General John J. Pershing and America's Part in the World War in Episode of Efficient Effort for a Mistaken Cause

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GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING AND AMERICA'S PART
IN THE WORLD WAR AN EPISODE OF EFFICIENT
EFFORT FOR A MISTAKEN CAUSE.

By

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Bibliography
Preface

General John J. Pershing was chosen to command the American Expeditionary Force in Europe by President Wilson, an honor gained not only by his record of achievement, but also for his extreme loyalty to Government authority under hampering circumstances. Pershing was known as one of the coolest men under fire and possessed a character which compelled men not only to die, but to work, grumbling perhaps but respecting him.

Although the War to end War ended November 11, 1918, the world has never been free of war since. War ravaged Ireland and Russia for years after the World War. Revolutions shed blood in Germany and in Italy, long before the civil war in Spain. French soldiers fought the Riff, the Syrians and the Algerians to cement colonies to France. American troops were under arms in Haiti and Nicaragua. Japan found new battles to fight in Manchukuo before Shanghai became a shambles. Italy, fired with Imperial enterprise, waged a war in Ethiopia. In the nineteenth year of "the peace," the world groans under the heaviest armaments in history, adds more men to standing armies. New inventions promise sickening possibilities. New wars do not exempt civilian population! Even the United States and Britain are spending billions on new armaments. And the common people of all countries pay the bills! Let's pray and hope that our United States and its people will never experience another war. When International difficulties arise, let's settle them in a diplomatic, civilized and peaceful manner.

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partment of History of Marquette University in the development and completion of this thesis.
Chapter I
Causes of the War

The War of the nations, the most stupendous struggle the world has ever witnessed, involved every continent and all the Great Powers on the Globe.

On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-presumptive to the throne of Austria-Hungary, was killed at Sarajevo, Bosnia. Austria believed the murder was plotted in Serbia, and sent that country an ultimatum on July 23, followed by a declaration of war on July 28. Russia protested and mobilized her forces. Germany declared war on Russia August 1, and on France August 3, on which day she invaded Belgium. England joined with France and Russia August 4.

Of the other European countries, Belgium was forced into the war to defend her neutrality; Montenegro threw in her lot with Serbia from the beginning; Italy, Japan, Portugal, and finally Rumania joined the Allies, while Turkey and Bulgaria took the side of Germany and Austria. (1)

The independent and peace-loving countries of the New World endeavored to maintain an impartial neutrality, but their rights as neutrals were constantly disregarded. In her submarine warfare, Germany attacked liners and neutral merchant ships, contrary to all precedents of civilized warfare. February 1, 1917, Germany announced a renewal of submarine warfare against all vessels approaching the British coast, regardless of character or nationality. The United States immediately severed

(1) F. J. Reynolds - Collier's Photographic History of the European War. P. 3.
diplomatic relations with Germany, on February 3, 1917, and on April 6, Congress declared a state of war existing between the two countries. On April 7, the republics of Cuba and Panama aligned themselves with the United States in war on Germany. The sinking of a Brazilian vessel on the same day led that great South American republic to sever diplomatic relations with Germany on April 10. China had already done this on March 14. Thus countries not affected by the particular rivalries of Europe were drawn into the war.

F.J. Reynolds - op. cit., p. 3.
Chapter II

Life Story of Pershing

Pershing, John Joseph, American soldier, was born near Laclede, Missouri, September 13, 1860 — destined to as astonishing a rise from humble circumstances as Joffre, the first commander — in — chief in the World War of the other great republic. By teaching in a children's school he gained the means to study at the Kirksville, Missouri, normal school and then seized the chance to compete successfully for entry into the United States Military Academy. Passing out in 1886, he was commissioned in the sixth Cavalry and saw immediate service against the Apaches in Arizona. In 1890, during an uprising of the Sioux, he served in Dakota, in charge of the Indian scouts. In 1891, he was appointed military instructor at the University of Nebraska, where he took the opportunity to graduate in the law school. After being instructor in tactics at the United States Military Academy, he served in Cuba through the Santiago campaign (1898), where he earned from his commander the tribute, "Pershing is the coolest man under fire I ever saw." Soon afterwards he had the chance to show that he was more than merely brave and energetic, for, sent to the Philippines, he pacified by 1903 the fanatical Moros of Mindanao through an apt blending of force and diplomacy. In 1905 he went to Japan as military attache and witnessed part of the campaign in Manchuria. As a reward for his success in the Philippines, President Roosevelt in 1906 promoted him directly from captain to brigadier general, passing him over 862 senior (1)

(1) Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume XVII, p. 546
officers. Subsequently, he returned to the Philippines as commander of the department of Mindanao and governor of the Moro Province. Returning in 1913, he was sent from San Francisco in 1916 to command the punitive expedition into Mexico against Francisco Villa, and after the death of Major General Funston in 1917, he succeeded as commander on the Mexican border.

On America's entrance into the World War, Pershing was chosen to command the American Expeditionary Force in Europe, an honor gained perhaps not only by his record of achievement but also by his proof in Mexico of extreme loyalty to Government authority under hampering circumstances. With his staff he reached England on June 9, 1917, and four days later landed in France. To pass from guerilla expeditions in jungle, mountain and desert to the vast siege then in progress - or stagnation - on the western front was an extreme test, but in compensation for a military experience limited to petty expeditions he brought a trained administrative sense, with the will and knack of carrying through plans under difficulties. And while the Washington War department was contemplating a limited liability war, Pershing in France was methodically laying the foundation for an army of 3,000,000 men - stamped with the Pershing seal. If this plan, inevitably slow in fruition, imposed a severe strain on the exhausted Allies, it was justified not only by the proverbial warning against "putting new wine into old bottles"; for the alternative would have demanded an unprecedented sacrifice of national prestige. If the realization of an independent American army would be, as Pershing felt, a serious blow to German morale, it was al-
so likely to uplift the military spirit and self-confidence of the United States not only for the moment but for all time. (1)

The disasters of early 1918 seemed to show that a great risk had been taken in pursuit of this ideal, and they led Pershing to place all his resources freely at Foch's disposal. But directly the crisis began to pass he reverted to his policy, and at St. Mihiel, in September, it was consummated by the victory of the first American army in the first entirely American operation. This was followed by the Meuse-Argonne battle under Pershing's direction. If the attainment of its aims was slower and more costly than had been expected, Pershing had accepted the actual battle-ground in deference to his allies and against his own preference for a blow towards Metz. Even so, it is probable that he underrated the difficulties of breaking through a strongly organized trench system, as well as the causes that had sapped the offensive spirit of the French. He had a Grant-like ruthlessness, similarly lacking the personal magnetism which leads men to lay down their lives gladly, but he had the character which compels men not only to die but to work, grumbling perhaps, but respecting him. (2)

It was a just recognition of his achievement in creating almost from nothing the vast structure of the national army that, on September 1, 1919, he was confirmed in the permanent rank of general, a grade held previously by only four Americans, Washington, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan. In 1921, he was appointed chief-of-staff, and during his tenure of office he de-

(2) Ibid, P. 547.
signed the new permanent framework of the United States army. Subsequently, appointed by President Coolidge as the United States representative and ex-officio head of the commission to supervise the plebiscite under the Tacna-Arica arbitration award, he went to Arica in July, 1925, but, owing to health, had to resign. He returned home in February, 1926. (1)

(a) Efficiency of Pershing

Pershing assumed the duties of Commander-in-chief of the American Expeditionary Forces on May 26, 1917, and, accompanied by a small staff, departed for Europe on May 28. He arrived at London on June 9 and, after spending some days in consultation with the British authorities, reached Paris on June 13.

Following the rather earnest appeals of the Allies for American troops, it was decided to send to France, at once, 1 complete division and 9 newly organized regiments of Engineers. The division was formed of regular regiments, necessary transfers of officers and men were made, and recruits were assigned to increase these units to the required strength.

The offer by the Navy Department of one regiment of Marines to be reorganized as Infantry was accepted by the Secretary of War, and it became temporarily a part of the First Division. (2)

Prior to our entrance into the war, the regiments of our small army were very much scattered, and we had no organized units.

(2) Final report of General John J. Pershing, P. 5.
even approximating a division, that could be sent overseas prepared to take the field. To meet the new conditions of warfare an entirely new organization was adopted in which our Infantry divisions were to consist of 4 regiments of Infantry of about treble their original size, 3 regiments of Artillery, 14 machine-gun companies, 1 Engineer regiment, 1 Signal battalion, 1 troop of Cavalry, and other auxiliary units, making a total strength of about 28,000 men. (1)

Military Situation

In order that the reasons for many important decisions reached in the early history of the American Expeditionary Forces may be more clearly understood and the true value of the American effort more fully appreciated, it is desirable to have in mind the main events leading up to the time of our entry into the war. (2)

1914

Although the German drive fo 1914 had failed in its immediate purpose, yet her armies had made very important gains. German forces were in complete possession of Belgium and occupied rich industrial regions of northern France, embracing one-fourteenth of her population and about three-fourths of her coal and iron. The German armies held a strongly fortified line 468 miles in length, stretching from the Swiss border to Nieuport on the English Channel; her troops were within 48 miles of Paris and the initiative remained in German hands. (3)

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(2) Ibid, p. 6.
(3) Ibid, p. 6.
ed Germany, even before the Battle of the Marne, to send troops to that frontier, but the close of 1914 found the Russian armies ejected from East Prussia and driven back on Warsaw. (1)

The entry of Turkey into the war, because of the moral effect upon the Moslem world and the immediate constant threat created against Allied communications with the Far East, led to an effort by the Allies in the direction of the Dardanelles.

1915

Italy joined the Allies in May and gave their cause new strength but the effect was more or less offset when Bulgaria entered on the side of Central Powers.

The threatening situation on the Russian front and in the Balkans was still such that Germany was compelled to exert an immediate offensive effort in those directions and to maintain only a defensive attitude on the western front. German arms achieved a striking series of successes in the vicinity of the Mazurian Lakes and in Galicia, capturing Warsaw, Brest-Litovsk, and Vilna. The Central Powers overran Serbia and Montenegro. Meanwhile, the Italian armies forced Austria to use approximately one-half of her strength against them. (2)

In the west, the French and British launched offensives which cost the German armies considerable loss; but the objectives were limited and the effect was local.

The Dardanelles expedition, having failed in its mission, was withdrawn in January, 1916. In Mesopotamia the Allied operations had not been successful. Although the British fleet had

(1) Final report of General John J. Pershing, P. 6
(2) Ibid, p. 6.
established its superiority on the sea, yet the German submarine blockade had developed into a serious menace to Allied shipping. (1)

1916

Germany no doubt believed that her advantage on the eastern front at the close of 1915 again warranted an offensive in the west, and her attack against Verdun was accordingly launched in the spring of 1916. But Russia was not yet beaten and early in June, aided at the same time by the threat of an Italian offensive in the west, she began the great drive in Galicia that proved so disastrous to Austria. (2)

Roumania, having entered on the side of the Allies, undertook a promising offensive against Austria. The British and French Armies attacked along the Somme. Germany quickly returned to the defensive in the west, and in September initiated a campaign in the east which, before the close of 1916, proved unfortunate for Russia as well as Roumania. (3)

Spring of 1917

Retaining on the eastern front the forces considered sufficient for the final conquest of Russia, Germany prepared to aid Austria in an offensive against Italy. Meanwhile, the Russian revolution was well under way and, by the midsummer of 1917, the final collapse of that government was almost certain.

The relatively low strength of the German forces on the western front led the Allies with much confidence to attempt a decision on this front; but the losses were very heavy and

(2) Ibid, p. 7.
the effort signally failed. The failure caused a serious reaction especially on French morale, both in the army and throughout the country, and attempts to carry out extensive or combined operations were indefinitely suspended. (1)

In the five months ending June 30, German submarines had accomplished the destruction of more than three and one-quarter million tons of Allied shipping. During three years Germany had seen practically all her offensives except Verdun crowned with success. Her battle lines were held on foreign soil and she had withstood every Allied attack since the Marne. The German general staff could now foresee the complete elimination of Russia, the possibility of defeating Italy before the end of the year and, finally, the campaign of 1918 against the French and British on the western front which might terminate the war. (2)

It can not be said that German hopes of final victory were extravagant, either as viewed at that time or as viewed in the light of history. Financial problems of the Allies were difficult, supplies were becoming exhausted and their armies had suffered tremendous losses. Discouragement existed not only among the civil population but throughout the armies as well. Such was the Allied morale that, although their superiority on the western front during the last half of 1916 and during 1917 amounted to 20 per cent, only local attacks could be undertaken and their effect proved wholly insufficient against the German defense. Allied resources in man

(2) Ibid, p. 7.
power at home were low and there was little prospect of materially increasing their armed strength, even in the face of the probability of having practically the whole military strength of the Central Powers against them in the spring of 1918. (1)

This was the state of affairs that existed when we entered the war. While our action gave the Allies much encouragement yet this was temporary, and a review of conditions made it apparent that America must make a supreme material effort as soon as possible. After duly considering the tonnage possibilities Pershing cabled the following to Washington on July 6, 1917: (2)

"Plans should contemplate sending over at least 1,000,000 men by next May."

Organization Projects

A general organization project, covering as far as possible the personnel of all combat, staff, and administrative units, was forwarded to Washington on July 11. This was prepared by the Operations Section of Pershing's staff and adopted in joint conference with the War Department Committee then in France. It embodied Pershing's conclusions on the military organization and effort required of America after a careful study of French and British experience. In forwarding this project Pershing stated:

"It is evident that a force of about 1,000,000 is the smallest unit which in modern war will be a complete, well-balanced, and independent fighting organization. However, it must be equally clear that the adoption of this size force as a basis of study should not be construed as representing the maximum force which should be sent to or which will be needed in France."

(2) Ibid, p. 8.
It is taken as the force which may be expected to reach France in time for an offensive in 1918, and as a unit and basis of organization. Plans for the future should be based, especially in reference to the manufacture of artillery, aviation, and other material, on three times this force - i.e., at least 3,000,000 men." (1)

While this general organization project provided certain Services of Supply troops, which were an integral part of the larger combat units, it did not include the great body of troops and services required to maintain an army overseas. To disembark 2,000,000 men, move them to their training areas, shelter them, handle and store the quantities of supplies and equipment they required called for an extraordinary and immediate effort in construction. To provide the organization for this purpose, a project for engineer services of the rear, including railways, was cabled to Washington August 5, 1917, followed on September 18, 1917, by a complete service of the rear project, which listed item by item the troops considered necessary for the Services of Supply. (2)

In order that the War Department might have a clear-cut program to follow in the shipment of personnel and material to insure the gradual building up of a force at all times balanced and symmetrical, a comprehensive statement was prepared covering the order in which the troops and services enumerated in these two projects should arrive. This schedule of priority of shipments, forwarded to the War Department on October 7, divided the initial force called for by the two projects into six phases corresponding to combatant corps of six divisions each. (1) Final report of General John J. Pershing, p. 3. (2) Ibid, p. 8.
The importance of the three documents, the general organization project, the service of the rear project, and the schedule of priority of shipments should be emphasized, because they formed the basic plan for providing an army in France together with its material for combat, construction, and supply. (1)

General Staff

The organization of the General Staff and supply services was one of the first matters to engage Pershing's attention. Our situation in this regard was wholly unlike that of our Allies. The French Army was at home and in close touch with its civil government and war department agencies. While the British were organized on an overseas basis, they were within easy reach of their base of supplies in England. Their problems of supply and replacement were simple as compared with ours. Their training could be carried out at home with the experience of the front at hand, while our troops must be sent as ships were provided and their training resumed in France where discontinued in the States. Our available tonnage was inadequate to meet all the initial demands, so that priority of material for combat and construction, as well as for supplies that could not be purchased, in Europe, must be established by those whose perspective included all the services and who were familiar with general plans. For the proper direction and coordination of the details of administration, intelligence, operations, supply, and training, a General Staff was an indispensable part of the Army. (2)

(1) Final report of General John J. Pershing, p. 11.
(2) Ibid, p. 12.
The functions of the General Staff at Pershing's headquarters were finally allotted to the five sections, each under an Assistant Chief of Staff, as follows: To the First, or Administrative Section — ocean tonnage, priority of overseas shipments, replacement of men and animals, organization and types of equipment for troops, billeting, prisoners of war, military police, leaves and leave areas, welfare work and amusements; to the Second, or Intelligence Section — information regarding the enemy, including espionage and counterespionage, maps, and censorship; to the Third, or Operations Section — strategic studies and plans and employment of combat troops; to the Fourth Section — coordination of supply services, including Construction, Transportation, and Medical Departments, and control of regulating stations for supply; to the Fifth, or Training Section — tactical training, schools, preparation of tactical manuals, and athletics. This same system was applied in the lower echelons of the command down to and including divisions, except that in corps and divisions the Fourth Section was merged with the First and the Fifth Section with the Third. (1)

As the American Expeditionary Forces grew, it was considered advisable that, in matters of procurement, transportation, and supply, the chiefs of the several supply services, who had hitherto been under the General Staff at Pershing's headquarters, should be placed directly under the supervision of the commanding general, Services of Supply. At General Headquarters, a Deputy Chief of Staff to assist the Chief of Staff was provided. (1) Final report of General John J. Pershing, p. 12.
and the heads of the five General Staff sections became Assistant Chiefs of Staff. (1)

The General Staff at Pershing's headquarters thereafter concerned itself with the broader phase of control. Under Pershing's general supervision and pursuant to clearly determined policies, the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, coordinated by the Chief of Staff, issued instructions and gave general direction to the great combat units and to the Services of Supply, keeping always in close touch with the manner and promptness of their fulfillment. Thus a system of direct responsibility was put into operation which contemplated secrecy in preparation, prompt decision in emergency, and coordinate action in execution. (2)

With the growth of our forces the demand for staff officers rapidly increased, but the available number of officers trained for staff duty was very limited. To meet this deficiency, a General Staff college was organized at Langres on November 28, 1917, for the instruction of such officers as could be spared. An intensive course of study of three months was prescribed embracing the details of our staff organization and administration, and our system of supply, and teaching the combined employment of all arms and services in combat. Officers were carefully chosen for their suitability and, considering the short time available, graduates from this school returned well equipped for staff duties and with a loyal spirit of common service much accentuated. The Staff College carried to completion four courses of three months each, graduat-

Training

Soon after our arrival in Europe careful study was made of the methods followed by our Allies in training combat troops. Both the French and British maintained continuously a great system of schools and training centers, which provided for both theoretical and practical instruction of inexperienced officers and noncommissioned officers. These centers were required not only to train new troops, but to prepare officers and soldiers for advancement by giving them a short course in the duties of their new grades. These school systems made it possible to spread rapidly a knowledge of the latest methods developed by experience and at the same time counteract false notions. (2)

A similar scheme was adopted in August, 1917, for our Armies, in which the importance of teaching throughout our forces a sound fighting doctrine of our own was emphasized. It provided for troop training in all units up to include divisions. Corps centers of instruction for noncommissioned officers and unit commanders of all arms were established. These centers also provided special training for the instructors needed at corps schools. Base training centers for replacement troops and special classes of soldiers, such as cooks and mechanics, were designated. The army and corps schools were retained under the direct supervision of the Training Section, General Staff. The schools mentioned graduated 21,330 non-

commissioned officers and 13,916 officers. (1)

Particular care was taken to search the ranks for the most promising soldiers, in order to develop leaders for the command of platoons and companies. There were graduated from these candidate schools in France 10,976 soldiers. It was planned to have 22,000 infantrymen under instruction by January 1, 1919, graduating 5,000 to 6,000 each month. In addition, there were to be graduated monthly 800 artillerymen, 400 engineers, and 200 signalmen, making a total of about 7,000 soldiers each month. Prior to November 14, 1918, 12,732 soldiers were commissioned as officers. (2)

It must not be thought that such a system is ideal, but it represents a compromise between the demand for efficiency and the imperative and immediate necessity for trained replacement officers. (3)

Every advantage was taken of the experience of our Allies in training officers. It was early recommended to the War Department that French and British officers be asked for to assist in the instruction of troops in the United States. Pending the organization and development of our own schools, a large number of our officers were sent to centers of instruction of the Allied armies. The training of our earlier divisions was begun in close association with the French divisions, under conditions set forth in the following paragraph on divisional training:

sive as opposed to the offensive. To guard against this, the basis of instruction should be essentially the offensive both in spirit and in practice. The defensive is accepted only to prepare for future offensive." (1)

For training our Artillery units, special localities such as Valdahon, Coetquidan, Meucon, and Souge, had to be sought, and the instruction was usually carried on in conjunction with French artillery followed up later, as far as possible, with field practice in cooperation with our own Infantry. (2)

The long period of trench warfare had so impressed itself upon the French and British that they had almost entirely dispensed with training for open warfare. We wished to avoid this result in our Army and to encourage the offensive spirit instead. (3)

Recommendations were cabled to Washington emphasizing the importance of target practice and musketry training, and recommending that instruction in open warfare be made the mission of troops in the United States, while the training in trench warfare so far as necessary be conducted in France. Succeeding divisions, whether serving temporarily with the British or French, were trained as thus indicated. The assistance of the French units was limited to demonstrations, and, in the beginning, French instructors taught the use of French arms and assisted in the preparation of elementary trench warfare problems. (4)

Assuming that divisions would arrive with their basic training completed in the United States, one month was allotted for the instruction of small units from battalions down, a second month of experience in quiet sectors by battalions, and a

(4) Ibid, p. 15.
third month for field practice in open warfare tactics by division, including artillery. Unfortunately many divisions did not receive the requisite amount of systematic training before leaving the States and complete preparation of such units for battle was thus often seriously delayed. (1)

The system of training profoundly influenced the combat efficiency of our troops by its determined insistence upon an offensive doctrine and upon training in warfare of movement. Instruction which had hitherto been haphazard, varying with the ideas and conceptions of inexperienced commanding officers and indifferent instructors, was brought under a system based on correct principles. Approved and systematic methods were maintained and enforced largely by the continual presence of members of the Training section with the troops both during the training period and in campaign. (2)

Intelligence.

Before our entry into the war, European experience had shown that military operations can be carried out successfully and without unnecessary loss only in the light of complete and reliable information of the enemy. (3)

From careful studies of the systems and actual participation by our officers in methods in use at various Allied headquarters, an Intelligence Service was evolved in our forces which operated successfully from its first organization in August, 1917. (4)

With us the simpler methods, such as observation from the air and ground and the exploitation of prisoners and docu-

(2) Ibid, p. 15.
(3) Ibid, p. 16.
(4) Ibid, p. 16.
ments, have proved more effective than the less direct means. Every unit from the battalion up had an intelligence detachment, but only in divisions and larger organizations did the intelligence agencies embrace all available means and sources, including radio interception stations and sound and flash-ranging detachments. (1)

The subjects studied by the Intelligence Section embraced the location of the enemy's front line, his order of battle, the history and fighting value of his divisions, his manpower, his combat activities, circulation and movement, his defensive organizations, supply, construction and material, air service, radio service, strategy and tactics, and what he probably knew of our intentions. The political and economic conditions within the enemy's countries were also of extreme importance. (2)

To disseminate conclusions, daily publications were necessary, such as a Secret Summary of Intelligence containing information of the broadest scope, which concerned only General Headquarters; and a Summary of Information, distributed down to include the divisions, giving information affecting the western front. A Press Review and a Summary of Air Intelligence were also published. (3)

Maps showing graphically the disposition and movement of enemy troops in our front were the best means for distributing information to our troops. At the base printing plant and at General Headquarters base maps were prepared while mobile print-plants, mounted on trucks, accompanied corps and army headquarters. Combat troops were thus supplied with excellent maps.

(1) Final report of General John J. Pershing, p. 16.
(2) Ibid, p. 16.
(3) Ibid, p. 16.
ributed, just before and during an attack, down to include company and platoon commanders. Between July 1 and November 11, 1918, over 5,000,000 maps were used. (1)

The secret service, espionage and counterespionage, was organized in close cooperation with the French and British. To prevent indiscretions in the letters of officers and soldiers, as well as in articles written for the press, the Censorship Division was created. The Base Censor examined individual letters when the writer so desired, censored all mail written in foreign languages, of which there were over 50 used, and frequently checked up letters of entire organizations. (2)

The policy of press censorship adopted aimed to accomplish three broad results:

To prevent the enemy from obtaining important information of our forces.

To give to the people of the United States the maximum information consistent with the limitations imposed by the first object.

To cause to be presented to the American people the facts as they were known at the time.

There were with our forces 36 regularly accredited correspondents, while visiting correspondents reached a total of 411. (3) Summer of 1917 to Spring of 1918.

In order to hinder the enemy's conquest of Russia and, if possible, prevent a German attack on Italy, or in the near east, the Allies sought to maintain the offensive on the western front as far as their diminished strength and morale would permit.

(1) Final report of General John J. Pershing, p. 16.
(2) Ibid, p. 17.
(3) Ibid, p. 17.
On June 7, 1917, the British took Messines, while a succession of operations known as the Third Battle of Ypres began on July 31 and terminated with the capture of the Passchendaele Ridge, November 6-10. The British attack at Cambrai is of special interest, since it was here that American troops (Eleventh Engineers) first participated in active fighting. (1)

The French successfully attacked on a limited front near Verdun, capturing Mort Homme on August 20 and advancing their lines to La Forge Brook. In another offensive, begun on October 23, they gained considerable ground on Chemin des Dames Ridge. These French attacks were characterized by most careful preparation to insure success in order to improve the morale of their troops. (2)

Notwithstanding these Allied attacks on the western front, the immense gains by the German armies in the east, culminating at Riga on September 3, precipitated the collapse of Russia. The following month, the Austrians with German assistance surprised the Italians and broke through the lines at Caporetto, driving the Italian armies back to the Piave River, inflicting a loss of 300,000 men, 600,000 rifles, 3,000 guns, and enormous stores. This serious crisis compelled the withdrawal of 10 French and British divisions from the western front to Italy. The German situation on all other theaters was so favorable that as early as November they began the movement of divisions toward the western front. If needed, her divisions could be withdrawn from the Italian front before the French and British dared recall their divisions.

(2) Ibid, p. 17.
At first the Allies could hardly hope for a large American Army. Marshal Joffre during his visit to America had made special request that a combat division be sent at once to Europe as visual evidence of our purpose to participate actively in the war, and also asked for Engineer regiments and other special service units. (1)

The arrival of the First Division and the parade of certain of its elements in Paris on July 4 caused great enthusiasm and for the time being French morale was stimulated. Still Allied apprehension was deep-seated and material assistance was imperative. The following extract is quoted from the cabled summary of an Allied conference held on July 26 with the French and Italian Commanders-in-Chief and the British and French Chiefs of Staff: (2)

"General conclusions reached were necessity for adoption of purely defensive attitude on all secondary fronts and withdrawing surplus troops for duty on western front. By thus strengthening western front believed Allies could hold until American forces arrive in numbers sufficient to gain ascendency."

The conference urged the immediate study of the tonnage situation with a view to accelerating the arrival of American troops. With the approach of winter, depression among the Allies over the Russian collapse and the Italian crisis was intensified by the conviction that the Germans would undertake a decisive offensive in the spring. (3)

A review of the situation showed that with Russia out of the war the Central Powers would be able to release a large number of divisions for service elsewhere, and that during the

(2) Ibid, p. 19.
(3) Ibid, p. 18.
spring and summer of 1918, without interfering with the status quo at Salonika, they could concentrate on the western front a force much stronger than that of the Allies. In view of this, it was represented to the War Department in December as of the utmost importance that the Allied preparations be expedited. (1)

On December 31, 1917, there were 176,665 American troops in France and but one division had appeared on the front. Disappointment at the delay of the American effort soon began to develop. French and British authorities suggested the more rapid entry of our troops into the line and urged the amalgamation of our troops with their own, even insisting upon the curtailment of training to conform to the strict minimum of trench requirements they considered necessary. (2)

Pershing's conclusion was that, although the morale of the German people and of the armies was better than it had been for two years, only an untoward combination of circumstances could give the enemy a decisive victory before American support as recommended could be made effective, provided the Allies secured unity of action. However, a situation might arise which would necessitate the temporary use of all American troops in the units of our Allies for the defensive, but nothing in the situation justified the relinquishment of our firm purpose to form our own Army under our own flag. (3)

While the Germans were practicing for open warfare and concentrating their most aggressive personnel in shock divisions, the training of the Allies was still limited to trench warfare.

(2) Ibid, p. 18.
As our troops were being trained for open warfare, there was every reason why we could not allow them to be scattered among our Allies, even by divisions, much less as replacements, except by pressure of sheer necessity. Any sort of permanent amalgamation would irrevocably commit America's fortunes to the hands of the Allies. Moreover it was obvious that the lack of homogeneity would render these mixed divisions difficult to maneuver and almost certain to break up under stress of defeat, with the consequent mutual recrimination. Again, there was no doubt that the realization by the German people that independent American divisions, corps, or armies were in the field with determined purpose would be a severe blow to German morale and prestige. (1)

It was also certain that an early appearance of the larger American units on the front would be most beneficial to the morale of the Allies themselves. Accordingly, the First Division, on January 19, 1918, took over a sector north of Toul; the Twenty-sixth Division went to the Soissons front early in February; The Forty-second Division entered the line near Luneville, February 21, and the Second Division near Verdun, March 18. Meanwhile, the First Army Corps Headquarters, Major General Hunter Liggett, commanding, was organized at Neufchâteau on January 20, and the plan to create an independent American sector on the Lorraine front was taking shape. (2)

This was the situation when the great German offensive was launched on March 21, 1918.

(2) Ibid, p. 19.
Chapter III

Chateau-Thierry, Field of Glory

In the latter days of May, 1918, the Allied forces in France seemed near defeat. The Germans were steadily driving toward Paris. They had swept over the Chemin des Dames and the papers from day to day were chronicling wonderful successes. The Chemin des Dames had been regarded as impregnable, but the Germans passed it apparently without the slightest difficulty. They were advancing on a forty-mile front and on May 26, had reached the Aisne, with the French and British steadily falling back. The anxiety of the Allies throughout the world was indescribable. This was the great German "Victory Drive" and each day registered a new Allied defeat. Newspaper headlines were almost despairing. (1)

On May 29, however, in quiet type, under great headlines announcing a German gain of ten miles in which the Germans had taken twenty-five thousand prisoners and crossed two rivers, had captured Soissons, and were threatening Rheims there appeared in American papers a quiet little dispatch from General Pershing. It read as follows:

"This morning in Picardy our troops attacked on a front of one and one-fourth miles advanced our lines, and captured the village of Cantigny. "We took two hundred prisoners, and inflicted on the enemy severe losses in killed and wounded. Our casualties were relatively small. Hostile counter-attacks broke down under our fire." This was the first American offensive. (2)

This may be said to be the turning point in the whole war. It not only stopped the German Drive at this point, but it gave new courage to the Allies and took the heart out of

(1) Francis A. March, History of the World War, p. 545.
(2) Ibid, p. 546.
the Germans. The troops were rushed to the battle front at Thierry, arriving on Saturday, June 1. They entered the battle enthusiastically almost immediately after they arrived. A despatch from Picardy said:

"On their way to the battle lines they were cheered by the crowds in the villages through which they passed; their victorious stand with their gallant French Allies, so soon after entering the line, has electrified all France." (1)

The American troops had gone into the action only an hour or so after their arrival on the banks of the River Marne. Scarcely had they alighted from their motor trucks when they were ordered into Chateau-Thierry with a battalion of French-Colonial troops. (2)

During the rest of the summer the Americans took an active part in Foch's great offensive which ultimately crushed the German army. They were heard from at widely divergent points: in Alsace, about Chateau-Thierry, at Montdidier, and in the British Lines. (3)

Nowhere in American History may be found a more glorious record than that which crowned with laurel the American arms at Chateau-Thierry. Here the American Marines and divisions comprising both volunteers and selected soldiers, were thrown before the German tide of invasion like a huge khaki-colored breakwater. Germany knew that a test of its empire had come. To break the wall of American might it threw into the van of the attack the Prussian Guard backed by the most formidable troops of the German and Austrian empires. The object was to

(1) Francis A. March, op. cit., p. 547.
(2) Ibid, p. 548.
(3) Ibid, p. 549.
overwhelm them, to drive straight through them as the prow of a battleship shears through a heavy sea. If America could be defeated Germany's way to a speedy victory was at hand. If America held well, that way lay disaster. (1)

And the Americans held. Not only did they hold but they counter-attacked with such bloody consequences to the German army that Marshal Foch, seizing the psychological moment for his carefully prepared counter-offensive, gave the word for a general attack. (2)

With Chateau-Thierry and the Marne as a hinge the champ of the Allies closed upon the defeated Germans. From Switzerland to the North Sea the drive went forward, operating as huge pincers cutting like chilled steel through the Hindenburg and the Kriemhild lines. It was the beginning of autocracy's end, the end of Der Tag of which Germany had dreamed. (3)

The matchless Marines and the other American troops suffered a loss that staggered America. It was a loss, however, that was well worth while. The heroic young Americans who held the might of Germany helpless and finally rolled them back defeated from the field of battle, and who paid for that victory with their lives, made certain the speedy end of the world's bloodiest war. (4)

The story of the American army's effective operations in France from Cantigny to the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, is one long record of victories. To the glory of Amer-

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(1) Francis A. March, op. cit., p. 550.
(2) Ibid, p. 553.
(3) Ibid, p. 555.
ican arms must be recorded the fact that at no time and at no place in the World War did the American forces retreat before the German hosts. (1)

(1) Francis A. March, op. cit., pp. 560 - 562
Chapter IV

Wilson's Fourteen Points and the Making of the Peace.

From time to time during the war the various Allies had declared their war aims. In the bleak January of 1918 both Great Britain and the United States had sought to restate their case in the most reasonable terms. In particular on January 8, President Wilson had delivered a speech to Congress in which he had mentioned fourteen points which should in his opinion guide American aspiration. These "Fourteen Points", admirably, if vaguely, phrased consisted in the main of broad principles which could be applied in varying degrees according to the fortunes of war. They included however two perfectly definite conditions, the reconstitution of an independent Poland, and the retrocession to France of Alsace-Lorraine. The adhesion by the United States to these profoundly important war-objectives, involving, as it did, a fight to a finish with Germany, was very satisfactory to the Allies. None of them was concerned to examine the whole speech meticulously or felt committed except in general sympathy. In the meanwhile the President's declaration played an important part in holding the Western democracies firmly and unitedly to the prosecution of the war, and also encouraged defeatist and subversive movements among the enemy populations. (1)

While American troops were pouring into France, President Wilson was preparing the way for a discussion of peace

terms. In January, 1918, he proposed 14 points as "the only basis of peace." Time and again he emphasized the fact that the United States was not interested in injuring Germany, but rather in freeing the German people from the "vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government." It was a fight against the "military masters of Germany" rather than the German people. It was a "war to end war," a war "to make the world safe for democracy," and the peace would be a "peace of justice." It was effective propaganda not only in arousing the idealism of the Allied peoples but in weakening the enthusiasm of the German people for the war. (1)

The Fourteen Points

Except to accomplish the defeat of Germany, little was generally known of the war aims of the Allied governments. After the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in November, 1917, certain secret treaties which the Allied nations had made with one another were published by the Bolshevik government. These treaties revealed that the Allied nations, as well as the Central Powers, were fighting for definite selfish gains. Russia, for instance, had been promised Constantinople and Poland; France was to extend her territory to the Rhine; Great Britain was to have the German colonies, and Italy was promised "compensations" at the expense of Austria. Were these the real aims of the Allies? Russia wanted to know this, and so did Germany. The objectives stated in the secret treaties were hardly consistent with Wilson's idealistic utterances. (1) Faulkner and Kepner, "America, Its History and People," pp. 715-716.
that it was a war "to make the world safe for democracy," and a conflict not with the German people but with their autocratic rulers. (1)

In part to counteract the effect of the secret treaties, Wilson in a message to Congress on January 8, 1918, outlined his famous Fourteen Points as the basis for a generous peace. The first five were general in nature and dealt with international relations:

(1) Open covenants of peace openly arrived at; (2) Freedom of the seas in peace and war except as they "may be closed in whole or in part by international action"; (3) Removal of economic barriers between nations; (4) Reduction of national armaments; (5) Impartial adjustment of territorial claims. The next eight points had to do chiefly with territorial adjustments: (6) Evacuation of Russia; (7) Evacuation and restoration of Belgium; (8) Restoration of France and the return to her of Alsace-Lorraine; (9) Re-adjustment of Italian frontiers along recognized lines of nationality; (10) Independent development for the peoples of Austria-Hungary; (11) Reconstruction of the Balkan states along racial lines, and access to the sea for Serbia; (12) Self-determination for the peoples of the Turkish Empire; (13) Independence for Poland and an outlet to the sea. (2)

In the mind of President Wilson the Fourteenth Point was undoubtedly the most important. It called for a "general association of nations" which "must be formed, under specific covenants, for the purpose of affording mutual guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity to great and

(2) Ibid, p. 720.
small states alike." It was this point that was behind the League of Nations, which was soon to be set up and which Wilson believed would not only maintain a just peace but would prevent future wars. (1)

The Treaty of Versailles

The Fourteen Points were anything but specific in details, but they represented the hopes of millions who looked forward to a Europe reconstructed on a saner basis. The Fourteen Points were Wilson's, and he decided, contrary to precedent, to go himself to the Peace Conference to work in their behalf. As his colleagues on the Peace Commission he chose Robert Lansing, Secretary of State; Edward M. House, who had acted since 1914 as Wilson's confidential agent; General Tasker H. Bliss; and Henry White, a Republican who had served in various important diplomatic posts. With them went a host of experts who for months had been working on the various problems which were bound to present themselves at the Peace Conference. (2)

The Conference had hardly convened before it became quite evident that the terms of the treaty of peace would not be written by it, or by the Council of Ten which began to meet in January, but rather by Lloyd George of England, Clemenceau of France and President Wilson, meeting in secret. The Council of Ten contained two representatives each from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. This was expected to be the real working body of the conference, but the important decisions were reached by Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Presi-

(2) Ibid, pp. 723-724.
dent Wilson, with the addition occasionally of Orlando of Italy. This the first of the Fourteen Points, "Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, "was thrown to the winds; and this was typical of what was to follow. (1)

The Secret Treaties

The first shock which the President and his Delegation is said to have received was confrontation with the secret Treaties made between the Allies during the war. Mr. Baker in lurid pages has gloated upon their unmoral character. 'The old diplomacy -- what it stood for'; The Secret Treaties'; 'The Turkish Empire as booty'; The Slump in Idealism', form the headings of chapters which reveal to the American public European baseness and their own correctness. But let us see what had actually occurred. The American thesis after the United States entered the war was that the Germans represented the most violent form of military aggression recorded by history. England and France had been fighting against this monster since August 4, 1914. In the spring of 1915 Italy had shown a disposition to come and help them. The accession to their side of a nation of thirty-five millions mobilizing an army one and a half millions strong seemed to be a matter of the highest consequence. But Italy appeared to have a move either way; and the Germans were eagerly displaying to Italian eyes the advantages to Italy of playing a true part in the Triple Alliance. Instead of seeking the Trentino from Austria, why not take Savoy from France? And so on; (1) Faulkner and Kepner, op. cit., p. 724.
bid and counter-bid. We should wrong the Italians by suggesting that their decision was taken on these material grounds. But who can blame the Allied statesmen for dwelling upon the superior advantages which Italy could obtain at the expense of Austria and of Turkey? The Treaty of London, upon which Italy entered the war on the Allied side, embodied the belief that to France and Britain the aid of Italy spelt speedy victory, and that her hostility might mean their total defeat. (1)

In the same way Roumania, who had equally great prizes to gain by adhering to either combination provided it emerged victorious, was the subject in 1916 of every form of threat and inducement which States as desperate leaguers could present. Such were the secret Treaties entered into by the Allies in their distress and jeopardy in order to secure reinforcements. (2)

Another series of secret agreements had been made among the Allies themselves -- to keep themselves in good temper with each other. In 1914, 1915 and 1916, Russian assistance was vital. France was bleeding to death; the British armies were only just becoming a prime factor in the field. To keep the struggling Russian Colossus in good heart, to avoid all excuses for estrangement, was the first duty of British and French diplomacy. Turkey, which had been offered territorial integrity on the guarantee of France, Britain and Russia, had joined the Germans and had made an unprovoked assault upon Russia. No one was going to shed many tears about the

(2) Ibid, P. 123.
break-up of the Turkish Empire or the end of Turkish domination over Christian or Arab races. The assignment of spheres of interest over the non-Turkish provinces of Turkey became at once a necessity and a convenience to the Allies. England, abandoning the policy of generations consented to the prospect of a Russian Constantinople and dwelt upon her own interests in the Persian Gulf and in Mesopotamia. France asserted her historic claims to Syria. Italy was assured that none of her Allies would obstruct her ambitions in Adalia nor indeed upon the Alps and in the Adriatic. An understanding about Persia had for many years been an indispensable foundation of good Anglo-Russian relations. These arrangements had to be recast on the assumption of a general victory in which the Turkish Empire would have disappeared. Mr. Baker pretends that all these inter-Allied agreements represented the inherent cynical wickedness and materialism of old-world diplomacy. They were in the main simply convulsive gestures of self preservation. (1)

The greater part of these secret Treaties was found to be conformable to the principles laid down by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points and was consented to by him in the ultimate settlement. There were features in all of them which nothing but duress could explain and excuse. However, here were the secret Treaties to which the faith of great countries was pledged and their signatures appended; and they ran criss-cross, not in the main, but in some important instances, to the

broad and simple theories of the Fourteen Points. (1)

Confronted by the secret treaties and the spirit of
revenge as well as by the fact that many of the Allied lead-
ers had little interest in the League of Nations, Wilson
fought desperately during the weeks of negotiation to save
his Fourteen Points, and in particular, the League of Nations.
Under terrific pressure, he was time and again forced to give
way until the Fourteen Points all but disappeared. The League
of Nations, however, survived, and through it, Wilson hoped,
the injustices of the treaty might finally be remedied. (2)

On June 28, in the famous Hall of Mirrors in the Palace
of Versailles, Germany signed the treaty under protest. By
it she was forced to assume sole guilt for the war; to cede
Alsace-Lorraine to France and other territories to Denmark,
Poland and Belgium; to relinquish her colonies; to reduce
her army to 100,000 men; to destroy her fortifications in large
areas; to allow Allied occupation of strategic points for 15
years, and to pay reparations for 30 years up to her ability
to pay, the amount to be determined annually by the victors.
Subsequently, treaties with the defeated Allies of Germany
were also signed. (3)

(2) Faulkner and Kepner, op. cit., p. 725.
(3) Ibid, p. 726.
Chapter V

Results Growing out of the War.

The World War lasted exactly 1565 days and was the bloodiest and costliest war in the history of mankind. The number of casualties in this one war was twice as great as the loss of life in all the major wars during the years 1790-1913, including the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, the Danish War (1864), the Austro-Prussian War, the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War, the Boer Wars, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Balkan Wars. During the years 1914-1918, 65,000,000 men were called to arms. Of this astounding number 9,000,000 were killed in action, 22,000,000 were wounded; 7,000,000 were permanently disabled; and 5,000,000 were reported missing. The average daily cost of the war was $123,000,000 in the beginning, and $224,000,000 toward the end. Thus, the total net cost of the World War amounted to $186,000,000,000 of which $126,000,000,000 was spent by the Allies; $60,000,000,000 by the Central Powers. Property damage on land amounted to an extra $30,000,000,000; on sea $7,000,000,000; production losses to $45,000,000,000; war relief and losses to neutrals to $2,000,000,000. Adding these to the total net cost, the expense of the World War amounted to $210,000,000,000. (1)

The most important results of the World War, which was fought to "make the world safe for democracy" and "to end all wars," may be summed up as follows: (1) The autocratic forms of government in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey

were swept away and were replaced temporarily by liberal regimes. Whereas before 1918 there were only five republics on the European Continent, between 1917 and 1932 twelve new republics were established. The democratic trend, however, was very shortlived in most of these countries, and by 1937 there were 19 dictatorships in those countries which had participated in the World War. The reason for the establishment of the majority of these dictatorships was the economic distress into which Europe was driven as a result of the unwise peace treaties contracted at Versailles between 1919 and 1920. These treaties remade the map of Europe without due regard for geographic, racial, and economic, boundaries, and the result was an ensuing economic chaos and the rise of the most extreme kind of economic chauvinism. In 1937 armaments reached a dizzy height, and the world, which is still licking its wounds received in the last combat, was feverishly preparing for new war. (2) On the ruins of the fallen European empires a number of new states were built. The most important of these succession states, which owed their existence to the World War were Poland, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. (3) Out of the chaos of post-war political and economic experimentation, fascism, a new philosophy of force and nationalism was born. During the years following the World War this new experiment in government, which was first put to practice in Hungary, became the prevailing method of national management in southern and central Europe. By 1937 the following important coun-

tries had adopted different degrees of fascist government: Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Poland, Japan, and Spain. (4) The League of Nations and the World Court were established in accordance with the Wilsonian ideas of international cooperation, and peaceful settlement of disputes. The League, however, never received the sanction of the United States, and thus one of the most important countries of the modern world remained outside the new organization. For a time the talk about a United States of Europe was renewed by the French statesman Briand, but with the rise of dictatorships in Italy, Germany, and Spain, international accord and cooperation were reduced to the vanishing point, and the League was rendered impotent by the absence of the United States, Germany, and Japan. The most serious blows to the prestige of the League were dealt by Japan's protested aggressions in Manchuria and China and by the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-1936, when Italy successfully defied the economic embargo applied against her by the League. (5) The United States emerged from the World War as the greatest creditor nation, but her debtors, with the exception of Finland, defaulted their obligations. (6) In October, 1929, the stock market in Wall Street crashed as a direct result of the economic upheaval brought about by the World War. The United States of America and the rest of the world sank into the worst economic depression known to history, this condition was still making its effects felt in 1937, although at that time signs of recovery were already discernible. Thus it
becomes apparent that the World War fulfilled none of the promises the different governments made to their respective peoples; for in 1937, just as in 1913, the right of self-determination was still being violated, minorities were still being mistreated, propaganda for unredeemed territories was still being carried on, the spirit of nationalism still ruled supreme, armaments still continued to burden the nations of the world, the spirit of imperialism still threatened the independence of the weak, political assassinations were still of frequent occurrence, and autocratic forms of government were still enslaving millions of people. In short, the World War had made the world unsafe for democracy and had done much to start new wars. Following the conclusion of the treaties of 1920, the world did not know one year of complete peace but witnessed annually a new war between some two nations. (1)


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