The Metaphysics of Paul Weiss

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OF
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by
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This thesis is an exposition of the metaphysical position set down by Paul Weiss in his *Modes of Being*. It is written in answer to the question, "How is it that there are four irreducible modes of being as held by Paul Weiss?" While the bulk of material with which this thesis deals derives directly from *Modes of Being*, several of Weiss' central arguments in support of his position were taken from an earlier work, *Reality*, written in 1939. The fundamental metaphysical positions of both works are compatible with one another.
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CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF THE MODES OF BEING

The systematic philosophy of Paul Weiss, presented in Modes of Being as an articulated "vision of the whole of things," analyzes the cosmos into four fundamental and original realities which exhaust the totality of beings. These four realities, irreducible, yet co-ordinate, comprising by their inter-relatedness the community of being, Weiss has named Actuality, Ideality, Existence and God. Each of the four, at once and in its turn, constitutes a modality of all of them taken as together; each is an unique and relatively exclusive way of being; each is a mode of being. Far more than mere appearance or manifestation of a more fundamental reality, the four modes of being are the fundamental reality, or more precisely, the fundamental realities. The philosophy of Paul Weiss recognizes a plurality as the basic condition for being, and is wholly adamant and irreversible in its opposition to monism in any form, however subtle.

The efforts of philosophers to reduce reality to its most fundamental constituents has not uncommonly resulted in typologies of being which cut across the multiplicity
common sense initially encounters to establish certain priorities within reality. Thus have arisen such ordering distinctions as appearance and reality, "the real" and "the really real", existence which precedes essence, and vice versa, and others of similar sort which define some fundamental constituent of reality to be more fundamental than another. In contrast with this tendency in other philosophies, Weiss maintains an original plurality of beings, the modes of Actuality, Ideality, Existence and God, are each on equal footing with one another. "Completeness and impartiality require that all four modes be dealt with as equally basic, equally real, equally indispensable." As equivalent in their claim to reality, the four modes are not simply fundamental elements in reality, but the fundamental character of each is dictated by the fact that there is a plurality of four of them. Each of the four is a necessary constituent in reality; taken together they are the only necessary constituents of reality. What is necessary to reality, is that all of the modes are.

Actuality, Ideality, Existence and God, therefore, are original and equal. They are also final. Only mutually do they make up the whole of things; their mutuality is the condition by which each has reality. Because the four modes are mutual with respect to one another, not with respect to some more fundamental reality, no one of the modes possesses the whole of reality. Each is deficient in the sense that it does not possess the reality which the others do. Paradoxically, each mode is a real being, but only partially the being of reality.
"Each needs the others, not consciously or biologically, but ontologically, as external conditions outside its control, determining it to have the status of a being which is not and cannot be the whole of being."\(^3\)

A plurality of modes of being, sustained by a mutual finality, demands that the modes be not only analytically distinctive, but distinct in themselves. Each of the modes "has its own nature and integrity."\(^4\) As such each is exclusive of the other modes and their differing natures. But at the same time, because each mode is only partial being, the nature of each is also partially defined by the natures of the other three modes. To reach the nature of a particular mode, therefore, some recourse must be made to the delimiting features which the other modes impress upon it. Inasmuch as the four modes are inter-related, constituting as they do the interlocked whole which is the cosmos, no one mode stands apart from the totality which all of the modes make up together. But inasmuch as each mode is equally a real element in the ontology of the whole, each is accessible, in itself, seen as standing over against all the others.\(^5\)

Of the four modes of being, Actuality is the most immediately evident to men. Actuality is the mode of being of Actualities, which are "finite beings in space and time."\(^6\) Determinate, extended, bodily, Actualities comprise that set of realities which can be encountered empirically. Their essential mode of being, Actuality, gives them the character of unique individuals, concrete entities, readily accessible to rational
beings.

Actuality as a mode is distinguishable from the set of Actualities at any one time or in a single space by the fact that individual Actualities are transitory and multiple, whereas the mode of being by which they are individual beings comprising a real set is irreducible and one. It is more to the point, however, to say that Actuality at any moment is no more nor less effective a dimension of reality than is given in the many, discrete and extended beings which are Actualities. In view of multiple Actualities, then, what is essential to Actuality is being as individual. "Individuality is a basic fact of the universe and every feature of the universe is what it is because of what individuals are." Actuality is integral with Actualities, the individual. A conception of Actuality as a distinct principle of individuation is precluded, for it is the individual which is basic to reality, not an individuator. That Actuality can be distinguished from the individuals which carry its reality testifies to the irreducible character of its modality rather than to a finality apart from Actualities themselves.

The nature of Actuality, therefore, is given in the very Actualities which make up the spatio-temporal world. These are either primary and active, having aims and energy of their own, or they are secondary, compounds of primary Actualities, lacking their own aims and energy but characterized by the activity of their constituent parts. Since secondary Actualities are reducible to primary ones, only the latter need be the concern
of this inquiry. These are analyzed further into simple and complex beings. Simple primary Actualities are ontologically ultimate units of spatial magnitude, indivisible save mathematically true substances, active and individual. Complex primary Actualities differ only in that they are to some extent divisible; their natures, however, dominate and unify the activities of their parts, maintaining their substantial integrity and distinguishing them from compounds. Organisms are such complex primary Actualities.

In making these distinctions Weiss isolates a unity as characteristic of Actualities which, both external and internal, is unity through magnitude in space and unity through activity in time. Space and time, therefore, are coincident with Actualities, and are to be regarded as extended in units which correspond to the extensive and intensive unity of the ontologically "smallest" Actuality.¹¹ Space is a "domain of symmetrical, extended relations," such that "the being of space is inseparable from the Actualities which are related in and by means of space."¹² The being of Actualities, though obviously different than that of space, is bound to the being of space. This is evident inasmuch as space defines boundaries and characterizes the geometric relations between Actualities. This situation, an Actuality with its surrounding space, presupposed by the being of both, is possible only on the supposition that there are at least two Actualities: otherwise there could be no space because no relations between Actualities, and no Actualities because no space. As a unit of magnitude an Actuality is an individual unity in space, and also a demand that there be
The fact that Actualities co-exist in space and thereby are able to affect one another inasmuch as they constitute a domain of mutual inter-relatedness has its ramifications for the interaction of Actualities and time. That an Actuality is bound to time, as well as to space, and vice versa, is a somewhat subtler point, but one whose difficulty resolves in the fact that all primary Actualities are active. Even while seemingly at rest they are active, struggling to maintain their state of being and to resist the forces which ever threaten their stability, namely, the conditioning forces which Actualities affect upon one another through their demands to be inter-related.\textsuperscript{13} Weiss conceives of all activity as a production, a causal process which implies duration in the very fact that an effect is never simultaneous with its cause, but always succeeds it. Therefore, through the units or moments of its constantly active nature, an Actuality both persists in and marks time. Co-existence in space among Actualities is tantamount to contemporaneity in time.

An Actuality is an individual being, necessarily finite, which presupposes and is presupposed by both time and space. It has being both on its own and among other Actualities. As such, an Actuality has a private unity, its substantial core, as well as a public unity resisting conditioning incursions from without and providing it with a distinct form or shape. These are, of course, simply analytic components of Actualities, but they are always peculiar to them. Actualities are in fact
a real unity of public and private sides.\textsuperscript{14}

Though Actualities are consummate unities with respect to their individuality, they are evidently imperfect, for they come into being and pass out of being, and must be active at every moment maintaining themselves in being. Still it is most appropriate to speak of Actualities as existing in themselves and on their own.\textsuperscript{15} This status is afforded them by their mode of being. Should they lose their existence or not yet have it, they would enter or be encompassed by some other mode of being. While actual, however, they are essentially individual, determinate in time and space, and actively engaged in maintaining their own existence. The being of Actualities is in no sense derivative; their reality is finally irreducible, even as distinct from their existence. Their existence belongs to them, when they have existence. It does not belong to Existence, nor do they have existence from any other being.

Just as there is a real distinction between the existence of Actualities and their being as Actuality, so too there is a real distinction between the natures of individual Actualities and their being. That Actualities have characteristic natures is evident in the fact that they can be distinguished from one another, as apples are not men, nor horses teapots. An Actuality's nature is neither adventitious nor indifferent to it, but is its own. "If it be affirmed that there are natures but denied that the natures are integral to the things, the things as outside those natures will be unintelligible, and we would have no reason for saying that those things existed at all."\textsuperscript{16} However, even
though every Actuality is decidedly an individual with its own singular nature, each may also be characterized in universal terms. From this latter point of view, no single Actuality wholly possesses its nature, but rather shares in a nature's universality as it maintains itself privately. Singularity is preserved through an Actuality's irreducible mode of being, universality is sustained by the activity of the other modes of being.

Neither an Actuality's nature, then, nor its Existence can account for its being an Actuality. By virtue of an Actuality's irreducible reality, possessing and not possessed by its own nature and Existence, an Actuality is seen to be distinct and separate from other Actualities and the other modes of being. As such an Actuality is a true substance, wholly over against all else. The primary relation Actualities have with every other being is otherness. "To be fully over against all else it must have the status of an other." As Weiss conceives of it, this relation is necessarily symmetrical, following on the claims of each fundamental being in the cosmos to being equally real. Thus, to be a full reality, an Actuality must be a substance existing mutually with other realities, not bound dependently to any being save its own. It is as an other that an Actuality can be regarded as an individual. An Actuality, therefore, empirically encounterable is an existent, intelligible, other, unique in its mode of being, irreducible and characterized by its own Existence, nature, and substantiality.
Possibilities are direct correlates of Actualities as spatio-temporal beings. In Weiss' system, their unique mode of being, Ideality, is a domain of all-inclusive possibility, real, future, and perfective. Here resides what can be, what ought to be, and what will be: in sum, all real possibility. Possibilities are not spatial beings, though they may be realized in space, nor are they temporal beings, though they may be realized in time. Distinct from Actualities and the other modes, they have a being all their own.

Because internally coherent, a possibility is distinguished from an impossibility on logical grounds. The impossible—which can never be—is not, however, only that which is in itself unintelligible. Ontologically, that which in fact is—wherever in the whole of reality—may preclude as impossible something logically possible: it is impossible that an event in the past be other than it is in fact, though logically it can be conceived as otherwise. A real possibility, therefore, is what can be in fact. This entails that a real possibility is always determined by what in fact is, for what is past is no longer possible, and what will be is not coherent enough to be really possible until conditions are ripe for it. Real possibilities have their being just beyond, exterior to, whatever else there be, and always remain somewhat indeterminate until they are realized as some mode of being, or as some feature or derivative of a mode. Once realized, a possibility is wholly determinate, ingredient in some other being. Abtracted from that being, an ingredient possibility is an idealization of what that being has become.
Individual possibilities are not the Ideal, but specifications of the Ideal, imminent determinations of it. All realized possibilities are derivatives of a single all-inclusive inexhaustible possibility, the Ideal. They are not of the Ideal, but for their realizations, of the beings that realize them. Here is a difficult tension attending any notion of the Ideal as all-inclusive possibility, and one which Weiss attempts both to preserve and to resolve: that, namely, possibility is precisely that which lies beyond whatever else there is, but which also must be that which is within the ken of other beings who would realize it. To the effect that real possibilities actually do have a being exterior to Actualities, it is evident that, "there is that which ((Actualities)) are not yet, that which they are to become. Before they have this feature or that, there must be a possibility for the feature which they, in the course of their careers, realize."\(^{21}\) Possibilities must be exterior to the other modes as well. Existence, because it is the driving flux of the cosmos and is also time-dominated, faces possibilities beyond its present; and God, if he is to have a relevance to the spatio-temporal world and to its history, must have possibility before him to be capable of entering space and time.\(^{22}\) Possibility, therefore, has a mode of being independent of all other realities.

At the same time, real possibilities must be relevant to the rest of reality, since they can be realized.\(^{23}\) In order for them to be both separate and realizable, however, it must be recognized that their Ideal mode of being can neither be
indifferent to other realities nor complete in itself. Were it indifferent to other realities, the fact that it is realized would mean the Ideal could somehow be subjugated in spite of itself, and could hardly be thought to have the status of an irreducible mode. On the other hand, were it complete in itself, its domain would be pre-eminently impervious to any realizations whatsoever, a conclusion which is against the facts unless one is willing to give up the reality of Actuality already established. The Ideal, therefore, must be an Ideal for others, attainable because it is geared to other realities and because it needs other realities in order to be completed.

The Ideal is possible because relevant, for, "what is in no way relevant is not a possibility for anything." It is primarily from the standpoint of Actuality that the Ideal is regarded as possibility. Taken together, Actualities confront a common possibility which, so that it might be relevant to their diverse natures and interests, is necessarily subject to multiform specializations. These delimited versions of the common possibility come to the fore as immediate prospects for Actualities to realize. With a gradual lessening of determinacy, less immediate prospects link immediate prospects to the future which terminates in the Ideal. Thus the only real possibilities are imminent ones; until these are realized other contingent possibilities remain merely logical. However, because possibilities do form intelligible linkages with one another, possibilities implicate one another. Each real possibility actualized prescribes which further possibility will become a real one.
Because each Actuality is an instance of a real possibility realized, each specifies which will be real relevant possibilities for it. And because of the linkage of possibilities through subsequent implication, each Actuality is individually related to the common possibility in a way which tends to define some possibilities as more relevant to it than others. This special linking of the common possibility to an ingredient possibility realized in an Actuality makes the common possibility normative for an Actuality. In the sense that this situation is operative for all Actualities, providing them with a mutual objective, the common possibility is called "The Good." 27

The Good orders Actualities to itself, seeking fulfillment of the promise it holds. Actualities in turn follow the implicated Goods determined for them by their ingredient possibilities, seeking to obviate the inconclusiveness of their natures. Because the Good, or Ideal as relevant to Actualities, is the all-inclusive possibility and therefore can be diversely specialized, it demands a plurality of instances in which it may be realized in order to be fulfilled completely. Were there but a single realization possible, it would already be realized and thus no possibility at all. The Good presupposes the Actualities which face it as occasions for its realization.

This plurality which the Ideal presupposes is over against it as many over against a one. Its items stand outside the Ideal as that which the Ideal must master, make its own by encompassing them when and as they accommodate it. Were there no such plurality, the Ideal would remain wholly promissory; it would not have an opportunity to make itself through and through determinate, by an exhibition of itself in a plurality of distinct but related guises. 28
But the very plurality of instances demanded by the Good for its fulfillment effects a most curious result. Each instance or determination of the Good excludes others; diverse Actualities have diverse interests and aims which mitigate against their mutual efforts to attain their Goods. No Actuality, in fact, is able to be all it should. The Good therefore can never be wholly realized by Actuality, nor, conversely, can Actuality ever be the Good.

But if the Good is real, a real possibility, it must somewhere be fulfilled, for to be a real possibility is precisely to be realizable. What is not accomplished by Actuality must, therefore, be accomplished by some other mode of being. That being is God, who regards the Ideal under the guise of a principle of perfection because he is the most perfect exemplification of the Ideal. He remains distinct from the Ideal, nevertheless, because the accomplishments of Actualities preclude his ever usurping the Good wholly for himself. Existence, too, is involved with the Ideal. Facing possibilities under the guise of the Future, it relentlessly pursues its course through time giving those possibilities a relevance cosmic in scope. Existence can never wholly absorb the Ideal, because it is altogether too indeterminate to satisfy the demand of the Good for determinacy.

The failure of each mode to fulfill the Good wholly both explains and is the result of the fact that the Ideal is an irreducible mode of being. As such it stands as a perpetual possibility for all the modes of being. Each of the other modes
and the Ideal itself, by virtue of their being at all, presuppose a possibility of their being. Each is possessed of an ingredient possibility which ordains it to some unique specification of the Ideal excluding from each one's purview realizations open to the others. The Ideal remains intact and effective, therefore, because from the perspective of each of the modes it is never wholly fulfilled.

That mode of being which provides the dynamics by which Actualities are enjoined to realize their abstract futures and which impels the expansiveness of their mutual space is Existence. A sheer vitalizing energy, Existence enjoys a being of its own manifestly self-divisive and self-distancing. Were it not for constraints effected by the other modes of being, neither discipline nor coherence would attend its perpetual onrushing. Inasmuch as they are somewhat able to withstand its incursive drive, Existence effects an othering which permeates the cosmos, making spatial relations, real relations and temporal relations irrevocable. At the same time each being "encapsulates" a modicum of Existence within itself according to its nature, making it possible to say of each, "it exists."

Weiss defines the act of existing as "to stand out or away from; it is to be engaged in an act of opposition which is self-opposing." There are two senses, corresponding to the public and private aspects of exiting, in which this definition may be applied. For a being publicly existent, whether modal or entitative, Existence secures the relation of otherness that separates it from other beings. Were existence unable to
accomplish this task, the distinctions between beings would be jeopardized. In this sense Existence is seen to maintain an exteriority among beings. Privately, each being's nature appropriates the existence by which it is an existent and is thereby on its own part able to stand over against all else. All beings, however, have difficulty holding onto their portion because the dynamic character of Existence continues its othering in defiance of their particular natures. Furthermore, Existence not only alienates itself from all other beings, "Existence is opposed even to its own unifying essence." A perpetual tension, therefore, pervades all of Existence, threatening the stability of every being and at the same time uniting all beings in a common cause to maintain themselves both within and over against Existence. The restraints which the other modes impose on Existence, Weiss allows, may be schematically depicted. "((Existence)) is, as it were, terminated by them from the outside, sideways by Actualities, frontwards by the Ideal and from above by God." The conception of Existence integral to this representation indicates the plastic nature of its expansiveness. Each of the modes contributes to molding existence into a relatively manageable being, though each in turn yields characteristically to its inimical energies.

The course of spatial division which Existence pursues, thus accounting for the fact of an expanding universe, demands a being beyond the reaches of the physical universe maintaining boundaries which will sustain its unity, giving essence, as it were, to the sheer energies of Existence. God, whose domain
is the eternal, outside of both space and time, delimits the units in which energy may subdivide and thereby accomplish the necessary harnessing of Existence which will insure an integral universe. The effect of this divine action is to endow Existence with a uniformity which manifests itself in the constancy of the laws of nature. The normative instances of the units God ordains to delimit Existence appear in the modes of Ideality and Actuality.

In its temporal dimension Existence encounters meaning, the Ideal in the guise of the future, which renders Existence partially intelligible by delimiting it into units of time. "The sheer Existence as standing over against the meaning is a duration which persistently divides the future into succeeding presents, extensionally related to what had been and what will be." Each meaning Existence encounters as it rushes into the future stipulates a duration within Existence. As a result of the layered arrangement of possibilities within the future, the meaning, or possibilities, which Existence brings into contemporaneousness overlap one another in consonance with their durative implications, e.g., as walk overlaps step. The smallest unit of time, therefore, is that defined by the smallest unit of change possible to an existent being. It follows, on analogy with the relation of Existence as over against meaning in the future, that eternity is intelligible simply as Existence over against the divine mode implicating a perpetual duration.

Actualities interrupt the continuum of Existence, demarcating internal boundaries and providing terminal points at which
Existence sums up in composition with them. Because each Actuality is extended in its own right, each provides a standard against which the extendedness of Existence may be compared. "The smallest Actuality, as a unitary single bit of extendedness, defines the magnitude of the smallest bit of space that is in fact being distinguished."41 In its own course of divisiveness Existence does not differentiate units of itself anymore elemental than the most elemental Actuality. This position Weiss maintains in accordance with the supposition that the divisiveness of space, Existence, accounts for its expansiveness. Thus, a limit placed on the size of differentiable elements in space would eventually limit divisiveness itself, since all possible fundamental units would theoretically be accomplished. The effort of Existence to reach even this limited state is restrained, however, by the multiplicity of variously constituted substances of differing magnitudes, which are scattered throughout space. These Actualities must struggle to maintain their own Existence against the corrupting action to which Existence subjects them because the portion of Existence they possess differentiates a greater segment of Existence than that measured by the Actuality having the smallest magnitude. But even this smallest Actuality must maintain itself against the general force of Existence, for it always seeks to divide and oppose itself, extending the regions of space.

The being of Existence is continuous with the being of all the other modes since each contains something of existence
within itself. Were this not the case, Existence would be wholly ineffective and the other modes would be unable to exert any restraints upon it. The other modes are within Existence as well. "As a basic mode of being, Existence has within it sheer Existence, its own unitary essence, its own meaning, and its own actual divisions." Its essence unifies the perpetual process of spatial division, its meaning lends it the self-sameness it needs in order to be in accord with the lawful ordering of time, and its actual divisions delimit it within itself controlling its expansiveness.

Since he is but one of four basic modes of being, God is a finite being. To be sure, God is omnipotent, unitary, and interested, but he is not all that is, nor is he the source of all that is. God is the mode of being God. That is, God is wholly self-identical. Not simply the epitome of self-identity, but the substance where with all other self-identical substances are meaningful. God is the absolute other whose otherness transcends the fleeting otherness of particular Actualities, and he provides an eternal standard of self-identity against which the diversifications within the remaining modes may be distinguished. God is the singular counterpoise of all else. His being is most adequately termed undivided, thus contrasting him with each of the other modes. His simplicity presumes a substantial unity, and suggests as well that he is the most perfect of beings. Still, the reality he lacks limits his excellence, and of him as of the other modes it must be acknowledged that he is not all he might be.
God's being is one with his ideal essence, not tensionally related to it as Existence is to its essence; his being is one with his actual individuality, but not as a member of a plurality within a mode as each Actuality finds itself; and his being is one with his vital existence, and therefore he is not in space or time. But despite this encompassing self-identity, God fails to incorporate wholly the modes. The absolute otherness which is a characteristic of God is a limiting relation between him and Actuality. If Actualities are to be real beings with their own characteristic natures and existence, it must be that they stand over against God constituting a reality independent of God's reality which he can neither contest nor assimilate.\(^{44}\) God merely relates as an other to Actuality on the fundamental ontological level. Though in so doing he preserves the substantiality of Actualities by providing a constant for them. The reality which Actualities have over against God also precludes attributing to God the origin of all Existence. If Existence derives from God, it makes little sense to speak of an Actuality's own Existence. A God who is defined as having Existence as his being, cannot give some of his Existence away or bestow it and yet remain self-same.\(^{45}\) Neither can an Actuality's nature be said to derive from God's essence because, again, that it is an Actuality's own is not clear; and more importantly, if God is conceived as essence and therefore in his simplicity as in no way distinguishable from himself as essence, the fact that he distinguishes other beings is inexplicable.\(^{46}\) If Actualities are to have a being of their own, as Weiss maintains they must,
then God can be the source neither of their existence nor of their nature, and certainly not of their being. All four modes must be distinguished from one another as irreducible in themselves.

There is, however, a sense in which it is proper to speak of God as absolutely comprehensive. This is theoanalytically, or from the standpoint of God. Since in God's being his actual individuality, ideal essence, and vital existence are wholly one and undistinguished, God is the perfect exemplar of whatever else exists. His actual individuality instances his maximal self-identity, so that to him, Actualities, self-identical themselves, are but his own self-identity "endlessly multiplied and combined." God's essence may be regarded as all-inclusive, as that within which he can meaningfully contain the essence of every other reality as a limited case of his own essence. In this sense, the Ideal in which the nature of all else is delimited or idealized is God's essence exteriorized. The vital existence of God points to his omnipotence and thus manifests itself as God's self expression in a plurality of creations. From other points of view, however, God's self-identity is distinctly his own and only analogously found in Actualities. His essence is in fact internalized in him, so that all of his reproductions occur within himself. What is outside of him is the domain of the other modes. God's vitality as well is self-contained. His creativity is in fact the work of Existence. Internally, God is infinite; externally, he is subject to the limitations common to all the modes.
God's infinite capacity for interiority is his capacity to reflect himself within himself, and in so doing to reproduce all the other modes of being. But this activity does not preclude his having a direct awareness of the other modes as well. Each of the other modes impresses itself on God exteriorly: Actualities in their guise as others, the Ideal as a norm which God recognizes as separate from himself when he measures himself by it, and Existence as somehow in tension with him as he provides an essence for it. God takes account of these impressions in his reproductions of Actuality, Ideality, and Existence and thereby comes to know them for what they are. He does not know them in themselves for they remain outside of him; but he utilizes his awareness of their exteriority to guide his reproductions. God affects the other modes quite as much as they affect him. He does this omnipotently through his omniscience, his providence, and his self-expression. The reciprocal activity between God and other realities, and between all of the modes in their inter-relatedness is the subject of the next chapter and so is temporarily deferred.

This chapter has attempted to characterize and to isolate the character of each of the four modes. Actualities were seen to be individual substances with their own natures and existence; the Ideal seen to be a universal meaning providing a standard of excellence at once exterior to and for others; Existence seen to be activity perpetually in process of spatial division, expansive, and lawfully natured; and God seen to be an undivided unity, excellent, and omnipotent.
CHAPTER II

THE INTERPLAY OF THE MODES OF BEING

Four irreducible modes of being exhaust the whole of reality. From the private standpoint of any one of them, they do this conditionally; from a neutral standpoint above them all, they do it concordantly. This is but to say the being of any one of the modes is necessary to the being of the others, and the being of them all necessary for the true being of any one of them. In the former sense each mode is seen to stand over against every other. The latter sense shows each mode to possess something of each of the other modes and thereby to have the status of true being. Because these characterizations only complement one another, neither alone being fully adequate to the complete reality of the modes of being, a certain ambivalence accompanies each description of the modes expressive of the fact that each mode is a reality both in itself and with the others. Thus, the fact that an Actuality has existence contrasts with what is equally true, that Existence is in Actualities. Both formulations describe a common state of affairs but they do this from different perspectives. On the one hand the irreducible character of
Actuality is asserted, and on the other, the pervasive character of Existence is pointed to, while both maintain that Existence and Actuality are inter-related. The implications one mode of being has for another are always met by further implications arising from the fact that the modes are on an equal footing. What is said from the perspective of one may be said also from the perspective of another, but with, of course, a concomitant shift in emphasis.

Similarly, when analyzing the situation within each of the modes the numerous diversifications of that mode receive a somewhat different treatment than the mode itself, regarded as a singular reality. Actuality, for example, as a fundamental mode of being is distinguishable from the Actualities which are but the occasion of Actuality—the former is but one of the four modes of being, the latter are each part of a collection of similar realities. The plurality of Actualities stands against a backdrop provided by the singular character of Actuality. The plurality of possibilities, the divisions of Existence, and God's articulations of himself can be similarly distinguished from their respective modes of being. The relationship between a given mode and the plurality of its manifestations, however, is not the same as the relationship between the four modes. Differences which arise between a view of the manifold embraced by a particular mode and a view of the mode itself as, e.g., in the statement that possibilities are realized whereas the Ideal is never wholly realized—are
not mere differences in perspective or emphasis, but differences in priority. The manifold is always, potentially at least, reducible to the singular which is the being of the mode itself; but the converse is never true, for the modes are irreducible. "The only plurality that is absolutely necessary is the plurality of the modes of being."\(^1\) The plurality of realities encompassed by Actuality and Existence and the plurality of realities encompassed by Ideality and God are finally the resultants of what must be considered the fundamental order of reality, namely, the four original modes of being and their interplay.

The necessary plurality of the four modes of being, therefore, defines the absolute condition whereby true beings are occasioned. For any one of the fundamental modes of being, which in itself is only partial being, to occasion true being, it must contain within itself some of the reality possessed by the other three modes so as to fulfill the basic condition for the being of any reality. Each mode is able to be in its characteristic way only through the presence within it of the other modes. "Each mode of being is ingredient in the others."\(^2\) This fact allows such qualifications of the modes by one another as will account for the occurrence of all real beings even though they be ontologically subtended by partial realities. Inasmuch as each mode is necessarily ingredient in every other in order for it to have being, the four modes constitute a system of inter-relatedness which involves them
perpetually with one another, limiting them each to each, and characterizing to a considerable extent the forms of each. As ingredient in the being of Actuality, Ideality provides the natures whereby individual Actualities are the kind of Actuality they are, Existence makes them existent Actualities, and God makes them substantial others, incorporated versions of his self-identity. Ideality, in turn, is delimited into a multiplex of relevant possibilities by Actualities, given cosmic status as a standard of excellence by Existence, and kept exterior, yet relevant, to temporal reality through its involvement with God. Existence is provided with a unitary Essence by God, made coherent with a lawful nature derived from Ideality, and given internal boundaries for its expansiveness by its possession of Actuality. Finally, God is excellent as the embodiment of Ideality in its guise as the principle of perfection, is able to articulate himself infinitely through his command of Existence, and has multiple occasions for manifesting his power in Actualities.

This characterization of the modes, though accomplished through a recognition of the ingredient action of the other modes on a given mode, does not compromise the irreducible character of any of the modes. It does, however, call for a distinction to be made between the being of the modes and the modes of being—a distinction which Weiss, though he never presents it explicitly, clearly understands.

But since each is being in an essential mode, no one of the modes can truly be except so far as it is one
with true being and thus contains within itself something of the others.

The internal presence of other modes in a given mode does not change the nature of that mode as in itself or as over against the rest, but it does enable it to be, in itself and over against the rest.3

Because the modes are in fact ingredient in one another, the all-inclusive plurality of just four modes of being must be seen to give way—to merge, as it were—into four sets of pluralities which constitute the beings of the four modes. Each set is a distinct form of the exhaustive togetherness of the modes. In each, one of the modes dominates and thereby occasions a unique kind of real being, either Actual, Ideal, Divine, or Existential, preserving the integrity of its modal status, and at the same time sharing its reality by helping to constitute other togethernesses around the other modes. To speak of being, therefore, is to speak of one of four equally real togethernesses of the modes which has fundamentally the character of but one of the modes.4 Thus an Actuality is a constituted togetherness of Actuality with the modes of Idealilty, Existence and God. This particular togetherness conjoins an individuality with a nature, existence, and substance. Such a composite being will evidence needs and aims which bespeak its essential mode of being, Actuality, and will be quite unlike any of three other kinds of beings, God for example, who also grounds a togetherness of the modes but of a radically different sort.
To sum up the above, the four modes of being need one another in several senses. Ontologically, they are given as an absolutely necessary plurality: no one of them can be without the others. In order for there to be true being a form of the originally distinguished plurality of partial beings must make up a togetherness such that the being has but one primary mode of being but contains within it something of the other modes. The being, or beings, of a given mode, therefore, need the reality of the other modes in order to be, and these other modes, in order to have that necessary reality, must already be themselves. The modes confront one another, not as empty modalities, but as true beings: each has need of the full reality of the others in order to be itself. Each may be seen to contribute to the reality of the others both by maintaining its own being apart from the others, and by submitting a part of itself as ingredient in the being of some other mode. A mode maintains its own being by possessing ingredient portions of the other modes and by contributing to the reality of those others. This is the basis for the reciprocity between the being or beings of each mode.

No single mode of being is a complete reality in itself, nor could it ever become the only mode of being. From the perspective of a given mode, however, the very being of the mode is had at the expense of the other modes for it is able to subsume them to the extent that they are ingredient in its being. Because the being of a mode depends on its subjugating the others to
itself, each mode in fact attempts to reduce every other mode to its own reality. On the other hand, the being of a given mode also demands that the other modes have true being apart from it, so that its attempts to make the others serve its reality are always met by the ontological necessity that it must serve their reality as well. Thus each mode needs the others both on its own side to give it the reality it has, and on their side to provide the reality its being lacks.\(^5\) The reality a mode lacks is precisely that possessed by the other modes. Because something of those other modes is ingredient in a given mode, it does not wholly lack reality—which is given in a partial togetherness of all four modes—but it does lack the reality the other modes have in their concreteness. The fact that the others have a reality of their own defines a given mode to be imperfectly a reality because it is not the whole and only reality.

Each of the modes must be, but each is prevented from realizing the full perfection of its reality by the being of the others. Each tries to be at once all of the modes together, but none succeeds because each is equally irreducible. The being of each is only a partial togetherness of them all. Yet that reality which the others have is a condition for each mode's being at all: "To be conditioned by what is external is to be dependent on what is external."\(^6\) It is to need what is external. Thus the reality which each mode is unable to secure for itself—but needs in order to be at all—becomes
an externalized need, a need for the completion of being which can never be fully realized within the being of a given mode, but which must be realized somewhere in order for it to be a need at all. Each mode, therefore, by exhibiting as realized a need characteristic of some other mode supports the partial reality of that other and the full reality of all of them together.

The condition which each mode sets for the others, and which they in turn seek to overcome in an effort to satisfy for themselves a need which that condition defines, is presented by each mode in the guise of a norm. All modes have to some extent mastered the others' norms, to the extent, that is, that they possess one another as ingredient in them. Each is also able to assert its characteristic norm on the others as a condition of their being ingredient in it. The norm presented by a mode of being for the other modes is epitomized by that mode. The norm which Actuality provides for the others is individuality, the Ideal provides value, Existence provides Activity, and God provides unity. In so far as each mode is able to embody the norms of the others, it establishes a self-sufficiency over against the other modes. In so far as each is unable to wholly embody the norms of the others it remains conditioned by them.

Severally they ((the modes as norms)) say that the others are more or less good, more or less individual, more or less vital, more or less unified. Conversely, each mode endeavors to realize that single norm which is constituted by the three norms represented by the
others. The Actual should be at once good, one, and dynamic; the Ideal should be at once individual, dynamic, and one; Existence should be at once one, rational, and individual; God should be at once dynamic, individual, and excellent. 7

The norms the modes set for one another are unique and derive from their irreducible characters, the normative situation each fails to realize is representative of the deficiencies in their peculiar realities. The needs of each mode, therefore, are characteristically its own, and place special demands on the others. 8 Actualities, whose individuality places them in special jeopardy, have a constant general need for preservation. The other modes help in characteristic ways to sustain them, while Actualities exercise on their own behalf a strategy of self-preserving adjustment to one another and the other modes. The Ideal, which can be only in so far as it is realized, has a primary need to be all-encompassing in the service of which it characteristically tries to subjugate the other modes to itself while they try to realize it for themselves. The primary need of Existence, whose self-divisiveness, if unrestrained, would result in its endless erratic proliferation, is organization and stability. By permeating the other modes Existence gives some stability to itself, and the others are enabled to supplement this effort each in their own way. God's unity and simplicity so cut him off from the rest of reality that his primary need is to be effective in the spatio-temporal interplay of the modes. He is able to manifest a certain involvement through a
characteristic sympathy, but needs the aid of the other modes to be a maximally effective reality.\(^9\)

Were demands of each mode that its needs be satisfied to go unanswered, the consequence would be the collapse of the being of the modes. If, for example, Actualities were not preserved by the other modes, they in turn would be unable to help in the realization of the Good, or in the restraining of existence, or in the effectiveness of God. The others, since they lacked the necessary reality Actuality provides, would themselves be unable even to support the demands they make of one another. This last consequence is simply explicative of the fact that the reality of each depends on the reality of the others.

The ontological rule which grounds the activities of interdependence between the four modes derives directly from the necessary deficiencies each mode exhibits as conditioning its reality. Those deficiencies define what a mode ought to be, but is not. Thus they appear as either norms set by the others or as the needs of each. They define tasks which the modes set for one another and which they partially realize on each other's behalf. The sum of tasks which the modes ought to perform out of deference to one another's needs is one with the whole of what must be if the modes are to have reality at all. Thus, what ought to be, must be, from the perspective of any single mode, therefore, what ought to be can be, even though that mode may be unable to satisfy on its own what ought to be. The rule by which the modes deal with
the tasks their various deficiencies set before them is simply stated: "... every task ought to be completed, and what ought to be done can be done, if not by the being that ought to do it, then by some other." Each mode articulates its characteristic general need into a three-pronged demand for satisfaction by the three other modes. A failure by another mode to answer a demand imposed upon it is made up for by the work of the remaining two; thus, while no mode is ever wholly able to do that which it ought to do for the others and itself, everything that ought to be done is ultimately accomplished. Whatever is done is done by all of the modes together: since the being of each is the being of all together, what is realized by one is realized by them all. Were this not the case the realization could have no being and would not be a realization at all. Of course, each mode always contributes in a characteristic way.

An Actuality primarily needs to be preserved. This need is answered by Existence to the extent that an Actuality encapsulates a portion of Existence within itself. Existence, however, is continually moving on and can provide only a transitory preservative for the being of an Actuality. Despite its efforts to hold on to its own Existence, an Actuality invariably loses it and enters the past. God maintains the de-existentialized Actuality as a fact in the past by seeing to it that a "simulacrum" of Existence still pertains to it. The Ideal also supplements Actuality's need for the preserving power of Existence by staying abreast of
Existence as the future. It thereby provides both Actualities and Existence with a mutual present in which Existence cannot so readily outdistance Actualities. From Ideality, an Actuality has the Nature that it needs in order to maintain its being. But an Actuality evidently does not completely possess this nature because an Actuality, though a singular being, may always be characterized in universal terms as if many Actualities were able to possess that nature. Though it partially answers Actuality's need to be preserved in being by providing the nature, the Ideal must be supplemented in this task by God, who supports the Actuality's possession of its nature by demanding that the possible be realized in the Actual. He sees to it that Actualities realize the natures which define the possibilities of their being. In so insisting on the fulfillment of Actuality, God manifests his providential interest in history, and, moreover, makes an Actuality a meaningful individual who as one of a class of beings may fall under the purview of his divine judgment. Existence, too, aids in the necessary support of an Actuality's nature. It maintains Actualities in the present where they may truly confront the possibilities their natures make potential to them, so that once realizing those possibilities and becoming past they are and continue to be determinate realities. God directly preserves Actualities by answering their need for an Absolute other. They need a being in this relation to them in order to be fully and finally over against all else, other Actualities and other modes. As their Absolute other, God makes Actualities to be true
substances with a genuine being of their own. In order to secure this symmetrical relation between God and Actualities, Existence helps to separate them from one another, from Ideality, and from other Actualities by making Actualities continuous and contemporaneous with it. The aversion Existence has for all beings keeps it too in relation of otherness with Actualities. The Ideal contributes to the otherness of Actualities by providing them with unique possibilities not open to other beings. In facing Actuality the Ideal presents itself as the Good, a guise which the other modes cannot confront, thus giving Actuality an unique promise of its own. All of these efforts by Ideality, Existence, and God on behalf of Actuality serve to supply A Actuality with the partial reality it needs for its general preservation. That which they are unable singly and conjointly to do for Actuality, Actuality must do for itself by seeking to realize the norms and satisfy the characteristic needs they present to it.

The fundamental need which conditions the being of Ideality is the necessity that it be everywhere realized; and it presents this need to the other modes in guises appropriate to each. As an Ideal for others to realize, the Ideal is primarily open to Actualities. They specialize it, make endless determinations of it, turn it into a possible Good for themselves. The Ideal is a possible Good for them because it is the all-inclusive possibility by which Actualities share the nature of a single mode of being.
But because Actualities are so diversified and have conflicting interests among themselves which force them to realize some possibilities rather than others, they cannot be counted on to realize all the possibilities they may confront. Those possibilities not realized by Actualities must, however, be realized somewhere, or they cannot be possibilities at all. Thus, God must supplement the action of Actualities on behalf of the Good and see that all real possibilities are somehow and sometime realized. Were it not that Existence also has a hand in the realization of possibilities, God might be thought to realize at once all possibilities that had not yet been realized by Actuality. But Existence provides the course of space and time in which possibilities may be realized in an extended cosmic way, so that God merely conserves them for that realization. To satisfy the Ideal's need to be realized, its status as a being for others must be complemented by a guarantee that it be relevant to others, because it is, like the other modes, a being at least partially independent of and exterior to every other. God is primarily responsible for making the Ideal relevant; he sees that its full meaning is finally realized in space and time, thereby assuring the Ideal's relevance for history. Actualities, of course, qualify God's effort as they articulate the Ideal in the guise of the Good, and Existence limits to the transient present the extent to which the Ideal may be relevant. As a standard of excellence, the Ideal's need to be realized takes on cosmic proportions, since to be truly an Ideal it
must provide a measure for all that is. Existence, by establishing a causal ground throughout the cosmos, converts the Ideal into a perpetual future prospect for itself and for Actualities, and separates it from God so that it remains a norm which each has yet to fully realize for itself. Because Actualities treat the Ideal as a Good which they ought to realize, they help Existence to give it status as the standard of excellence by submitting those portions of Existence each possesses to the transcendence of the Good. God, in his relations with the Ideal, regards it as the standard by which he is excellent himself, and therefore the standard by which he evaluates all other beings. The tasks which the Ideal sets for the other modes are divided among them, thus guaranteeing that the Ideal will be wholly realized—although the Ideal itself is never fully realized by any one of them and thus remains forever an Ideal for all of them.

As the dynamic mode of being, Existence has an overriding need for stability. Of itself Existence is perpetually in a process of spatial division, and thus, needs some unity if it is to be a single being. God provides that needed unity by giving Existence an integral essence which, despite the self-opposing character of Existence, is able to sustain a partially satisfactory coherence and uniformity in its activity. The stabilizing effect God has on Existence is enhanced by the involvement of Actuality and Ideality with Existence.
Because existent Actualities possess some of the stuff of Existence, they must, in order to keep a hold on their existence, be coordinate with the unity of Existence in general. Actualities accomplish this necessary coordination by delimiting a spatial field in which they remain continuous both with one another and with Existence. The unifying action of God on Existence, carried through in space by Actualities because God is outside of space, is similarly made effective in time by Ideality because he is outside of time. By keeping a single meaning before Existence as it advances the Ideal helps to make uniform the contiguous units of its temporal divisions, thereby making Existence a unified being in time.

The stability of Existence is threatened by its expansiveness, so that it needs boundaries which will curtail its potentially endless extendedness. The terminal point which every Actuality provides for it gives Existence the necessary limits. Actualities restrain Existence, however, precisely by taking over portions of it for themselves. Were they able, Actualities would hold these portions over against and apart from Existence with the effect of breaking down the continuity between their own existence and Existence in general. Existence would be free then to expand however much it pleased. The Ideal and God, therefore, must also restrain the expansiveness of Existence by keeping Actualities effectively within Existence. This they are able to do because they reside outside both Actuality and Existence and can thus
To be thoroughly self-same despite its divisive character, Existence needs a lawful nature which will order its drive to an intelligible purpose. This demand is primarily answered by the Ideal, which provides Existence with a directive that determines its course into the future. However, the Ideal can give Existence only a general teleological intelligibility and is not able of itself to guarantee its realization. God must therefore see to it that Existence actually does serve the objective which the Ideal provides for it. The external lawfulness imposed by Ideality and God on Existence is deficient, however, in that an effective ordering of Existence must also establish some control of its internal adventures. Actualities, because they have characteristic rhythms and objectives of their own and frequently exhibit consistent behavioral patterns, determine to some extent the laws which prevail within Existence and thereby help to make its intelligibility obtain through and through. Even though the other modes together are able to give Existence the stability it needs, no single one of them is able to wholly withstand its drive. Thus Existence remains somewhat incorrigible to each of them and in itself irreducible.

God's perfect unity makes him the most powerful and excellent of the four modes of being. However, God has his perfections at the expense of his effectiveness, for his simplicity tends to limit him to a realm outside the spatio-temporal world in which the other modes interact. In order to be as
effective as his omnipotence would have him be, God needs Actualities to provide him with numerous individualized avenues through which he can manifest his infinite capacities and omniscience. They are not wholly adequate to the task, however, for they do not always recognize God and some often enough refuse to serve his interests. Other channels are necessary because of the deficiencies of Actualities and these are made available by Ideality and Existence.

The Ideal manages to make God relevant to Actualities and to their spatio-temporal world by yielding to his providential designs and thereby ordering Actualities in accordance with divine intent. Through Existence, which is continuous with him as with the other realities, God is able to make his self-expression omnipresent and cosmically effective, although somewhat limited by resistances on the part of Actuality and the Ideal. God's excellence would be wholly self-contained and not at all evident to the other modes were it not that he is able to emulate and epitomize the Ideal as his principle of perfection. Because the Ideal exhibits its highest perfection in being realized throughout space and time, it can serve as an adequate principle for God's perfection only on the condition that it is made relevant to the course of natural and human history. Existence provides the necessary continuity with Actuality which allows the Ideal to be always and everywhere relevant. Actualities are, thereby, enabled to occasion the Ideal in many ways.

Thus, the Ideal may have a fullness of value adequate to God's
perfection which God can then make his own.37

God's tremendous unity does not preclude his being capable of unlimited self-articulation and diversification. Rather, it is the source of this very potential. But without the aid of Existence God would be unable to express his power cosmically.38 Endless divisiveness of Existence gives God an infinite number of opportunities to forever "become explicitly what he is implicitly, a being capable of distinguishing himself from himself."39 This self-identity which God expresses through Existence is concretized in Actualities. By exhibiting their own characteristic self-identities, they become so many manifest instances of God's own articulated self-identity. Insofar as Actualities are ordered by the possibilities they confront, the harmony they realize among one another further approximates the order within God's self-articulation, making them even better vehicles for his expressive nature.40 "The diversification in space and time which Existence provides, the ethical diversification which Actualities provide, and the rational diversification which the Ideal provides, are all needed if the interior richness of God is to be given occasion to fully be."41 No one of the modes alone provides all of the necessary diversification, however, so that God's reality always remains somewhat transcendent to each of them.

The interplay of the four modes involves each of them intimately with the others and also secures for each a reality sufficient to maintain its being over against that of the others. Because of its private needs to enhance its imperfect
reality, each mode reaches out toward the others for satisfaction; because of their public interest in one another's reality each goes out to meet the demands made by the others upon it. "Each reaches towards another in an act which is primarily like the being itself, and which, at its terminus, is primarily like the being in which it terminates." As a mode enters into this process it engages itself in a concordant effort with the others that results in the characterizing of the total cosmos as a togetherness of realities which can never be less than four. Since each commands a portion of that togetherness as its own, the togetherness of the modes remains in a constant state of disequilibrium, so that their togetherness could never become yet a fifth being over against the original four, nor attain the state of rest by which they might merge into a single reality. "Each mode imposes itself on the others, and because each imposes in ways that reflect its own nature and ultimacy, they together preclude the achievement of final equilibrium in which one dominates over all the others, or where all are at rest."

The special ultimacy each mode possesses lends a certain character to the togetherness of the modes. God is the source of the eternal condition of their togetherness and accounts for the self-contained unity of each mode; Actuality is the source of the actual way they are together and accounts for all real diversifications within each mode; Ideality is the source of their structural involvement with one another and
accounts for the possibility of the being of each mode; and Existence is the source of their existential area of interplay and accounts for the activity exhibited by each mode.

This chapter has presented the four modes of being as Weiss conceives them to interact with one another. Their togetherness as a necessary plurality of beings was seen to demand four partial yet distinct togethernesses of all four which would account for the being of each mode. The modes were seen to interact in consonance with their characteristic natures, establishing normative conditions for one another and exhibiting specialized needs which the reality of each demanded be satisfied. Each mode was seen to be uniquely incomplete and only imperfectly able to do what it ought to do on behalf of the others. But what one was unable to accomplish the others managed to finish for it, so that the sum of reality remained constant and each mode irreducible.

It still remains to be shown how the philosopher is able to know the cosmos for what it is—a system of four inter-related irreducible modes of being—and how he is able to maintain the consistency of his vision. These problems are the matter of the next chapter and their resolutions are particularly revealing because the position the philosopher occupies in reality is that of an Actuality; thus in knowing the modes of being he is participating in the interplay of the modes.
CHAPTER III

KNOWING AND THE MODES OF BEING

By virtue of their interplay with one another Actuality, Ideality, Existence and God are each able to have the status of being, though each remains and must remain forever but one of four unique kinds of being. This qualified situation would hardly be tolerable from the standpoint of any one of the modes were it not for the fact that they are able to take account of one another and exercise strategies and adjustments on their own behalf. Thus, at least from their own particular perspectives each of the modes seems to have overcome the conditions which the others impose on it. Thus, from the perspective of God his independent unifying activity reduces the other modes to vehicles and instances of his divine intent so that the whole of reality may be regarded as the manifestation of but his single being. Philosophies of the Absolute spirit and theologies which view nature as a reflection of God are exemplary statements of reality viewed from a single perspective, God. But there are other perspectives. From that of Ideality, reality seems to be a structure of forms, wholly intelligible and ordered to the Ideal. Platonism has such a view. From
an opposite standpoint, Existence makes reality seem to be primarily a process, irrational and self-determining. Materialism exploits this perspective. A universe in which Actualities are the predominating reality is a universe of life and nature in which possibilities are only particular and the individual will has arbitrary powers. Such is the scheme of reality to the Nominalist. No matter how thoroughly the relation of reality to a particular mode is unfolded, however, justice can be done to the whole of things only by taking account of reality from all four perspectives. Still it is of value—the insights of the various partial philosophies speak for themselves—to take up the perspective of a single mode and see it all the way through. This is what each mode attempts to do for itself when it interacts with the others; and from their various perspectives each more or less succeeds in asserting its priorities over the others.

The manner in which the modes transcend the limitations they place on one another is peculiar to each, but they have this in common: each mode somehow is able to regard the others simply as data for itself, as having no other reality or function than to serve its interest and enhance its being. In this self-aggrandizing effort, each mode presumes for itself the aspects of an absolute related to its contingencies. No mode is actually able to accomplish a complete subjugation of the others, of course, so that as one concerns itself with the others as data, it must in turn be serving as data
for those others. The modes in effect offer themselves as data for one another. Conversely, each mode is called upon by the others to accept certain data which they extend to it. They do not offer themselves in their full concreteness, however, so they frustrate any attempts to subjugate them completely. But they do provide one another with qualified versions of themselves enabling the others to deal with them from their own standpoints.

Each mode has its own characteristic strategy by which it receives the data the others provide, takes account of that data, and orders its activities accordingly. For Actuality that strategy is knowledge; for Ideality, it is evaluation; for Existence, it is co-ordination; and for God, it is appreciation. By adopting the posture appropriate to its particular strategy, a mode is able to maintain a position of relative neutrality beyond its limiting concrete situation with the other modes. By sacrificing a grasp of the other modes in their concreteness, a mode is able to survey and apprehend their reality. These strategies enable each mode to abstract from its particular reality and to discover in a general way what the others are like in themselves.

With reference to the strategies appropriate to Ideality and Existence, it is difficult to know just what Weiss has in mind. While the two modes, God and Actuality, contain beings who are intelligent and therefore able consciously to perform their characteristic strategies, Existence and Ideality seem less able to initiate their own strategies of
evaluation and co-ordination for they do not possess intelligent constituents. Nevertheless, from their own perspectives a purview of the whole of reality would seem to involve them necessarily in acts which were essentially evaluative or co-ordinative in nature. The Ideal as it is defined could hardly take any other account of the data the other modes provide for it than an evaluative one, for it transcends them only as a value, as an Ideal to be attained. Existence, for its part, surely does co-ordinate the others when and as it provides the area of their interplay. From its perspective it does provide all beings with a general inter-relation inasmuch as it is continuous with all of them. These strategic acts which Ideality and Existence perform on their own behalf, therefore, are evidently analogous to the knowing and appreciative acts of Actuality and God in so far as Ideality and Existence are able to reach every other mode in a way which relates those other modes to their effort without compromising the status of them all as over against every other mode.

God performs his action of appreciation—the act whereby he is able to remain apart from the other realities and yet is able to take sympathetic account of them in their guise as data for him—when and as, through his external awareness of the other modes, he orders his self-articulations to make reproductions of them within himself and then relates them to the objects of his awareness. The other beings become data for him to the extent that he is able to reproduce them in their perfections within himself. Because they always
remain outside and over against him, this activity is simply God's peculiar strategy for claiming the data they offer him as his own, enabling him to purify them of any imperfections, and thus to make them amenable to an appreciative apprehension.

God sweeps over the infinite range of his being in new ways at every moment and thereby conforms to the Actualities that happen to be, and of which he is aware. He also analyzes himself into multiple loci of self-identities, thereby reproducing the Actualities that are apart from him. He is also aware of the Ideal as a measure of himself and all else, reproducing it in himself in the form of an all-encompassing absolute value. At the same time he is aware of Existence as actively separating Actualities from one another and from the Ideal, and both of these from himself, when and as he reproduces that Existence in his act of complete self-expression.

Through knowledge, Actualities are able to comprehend the rest of reality, take exception to it, and inter-act with it according to their own interests. The other modes present themselves as data for that unique Actuality, man, who alone of all Actualities is able to grasp, retain, manipulate, and relate intelligently the whole of what he encounters. By their power of knowing human Actualities are able to assume a position apart from the other modes and from the rest of Actuality which allows them to survey whatever is over against them. Actualities, therefore, are able to know the Good and thereby to realize it in themselves; they are able to know the course of Existence and thereby subjugate those Actualities subject to its laws in nature; they are able to know God and thereby accommodate to his divine intent; and
they are able to know themselves and thereby to integrate the other modes into their lives.

Of all the various enterprises of knowing which man may undertake, that which affords him the greatest breadth of vision and most consistent knowledge of all reality is philosophy. Philosophy is the most abstract of his knowledges of reality and therefore the most neutral and unbiased approach by which an Actuality can engage the other realities. However, actual men are never able to enjoy a position of complete neutrality outside of the other modes for they are bound to the characteristic biases of their own mode of being. Other realities, therefore, escape full comprehension because knowledge, especially in its purer form, i.e., philosophy, is had only in the abstract and so never possesses them completely. Knowledge is a limited strategy also because Actuality as an irreducible mode cannot wholly transcend itself or the others and therefore is necessarily always servant to its perspective and biases. Actualities are thus not unlike the other modes in that, while they are able to attain a position somewhat over and above all the others, they do so in their own interest and from their own perspective. Thus they only partially subordinate the others and must remain vulnerable to their encroachments as well as obliged to accommodate their various demands. Knowledge is, however, a strategy which, analogous to the strategies of the other modes, enables Actualities to concern themselves with the rest of reality from an independent standpoint. It is an effective
strategy because, as far as it goes, it does not jeopardize the integrity of Actualities in themselves and over against all other realities, but allows them to reach other beings and determine their independence apart from the others.

The foregoing discussion of Actualities and their knowing as a strategy which, in conjunction with the strategies of the other modes, enables the modes to mutually inter-relate, implies that a kind of ontological necessity obtains for Actualities certifying that they are truly able to encounter realities other than themselves. From the standpoint of Actualities, however, and more particularly from the standpoint of philosophy as a discipline which is "systematic and self-critical beyond any pre-assignable limit," such an implication is but a gratuitous assumption without a theory which relates knowledge to being and demonstrates the extent to which actual man may know the truth of reality to be a systematic of four modes of being. The epistemology able to complement this ontological structure of four fundamental realities must be a realistic one which respects the irreducible and transcendent character of the known while at the same time acknowledging a maximal openness of reality to the knower. The basic relation of otherness which holds between the modes must find an analogous counterpart on the level of knowing where Actualities encounter other realities, truly other and over against themselves. The system of reciprocal relations which grounds the modes as epistemologically relevant consequently demands an interaction between knower and known. In this system, a wholly passive
known would be just as unsatisfactory as a wholly passive knower because in either case, one or the other, the knower or the known, would then be wholly dependent on its opposite term and the relation between them would break down. But if the otherness must be maintained there is difficulty in establishing just how a reality which is "other than" can be reached by a knower. The basic task of a serviceable epistemology, therefore, will be to show that realities which are fundamentally over against each other can inter-relate in such a way that the reality of one can be revealed to the other without compromising either's essential character. This will depend on a theory of perception.

Before any knowledge is obtained and before a knower enters into an act of perception, the senses encounter objects which lie beyond them and undergo the sensible, which they diversely specify and pass as sensuous content to a common sense through which the mind is subjectively able to exhaust a part of the experienced sensation. This received sensuous content serves to maintain the connection of the knower with the known throughout the actual perceiving of a real object. Because it cannot be retained beyond the experiencing of it and because the mind cannot reproduce it except abstractly, sensuous content can occur only during a waking state and through actual sensation.

In perception the sensuous occurs co-presently with non-sensuous content enabling the knower to reach beyond mere sensation to an acknowledgement of the source of that sensation and an eventual grasp of what that object is in itself. "Perception thus goes
far beyond sensing—not necessarily in its grasp of a being, but in what it knows of that being. It analyzes, and then synthesizes that which it has isolated to make a unity claiming to be true of a world beyond. In reaching an object through an act of perception, a perceiver makes that object at once related to him externally as an object of knowledge and integral with himself as the possession of his mind. Certainty that perception actually does encounter an external world is guaranteed by the fact that perceptual errors sometimes occur. Such errors could be explained only by an acknowledgement of realities beyond actual perception which are able to relate the perceptually false to the perceptually veridical and do this on the same order of being. "Our erroneous perceptual judgments are not merely privately entertained, floating in our minds or between our minds and the world. Instead they are in a real relation to a world beyond which precludes the truth of those perceptual judgments." Perception does more, however, than simply affirm the being of independent realities; it yields further knowledge of its object's position in space, of the relation of the object to other Actual beings, and something of the object's nature. All of this is accomplished by means of a content which perception obtains directly from its objects in perceiving them.

A perception is not altogether simple; rather, it is constituted by three distinct yet co-ordinate modes of apprehension which detach three distinguishable though existentially unified aspects from the perceived object. The modes of apprehension and their objects are "indication" and an isolated presence,
"the indicated;" "contemplation" and a determinate nature, "the contemplated;" "adumbration" and an indeterminate concreteness, "the adumbrated." The act of perception analyzes the perceived into the three elements, the indicated, contemplated, and adumbrated, which if they are to yield more than disparate hints of an external reality must be re-combined into a synthetic unity which approximates their existential unity. This is achieved by an act of perceptual judgment. "Perception is the wedding of an interpreted contemplated with an objective indicated to form an articulate object of knowledge, which itself merges into an adumbrated as a more substantival but unarticulated version of it." 17

Each of the elements of perception attend every act of perception. The indicated serves to terminate the perceiver's cognitive relation with the perceived and provides a purely logical subject for combination with the contemplated and adumbrated. 18 Because the indicated has only epistemological significance, the relation which the cognizing agent secures by means of it must be distinguished from the relation that it serves to indicate. The indicated non-spatially locates an object in a one-to-one cognitive relation with a knower by providing the abstract locus in which the relation terminates as it goes out from the knower. The indicated 'indicates' that a spatial and non-cognitive relation actually exists between the knowing being and the real object of his knowledge. The distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive relations
across the same domain--on which the epistemological significance of the indicated depends--results from a conception of perception in which the act of perceiving is thought to wholly transcend spatial relations. The knower and the known, therefore, are properly and always contemporary beings, a position which would seem to contradict physical science and its discoveries concerning the absolute speed of light, etc. Nevertheless, what must be affirmed is the connection of the perceived with a real object as indicated, and this demands that a relation of otherness, the one-to-one relation, obtain externally between perceiver and perceived.

What we perceive is never entirely dislocated from objects, nor is what is in our minds identical with what is outside them.

We may mistake the nature of the being which possesses a character ((this is the perceived as elaborated by the contemplated)); we may misunderstand the nature of the transformation to which a being subjects a character ((this is the perceived attached to its proper object, an object which has been mistaken for some other but which is, in fact, referred to by the indicated)); but we are not mistaken in seeing the character to be resident in more than mere space.19

This resolution of a most difficult problem would be wholly arbitrary if grounded only in a definition of the indicated as that which is non-spatially related to the perceiver which indicates an object in a real spatial relationship. However, the other perceptual elements must be taken into account in order to justify the assertion that extra-empirical relationships hold between beings, and also in order to see the part these elements play in delineating the differences between a purely phenomenal epistemology and one which seeks to answer to the whole of reality.
The contemplated is the vehicle of intelligibility in perception, and serves to relate the nature of the perceived object to a meaning for the perceiver.²⁰ "It is the sensuous made generic, the sensuous deprived of its singularity and made into a kind or form of which the sensuous is a passing singular illustration."²¹ As isolated in the act of contemplation, it conveys to the perceiver the unity of its subject as well as the extensionality and intensive depth that characterizes any object presented in a spatial field. Moreover, it conveys the reality of its subject as present, for it is obtained from the object when and as the attending act of perception terminates in the object. The contemplated is more than a Platonic form because it is sensuous in origin and retains the sensuous in abstract form throughout the act of contemplation which isolates it. The contemplated is more than the nominalist's wholly functional, confused singular image because it must be intelligible, able to undergo contemplation both now and later, even if its subject is no longer present: it also must be able to convey like meanings for like objects. The contemplated, finally, is more than a pragmatic contemplated whose meaning is exhausted in the sum of future consequences which it suggests: it must yield knowledge of the nature of objects present in the here and now, otherwise there is no knowledge of the present.

Because the perceptual contemplated is an organic whole which may be analyzed into numerous constituent elements, it is wholly distinct from the indicated which, as a purely demonstrative "it", yields no content and serves no other purpose
than the focusing of attention at a particular locus. By further contrast with the indicated, the contemplated is a bearer rich with meaning while the former always has a purely functional role. The contemplated carries that meaning with it even before the meaning is defined by the perceiver. Because a contemplated is equivalent with the singular nature it makes intelligible, its meaning can only be expressed in terms of other contemplations which its particular meaning defines to be other than itself. Thus, "the meaning of any given contemplated must be other contemplations or contemplatable as qualified by the conceived transformations which convert them into that given contemplated." Contemplations become explicitly defined when and as they are observed to evoke consistently a particular response, be it attitude, emotions, words or the like, thereby excluding other conceivable responses which already attend the advent of other contemplations. A given contemplated, therefore, has its own singular meaning and is ideally equivalent with the nature of the contemplatable. Of course a contemplated may not always be recognized fully for the meaning it contains, nor is the act of contemplation always keen enough to obtain the fullest possible contemplated from the contemplatable. The contemplated and the contemplatable, therefore, are related as equivalents according as the contemplatable is qualified by those operations which transform it into the contemplated. The contemplated is thus a qualified meaning in as much as it is subjected to conditions which attend the perception by which is obtained.
The fact that the contemplated is qualified by the conditions of perception does not mean, however, that the nature of the object is hidden from us, since the integration of different prevailing conditions with their corresponding perceptual contemplations sums to a constant result, the nature of the public object.

Though it is not always easy, these attending conditions must simply be taken into account.

As logical elements, the contemplated corresponds to a predicate and the indicated to a subject. The contemplated is not predicated of the indicated, however, for that would result in an assertion irrelevant or only accidently relevant to the reality from which they were derived. Rather, they must be taken together, made a unity approximating their indistinct complete unity in the real object, and have their combined meaning and implication asserted of the exterior reality through the synthesizing act of perceptual judgment.

Even as distinct and independent elements, the indicated and contemplated exhibit a pertinence to one another, and this, naturally, because they derive from a common source. Each is amenable to being conjoined with the other to constitute a new unity within a perceptual judgment, whereby they provide a real knowledge of an exterior reality.

The contemplated is involved, as well as the indicated, in the difficulty in establishing that a cognitively secured exterior relation between perceiver and perceived must hold noncognitively as well. The indicated and the contemplated are "aspects of the object veridically perceived," only when
they are properly together. The contemplated serves as the intellligible element asserted of the external object when it is indicated. That spatially distant object is not to be identified in perception either wholly with the indicated or wholly with the contemplated; nor yet with a unified indicated and contemplated.

The indicated and the contemplated are the object only as in special relations to us, and since we can know this the object surely has its reality independently of a perception of it, for it does not disappear when perception ceases, e.g., during sleep, we, in perceiving, must be acquainted with something more than the elements by means of which we perceive. It is evident, therefore, that in every perception there is an element of ignorance arising from the fact that part of the object, the object in its concreteness, remains beyond the reach of the perceptual judgment. Were this not the case—and every experience testifies that it is the case—either omniscience or absolute ignorance would have to be asserted of the perceiver. But neither position could account for perceptual error. Justice can be done to both the perceiver and the perceived object only if it is recognized that an element of partial ignorance is always integral to any perception which testifies to the fact that a real object whose nature and position are revealed in the synthetic union of the indicated and contemplated lies somewhat beyond the perception and external to the perceiver. If something of an object's real nature and position were not revealed in perception, the object would not be known at all, not even as that which is to be perceived. If the transcendence of the
object were not somehow given with the perception, the object would be the perception coming into and going out of existence as the agent perceived or did not perceive according to his whim.

That element in perception which serves to define a domain of ignorance reaching beyond the perceptual judgment to the concrete sensuous object itself is the adumbrated. Present in every perception, the adumbrated is acknowledged by the common sense to convey that sensuous content which none of the diverse senses is able to specify. As such, it is an inarticulate perceptual element serving in part to ground the union of the indicated and contemplated in a perceptual judgment, and in part to provide a correlate for them which remains beyond the grasp of the perceptual judgment and signifies that the being of an object has not been exhausted in the perception. The adumbrated, then, is both within and outside the perceived and functions to sustain the perceived's reference to a reality outside perception. It is because the adumbrated is present in perception that a proper synthesis of indicated and contemplated can be made. Without the adumbrated, any combination of indicated and contemplated would constitute an arbitrary unity from which the reality of an external world could only be inferred, and that with no guarantee that the object inferred actually existed or even corresponded with the perceptual judgment of its nature and position. Perception is able to reach an external object directly and cognitively. As it analyzes that object into perceptual
components and combines them in a synthesizing judgment, the adumbrated serves throughout to maintain the roots of the perception in the real object. That object is adumbrated when and as it is perceived, providing the perceived with a substantial depth that reaches into the very reality of the object.

All three perceptual elements, therefore, serve to make the perceiver aware of a truly external and contemporary reality, known at once as over against him, sensuously endowed, intelligible, and present. About the relation between the knower and his object of perceptual knowledge several general points can be made. Non-cognitively, the knower and the object are given absolutely to one another as termini of a relation in which each is wholly and really other than its opposite term. Cognitively, the status of the perceived object is relegated to that of a relative given whereby it is subjected to analysis and integration with the knower. Between these two extremes the object is related to a potential knower as a variable given. That is, the given object is as yet unarticulated by perception; it alters its guises emphasising one or other of its features depending upon changes in perceptual conditions. Once the object is actually perceived, however, it becomes a relative given, though objectively it retains a status as a variable given, i.e., able to perceived in a different light; of course, non-cognitively it always has the status of an absolute given wholly other than the knower.30

On the basis of the foregoing theory of perception,
Actualities may be taken to have veridical knowledge of beings other than themselves. Their knowledge is essentially "knowledge of", for the perceptual act which grounds whatever they know--hence, all generalizations, specifications and inferences--is by definition a going out from the knower which terminates in a known. All knowledge which Actualities have, therefore, has its origin in what they are able to perceive in other Actualities. By exercising transformations on the intelligible ideas it receives through perception, a mind is able to inter-relate these ideas with one another to form systems and classifications within its knowledge. All transformations of ideas follow the principle: "The meaning of an idea is any other, perceptual or not, as qualified by that conceivable transformation which would convert it into the former." Empirical and non-empirical ideas may be inter-transformed on this principle just as empirical ideas may be transformed by other empirical ones, but on the supposition that the non-empirical be somehow really related to the empirical. Specializations of the principle of transformation are rules of inference. Transformations are possible and yield valid results because Actualities are able to perceptually obtain veridical contemplateds of intelligible natures because contemplateds are fundamental wholes, they are able to serve as self-sustained elements for all of the intellectual powers. At the same time contemplateds dictate through their constituitive meanings, just what transformations they may properly undergo. Upon these elements the entire system of knowledge rests.
It is one thing, however, to establish that Actualities are able to know other Actualities, and quite another to show that their knowledge of limited realities can serve as a basis for an ontology embracing the whole of reality, i.e., the modes of being. For this latter order to be a real possibility, an ultimate intelligible co-ordinating relation must hold between thought and being which will finally ground ontology in epistemology and vice versa. Ontology asks about the nature of the real. "A theory of knowledge is the result of the reflection that what we perceptually know, or conceptually but non-speculatively understand, cannot be the ultimate truth regarding the real." Despite the fact that each perceived can provide some, if only partial, statements about ultimate realities and can yield a portion of this when it is perceived, perception is never able to grasp the full reality of the perceived and so must fall short of discovering the ultimate nature of things. A theory of knowledge tries to overcome the inadequacies of perception by concerning itself with the nature of all possible items of knowledge, and thereby attaining, hopefully, a formal knowledge of all that is to be known. What it seeks to accomplish finally is a determination of the true form of the ultimate question that can be asked about the nature of reality.

That form, under which all lesser questions about reality are but specializations of the same question, is expressed as the primary category of both knowledge and being:

A necessary category must be integral to all knowledge if it is to be that in terms of which we know, and is
also to enable us to grasp the nature of what is in fact. It must also be integral to all being, express a structure which is exemplified in everything, or fail to be more than one category among many, somehow included in a more inclusive category, embracing all the others.

Because the primary category necessarily encompasses the totality of realities, it must, if it is to be exemplified everywhere, embrace both the contingent and the necessary, both the true and the false. It must have of itself an actual reference to the content which it organizes. Were the category altogether other than the content to which it applies, it would either have to be imposed on its content by some agent outside itself or its action on that content would be wholly indifferent. But if the category were imposed by an agent, it could not then be primary for that extrinsic agent would elude its organizing form. Further, if the category's relation to content were indifferent, its primacy would be a matter of indifference and, again, exhibit no ultimacy. The primary category must provide a relevant form to whatever has being. The basic form which is embodied by the primary category is the law of contradiction: "For every x, x is not non-x." Under various guises the law of contradiction is illustrated everywhere, limiting the real to the possible and defining everything to have some intelligibility. Transcending even itself as symbolized when embodied in the primary category, this most abstract of categories is perfectly neutral to the whole of reality. But at the same time it is most intimately committed to reality, because as a category it is purely abstract form and therefore has no reality beyond its concrete embodiment in whatever there is.
Of the various possible symbolized forms of the primary category, four most closely approximate the ideal form and thereby serve to define four fundamental categories of real beings. These are the symbolized law of contradiction, the law of identity, the law of the excluded middle, and the general law of inference. Not surprisingly, each is appropriately epitomized by one of the four modes of being. The law of contradiction, which determines a being to be what it is by posing it against what it is not, is embodied at the root of every Actuality thus giving it a characteristic posture over against all else. The law of identity defines God as the perfect unity, wholly integral with himself. The law of the excluded middle, with its alternative determinations, "either-or", is exemplified by Ideality as it presents itself for alternative specifications by the other realities. The law of inference is best illustrated by Existence as it moves its own way, relentlessly determining moment to succeed on moment, just as inference moves through its terms by necessary steps.

The primary category of course transcends all the modes, but the modes define four categories or basic guises in which the primary category may be exemplified. Taken abstractly, at a neutral position beyond the modes, the primary category is seen as the category of being or the category of togetherness, which the four modes imperfectly exemplify in their limited versions of its ultimate embodiment of an ideal togetherness transcending them all. The ultimate form for all knowledge, therefore, is seen to be rooted in the beings of the four modes. It remains, nevertheless, to see it rooted in the essence
of the knowing activity, thus securing the circle epistemology must make with ontology.

The distinction between being and knowledge which the primary category transcends is a generalization of the distinction between the form of knowledge and the content of knowledge. With regard to the form and content of knowledge, the primary category yields a categorical form for perceptual knowledge which enable perceptual judgment to synthesize the three analytic components of a perception. The unifying act restores an external unity to them which may be referred to their unity in the perceived object. Because the category is embedded both in the knower and in the known it sustains a fundamental compatibility between them, which appears through perception as the ground of their unity in knowledge. Thus, the category secures an appropriate rapport between the form of knowledge and the content of knowledge, extending beyond the perceived to embrace also the reality of the object.38

The fundamental dimensions of reality each have a correlate within the structure of the knowing act. The unity of the primary category embodied in the perceptual judgment enables the perceiver to regard the perceived as a transcendent unity over against him, and therefore as an analogate of the divine manifest in perception. The indicated which is isolated in perception represents the Actual to the perceiver. The contemplated corresponds to the presence of the possible as an ingredient nature. Existence is represented by the act which attends to content in perception and thereby is refered to its role outside the perceiver.39
Within the very act of perceiving, an Actuality encounters reference to each of the fundamental modes of being. As an embodiment of the primary category the knowing Actuality is one with the realities he knows, and is thereby able to seek out his own ultimate reality within himself and relate his reality to the whole. He is able to know fundamental realities because his knowing act is itself, a representative version of the modes of being replete with the characterizing form of the primary category. Because the Actuality fully expresses the primary category as the core of his reality as well as of his knowledge, he is also able to determine within his being each of the four facets of the category so arranged as to make him essentially exhibitive of the law of contradiction. Thus, the Actuality is at once unified, dynamically involved in existence, an Actual locatable 'x', and a 'non-x' ingrediently defining his nature as the exclusion of all other possible natures.

In sum, an Actuality embodies the primary category in the essence of its being; as a knower his knowledge is informed by the category. He is thus enabled to relate to other realities as they are in themselves, and to recognize himself as a reality ontologically related to the whole of reality and to each singular being within it.

Because the possibility for knowing the other modes is grounded in an Actuality's very being, these other fundamental realities may properly occupy his attention both from his own particular perspective and, as nearly as they can be approximated, from the perspectives of the others. Moreover, transcending all of the
four possible perspectives, there is available a neutral perspective representative of the togetherness of the modes. This perspective promises the highest possible abstraction from the modes and therefore the most general knowledge of reality. This is simply to say that by adopting a position utilizing the concepts of the most abstract knowing available to him, an Actuality is to some extent able to nullify his biases against the other modes and know them in their most fundamental togethernesses.\(^{42}\) This is the task of philosophy. Were he to seek the other modes on their own terms, an Actuality might approach God through religion, or the Ideal through morality, or Existence through art. None of these approaches, however, allows for the neutrality and overview with which direct thought provides him. Extensive knowledge of all the modes is available to an Actuality "because the category of knowledge is the cosmos in miniature, desiccated, located within us and within the very beings which our knowledge abstractly possesses."\(^{43}\)

The foregoing has been an exposition of the main lines of Weiss' theory of knowledge as he conceives it to be integrated within the ontological structure of the four modes of being. Knowledge, it was seen, is the special perogative of Actualities, and is the unique strategy which an Actuality exercises in order to deal with other Actualities and modes of being. Each of the other modes has also a characteristic strategy, so that the entire cosmos was seen to be an inter-activity of beings taking account of one another and acting accordingly. The knowledge
which Actualities employ to order their interaction with the other modes and between themselves was seen to be grounded in veridical perception which, because it embodies the ultimate category of both being and knowledge, yields certain knowledge of the reality of beings outside the Actuality. The components of perception were seen to represent the reality of each of the four modes of being to the perceiving Actuality. These representations, along with the fact that an Actuality itself exemplifies a facet of the primary category, guaranteed that an Actuality might truly encounter the other modes of being. By assuming a neutral standpoint above all the others through philosophy, an Actuality is able to attain an understanding of their togetherness. The next chapter will deal with the intelligibility of the four modes, and seek to show what it is that is known when each of the modes is isolated from its togetherness with the others.
Each of the four modes of being is a constituent in whatever has being. This must be the case whether it is regarded as an epistemological necessity defined by the primary category, or is taken as an ontological necessity defined by the nature of the four irreducible modes. The togetherness of the four modes that every real being exhibits is, in fact, demanded by the correlativity that obtains between the primary category and the modes. The single category is everywhere in reality. Thus, inasmuch as each mode exemplifies the category, each must exemplify it to some extent as it refers to each of the other modes. Similarly, each mode depends for its being on the reality of all the modes. Thus, inasmuch as each mode has reality, each has it by virtue of its involvement with the other modes of being. Every real being, therefore, testifies through its very being to the reality of its own mode of being and to the reality of the other modes of being. Viewed abstractly, such testimony is one with the exemplification of the primary category which beings instance and knowers grasp. Whenever a knower encounters a real being, he encounters not only that being's essential mode of being,
but each of the other modes as well.

Since man is a real being, essentially an Actuality, he is possessed of all the modes of being. In knowing himself and knowing his own acts he is able to know not only Actuality, but the modes of Ideality, Existence and God as well.\(^1\) These latter appear as "tinctures" of himself. Direct acquaintance with the self shows the presence of the Ideal, of the existential, and of the divine grounded in the Actual self, revealing the self to be intelligible, vital and unified. It is not enough, of course, to recognize these features as simply belonging to oneself. Frequent reflection is necessary before they are revealed as characteristic of one's own being though not essential to being as an Actuality.\(^2\) Because these features are descriptive of one's concrete Actual reality and yet are not derivatives of the individuality essential to Actuality, there is warrant for acknowledging these features of the self to be derivatives of realities essentially different than Actuality. Thus, a man's first or most immediate knowledge of the other modes of being comes in knowing himself, and recognizing that his full concrete reality entails more than can be accounted for by simply referring to his being as an Actuality.

Similarly, external perception reveals other Actualities to have features which characterize their being, but which are not essential to them as Actualities. As described in Chapter Three above, these features appear in perception as the contemplated and adumbrated in unification with an indicated. An object of
perception presents itself as an Actuality whose unity with
an intelligible nature and existence demands reference ultimately
to the divine; whose intelligibility as an existent and unified
individual demands reference to a source of intelligibility,
the Ideal; and whose existence as a unified individual with a
nature demands reference to Existence. Perception alone, however,
does not reveal these characteristic features of Actualities
to be derivatives of specifically three other modes of being.
It directly reveals only one mode of being, Actuality, and that
not as a mode, but as a limited reality. Perception is an act
by which an Actuality is able to directly terminate its being
in the being of another Actuality. In order to terminate
directly in the modes of Ideality, Existence and God, an Actuality
must engage in other acts besides perception which are appropriate
to these modes. The problem here is to reach the modes other
than Actuality so that they serve as objective data in a way
analogous to the way Actualities serve as objective data for
perception.

The other modes serve as objective data for knowing
Actualities in accordance with the special guise by which each
mode, from its own standpoint, presents itself to Actuality.
Thus, when the Ideal presents itself as the Good an Actuality
may encounter the Ideal as an objective datum through a
recognition of the Good as a terminus of its obligations. In
realizing its nature, as it is obliged to do, an Actuality is
able to directly engage the Ideal in an act which, like perception,
begins in the Actuality and terminates in a reality beyond it.
Existence presents itself to Actualities as a dynamic field so that an Actuality, in recognizing the compulsive action of the field through the course of nature or society, may reach Existence as the terminus of an act of self-preservation. God presents himself as the eternal judge, so that Actualities, by measuring their cosmic significance, may encounter him as the terminus of an act of self-evaluation in which he is recognized as their absolute other. Whenever an Actuality engages in one of these fundamental acts—perception, self-realization, self-preservation, or self-evaluation—he consciously takes account of the modes of being as objective realities lying beyond himself. If he does this consciously, the act may yield a recognition of these realities as the fundamental realities.

However, knowledge of the self and its acts which realizes the other modes simply as non-essential characteristics of the self and perceived Actualities, and discoveries of the other modes as terminal realities for such fundamental activities as an Actuality might engage in, are but two limited ways of encountering the presence of the modes of being. Neither of these two ways of knowing the basic realities yields an actual knowledge of the modes as modes, of these realities as modally distinct from one another and as exhaustively constituting the interrelated whole of reality. A third way of knowing is necessary in order that the true state of reality might be understood as the four-fold complex of the modes of being and reason be able to learn the significance of experienced realities for the modal design of reality. That way of knowing which will yield knowledge of the other modes as modes is the exercising of dialectic and speculation,
philosophical knowing. Self-knowledge and acts which terminate in the modes provide data about which philosophical knowing seeks to accomplish

an ordered knowledge of the world and of the conditions and principles involved in an adequate grasp of it. Seeking to bring to the fore the presuppositions characteristic of all thought and experience, philosophy thereby illuminates what is daily encountered, known in the sciences and enjoyed in the arts.

The ultimate systematic which philosophy seeks to realize in all that is encountered must account for the very occasion of fundamental realities in the world of experience. Philosophy begins to establish this account when it asserts that one's public and private experience yields trustworthy data for inquirens into the ultimate nature of the whole of things. Since, however, individual experience gives rise only to delimited portions of reality, it is a question for philosophy whether or not knowledge of the given data may result in veridical knowledge of ultimately metaphysical realities. Knowledge of various Actualities suggests the reality of the mode of Actuality, but philosophy must show that in presuming to know Actuality as an irreducible mode of being it actually knows a reality and not a figment. Hence the question: Are Actuality, Ideality, Existence and God intelligible in themselves as irreducible modal realities? Actually those are two questions here, but the questions merge into each other. To know Actuality, Ideality, Existence and God in themselves may be to know them as one of a complex of four modes: it may be also to treat them individually,
though inadequately, without alluding to their modal status. The problem of the intelligibility of the modes asks after their intelligibility both as inter-related realities and as intellectually separated and distinct realities. Inasmuch as the fundamental realities that philosophy knows are dependent on one another for their reality, knowledge of one of them implies some knowledge of the others. Because this is true, philosophy's enterprise is a circular one. A properly philosophical account of one mode involves all the modes; and yet each mode must be somehow distinguishable from the others, hence intelligible, if any knowledge at all is to be had of the modes.

It has been assumed thus far that Actuality, Ideality, Existence and God are intelligible in themselves, notwithstanding their status as modes. The assumption has been carried to the extent that arguments resting on the supposition that there is an intelligible difference between these realities have been brought forth to demonstrate relations of exteriority between them. At issue here is the legitimacy of supposing that the modes are actually thus intelligible. In support of the supposition, attention may be called to the fact that the very consideration of such fundamental realities, implies that they are known in some way; for what is not intelligible cannot be known in any way. Precisely because men are able to know what it is to be actual, to exist, to be possible and to be divine, the modes of Actuality Ideality, Existence and God must be somewhat intelligible. But this is not yet to have demonstrated that they are intelligible as modes. A conception of modal reality is necessary for that
understanding. It must be insisted, however, that the Actual, the Possible, the Existential and the Divine are intelligible in themselves and are distinguishable apart from the individual beings which they characterize. Were this not the case they could not be known as characterizing many individuals, but only as isolated to a single instance. In effect there would have to be as many fundamental realities as there are distinctions in beings, and no knowledge beyond the singular would be possible.

Each of the basic realities, therefore, must be assumed to be the object of some special rational category by which their unique reality is ordered in knowledge. The status of these realities, however, must be carefully preserved. Adequate knowledge of independent reality demands that, "what is, is other than, though not alien to its category." This position is held in opposition to Kantian and phenomenalist epistemologies, which preclude the possibility of real knowledge of metaphysical objects, things-in-themselves, because they deny a distinction between the reality known and the structure of the reason by which it is known. A principle of intelligibility which resides in reason alone is insufficient for a knowledge of fundamental realities. Such a principle must define realities within the limits of the intelligible and therefore cannot allow that knowledge of realities which are independent of reason is possible. Knowledge of the four modes of being, on this theory, would be beyond the capacity of men because the modes have necessarily a status beyond reason, or to put it another way, beyond the knowing of them.
The modes must certainly be intelligible if they are known at all. But if they can be known, they must be knowable for what they are, and what they are is more than simply the intelligibility by which they are known. All knowledge, not just knowledge of perceived realities, must be of objects distinct from the means by which the knowledge is had. Thus, the objects of knowledge grasped by dialectic and speculation must be other than the dialectic and speculation by which they are known. This is not an ontological argument for the reality of whatever can be thought—for the logical possible as the really possible—but rather an assertion that although an object's reality cannot be exhausted in its intelligible aspects, its very intelligibility can reveal its real status in reality. The reliability of this assertion depends upon the supposition that the structure of inter-relatedness among realities is consistent with the inter-relatedness of intelligibles which reason is able to discover. Because the correlation of thought and being is guaranteed by the inclusiveness of the primary category, every intelligible essence carries a meaning which can be defined by meanings outside it. The known, therefore, is never simply an isolated intelligibility, but a something with an import beyond the categories by which it is conceived.

An object known is known through its essence, but known to be more than that essence. "Nothing...is identical with its essence." As an object of rational category, a knowable is related to that category through its essence. Because its reality is not its essence, nor the reality of its essence the
category, the object known may be regarded as having a reality beyond the fact of its being known. The intelligible essence of an object of knowledge is known as belonging to the object to which it refers. Neither an object without its essence nor an essence in itself are ever wholly distinct in reality, but they are intellectually distinguishable. The modes can be intelligible realities, and more than mere mental constructs, if they are not their essences and therefore can be intellectually distinguished from their essences through the use of subordinate or functional concepts. Such concepts enable the knower to grasp them as realities beyond the intelligible features by which he knows them. The modes are intelligible if they can be known; they can be known if they are intelligible. This is more than a "vicious circle" because the reality of the modes is not exhausted in their being intelligible. Rather, their intelligibility enables them to be known by the methods of reason.

Simply to state that the modes are intelligible and to provide the framework of suppositions which must attend such a claim does, of course, not prove that the modes are intelligible as modal realities nor that their modality is not an imaginative construction with no sound basis in reality. However, the intelligibility of the four modes of being is here being defined only as adequate to the task of presenting fundamental realities to a knower. Their modal status and interplay as modes can be known only as the result of rigorous philosophical inquiry into the nature of these realities. Most important, nevertheless, is the fact that the modal structure of reality which philosophy may
ultimately realize also grounds the possibility of a philosophical endeavor to that end. Because no one of four modes of being could be intelligible at all except insofar as it is one of four fundamental realities, knowledge of a single mode's simple reality can be had only on the condition that knowledge of the roles of the other modes is employed in knowing that mode. Knowledge of all the modes must support any knowledge of a single mode as a mode because the intelligible essence which a mode possesses and which is not identical with that mode must be provided for that mode by some one of the other three modes. Thus, in knowing a mode in its irreducible reality recourse must be made to the framework the modes provide for one another whereby each is intelligible.

Sheer Existence, for example, were it independent in every way of the other modes of being, would be wholly without an essence and hence unintelligible and unknowable. But sheer Existence cannot be so distinct a reality because its very reality demands that it be together with all of the modes. "The essence of Existence is, like every other essence, an intelligible unity. This is in a tensional relation to sheer Existence, which tough not a distinct reality can be intellectually distinguished as being over against the essence." The essence by which Existence is made intelligible was seen to be provided provided by God, ordered to the Ideal and instanced in Actualities.

It is through the mediating guises of the other modes that the intelligibility of Existence is revealed. Similarly, in the cases for the intelligibility of the remaining three modes,
their essential intelligibility is provided for and made manifest through engagement with the other modes of being.

The problem of the intelligibility of the modes is not, of course, limited to Existence, though Existence makes a good case in point. Since each of the modes is a final and irreducible reality, none of them can be a composite in itself. Its status as a reality, it is true depends on its co-existence with the other modal realities, but this necessary togetherness of distinguishable realities may not be regarded as an inviolable composite such as the one which the Thomist philosophers hold is constituted by a really distinct essence and existence. Whereas the Thomist distinction is intended to hold only for individual concrete realities and to define their dependence on a source of being, the four modes of being, as together though distinguishably comprise a fluent interaction of realities which transcend as well as constitute individual beings. Certainly, the intelligibility of a mode of being depends on its having an essence, but that essence occurs as a partial condition for its status as an ultimate reality, not as a necessary constituent of a dependent and wholly relative being. For the Thomist, God differs from creatures in that his essence is his existence, but Weiss maintains that no real being is identical with its essence whether the being is an ultimate reality, a mode, or an instance of the interaction of ultimate realities, individual beings. For these latter beings, their very individuality is their being in a special irreducible mode, Actuality. They need no more ultimate and unique a source to account for their being as Actualities.
The intelligibility of all beings arises from the fact of their own reality, a reality which is the state of their togetherness with other realities.

The distinction between a mode and its essence which obtains for each of the four modes is not, therefore, a distinction in being, but a distinction between ultimate beings. Taken in themselves these beings have no components, though in reality each is intimately related to its own special essence as well as to other features provided by conditioning realities. The full intelligibility of a mode of being derives from its inter-relatedness with three other modes of being. The intelligibility of each requires the other three just as the reality of each requires all of them together. "We cannot acknowledge any less than four modes without making something in the nature or function of the universe unnecessarily mysterious or unintelligible."\(^{13}\)

Because the modes of being are not identical with their essences, knowledge of them is always mediated by realities other than themselves. But this is not to imply that each mode is in itself absolutely simple. Actuality is made up of a plurality of distinctions, and Existence is infinitely self-divisive; Ideality and God also have determinations within themselves. "These are sometimes spoken of as though they were absolutely simple; but if this were the case there would be no possible judgment made of them by means of features derivable from them, or even supposed to be in them."\(^{14}\) Such features as these modes have in themselves refer to the other realities, as indeed the reality of a mode implies the realities of the others.

"Within the Ideal there are creases and foci which precipitate
out as limited objects under the pressure of appetitive beings; within God there are the Ideal and Actualities and Existence as judged by him.\(^{15}\) The modes of being are knowable through the essence which these special features manifest inasmuch as they make a mode intelligible within the framework of the fourfold complex of reality.

Precisely because Actualities have common features which bespeak their common reality, or mode of being, individual Actualities cannot each be unique modes of being. In order for each Actuality to be its own mode of being, each would have to possess wholly unique features. "The modes of being exhaust being, and do it in diverse and opposed ways. There are no features which they share, no needs they have in common, no terminus at which they together point."\(^{16}\) The common characteristics which Actualities exhibit reveal their common essence. Because this essence is plainly both other than any one of them and relevant to each of them, it cannot be identical with Actuality. Though one Actuality might be substituted for another or even pass away, the reality manifest in their common essential features endures. That enduring reality is recognizable in every Actuality for they are the sole preserve of it. The reality of Actuality is a unity which is immanent to the individual realities of the mode and which does not transcend the whole which they constitute.\(^{17}\) Their plurality is original and not the derivative of a primal unity because their mode of being is defined in the essential individuality by which each is wholly "other than" all else. Actuality is but one of four modes of being, but to be an Actuality is to be
uniquely an individual. Thus, to be an Actuality is to have a character wholly unlike that given with the other modes of being, but essentially the same as that possessed by other Actualities. To say that individuality is the very condition of an Actuality's intelligibility is to point out nothing more than the common essence which Actualities share. That essence then serves as the means by which the reality of Actuality as a fundamental mode of being may be grasped as necessarily more than its essence. Were the situation otherwise, the diverse features which Actualities evidence would be incomprehensible or wholly irrelevant.¹⁸

The distinction between the Ideal and its essence, like the distinction between Actuality and its essence, allows that mode of being to have an irreducible status and yet to interact with other realities. Were the Ideal nothing beyond its essence it would be a wholly static reality and therefore unable to provide relevant possibilities for other realities. Because the Ideal is other than its essence—which is to say other than its determinations—it is able to remain an Ideal forever. The Ideal is knowable as determinately what it is, but its determinateness changes as it provides new and different real possibilities for realization. Thus, the Ideal remains an Ideal for all other beings because they define its essence but cannot exhaust it wholly in any one of the defining conditions they impose upon it, nor in any single final realization.¹⁹ On this basis the 'best of all possible worlds' remains always a possibility and at the same time always a given. That is, the Ideal is always
able to provide a yet unaccomplished Ideal, though at the same time the essence of the Ideal is defined by what is real. Though it lies perpetually beyond realization in any one temporal period, the Ideal is known through or by means of realizations already accomplished. It is intelligible not because it is fully realized at a given moment, but because it can be known by means of its realized possibilities. Every reality is in some way a realization of a possibility and at the same time the definition of that possibility. In this sense the Ideal is the source of all intelligibility in existence. To know an existent reality is to grasp the possibility which it realizes and possesses as an ingredient nature. In grasping such an intelligible one is able to know something about the present reality and about the nature of the Ideal as possible.

Once it is recognized to be logically underivable, Existence is easily seen to be other than the essence by which it is made intelligible. Yet it is intelligible precisely because it is never wholly able to alienate itself from essence. Taken at its broadest as an ultimate mode of being, Existence is fundamentally in a tensional relationship with God, who provides its unifying essence. 20 Its ultimate meaning and intelligibility, therefore, rest finally in God. However, because it can be distinguished from its unifying essence, it can be distinguished from God as well. The distinction is possible because delimited versions of Existence-Existence as related to subordinate essences in Actualities—may be known as other than an Existence whose meaning is exhausted in God.
At every stage in a movement to analytic components of Existence, we come to an essence which has over against it an Existence differing from that essence not in its being, in its function, in the way it acts and thereby affects that essence and other beings.  

Existence is never known wholly apart from some essence because at the moment it broke all ties to an essence it would cease to be intelligible and no means of sustaining it rationally would remain. But more importantly, because Existence can be distinguished from its single unitary essence, those essences by means of which it is grasped as other than God are guaranteed a status really independent of God but related to him through the continuity of Existence.

The ultimate meaning of an Actuality's Existence is to be found in God, but Actualities possess a meaning which is effectively their own. They could not, of course, sustain this meaning, even with the aid of an Existence separated from God, were it not for the fact that the Ideal as the source of all meaning and intelligibility is also distinct from God. The separation of the Ideal from God secures the meaning each Actuality carries from subsumption in the ultimate meaning of God. "The Thomists sometimes speak as though they meant to hold that all Existence is God, in him or from him. But then it is not clear how I can exist." Existence must have a status as separated from God. "In any case it is hard to see how a plurality of places, moments, energies, and beings can be or have their source in an individual eternal unity which is, according to their doctrine, always the same." Essence, the Ideal, must have a status independent of God or else all
meaning is only his derivative, a situation which would contradict his divine unity. Furthermore, the self-possessed independent reality of Actualities would be difficult to maintain even with an independent status granted to Existence and the Ideal, except that Actualities may be understood as the ground of their own plurality. Without establishing Actuality also as an irreducible mode of being, neither Existence nor the Ideal account for individual realities and God has to be invoked as an individuator. On this latter view, the Ideal and Existence would finally have to be subordinated to God because his intelligence would necessarily establish all distinctions in essence, and his power would not only direct all Existence but would become its source. Actuality, it Ideal and Existence each must be distinctive as realities with a modal status equal to that possessed by God if the reality of a plurality of individual beings is to maintained.

Conversely, these considerations also demand that God be distinct from his essence. If God were identical with his essence he would be subordinated to the Ideal or be the Ideal. In either case the Ideal would cease to be an Ideal. Because God is not identical with his essence, he is necessarily a limited reality. Nevertheless, this is a condition of his absolute unity which, together with the external conditions imposed on him by the independent realities of Actuality and Existence, enables his being to be absolutely one, indivisible and comprehensive, encompassing all other realities. God is able to be inwardly determinate precisely because his being is separable from external
pre-occupations. His status as a reality depends in part on external realities, but not his being as he is for that is being in a wholly and singularly different mode from that of all other realities.

Because no one of the modes of being is identical with its essence, nor in any way identical with any other mode of being, each mode is able to have its own independent status. In approaching this problem of the status of the modes through an examination of their intelligibility, the modes are discovered to be intelligible precisely because no one of them is wholly intelligible in itself but each depends for its intelligibility on its relations with and independence of the other modes. Perception provides a model for all knowledge of reality: knowledge of realities with a status beyond the mere knowing of them implies that indications of such a status must accompany the very grasping of their intelligible aspects. While never alien to the knowable as content, the rational categories must nevertheless remain other than that content. The ontological principle on which this demand rests is simply that no reality be identical with its essence; thus the status of the reality is preserved apart from the means by which it is knowable. A further result is that the modes are able to maintain their irreducible character because independent of the other modes. The Ideal as the source of intelligibility becomes, in this exposition, representative of any case in which one of the modes might be conceived as identical with some other one of their number.

Once the need to keep the modes distinct from one another in order to secure their intelligibility is recognized, the
bases of their distinction in reality demands attention. The modes are necessarily distinct in every way from one another because they are irreducible. Yet they share a status as equals in reality; they are all modes of being. If none of them is identical with its essence, by what ground or principle can they be understood to be distinct from one another?

The independent reality of each of the modes has been seen to depend on the reality of all of the modes together, and the significance of this ontological demand for the intelligibility of each of the modes has been examined. These considerations suggest that the togetherness of the modes is also the source of the distinctions between them. The modes of being must differ radically from one another or else the whole complex of the modes of being risks collapse into some single mode of being, into some monism in which all of the distinctions between beings are ultimately resolved. Because the modes are necessarily final realities, an irreducible plurality of four beings, they must never lose their distinctions in the unity of an Absolute, as for instance in the philosophy of Hegel. Nor for that matter can they have such a synthesis of their realities as a common purpose. Their opposition to one another must be regarded as irreconcilable. Further, the modes cannot have derived from a common origin or ground. Were their reality as radically differing from one another related to some supervening whole, or originally subsistent unity of being, they would again be reducible to a reality which, if not
the sole ultimate reality, would have to be one of them and therefore over against them.

The difference between the possible and other realities cannot be merely possible. If it were the possible would be over against those other realities, and would need a relation to connect it with those others. Nor can the difference be Actual, or Existential, or Divine, for similar reasons.27

In order to maintain the reality of distinctions between the modes, therefore, recourse must be had to a conception of the modes which takes them simply as being together, with their radical distinctions given in their very togetherness. The modes can then be radically distinct from one another only because each is not any one of the others nor the others in combination. "In . . . the relation of difference among the modes is all of the modes together, not as constituting a new entity, but as in fact constituting an unstable combination of them, dissolving when and as it occurs."28

The distinctions which obtain between the modes are therefore defined by the togetherness of the modes. The epistemological demand that the modes be intelligible has its justification in the ontological demand that the modes be distinct from one another through their togetherness. As the organizing conception of Weiss' modal philosophy, the togetherness of the modes is the subject of the final chapter. That chapter will examine Weiss' conceptions of plurality and totality which give rise to the doctrine of the togetherness of the modes of being.
CHAPTER V

THE TOGETHERNESS OF THE MODES OF BEING

The modes of Actuality, Ideality, Existence and God make up a community of fundamental realities. Each has a unique role to play on behalf of the community and these roles provide each with a special status for itself and significance for the others. Nevertheless, no one of the modes is able to account for its own reality or for the reality of the others. As the central feature of the whole of reality, therefore, all of the modes together must somehow enter into every account of the individual beings that constitute the community.

The togetherness of the modes of being is the condition whereby each mode has its own being. It is not an end towards which all of the modes point, nor the source from which they all arose. When it is said, therefore, that the togetherness of the modes must account for all that occurs in reality, togetherness is meant as a thematic concept describing what is the case. It does not denote a special kind of being whose reality transcends the individual modes. Though it is a temptation to discount the radical plurality demanded by the very idea of the modes, and place in its stead a unifying concept which in effect reduces their being to some single all encompassing being, the togetherness
of the modes cannot be such a being. "The togetherness of beings is the being of them together," no more, no less than that.\(^1\) If four modes of being are together, they are four different modes of being. Were the modes in part the same, that sameness would constitute another mode of being. Were they wholly the same, they would be but a single mode of being. But there are differences in being. To account for them and at the same time to do justice to them, more than one mode of being must be acknowledged. Whether or not exactly four modes of being are required can be determined only by examining the realities that men can encounter to discover just what will account for the features those realities exhibit. A philosophy of the four modes of being does not arise out of some magic inherent in the number four, but results from the need to provide an intelligible account of those realities that are known.

If the four modes of being do account for whatever there is, on the most fundamental level they must account for themselves and do so through the very fact of their being together. Conversely, if the togetherness of the four modes enters into everything that is, that togetherness must itself be accounted for by the four modes of being; that togetherness must be a unique togetherness belonging to four modes of being in a way unlike the togetherness that might belong to any other combinations of beings. These complementary formulations of the problem of the togetherness of the modes indicate the two ways in which this togetherness may be viewed. "This togetherness can be viewed as a neutral relation connecting each with the rest, or as a
togetherness of all which is possessed by each and terminates in the others."\(^\text{2}\) The former view recognizes the togetherness to be a condition of the totality regarded from a neutral standpoint. The latter view regards the same togetherness, but from the standpoint of each, as a dynamic juncture of the four at each of the modes. In either view, the togetherness of the modes of being is conceived to accomplish the constitution of a comprehensible totality and to secure at the same time a radical distinctness between individual beings.

This doctrine of togetherness, therefore, preserves the integrity of many ones, not over against any all-encompassing one, but within the very totality which they constitute together. An answer to the problem of the one and the many, the togetherness of the modes of being is meant to explain, "how a plurality of entities can be together without the very fact of their togetherness adding another member to the totality of things which in turn must be brought together with the original set, and so on."\(^\text{3}\)

Underlying this formulation of the problem is the view that because there are difficulties in reconciling a one and a many, there must be a distinction between the one and the many such that, taken together, the one and many necessarily constitute a many. All that could relate an original one and many, therefore, and maintain the status of each is the fact that they are together. A solution to the problem of the one and the many, then, must show how a plurality of distinguishable realities can be related to one another in a way that preserves the distinctions which separate them, but does not introduce some new reality into their community. The distinctions which hold between the members
of a plurality must be sustained by those beings within the plurality.

The inter-relatedness of beings, therefore, must be the fact of their being together. The togetherness of the modes of being is a state constituted by the modes themselves as each seeks an answer for its claim to reality in the being of the others. Inasmuch as each mode terminates in the others, they are most intimately bound together. But this relationship preserves, too, the greatest possible distinctness. From their private standpoints, each is connected with the others by the symmetrical relation, "other than." Such fundamental otherness maintains the integrity of the modes, but does not so separate them that they lose significance for one another. Were the modes entirely independent of one another, their discontinuity would make necessary the introduction of non-being or some further reality into being in order to sustain the reality of the whole. But the four modes of being must exhaust all that is or can be. Nevertheless, because each mode is able to be over against the others, it is possible to speak of that which separates them. "In between all four modes there would have to be all of the modes together, which is being qua being, being which is not being at all." This togetherness of the modes which is not being at all is the intersecting totality of the four ways of being. No single being can be in four ways at once. If there were such a being, it would constitute a fifth mode of being. But such a fifth mode would constitute a new togetherness with the other modes which in its turn would have to become a sixth mode, and so on, into a regress that makes an absurdity
out of the whole enterprise. There can be only four final irreducible modes of being.

If the togetherness constituted by the modes cannot be itself a being, neither can it be a mere abstraction. Such a view of their togetherness might be suggested by the fact that in order to consider all of the modes at once, it is necessary to abstract from the standpoint of any one of them and assume a position of neutrality above them. However, if the modes exhaust the whole of reality, there could be no way in which one could wholly transcend them. Neither could the togetherness of the modes resolve into a neutralization of their distinct realities. Full neutrality is impossible because the totality of beings must be fourfold as well as all-encompassing. Furthermore, to hold that the togetherness of the modes is no more than an abstraction is to empty the concept of togetherness of meaning for the totality of realities. Whatever unity there is among beings would be, on this view, either arbitrary or accidental, and certainly unfathomable.

Because the togetherness of the modes cannot be either a single being or a mere abstraction, it must also be distinguished from the unity of the modes. Togetherness is constituted by the fact that all of the modes are. "Each mode of being is a being only because there are others. Pure being altogether is not; the only beings there can be are beings together." Because there can be no single pure being, the unity of the modes must persist within their interplay. The interplay of the modes arises from the fact that each of the modes, because it is
imperfect, needs the others and therefore engages in a reciprocal effort with them in its own interests. While the totality of this interplay constitutes the togetherness of the modes, their unity implicit in being together is sustained by the unifying presence each of the four modes brings to its particular togetherness with the others. The unity of the modes is not a single all-encompassing unity, but four distinctive unities which collectively account for the togetherness of the whole. From its own standpoint, each of the modes assumes the posture of a one which is both over against the others and consisting for them as that for which they are many. The unity of the modes is the unity each mode from its own position is able to lend to the whole. Thus, the togetherness of the modes embraces four ones which stand related to four sets of many. The modes are together in four different ways.

Understood now as preserving the greatest distinctness among the modes, togetherness can be analyzed into four kinds of togetherness. One kind is characteristic of each of the modes as it stands as a one in togetherness with its particular many.

Togetherness can be said to be polarized into a plurality of togetherness by each of the ((plurality of the original four modes)) to the extent that this maintains itself as a unity. The plurality of unified beings requires a plurality of ways of being together. We can stress any one of these beings and make it into a supreme One having the rest as a Many for it. Out of the togetherness of an original many, the plurality of the four irreducible modes of being, arises a second order of plurality. In this plurality of four kinds of togetherness, the modes are able to be together in four distinctive ways. The
irreducible character each mode uniquely possesses determines one of the four ways in which the modes are together. From the standpoint of God their togetherness is an eternal condition. Actuality defines an actual way in which beings can be together. Ideality guarantees the fact that the modes are structurally involved with one another. Existence provides an existential area of their interplay. 11

The fact that beings are able to be together in different ways results in a progressive pluralization within each mode. These pluralities arise by virtue of the original interplay between the four modal roots. Because each mode must reach out to three other modes and answer at least three demands put to it by the others, the individual modes are internally diversified by their interplay. "And if account be taken of the fact that there are many Actualities each of which is occupied with the other modes of being, one could go on to maintain that there are at least as many instances of the other modes of being as there are Actualities." 12 Because each Actuality is an instance of a kind of togetherness of the modes, each is able to stand over against the reality of the other modes as a one to a many and thus to effect distinctions within those other modes. The initial distinctions which hold between the four modes of being are therefore seen to be multiplied into the seemingly infinite array of distinctions which make up the cosmos. These derivative realities and distinctions are ultimately reducible to the simplest necessary plurality, the four modes of being, but
they are no less real for that.

What is important at this juncture in the discussion, however, is not the fact that many individual beings exist, but the assertion that an original plurality of beings together must be acknowledged in order to account for the multitude of experienced realities. This assertion of a necessary original plurality involves a certain conception of reality as a totality. That conception sees the whole to be a sum or collection of many beings. The two notions, plurality and whole, operate correlatively to ground the fundamental statement of the togetherness of beings, namely, that to be is to be one of many which constitute the whole of things. In the language of *Modes of Being*:

> There are no more and no less than four modes of being. To be is to be one of four beings. What is less than all four is an imperfect being; what is more than all four is self-contradictory; what is just four is being as exhausted in the four modes together.\(^{13}\)

The whole is constituted and exhausted by the plurality; reality is through and through the four modes of being. There is, therefore, no single "being" in which all beings share. There are four unique "beings" which have the power of being only from their togetherness with one another. Because their togetherness is the very condition of their being, the four modes of being define a closed system or totality of reality in which all occurrences can be explained internally. But the fact of this self-possessed totality must also be explained.

The view that reality is to be regarded ultimately as a whole or totality, rather than as a single one or unity,
depends for its justification on a demonstration that plurality is at least as real and basic a fact of being as unity. Such a demonstration must show that reality necessarily entails a plurality, or what is the same thing, that the reality of a single being existing wholly alone is an impossibility. If neither the necessity of a plurality of beings, nor the impossibility of a single being alone can be shown, there is no rational basis for a philosophy which recognizes a plurality of fundamental realities. But a philosophy of modal realities must have plurality as its fundamental conception. Modality signifies nothing if it does not imply a distinction of some kind of another between beings. At issue here is whether or not the modal conception of being reveals something significant about the essential nature of reality.

The adequacy of modality as the fundamental expression of the nature of the real would seem to be challenged by the fact that traditional conceptions of modality held that modes defined distinctions within an ultimate substratum. The modal distinctions held by Duns Scotus and Spinoza are cases in point. Although modality serves different purposes for these philosophers, certainly the phrase, "modes of being," would suggest to them distinctions within a substantial unitary being. For these philosophers, modal togetherness would imply an originating primary substance. But for Weiss, the modes are the fundamental realities, the substantial realities which ensue from the togetherness of the modes. When Weiss is discussing the four different manyes which constitute the togetherness of the modes and from which substantial beings arise, he cautions against the views of such philosophers as Duns Scotus and
Spinoza.

The Many's never make one single neutral concrete Many. Could they do so, they would by that very fact require the dissolution of all the modes of being, break them up into an inside and an outside, a process and a terminal point. Thus, if the modes belonged to a basic substance, they would have no more status in being than the modal distinctions of traditional philosophers. The status of the modes of being depends on the necessity of an original plurality of beings.

Weiss argues for an original plurality of realities, first, by discrediting arguments which seek to demonstrate the necessary reality of but a single subsistent being, and secondly, by offering a positive demonstration in support of his own position. He understands all philosophies which advocate the monistic position to employ some variation of either the cosmological or ontological argument for the existence of God. He takes the cosmological argument to move from the fact of the possible to a necessary implicated conclusion, the existence of an infinite source of all being. But such a conclusion has already been shown incapable of accounting for the fact that the contingent beings with which the argument must begin have a reality over against that necessary being. Moreover, this argument can never completely exclude the presence of the contingent beings and their claim to a reality of their own, and therefore cannot demonstrate the possibility of a necessary being actually able to exist without other realities. A plurality of beings is a condition for the argument and cannot be denied by the argument's conclusion. As usually
employed, this argument terminates in a being which cannot be detached from the beings with which the argument begins, unless the argument sacrifices all comprehension of that being. To assert that the being is comprehensible as the sole existing reality—which is what is asserted when the being is supposedly proved to be the only necessary reality—is to employ the ontological argument for the existence of God, namely, that because a being may be conceived of as absolutely necessary, it therefore exists.

Against this argument Weiss insists that the existence of a being independent of any other realities, wholly in isolation, is an impossibility. With Hegel, he maintains that an absolutely self-sufficient being is indistinguishable from non-being. Determinateness in beings depends upon their exemplification of the law of contradiction. But because the law of contradiction operates only on the condition that the nature of one being can be contrasted with the nature of another, a being which exhausted the possibility for any natures other than its own would be unable to exemplify the law of contradiction. It would necessarily be indeterminate. At this point Weiss parts company with Hegel to uphold the primacy of the law of contradiction as the fundamental principle of being. He declares the absolutely self-sufficient being impossible because it cannot exemplify that principle. It is therefore identical with non-being. Because the ontological argument offers non-being as necessary being, it yields only the self-contradictory. "Anything that there may be must be
one of many. It is necessarily true that I and every other reality are contingent beings."\(^{18}\)

But if all beings are contingent beings, it would seem that all necessity would be inexplicable, or could conceivably disappear altogether. The reality of everything would seem to be jeopardized. Against these conclusions, Weiss argues to the necessity of the real. By real, he means a totality made up of many beings, and precisely not a single being. Thus, if the real might not be, then its complete negation, absolute non-being, might be. But absolute non-being, or a Substantial Nothing, is impossible. It is impossible because non-being as the absolutely indeterminate Nothing must be determinately what it is, therefore, determinately indeterminate.

If the Substantial Nothing is not to be self-contradictory, its determinateness must characterize its indeterminateness and not the nothing which that indeterminateness itself characterizes. But then, since the determinateness of the indeterminate is itself determinate, and so without end, instead of a Substantial Nothing there would be a multitude of characteristics, which as distinct from the Nothing and presupposed by it, would prevent the Substantial Nothing from being that which eliminated everything whatsoever.\(^{19}\)

The result is that the Substantial Nothing is no more than a kind of logical self-contradictory. If not that, it must be a relative nothing which, in order to be, presupposes a system of somethings which it can negate. Because such a nothing must be relative to real beings, it cannot exist prior to them. Neither could it exist subsequent to the existence of the totality of real beings, that would result in its complete indeterminateness.
for this state has just been shown an impossibility. "The non-being of anything entails the presence of something else."20

A reality made up of a plurality of beings is, therefore, a fact. The existence both of a single subsistent being, and of a Substantial Nothing have been shown to be impossible. Reality, therefore, is many beings together, a disjunctive totality of beings which together constitute a necessary whole. Beyond the totality lies nothing at all, nothing which is merely the relative negation of what in fact has reality.

"Our universe is made up of all that can interact with what is experienced here and now."21 The reduction of this enormous plurality of beings to those which are fundamental to the whole of reality yields the four modes of being. These irreducible realities ground whatever has reality. The systematic exposition of the interplay of the modes accounts for whatever is and can be by acknowledging that this original togetherness of basic realities pervades every derivative individual reality. Of course, the demonstration that reality is necessarily a plurality of beings constituting a totality does not prove that the modes of Actuality, Ideality, Existence and God are the irreducible realities that make up that totality. They are understood to be the fundamental realities because a comprehensible account of the whole of the reality men know demands that these four realities be acknowledged as fundamental. "But there is no need to acknowledge more than four, until and unless there are difficulties which
cannot be resolved except by taking this further step. One ought not to multiply entities beyond necessity." That further step could be occasioned only by the discovery of some fact in experience that could not be integrated within the system of the four modes of being. Because the intelligible interplay of the four modes is taken to be all-inclusive, the systematic account of their interplay ought to be able to deal with the entirety of man's experience. Just as the reality of beings was seen to reside in their togetherness and not in some being over against them, so the proof of the four modal realities as the irreducible plurality grounding the whole of things resides in the consistency which the account of their interplay can achieve and in the fact that nothing in experience is left out of the account.

In this chapter an attempt has been made to lay open the essential structure and rational grounding of the four modes of being. The central concept of their reality, their togetherness, was seen to be an answer to the problem of the one and the many. It presupposed an original plurality of realities and a conception of reality as a totality made up of that original plurality. Weiss' arguments for acknowledging a necessary plurality of beings were set forth in an effort to support his contention that the distinctions between beings and the integrity of individual beings could be maintained only by recourse to the four irreducible modal realities. These arguments involved the insistence that the law of contradiction is fundamental to being and could tolerate no indeterminacy in real beings. Because
the law had to be exemplified, no single being could be thought to exist self-subsistantly. All beings were seen to be necessarily contingent. Instead of being the privilege of a single being, necessity was seen to belong to reality as a totality of many beings. The systematic exposition of this totality would be all-inclusive, if it could integrate all the facts of experience into the complex interplay of the four modes of being. *Modes of Being* is intended as just such an all-inclusive account.

**CONCLUSION**

Within the context provided by the four irreducible modes of being, Paul Weiss has brought certain fundamental metaphysical conceptions into sharp relief and given them a thematic status almost equal to the modes themselves. By way of conclusion, it would be well to review these conceptions. One theme to which Weiss devotes considerable attention is the ontological status of the individual. As should be evident from the foregoing exposition, the status of the individual in Weiss' system is guaranteed by a unique and irreducible mode of being, Actuality. It is significant too that within the mode of Actuality, the plurality of individuals which constitute that mode have a priority over the unity of the mode. Because individuals have this basic modal status, their integrity is sustained against the fate that has so often befallen the individual in other comprehensive metaphysical systems, namely, its subsumption into some higher
reality. Against such an eventuality, Weiss most adamantly defends the total uniqueness of individual beings. The very nature of the modal conception is calculated to insure the individual's place within the structure of reality. As Weiss states this:

"For us the modes are primary and constitute the bare fact of their togetherness. Only the latter way of speaking does justice to the truth that we can never entirely free ourselves from the fact that we at least are, and thus ground and are not functions of a number of states of togetherness." 25

Supporting this basic regard for the integrity of individual beings is an attempt to do justice to the distinctions in reality. Weiss' insistence on an original irreducible plurality of unique realities challenges the failure of much of traditional metaphysics to provide an adequate account of the distinctions between things. Against the monisms and monistic tendencies in philosophy, Weiss levels a charge that a One can never on its own account for a Many. Intelligible distinctions in beings, he argues, demand the acknowledgement of distinctions within the ground of their beings. The diverse characteristics which beings exhibit must ultimately derive from distinct realities, or else be adventitious. Real distinctions in individual beings must be guaranteed by the radical distinctness of the four most basic realities.

The grounding of multiple distinctions in a fundamental plurality has its rational basis in Weiss' position that the primary ontological relation is the symmetrical relation of otherness. Every being in his system may be regarded as standing fundamentally over against all other beings. Actualities
are defined by an essential otherness; God is defined as a unity wholly over against all else; the Ideal is always exterior to all else; and Existence is defined as a dynamic othering. All realities, therefore, stand reciprocally related to one another. Furthermore, they stand outside the very relation, for they are related simply by the fact of their being together. Their togetherness defines both their maximum and minimum inter-relatedness. No being is ever wholly able to subjugate another reality. Every being must always remain in some real sense "other than" every other being. Every act must be distinct from every agent; every cause distinct from its effect; every possibility distinct from the being for which it is a prospect.

But the fact that beings are necessarily "other than" one another entails too their total interdependence. It demands that in order to be at all, a being must be together with other beings. Even non-being must be related to real beings. Fixity becomes a relative concept in this system. A state of constant inter-activity dictated by the needs and demands of each reality occasions new events and radical changes in beings. These same needs and demands, thrusts and counter-thrusts, sustain the unity of the system. The unity of reality may be said to be one with the otherness of beings.

Because beings are necessarily "other than" one another, they constitute an exhaustive togetherness of many realities. Each being provides that togetherness with a certain unity. But the summation of those unities can never make a single unity of being. Rather, they must constitute a totality. Such a
totality constituted by beings reciprocal with one another and completely exhaustive of all that is and can be necessarily embraces a system of internal consistency. That implicit consistency finds expression through the intelligibility of beings. Because all beings exemplify an essential modality of a single primary category, all of reality is open to philosophical investigation.

Drawing its principles from a reality which it conceives to be a self-consistent totality, the philosophy of the modes of being is thus thoroughly systematic. Therein lies its virtue and its credibility. The consistency with which Weiss treats his fundamental themes admits no unacknowledged presuppositions into his arguments; his consistency is by design self-challenging. But perhaps even more important is the fact that Weiss' systematic philosophy attempts to do justice to the seeming inconsistencies of the world about us through its very consistency. The Modes of Being is a philosophy which accepts plurality, tension, and process as its primary data. Four irreducible modes of being testify that this philosophy did not abandon the realities which prompted its inception.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

1 Paul Weiss, Modes of Being (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1953), Introduction, p. 3. (Hereinafter entries from this work will be referred to with the abbreviation MB.)

2 MB, p. 18.

3 MB 4.02.

4 MB 4.01.

5 Ibid.

6 MB, p. 14, 1.01, 1.06.

7 Paul Weiss, Reality, (New York: Peter Smith, 1949), p. 177. (Hereinafter entries from this work will be referred to with the abbreviation R.)

8 R, p. 178.

9 Difficulties which may be raised in issue with this point, e.g., how the distinction is possible at all, whether Actuality as a concept is intelligible in itself, or as is suggested in the argument, is any more than an abstraction, are considered in the chapters on the Intelligibility of the Modes and the Togetherness of the Modes.

10 MB 1.02, 1.04.

11 R, p. 236, 237; MB 3.04, 3.05.

12 MB 1.01.

13 Also, there are tensions and conditions effected by the other modes against which Actualities must struggle; but this is anticipatory. See chapter on the Interplay of the Modes.
That Weiss even speaks of the substantial core of an Actuality as a side testifies to the analytic character of the distinction between public and private. As will be made evident in the exposition of the inter-relatedness of the modes the tensions between inside and outside are conflicts resulting from the incursions of the other modes and Actualities on the modal interests of an individual Actuality engaging the other realities and securing itself against them. See also, MB 1.17, 1.45.

MB, p. 533.

MB 1.07.

MB 4.16.

MB, p. 534.

MB 2.04.

MB 2.02, 2.03.

MB 2.04.

See Existence and God below.

MB 2.09.

MB 2.16.

MB 2.05.

MB 2.07.

MB 2.15.

MB 2.17.

MB 2.19.

MB 2.22.

MB 3.01.

Weiss' gerund use of his verb "to other," meaning to produce a relation of otherness between distinct beings, refers to an essential characteristic of the mode Existence. See MB 1.03, 3.01.
Among Actualities this exteriority constitutes the dynamic field in which they delimit a common space.
CHAPTER II

1. MB 4.61.
2. MB 4.01.
3. MB 4.01.
4. MB, p. 518.
5. MB 4.02.
6. MB 4.03.
7. MB, pp. 540-541.
8. MB 2.104.
10. MB 4.05.
11. MB 3.59.
12. MB 4.17.
13. MB 2.20.
14. MB 4.16.
15. MB 4.76.
16. MB 3.43.
17. MB 4.15.
19. MB 2.23.
20. MB 2.15.
21. MB 2.10.
23. MB 3.104.
24. MB 3.92.
25 MB 1.106.
26 MB 2.22.
26a MB 4.89.
27 MB 4.21.
28 MB 3.06.
29 MB 3.04.
30 MB 3.03.
31 MB 3.05.
32 MB 3.101.
33 MB 4.23.
34 MB 4.84.
35 MB 4.76.
36 MB 4.85.
37 MB 4.84.
38 MB 4.86.
39 MB, p. 539.
40 MB 4.68.
41 MB, p. 540.
42 MB 2.12.
43 MB, p. 541.
CHAPTER III

There is an element of sacrifice here; for Weiss' views on the nature of sacrifice see "Sacrifice and Self-sacrifice," The Review of Metaphysics, II, No. 7 (March, 1949), 76-98.

For further remarks on this subject with special application to the problems posed by the velocity of light, see R, p. 111.

MB 4.03.

2MB, p. 376.

3MB, p. 378.

4 There is an element of sacrifice here; for Weiss' views on the nature of sacrifice see "Sacrifice and Self-sacrifice," The Review of Metaphysics, II, No. 7 (March, 1949), 76-98.

5MB 4.77.

6MB 4.73.

7MB, p. 373.

8MB, p. 510.

9R, p. 59.

10MB, 1.56.

11MB 1.59.

12MB 1.57.

13MB 1.60.

14MB 1.58.

15MB 1.58.

16MB 1.63.

17R, p 32.

18R, pp. 33-41.

19 For further remarks on this subject with special application to the problems posed by the velocity of light, see R, p. 111.

20MB 1.61; R, pp. 41-56.

21MB 1.61
$22_{R}$, p. 46.
$23_{R}$, p. 56.
$24_{MB}$ 1.64.
$25_{MB}$ 1.62.
$26_{MB}$ 1.63.
$27_{MB}$ 1.65.
$28_{R}$, pp. 57-63.
$29_{MB}$ 1.67.
$30_{R}$, pp. 67-68.
$31_{R}$, p. 61.
$32_{MB}$ 1.67.
$33_{MB}$ 1.74.
$34_{R}$, p. 143.
$35_{MB}$ 1.95.
$36_{MB}$ 1.100.
$37_{MB}$ 1.96.
$38_{MB}$ 1.102.
$39_{MB}$ 1.03.
$40_{R}$, p. 154.
$41_{MB}$ 1.104.
$42_{MB}$, p. 529.
$43_{MB}$, p. 528.
CHAPTER IV

2. MB 4.06.
4. MB 1.91.
5. MB 3.25.
6. MB 1.93.
7. See Chapter I, p. 8.
8. MB 3.15.
9. MB 3.15.
11. MB 3.15.
12. MB 3.15.
13. MB 2.102.
13a. MB, p. 17.
15. MB, Ibid.
18. MB 3.15.
20. MB 2.104.
21 MB 3.15.
22 MB 3.06, 3.07, 3.08.
23 MB 3.08.
24 Ibid.
25 MB 4.70.
26 MB 4.60.
27 MB 2.12.
28 Ibid.
CHAPTER V

1 MB, p. 514.
2 MB 2.12.
4 MB 2.12.
5 MB, p. 518.
6 MB, p. 517.
7 MB, 4.109.
8 MB 4.59.
9 MB, p. 515.
10 MB, p. 516.
11 MB, p. 514.
12 MB 4.61.
13 MB, p. 518.
14 MB, p. 515.
15 R, p. 163 n.
16 MB 3.08.
17 MB 4.12.
18 R., p. 165.
19 R., pp. 165, 166.
20 R., p. 169.
21 R, p. 171.
22MB, p. 17.


24MB 4.61.

25MB, p. 518.
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