toured southern states and found evidence to support the enfranchisement of black men. In his *Report on the Condition of the South*, Schurz focused on the “effect of the extension of the franchise to the colored people upon the development of free labor and upon the security of human rights in the South.” Some of Schurz’s colleagues, speaking to a narrower, German-language audience, were more explicitly transnational in their pro-suffrage arguments. In stumping for Grant in the 1868 election, Forty-Eighter August Willich described black suffrage as the capstone of German Americans’ global mission, telling Cleveland Germans that they must “continue to act for the dominance of the German spirit, in accordance with complete freedom.” The connection he made between German-American identity and black rights sounded plausible because African-American suffrage was gaining ground among Republican politicians between 1865 and 1870. But voting returns in state referenda tell a more nuanced story. German wards, even Republican-leaning ones, frequently disappointed Republican leaders. As Julia Brookins points out in Chapter 6 of this volume, German Texans cared more about national control than liberal laws. Schurz’s waning interest in black suffrage after 1870 did not signify a complete reversal among his constituents.

Using immigrant experiences to compare the United States to other countries was always a limited tool for dismantling racial inequality. Important leaders constructed German-American ideals in a way that supported the interests of African Americans for the time being, but the transnational approach of the white immigrants had intrinsic weaknesses from the standpoint of Americans of color. Even at its most idealistic, the image the freedom-loving German was only ever tenuously connected to the lives of black southerners, who were far less important to Schurz than the immigrants upon whom he built a career. German Americans’ self-absorption made them unreliable allies, and so too did their preoccupation with events far across the Atlantic Ocean. The energy from the Revolutions of 1848 survived with surprising vigor in late 1860s America, but conditions in Europe were always subject to change. If unsuccessful uprisings could so forcefully shape how immigrants participated in American politics, what might come of a conventional land war with a traditional adversary?

France declared war on Prussia in July of 1870, setting in motion events that would transform Europe and reconfigure German-American politics. Prussian
Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck was ready, eager even, for an armed confrontation. A military threat was just what he needed to convince smaller German states to unite under Prussian auspices, completing the complex and drawn out process of national consolidation. The German forces advanced rapidly, besieging Paris and capturing Emperor Louis Napoleon III on the battlefield by September. The French responded by declaring a republic and fighting on until their final defeat in January 1871. By that time, Wilhelm I of Prussia was emperor of the new Germany; Bismarck was its chancellor.

Schurz’s arms scandal was part of the American—and especially German-American—response to the Franco-Prussian War. The recently laid Atlantic cable gave the European events an immediacy that prior conflagrations had lacked. Ohio Governor Rutherford B. Hayes received a letter from an associate in New York informing him that “the war telegrams make immense excitement here. A]s much as our own war.” Newspaper correspondents used the wires to dispatch updates on troop movements and sieges, while long-form descriptions of troop morale and supply networks still came by mail. Most American newspaper editors matched the stream of information with commentary. They evaluated the military strength of each side and contemplated the relative merits of the French Republic and the German Empire. Republicans, who were swayed by Prussia’s Protestantism and an interest German immigrant votes, showed more sympathy toward the Germans than the Democrats. Napoleon III had earned Republican distrust when he encouraged the Confederacy with his invasion of Mexico during the Civil War. (At the time, General Grant had gone as far as facilitating the covert arming of the Juárist resistance to the French-supported government, an act Schurz could have turned to his political advantage in 1872 if he had known of it.) When the Franco-Prussian War began, President Grant proclaimed American neutrality but told his minister to France, Elihu B. Washburne, “Every unreconstructed rebel sympathizes with France, without exception, while the loyal element is almost as universally the other way.” Revealing his own sympathies, Grant charged Washburne with representing the Germans who were stranded in Paris at the outbreak of hostilities. Grant’s opponents in the Democratic Party, even leaders with solidly Unionist credentials, were indeed more likely to defend France. They cited its republican heritage and contributions to the American Revolution, arguments that won more support after the declaration of the Third French Republic.

Among German Americans, there were few partisan divisions over the war itself. Not only did they see France as the aggressor, but they also welcomed the unification that had eluded the revolutionaries of 1848. In large cities and small
towns across the United States, thousands of German immigrants attended "sympathetic meetings." At these and a host of demonstrations and fundraisers, Forty-Eighters who had once fought Prussian troops thrilled at the prospect of German lands uniting under Bismarck’s control. German-American Catholics disagreed with the Forty-Eighters on many things, but they joined the excitement, predicting naively that Bismarck’s Protestantism would not affect his administration. There were only a few pockets of dissent from the general fervor. In some cities, Hanoverians and socialists warned of Bismarck’s authoritarian tendencies. One radical working-class newspaper in New York, for example, was famous for its critique of German Americans’ zeal for Bismarck’s war. The Arbeiter-Union lost subscribers and folded in 1870, a fate that observers attributed to this position. Schurz summed up the climate of opinion before a crowd in Chicago, stating, "The great soul of Germany, which for ages has haunted the history of the world like a specter, has finally found again a body mighty like herself." At this moment of intense optimism, most German Americans were willing to place their aspirations for Germany’s future in the hands of Bismarck’s government.

German Americans did not endorse all of Bismarck’s positions, but the euphoria of 1870–71 carried with it new priorities relevant to the arms scandal, the Liberal Republican movement, and a new kind of transnational outlook in the United States. Wishful thinking among the immigrants led them to accentuate the positive aspects of German governance. Hoping that individual rights and democratic decision-making, the two main priorities of 1848, would follow in due course, German-American leaders turned their attention to Prussia’s educational success, military might, and incorruptible civil service. Missouri’s St. Charles Demokrat, for example, attributed the triumph of German troops over the French to a comprehensive system of public education superior to that of the United States. The German armies won editorial praise for their training, order, and efficiency, although a few German Americans warned of the risk that such admiration could slide into an endorsement of militarism. Regardless of these cautions, the exuberant war news that filled every German-American newspaper for months argued strongly for German prowess. When France became a republic, immigrants had to explain why they believed that “Germany is today, without bearing the name, closer in reality to the concept of the true essence of a free state than Paris with all its republicanism.” The faith that “minor institutions” expressed German capacities formed part of the answer. Cincinnati Republican J. B. Stallo told a crowd in September 1870, “No republic can be made overnight merely by proclaiming it; it must be developed slowly and gradually within a Volk, in its minor institutions, in its everyday actions and intentions.”
tails of administration were as important as electoral systems. The encouraging lessons of 1870 seemed as significant to German immigrants as the cautionary tales of 1848, and the sale of American arms to the French became an opportunity to communicate them.

On October 4, 1870, reports that the French were purchasing American guns made it out of the shipping news columns and onto the front pages of the New York newspapers. The New-York Tribune ran a dramatic description of dockworkers loading crates of small arms into a French Steamship Company vessel behind an improvised screen. The following day the paper disclosed that some of the boxes had been labeled with the names of U.S. arsenals and that the deliveries had been commissioned “by the direct order” of the new republican government of France. Despite the cloak-and-dagger tone of the reporting, the Tribune maintained that the rifle sales were consistent with American policy, which allowed individuals and companies to continue to sell arms to belligerents on a private basis. The administration could have agreed, asserting that it bore no responsibility for what private traders did after they bought arms from the government. Instead, it claimed that the United States was not selling arms to the French or the Prussians either “directly or indirectly.” The statement sounded like an outright denial of the Tribune account.

Many German Americans demanded clearer answers to the questions raised by Horace Greeley’s Tribune and other papers from late 1870 to early 1871. Immigrants in the Democratic camp naturally added aiding the French to their list of complaints against the sitting president. It provided a good rejoinder to German Republicans who capitalized on their party’s rhetorical support for the German cause. Oswald Ottendorfer, New York’s imposing Democratic editor and politician, sounded more incensed than Schurz ever would. In December 1870, he wrote, “The freedom-loving German people reached out the hand of brotherhood [during the Civil War], and now America delivers to their archenemy weapons with which German warriors will be destroyed and a brutal war will be prolonged. This ingratitude will be avenged sooner or later.” But Ottendorfer’s vehemence was atypical. Although the editor of the Democratic Cincinnati Volksfreund was no fan of Grant, he wrote more calmly that the affair merited “serious consideration.” Another Democrat, Milwaukee editor and state assemblyman Peter V. Deuster, asked the Wisconsin legislature to censure the president, but his newspaper, the Milwaukee Seebote, devoted only a few paragraphs to the proposal.

News of the shipments to France also provoked some German-American Republicans. Hermann Raster edited the Illinois Staatszeitung in Chicago, and
his service to Grant would soon earn him a post as local collector of internal revenue. In January 1871, Raster's paper printed an editorial that stated that the administration's position was "wrong [falsch], and must be condemned by every true American." Yet the editor perceived a relatively lackluster response from German Americans. He complained, "It has not occurred to anyone to do anything else about the matter other than holding forth behind a beer glass." Raster experienced the same sort of frustrations as the Fenain leaders trying to rouse Irish immigrants to fight the British Empire in Chapter 5. The readers of the *Illinois Staatszeitung* were not Germans but German Americans. In January 1871, some Chicago Germans did organize a public meeting, one of a flicker of protests in cities including Detroit, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C., which petitioned for an end to any sales.

Schurz felt the pressure by January 1870, but as he told his business partner, "raising the matter in Congress" was "a somewhat sensitive thing" in "the prevailing circumstances." The German-born freshman senator, who had already antagonized Grant, did not want to question American actions when the German Confederation had not lodged a public protest. Schurz's St. Louis newspaper, the *Westliche Post*, assured readers he would act, but the action occurred behind the scenes. On Saturday, January 21, after getting nowhere with Secretary of War William Belknap, he paid a call to the secretary of state, Hamilton Fish. Just two days later, he received a "personal and confidential" letter from Fish. The president, Fish confirmed, had ordered Belknap to "suspend all sales." German-language newspapers covered the halt, but English-language newspapers hardly mentioned it. By this point, French capitulation was the main story. The shipments and the war were over.

About a year would pass—from early 1871 to early 1872—before the arms sales reemerged as the arms scandal. New suggestions of bribery meant that German-American charges were more significant to the movement gathering against the Grant administration. A twist came when a diplomat, and not a German but a French one, Charles Adolphe de Pineton, the Marquis de Chambrun, approached Senator Charles Sumner shortly before Christmas 1871 with details of a French investigation into irregularities in arms purchasing during the recent European war. Although the distinguished Radical Republican from Massachusetts remained strongly committed to African-American rights, Sumner too had fallen out with Grant, and he was happy to share the new information with his friend Carl Schurz. By the end of January 1872, Schurz and Sumner were working together to sift through the evidence Chambrun had collected and the press had
Thinly veiled allegations that individuals in the War Department had taken money under the table in return for violating neutrality law drove two critical weeks of Senate debate on the international standing of the United States and administrative propriety. Direct evidence of bribes never surfaced, but Sumner cited Ordnance Bureau records that failed to account for hundreds of thousands of dollars. If highly placed employees had diverted assets, perhaps bribes had induced them to make unauthorized sales. But this line of inquiry was so poorly grounded that Sumner and Schurz backed away from it within a few days. They had simply misunderstood the charts. Schurz then took over, focusing on evidence that Secretary Belknap had learned that Remington & Sons was “an agent” of France in mid-October 1870, presumably shortly after his office denied trading with the country, and therefore cut off sales from the Ordnance Bureau to the firm. Schurz considered indirect sales to Remington’s firm using proxies between October 1870 and January 1871 just as reprehensible as the original transactions. Calling the idea that the Ordnance Bureau had exercised “reasonable diligence” in vetting dealers a “transparent farce,” Schurz quoted letters indicating that Samuel Remington had personally intervened to have cartridges manufactured in order to facilitate a deal that supposedly had nothing to do with his firm. Incredulous, Schurz exclaimed, “There is an impression prevailing in this country that somewhere in this Government there sits a military ring.”

Before Schurz’s numerous opponents got to the implications of his assault, they addressed the specific charges. They said that the secretary of war had never knowingly sold arms to France and contended that the Ordnance Bureau bore minimal responsibility for scrutinizing arms dealers. Matthew H. Carpenter of Wisconsin went so far as to argue that the United States government could trade in munitions without compromising its neutrality, but few senators agreed with his reading of international law, probably thinking of the arbitration still pending in the *Alabama* Claims. The United States was pursuing damages because Britain had failed to prevent ships such the *Alabama* from being built and sold to the Confederacy during the Civil War. In a novel step, the two countries had agreed to submit the issue and other disputes between the United States and Great Britain to an international tribunal. With the *Alabama* Claims still under consideration, Schurz pointed out, Americans did not want to appear to condone the equipping of belligerents in—and especially by—neutral countries.

Yet during the second half of February 1872, debate in the Senate ranged far beyond the case’s specifics to touch on the American place in the world and the
future of Republicans' southern policy. Senators and the public understood the scandal in the context of the Schurz's leadership of the solidifying Liberal Republican movement. During 1870 and especially 1871, his longstanding distaste for "party despotism" and preexisting inclination to treat former Confederates with magnanimity had come to dominate his politics. When he first entered the Senate in December 1869, he had introduced a civil service reform bill, and his interest in such legislation increased as Grant made poor appointments, removed Schurz supporters from office, and failed to disentangle the administration of government from party politics. Men such as Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, E. L. Godkin at The Nation, and Horace White at the Chicago Tribune shared Schurz's belief that outright corruption was connected to both the power of unqualified voters and federal overreach in subsidizing business, enacting tariffs, and enforcing black rights. Liberal Republicans issued a call for a national convention weeks before Sumner's resolution, so the scandal communicated, advanced, and shaped their program at a critical time.

In particular, the arms scandal reflected the ideas of the German-American Midwesterners who were both leading and following Schurz out of the Republican Party, away from active support for black rights, and toward new transnational comparisons. Disgruntled immigrants had been indispensable to the Liberal Republican movement from its early days in Missouri. About a third of the delegates to the Republican state convention of 1870, men mostly from St. Louis and other heavily German counties, had bolted to join a competing convention chaired by Schurz. The movement's spread left Grant with few high-profile German-American backers in the Midwest by the end of 1871. Chicago's Hermann Raster and Ohio's Lieutenant Governor Jacob Müller held out, as did scattered minor leaders, but important German-speaking Republicans such as Gustav Koerner, Caspar Butz, and Friedrich Hecker of Illinois, and J. B. Stallo, Friedrich Hassaurek, and August Thieme of Ohio were preparing to leave their party. Schurz later observed that German Americans "had joined [the Liberal Republicans] in Masse [sic] and "in some Western states they formed the whole backbone of the movement." At the national level, the proportion of Liberal Republicans among German Americans was higher than the proportion of German Americans among Liberal Republicans. But one of the reasons for Schurz's stature in the party was the belief that he represented an indispensable group of voters.

Since 1870, German-American Liberal Republicans had been developing a reform sensibility that incorporated their reactions to events in Europe and the original news of the arms shipments. When Schurz became the public face of the
arms scandal in February 1872, he had already been party to an eighteen-month discussion of administrative propriety that was fueled by unfavorable comparisons between the United States and other governments, especially the rising German state. In 1871, the editor of the *St. Charles Demokrat*, which had until recently supported Republican candidates, worried that corruption meant that the United States was “losing respect in the eyes of all other civilized nations.” The Democratic *Cincinnati Volksfreund* lamented, “Corruption, special interest legislation, and privileges, characterize our public life in such a conspicuous way that we must blush when we hold up our current state of affairs, republican in name only, as an example for other nations to imitate.” Also in Cincinnati, maverick Republican Friedrich Hassarek was annoyed that Americans feigned to have “the best government under the sun.” Another Forty-Eighter and discontented Republican, Friedrich Hecker, delivered a speech on the German-language lecture circuit in 1871 and 1872, which Schurz’s *Westliche Post* published weeks before the scandal broke. Hecker maintained, “In no civilized to half-civilized land of the world, not even in Turkey, is an unlimited administration in relation to the naming and removal of officials laid in the hands of an individual [the president] as here.” He was, in fact, critical of the Prussian system, too, which made him an outlier in the German-American community. Holding the United States to a higher standard than the German Empire, he remarked that the U.S. civil service was better fitted to a “princely state” than a “people’s state.” Like most German Americans, he preferred the United States, but Hecker presented it as an imperfect country grappling with common problems.

Standing in the Senate, Schurz built the arms scandal on the foundation of German Americans’ critical comparisons, but he found it unnecessary to detail them. His underlying complaint was that American corruption had deprived Prussia of the respect it deserved in international dealings. In relatively few words, he signaled to German Americans that he shared their perspective and reassured other Americans that foreign practices were no threat. Schurz stipulated that immigrants were devoted to “liberty” and “republican principles,” but also—and here lay the stress of the sentence—“honest government.” He notably spoke of upholding “the honor of the American name” far more frequently than he cited any German considerations. When he said, “My country right or wrong; if right to be kept right; if wrong to be set right,” he was talking about the United States. Yet he also declared, “I certainly am not ashamed of having sprung from that great nation whose monuments stand so proudly upon all the battlefields of thought; that great nation, which having translated her mighty soul into action, seems at this moment to hold in her hands the destinies of the Old World...”
Schurz spoke of origins, not allegiances, but the statement demonstrated his ongoing political engagement with Germany. Schurz defended the empire when Oliver P. Morton of Indiana and Roscoe Conkling of New York speculated that the allegations might “poison Prussian minds” against the United States right as Wilhelm I was about to sit on a tribunal to adjudicate one of the disputes with Britain related to the Alabama Claims. Schurz retorted that “mean, miserable, personal motives” did not drive the “great Government” of Germany.85

Schurz’s rhetorical defense of Germany had a policy corollary in Liberal Republican initiatives to institute civil service reforms to prevent the sort of corruption that they thought must have caused the arms scandal. Congress had debated several bills that included examinations and merit-based promotion standards like those that had developed in Prussia and other German states since the eighteenth century and in Britain since the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854.86 Back in 1865, Republican Congressman Thomas A. Jenckes had cited British, French, and Prussian precedents when he introduced an unsuccessful civil service reform bill, and in 1872, Horace White at the Chicago Tribune described the Liberal Republicans’ desired system as “English or Prussian” in a letter to Schurz.87 Schurz and others had strong domestic arguments for reform, so they did not make foreign references the mainstay of the English-language debate.88 It was only the beginning of a the transition from a politics of rights and representation in which most Americans considered themselves frontrunners to a politics of administration with international leadership up for debate.

In February 1872, some senators made the political risks of Schurz’s comparisons clear when they equated it with disloyalty. Frederick Frelinghuysen of New Jersey said that after reading part of one of Schurz’s speeches to German Americans he “could plainly see the chord of sympathy that ran and vibrated between the speaker and his auditors. I could see that the common bond of union between them was their own, their native land, the fatherland as the speaker called his home.” Frelinghuysen pointedly stated that Americans “have a sensitiveness in behalf of the honor of this country equal at least to the sensitiveness of Germans for the national rights of Germany.”89 Senator Carpenter, who represented the very German state of Wisconsin, was more hostile. He brought up the idea of apologizing to Prussia, which no one had advocated, so that he could say that he saw “humiliation” in “voluntarily prostrating ourselves before a foreign Power.” He generously “acquitted” Schurz of “want of patriotism,” but warned ominously that if a senator “is not able to cast off his allegiance to his native land,” perhaps naturalization law ought to be changed.90
Yet for all the attacks on Schurz, most senators joined their colleague in prais­ing German Americans and the new German Empire. Carpenter aside, even Grant’s supporters accepted the idea that incorruptible German immigrants made upstanding Americans. They flattered immigrant voters in hopes of dissuading them from leaving the party. Morton, for example, insisted, “[T]he Germans of this country do not belong to anybody. They cannot be carried in anybody’s breeches pockets. I do not care how capacious those pockets are. . . . They cannot be led from one party to another at the whim or caprice of politicians.” No one challenged Schurz’s positive depiction of Germany. Morton, Conkling, and Fre­linghuysen, three of his main opponents, all spoke respectfully of the new coun­try, instead fretting that what they saw as Schurz’s antics would alienate leaders that Americans admired. All this was in keeping with Grant’s statement to Con­gress the previous year, which complimented the German people and compared the German Empire to the United States. Republican senators would have read the approving accounts of Germany in their partisan newspapers and especially in the periodicals now aligning with the Liberal Republicans. Bismarck did not beguile Republicans, but they anticipated that his empire might incorporate what they considered the best of German traits and they treated it with a respect they had not accorded its forerunners. The resulting impression was that the United States and Germany belonged to a select community of states that were roughly equal. Just as they might arbitrate each other’s disputes, they would attentively observe and evaluate each other’s achievements.

No one who followed the scandal could miss the relevance of international standing and administrative probity to the domestic issues that have occupied scholars of the post-war United States. Liberal Republicans connected outright malfeasance to the active—they would say unconstitutionally overzealous—enforcement of the Reconstruction acts and amendments. During 1871, Schurz had opposed the Ku Klux Klan Act on the grounds that empowering the president to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment might lead to abuses of executive power. He supported rather symbolic bills to grant amnesty to the few former Confeder­ates whom the Fourteenth Amendment still barred from holding office. Right before the arms debate, Schurz had spoken against Sumner’s efforts to amend an amnesty bill to include a provision outlawing racial discrimination in access to various public accommodations. In a substantial comment in the Senate, Schurz said that the main question confronting Americans since the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment was how to “secure good and honest government
Schurz repeated several times that "nothing could be further from my intention than to cast a slur on the colored people of the South," but he regretted that replacing "intelligent and experienced" voters with "ignorant and inexperienced" ones had led to what he saw as maladministration, which in his mind had exacerbated Ku Klux Klan outrages.

Less than a week later, while discussing the Ordnance Bureau sales, other Liberal Republicans alluded to the link Schurz perceived between corruption and Republican actions in the South. Lyman Trumbull of Illinois believed Americans would understand his reference to "the history of the enormous frauds which have been perpetrated in nearly all the reconstructed States" without further explanation. Thomas W. Tipton of Nebraska said Republicans had closed ranks ever since "the discovery was made that the President's body guard intended to make the first object of their reconstruction laws the perpetuation in power of the Republican Party in the South." Discussing corruption meant discussing southern policy.

Republicans loyal to Grant argued that anything that undermined the administration would result in victories for Democrats, who intended to erode the gains African Americans had made. Morton recounted the history of Missouri, where many more Democrats than Liberal Republicans had been elected to the Missouri legislature in 1870. The Liberal Republican governor, Benjamin Gratz Brown, had begun to support unabashedly racist Democrats, while the state legislature sent Frank Blair, Jr., to the Senate. Blair was famous for running a particularly nasty anti-black campaign for the vice presidency in 1868, and Morton now dubbed him Schurz's "official offspring."

As if to underline the potential cost of fraternizing with Democrats, Blair dismissed Republican accounts of Klan violence as "the foulest calumny ever perpetrated or circulated upon or against a helpless people" the day before Schurz's big speech on the arms deals.

Thomas Nast, the country's leading political cartoonist, illustrated the Republican interpretation of the racial import of a scandal that alleged corruption on the world stage. Nast had himself emigrated from Bavaria as a child, but the New Yorker stood aloof from German-American politics. His nativity seems to have served mostly to free him to attack Schurz with more gusto than Anglo-Americans dared display. One of Nast's many cartoons about the scandal, "Mephistopheles at Work for Destruction: A Bid for the German Vote," ran in Harper's Weekly in March 1872. In it, Schurz plays the devil from Goethe's celebrated tragedy Faust, tempting a wary Charles Sumner to abandon his racially egalitarian principles. The lanky German American leans over Sumner to guide his hand as he drafts his controversial Senate resolution, and behind his bent back is a sign
Figure 4.1. Thomas Nast depicts Carl Schurz as the devil from Goethe’s *Faust*, trying to tempt Charles Sumner to abandon his racial egalitarianism. *Harper’s Weekly*, March 9, 1872, 185.

reading, “WANTED: NEW PLANS FOR BREAKING DOWN THE ADMINISTRATION” and “WANTED: PLANS TO STIR UP BAD FEELINGS BETWEEN EUROPEAN POWERS AND THE UNITED STATES.” Sumner, whose large figure sits at the center of the page, gazes uncertainly over his shoulder at a female representation of the American republic. She is poised above large volumes entitled “Sumner’s Anti-Slavery Record” and “Sumner’s Rebellion Record.” Nast thought the scandal baseless and Schurz’s motives base, but worst of all was how it imperiled black rights.104

A German-American senator made a *cause célèbre* of the arms sales because they involved partisan power and national honor, but those same qualities checked the scandal’s progress. Anglo-American reactions followed the predictable lines of party affiliation. Democrats and Liberal Republicans located evidence of the corruption and partisan arrogance, while Republicans saw an underhanded
and potentially disloyal attempt to derail what they had gained in the South. Ethnicity changed the equation somewhat for German Americans. Immigrants from around the country wrote to Schurz to thank him for bringing a “German” approach to American corruption. One Ohioan enthused: “After I read your great speech on the ‘arms hagglers’ in the Cin. Volksblatt through very carefully, I feel compelled & spontaneously drawn to congratulate you from the bottom of my true German heart.” But the exuberance of the letters contrasted with the circumspection of the German-language press. The more of a spectacle the scandal became, the more reluctant editors seemed to be to identify as Germans. The relationship between the United States and Germany had to be handled carefully. Democrat Peter Deuster had brought the arms scandal to the attention of the Wisconsin legislature in 1871, but now his Milwaukee Seebote commented tersely that Democrats played the most “honorable” role in the Senate debate by staying quiet. Raster in Chicago, who still supported Grant, agreed with Schurz that an investigation was vital, but he disapproved of Schurz’s divisive grandstanding. Schurz’s most enthusiastic supporters were Liberal Republicans such as Friedrich Hecker and August Thieme.

Ultimately, the partisan nature of the wrangling and the imperative of national face-saving prevented the Senate investigation, and a smaller one in the House, from achieving more than adding to the general impression that Grant’s administration was an imperious one. Members of the Senate committee were exclusively Republican except for one Democrat, John W. Stevenson of Kentucky. Schurz himself participated, but as a witness and an unofficial member. In a canny political move, Republican senators had given the committee the additional responsibility of investigating senators’ possible entanglements with foreign powers, and Schurz could not investigate himself. Committee members grilled him at length on his interactions with foreign informants, apparently to raise suspicions about his loyalty. Chairman Hannibal Hamlin of Maine was thinking of Schurz when he provocatively asked Sumner, “Would you deem it the duty of a patriotic Senator to inquire of foreign legations in relation to questions which would tend to put his own Government in the wrong with other governments . . . ?” When Schurz acted as interrogator, Secretary Belknap and other witnesses from the War Department defended themselves and the Grant administration, testifying that any irregular practices only made money for the government. The officials stubbornly denied knowingly selling to direct agents of foreign powers. The committee took this position in its final report. Any infractions on the government’s part were minor technicalities, nothing to bring “dishonor” upon the country or “officers of the Government,” it concluded.
Schurz fired back by reiterating his transnational framing of corruption one last time in the Senate at the end of May. Agreeing with Stevenson that the sales were “in direct violation of the letter and spirit” of the law, he described the inadequacies of the investigation. The speech began by likening Grant’s “defiance” of public opinion to that of “profligate European aristocracies,” which clearly did not include modern Germany. He commended German immigrants for remonstrating against the sales and spoke at great length of “the honor and the international standing” of the United States. Senators again heard about the Alabama Claims and the importance of “favorable public opinion abroad.” Perhaps because it was repetitive, Schurz’s speech received only perfunctory coverage in the press, and the broader issue of corruption subsumed the scandal in the fall campaign. It is hard to see the scandal’s conclusion as anything but anticlimactic.

Yet even if Schurz’s work on the scandal did not result in prosecutions, it was, like the Liberal Republican movement more broadly, significant because it influenced American political culture. The Liberal Republican part in helping to spell the “doom of Reconstruction” bears emphasizing. Republicans began to appropriate Liberal ideas just weeks after the third party nominated Horace Greeley for the presidency. Congress finally passed an amnesty bill, and then in June, Republicans placed civil service reform and liberal economic policies on their national platform. Greeley became more active in criticizing Republican support for African Americans once Democrats endorsed him, a change that also affected his opponent. Grant was reelected, but he began a slow disengagement from the South. The president gave Democrats patronage positions, backed off prosecuting violations of the Fifteenth Amendment, and withheld aid from the victims of racially motivated attacks such as those that stained Mississippi’s elections in 1875. In the settlement that decided the 1876 election, Rutherford B. Hayes made it known that the military would stand down from the role it had assumed in the South since the war. The new president showed his debts to Liberal Republicans by selecting Carl Schurz to serve as secretary of the interior. Once he oversaw his own department, Schurz had his chance to implement a system of efficiency reports, examinations, and merit-based promotion.

The German-American Liberal Republicans who stoked the arms scandal were harbingers of the Gilded Age reform ethos of expertise and oversight that encouraged receptivity to examples overseas. Like their successors, they had an orientation that did not amount to a coherent ideology. German immigrants valued the American tradition and sometimes spoke in classical republican terms. They did not think of themselves as defending centralized power or authoritarian government—the very things for which they criticized Grant. It
would make no sense to see them as ambassadors for the ideas of German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel, whose work blurred the distinction between the people and the state. Yet German-American Liberal Republicans implicitly believed in the practical benefits of insulating officeholders from parties and markets by inducting them into a self-regulating group with its own criteria for inclusion and advancement. Their campaign to make a scandal of the arms sales both borrowed principles from European nations and negatively compared the United States to those nations.

The immigrants who turned optimistically from the reference point of the Revolutions of 1848 to the consolidating Germany of 1871 prepared the way for a generation of public intellectuals looking for solutions to the problems of industrialization. After 1870, the number of Americans attending German universities rose dramatically to several thousand per decade, with a peak in the 1890s preceding a rapid decline. Influential student sojourners such as Richard T. Ely and Henry C. Adams, and later W. E. B. Du Bois and Lincoln Steffans forged transnational bonds and exchanged political ideas. Ely, the important economist who features in Daniel Rodgers's seminal description of these developments, wrote an article in 1883 that showed how well the arms scandal augured the future. Describing the Prussian civil service for California's *Overland Monthly*, Ely included a nod to the republican example of Rome and the need for "public and private virtues," but he found in Prussia the sort of procedures that he believed could institutionalize such ideals. With a judicious eye on Bismarck's recent retaliations against dissenting public servants, he set out why scholars considered "the Prussian civil service the most admirable of which we have any knowledge." The piece contained nothing to surprise the immigrants involved in the arms scandal. They would have been glad to see their ideas spreading. The decade following the Civil War was not a hiatus between an era of transatlantic radicals and nationalists who criticized Europe's governments and an era of interconnected reformers and experts who were open to the lessons of Europe; it was a pivot.

Notes

The author is grateful to David Prior, Julia Brookins, and Andrew L. Slap for their encouraging and detailed criticism and to Mark Summers for his staggeringly comprehensive feedback.


4. Congressional Globe, 42nd Cong., 2nd sess. (all Globe citations refer to this session unless otherwise noted), 1131 (February 21, 1872); Chicago Tribune, February 21, 1872; Cincinnati Volksfreund, February 27, 1872.

5. Chicago Tribune, February 21, 1872.

6. Congressional Globe, App. 67 (February 20, 1872).

7. Ibid., App. 72 (February 20, 1872).

8. Ibid., 1047 (February 15, 1872).

9. Ibid., App. 70 (February 20, 1872).


22. Fleche, Revolutions of 1861, 40-43.


28. Cleveland Wächter am Erie, September 29, 1868.

29. Efford, German Immigrants, Race, and Citizenship, 120-42.

30. St. Louis Westliche Post, September 16, 1870.

31. J. A. Joel to Rutherford B. Hayes, Aug. 25, 1870, reel 19, Rutherford B. Hayes Papers (microfilm), Library of Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential Center (hereafter HPC), Fremont, Ohio.


37. America's largest German-language newspaper claimed from New York that it would be impossible to report all the sympathy meetings. Wochenblatt der New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung, July 23, 1870. There were elaborately planned gatherings in cities from New Orleans to Boston, spontaneous neighborhood celebrations, and smaller events in towns such as Toledo and Dayton in Ohio, Jefferson City, LaGrange, and St. Joseph in Missouri, and Wausau in Wisconsin. Westliche Post, August 1, 2, 8, 9, October 19, 1870; Cincinnati Commercial, July 20, 1870; Milwaukee Seebote Wöchentliche Ausgabe,

38. *Fremont Courier*, August 11, 1870; *Cincinnati Wahrheitsfreund*, September 7, 1870; *Cincinnati Volksfreund*, August 2, 1870. For reviews of the Catholic press on the war, see *Cincinnati Volksfreund*, August 26, 1870; *Seebote Wöchentliche Ausgabe*, August 10, 1870.


40. Schurz provided the translation in the Senate. “Soul” was probably his rendering of “Geist.” *Congressional Globe*, 1155 (February 22, 1872).


42. *St. Charles Demokrat*, January 26, 1871, December 15, 1870. See also *Seebote Wöchentliche Ausgabe*, January 23, 1871. German Americans sometimes communicated these points by quoting Anglo-Americans. See *Cincinnati Volksfreund*, August 23, September 1, 1870; *Watertown Weltbürger*, September 3, 1870.

43. For positive descriptions of the military, see *New Philadelphia Deutsche Beobachter*, August 15, 1870; and *Cincinnati Volksfreund*, February 13, 1871, September 29, 1870. For some wariness, see *Wächter am Erie*, April 11, 1871; *Illinois Staatszeitung*, January 7, 1871.

44. *Mississippi Blätter* [Sunday edition of the *Westliche Post*], September 25, 1870.

45. *Cincinnati Volksfreund*, September 8, 1870. See further civil service examples later in this chapter.

46. *New York World*, October 4, 5, and November 3, 4, 1870; *New York Times*, October 4, 5, 1870; *The Nation*, October 4, 5, 1870; *Cincinnati Enquirer*, October 5, 1870; *Cincinnati Commercial*, October 6, 1870.


52. *Cincinnati Volksfreund*, October 5, 1870.

53. *Seebote*, January 30 and February 6, 1871.

54. *Illinois Staatszeitung*, January 9, 1871.


57. *Westliche Post*, December 22, 1870. For a similarly cautious approach by a paper closely allied with Schurz, see St. Charles *Demokrat*, February 16, 1871.


59. Hamilton Fish to Schurz, January 23, 1871, reel 5, Schurz Papers, LOC, Washington. See also William Belknap to Schurz, January 24, 1871, reel 5, Schurz Papers, LOC. Francis Lieber also petitioned Fish. Lieber to Hamilton Fish, October 8 and November 17, 1870, February 14, 1871, vol. 73, 74, 76, Hamilton Fish Papers, LOC.

60. On the original *Westliche Post* notice, see St. Louis *Missouri Republican*, January 27, 1871. For a selection of fairly substantial stories, see *Cincinnati Volksfreund*, January 27, 1871; *Illinois Staats-Zeitung*, January 27, 1871; *St. Paul Minnesota Staats-Zeitung*, February 2, 1871; *Scranton Wochenblatt*, February 2, 1871; *Baltimore Deutsche Correspondent*, January 27, 1871. Nothing appeared in the *New York Times*, *New-York Tribune*, and *Chicago Tribune*, but there were a few lines on February 26, 1871 in small newspapers such as the *Boston Daily Advertiser*, *Central City (Colorado) Register*, and *Arkansas Gazette*.

61. Senate Report No. 183, 268-71. Chambrun's stake in the matter was never clear, but it appears that he expected that proving the culpability of Remington & Co. would lead to the exonation of certain of his countrymen. Ibid., 336-411.


63. *Congressional Globe*, 1017-18 (February 14, 1872); 1047 (February 15, 1872); 1066-67 (February 16, 1872).

64. Ibid., 1016 (February 14, 1872).

65. Ibid., App. 70, 69, 71 (February 20, 1872).

66. Ibid., 1048 (February 15, 1872), App. 72 (February 20, 1872).


68. Ibid., App. 124 (February 29, 1872). Harlan came closest to Carpenter. Ibid., 1015 (February 14, 1872).


75. Schurz to Horace Greeley, May 6, 1872, reel 7, Schurz Papers, LOC.

76. Efford, *German Immigrants, Race, and Citizenship*, 173.

77. *St. Charles Demokrat*, September 21, 1871. See also the issue of March 9, 1871.

78. *Cincinnati Volksfreund*, February 6, 1871. See also issues of August 25 and September 14, 1870 and *Waterstown* (Wisc.) *Weltbürger*, August 6, 1870.


82. Ibid., 1048 (February 15, 1872).

83. Ibid., 1287 (February 29, 1872).

84. Ibid., App. 111 (February 27, 1872).

85. Ibid., 1069 (February 16, 1872), App. 58 (February 19, 1872), App. 72 (February 20, 1872).


89. *Congressional Globe*, 42nd Cong., 2nd sess., App. 107 (February 26, 1872). For earlier remarks, see 1040 (February 15, 1872).

90. Ibid., App. 120, 126 (February 29, 1872). See also charges of improper contact with the Prussian legation. Ibid., App. 64–65 (February 19, 1872).

91. Ibid., 1069 (February 16, 1872). See especially further remarks by Morton and Frelinghuysen on pages 1132 (February 20, 1872) and 1041 (February 15, 1872).

92. Ibid., 1069 (February 16, 1872), App. 58 (February 19, 1872), 1040 (February 15, 1872).
94. The Nation, August 11, 25 and September 29, 1870; Cincinnati Commercial, August 31, 1870; Gazley, American Opinion of German Unification, 348–58.
95. Efford, German Immigrants, Race, and Citizenship, 182–83, 184.
96. Congressional Globe, 703 (January 30, 1872). For further debate on the amendment, see 928–29 (February 9, 1872).
97. Ibid., 699 (January 30, 1872). He also mentioned “new guarantees for the rights of the colored people,” a policy that he had already said he did not favor.
98. Ibid., 699, 700 (January 30, 1872). He had made the same point at an important Nashville speech calling for a complete break with the Republican Party in September 1871. Schurz, “The Need for Reform and a New Party,” September 20, 1871, in Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz, 2:283–84.
99. Ibid., App. 83 (February 23, 1872).
100. Ibid., 1075, 1076 (February 16, 1872).
101. Ibid., 1133 (February 20, 1872).
106. Louis Phillip Salterbach to Schurz, February 22, 1872, reel 7, Schurz Papers, LOC.
See also other German-language letters on this reel from February and March.
107. Seebote, March 4, 1872. See also Cincinnati Volksfreund, February 27, 28, 1872.
108. Illinois Staatszeitung, March 26, 27, 28, 1872. On Raster, see H. Holst to Schurz, New York, March 13, 1872, reel 7, Schurz Papers, LOC.
109. Schurz to Friedrich Hecker, March 1, 1872, reel 3, Friedrich Hecker Papers (microfilm), State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia; Wächter am Erie, March 9, 1872.
110. Congressional Globe, 1156 (February 21, 1872); Senate Report No. 183, 825, 11.
111. Ibid., 264–68, 334.
112. Ibid., 26, 177.
113. Ibid., 190, 472–74.
114. Ibid., xii.
115. Ibid., liv.
117. *New York Times*, June 1, 1872; *New-York Tribune*, June 1, 1872; *Chicago Tribune*, June 1, 1872; *Illinois Staats-Zeitung*, June 2, 3, 1872; *Cincinnati Volksfreund*, June 3, 1872; *Seebote*, June 2, 1872. For campaign references, see *Cincinnati Volksfreund*, October 8, 1872; *Cincinnati Volksblatt*, November 5, 1872; *Seebote*, September 23 and October 14, 1872; *Cleveland Anzeiger*, August 8, 1872; *Toledo Express*, September 4, 1872.
120. Ibid., 575–87; Trefousse, *Carl Schurz*, 239–41.