ITE, MISSA EST! A Missional Liturgical Ecclesiology

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A MISSIONAL LITURGICAL ECCLESIOLOGY

by


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ABSTRACT

ITE, MISSA EST!

A MISSIONAL LITURGICAL ECCLESIOLOGY


Marquette University, 2016

Since the latter half of the twentieth-century, a great many churches and ecclesial communities have agreed that the basic contours of what is called an ecclesiology of communion represents their own self-understanding. Communion ecclesiology centers upon a vision of the church as sharing together in the life of God, with ecclesiastical apparatus such as office, liturgy, and sacraments seen as facilitating this communion. Understood in this light, communion ecclesiology represents a movement away from overly juridical accounts of the church and toward a more organic conception of the church.

For nearly the same time frame, a parallel missiological consensus has emerged, which sees the church’s mission as a participation in the missio Dei—the mission of God. Certain representatives of missio Dei theology have raised the criticism that a communion ecclesiology winds up conceiving the church as a self-enclosed entity, severing its mission from its life, such that communio ecclesiologies no longer share in the missio Dei. They call for an abandonment of communion ecclesiology in favor of a missional ecclesiology, which sees mission as constitutive of the church’s life and eschews a structured community or settled liturgical form.

This dissertation confronts the divide between communion and missional ecclesiologies by constructing an ecclesiology which is at once missional and liturgical. It proceeds by an examination of the theological underpinnings of missional and communion ecclesiologies, especially the doctrine of the Trinity and sacramental liturgies, to demonstrate that mission and liturgy are intrinsically related to each other. The church’s liturgical rites disclose and enact the church’s identity as a missionary community.

The rites of initiation constitute the church as the body of Christ, sharing in the life of God through the paschal mystery. The action of the paschal mystery, especially as it is represented in the sacrifice of the Mass, discloses that the body of Christ is a body which is given away to God and to the world for the world’s salvation. Sharing in the sacraments makes the church to be such a body as well. Mission is not a secondary activity alongside liturgy, but rather part of the liturgy’s intelligibility. To share in the life of God is also to share in the mission of God, for the same reality, the paschal mystery, lies behind both communion and mission.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


A project like this is, inevitably, a long time in the making, meaning that the ranks of those to whom I owe a debt of gratitude are legion. I cannot presume to thank them all, but hope that in this space I can cover a few centers of gravity. My parents, Lou and Paula, instilled in me and my siblings a drive for academic excellence, which could have easily become pathological (and perhaps is!), but which has been a remarkably helpful personality trait in pursuing my scholarly work.

I was first introduced to serious eucharistic ecclesiology by Eugene F. Rogers near the end of a seminary education from which it had been lacking. Had he not corrupted a young Southern Baptist with Radical Orthodoxy and John Zizioulas, I would probably never have been set on the course that led to this dissertation. He and Derek Krueger (with whom I first studied early Christianity, and who first encouraged me to pursue graduate studies) have remained among my most generous supporters on the path through academia.

Without question, one of the greatest debts I owe is to Marquette University, and especially to the Department of Theology, for supporting me throughout my doctoral studies. I cannot imagine a place I would rather have done this work. This community of scholars truly does embody the “collegial” spirit that most departments only claim to have. In particular, I am grateful to Luke Togni, whom an accident of providence made my carrel mate at Marquette. Little did we know that we would become fast friends, constantly looking for ways to bring sacrifice into a conversation. Luke and Richard J. Barry IV provided helpful feedback on portions of this project. Jakob Karl Rinderknecht has always been a generous resource in navigating the rigors of the dissertation process. I am especially grateful for the financial provision of the Rev. John P. Raynor, SJ Fellowship for the 2015–2016 academic year, which helped to make this work possible.

I have been blessed with a wonderful dissertation committee—Susan K. Wood, SCL, Michel René Barnes, Daniele Nussberger, and John Laurance, SJ—who have been generous with their time and attention during this project, whether it involved providing me with feedback on chapters, sending me unsolicited bibliographic recommendations, or raking me over the coals when I had not kept up with the literature! Most importantly, they freed me to pursue this work in my own voice, rather than being boxed in by other tasks and conversations with which I had thought I would need to engage. This project would not have been the same without their efforts. Likewise, D. Stephen Long has offered valuable advice on this project, especially chapter two.

My two years as Michel Barnes’s Teaching Assistant have taught me much about pedagogy, care for one’s students, and the proper use of multi-colored chalk in the
classroom. Likewise, collaboration in a team-taught course with Danielle Nussberger and my own experience in graduate seminars with her taught me much about classroom dynamics, and about teaching theology as if you think it really matters. Most especially, I am grateful to my dissertation advisor, Susan Wood, with whom I have been discussing this project since before I began my studies at Marquette. Her enthusiasm and support for my work has been unwavering, but never uncritical. She knew precisely when to rein me in and when to give me latitude. I cannot imagine a better director than she has been.

Finally, I want to thank my family. It must be a strange experience to be a young child with a parent in graduate school. What does Dad do, exactly? I do not know that my daughters, Joann and Evelyn, ever quite figured that out. But they have been an important fixture at Marquette parties, and, they have always enthusiastically celebrated milestones and victories along the way. Once they figured out that I was working on something called a “dissertation,” they have been faithful to pray for me as I do it. In pride of place, is my wife, Loren. I have learned more about the self-giving love that is the Holy Trinity, and which stands at the heart of this dissertation, from her than from anywhere else. I could not have done this without her constant support and her partnership with me in life. I affectionately dedicate my effort in the following pages to her.
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<tr>
<td>ARCIC</td>
<td>Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td><em>Bibliothèque augustinienne: Œuvres de saint Augustin</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
<td><em>Book of Common Prayer (1979)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>BECNT</td>
<td>Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEM</td>
<td><em>Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry</em></td>
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<td>CCSL</td>
<td><em>Corpus Christianorum Series Latina</em></td>
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<td>CELAM</td>
<td><em>Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>CivDei.</td>
<td><em>De civitate Dei</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>CSEL</td>
<td><em>Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>EKK</td>
<td><em>Evangelisch–katholischer Kommentar zum NeuenTestament</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Critical Commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>International Missionary Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InIo.</td>
<td><em>In Iohannis Evangeliunm Tractatus</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>NICNT</td>
<td>New International Commentary on the New Testament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIGTC</td>
<td>New International Greek Testament Commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCIA</td>
<td><em>Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td><em>Sources chrétiennes</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBC</td>
<td>Word Biblical Commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZECNT</td>
<td>Zondervan Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament</td>
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INTROIT: AN INTRODUCTION

“The pilgrim church is of its very nature missionary.”¹ So declares the Roman Catholic Church’s document from the Second Vatican Council, Ad gentes. This conviction has echoed and reverberated throughout the second half of the twentieth-century and up to the present time.² This study carries forward this theolegoumenon in


The missionary nature of the church is also affirmed in contemporary Anglican theology. E.g., Church of England, Mission Shaped Church (London: Church House Publishing, 2004); Paul Avis, A
concert with another key affirmation of the Second Vatican Council: that the church’s liturgy most clearly discloses the church’s nature, a statement, which has, again, gained a good deal of ecumenical purchase. If these two statements are correct and harmonious,


Sacrosanctum concilium, no. 2 [Tanner, 2:820]. Massimo Faggioli has demonstrated that Sacrosanctum concilium, the first document issued by Vatican II, has an influence extending far beyond liturgical reform. Its outlook gave shape to the emerging vision of the entire council, particularly in the area of ecclesiology. True Reform: Liturgy and Ecclesiology in “Sacrosanctum Concilium” (Collegiaveille: Liturgical Press, 2012).

For statements of the ecclesiologically basic character of the liturgy see, e.g., Gordon W. Lathrop, Holy People: A Liturgical Ecclesiology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999); Mattijs Ploeger, Celebrating Church: Ecumenical Contributions to a Liturgical Ecclesiology (Groningen: Instituut voor Liturgiewetenschap, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2008); Paul McPartlan, The Eucharist Makes the Church: Henri de Lubac and John Zizioulas in Dialogue (London: T & T Clark, 1996); Alexander Schmemann, For
it follows that there must be an intrinsic relationship between the church’s internal life of liturgy and its external life of mission. In this study I argue that liturgy and mission are not only self-implicating, but indeed dual aspects of the same reality, namely the participation of the redeemed in Christ’s paschal mystery. Further, recognizing their paschal character yields a distinct perspective on the church.

In the following pages, I confront two problematic tendencies in the field of academic ecclesiology. The first is to conceive of the church in primarily static terms that consider what the church is apart from its mission in the world. The second is to emphasize the church’s mission to the world to the detriment of its visible, institutional, sacramental reality, such that there is no ecclesial stability that would allow one to identify where the Church actually is. Against the first I propose an ecclesiology in which the church’s esse as communio is thoroughly bound up with its missio to the world, a mission that always carries it beyond itself. Against the second, I contend that it is

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5 John Flett, in Witness of God, 204–208, raises this particular criticism against John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion; Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology: Volume 2: The Works of God (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998). It is important to note that in none of these cases do the authors explicitly state that the church need not engage in mission. Rather, the problem, as Flett notes, is that they are able to give an account of ecclesiology that stands complete without any consideration of mission at all.

6 In this regard, perhaps the most radical proposal comes from Nathan R. Kerr, who, in Christ, History and Apocalyptic, 161–196, espouses an ecclesiology of apocalyptic rupture in which the church cannot be anticipated in advance of its actual arrival in actu. In this regard, Kerr is taking up a trajectory pioneered by Johannes Christiaan Hoekendijk, Church Inside Out, 39–42. Flett allows for an ecclesial visibility, but opposes liturgical form to the essence of both mission and of “worship in Spirit and truth,” Witness of God, 262–284 [284].
precisely in its sacramental life that the church confronts its own reality as a mission that always calls it to transcend itself. What I articulate, then, is a liturgically grounded ecclesiology of communion, which is at once and in the same way an ecclesiology of mission. What I mean by this shall be clarified below.

The Goal: Liturgy and Mission in Apposition

Each Sunday, in its eucharistic gathering, the church professes, “We believe in one holy catholic and apostolic church.” By this liturgical confession of the Christian faith, the church notes that mission is intrinsic to its own self-understanding. The apostolicity of the church (without prejudice to questions of the episcopate and apostolic succession) names its continuity with the apostolic mission, which was itself in continuity with Christ’s own mission. The New Testament Gospels variously record Christ commissioning the apostles to carry forward his mission to all the world (Matthew 7:18). For representative articulations of communion ecclesiology see, e.g., Jean-Marie R. Tillard, *L’égile locale: Eclésiologie de communion et catholicité* (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1995); *Church of Churches: The Ecclesiology of Communion*, trans. R. C. de Peaux (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1992); *Flesh of the Church, Flesh of Christ: At the Source of the Ecclesiology of Communion*, trans. Madeleine Beaumont (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2001); Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*; Jenson, *Systematic Theology: Volume 2*; Volf, *After Our Likeness*. Communion ecclesiology developed first in Roman Catholic and Orthodox contexts, but has come to be recognized by the churches of my own Anglican Communion as reflective of their own understanding of ecclesial existence. This understanding is particularly affirmed in statements from ARCIC, *Church as Communion: An Agreed Statement* (London: Church House Publishing, 1991), and the International Commission for Orthodox-Anglican Dialogue, *Church of the Triune God* (London: The Anglican Communion Office, 2006). The general contours of a communion ecclesiology are agreed upon by all parties, though differences remain with regard to issues such as the nature of authority (an issue which also involves the place accorded the bishop of Rome and the ordination of women) and the relative priority of the local and universal church. As my argument does not turn upon either of these issues, I view it as unproblematic to draw from Roman Catholic and Orthodox sources in this ecclesiology.

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7 For representative articulations of communion ecclesiology see, e.g., Jean-Marie R. Tillard, *L’égile locale: Eclésiologie de communion et catholicité* (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1995); *Church of Churches: The Ecclesiology of Communion*, trans. R. C. de Peaux (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1992); *Flesh of the Church, Flesh of Christ: At the Source of the Ecclesiology of Communion*, trans. Madeleine Beaumont (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2001); Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*; Jenson, *Systematic Theology: Volume 2*; Volf, *After Our Likeness*. Communion ecclesiology developed first in Roman Catholic and Orthodox contexts, but has come to be recognized by the churches of my own Anglican Communion as reflective of their own understanding of ecclesial existence. This understanding is particularly affirmed in statements from ARCIC, *Church as Communion: An Agreed Statement* (London: Church House Publishing, 1991), and the International Commission for Orthodox-Anglican Dialogue, *Church of the Triune God* (London: The Anglican Communion Office, 2006). The general contours of a communion ecclesiology are agreed upon by all parties, though differences remain with regard to issues such as the nature of authority (an issue which also involves the place accorded the bishop of Rome and the ordination of women) and the relative priority of the local and universal church. As my argument does not turn upon either of these issues, I view it as unproblematic to draw from Roman Catholic and Orthodox sources in this ecclesiology.

8 This quotation of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed is taken from *The Book of Common Prayer* (New York: Church Hymnal Corporation, 1979), 358. I cite it in this format, rather than from Tanner’s collection of conciliar decrees in order to foreground the liturgical character of this act.

28:16–20; Luke 24:44–49; John 20:19–23),\(^{10}\) the Acts of the Apostles is the record of this mission’s earliest unfolding, and the epistolary literature is the product of missionary expansion.\(^{11}\) That the church is a missionary community is not a controversial statement. In the contemporary context, mission remains basic to the ecclesiological outlook of the Second Vatican Council, and the notion of the “missional church” has proven quite popular since its first emergence in the 1990s.\(^{12}\)

*That* the church is missionary is a straightforward enough claim. What this study attempts is to account for the phenomenon, easy enough to miss, noted at the beginning of this section’s first paragraph: that the church’s liturgical action discloses the church’s existence as a missionary one and implicates the church in that mission. In other words, I seek to account for the relationship between liturgy and mission in ecclesiology. To put a finer point on it, this project constructs an ecclesiology that is at once missional and liturgical.

A few points of clarification are immediately in order, and will help me to show what is in view and at stake here. First, the adjectival forms of “mission” and “liturgy” (missional and liturgical) are meant to signal that these realities are attributes of the church, not simply some super-added activity which is undertaken in addition to some

\(^{10}\) Mark is an outlier in this regard. Its longer ending, almost certainly a later addition, has a direct commission from Christ (Mark 16:14–19), while the shorter, original ending lacks such a commissioning. Even in the original ending, though, the women at the tomb are charged with proclaiming the resurrection (16:7), so even in that case there is an implicit missionary commission.


\(^{12}\) In Vatican II see, e.g., *Sacrosanctum concilium*, nos. 1–2 [Tanner, 2:820]; *Ad gentes*, nos. 1–2 [Tanner, 2:1011]. On the missional church see Guder, *Missional Church*. For a discussion of the genesis and legacy of the idea of a missional church see Craig Van Gelder and Dwight J. Zscheile, *The Missional Church in Perspective: Mapping Trends and Shaping the Conversation* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2011). See also note 2 above. I document these trajectories more fully in chapter one.
other, already-established, being of the church. They are understood to be constitutive realities, through which the church, by divine grace, enacts its own being.13

Second, these two adjectives—missional and liturgical—stand in apposition to each other. In other words, both are equally basic to the ecclesiological perspective operative here. Neither is subordinated to the other, neither is more central than the other, and they cannot be pitted against each other (a tendency that I will discuss below). At the same time, that both are used also signals that they cannot simply be collapsed into each other. As Vatican II’s Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, Sacrosanctum concilium, notes, “Liturgy is not the only activity of the church.”14 So it will not do to collapse mission into it. By the same token, “If everything is mission, then nothing is mission,” meaning that liturgy cannot simply be elided with mission either.15 Hence, while neither is subordinated to the other, and while they remain united, liturgy and mission both retain their own discreet character.16

Finally, my use of the term “construct” to describe my project should not in any way imply novelty. Rather, I seek to articulate a vision of the church consonant with traditional ecclesiology, sacramental theology, and liturgical formularies. In other words, the goal is to demonstrate how the resources already available to the church, according to which it understands itself and enacts its life, already offer it a missional ecclesiology.

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13 It would, of course, be equally accurate to state that God enacts the church’s being through these activities, an insight that accords with the mission as missio Dei perspective that chapter one discusses, as well as with the traditional affirmation that the chief actor in the church’s liturgy is Christ himself.

14 Sacrosanctum concilium, no. 9 [Tanner, 2:823].


16 I discuss this most fully in chapter four.
even if, at times, this may be obscured. Indeed, were my ecclesiology novel, I would have failed in achieving the goal upon which I have set out.

**Ressourcement Ecclesiology in the Service of the Missio Dei**

This is a project in *ressourcement* ecclesiology, appealing to Scripture, to the church fathers, and to the liturgy. And this *ressourcement* is carried out to enrich the horizons of both the ecclesiology of communion and the concept of mission as *missio Dei*. The *missio Dei* concept emerged as a clarifying watershed in the mid-twentieth century, and understands mission as, before all else, a divine activity, rather than a human one. Human beings and the church share in this mission of God, but their activity is located in a place subordinate to God’s own. Understood in these terms, *missio Dei* represents the broad consensus of contemporary mission theology. My retrieval of Scripture, patristics, and liturgy is in the service of providing a more robust ecclesial and trinitarian depth to the concept.

That the concept stands in need of trinitarian depth has been shown clearly by John Flett, who attempts to make up for this deficiency by appeal to Karl Barth’s trinitarian theology. For reasons I shall explain in chapter two, I believe a different trinitarian basis is needed. Nevertheless, Flett is correct in his assessment that the *missio Dei* concept lacks sufficient trinitarian depth.

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17 Hence, Flett is right to criticize Zizioulas et al. for giving the impression of the church as a self-enclosed entity (see note 5 above). Yet, as I shall show, the very elements that comprise a liturgical communion ecclesiology also indicate a missional ecclesiology.


That the concept needs greater ecclesial depth is demonstrated by a certain radical trajectory within the broader consensus of *missio Dei*, which suggests that concern for the church’s internal life, including liturgical form, sacramental observance, and so forth, necessarily occurs at the expense of the missionary engagement that is the church’s *raison d’être*. Theologians such as Johannes Christiaan Hoekendijk, John Flett, and Nathan R. Kerr suggest that an ecclesiology of communion introduces endemic gaps between the church’s liturgical life and its mission, and leads to a potentially endless deferral of mission.\(^{20}\) For the sake of clarity, I shall refer to this trajectory with such labels as “radical” or “secularized,”\(^{21}\) to differentiate it from the broader consensus regarding *missio Dei* within which I operate.

Obviously, if, as I argue, mission is constitutive of ecclesial existence, such a deferral is deeply problematic. Nevertheless, in avoiding this Scylla, the radical *missio Dei* theologians stumble into the gaping maw of an unforeseen Charybdis. Ecclesiology must be both missional and liturgical since both mission and liturgy are constitutive of the church. Hence, an attempt to sever the relationship between the liturgy and mission proves to be equally as problematic as a liturgical church that fails to engage in mission.\(^{22}\) By constructing an ecclesiology in which liturgy and mission are in apposition I provide the broad concept of *missio Dei* with a deeply trinitarian and ecclesial expression, which also avoids the criticisms raised by the radical *missio Dei* theologians.


\(^{21}\) “Radical” can be applied fairly to all three of these interlocutors (Hoekendijk, Flett, and Kerr). “Secularized” is probably best reserved for Hoekendijk, though it probably fits Kerr as well.

\(^{22}\) This is not the only way in which I find their constructive proposals to be problematic, but it suffices at this point. I will demonstrate other inadequacies of their positions in the course of my argument.
Where these radical missional theologians prove important for this project is their provision of critiques of what could be problematic tendencies for communion ecclesiology. Throughout this project I attempt to take their criticisms seriously, even though I find their constructive proposals to be deeply problematic. These critiques invite greater precision and clarification, which I endeavor to provide in what follows. However, the resultant ecclesiology is in no way dependent upon them. They are like signal lights warning of dangerous shoals against which the bark of the church could flounder. However, as my work here demonstrates, the church’s liturgy is able to give these dangerous waters a wide berth without jettisoning any of its cargo.

The result is an articulation of a communion ecclesiology in which mission and liturgy are both given their due. The two appositioned adjectives, “missional” and “liturgical,” mutually enrich the ecclesiological perspective. Missional theology is invited to the liturgical feast provided in the church considered as communion. Liturgical theology is invited to participate more fully in the missionary endeavor for which Christ has commissioned the church. Finally, insofar as I succeed in constructing this ecclesiology by way of retrieval, insofar as I show that this perspective is actually native to conciliar ecclesiology and liturgical formularies, I demonstrate that within ecclesiologies of communion the church, in order to be fully communio must at the same time be missio. If I succeed in this, the positive positions of the radical missio Dei theologians do not need to be directly rebutted, as the entire basis on which they are articulated is shown to be without foundation.
Structure of the Argument

My argument unfolds by way of two related insights. First, at the center of my proposal stands the paschal mystery of Christ’s life, death, resurrection, ascension, bestowal of the Holy Spirit, and future *parousia*. This complex of events is at once the definitive revelation of God, the action by which humanity’s salvation and the world’s redemption have been achieved, and the reality that drives the church’s mission. Following Louis-Marie Chauvet, I understand the paschal mystery to be the most appropriate starting point for a consideration of sacramental theology. Following Hans Urs von Balthasar, I understand the paschal mystery as a trinitarian event, which provides a window into the eternal life of God, and recruits humanity to share in Christ’s mission from the Father. Both liturgy and mission, then, are modes of participating in the paschal mystery. I further advance a consideration of soteriology as communion in the divine life through the mediation of the incarnate Son. These conceptions in their totality integrate liturgy and mission, *communio* and *missio*, for all are driven by the same reality.

Second, the movement of humanity’s return to God through Christ and in the Holy Spirit is itself the path of mission, because the incarnate Christ’s return to the Father

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23 As I shall explain in chapter two, the paschal mystery is a complex of events, which, counterintuitive as it may seem, includes the as-yet future return of Christ. That the *parousia* is included in the paschal mystery gives the entire complex of events an eschatological character.

24 Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 476–489. Chauvet further sees the paschal mystery as providing a window into a trinitarian perspective on God, and worries that approaches that start from another position will function with an inadequately trinitarian outlook (492–547).

was carried out by way of his own missionary passage through the world.\textsuperscript{26} Just as there is a bi-directionality to the Son’s mission, according to which he gives himself at once to the Father and to the world, there is a bi-directionality to the church’s life—towards God and towards the world, indeed, towards God through the world—because the church exists within this same movement of Christ. Therefore, to pit the church’s movement towards God in liturgy against its movement towards the world in mission, as though the two are opposed, misunderstands the nature of the church’s relationship to God and to the world.\textsuperscript{27} By developing these twin themes of a trinitarian perspective on the paschal mystery and the bi-directionality of the return to God, I articulate an ecclesiology in which liturgy and mission are bound tightly together.

**Chapter One**

My argument unfolds in a logical progression across four chapters. I begin in chapter one with a consideration of mission itself. When I speak of a missional ecclesiology what do I mean? This, obviously, is an important starting point, for without it all that follows will be hopelessly vague. Through engagement with biblical texts, conciliar and ecumenical documents, and contemporary mission theology, I establish a working definition of mission, which focuses upon the church’s engagement with the


\textsuperscript{27} I develop the church-world relationship in chapter one, and the bi-directionality of movement toward God and the world in chapters two and three.
world beyond itself. I demonstrate that mission is a holistic reality, encompassing spiritual and material dimensions, involving proclamation and concrete work for justice and integral development. In particular, I appeal to the concept of missio Dei, which proved to be revolutionary to twentieth-century mission theology. Mission is a holistic reality because it is, first and foremost, an activity of God, whose salvation reaches to all dimensions of humanity.

This consideration of mission as carrying the church beyond itself leads naturally to a consideration of the church-world relationship, which I pursue with reference to Vatican II’s Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, *Gaudium et spes*, and supplement with the perspectives afforded by contemporary theological voices, especially voices from Latin America. This leads to a recognition that the church’s existence is interior to the world and its history, and that the church and world exist in a mutually reciprocal relationship. The church is, of its nature, implicated in action within the world because, due to its interiority to the world there is nowhere else that it could possibly act. Furthermore, the church’s own catholicity impels it outward to embrace the whole of humanity. Finally, a recognition that the Holy Spirit operates outside the church within the world, demands that the church also engage with the world, in order to encounter God at work there.

**Chapter Two**

The second chapter reprises the theme of *missio Dei*, and attempts to provide it with a positive trinitarian content, which John Flett has shown it to lack, but fails to

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adequately provide himself.\textsuperscript{29} In speaking of the mission of God, the trinitarian missions ought to be central, and these missions have their clearest expression in the Christ event. I specifically propose an understanding of \textit{missio Dei} as paschal mystery, and do so in conversation with Hans Urs von Balthasar and Bernard J. F. Lonergan.

I adopt Balthasar’s basic trinitarian analogy as a strategy for rooting all trinitarian reflection in the Christ event. In this way, I demonstrate that the paschal mystery of Christ’s life, death, resurrection, and bestowal of the Holy Spirit is an \textit{ad extra} enactment of God’s own eternal life. With Balthasar as my guide, I articulate a trinitarian soteriology according to which humanity is saved by being incorporated into the Son’s place in the divine life. This trinitarian vision proves to be the central organizing motif of this project. I supplement Balthasar’s trinitarian theology with Lonergan’s account of the relationship between the economic missions of the Son and Holy Spirit and their eternal processions within the Godhead. This supplementation helps to clarify potential ambiguities of Balthasar’s theology.

The chapter then proceeds to a consideration of Christian initiation, which I pursue with reference to the Roman Catholic \textit{Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults}, and the Liturgy of Holy Baptism in the American \textit{Book of Common Prayer}.\textsuperscript{30} Both rites of initiation begin with the administration of baptism and issue in first communion. Both rites depict initiation as coming to share in the paschal mystery \textit{and} as coming to share in the church’s mission. This dual function of initiation points to a preliminary application

\textsuperscript{29} Flett diagnoses the problem through a thorough consideration of the concept’s history. \textit{Witness of God}, 1–162. He then attempts to provide the missing trinitarian basis by appeal to Karl Barth’s trinitarian theology (163–298).

of the notion of *missio Dei* as paschal mystery—to participate in the church’s mission is a mode of participation in the paschal mystery, in the *missio Dei*. Furthermore, to share in the paschal mystery is, by the same token, to come to share in the church’s mission.

**Chapter Three**

Chapter three picks up where chapter two left off, by considering the sacrament that completes the sequence of initiation, the Holy Eucharist, and does so in such a way as to provide an account of *why* coming to share in the paschal mystery is at the same time a coming to share in ecclesial mission. I pursue this question through a consideration of the eucharistic sacrifice, which I synthesize with the trinitarian soteriology articulated in chapter two.

Through an investigation of the Eucharist’s status as a meal within a Græco-Roman milieu in which meal and sacrifice were thoroughly intertwined, and especially through a consideration of Augustine of Hippo’s theology of true sacrifice from Book ten of *City of God*, I provide an account of sacrifice as communion. Understanding Augustine’s teaching on sacrifice within its polemical context and in the context of his work as a whole allows us to see that for Augustine sacrifice is another way of naming that dynamic process by which humanity is brought to share in the divine life through the mediation of the Son. For Augustine, the sacrifice of the cross, of the Eucharist, and of the lives of the faithful are all intrinsically related.

With Augustine’s teaching on sacrifice as communion in place, I make a further argument for seeing sacrifice as mission. I do so in two ways. First, I note that Augustine gives us a grammar for considering the ethical lives of the faithful (including missionary engagement) as united to the one sacrifice of Christ. In this way, missionary effort can be
seen as interior to Christ’s sacrifice, and hence, to the Eucharist. Second, returning to Balthasar’s trinitarian theology, I show that the movement to the Father and the movement to the world are as one. In particular, the New Testament accounts of the Eucharist’s institution show Christ at once giving his body to the Father and to the disciples. In the same way, the body offered at the altar is offered to the Father and to the faithful for the world, and the body that the church is, because it shares in Christ’s movement to the Father, is bound for both the Father and the world.

Chapter Four

The final chapter specifies the relationship between liturgy and mission by means of a close reading of the eucharistic prayers in the Book of Common Prayer. By appeal to Chauvet’s arguments regarding the structure of the eucharistic prayers and his account of symbolic exchange, I note that within the liturgy every gift calls forth a return-gift. Indeed, effective reception of a gift occurs precisely in the mode of oblation. What we receive in the eucharist we receive by giving it away. In the eucharistic prayer the church receives the sacramental body and blood of Christ by means of the eucharistic sacrifice. But Christ’s eucharistic body is not the only one in view in the liturgy, it is here that the church receives anew its identity as the body of Christ. The reception-as-oblation of this gift can only be enacted extra-liturgically in the movement of mission. Hence, mission is itself an intrinsic component of the liturgy. There are no gaps or deferrals in view between them. Mission is not a second stage that unfolds alongside or after the liturgy, but is itself part of the liturgy’s immanent intelligibility.

Having articulated this relationship between liturgy and mission, I attend to the eschatological consummation of the church. On the one hand, mission is positioned as the
fulfillment of the liturgy. On the other hand, the liturgy’s ultimate fulfillment is eschatological, and in this consummation there will be no more mission, for God will be all in all. Therefore, I explain that liturgy should be understood in a manner analogous to the visible, institutional aspects of the church, which also pass away with the coming of the eschaton. Though these elements ultimately pass away, they cannot be considered as separate from their eschatological fulfillment. Recourse to Henri de Lubac’s eschatology, and especially his account of the unity between the church as it exists in history and as it shall exist eternally, helps to clarify this relationship.

Though mission and liturgy both pass away, the reality that constitutes their inmost reality—the paschal mystery, and, indeed, the trinitarian life—will endure eternally. This sets the stage for a final, synthetic articulation of the ecclesiology I have constructed in terms of the eternal life of God, the church’s present sharing in that life, and its glorious eschatological consummation.
CHAPTER I: SÆCULA SÆCULORUM: THE CHURCH’S MISSIONARY ACTIVITY

As I stated in the introduction, the goal of this work is an ecclesiology which is at once missional and liturgical, which I will articulate by demonstrating the intrinsic relationship between the church’s internal life of liturgy and its external life of mission. Specifically, these two modes of ecclesial life are themselves dual aspects of the church’s participation in Christ’s paschal mystery.

In order to construct my missional and liturgical ecclesiology, I begin, in this chapter, with an account of mission, which will also necessarily involve an account of the church’s relationship to the world. Beginning with mission allows me to accomplish at least three goals. First, it will introduce the conceptualities in consideration. This way when I turn to the liturgy and argue for its missional comportment, a concrete reality with material content, rather than a formal abstraction will be in mind. Second, considering mission first helps to displace a potential liturgical hegemony, which several of my interlocutors warn against, fearing that if we do not begin with mission, it will be endlessly deferred in the interest of building up and maintaining the church’s liturgical life.¹ Third, and related to the first two, if mission and liturgy are indeed intrinsically related, then it may be that beginning with the end is the best way to understand both.

The Mass derives its name from the dismissal—*Ite, missa est!*. It may well be that apart from a thorough consideration of the *missa* we will fail to truly understand the Mass.²

I argue that the church is liturgical and missional. What the first of these adjectives entails is straightforward enough: the church is most fully itself when engaged in its liturgical worship of God. The second is like unto it, but with the liability that “missional” has attained the status of a buzzword and is utilized in a variety of inconsistent ways.³ Apart from definition, it runs the risk of amounting to little more than “sound and fury signifying nothing.” To avoid this, I shall provide a provisional definition of what I mean by a missional ecclesiology; though its full meaning must emerge over the course of this study. The adjectival form of mission is meant to indicate that the church’s mission is not just one of its many activities, but rather that it pertains to the church’s very nature. A missional ecclesiology, then, is one in which the church’s being and mission are bound together as one.

Of course, such an understanding of the church runs the risk of devolving into what has been dubbed “panmissionism,” where “if everything is mission then nothing is mission.”⁴ Panmissionism does have a kernel of truth, though, for surely it must be valid to join Lesslie Newbigin in affirming mission as “the entire task for which the Church is sent into the world.”⁵ Yet this definition, standing alone, will not do. It needs to be

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³ Gelder and Zcheile discern four branches of “missional” theologies, each with its own subbranches. *Missional Church in Perspective*, 67–98.


⁵ Lesslie Newbigin, *Gospel in Pluralist Society*, 121.
supplemented with greater specification. Newbigin does this by differentiating between “mission” and “missions,” the latter of which refers to “those specific activities which are undertaken by human decision to bring the gospel to places or situations where it is not heard, to create a Christian presence in a place or situation where there is no such presence or no effective presence.”

Another means of making this distinction turns upon the difference between “missionary dimension” and “missionary intention.” “Missionary dimension” refers to the fact that there is some aspect of mission implicit in all of the church’s activities; that they are all for the sake of mission, and all have the potential to carry forward that mission. An example of this outlook might be the evangelizing potential of the eucharistic celebration, which, though it is not offered in the interest of converting non-believers (at least not in an instrumental way), does have the potential to do so, as it does proclaim the Lord’s death (1 Corinthians 11:26). Moreover, those who share in the celebration are formed by it to engage in mission. “Missionary intention” refers to those activities by which the church intends to spread the gospel beyond itself. This is a particularly helpful distinction, but my argument pushes farther. To frame the matter using the terminology of dimension and intention, my central concern is to show that the missionary dimension and the missionary intention are more intrinsically related than

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6 Newbigin, *Gospel in Pluralist Society*, 121.


they might first appear, that, indeed, the missionary intention is part of the immanent intelligibility of the liturgy.

However, apart from making some such distinction, I cannot articulate a meaningful thesis: all that would remain would be abstractions and tautologous niceties. Therefore, in the service of demonstrating that they are inextricably and irreducibly linked to and implicated in each other, I distinguish between the church’s life *ad intra* and its life *ad extra*. Mission refers to the church’s engagement with the world beyond itself, with its life *ad extra*, with its ex-cessive movement throughout its pilgrimage.⁹ In this chapter I shall first give an account of what this ex-cessive movement entails, and then consider the nature of the relationship between the church and the world into which it moves in mission.

**Defining Mission: Beyond Reductionisms**

In his seminal work, *Transforming Mission*, David Bosch notes, after 510 pages of exposition:

It remains extraordinarily difficult to determine what mission is…the definition of mission is a continual process of sifting, testing, reformulating, and discarding. Transforming mission means both that mission is to be understood as an activity that transforms reality and that there is a constant need for mission to be transformed.¹⁰

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⁹ This is not a far cry from Paul Avis’s affirmation that mission is “the cutting edge of the total life of the Church.” *Ministry Shaped by Mission*, 1. Cf. *Identity of Anglicanism*, 104. For another similar approach see Ruth A. Meyers, *Missional Worship, Worshipful Mission*, especially 29–45. When I turn to the liturgy itself in chapter four, I shall explain how my approach differs from Meyers’s.

Therefore, any attempt to give an account of mission must reckon with its own tentativeness and provisionality. Mission has assumed many forms and meant many things throughout the church’s history, and continues to do so today. Yet, some common features can be discerned throughout the literature, and indeed—despite a continued diversity—a general consensus obtains regarding some of mission’s indispensable components. In this section, I confine myself more or less to contemporary viewpoints regarding mission, taking as primary sources the official statements produced by the Roman Catholic Church, the World Council of Churches/International Missionary Council, and the evangelical Lausanne Council for World Evangelization. Through consideration of these sources, a provisional, yet

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11 Bosch notes plural understandings of mission as early as the New Testament documents, and traces various paradigm shifts throughout history up to an “emerging ecumenical paradigm” comprised of “Mission as the Church-With-Others,” “Mission as Missio Dei,” “Mission as Mediating Salvation,” “Mission as the Quest for Justice,” “Mission as Evangelism,” “Mission as Contextualization,” “Mission as Liberation,” “Mission as Inculturation,” “Mission as Common Witness,” “Mission as Ministry by the Whole People of God,” “Mission as Witness to People of Other Living Faiths,” “Mission as Theology,” and “Mission as Action in Hope.” Transforming Mission, 15–510. Goheen provides a contemporary evangelical restatement of Bosch’s basic viewpoint. Introducing Mission, 122–164. Kirk ties mission to proclamation, inculturation, striving for justice, interreligious encounter, working for peace, environmental responsibility, and ecumenical efforts. What is Mission?, 56–204. Oborji discerns five historical perspectives on mission: mission as conversion, as church planting, as inculturation, as interreligious dialogue, and as Missio Dei and kingdom service; as well as two contemporary models: mission as ecumenism and as contextual theology. Concepts of Mission, 59–205. Sunquist traces the understanding of mission from an ancient monastic conception, through a history tied to colonial expansion, and then to a postcolonial perspective. Understanding Christian Mission, 27–175. Bevans and Schroeder note four models of contemporary missiology: sharing in the Missio Dei, service for the reign of God, proclamation of Christ, and their own synthesis: prophetic dialogue, which includes witness, proclamation, liturgy, prayer, contemplation, justice, peace, care for creation, interreligious dialogue, inculturation, and reconciliation. Constants in Context, 286–395.

12 Bevans and Schroeder discern six constants in the church’s mission: the centrality of Christ, the ecclesiality of mission, eschatology, salvation, anthropology, and interaction with culture. Constants in Context, 33–34. Oborji notes that proclamation has been, is, and must remain central to an account of mission, but goes further noting that proclamation necessarily entails “inculturation, dialogue with the religions and cultures, as well as commitment to human promotion and liberation.” Concepts of Mission, 206–211 [208]. In addition, the overlap between the paradigms and models in note 11 above, demonstrates a large degree of commonality.

13 In 1961, discerning that the tasks of ecumenism and mission were closely related, the WCC and IMC merged. For this reason, I shall treat them together as one, even in instances before the official merger.
workable, understanding of mission as a holistic endeavor should emerge. Before moving to the contemporary scene, though, I begin with a consideration of Jesus’s mission.

**Biblical Approaches to a Definition of Mission**

A comprehensive biblical theology of mission is beyond the scope of this study. However, a consideration of two passages of Scripture shall give an adequate biblical grounding for what I hope to say about mission, namely that it is a holistic endeavor rooted in the mission of Jesus Christ. If my treatment of these passages establishes a holistic account of mission, then anything else that could be added by further exegesis—of these or other texts—would only serve to strengthen my basic point.


The Great Commission at the end of Matthew’s Gospel has long been a *locus classicus* for considering mission, providing, as it does, a mandate for mission grounded in the authority of the risen Jesus. Surely, if for no reason other than obedience to Christ, the church ought to be engaged in mission. And yet, as Bosch has noted, this approach tends to abstract the pericope, as a proof text, away from the larger context of the Gospel of which it forms an integral part. Nevertheless, when read in concert with the rest of the Gospel, the pericope still provides an important perspective on the nature of mission.

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At the Gospel’s conclusion, the risen Christ appears to his disciples and instructs them:

All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. As you go, therefore, disciple all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to keep all that I have commanded you. And behold, I am with you always, unto the end of the age” (Matthew 28:18–20).  

As Hubert Frankemölle notes, this pericope represents a “consequence and fulfillment of the passion and resurrection narrative.” This passage, with its dominical institution, has long served as warrant for the church’s baptismal practice. While some contest and others defend its historicity, the net effect is the same for my argument. Regardless of whether or not these represent the ipsissima verba of Jesus, they represent an authentic and authoritative ecclesial understanding of baptism and mission.

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19 So also Avis, Shaped by Mission, 22.
Craig Keener points out that this pericope, with its mention of baptism, harks back to the one other baptism recorded in Matthew’s Gospel, namely, Jesus’s own.\(^{20}\) There are no other candidates in the Gospel for antecedents to Jesus’s instruction here. It was Christ’s baptism in the Jordan that inaugurated Jesus’s own mission, and now baptism forms a component of the church’s mission. Regarding Christ’s baptism, Matthew conforms his account of it to his scheme of fulfillment.\(^{21}\) Although John needs Jesus’s messianic baptism, it is fitting that he baptize Jesus instead in order “to fulfill all righteousness” (Matthew 3:14–15). The heavenly voice’s approbation of Jesus as beloved Son combines Psalm 2:7 and the Isaianic Servant of God (Isa. 42:1).\(^{22}\)

The baptism, then, marks the beginning of Christ’s messianic mission. In order to empower him for this task, he receives the Holy Spirit.\(^{23}\) Jesus is, as Krzysztof Gasecki characterizes him, “the true Spirit-bearer.”\(^{24}\) It is not for his own sake that Jesus receives the Holy Spirit. Instead, he receives the Spirit for the sake of his fellow human beings, for whom he now embarks upon his mission. Having been baptized, Jesus is led on by the

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\(^{22}\) So Beasley-Murray, Baptism in the New Testament, 51; Turner, Matthew, 120; Donald A. Hagner, Matthew 1–13, WBC 33a (Dallas: Word Books, 1993), 58–59; Osborne, Matthew, 125; Keener, Matthew, 134–135; Morris, Matthew, 68; Harrington, Matthew, 62; Ferguson, Baptism in the Early Church, 103; Kavanagh, Shape of Baptism, 13; Johnson, Rites of Initiation, 15.


\(^{24}\) Krzysztof Gasecki, Das Profil des Geistes in den Sakramenten: Pneumatologische Grundlagen der Sakramentenlehre. Darstellung und Reflexionen ausgewählter katholischer Entwürfe (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2009), 301 (My translation [the German has this all in the dative]).

Jesus’s baptism launches him on his public ministry and his messianic mission. Precisely what, though, does this mean? Throughout his mission, Jesus is preoccupied with the reign of God. Returning from his wilderness temptation, Jesus preaches repentance in view of the coming reign (Matthew 4:17). His calling of the disciples follows upon his announcement of the reign of God, and they join with him in announcing its coming (Matthew 4:18–22; 10:1–42). His works of healing demonstrate the proximity of the reign of God (e.g., 9:35; 12:25–28). The kingdom forms a central component of Jesus’s teaching ministry as well (e.g., 5–7; 13:1–52; 20:1–16; 22:1–14; 25:1–13). These considerations set Jesus’s mission firmly within the context of the reign of God. The act of baptism links the ongoing mission of the disciples to Jesus’s own baptismally inaugurated mission.

The Matthean Great Commission obviously points to mission *ad gentes*. All nations are to receive the church’s missionary activity, and this universality is grounded

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in the universal authority granted to the risen Christ. Indeed, as Bosch notes, his promise of “abiding presence is…intimately linked to his followers’ engagement in mission. It is as they make disciples, baptize them, and teach them, that Jesus remains with those followers.” Turner observes, “[The pericope] implies the central role of the church as God’s primary agency for mission. Only in the community/family that is the church can disciples be baptized and taught to observe all that Jesus has commanded.”

Significantly, though, this mission is expressed in terms of discipleship. Grammatically, the finite verb μαθητεύσατε [make disciples], governs the participles πορευθέντες [going], βαπτίζοντες [baptizing], and διδάσκοντες [teaching]. These all retain imperatival force, but as aspects of what it means for the church to μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη [disciple all the nations]. As the church goes, it is to be engaged in the work of discipleship. This realization, notes Bosch, leads to “a different picture of mission…[which] refers to bringing people to Jesus as Lord, wherever they may be. Mission then loses its preoccupation with the geographical component and becomes mission in six continents.” It is mission ad gentes and intra gentes.

27 Luz, Matthew 21–28, 625; Keener, Matthew, 718; Morris, Matthew, 746; Osborne, Matthew, 1079; Bosch, Transforming Mission, 78.

28 Bosch, Transforming Mission, 77.

29 Turner, Matthew, 690.

30 So Ferguson, Baptism in the Early Church; Luz, Matthew 21–28, 625; Turner, Matthew, 689; Donald A. Hagner, Matthew 14–28, WBC 33b (Dallas: Word Books, 1995), 882, 886; Keener, Matthew, 718–719; Osborne, Matthew, 1080. Contra Beasley-Murray, Baptism in the New Testament, 88–89. I should note, though, that Beasley-Murray’s disagreement on the grammatical point does not prevent him from affirming that baptism is an aspect of how disciples are made. Frankemölle does not comment on the imperatival force, but does see baptism as causative of disciple making. Matthäus Kommentar, 2:548. In my own translation, I have rendered μαθητεύσατε as the transitive verb “to disciple,” rather than as “make disciples” to emphasize that discipleship is the verb, rather than the verb’s object in this context.

The theme of discipleship has been prominent in Matthew.\textsuperscript{32} Indeed, in the New Testament its verbal form occurs only in this Gospel (13:52; 27:57; 28:19) and in Acts 14:21.\textsuperscript{33} Discipleship, which involves personal adherence to Jesus,\textsuperscript{34} is expressed in terms of two participles: \textit{βαπτίζοντες} [baptizing] and \textit{διδάσκοντες} [teaching]. So, then, one becomes a disciple of Christ in part by being baptized. Further, implicit in this account is the entailment that, upon being baptized, one joins, as a disciple, in this mission entrusted to the church.

It would follow, then, that by baptizing, the church carries out its mission. There is an intrinsic relationship between baptism and mission. Apart from baptizing the church cannot engage in its mission, and in baptizing the church carries out its mission. That baptism is an aspect of discipleship also points to the ecclesiality of mission. Because baptism is an ecclesial act, it follows that if it is an integral component of mission, then mission too must be ecclesial. Further, because the church is, in part, grounded in baptism, it would seem that establishing the church is another component of mission.\textsuperscript{35}


For a thorough treatment of the theme of discipleship in Matthew see Michael J. Wilkins, \textit{The Concept of Disciple in Matthew’s Gospel: As Reflected in the Use of the Term Μαθητής} (Leiden: Brill, 1988), especially 126–172. See also Osborne, \textit{Matthew}, 1103–1107.


There is a growing consensus that baptism represents the baseline of ecclesial belonging and communion. Without being exhaustive, this perspective can be discerned in the Anglican Communion with the 1920 Lambeth declaration, which addressed itself to all Christian people on the basis of common baptism, calling for work towards reunion. “Resolution 9,” 1920, http://www.lambethconference.org/resolutions/1920/1920-9.cfm. Paul Avis suggests a “baptismal paradigm” for understanding the Anglican claim to be a true Christian church, and as a viable ecumenical strategy. \textit{Anglicanism and the Christian Church: Theological Resources in Historical Perspective}, Revised and Expanded ed. (London: T & T Clark, 2002), 352–354. So also Stephen Sykes, \textit{Unashamed Anglicanism} (London: Darton, Longman, & Todd, 1995), 132–134. Colin Davey notes that, for Anglicans,
Of course, there is more to the church’s mission than mere baptism and church planting. This is obvious from the other component of discipleship: “teaching them” to observe all that Christ has commanded. Bosch, notes that Jesus’s words here “are a clear allusion to those in Matthew 19[:17],” where Jesus condensed all the commandments to love of God and love of neighbor. Love, then, becomes the driving force of the church’s mission.

Mission is not narrowed down to an activity of making individuals new creatures, of providing them with “blessed assurance” so that, come what may, they will be “eternally saved.” Mission, involves, from the beginning and as a matter of course, making new believers sensitive to the needs of others, opening their eyes and hearts to recognize injustice, suffering, oppression, and the plight of those who have fallen by the wayside…To become a disciple means a decisive and irrevocable turning to both God and neighbor.

Nevertheless, surely this mention of teaching disciples to observe what Jesus has commanded also refers to the large blocks of teaching material within the Gospel (5–7; 10; 13; 18; 24–25). And yet, in a context dominated by universality, such as this one, a recognition of baptism is also a recognition of the baptizing Church’s ecclesiality. “The Ecclesial Significance of Baptism According to Anglican Ecumenical Documents,” One in Christ 35, no. 2 (1999): 131–42. For Roman Catholic affirmations of this principle see Lumen gentium, no. 15 [Tanner, 2:860–861], and the Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis redintegratio (November 21, 1964, no. 3 [Tanner, 2:909–911]. These documents similarly root Christian unity and ecclesial communion in baptism. Finally, the WCC document, BEM, grounds Christian unity in common baptism (1.6). Significantly, both Lumen gentium (nos. 11, 14 [Tanner, 2:857, 860]) and Ad gentes (nos. 11, 36 [Tanner, 2:1020, 1038]) view baptism as not only granting admission to the church, but obliging one to a life of witness. I shall return to this in chapter two. Ton Veerkamp relativizes the ecclesiality of mission in favor of solidarity with the world. “Das Ende der christlichen Mission: Matthäus 28,16–20,” in (Anti-)Rassistische Irritationen: Biblische Texte und interkulturelle Zusammenarbeit, ed. Silvia Wagner, Gerdi Nützel, and Martin Kick (Berlin: Alektor, 1994), 179–185. I shall take up the issue of the relationship between church and world in the next major section of this chapter.

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37 Bosch, “Structure of Mission,” 84.
38 Bosch, Transforming Mission, 81–82. Bosch further bears this out with a consideration of the categories of the reign of God and justice/righteousness in the Gospel of Matthew (70–73).
surely it is also valid to extend the referent beyond them. No teaching of Jesus should be omitted. This brings me to the next pericope I shall examine.

**Mission in Jesus’s Nazareth Sermon (Luke 4:14–21)**

Greater specificity regarding what it might mean to observe all that Jesus has commanded may be found through a consideration of Luke 4:14–21, which records a sermon preached in the synagogue of Nazareth near the outset of Jesus’s ministry. Within the context of Luke’s Gospel, this sermon provides a manifesto of Jesus’s understanding of his own mission. It therefore gives a further important window into the mission of the church.

The scene occurs within the context of Jesus’s ministry in Galilee, a ministry which is “in the power of the Spirit” (Luke 4:14). He has been teaching in the synagogues, and will now do the same in Nazareth (4:14–16). His textual basis is Isaiah 61:1–2a, which he reads:

The Spirit of the Lord is upon me because he has anointed me to evangelize [εὐαγγελίσασθαι] the poor; he has sent me to proclaim [κηρύξαι] release [αφεσίν] to the captives, and to the blind recovery of sight, to send out those who are bound in freedom [ἐν ἄφεσιν], and to proclaim the favorable year of the Lord (4:14–19).

Having said this, he is seated, and tells his audience that this Scripture is fulfilled before them (4:20–21).

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Jesus’s view of his own mission is quite comprehensive, then. It involves evangelization and proclamation as its basic modality. Significantly, though, this proclamation is not of a straightforwardly spiritual nature. It involves economic and political realities (the poor, release of captives), as well as items pertaining to physical health (recovery of sight), and spiritual realities (the Lord’s favor). While the mode in which Jesus describes this mission is proclamatory, the nature of what is proclaimed gestures also towards praxis, otherwise the proclamation is stultified or even falsified. This comprehensive and holistic account of mission—involving both proclamation and praxis—will remain basic to our considerations in this study.

In addition to the scope of Jesus’s mission, we ought also to take account of its pneumatological character. Jesus is empowered for this mission by the Holy Spirit, whom in Luke, as also in Matthew, he received at his baptism (3:21–22). The Gospel of Luke closes with the risen Jesus informing his disciples, with much of the same terminology

41 Commentators are divided on the extent to which Jesus intends these categories to be understood as metaphors for spiritual realities. Plummer, while noting the political and economic overtones, sees them as metaphorical. Luke, 121. Bovon dismisses the idea that Jesus is sent to such people “in a merely literal sense,” while also noting that “the words should not be understood purely metaphorically for spiritual benefits, after death or the parousia. Jesus’ speeches and miracles will show that salvation reaches the entire person even now.” Luke 1, 154. Nolland sees the recovery of sight as more literal, but is reticent to see Jesus as literally addressing political realities. Luke 1–9:20, 197. Marshall sees the recovery of sight as metaphorical, while noting Jesus’s own healing works. Luke, 184. Green, however, notes that Jesus’s ministry is holistic, neither limited to spiritual nor material/political realities. For instance, the designation “poor” was broader than, but inclusive of economic realities, referring primarily to the marginalized. Luke, 210–213. Bock’s reading is similar to Green’s, recognizing that Jesus’s outlook is inclusive of both spiritual and material realities and cannot be reduced to one or the other. Luke 1:1 – 9:50, 400–401, 408–411. No spiritualizing is discernible in Johnson, though he limits Jesus’s ministry to the “personal,” rather than political or social spheres. Luke, 81; Wolter quite strongly sees Jesus as referring primarily to social and bodily realities and needs, and simply acknowledges a “potential for a metaphorical understanding.” Lukas, 192–193 [193] (My translation). As Bosch puts it “for Luke, salvation actually had six dimensions: economic, social, political, physical, psychological, and spiritual.” Transforming Mission, 117 (Italics original).

from the Nazareth sermon, that they will be witnesses proclaiming [κηρυχθῆναι] to all nations [πάντα τὰ ἔθνη] repentance and forgiveness [ἀφεσιν] of sins in the name of the Christ who has suffered and risen. He will send the promise of the Father upon them. He then instructs them to wait in the city until they are clothed with power from on high (Luke 24:46–49). John Nolland writes, “In the context of Luke 24:44–49, the Spirit is anticipated distinctly as empowerment for the witnessing task that lies ahead.”

In Acts this instruction receives greater pneumatological specificity. After again instructing them to wait in the Jerusalem for the promise of the Father, he explains, “for John baptized with water, but you will be baptized with the Holy Spirit…you will receive power when the Holy Spirit comes upon you and you will be my witnesses in both Jerusalem and in all Judaea and Samaria and to the end of the earth” (Acts 1:4–5, 8).

The fulfillment of this promise is the coming of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. The apostles respond by taking up their mission as witnesses of Christ, proclaimers of his resurrection.

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Those who accept to their proclamation are baptized and receive the Holy Spirit (Acts 2:1–41). So, then, the same Holy Spirit that empowered Jesus’s holistic mission now empowers the church, which carries forward a mission of the same sort.

**Contemporary Accounts of Mission**

My examination of two biblical passages has yielded an account of mission as carrying forward the holistic mission of Christ, which includes proclamation; baptism and the establishment of churches; and attention to economic, social, political, and spiritual realities. With this basic perspective in place, I turn now to more contemporary accounts of mission, which develop these fundamental elements of mission. Because mission is a pluriform reality, it is particularly susceptible to reductionism. These reductionisms can occur in either a “spiritualizing” or a “secularizing” direction. A spiritualizing reduction might posit the church as concerned solely with the soul, leaving the social and political dimensions of life out of the parameters of its mission. A secularizing reduction would entirely identify the church’s mission with immanent political or economic ends.

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Contemporary Roman Catholic teaching on mission clearly develops a robust and holistic account of mission, avoiding both spiritualizing and immanentizing reductions. I begin with Vatican II’s decree on mission activity, *Ad gentes*, which asserts that mission involves spreading the gospel to those who have not yet believed, and that “the true goal of this missionary activity is evangelization and the establishing of the church among peoples and groups in whom it has not taken root.” The council fathers are careful to distinguish between mission and pastoral care or ecumenism, though they acknowledge a connection between these activities. However, the decree is also willing to go beyond mere proclamation and church planting, stating that the “right ordering of social and

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economic affairs” should be a concern of “Christ’s faithful,” though without the church being directly involved in worldly government.49

Ten years later, the apostolic exhortation, *Evangelii nuntiandi*, deepened the holistic conception of mission, noting that evangelization is a complex reality, defying complete synthesis. The best approach is to note its essential components.50 Three such elements are identified in the document: the witness of one’s Christian life; proclamation of the gospel as an explanation of that witness; and conversion and entry into the church and its sacraments, which in turn leads to evangelizing others.51 “These elements may appear to be contradictory, indeed mutually exclusive,” writes Paul VI, but “in fact they are complementary and mutually enriching. Each one must always be seen in relationship with the others.”52 The pope insists that evangelization must always be centered upon the proclamation of salvation in Christ:

and not an immanent salvation, meeting material or even spiritual needs, restricted to the framework of temporal existence, and completely identified with temporal desires, hopes, affairs and struggles, but a salvation which exceeds all

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49 *Ad gentes*, no. 12 [Tanner, 2:1021]. Oborji rightly notes that although the decree defines mission fairly narrowly in terms of evangelization, its understanding of evangelization is broad and holistic, rooted in the divine life, and expressed in integral development. *Concepts of Mission*, 4–5. So also Bevans and Schroeder, *Constants in Context*, 286–287; Bevans, “*Ad Gentes,*” 38–41. Bosch’s assessment is more critical, viewing no. 6 as representing “a somersault...to espouse a pre-Vatican II perception of church and mission: mission was again one-way traffic from West to East, and the overriding aim of mission remained *plantatio ecclesiae.*” *Transforming Mission*, 381. George is careful to stress that the decree disallows reduction to social and political agendas. “*Ad Gentes,*” 295. Walter notes two perspectives on mission that remain in tension through the decree. One insists on the necessity of conversion and incorporation into the church for salvation, the other is premised on freedom and witness. “Geistes-Gegenwart und Missio-Ekklesiologie,” 64–67. So also Bevans, “*Ad Gentes,*” 36–37; Brechter, “Missionary Activity,” 121–123. However, Brechter suggests that this tension is the result of a desire for clarification after the more positive outlook on people of other faiths expressed in *Lumen gentium*, no. 16 [Tanner, 2:861], which led to the reassertion of the necessity of faith and baptism for salvation.


these limits...a transcendent and eschatological salvation, which indeed has its
beginning in this life but which is fulfilled in eternity.\textsuperscript{53}

At the same time, though, the Pope acknowledges that an understanding of
evangelization that does not “take account of the unceasing interplay of the Gospel and
man’s [sic] concrete life, both personal and social” is inadequate; which leads him to
affirm that evangelization also concerns “life in society...international life, peace, justice
and development,” even “liberation.”\textsuperscript{54} There are indeed “profound links” between
evangelization and human development and liberation. These links are anthropological,
because humanity is a complex whole; theological, because the redeemer is also the
creator; and evangelical, because the virtue of charity demands struggle for human
advancement.\textsuperscript{55} At the same time, though liberation and salvation are related to one
another, they are not wholly elided into one another because “not every notion of
liberation is necessarily consistent and compatible with an evangelical vision...[and] that
in order that God’s kingdom should come it is not enough to establish liberation and to
create well being and development.”\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{53} Paul VI, \textit{Evangelii nuntiandi}, no. 27. Oborji notes the consistency in insisting upon

\textsuperscript{54} Paul VI, \textit{Evangelii nuntiandi}, no. 29. Bevans and Schroeder note the exhortation’s holistic
account of salvation and mission, even going so far as to place it under the paradigm of “liberating service
of the reign of God.” \textit{Constants in Context}, 305–307. For more on this expanded conception of mission see
George, “\textit{Ad Gentes},” 300–301, but note his solicitude to emphasize that the pope ruled out replacing
mission with any of these concepts. See also Bevans, “\textit{Ad Gentes},” 63–65; Ferdinand Nwaigbo, “Integral

\textsuperscript{55} Paul VI, \textit{Evangelii nuntiandi}, no. 31. Deneken notes the influence of the 1968 CELAM
conference at Medellin on the pope’s thought. “Mission comme nouvelle évangélisation,” 220–221. So also
Bevans, “\textit{Ad Gentes},” 61–64. I shall develop the Latin American perspective in the next section.

\textsuperscript{56} Paul VI, \textit{Evangelii nuntiandi}, no. 35. For the integral relationship between evangelization,
salvation, and liberation see nos. 29–39. The interplay of these elements in the exhortation is summarized
This ongoing development was granted further specificity by Pope John Paul II’s encyclical *Redemptoris missio*, in which the imperative of ecclesial mission *ad gentes* was forcefully reasserted on the basis of Christ’s unique place as universal mediator and savior. \(^{57}\) While insisting, in no uncertain terms, on the ongoing necessity of proclamation of and faith in Christ, John Paul II also notes that Christ’s kingdom brings holistic salvation and liberation. It transforms human relationships, embracing individuals, societies, and the world as a whole, leaving nothing out of its ambit. \(^{58}\) He overcomes some of *Ad gentes*’s reticence about an expansive notion of mission by stating that pastoral care, the new evangelization, and outreach *ad gentes* are all interdependent, mutually reinforcing aspects of the church’s mission. \(^{59}\)

“Mission is a single but complex reality, and it develops in a variety of ways.” \(^{60}\) These include the witness of the Christian life; proclamation of Christ as savior;

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\(^{57}\) John Paul II, *Redemptoris missio*, nos. 4–11. This leads Bevans and Schroeder to classify the encyclical under a paradigm of “proclamation of Jesus Christ as Universal Savior.” *Constants in Context*, 323–325. While this is not inaccurate, classifying it in a different paradigm tends to obscure this encyclical’s continuity with previous documents in its commitment to integral holism and in their insistence upon proclamation’s centrality, both of which Oborji notes. *Concepts of Mission*, 7–11, 206–207. Elsewhere Bevans argues for this discontinuity on the basis of the different sorts of appeal to Scripture found in *Ad gentes*, *Evangelii nuntiandi*, and *Redemptoris missio*. “The Biblical Basis of the Mission of the Church in *Redemptoris Missio*,” in Engeng, Gilliland, and Pierson, *Good News of the Kingdom*, 37–44. In “*Ad Gentes*,” however, Bevans clarifies that each of these paradigmatic perspectives is valid, and that he views an emergent synthesis in contemporary mission thought (93).


\(^{60}\) John Paul II, *Redemptoris missio*, no. 41.
conversion and baptism into the church; the formation of local churches, which will in turn take up the missionary task; inculturation;\textsuperscript{61} interreligious dialogue;\textsuperscript{62} and the work of development.\textsuperscript{63} On this last point, the work for liberation and development is rooted in evangelization, which forms the conscience, and thereby leads one to strive for development.\textsuperscript{64} This expansive definition of mission goes beyond what the conciliar decree was willing to affirm twenty-five years before, when mission was distinguished from pastoral care and ecumenism.\textsuperscript{65} However, its seeds are to be found in the decree’s recognition that social and cultural issues are entailed in the church’s mission.

The most recent Roman Catholic account of a holistic mission is found in Pope Francis I’s apostolic exhortation, \textit{Evangelii gaudium}.\textsuperscript{66} Francis’s exhortation develops the tradition I have already traced, but with marks of a Latin American influence, which grants a greater attention to concrete historical specificity.\textsuperscript{67} This is reflected in his

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{62} Walter suggests dialogue as the best encapsulation of the “freedom and witness” form of missiology found in \textit{Ad gentes} (see note 49, above), and appeals to \textit{Redemptoris missio} in support. “Geistes-Gegenwart und Missio-Ekklesiologie,” 72–75. See also Oborji, who also insists on the centrality of proclamation. \textit{Concepts of Mission}, 210. This is perhaps not a far cry from Bevans and Schroeder, who suggest prophetic dialogue as a synthetic model for contemporary mission theology. \textit{Constants in Context}, 348–395. Dialogue represents openness to the world, while the prophetic character of this dialogue retains the place of proclamation. See also Bosch, \textit{Transforming Mission}, 483–489.
  \item \textsuperscript{64} John Paul II, \textit{Redemptoris missio}, nos. 58–59.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} So also Stransky, “Vatican II to \textit{Redemptoris Missio},” 145. Cf. \textit{Ad gentes}, no. 6 [Tanner, 2:1016]
  \item \textsuperscript{66} Francis I, \textit{Evangelii gaudium}.
  \item \textsuperscript{67} I shall develop more of what the Latin American perspective entails in my next section, on the relationship between church and world.
\end{itemize}
adoption of Gustavo Gutiérrez’s approach of annunciation and denunciation, \(^{68}\) which he deploys in a section decrying unjust economic practices. It is further born out by his use of the phrase “missionary-disciples,” which appeared in the final document from the 2007 CELAM meeting at Aparecida. \(^{69}\) The concept of missionary-discipleship indicates that there is no separation of mission from adherence to Jesus. To be his disciple is to be a missionary and vice-versa. Drawing again from Aparecida, Francis notes that mission is universal: it is intended for all peoples, and it “‘encompasses all dimensions of existence…Nothing human can be alien to it.’ True Christian hope, which seeks the eschatological kingdom, always generates history.” \(^{70}\) Though an integral view of salvation, and therefore mission, was in view as early as Ad gentes, Francis’s exhortation grounds the church’s activity firmly in the realm of history. \(^{71}\)

**Evangelical and Ecumenical Perspectives**

The evangelical Lausanne Committee for World Evangelization has likewise moved towards a more expansive definition of mission. Their initial statement, “The Lausanne Covenant,” was careful to note that “evangelism is primary,” \(^{72}\) while also distinguishing it from social action: “reconciliation with man [sic] is not reconciliation

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with God, nor is social action evangelism, nor is political liberation salvation.”

Nevertheless, the document did affirm both that evangelism and social action are not “mutually exclusive,” and that “The salvation we claim should be transforming us in the totality of our personal and social responsibilities.” Further, “World evangelization requires the whole church to take the whole Gospel to the whole world.” In addition to removing geographic restrictions—mission arises from everywhere and extends to everywhere—this statement, with its commitment the “whole gospel,” sets the stage for a more holistic account of mission.

The more recent “Cape Town Commitment,” which arose from the third Lausanne Conference meeting in 2010, displays a greater willingness to see proclamation and social action as mutually interpenetrating realities, largely because of a recognition that the gospel is “God’s glorious good news in Christ, for every dimension of his creation.” This leads to a call for “integral mission,” which is expressed thus:

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73 Lausanne Movement, “Lausanne Covenant,” no. 5. See Bevans and Schroeder, Constants in Context, 325; Goheen, Introducing Mission, 168–171; Bosch, Transforming Mission, 405–406. Bockmühl notes that the Lausanne Covenant’s perspective on mission is that it is the totality of what the church has been sent to do. This means that social action is an aspect of mission, but one that is subsidiary to evangelism. Was heißt heute Mission? Entscheidungsfragen der neueren Missionstheologie (Basel: Brunnen, 2000), 141, 145–151.


75 Lausanne Movement, “Lausanne Covenant,” no. 6. Avis adapts this statement to give his basic definition of mission: “Mission is the whole Church bringing the whole Christ to the whole world.” Shaped by Mission, 1 (Italics removed).

Integral mission is the proclamation and demonstration of the gospel. It is not simply that evangelism and social involvement are to be done alongside each other. Rather, in integral mission our proclamation has social consequences as we call people to love and repentance in all areas of life. And our social involvement has evangelistic consequences as we bear witness to the transforming grace of Jesus Christ.\(^\text{77}\)

Now the whole gospel for the whole world is seen to have implications beyond simple proclamation and evangelism.

This holistic account of mission is also displayed in the recent statements by the World Council of Churches, *Mission and Evangelism in Unity Today*,\(^\text{78}\) and *Together Towards Life*.\(^\text{79}\) Both documents affirm mission as inclusive of proclamation/evangelism and as involving a commitment to all dimensions of human existence, including social realities.\(^\text{80}\)

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Mission as Missio Dei

Before moving to my constructive treatment of the church-world relationship, I turn to what is without doubt, the fundamental watershed in twentieth-century missiology: the emergence of the concept missio Dei, which first occurred at the 1952 International Missionary Council meeting at Willingen, and has since become the predominant framework for considering mission. The Willingen Conference’s “Statement on the Missionary Calling of the Church” states that “the missionary movement of which we are a part has its source in the Triune God Himself,” who sent his renewal the life of the earth.” Though somewhat sparse, and without any explicit recourse to a theological grounding, these marks point in the direction of holistic mission as well. Note Avis’s critique that the five marks lack an adequate account of the church’s total life. Shaped by Mission, 16–17.

Son to reconcile the world, and then sends the church “for the continuance of His mission as His witnesses and ambassadors.”

The received narrative regarding *missio Dei* tends to have it emerge through Karl Barth’s 1932 lecture, “Die Theologie und die Mission in der Gegenwart,” and then mediated by Karl Hartenstein to the Willingen conference. However, John Flett has argued convincingly that the facts will not bear out this genealogy, asserting, “In reality, Barth never once used the term *missio Dei*, never wrote the phrase ‘God is a missionary God,’ and never articulated a Trinitarian position of the kind expressed at Willingen.” Moreover, Hartenstein’s contributions to Willingen do not demonstrate a direct dependence upon Barth or the 1932 lecture. For this reason, I leave considerations of Barth to the side. Although the received narrative is historically inadequate, the *missio Dei* concept has unmistakably entered the discourse of mission theology.

At its heart, the concept *missio Dei* refers to the conviction that mission is primarily and fundamentally the activity of God, rather than a human endeavor. Flett notes three common components of *missio Dei* theology: its basis in the Trinity, its

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82 IMC, “A Statement on the Missionary Calling of the Church,” in Goodall, *Missions Under the Cross*, 189. This is also reiterated in an interim report that was not officially adopted at the meeting: “The Theological Basis of the Missionary Obligation (An Interim Report),” in Goodall, *Missions Under the Cross*, 241.


orientation to the kingdom, and its conception of the church as missionary in its

88 The first of these will be developed in the next chapter, the second informs my current argument, and the third provides the basic conviction from which this project operates.

*Missio Dei* carries the further advantage of reconnecting the terminology of mission with its roots in the doctrine of the Trinity, for up until the sixteenth-century, the phrase “mission” referred to the sendings of the Son and Holy Spirit into the economy, rather than to the church’s activity. 89 Such a trinitarian grounding for the church and its mission is found in the conciliar documents *Lumen gentium* and *Ad gentes*, though the trinitarianism of *Ad gentes*—with its discussion of the divine processions (as opposed to *Lumen gentium*’s bare statement that the Father sends the Son and Spirit)—is more developed. 90 As Peter Hünemann notes, *Ad gentes* operates within the basic contours of the *missio Dei* theology that had gained currency beginning in the 1950s. The trinitarian basis for mission is clearly established in the decree, and yet a manifest desire to

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89 Bosch, *Transforming Mission*, 1. Sunquist notes that this shift away from a strictly trinitarian use of the term began with the Jesuits. *Understanding Mission*, 46. No negative assessment of this terminological shift is implied.


91 *Ad gentes*, nos. 2–5 [Tanner, 2:1011–1014].
counteract the secularizing reductions that developed within certain strands of missio Dei theology is also evident.  

At the same time, missio Dei has proven to be a wax nose, meaning anything its wielders care for it to mean. As John Flett notes:

*Missio Dei* is a Rorschach test. It encourages projection revealing our own predilections rather than informing and directing our responses…The doctrine of the Trinity plays only a negative role, distancing mission from improper alignments with accidental human authorities…Paradoxically, while the doctrine of the Trinity is counted as the Copernican heart of *missio Dei* theology, in actuality it holds no constructive place in that theology.

This has led some to question the concept’s utility. Nevertheless, as Flett notes, there really is no going back. To posit any other basis for mission “risks investing authority in

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95 Haudel, “Die Relevanz des trinitarischen Gottesbegriffs,” 68–78. James Scherer opines that “in the decade of the 1960s, *Missio Dei* was to become the playing of armchair theologians with little more than an academic interest in the practical mission of the church but with a considerable penchant for theological speculation and mischief making.” “Church, Kingdom, Missio Dei,” 85. As Hoedemaker puts it, “All in all, the harvest has been poor. The formula *missio Dei* marks a transition toward a new discussion, toward an attempt to bring mission and church together in a new theological connection. But it is too open in all directions to be fruitful…I have come to the conclusion that the term *missio Dei*, which has usually been pivotal in the discussions that have happened, does not really help us.” “People of God and the Ends of the Earth,” 165, 171. Philip L. Wickeri contends that the phrase should be abandoned as having run its course. “The End of Missio Dei—Secularization, Religions and the Theology of Mission,” in *Mission Revisited: Between Mission History and Intercultural Theology: In Honour of Pieter N. Holtrop*, ed. Volker Küster (Berlin: LIT, 2010), 39–43. Bevans and Schroeder view *missio Dei* as the “most promising of the contemporary models of mission,” but note that it has its own liabilities. *Constants in Context*, 303–304.
historical accident and human capacity."

Therefore, I use the concept advisedly, and intend to fill it in with positive and constructive trinitarian doctrine, which will be the subject matter of the next chapter. For now, let it suffice to note that mission is fundamentally a divine work, and that this is rooted in the triune life.

**Defining Mission: Conclusions**

This section has not provided a comprehensive account of mission. However, a working definition, which has broad-based biblical, ecclesial, and ecumenical support has emerged. The church’s mission is rooted in the mission of Jesus Christ, which was oriented towards the kingdom of God. It is an all-encompassing reality, touching upon every aspect of human existence. Mission is a feature of the pilgrim church, and belongs particularly to the historical situation between Christ’s ascension and the *parousia*. It is, therefore, an eschatologically oriented endeavor. It is this eschatological comportment that bestows an integral character upon the missionary enterprise. That mission unfolds within history means that it must take into account historical realities. A purely otherworldly mission fails at the crucial point, for it is addressed to women and men within their historical particularities.

The eschatological salvation will encompass all dimensions of humanity. The mission of witnessing to, proclaiming, and extending that salvation should be consonant

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with this by addressing of all dimensions of humanity. At the same time, the eschatological reserve demands that mission retain a transcendent referent. No immanent reality can be wholly identified with the coming kingdom. The two cannot be separated, but neither may they be elided. I shall return to the question of mission’s eschatological fulfillment in chapter four. For now, though, it should suffice to note that mission is oriented to an eschatological consummation in the kingdom of God, but that this same kingdom is operative here and now.

That the eschaton will bring the resolution to all aspects and dimensions of humanity demands an integral account of mission, disallowing a reductionism in either the spiritual or the secular directions. Mission, then, as *missio Dei*, is the church’s participation in God’s holistic and redemptive engagement with the world. Though God’s dealings within the church are an obvious aspect of this engagement, I shall be using “mission,” to specifically refer to those activities that carry the church beyond itself to the world. As I am positing a missional ecclesiology, this self-transcendence is essential to the church’s identity, rather than accidental. However, it remains to clarify what the relationship between the church and the world is. It is to this task that I now turn.

**The Dynamic Relation between Church and World**

If mission is the life of the church ex-cessively directed toward the world, then it follows that an adequate account of ecclesial mission will also entail an account of the relationship between the church and the world with which the church engages. In this

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section I provide the account of the church-world relationship that the rest of this study assumes: one in which the church is interior to the world, involved in concrete historical praxis; one in which there is a dynamic interpenetration between the church and the world, such that the church must go beyond itself into the world in order to be truly itself. Providing this account will allow me to circumvent the problematic identified by John Flett, when he notes that:

The question of the church's relationship with the world is properly a missionary one. Yet, when it is depicted as a necessary middle point between the church and the world, mission functions as a bridge between the two. In that it prepares the ground for the church's own proper task—the proclamation of the word—mission exists at some distance from the church. It becomes possible, or even normative, to develop theological formulations in particular service to the church without actually engaging the world. 99

My treatment will, further, provide a preliminary, though indirect, rebuttal to secularized versions of missio Dei theology, which would seek to bypass the church entirely in their considerations of mission. Finally, it will set the stage for my discussion of the relation between the missio Dei and the triune life in the next chapter.

**The Radical Critique of Ecclesiocentrism**

Because missio Dei conceives of mission primarily and fundamentally as an activity of God, it supplants ecclesiocentric notions of mission, wherein the goal of mission is simply extending the boundaries of or consolidating the influence of the church. The divine origin and agency of mission means that human missionary endeavors are contingent and instrumental at the very most. God is able to act in the world, and may

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do so independently of the church. Thus far, most would agree. However, *missio Dei* is open to widely divergent interpretations, ranging from the deeply ecclesial vision of mission evident in conciliar and post-conciliar documents within the Roman Catholic Church (see the previous section) to Johannes Christiaan Hoekendijk’s theology of the apostolate, which has appealed to the concept in a more or less secularized way.

Hoekendijk’s basic argument runs thus: Christ was sent to the world, making world and Christ to be “Messianic correlates.” His coming “a secular event,” which means that “the thing we usually call Christianity…cannot be anything else but a secular movement, a movement in the world and for the world.” Therefore, it is necessary to “move out of the traditional church structures” and “to radically desacralize the Church.”

For Hoekendijk, the problem with ecclesiocentric understandings of mission is that they proceed *from* mission to the establishment of the church, which is invariably

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“understood…as first the Mission, then the Church-free-from-the-Mission[.]”  

However, because the gospel’s proclamation is intrinsic to the sort of news that the gospel is, it follows that we can only share in the gospel by joining in its spread.  

Therefore, just as world and Christ are correlates, so are gospel and apostolate. In the service of this idea, Hoekendijk seeks to supplant what he sees as the traditional sequence of God—church—world with the sequence of “Kingdom—apostolate—oikoumene,” or, alternatively, “kingdom-gospel-apostolate-world.”  

He notes that such a sequence “does not leave much room for the church.” Indeed, Ecclesiology does not fit here. When one desires to speak about God’s dealings with the world, the church can be mentioned only in passing and without strong emphasis. Ecclesiology cannot be more than a single paragraph from Christology (the Messianic dealings with the world) and a few sentences from eschatology (the Messianic dealings with the World). The church is only the church to the extent that she lets herself be used as a part of God’s dealings with the oikoumene… Where in this context does the church stand? Certainly not at the starting point, nor at the end. The church has no fixed place at all in this context, it happens insofar as it actually proclaims the Kingdom to the world. The church has no other existence than in actu Christi, that is in actu Apostoli. Consequently it cannot be firmly established but will always remain a paroikia, a temporary settlement which can never become a permanent home.  

In his view, the church is at best ancillary to God’s mission and is frequently simply bypassed. Instead the true focus is upon the oikoumene, where signs of shalom are to be

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105 Hoekendijk, “Church in Missionary Thinking,” 327. So also Church Inside Out, 22–24.  
106 Hoekendijk, “Church in Missionary Thinking,” 331; “Evangelization of the World,” 28; Church Inside Out, 41.  
107 Hoekendijk, “Church in Missionary Thinking,” 333.  
108 Hoekendijk, Church Inside Out, 39.  
109 Hoekendijk, “Church in Missionary Thinking,” 333.  
110 Hoekendijk, Church Inside Out, 40, 42 (Italics original).
established as witness to the activity of God.\textsuperscript{111} This, then, tends to elide the missio Dei with immanent political ends.\textsuperscript{112} This is an interesting move indeed; for if the primary value of missio Dei is its ability to recognize human endeavors as contingent, then it should follow that such immanent political movements have equally tenuous claims upon being the work of God as those made by the church.\textsuperscript{113} Hoekendijk’s account of the church world relationship proves too much; for there remains nothing that cannot be bypassed by God, rendering the missio Dei essentially invisible.

Similar in perspective are recent works by John G. Flett and Nathan R. Kerr, who both strongly challenge any notions of ecclesial stability as leading to the endless deferral of mission.\textsuperscript{114} Flett roots his argument in a particular reading of Barth’s trinitarian

\textsuperscript{111} Hoekendijk, Church Inside Out, 22–24, 42; “Church in Missionary Thinking,” 333–334. On this see Hoedemaker, “Hoekendijk’s American Years,” 8; Hollenweger, “Pluriformität der Kirche,” 673.

\textsuperscript{112} Bosch details this secularized account of mission, concluding that it has a certain prophetic validity, but leads eventually to “absurdity.” Transforming Mission, 384–388 [385]. See the similar evaluations in Oborji, Concepts of Mission, 142–149; Bevans and Schroeder, Constants in Context, 290–291; Guder, Missional Church, 99 (drafted principally by Hunsberger). More sympathetic appraisals may be found in Skreslet, Comprehending Mission, 74; Hoedemaker, “Hoekendijk’s American Years,” 7–10; “Legacy of Hoekendijk,” 166–170; Hollenweger, “Pluriformität der Kirche,” 663–677; Andersen, Towards a Theology of Mission, 36–40, 48; and Boeckmühl, Was heißt Mission?, 8–15. Flett’s critique is relatively unique in that he sees Hoekendijk as making the same basic move as the positions he criticizes only with a mission-centered conception rather than a church-centered conception. He further criticizes Hoekendijk for failing to attend to a prior trinitarian problem, which I shall take up in chapter two. Witness of God, 66–72.

\textsuperscript{113} Indeed, should one grant the perspective articulated in Lumen gentium, no 8 [Tanner, 2:854] that the church has both divine and human elements, which cannot be neatly separated from each other, but rather form “one complex reality,” then it would seem that the church’s claims are even stronger than those of political movements. Hoekendijk would, of course, wish to deny this perspective, making it a somewhat hollow and facile argument to use in this particular connection. Nevertheless, it is worth raising the issue, in order to demonstrate that a Catholic* articulation of missio Dei theology cannot follow in this radically secular direction. Indeed, it shows that already implicit in a Catholic ecclesiology are the resources for overcoming Hoekendijk’s criticisms.

*In this particular connection, I understand my own Anglican ecclesiology to be Catholic. Unless the context makes it clear that I must be referring to the Roman Catholic Church in distinction from my own church, any references to a Catholic viewpoint should be understood as expressive of my own.

\textsuperscript{114} Flett, Witness of God, 262–285; Kerr, Christ, History and Apocalyptic, 161–196.
theology, and in chapter two I shall provide an alternative account of trinitarian doctrine, which both takes his concerns seriously and provides a more liturgically robust ecclesiology than he is willing to allow. Kerr expresses a particular concern for “the political ontologization of the church, on the one hand, and a concomitant instrumentalization of worship, on the other hand.” Ontologizing the church leads to an inordinate concern with maintaining the church’s center, and hence a widening gap between the church’s being and its mission. Instrumentalizing worship refers to a common notion that liturgy serves as counter-formation for the church’s missionary encounter with the world. The problem with such a conception is that worship is no longer purely for the worship of God, but is directed toward some other end. In place of this, he argues for his in actu ecclesiology on the basis of the irruptive and singular logic of the Christ event.

While these perspectives express themselves in different fashions, the basic contention is the same: when the church is overly concerned with maintaining its internal

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118 Kerr, *Christ, History and Apocalyptic*, 171–173. Kerr turns his critique primarily upon Stanley Hauerwas, whose emphasis upon church as formational counter-culture in such works as *A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), and *With the Grain of the Universe: The Church’s Witness and Natural Theology* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2013), run the risk of simply positioning the church as the mirror image of the Liberal order that Hauerwas wishes to repudiate. In other words, Liberalism is still the controlling motif for Hauerwas’s ecclesiology, so far as Kerr is concerned. *Christ, History and Apocalyptic*, 93–126. This is not to say that mission is completely outside of Hauerwas’s concerns. In a recent article, he notes that “the only safeguard against...[the temptation to completely identify the church with its surrounding culture] is the demand that the church be in mission.” “Which Church? What Unity? Or, an Attempt to Say What I May Think about the Future of Christian Unity,” *Pro Ecclesia* 22 (2013): 273. Generally speaking, the essays in Guder, *Missional Church*, tend to also emphasize the church as counter-culture (e.g., 118–128, 142–182). I return to the idea of church as counter-culture in chapter four.

life, mission is invariably demoted from the church’s constitutive center. This is made all the more possible by a framework of God—church—world. Within this framework the church must maintain itself in order to engage in its mission. The problem, though, is that this maintenance supplants mission. Instead, these authors contend, the church is itself precisely in its engagement with the world. In the remainder of this chapter, I shall provide my own account of this dynamic, and provide a more complex framework than either God—church—world or Hoekendijk’s Kingdom—apostolate—oikoumene.120

The Church’s Existence is Interior to the World

Perhaps the most fundamental component of the relationship between church and world—so fundamental that it is easy to overlook—is that the church exists as a part of the world. There is no other place wherein it could be located or act.121 So when the

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120 Flett is instructive on this point. He notes that either of these sequences is liable to wind up with a gap between the church and its mission because it already presumes upon a gap between God and mission. His constructive engagement with Barth is meant to close this gap. *Witness of God*, 172–179. As he puts it, “the dueling orders of God-church-world and God-world-church both fail, for their ordering is based on an improper breach in the life of God. A better epigram of this relationship would be: God—God/human—human. God does not choose between the church and the world: God, in Jesus Christ, chooses humanity. This sets the church in her proper relationship to the world” (213). In the next section, anthropological and incarnational perspective will be developed with reference to *Gaudium et spes*. Similarly, Verkuyl views the dispute over such sequences as “needless bickering.” “Kingdom of God as the Goal of the Missio Dei,” 171–173 [172].

church engages with the world, it does so from within the world. This means that any sort of contrastive or adversarial relationship posited for the church-world relationship must be attenuated by this basic ontological fact. If the church is in contrast with the world, it is equally in solidarity with the world, because it is not non-world.  

**Gaudium et spes and Beyond**

Of course, “world” is an ambiguous and polyvalent concept. Vatican II’s Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, *Gaudium et spes* offers a sufficiently inclusive definition of the “world,” for our purposes, which is the one with which I shall be working:

This world it [the Council] sees as the world of men and women, the whole human family in its total environment; the stage of human history notable for its toil, its tragedies and its triumphs; the world which Christians believe has been established and kept in being by its creator's love, has fallen into the bondage of sin but has been liberated by Christ, who was crucified and has risen to shatter the power of the evil one, so that it could be transformed according to God's purpose and come to fulfilment [*sic*].

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The world, then, is understood in anthropological terms. It is the environment and sphere of activity wherein human beings live and work, within which history unfolds. It is, further, understood theologically as the creature of God, which has been corrupted by, but then liberated from sin.

The conciliar debate regarding the conception of the world was famously fractious. German theologians such as Karl Rahner and Joseph Ratzinger considered the constitution too optimistic, lacking adequate consideration of sin’s effects, and prone to eliding the natural and supernatural orders. On the other hand, certain French periti, particularly Yves Congar and Marie-Dominique Chenu, welcomed the schema’s intent, while also acknowledging its shortcomings. Eventually, the Germans accepted Schema...
13 as a basis for revision. The mixed commission responsible for the revisions had a number of German representatives, with the result that numerous changes were made and, as Charles Moeller notes:

the version put to the vote by the fathers before its promulgation represented the consensus of the two main tendencies which had stood confronted since the beginning of work on Schema 13: one a concrete outlook marked by a certain fundamental optimism, the other a dialectical, paradoxical attitude insisting on the polyvalency of the world in which the Church lives.127

Therefore, in evaluating the relative optimism of the constitution, we must keep in mind the fact that the final text’s express purpose is to address the German concerns about this optimism by taking into account the ambiguities introduced by the world’s fallenness.

So, while *Gaudium et spes* evinces a genuine optimism regarding the world—an optimism that continued to elicit reservations by figures such as Ratzinger, this optimism is a tempered optimism, recognizing the ambiguity of the world’s moral status. It is God’s good creature, but at the same time distorted by sin. Further, although sin distorts the creation, God has not abandoned the world to misery. The world is also redeemed by Christ, whose grace, in the Holy Spirit, is operative in the world. The redemption is not fully realized, but it is at work. Hence, in dealing with the world, its original goodness, its fallen sinfulness, and the operation of divine grace must all be taken into account. Neither a facile acquiescence to the status quo nor an impetuous rejection of worldly realities is adequate to the church’s call to scrutinize the signs of the times and interpret them in the gospel’s light.128

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128 Hünermann believes that the constitution has achieved this goal, describing its achievement as clearly articulating “the reciprocal interconnection of the Church and the world—without any leveling down and conformity.” “Final Weeks of the Council,” 424. As noted above, Moeller shares this basic
As the first paragraph of the constitution noted, the church in its pilgrimage is interior to this world and to the human project such that “there is nothing truly human which does not also affect” it. 129 The church is firmly rooted in history. Indeed, its founding events occurred in history. However, the church has an eschatological orientation, destiny, and mandate, such that its proper “function…can be fully discharged only in the age to come.” 130 So, while the church is interior to the world of human history, it retains an eschatological and transcendent reserve, and cannot be exhaustively identified with any particular project of world-building. 131 At the same time, though, this eschatological reserve does not excuse the church’s members from engaging in temporal responsibilities and world building, but rather infuses them with transcendent and eschatological depth. 132

129 Gaudium et spes, no. 1 [Tanner, 2:1069].
Ignacio Ellacuría offers a helpful perspective on this point, noting that the type of historical transcendence that Christianity envisions is not a transcendence away from history, but rather a transcendence within history. The Christ event, which stands at the center of history, and which affects every human being, has infused temporal realities with transcendent eschatological depths. Rather than there being a two tracked sacred and profane history, or a history of the world and a history of salvation, the entire world is united in God’s one saving history. The history of salvation expresses itself by

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way of salvation in history, which, while firmly rooted in concrete history, is suffused with the eschatological.¹³⁸

Within God’s one saving history, the church and the world share the same eschatological destiny,¹³⁹ variously expressed as the Kingdom of God, the New Heavens and New Earth, or as the *totus Christus*. The liberation theologians tend to prefer speaking of the Kingdom, which foregrounds the social and political dimensions of salvation, and connects to Jesus’s own kingdom proclamation.¹⁴⁰ Likewise, many missio *Dei* theologians prefer to speak of the Kingdom, because it moves us beyond ecclesiocentric conceptions.¹⁴¹ For reasons that will become clear in chapters two and three, I prefer to speak of the eschaton in terms of the *totus Christus*. However, I do so in conversation with the insights gained from the other images, particularly the recognition that the eschaton has concrete material and political repercussions and that the reign of God extends beyond the boundaries of the church. It is intended for the whole world, and not solely for the church. The church and the world are united in one history—indeed,

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¹³⁸ On salvation history and salvation in history see Ellacuría, *Freedom Made Flesh*, 12–14, 81–82; “Church of the Poor,” 544–554; and Burke, “Ellacuría’s Soteriology,” 177–180; Burke, *Theology of Ellacuría*, 137, 152. For the eschatological depth of history more generally, see above.


this one history is how Gaudium et spes defines the world—and share a common eschatological destiny.

Within the world, of which it is itself a part, the church functions as a leaven, effecting transformation and bringing elevation.\(^\text{142}\) In addition to its obvious biblical pedigree (Matthew 15:33; Luke 13:18–21),\(^\text{143}\) this is a powerfully missionary image. For leaven only functions when it has material on which to work. In order to properly be itself, the church needs the material provided to it by the world, specifically humanity, otherwise it has nothing to do.\(^\text{144}\) The leavening transformation effected by the church, then, spreads the transcendent eschatological depth brought about by the Christ event into the temporal realities in which the church’s members are engaged.\(^\text{145}\) The goal of the human project is a just society in which the entire human family is united,\(^\text{146}\) and the

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\(^{142}\) Gaudium et spes, no. 40 [Tanner, 2:1093]. On this see Gaillardetz and Clifford, Keys to the Council, 92–94; Ellacuria, “Church of the Poor,” 553–554; José Comblin, People of God, trans. Phillip Berryman (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2004), 142–163. The imagery of leaven is also used in Lumen gentium, no. 31 [Tanner, 2:875], and Ad gentes, no. 15 [Tanner, 2:1024]. In both of these cases, it refers specifically to the calling of the laity. Significantly, Gaudium et spes does not limit this leavening function to the laity, but refers it to the church qua church. On the ambiguity of the so called secular character of the laity see Zeni Fox, “Laity, Ministry, and Secular Character,” in Ordering the Baptismal Priesthood: Theologies of Lay and Ordained Ministry, ed. Susan K. Wood (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2003), 121–51; Aurelie A. Hagstrom, “The Secular Character of the Vocation and Mission of the Laity: Toward a Theology of Ecclesial Lay Ministry,” in Wood, Ordering the Baptismal Priesthood, 152–74; Jean Beyer, “Le laïcat et les laïcs dans l’église,” Gregorianum 68 (1987): 157–85. Aurelie and Hagstrom both conclude that the church itself has a secular mission, while Beyer notes that in almost all cases the aspects of the lives of the laity that are deemed “secular” are also shared by clergy and religious (the exception being marriage), making the concept of “secular character” not particularly useful.

\(^{143}\) Interestingly, in Jesus’s parables, the leaven refers to the Kingdom of heaven, rather than to the church as such.


\(^{145}\) Gaudium et spes, nos. 40, 43 [Tanner, 2:1093, 1096–1097].

church is called to realize the unity of the human race together with God. It seems, then, that the church’s mission is directed toward a supernatural end that at once encompasses, perfects, and surpasses humanity’s natural end.

**CELAM Conferences and Concrete History**

It is precisely because grace does not abolish, but rather perfects and elevates nature that Christian engagement in the world takes the form of concrete historical praxis. If the construction of a just society is the natural end toward which humanity is oriented, then the supernatural end toward which the gospel directs us cannot be less than the construction of such a society, though it also exceeds those proportions. In order to clarify this, I now turn to consider a particular development of the conciliar teaching on the church and the world. *Gaudium et spes* explained that the church’s task is to “scrutinize [perscrutandi] the signs of the times and interpret them in light of the gospel.” As this call has been heeded throughout the church, awareness has grown that economic realities are among the most significant signs of the times.

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147 *Lumen gentium*, nos. 1, 9 [Tanner, 2:849, 855]; *Ad gentes*, nos. 2–5 [Tanner, 2:1011–1014]; *Gaudium et spes*, nos. 38–39, 45 [Tanner, 2:1092–1093, 1099]. By “natural end” I mean no more than what is proportionate to the human nature even apart from supernatural elevation, and what may be explicitly discerned apart from special revelation. I am not making any statement one way or the other, about the orders of nature and grace, nor of the propriety of a hypothetical state of pure nature.

148 So also Jan L. Witte, who notes that the unity of which the church is the sacrament is not to be confused with the natural unity of the human race, even as it “presupposes” it. “L’église, «sacramentum unitatis» du cosmos et du genre humain,” in *L’église de Vatican II: Études autour de la constitution conciliare sur l’église*, ed. Guilherme Baraúna and Y. M.-J. Congar, 3 vols. (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1966–1967), 2:466, 487–488; Aloys Grillmeier, who notes that “those who are members of the Church of Christ are enabled to enter into the most intimate union with God and into a deeper fellowship with men [sic], one not founded merely on the usual basis of human relationships but also on the unifying force of the self-communication of God in Christ and the Spirit.” “Chapter I: The Mystery of the Church,” in Vorgrimler, *Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II*, 1:140.

The Latin American Episcopal Conference Meetings (CELAM) at Medellín (1968), Puebla (1979), and Aparecida (2007) develop the insights of *Gaudium et spes* with respect to the signs of the times within the context of Latin American life, particularly the economic realities of that life. In the face of the dire poverty of Latin America, the documents call for a preferential option for the poor expressed in a commitment to integral liberation. As the Aparecida document, having developed a

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comprehensive account of life in Latin America with special attention to economic,
social, familial, and ethnic realities.\footnote{CELAM, Aparecida, nos. 33–100.} puts it, “The Church’s rich social magisterium tells us that we cannot conceive of an offer of life in Christ without dynamism toward integral liberation, humanization, reconciliation, and involvement in society.”\footnote{CELAM, Aparecida, no. 359. So also Gutiérrez, Theology of Liberation, 83–105; Sobrino, Church and Poor, 40–63; Principle of Mercy, 9, 15–22; Christ the Liberator, 43–49; No Salvation Outside the Poor, 41–74; Ellacuria, Freedom Made Flesh, 87–124; “The Crucified People,” 592–603; “Church of the Poor,” 544–545, 554; Eine Kirche der Armen: Für ein prophetisches Christentum, trans. Raúl Fornet-Ponse (Freiburg; Basel; Wien: Herder, 2011), 210.}

I raise the Latin American perspective here largely because it demonstrates the concrete historicity of Christian missionary activity. While the reality of global poverty is a pervasive issue, it is not the sole issue facing the church in its task. However, the Latin American response to the sign of the times that is poverty ought to be illustrative of how, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, other realities might be approached.\footnote{In a parallel manner some have suggested that, as the signs of the times have shifted since \textit{Gaudium et spes}, making some of its specific statements now out of date, the constitution’s ongoing relevance might come from the general comportment towards the world that it shows. So Andrea Riccardi, “An Historical Perspective and Gaudium et Spes,” \textit{Journal of Catholic Social Thought} 3 (2006): 254; Norman Tanner, \textit{The Church and the World}: “Gaudium et Spes,” “Inter Mirifica” (New York: Paulist Press, 2005), 65–90. Weigel recognizes that the constitution is dated, and that there was much that it did not anticipate, but suggests that Pope John Paul II’s development of \textit{Gaudium et spes}’s anthropology is the best hermeneutical way forward, “Rescuing Gaudium et Spes,” 253–265.}

The CELAM documents throw into bold relief the fact that the world is a deeply ambiguous reality. The church has a mission in that world, and this mission has an eschatological purpose—the intimate union of God and humanity.\footnote{\textit{Gaudium et spes}, nos. 40, 45 [Tanner, 2:1093, 1099].} This eschatological resolution involves the complete wellbeing of human beings, in all aspects of their being and all dimensions of their existence. The reality of sin in its personal, social, and structural forms leads to human misery and injustice, all of which lead away from the
human flourishing which is the church’s eschatological goal. Short of the eschaton, mission involves addressing these realities that fall short of the full flourishing of the human race. The church, on its way to the eschaton does not by-pass human wellbeing.

**World-Engagement as Necessary for the Being of the Church**

I have already established that the church is not non-world, that it is interior to and part of the world. Already, this points to engagement with the world as a necessity for the church. Now, however, I shall push this somewhat tautologous affirmation further with more specifically theological undergirding for the exigency of engagement with the world for the church.

**Mission as a Catholic Necessity**

According to *Ad gentes* no. 1, the church’s mission is motivated by obedience to Christ and by its own catholicity’s internal demands.\(^{157}\) That the church is catholic means that it must take root and grow up within every segment and sub-segment of the human family. No portion or dimension of humanity may be excluded. Rather, the church must express itself among all the peoples of the earth. Note, then, that the logic driving this affirmation is not that the church must spread itself to the peoples of the earth for their own benefit (though, of course, that is not untrue). Rather, the church must find expression in all the peoples of the earth in order to be true to itself.\(^{158}\) The former arrangement can be used to undergird paternalistic colonialisms that seek to obliterate

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\(^{157}\) *Ad gentes*, no. 1 [Tanner, 2:1011].

local cultures with a “Christian” (read “European or American”) culture.\(^\text{159}\) However, on
the conception I am advancing, paternalism is ruled out, for the church is equally in need. In order for its
catholicity to be expressed, the church must receive from the local culture, and the gospel must take
root in and elevate that culture in such a way as to allow the church to remain true to itself.\(^\text{160}\)

Those who are baptized into the church do not cease to belong to their own local cultures. As
\textit{Gaudium et spes} puts it, they are members of both the heavenly and earthly cities, both of which
remain intertwined before the eschaton.\(^\text{161}\) Georg Vicedom speaks of a “double belonging” that makes
the church unique among religions: one belongs both to the church and its Lord and to one’s own “Volk.”\(^\text{162}\) Indeed, this is one of the reasons that
\textit{Gaudium et spes} only sparingly used the ecclesiological image “People of God,” which figured so
prominently in \textit{Lumen gentium}: in order to avoid giving the impression that the Christian Church
was one people among others, rather than itself being interior to all the peoples of the earth.\(^\text{163}\) Becoming a member of the church does not remove one from the


\(^{161}\) \textit{Gaudium et spes}, no. 40 [Tanner, 2:1093].

\(^{162}\) Vicedom, \textit{Missio Dei}, 91 (My translation. I have left \textit{Volk} untranslated because any rendering in English loses a good deal of depth and resonance that is present in the German).

world, for the church is within the world. Rather, it reconfigures one’s relationship with temporal realities, referring them to their eschatological fulfillment.

Hans Urs von Balthasar pushes this insight further, arguing that the church must recognize that its catholic unity is not its own, but lies solely “in Christ, not in itself, so that it only proclaims its unity from Christ, and only in fulfilling this mission does it even realize its unity…building up and expanding its catholicity by missionary work.”

The church exists not for itself but for the world to which it has been sent. “The church according to its inner constitution—and not only accidentally—transcends beyond itself into the entire human world.”

The church, according to Balthasar is utopian, in the sense of being oustopos (not a place), rather than merely eutpos (a good place).

“In the world…there is for his [Christ’s] church no space [Raum], it can only exist in the place-lessness [Ortolosigkeit] of the desert, where a “place” [Ort (topos)] is prepared for it…For the world the woman [i.e., the church, see Rev 12:13–17] remains utopian and formless in the worldly sense; the “place” [Ort] prepared for her by God cannot be found upon the earth.

The Church, then, is radically de-centered, lacking its own form, lacking its own place.

The Church exists within the movement of Christ to the world.

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164 Balthasar, Theodramatik, 2/2:388 (My translation). In a similar vein, Congar writes, “It is therefore called—and this is a source of its essential missionary character—too meet what is in Christ for mankind and for the world, and what is in mankind and in the world for Christ....This structure of the divine action is the reason for the Church’s having to receive from the world, and lends the accomplishment of its mission a certain dialogic character of which missionaries today are very conscious.” “Church in the Modern World,” 220–221.

165 Balthasar, Theodramatik, 2/2:400 (My translation). So also Mysterium Paschale, 263.

The Face of the Poor

As Gaudium et spes affirms, the Holy Spirit fills the whole earth, and God is at work throughout his creation. The church is led by the Spirit to recognize the work of God beyond its boundaries. This, of course, involves the church in the world. And, once more, this is not a matter of the church being involved in the world because the world is somehow dependent upon the church, but because the church itself needs this engagement.

Within the Latin American context, this has gained greater and more concrete specificity. The Aparecida document roots its account of missionary discipleship in a theology of encounter with Christ. The life of the missionary disciple is the result of such an encounter (nos. 11, 13, 32, 131, 243). Christ is encountered in Scripture, the liturgy, the lives of the saints, especially Mary, and in one’s neighbor, especially the poor (nos. 247, 250, 257, 266, 273). Through genuine encounter with the living Christ, one is enabled to read the signs of the times differently, and to joyfully engage the world with missionary love (nos. 19, 23, 38–29).

As the bishops relate,

In the face of Jesus Christ, dead and risen, bruised for our sins and glorified by the Father, in this suffering and glorious face, we can see with the eyes of faith the humiliated face of so many men and women of our peoples, and at the same time, their calling to the freedom of the children of God, to the full realization of their personal dignity and to brotherhood [sic] among all.

So, then, the life of missionary discipleship overflows from an encounter with the living Christ. Moreover, by virtue of the incarnation, by which Christ has “united himself in


168 CELAM, Aparecida, no. 32.
some sense with every human being,”169 the neighbor, and especially the poor neighbor, has become a site of encounter with Christ. As the church is carried beyond itself by its encounter with Christ, it finds, in the world into which it is carried, a further encounter with the same Christ, and by that encounter is carried once more into its mission.

Closely related to this theology of encounter is the notion of the “crucified peoples,” first elaborated by Ignacio Ellacuría, but then developed further by Jon Sobrino.170 The crucified peoples are history’s innocent victims, typically the poor. Jesus’s death as an innocent victim of the Roman Empire demonstrates his solidarity with the crucified peoples. He and the crucified peoples are mutually explanatory.171 In the crucified peoples, the concrete shape of the sorts of political forces whose resistance to the reign of God led Jesus to his death are vividly seen. In the death of Jesus, God’s saving solidarity with history’s victims is made manifest.172 The reality of Christ’s suffering and its reversal in the resurrection becomes less about “what God does with a dead body,” and instead about “what God does with a victim.”173

169 Gaudium et spes, no. 22 [Tanner, 2:1082].


172 Ellacuría, “Crucified People,” 584, 592.

173 Sobrino, Christ the Liberator, 84.
However, the point here is not just about solidarity, important as that might be, but about the crucified peoples as a locus of encounter with Christ. Sobrino speaks of the evangelizing potential of crucified peoples. This potential is expressed by the fact that the crucified people embody genuinely humanizing values, which present an invitation to renounce the dehumanizing distortions of Western culture. Further, crucified peoples expose the sin of the world, which provides an opportunity for repentance. Most significantly for our purposes here, the crucified peoples serve to mediate Christ’s presence. As Sobrino puts it, “To go forth to the poor with the intention of liberating them is to understand God's vision for the world and to conform to the reality of God. In this historical way the evangelizer becomes ever more Christian and, in the deepest sense of the term, is divinized.”

And so, once more, we see a reciprocity between church and world. Of course the church is to be engaged in service to the world through proclamation, through liberative praxis, and through taking the crucified peoples down from the cross. These activities, however, must be undertaken in full cognizance that the church also stands to gain from the encounter. The rich do not simply give to the poor; they also receive from them. The church does not simply grant a share in the gospel to the world’s peoples—as though God could not reach them apart from its efforts—but rather itself gains a deepened catholicity.

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177 Sobrino, *No Salvation Outside the Poor*, 41–44.
Conclusion: Beyond God—Church—World or Kingdom—Apostolate—World

Because the church and the world are interpenetrating realities, it follows that schemas such as God—Church—World or Kingdom—Apostolate—World are inadequate. The church’s members are citizens of both the heavenly and the earthly cities, which remain intertwined throughout history. The church is part of the world, and is called upon to affect the world, even as it is itself affected by the world. The ways in which the church is affected by the world can be either positive—such as gaining a better understanding of itself or human nature, and hence of its message, or learning from Philosophies, languages, and cultures— or negative—such as the rise of atheism, unjust economic practices (and especially an alignment of the church with a status quo that perpetuates such injustices), or political arrangements that curtail the church’s proper mission. Sometimes, the same development can affect the church both positively and negatively. For instance, Gaudium et spes no. 7 notes that changes in

178 Gaudium et spes, no. 40 [Tanner, 2:1093].

179 Gaudium et spes, no. 44 [Tanner, 2:1098–1099]. See also Benestad, “Doctrinal Perspectives,” 162–163; Congar, “Church in the Modern World,” 211, 221–222. As Hünermann puts it, “the Council fathers took it for granted that the Christian community profits in many ways from the cultural, social, and economic developments of the human race, and even that in relation to the gospel itself it has, as a result of cultural scientific, and social advances, gained a deeper understanding of its own message and its own gifts.” “Final Weeks of the Council,” 424–425. This then leads to a more dialogical and reciprocal stance toward the world. See, e.g., Hollenbach, “Commentary on Gaudium et Spes,” 275; James Gerard McEvoy, “Proclamation as Dialogue: Transition in the Church-World Relationship,” Theological Studies 70 (2009): 875–903.

180 Gaudium et spes, no. 21 [Tanner, 2:1080–1081].

181 Gaudium et spes, nos. 9, 26–27 [Tanner, 2:1073, 1084–1086]; Populorum progressio, nos. 21, 76–77; CELAM, Medellín, 1.3–5; 14.2–7.

182 Gaudium et spes, no. 42 [Tanner, 2:1045–1046].
psychology and morality have, on the one hand, led to a purifying of religion from superstition, and on the other have led some people to give up on religion altogether.\footnote{Gaudium et spes, no. 7 [Tanner, 2:1072]. See also Moeller, “Preface and Introductory Statement,” 105–107. On this ambiguity more generally see Chenu, “Signes des temps,” 216–217; Hollenbach, “Commentary on Gaudium et Spes,” 275; Thiils, “L’activité humaine,” 294–297.}

This is why the signs of the times must not only be attended to, but also interpreted in light of the gospel. The church has approbations and denunciations to speak in the face of historical developments, and a failure either to take seriously the signs of the times or to interpret them in the light of the gospel will prove detrimental to the church’s mandate to engage the world in a fully-orbed mission. Further, the Holy Spirit, “who fills the entire earth,” leads the people of God to find “true signs of God’s presence and purpose in the events which it shares with the rest of modern humanity.”\footnote{Gaudium et spes, no. 11 [Tanner, 2:1075].} In other words, God is at work throughout the world, and the church is charged with discovering this work and collaborating with it.

So, then, to plot the sequence evident in Gaudium et spes, we might say that it runs: God—church—world—church, and God—world—church—world. The church receives the gospel from God, and brings that gospel to the world, from which it discerns the signs of the times, which are to be interpreted in the gospel’s light, and the church discerns the work of God beyond its own boundaries, and thus comes to be more truly itself. At the same time, the world is the sphere of God’s activity, which means that the world affects the church, which in turn offers the gospel whereby God fulfills, perfects, and exceeds human project.

Or, to put it another way, though the church has its ultimate destiny in the eschatologically complete reign of God, its path to that reign carries it through the world.
This passage through the world is not only a path traveled, but rather a destination on the way to its final destiny, for the church’s mission calls it out into the world. The world is the dough that the church’s leaven needs in order to act upon it. At the same time, the church itself is a way station. As the church carries out its mission, churches are established (see the discussion of baptism and mission above). However, these churches are not ends in themselves, but are likewise outposts of the mission, for they too are leaven that needs the world’s dough on which to act.

Similarly, the world’s destiny is the eschatological kingdom of God, but in the interim it is called to the church, for though God is at work beyond the church’s bounds, the church is that place where faith in Christ and the activity of God are made explicit. But being summoned into the church necessarily carries one back to the world, which is the church’s proper sphere of activity. Neither world nor church is an end in itself. They are bound together throughout history though, because Christ is the head of both (e.g., Ephesians 1:10, 20–22; 4:15; 5:23; Colossians 1:18–25), though only the church is identified as his body.

Though identifying the church as a proximate end may strike some as an ecclesiocentric retrogression, it seems unavoidable to me. It is unavoidable because I am unwilling to dispense with explicit faith in Christ as a normative criterion. It is unavoidable because of my earlier reflections upon the nature of mission as involving,  

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185 So also Vicedom, *Missio Dei*, 91–95.
187 On this see Balthasar, *Theo-Logic*, 2:307–311; Witte, “*Sacramentum unitatis,*” 472. Witte, however, discerns a development in Ephesians toward an expansion of the conception of church as the *pleroma* of Christ, such that it is to fill the entire earth (481).
but not being limited to, the baptism of converts and hence establishing churches. I believe that the problematic repercussions of ecclesiocentrism are ameliorated by my recognition that the final end is the eschaton and that the church is a means to an end.

The church’s mission is a participation in the *missio Dei*, and involves a critically receptive engagement with the world, able both to learn from the signs of the times and to interpret them in the light of the gospel. Hence, there are criteriological functions that are not native to human beings. This raises two further questions beyond the proper relationship between church and world: the trinitarian content of the *missio Dei* and the matter of competency for such a participating in the divine mission. In the next chapter, I shall attempt to address both questions, as I turn to matters of trinitarian theology, the paschal mystery, and our participation in both.
CHAPTER II: GLORIA PATRI, ET FILII, ET SPIRITU SANCTI: THE CHURCH’S MISSIONARY FOUNDATION

The previous chapter provided an account of the church’s mission as a holistic reality involving both proclamation and concrete praxis within and for the sake of the world. It further demonstrated that this mission is not simply an activity of the church, but an aspect of the church’s identity. The church is, of its very nature, interior to the real world of history and called upon to share in God’s mission to that world. I further introduced the concept of missio Dei, which has proven to be quite influential in mission theology since the latter half of the twentieth-century.

In this chapter, I return to the concept of missio Dei in order to provide it with a positive trinitarian content. More specifically, I shall give an account of the missio Dei in terms of the divine missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit into the economy. Further, I argue that the missions are most clearly expressed in terms of the paschal mystery. To support these claims, I shall synthesize elements from the trinitarian theologies of Hans Urs von Balthasar and Bernard J. F. Lonergan. This synthesis will provide the central conceptual framework for the remainder of my argument in this study, for it provides an account of Christian salvation as sharing in the divine life by sharing in the paschal mystery, and does so specifically in terms of a mission theology. Mission and salvation are not two unrelated realities, but are inseparably intertwined modes of participation in the life of God. At least this is what I aim to demonstrate.

This synthetic and integrative proposal will lead me to a consideration of the sacraments of Christian initiation, which I will pursue in conversation with two
influential rites of initiation: the Roman Catholic *Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults*,\(^1\) and the 1979 *Book of Common Prayer*’s baptismal liturgy.\(^2\) My examination of these rites will show that they indicate that the effects of Christian initiation include association with the paschal mystery, incorporation into the church, and commissioning for mission. This conception of initiation, then, binds together my account of *missio Dei* as paschal mystery with the ecclesiological concerns of this project.

**The Exigencies for a Truly Trinitarian Account of Missio Dei**

As I noted in chapter one, John Flett exposes a significant flaw in *missio Dei* theology. On the one hand, the concept of *missio Dei*, which recognizes mission as a fundamentally divine rather than human undertaking, is a more or less irreversible insight. Once we have recognized God as the basis of a theology of mission, we cannot renege, for to do so would mean positing a creaturely base for mission. This would position some contingent, creaturely reality in a far too exalted position, shouldering a weight it cannot sustain.\(^3\) On the other hand, Flett has shown that despite the assumption that it provides a trinitarian basis for mission, there is essentially no evidence that the doctrine of the Trinity exerts any sort of controlling influence upon the concept of *missio Dei*:

> Contra popular perception, *missio Dei*’s decisive flaw resides in its insufficient Trinitarian grounding. From this desiccated root sprouts the range of its contemporary problems. The doctrine of the Trinity distances the missionary act from any accidental grounding. Fulfilling only this critical function, mission’s reformulation occurs in some contest with the doctrine. Or the term “Trinity”

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\(^1\) *RCIA*, nos. 211–243  
\(^2\) *BCP*, 298–314.  
becomes shorthand for the doctrines of creation and pneumatology in active distinction from christology.\(^4\)

The result is that *missio Dei* becomes whatever its exponents desire it to be, a cipher signifying anything and everything, and, therefore, nothing.

To meet this deficiency, Flett provides a trinitarian rendition of *missio Dei*, which he develops in terms of Karl Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity.\(^5\) In this section, I will briefly survey Flett’s proposal, noting the important exigencies he indicates for a trinitarian account of the *missio Dei*, as well as the problematic aspects of his formulation. I find Flett’s diagnosis of the concept’s history and his prospectus of what a trinitarian *missio Dei* must involve to be salutary. However, his attempt to meet this challenge trades upon false dilemmas and ultimately falters in deeply troubling ways. I will therefore in the next section propose an alternative trinitarian account of the *missio Dei*, which both meets Flett’s exigencies and avoids his deficiencies.

As I noted, Flett’s constructive argument builds upon Karl Barth’s trinitarian theology. Flett demonstrates that, despite the conventional wisdom that Barth stands at the headwaters of *missio Dei* theology, he has not actually exerted so profound an influence as is thought.\(^6\) Flett points out the dearth of Barthian influence upon the *missio Dei* concept in order to establish the importance of his own Barthian trinitarian account of *missio Dei* as what has been missing from the discussion.\(^7\) Rather than follow him in this

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\(^7\) Flett, *Witness of God*, 164.
regard, I will accept his historical argument about the lack of a constitutive role for Barth, but then part ways with him by using it as my warrant for offering a non-Barthian trinitarian grounding for missio Dei. This allows me to sidestep the contested questions surrounding the proper interpretation of Barth, particularly of his doctrine of election, while also affording the opportunity to fill in the missio Dei with positive trinitarian content.

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8 Barth famously placed the doctrine of election within his doctrine of God, making Christ at once the electing God and the elect human being, Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. G. W. Bromiley et al., vol. 2/2 (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2010), 3–506. Subsequently debate has arisen as to whether or not the election of the man Jesus also has a constitutive function in God’s self-determination. On the one hand, Bruce McCormack advocates the position that God’s triunity is a result of his elective self-determination to be for and with humanity in the man Jesus. In other words, God first determines to be with humanity and then, in order to realize this self-determination, constitutes Godself as Trinity. “Grace and Being: The Role of God’s Gracious Election in Karl Barth’s Theological Ontology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 92–110; “Seek God Where He May Be Found: A Response to Edwin Chr. van Driel,” Scottish Journal of Theology 60, no. 1 (2007): 62–79; “Election and the Trinity: Theses in Response to George Hunsinger,” in Trinity and Election in Contemporary Theology, ed. Michael T. Dempsey (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 115–37. On the other hand, George Hunsinger insists that God’s triune being is logically prior to any sort of self-determination. “Election and the Trinity: Twenty-Five Theses on the Theology of Karl Barth,” in Dempsey, Trinity and Election in Contemporary Theology, 91–114.

Closing Ontological “Gaps”

Flett’s basic contention is that *missio Dei*, in both of its major forms—God–church–world, and God–world–church—fails to deliver a satisfactorily missional ecclesiology because of a prior problem in the doctrine of God, which is common to both forms. This problem comes in the form of a “cleaving God’s being in and for himself from his particular movement into the economy.” This “breach between God’s being and act determines a community with a corresponding breach.”

Frankly, I am not aware of any major theologian who affirms such a cleavage in God, which makes Flett’s criticism perhaps overblown. Nevertheless, Flett is right that a breached conception of God would be problematic and that this breached God would lead to a church that is considered ontologically and ethically other than the world, and must concomitantly maintain this alterity. This generates an account of ecclesial life and practices that places this life and these practices in a realm distinct from the church’s mission. The practices are needed to cultivate the church’s way of life. Flett allows the importance of ecclesial practices. His concern is with is their abstraction from mission. As he puts it:

Missions occur in order to promote the true nonmissionary vocation of celebrating the Christian distinctive within the general religious ontic. This ontic is cultural in nature: that is, it differentiates one way of life from another, and its transmission occurs from one value system to another. Mission exists at a distance from this church: its mode, as one of propagating those cultural elements essential to

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9 I address these orders in chapter one.
10 Flett, “Missio Dei,” 5.
12 On the church’s interiority to the world see chapter one.
growth in true witness of the benefits, confirms the insular nature of Christian being, and it can be jettisoned as nonessential to that being.\footnote{14} This leads to a conception of mission indistinguishable from propaganda, as the church concerns itself with replicating a particular culture as a propaedeutic to proclaiming the gospel.\footnote{15}

Flett likewise sees this as leading to a fundamental problem inherent to ecclesiologies of communion. They posit their basis in the eternal communion of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but in conceiving of this life as already eternally perfect in itself, the church becomes the corresponding image, devoted to building up and consolidating its internal liturgical life and practices. Mission remains at the periphery of this account of the church because it is also at the periphery of the account of God.\footnote{16} While it is perhaps a fair question whether anyone actually poses such a gap between God’s eternal life and his economic activity, Flett is correct in his diagnosis that it is all too easy for ecclesiologies of communion to involve a gap between the church’s life \textit{ad intra} and \textit{ad extra} and that these ecclesiologies tend to take the Trinity as their model.

In contrast, Flett wants to avoid such cleavages between God’s being and act. Who God is eternally in Godself and who God reveals Godself to be in the economy must be the same. In addition to the correspondingly breached community, Flett notes two further problematic implications of such a cleavage. First, it leads to an understanding of the incarnation as a divine “self-alienation,” rather than a true revelation of who God

\footnote{14} Flett, \textit{Witness of God}, 179.
\footnote{16} Flett, \textit{Witness of God}, 204–208; “Communion as Propaganda,” 457–458. Among others, Flett points to Zizioulas (\textit{Being as Communion}), Jenson (\textit{Systematic Theology: Volume 2}), and Volf (\textit{After Our Likeness}) as exemplifying the sort of missionless communion ecclesiologies he has in mind.
really is. Second, “any human participation in the life of God would have to do only with his external life. God’s real being would have to be withheld from humanity.”  

I concur with Flett that such gaps between God’s being in se and his being pro nobis ought to be avoided.  

Where we differ will become clear shortly.

### Attending to the Singularity of the Christ Event

Flett likewise insists that the concrete history of Jesus Christ needs to be foregrounded in our conception of God as Trinity. It is from the Christ event that epistemological access to God as Trinity is granted in the first place.  

It is in the incarnate Christ that our point of contact with God is found.

It is because Christ is wholly given over to his mission that the church’s existence can only be missionary. Because Christ is the church’s point of contact with the divine life, it follows that sharing in Christ means sharing in his mission. “Thus stated, this commission does not become an act the community may choose to undertake or neglect; rather it is the very nature of the living fellowship of the divine and the human.”  

Within this arrangement, humanity—whether the humanity of Christ or of the church—remains human, not ontologically altered. Flett insists upon this based upon the Chalcedonian “without confusion, without change, without division, without separation,” which he

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18 It is worth noting that McCormack is similarly concerned with the avoidance of such gaps. “Election and the Trinity,” 119–120.


21 Council of Chalcedon, “Definition of the Faith” (451) [Tanner, 1:86].
sees as precluding any account of deification. My own constructive argument is premised upon an account of salvation and mission as theosis. However, I shall do so in a way that also upholds the Chalcedonian definition.

**Preserving the Freedom of Creation and the Gratuity of Redemption**

Thus far I have focused upon the exigencies for an adequately trinitarian theology of *missio Dei* explicitly raised by Flett. However, before turning to my own proposal, I must demonstrate why I do not simply adopt Flett’s own account. Simply put, Flett’s proposal is premised upon a false choice. He writes, “If it is possible to so define God’s true being apart from his economy, then his coming in the economy, though it forms a parallel to God’s eternal nature occurs *in contest with his being*.” In other words, Flett wants to not only close the breach in God, he wants to make God’s economic activity constitutive to the being of God, such that God’s being *in se* cannot be considered apart from the Christ event.

Flett wants to affirm God as a missionary God in such a way that “mission properly belongs to the eternal life of God.” Though he seeks to avoid reducing God to his activity in the economy, Flett also insists that “a satisfactory statement of God’s being must include his act *ad extra* as belonging to his being from all eternity. That is, this act is not a second step beside, but belongs to the very nature of his being.”

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God’s engagement with the economy an eternal component of his being risks, at the least, obscuring both the freedom of creation and the gratuity of redemption. At worst, Flett makes them necessary to God’s being, an arrangement which David Bentley Hart has shown to have morally disastrous consequences, as the entire bloody sweep of history becomes necessary for God’s own self-realization.²⁷

In all fairness to Flett, he explicitly states that he does not wish to make creation or redemption necessary to God. He upholds the divine aseity, insisting that God’s relation to creation is one of God’s own free self-determination.²⁸ It is worth asking whether Flett is as successful in avoiding this problem as he hopes. The way he formulates his proposal does leave the question open. Beyond this, though, even if Flett is successful in upholding the divine freedom, he does so at the cost of raising the equally vicious specter of voluntarism. God may no longer be constrained by necessity, but he determines his own being. This is the cost of dismissing divine simplicity. Now the being and nature of God are determined by a prior divine will, unbounded by the divine benevolence or love. If God is loving or good, it is only because he arbitrarily has decided to be, and not because he simply is so.

In sum, Flett has rightly shown that the missio Dei concept lacks an adequate grounding in the doctrine of the Trinity. From Flett we gain the impetus to provide a fully trinitarian account of the missio Dei, and an insight into the exigencies for such an account.

²⁷ David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 164–166. In this context, Hart is addressing his criticisms to Robert Jenson, however, these criticisms validly apply to any rendering of creation necessary to the being of God. Jan-Heier Tück, in a similar vein, notes that although contemporary theologies of God’s suffering attempt to address the urgency of a suffering world, they actually wind up compounding the problem. “Mit dem Rücken zu den Opfern der Geschichte? Zur trinitarischen Kreuzestheologie Hans Urs von Balthasars,” in Monotheismus Israels und christlicher Trinitätsglaube, ed. Magnus Striet (Freiburg; Basel; Wien: Herder, 2004), 199–204.

account: avoidance of ontological breaches within the divine life such that God is
different in his own eternal life *ad intra* than he is in his economic activity *pro nobis*, and
attention to the singularity of the Christ event. However, from Flett we also gain an
imperative that he has not explicitly mentioned, for it is found lurking within his own
proposal. Flett’s use of Barth’s trinitarian theology to ground the *missio Dei* ensconces
his proposal squarely upon the horns of a dilemma. We must choose between a Hegelian
binding together of God and the economy, which seemingly constrains the divine
freedom by necessity; or we are left with a voluntaristically free God, solely determined
by his own arbitrary will. Neither of these alternatives is acceptable.

I accept Flett’s history of the *missio Dei* concept, and his observation that Barth is
not its progenitor as is commonly assumed, as well as his prescriptions regarding the
singularity of Christ and the avoidance of “breaches.” However, the trinitarian doctrine
he provides proves disastrous. A different trinitarian basis is needed, one that not only
attends to the *desiderata* Flett rightly indicates, but that also avoids the snare latent in his
own proposal.

**A Proposal: *Missio Dei* as Paschal Mystery**

In its most basic affirmation my proposal is straightforward and involves three
components. First, the *missio Dei* should be understood in terms of the trinitarian
missions of the Son and Holy Spirit.  

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29 This basic perspective is affirmed by *Lumen gentium*, nos. 2–4, 17 [Tanner, 2:850, 862]; *Ad
gentes*, nos. 2–5 [Tanner, 2:1011–1014]; IMC, “Statement on the Missionary Calling of the Church,” 189;
Missiology,” 72–90; Seng-Kong Tan, “A Trinitarian Ontology of Missions,” *International Review of
be understood as an *ad extra* enactment of the eternal life of God *ad intra*. 30 Finally, this enactment of the Triune life in the economy particularly unfolds in the paschal mystery of Christ’s entry into and triumphant return from death. In addition to providing a positive trinitarian content for the concept of *missio Dei*, this approach also provides an important point of contact for ecclesiology and liturgical theology. 31

So while a turn to trinitarian theology may seem like a diversion in a project on ecclesiology and mission, it actually provides the underpinnings for my argument as a whole. The paschal mystery will allow me to integrate mission, church, and liturgy, for they all find their basis in it and, thereby, in the life of God.

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30 I shall develop this in conversation with Hans Urs von Balthasar and Bernard Lonergan. However, this perspective may also be found in Karl Rahner’s famous *Grundaxiom* that the Economic Trinity is the Immanent Trinity and vice-versa. “Der dreifaltige Gott als transzendenter Urgrund der Heilsgeschichte,” in *Karl Rahner Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Peter Walter and Michael Hauber, vol. 22/1b (Freiburg; Basel; Wien: Herder, 2013), especially 533–537. It is also affirmed by Ignacio Ellacuría, “Historicity of Christian Salvation,” 276–277.


Turning to the paschal mystery brings to the fore the concrete history of Jesus of Nazareth. When I refer to the paschal mystery, I do not have a single event in view. Rather, the Christ event is a whole complex of events, including Jesus’s suffering, death, resurrection, and ascension; as well as the bestowal of the Holy Spirit, the birth of the church, and the expected *parousia*. This last item gives to the entire complex of ideas an eschatological character and orientation. The paschal mystery is not just an event of the past, but a present reality, which awaits a further fulfillment at history’s conclusion.

Chauvet also notes that a focus on the paschal mystery provides a Christological and pneumatological balance. Twentieth-century theologians have frequently noted a tendency toward Christomonism and a relative neglect of the person and work of the Holy Spirit in theology, even if they have not quite been able to overcome this. The

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paschal mystery keeps both Christology and pneumatology in view. Pentecost is included in the Christ event, and the two are intrinsically related. Attention to the concrete history of Jesus of Nazareth bears this out further, as the Holy Spirit plays an important Christological role in the Gospels. The Orthodox, perhaps more than any other tradition, have maintained the importance of a pneumatologically conditioned understanding of Christology.

So then, by keeping the paschal mystery in focus, I attend to the singularity of the Christ event, one of the desiderata noted above. I further return the concept of divine missions to its original trinitarian context and meaning. Within trinitarian theology, mission refers not simply to God being on a mission, nor to a generic “sending” of the Son and Holy Spirit, but rather to the way that the divine life opens up to the economy and the way in which the sending of the Son and Spirit is related to their eternal processions within God. To construct my proposal, I engage with the thought of two twentieth-century Roman Catholic theologians, Hans Urs von Balthasar and Bernard J. F. Lonergan.

putting to rest the notion that “Christomonism” is a Western problem to which the Orthodox are immune. Congar’s work likewise demonstrates that a too fast distinction between East and West is overblown. Je crois en l’Esprit Saint, 525–791. Another attempt to overcome this tendency is Sarah Coakley, God, Sexuality and the Self: An Essay “On the Trinity” (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2013). Coakley, by beginning her proposed multi-volume project in systematic theology with pneumatology, attempts to confront this problem head-on.


As will become clear, Balthasar and Lonergan allow me to provide the trinitarian grounding of *missio Dei* that Flett rightly discerns as needed, but which he has been unable to provide. Synthesizing these two theologians provides a trinitarian theology that is rooted in the Christ event and avoids any gap between God’s activity in the economy and his own eternal life. Balthasar’s analogy for the trinitarian processions allows me to maintain consistent recourse to the paschal mystery, while Lonergan’s account of the relation between the missions and the processions prevents any conception of a breach between God *in se* and God *pro nobis*. Equally important, Balthasar’s notion of trinitarian kenosis and Lonergan’s account of contingent predication allow me to stringently safeguard the freedom of creation and gratuity of grace, while avoiding the pitfall of voluntarism.

**Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Trinitarian Eucharist**

I note at the outset that my engagement with Balthasar is limited in its scope to providing an account of his position on the trinitarian processions. I cannot, in this context, provide a comprehensive account of any aspect of Balthasar’s theology. Instead, I will limit myself to appropriating his basic trinitarian analogy in order to develop my own account of the *missio Dei*.

**Triune Kenosis**

The category of kenosis, of self-emptying, proved central to Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Christology and trinitarian theology. This centrality of kenosis derives from

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Balthasar’s commitment to taking the Christ event as his starting point for theological reflection. The revelation of God in Christ paradoxically takes the form of a man dying in anguish upon a cross, crying out in dereliction, receiving no response, and then sinking down into death. As Rowan Williams puts it:

What does it mean to identify, as the definitive embodiment of God in human history, someone who declares himself abandoned by God? This is the question that motivates Hans Urs von Balthasar’s entire theological vision; but it is particularly central to what he has to say about the trinitarian life of God.

Balthasar’s theological task is to at once take this stark reality in full seriousness and to discern its basis in the divine life.

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41 Williams, Rowan, “Balthasar and the Trinity,” 37.
This twofold commitment puts Balthasar at odds with both the Hegelian outlook of Jürgen Moltmann, who posited the cross as a self-actualization of God, and with rigidly philosophical accounts of divine impassibility and immutability, which cannot truly account for the data of revelation. As Balthasar puts it:

A way must be found to interpret the immanent Trinity as the ground of the world process (even up to the crucifixion), such that it neither appears [erscheint] as a formal process of God’s self-communication, as in Rahner, nor as entangled in the world process, as in Moltmann, that it is understood rather as eternal and absolute self-giving, which allows God to be seen [erscheinen läßt] as already absolute love already in himself, which alone explains the free self-giving to the world as love, without God needing the world process and the cross for his self-becoming (his “self-mediation”).

This is the crucial point: our account of God must at once allow for the data of revelation (viz., that in Christ God has entered history, and that the events of the paschal mystery are indeed divine acts), and avoid positing any sort of necessity in God for either the world or redemption. Such a conception of God would meet the exigency of safeguarding the freedom of creation and the gratuity of redemption.

To arrive at an account of the divine life that meets these demands, Balthasar posits that the kenosis displayed in Christ’s own life, and particularly in the cross, has its basis in the divine life:

The doctrine of the Trinity is to be taken as the always present inner presupposition of the theology of the cross, as, symmetrically to it, the doctrine of the covenant or of the church (even including the doctrine of the sacraments) must


43 Balthasar, Theodramatik, 3:300 (My translation).
not be construed as merely a result of the cross event, but rather as an intrinsic moment of it.\textsuperscript{44}

The reasons for viewing the church and its sacraments as integral to the Christ event will become clear as the argument unfolds. I draw attention to it now because Balthasar views it as symmetrical to my present concern: establishing the Trinity as the condition of possibility for the cross.

This intra-divine kenosis finds its expression in Balthasar’s account of the divine processions. Eschewing the psychological analogy, Balthasar posits that the processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit are both processions of love.\textsuperscript{45} Moreover, love is here understood in terms of both self-gift and the positive establishment of the other. In generating the Son, the Father gives himself away entirely to the Son.\textsuperscript{46} The Father’s

\textsuperscript{44} Balthasar, \textit{Theodramatik}, 3:296–297 (My translation).

\textsuperscript{45} Balthasar, \textit{Theo-Logic}, 2:135–137, 161–164. On the processions as processions of love see Hunt, \textit{Trinity and the Paschal Mystery}, 60–63; López, “Eternal Happening,” 88–90. However, Thomas Aquinas, the great systematizer of the psychological analogy, is committed to the divine simplicity, which leads him to affirm that knowledge and love are only conceptual distinctions in God. The Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished by the order of their processions, and not by the particular faculties with which they are analogically associated. \textit{Summa Theologica}, 1a.a27.a4 [Blackfriars 6:15–19]. See further Gilles Emery, \textit{The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas}, trans. Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 69–72. It follows that this particular criticism of the psychological analogy is unfounded. Though there may be problems with the analogy, the knowledge-love distinction cannot be utilized in this regard. On Balthasar’s eschewal of the psychological analogy and a defense of the analogy as complementary to Balthasar see Anne Hunt, “Psychological Analogy and Paschal Mystery in Trinitarian Theology,” \textit{Theological Studies} 59 (1998): 199–205, 213–218; “Trinity and Paschal Mystery: Divine Communion and Human Conversation,” in \textit{Theology and Conversation: Towards a Relational Theology}, ed. J. Haers and P. de Mey (Leuven: Leuven University Press; Peeters, 2003), 75–78. I use the term “eschew” rather than “reject” because it is not at all clear that Balthasar \textit{does} reject the psychological analogy. Instead, he merely uses a different analogy, which is not at all the same thing as rejection.

paternity means that he possesses the divine nature in the mode of donation. The Son gratefully receives all that he is and has from the Father, and immediately returns this gift in his joint spiration (with the Father) of the Holy Spirit. So then, the Son’s filiation means that he possesses the divine nature in the mode of receptivity. But because the divine nature he receives from the Father is in the Father in the mode of donation, he also mirrors the Father’s self-gift by joining with him in the Spirit’s spiration. In typical Western fashion, the Holy Spirit is envisaged as the bond of love between the Father and the Son: the We to their I-Thou.

So, then, the divine life is an eternal dynamic of donation, reception, and return of gift. The divine life is an eternal Eucharist. And in this eternal Eucharist, Balthasar finds the condition of possibility for all created reality. The generation of the Son results in an original “distance [Abstand]” or “separation [Trennung]” within God that allows for

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the space of creation. The Son and Spirit’s positive alterity allows for the difference of creation to be posited because God’s own life already includes difference, even “Godlessness,” by which Balthasar means allowing “space” for the other. The Father does not absorb or overwhelm the otherness of the Son or the Spirit.  

Allowing for the other is not foreign to God. The freedom and love of the divine life allows for the finite freedom of creatures, which is central to the drama of history. Finite creatures subsist within the eternal eucharistic dynamic, which is their condition of possibility. Creatures may, in their freedom, refuse to return the gift, however. As Balthasar describes it, “The creaturely no is within this [the Son’s divine and eucharistic yes to the Father] a point cramped together upon itself, beyond which the current of love always already flows.” It is, then, a perversion of the original, positive, divine “God-

52 Balthasar, *Theodramatik*, 3:306. The quotation marks around “Godlessness” indicate that I am quoting Balthasar, while those around “space” indicate that the concept of space is analogical. At the same time, the notion of “Godlessness” is also analogical, as the Son and Spirit are themselves both divine hypostases.


54 Balthasar *Theodramatik*, 3:307 (My translation). The German “auf sich zusammengekrampfter Punkt” is translated as “twisted knot” in the English edition (*Theo-Drama*, 4:330). In the original it evokes the classic depiction of sin as incurvatus in se. That the current of love always already exceeds it “über den [the twisting] die Strömung der Liebe immer schon hinaus ist,” indicates that the flow’s disruption occurs only at the level of creaturely participation in the eucharistic exchange, and does not intrude upon the divine life itself.
lessness” that allows for the generation of the Son and the creation of the world.\(^\text{55}\) Such refusal both disrupts the dynamic’s flow, and is parasitic upon it in the first place. After all, apart from the eternal Eucharist that the Son is there could be no creatures to refuse the movement’s flow.

This disruption in the eucharistic exchange indicates the contours of the Son’s mission, as he enters the world in order to clear the blockage and restore creation to the eternal eucharistic dynamic in which it subsists.\(^\text{56}\) Christ’s intention to restore the dynamic is why the church and its sacraments are not mere results of the Christ event, but interior to it. It is in the response of the church that Christ’s mission achieves its goal, which is to restore this response.\(^\text{57}\) In order to untie this knot of human sin, the Son’s eternal filial life is translated and transposed into human terms, and not just any human terms, but rather human terms that unfold under the contingent conditions of sin.\(^\text{58}\) This leads to the crux of the matter: the crucifixion is the divine life transposed into these conditions. It is the form that the divine love takes in face of the reality of sin.


I shall develop this notion of the divine life’s economic form in the next section. What particularly matters here is the fact that Balthasar picks up the notion of kenosis within God *precisely* as a strategy for attending to the economy while also upholding the divine freedom and immutability. Because this is who and how God eternally is, he does not need the world in order to actualize this kenosis as if it were a potency. Further, because this is who and how God eternally is, it can also be who and how God is economically, without any essential change in God. Moreover, because this is the shape of the divine life antecedent to the economy, we avoid the specter of voluntarism I noted in Flett’s account of God determining himself with reference to the economy.

*Economic Kenosis, Mission Christology, and the Trinitarian Inversion*

According to Balthasar, Christ’s mission is coextensive with his person, a *theologoumenon* that he owes to Thomas Aquinas’s account of the relation between the eternal divine processions and the temporal divine missions. Because the Son’s mission *is* his procession in economic form, and since his procession *is* his identity, there is no abridgment between mission and identity in Christ. For this reason, Karen Kilby

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characterizes Balthasar’s Christology as a “mission Christology.” I shall develop the position on the relationship between missions and processions in my section on Lonergan. For now, I simply note that Christ’s identity is bound up with his mission and that this is an expression of his eternal filial relationship.

Within the economy this filial relationship is expressed in terms of obedience and of transparency to the Father. Following the Johannine *double entendre* of Christ being lifted up, and the logic of humiliation and exaltation from the Christ hymn of Philippians chapter two, this obedience reaches its zenith in the nadir of Christ’s death on the cross. Within this mission Christology, the Holy Spirit plays a significant role, and by attention to the interactions of Christ and the Spirit, clarity will emerge regarding the life of Christ as an economic transposition of the divine life.

Balthasar’s treatment of the Spirit and Son’s economic relationship is marked by a “Trinitarian Inversion.” Following Aquinas, Balthasar sees the divine persons’ missions in the economy reflecting their processions in the Trinity. In other words, a person is only sent on mission by the one(s) from whom that person proceeds. However, the Spirit impels Christ on his mission: directing him and empowering him to accomplish the work

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66 Cf. the similar approach taken by Rogers, *After the Spirit*, 11–16.

of salvation. Though East and West are divided on the validity of the filioque and, therefore, on the order of the processions, neither affirms a schema wherein the Son proceeds from or through the Spirit, leading to an incongruity. The economic inversion is Balthasar’s means for resolving this apparent inconsistency. While some have suggested that the inversion actually presents a difference between the immanent and economic Trinity, the general consensus is that the trinitarian inversion transposes the life of the immanent Trinity into economic terms. More than simply accounting for the data, though, the trinitarian inversion foregrounds the way that the interaction of the divine persons in the economy is an ad extra enactment of the life they eternally share.

According to this schema, it was fitting that the Son’s earthly life and ministry be characterized by obedience, which bears a certain mark of passivity, as Christ allows himself, his work, and his mission to be determined by the will of the Father who sent him. This obedience is expressed in Jesus’s being conceived (passive voice) by the Holy


69 Cichon-Brandmaier, *Ökonomische und immanente Trinität*, 190–193; Day, “Spirit in the Drama,” 86–90. Indeed, Day suggests that while the Son has eternally had the potential to join in spirating the Holy Spirit, this potency is not actualized until his resurrected glory. David Coffey seems to also hold this position. Deus Trinitas: *The Doctrine of the Triune God* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 146–147. However, this is surely a misreading of Balthasar, who sees the “change” as pertaining only to Christ qua human, not qua Son. Theo-Drama, 3:189. Cichon-Brandmaier (*Ökonomische und immanente Trinität*, 221–222), and Plettscher (Die Selbstevidenz des Christusereignisses, 125–129) concur with my judgment here.


Spirit in the virgin’s womb, and by receiving the heavenly approbation and commission for mission in his baptism.\footnote{Balthasar, \textit{Theo-Drama}, 3:184, 186; Balthasar, \textit{Theo-Drama}, 4:364–367.} As Balthasar puts it:

> The Son, who is eternally subject to the Father, as man had to “learn obedience through what he suffered” (Heb 5:8)—an obedience undertaken on behalf of sinners in order to redeem their disobedience. But it is the Spirit in him and over him who makes this obedience possible, by the way in which, in his economic form \textit{[Gestalt]}, he mediates the Father’s will to the Son.\footnote{Balthasar, \textit{Theo-Drama}, 3:187 \textit{[Theodramatik, 2/2:171 (I have retained the English translation, but indicated, in brackets, key terminology from the German edition. So throughout, when a citation of the English translation is immediately followed by a bracketed citation of the German edition)].}}

In other words, the Spirit provides the condition of possibility for Christ fulfilling his mission.\footnote{Indeed, Gasecki notes that “Balthasar understands the mission-existence of Jesus Christ as a particularly spiritual dynamic.” \textit{Profil des Geistes in den Sakramenten}, 39, fn. 166 (My translation).} More than that, though, in bringing about Jesus’s awareness of his mission (i.e., the Father’s will for him), the Spirit gives economic expression to his joint spiration by the Father and the Son, which constitutes a bond of unity between Father and Son.

Balthasar’s formulation receives further specification. The Holy Spirit comes upon Christ, empowering him for and directing him in his mission. However, the Spirit by which Christ engages in mission is not foreign to him, just as his mission is not foreign to him, but rather is his own Spirit.\footnote{Balthasar, \textit{Theo-Drama}, 3:198.} This leads to a twofold characterization of Jesus’s relationship with the Spirit. The Spirit is upon him and the Spirit is within him. “If we connect this with what we have said about Jesus as the eternal Son,” writes Balthasar, “It follows that the \textit{being} of the Spirit in him—the Incarnate One—is the economic form \textit{[Form]} of the \textit{filioque}; and the Spirit who \textit{comes down} upon him, hovers
over him and drives him is the *a Patre procedit.*”  These two forms of the Spirit’s activity are harmonious and concentrated upon the accomplishment of Christ’s mission. After his death on the cross, the Spirit becomes “available [frei]” to be bestowed upon the church at Pentecost.

It is at the cross, however, that the Spirit-Son relationship reaches its clearest and most poignant expression as the divine eucharistic life transposed into a fallen creation. Throughout Christ’s life the Holy Spirit has mediated the Father’s will to him. Now, at the cross, the Father’s will is expressed in withdrawal and abandonment, and so the Holy Spirit occludes the Father’s presence from Christ. The divine will mediated by the Spirit is now that Christ die, and, true to his eternal filial identity, Christ obeys the hidden Father. The result is that in this moment of the greatest separation between Father and Son, they are actually in closest unity.

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79 Balthasar, *Theo-Drama,* 4:348–349. See discussion in Cichon-Brandmaier, *Ökonomische und immanente Trinität,* 244–245; Krenski, *Passio Caritatis,* 272–276; O’Hanlon, *Immutability of God,* 116–118. Note, though, Vetò’s reservation that, on its own, the passion cannot serve as a trinitarian revelation, as the unity of the Father and the Son is obscured. Only in the light of the resurrection can this unity be clearly perceived. *Du Christ à la Trinité,* 264–270. While this is true in the order of discovery, Balthasar’s point is that this unity is actually still operative even in the events that seemingly rend it asunder.
As Christ expires upon the cross, he gives up his Spirit (Matt 27:50; Luke 23:46; John 19:30), giving economic expression once more to his eternal spiration of the Holy Spirit. As Étienne Vetö describes it, “in remitting the Spirit, Jesus gives the most precious thing he has, the Spirit who was given to him by the Father, who guided and inspired him, who constituted him as Messiah.” All of this is owing to the shape of the triune life. The spiration of the Spirit, as return to the Father, constitutes the Son, so that in going out in this spiration, the Son also reverts to the Father. “The utmost removal from the Father and, in the fulfillment of the mission, the final stride toward him and into him. [sic—sentence fragment original] The paradox of every Christian mission: the path away from God as the path to God, is fulfilled here in a unique, because most deeply trinitarian manner.”

Christ’s kenotic trajectory is continued by his descent to the dead in Balthasar’s theology of Holy Saturday, where the distance between Father and Son, and the Son’s passivity becomes absolute, as Christ traverses hell with the “obedience of a corpse.” This interpretation of the descent is famously controversial, and though I find it, in its

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broad contours, persuasive, it is not necessary to the argument I am sketching, the point
of which is not an interpretation of Balthasar’s theology, but a constructive proposal
regarding the trinitarian content of the *missio Dei*. For this reason, I shall leave it to the
side, and proceed to the Easter event.

If the cross represented the original divine distance between Father and Son
transposed into the conditions of the sinful economy, the resurrection represents the
overcoming of that distance by a transposition of the joint spiration of the Holy Spirit, the
bond of love between Father and the Son. In this transposition, the distance overcome is
no longer simply the intra-divine difference, but rather the horrific distance of sin. By
transposing the Holy Trinity’s love into the modality of sinful humanity, this negative
distance has been taken up into and overcome by the original, positive, and good divine
distance of God’s own life.

The foregoing demonstrates that Balthasar has constructed a trinitarian theology
that both accounts for who God reveals himself to be in the economy and avoids the
problematic notion that God in any way needs the economy in order to be himself. He
does so by envisioning God’s acts in the economy as *ad extra* enactments of God’s own
divine life. The economic Trinity cannot be elided with the immanent Trinity, which
safeguards God’s freedom with regard to creation and redemption. The events of

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255. Elsewhere in *Glory of the Lord* 7 Balthasar casts human salvation as assimilation into this dynamic
(289–299). See also Vetò, *Du Christ à la Trinité*, 271–300, who sees the resurrection and Pentecost as
completing the economic revelation of the Trinity; Day, “Spirit in the Drama,” 148–153; Hunt, *Trinity and
the Paschal Mystery*, 76–78; Cichon-Brandmaier, *Ökonomische und immanente Trinität*, 209–210;
Krenski, *Passio Caritatis*, 310–318. Meyendorff likewise sees salvation as inclusion in the divine

87 So Martin, “Balthasar and Russian Philosophy,” 243–261 (who pursues the question in
Christ’s earthly life and the bestowal of the Holy Spirit are contingent modalities of who God always eternally has been. This then avoids the problem of ontological gaps between God’s life \textit{ad intra} and its manifestation \textit{ad extra} as well as the problems attending to necessity or self-determination in God. God does not need an economic other in order to be loving, or eventful, of infinitely vivacious. All of this is already contained in the triune life.\(^{88}\)

Balthasar has shown how trinitarian reflection can account for the vast variety within the drama of the economy. However, as Gerard O’Hanlon notes, Balthasar’s position is open to criticism due to certain imprecisions.\(^{89}\) Insofar as these imprecisions are due to Balthasar’s dramatic approach to theological method they are, for that reason, a significant aspect of why his trinitarian proposal succeeds. It is precisely the drama that unfolds within the economy for which he must account. However, some of these imprecisions, such as his identification of person and mission, which Day notes disallows a distinction—important to Balthasar himself—between the economic and immanent Trinity,\(^{90}\) cannot be so easily excused. While Balthasar’s economically rooted


\(^{89}\) O’Hanlon, \textit{Immutability of God}, 171.

\(^{90}\) Day, “Spirit in the Drama,” 199–200. Day also suggests that because Balthasar does not apply this concept to the Holy Spirit, he seems to leave his mission \textit{ad extra} (which he defines in terms of the Spirit’s mission beyond the earthly life of Jesus) without a ground in the triune life. However, on this
understanding of the eternal triune life goes a long way toward meeting the exigencies we have identified for a fully trinitarian account of the missio Dei, I believe that it needs to be supplemented by a more rigorous engagement of the relations between the eternal divine life and that life’s ad extra enactment in the economy.

**Bernard J. F. Lonergan and the Divine Missions**

Bernard Lonergan’s most complete account of the relationship between the trinitarian life ad intra and its economic expression ad extra may be found in chapter seven of *The Triune God: Systematics*, with antecedents in his 1946–1947 lectures on the supernatural order, and his 1951–1952 course on sanctifying grace. Because my purpose is a specific appropriation of a particular aspect of Lonergan’s position here,

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second point, he is surely wrong, for the church, as Christ’s body, is intrinsically related to Christ. See, e.g., Rogers’s application of the idea of the Spirit resting upon the body of Christ to the church and the Eucharist as well as to the historical Jesus. *After the Spirit*, 62, 158–159, 210. Note the similar criticism from Holzer that, at times Balthasar lacks “intellectual probity,” and so “risks the confusion” of the economic and immanent Trinity. *Trinité dans l’histoire*, 238 (My translation). Some of this confusion may be due to the infelicitous, though commonplace, nomenclature of immanent and economic Trinity. Balthasar rightly desires to both stress an identity between the immanent and economic Trinity and avoid absorbing the immanent into the economic. However, Gilles Emery notes that such language cannot help but give the impression of two Trinities, and proposes the distinction between processions and mission as a better one. “‘Theologia’ and ‘Dispensatio’: The Centrality of the Divine Missions in St. Thomas’s Trinitarian Theology,” *Thomist* 74, no. 4 (2010): 515–61.

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rather than an exposition of his thought more generally, I shall focus primarily upon the later work.

Moreover, as my intention is to appropriate the Lonerganian position on the relation between the processions and the missions, I shall forego detailed explanation of his trinitarian theology, which proceeds from an account of the divine processions conceived of in terms of a psychological analogy transposed into the framework of Lonergan’s own distinct epistemology, to an account of the divine relations (paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration), to a conception of the divine persons, and then finally to the missions of the Son and Holy Spirit in the economy. 94 Because I am utilizing Balthasar’s eucharistic analogy, rather than the psychological analogy, such an exposition would not serve to advance my argument. 95 Therefore, I focus solely upon


95 For treatments of the complementarity between Balthasar and Lonergan see, e.g., Robert M. Doran, “Lonergan and Balthasar: Methodological Considerations,” *Theological Studies* 58 (1997): 61–84 (which focuses upon methodological questions); *Theology and the Dialectics of History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 167–169 (which focuses upon the utility of Balthasar’s theological aesthetics for Doran’s own proposal of psychic conversion); *Trinity in History*, 50 (for the affirmation that Balthasar, Lonergan, and Aquinas all share the same basic position that the missions are an extension of the processions into the economy), 140 (for the methodological complementarity of the two). See further the work of Anne Hunt, which, while focused on the paschal mystery’s relationship to the triune life, sees an ongoing importance of the psychological analogy (particularly as articulated by Lonergan), and gestures toward the importance of psychic conversion in considering the analogy. “Psychological Analogy and Paschal Mystery”; “Trinity and Paschal Mystery,” 75–79; *Trinity and the Paschal Mystery*, 154–159.

Additionally, Lonergan’s trinitarian theology positions itself as a development of the Thomistic position, and Katy Leamy has demonstrated that Balthasar’s appropriation of Bulgakov has involved transposing him into a more Thomistic idiom. “Balthasar and Bulgakov,” 76–107. Indeed, Balthasar’s intra-trinitarian difference is, essentially, an appropriation of Aquinas’s articulation of the divine relations (97–98). The relations also form the central motif of Lonergan’s trinitarian theology. For further treatments of Aquinas’s influence upon Balthasar see Vetó, *Du Christ à la Trinité*, 320; Kilby, “Balthasar on the Trinity,” 210; Healy, *Eschatology of Balthasar*, 122–125.
Lonergan’s account of contingent predication and how it informs a conception of the divine missions.

**Contingent Predication: The Missions as the Processions with an External Term**

An adequate account of the divine missions depends upon some notion of contingent predication. Otherwise, God’s activity ad extra comes to be seen as necessary. This necessity would undermine both the freedom of creation and the gratuity of grace, and raise the troubling consequences of projecting necessity onto God that I noted in this chapter’s first section. Contingent predication allows us to speak of truths that are not necessary, but that are, nevertheless, true. 96 With regard to contingent predication, Lonergan’s basic affirmation is: “What is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons is constituted by the divine perfection itself, but it has a consequent condition in an appropriate external term.” 97

An example will clarify this point. While the affirmation that God exists is a necessary truth, affirming God as creator is contingent. God does not have to create, but he, indeed, has. The statement “God is the creator of the universe” has its constitution in God, in the divine perfection. It is rooted in God’s knowledge of the world he would create and his will to create such a world. This is all that is required to constitute the truth

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96 So Doran, *Trinity in History*, 42.

of God as creator. Nevertheless, the universe must also exist for the statement “God is the creator of the universe” to be predicated of God. 98

Lonergan applies the same basic logic to his understanding of the missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit. The missions ad extra are not necessary. If they were, then not only would redemption not be gratuitous, but the world would be necessary to God. What are necessary are the divine processions that constitute the eternal life of God. This leads to the assertion: “The mission of a divine person is constituted by a relation of origin in such a way that it still demands an appropriate external term as a consequent condition.” 99 This assertion is comprised of two basic affirmations. First, the mission is constituted by the corresponding procession. This, then, means “that nothing real and intrinsic is added to a divine person as divine on account of such a [contingent] truth.” 100 It follows logically that if God’s perfection is infinite, a contingent truth can add nothing to that perfection. 101 Second, apart from a contingent, external term, the mission could not be said to occur, “because there can be no contingent truth without a contingent reality.” 102

The Four-Point Hypothesis

Having established that the temporal missions of the Son and Holy Spirit are identical to their eternal processions, but with a contingent, created term (a position

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98 Lonergan, Triune God: Systematics, 467–469. My use of quotation marks in the body of the paragraph does not indicate that I am quoting Lonergan. See further Doran, Trinity in History, 41–42.

99 Lonergan, Triune God: Systematics, 455.

100 Lonergan, Triune God: Systematics, 457.


102 Lonergan, Triune God: Systematics, 457.
which I have already established that Balthasar also holds), Lonergan turns to the question of what these created terms are. He identifies “four absolutely supernatural realities, which are never found uninformed, namely, the secondary act of existence of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory.”

He then proceeds to identify these with the divine relations, which are central to his trinitarian theology:

the secondary act of existence of the incarnation is a created participation of paternity, and so has a special relation to the Son; that sanctifying grace is a participation of active spiration, and so has a special relation to the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity is a participation of passive spiration, and so has a special relation to the Father and the Son; and that the light of glory is a participation of sonship, and so in a most perfect way brings the children of adoption back to the Father.

While this four-point hypothesis is worth considering in its own right, my purpose in engaging it is more limited. Rather than parsing the precise identifications of

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105 Robert M. Doran has proposed to utilize the four-point hypothesis as an integral component of a “unified field structure” for contemporary systematic theology. “The Starting Point of Systematic Theology,” *Theological Studies* 67 (2006): 750–76; *Trinity in History*, especially 135–175. Responding to Doran, Neil Ormerod has noted the gains this four-point hypothesis offers in comparison with what might be called a two-point hypothesis in Karl Rahner. “Two Points or Four?,” 661–673. Meanwhile, while Charles Hefling has greeted Doran’s basic proposal with enthusiasm, he believes that the four-point hypothesis is flawed. “On the (Economic) Trinity,” 642–660. He objects on the grounds of its scant basis in Lonergan, incorrectly identifying it as a *hapax legomenon* (645). Doran notes that this point is incorrect, as the four points also appear in Lonergan’s *Divinarum personarum conceptionem analogicam evolvit B. Lonergan* (Rome: Gregorian University, 1957, 1959). “Addressing the Four-Point Hypothesis,” *Theological Studies* 68 (2007): 677. I would add that it is also evident in the 1951–1952 course on sanctifying grace. So also Monsour, “*Nexus Mysteriorum*,” 375–376. Hefling also denies the distinction between sanctifying grace and habitual charity, suggesting that a three-point hypothesis would be more adequate. “On the (Economic) Trinity,” 657–660. Apart from correcting him on the misidentification of the four-point hypothesis as a *hapax legomenon*, and insisting on the continued utility of the distinction between sanctifying grace and habitual charity, Doran has integrated other aspects of Hefling’s criticism into his more recent reflections. In addition to Doran’s proposed unified field structure, Stebbins notes that Lonergan’s proposal “expresses a remarkably comprehensible synthesis” with wide ranging theological consequences. *The Divine Initiative: Grace, World-Order, and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of*
the various scholastic categories involved, I want to draw attention to the fact that this hypothesis envisions the divine missions as bringing human beings into the eternal life of God. As Charles Hefling writes:

What Lonergan proposes in *De Deo trino* is that [in addition to being related to God as creatures of the creator] certain created beings are also related to God as *God* is related to God. That is what supernatural being is—assimilation to divine being as relational and, more exactly, assimilation to relations that are themselves identical with divine being. That, I take it, is Lonergan's significant and original contribution to trinitarian theology.

Hefling’s characterization of Lonergan’s position is borne out by three considerations. First, for Lonergan the divine relations, while conceptually distinct from the divine essence are really identical to it. Second, these relational oppositions are likewise identical to the divine processions, and hence, to the trinitarian hypostases. “The relations as relations are paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration, whereas the relations as substistent are Father, Son, Spirator [i.e., the Father and the Son as one principle of spiration], and Spirit.” Third, as Lonergan writes in the 1946–1947 course on the supernatural order, “There exists a created communication of the divine nature, which is a created, proportionate, and remote principle whereby there are operations in

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*Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 292–293 [292]. Monsour shares enthusiasm for the proposal, but notes that time will tell whether it is a permanent theological achievement or merely a passing fancy. “*Nexus Mysteriiorum,*” 403–404.

106 Note the debate between Hefling and Doran to which I gestured in the previous note.


109 Lonergan, *Triune God: Systematics,* 247. Later in the text, Lonergan argues that only paternity, filiation, and passive spiration are really distinct. Active spiration is only conceptually distinct from paternity and filiation, as Father and Son are together one principle of spiration. The result is that only three of the four real relations indicate substistent hypostases (253–255). See further Doran, *Trinity in History,* 176–178. It is on this basis that Hefling eschews the four point hypothesis, preferring his own three point version. “On the (Economic) Trinity,” 657–660.
creatures through which they attain *God as he is in himself*. In other words, for Lonergan the divine missions are an *ad extra* enactment of God’s eternal life for the purpose of drawing human creatures into that same life.

The Son’s entrance into the world as a human being means that the eternal love God has for this Son in the Holy Spirit is extended to human beings as well. Humans come to love the human being Jesus, and through him, are brought into friendship with God. This participation in the divine life occurs under two modalities: the good of act and the good of order. Both of these are ways of participating “in the one divine perfection.” Within the Godhead, the good of order refers to the way that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are in ordered relationship to each other, it is only conceptually distinct from the good of act, which constitutes the divine life. Within the economy, it refers to the ordered relationships that render possible this friendship with God and

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111 Lonergan, *Triune God: Systematics*, 495–499. Worth noting is the fact that of the four created participations in the divine nature, only Christ possess them all. While he possesses sanctifying grace and habitual charity by right (“The Supernatural Order,” 69–71), the hypostatic union surpasses even this. Christ does not just attain God, he is God. So Stebbins, *Divine Initiative*, 50; Ormerod, “Two Points or Four?,” 671. Stebbins points out that while the 1946–1947 treatment of the supernatural order gestured toward the uncreated ways God communicates Godself (generation and spiration), he does not attempt to synthesize them with their created counterparts in this text. This synthesis awaits the later treatment in the systematic portion of Lonergan’s trinitarian theology. *Divine Initiative*, 52–53.


sharing in the divine life. The good of order is not identical to any particular good, but is rather the context that enables particular goods to occur and recur.  

As Lonergan puts it:

The ultimate end is of course the divine good itself communicated immediately in the beatific vision, while the proximate end is that good of order which, according to various analogies with human goods of order, is called either the kingdom of God, or the body of Christ, or the church, or the mystical marriage of Christ with the church, or the economy of salvation, or the city of God.  

So, then, the good of order is where ecclesiology fits into Lonergan’s account of the divine missions. While the straightforward identification of the church and the kingdom in the quoted material is no longer tenable, we should bear in mind the pre-Vatican II context of the work in which it is found. Moreover, the fact that Lonergan distinguishes the kingdom from the beatific vision further attenuates this potential criticism.

In the next section, as I synthesize my own proposal, I shall point to both the utility and limitations of Lonergan’s appeal to the good of order. For now, though, it suffices to note that while other orders merely imitate the divine order, Lonergan envisions the order in question here as also participating in the divine life, and that the consideration of order moves Lonergan’s account of the missions (which, with their focus on created grace, tends to be quite individualistic) into a more social and corporate framework.

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Missio Dei as Paschal Mystery: Conclusions

The foregoing material has provided the elements of a trinitarian theology capable of meeting the exigencies for a properly trinitarian account of missio Dei, namely, avoiding ontological gaps between the economic and immanent Trinity, attending to the singularity of the Christ event, and safeguarding the freedom of creation and gratuity of redemption. What remains is to synthesize this material, and attend to a few remaining difficulties.

Adopting Hans Urs von Balthasar’s eucharistic analogy for the trinitarian processions meets the exigency of attending to the singularity of the Christ event. Who God shows himself to be in the act of redemption has its basis in who God always already is in his own life. The eternal dynamic of self-donation (generation) and eucharistic return of gift (joint spiration) provides the condition of possibility for both creation and the redemption of that creation should it fall into sin. On Balthasar’s account, salvation consists in being restored to the eternal eucharistic dynamic that is the divine life and within which creatures are ontologically constituted. Because the creation is grounded in the Son’s eternal generation, it is not foreign to him, and it is fitting for him to enter it in his mission. Because the paschal mystery is the divine life directed ad extra under the contingent conditions of sin, it is not necessary to posit either (1) change in God as he undertakes this act, or (2) some sort of eternal suffering in God to ground it.

Lonergan’s characterization of the divine missions as the eternal processions with a contingent created term provides a conceptual resource for overcoming certain ambiguities in Balthasar’s account. The missions are constituted by the relations of origin, and have their external term as a consequent condition. Hence, it is misleading to
speak, as Balthasar does, of Christ’s person being constituted by his mission.\(^{118}\)

Reserving language of “constitution” for the eternal realities avoids any hint that the economy is necessary to God (and also avoids calling into question the personhood of the Father, who is not sent into the economy, or the Holy Spirit, to whom Balthasar does not apply this *theolegoumenon*). This further meets the exigency of avoiding metaphysical gaps between God *in se* and God *ad extra*, while also calling for greater precision regarding what it means for God to be a missionary God. Mission is not something already inherent in God.\(^{119}\) It is the form the divine life takes when freely directed outward. Moreover, the notion of contingent predication meets the exigency of preserving the freedom of creation and gratuity of grace, including the form it takes in the paschal mystery.

The paschal mystery of Christ’s death, resurrection, ascension, bestowal of the Holy Spirit, and future *parousia*, then, is the form that the divine life takes when it is enacted *ad extra*. Moreover, the goal of this *ad extra* enactment of the eternal triune event is to draw humanity into that very event that constitutes the life of God. Hence my proposal: the *missio Dei* is the paschal mystery. This provides the basic trinitarian content of the *missio Dei* concept. Moreover, this identification of *missio Dei* provides an entrée into ecclesiology. According to *Sacrosanctum concilium*, the church is born from Christ’s

\(^{118}\) I am convinced that Balthasar does not actually run afoul of this problem. The mission consciousness he posits as constitutive of Christ is an aspect of his *human* self-consciousness. *Theo-Drama* 3:168, 173–183. On this see Plettscher, *Die Selbstevidenz des Christusereignisses*, 127, 156–157. Nevertheless, the terminology can very easily lead to misunderstanding.

side upon the cross and from the Pentecost event. 

120 *Lumen gentium* and *Ad gentes* understand the church as the creature of the divine missions. 

121 Understanding the *missio Dei* as paschal mystery allows us to synthesize the ideas of church as creature of paschal mystery and as creature of the divine missions.

In both Balthasar and Lonergan the church is understood as an extension of the missions of the Son and Holy Spirit. 

122 For Balthasar, whom I follow in this regard, it is
intrinsic to the Christ event, rather than a mere result, while for Lonergan, it falls in a more secondary place, as an aspect of the good of order. The church is interior to the Christ event for Balthasar because the logic of redemption demands that the free human response be included, otherwise we are not restored to the eucharistic dynamic that is the divine life. The church’s interiority to the Christ event more naturally integrates the triune life, triune missions, and our coming to share in them than does Lonergan’s account, where the church is the ecosystem that allows for the recurrence of individual participation in the divine life. Lonergan’s account of the church’s relation to the divine missions runs afoul of Flett’s criticisms of the church as incubator of virtues, which leads to propaganda and the endless deferral of mission. Hence, in addition to providing a trinitarian analogy more closely related to the Christ event, Balthasar’s articulation of the matter also connects the church more closely to its mission.

Nevertheless, the question suggests itself: does my account of the trinitarian missions as constituted in God alone, but with a contingent term not reintroduce a gap between the church and its mission? I have insisted that God’s life can be and is complete apart from the economy, and hence, apart from the divine missions, and that the church’s mission is conceived according to an analogy with the divine missions. This could seem to suggest that the church can be complete in its own interior life without any necessity of mission. While engaging the world in mission might be a good thing for the church to do,

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124 Lonergan, *Triune God: Systematics*, 490–495. It is important to note that for Lonergan this good of order is a participation in the divine life. So while the church occupies a logically secondary position, it would not be accurate to characterize this as a downgrading of its importance.

it would seem that, according to this analogy, it is not necessary. To conclude that the analogy makes mission somehow optional to the church would be a misconstrual of my proposal. The church’s situation *ad intra* is not like God’s for the simple reason that the church is constituted within the divine missions, which are already directed *ad extra*. Because the *missio Dei* is directed to the world, so must be the church. It is constituted both internally by the liturgy and externally by mission. Indeed, the import of my proposal is that this twofold constitution of the church shares a common foundation: the *missio Dei*, which is the paschal mystery. As with Christ, the movement out into mission and the return to the Father are at one. Chapter three shall bear this out further.

However, a second, potentially more serious, objection may be raised against this identification of *missio Dei* and paschal mystery. Does this not represent a regressive narrowing of focus from the expansive and holistic account of mission I articulated in chapter one? Once more, the answer is no. I begin by noting that the cross arises in continuity with the rest of Jesus’s life and ministry. It is the “hour” to which his whole existence was oriented. It represents the ultimate heightening of the sort of disposition towards God and humanity that Christ demonstrated throughout his earthly existence. Therefore, it would be illegitimate to separate this event from the rest of Jesus’s life and holistic ministry. It is a concentration of his mission, not that mission in its totality.

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126 To my mind, both John Dadosky ("*Ecclesia de Trinitate*: Ecclesial Foundations from Above," *New Blackfriars* 94 [2013]: 93–104), and Neil Ormerod ("‘The Times They Are a ‘Changin’’: A Response to O’Malley and Schloesser," *Theological Studies* 67 [2006]: 834–835) run this risk in their proposals to supplement *communio* with *missio* in ecclesiology. On the one hand, they are absolutely right: the church must be seen as essentially missionary. Their proposals are attempts to foreground this. On the other hand, by contrasting communion and mission, the church winds up depicted as a self-enclosed entity.

That said, the objection does afford the opportunity to supplement Balthasar’s theology with a greater attentiveness to concrete history. To that end, I turn to Ignacio Ellacuría’s concept of the historical necessity of Jesus’s death. Ellacuría rigorously distinguishes between natural necessity and historical necessity. Natural necessity refers to a philosophical conception of necessity that entails metaphysical inevitability. This is the type of necessity I have strenuously tried to avoid attributing to Christ’s death. Historical necessity refers to the fact that events that occur within history are the product of historical occurrences. Hence, Jesus’s death was historically necessary in the sense that (1) this was the shape that divine love took under the contingent conditions of human sinfulness, and (2) it was the result of his confrontation with oppressive political structures.

The category of historical necessity allows us to affirm the saving reality of Christ’s death, while also recognizing the evil involved in his suffering. Ellacuría extends this principle to the crucified peoples, history’s innocent victims. Their suffering, while linked to Christ’s own, and therefore, in some measure, salvific must not be romanticized. The Medellín conference helpfully distinguishes between spiritual poverty, which is exemplary, material poverty, which is an evil, and evangelical poverty,


whereby one voluntarily lives a materially poor life in solidarity with those who do not have the luxury of doing so voluntarily.  

Balthasar’s own account of poverty does tend to be idealized: a spiritual poverty, which is, rightly, seen as commendable.  

This has led to the criticism that his notion of poverty and suffering are romanticized and harmful.  

I would contend that by grounding his theology in the triune life, and characterizing sin and suffering as contingent distortions, Balthasar does avoid underwriting destructive poverty and suffering. At the same time, attention to actual historical conditions led the Medellín conference to distinguish spiritual poverty from the destructive material poverty, which the gospel calls the church to overcome. It is not so much that Balthasar’s account of poverty needs to be changed, as it needs to be supplemented with these additional categories of poverty, which result from attention to concrete history. A non-romanticized account of suffering leads to the further mandate to take the crucified peoples down from their crosses, an act which parallels God’s own act of raising the innocent victim, Jesus, from death.  

The paschal mystery is not limited to the event of the cross, but includes the resurrection, which analogously, within a historical context, demands work to alleviate suffering. It also includes Pentecost, which demands following the Holy Spirit’s lead and seeking to discern his work in the wider world, as well as the parousia, which looks to

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132 CELAM, Medellín, 14.4.
135 Ellacuria only gets as far as gesturing towards this. “The Crucified People,” 603. However, it is developed forcefully by Sobrino, Principle of Mercy, 15–56; The True Church and the Poor, 86–123; No Salvation Outside the Poor, 41–74.
the time when all wrongs shall be righted, and the anticipation of which demands working to right those wrongs now. Far from representing a reductionist regression, my proposal of missio Dei as paschal mystery provides a Christologically and pneumatically rich account of mission, which is grounded in the doctrine of the Trinity and oriented toward holistic mission in the world.

**Christian Initiation: Sharing in the Paschal Mystery and the Church’s Mission**

As I argued above, the missions of the Son and Holy Spirit, which are most fully expressed in the paschal mystery, have as their end bringing human beings into the life of God. This coming to share in the divine life is expressed and enacted in the sacraments of initiation.\(^\text{136}\) In this final section, I shall demonstrate that Christian initiation is characterized both by a coming to share in the paschal mystery and a coming to share in the church’s mission. In so doing, I provide a conceptual link between mission and the liturgy. To share in the life of the church is to share in the paschal mystery is to share in the missio Dei is to share in the divine life. This section then provides a bridge between this chapter and the next. I have shown that the missio Dei is the paschal mystery. Now I show that the process of initiation is a coming to share in the paschal mystery, and that


this sharing has missional implications. In the next chapters I shall show how thoroughly intertwined these realities—sharing in the paschal mystery and sharing in ecclesial mission—truly are.

The rites by which one is initiated into the Christian church are a privileged locus for discerning the nature of the church, for they provide a window into that into which one is being initiated. Rowan Williams suggests that the sacraments are “the most characteristic (i.e. self-identifying) acts of the Church” because they are signs of the Christ event, from which the church is born. In fact, “In these acts the Church ‘makes sense’ of itself, as other groups do, and as individuals do; but its ‘sense’ is seen as dependent upon the creative act of God in Christ.” Chauvet articulates much the same point with his notion of the church’s “radical involvement” in the sacraments, which in turn institute the church’s very identity. As Peter McGrail notes:

The insistence on a sacramental foundation for ecclesiology perfectly expresses the close relationship between the sacraments of initiation and ecclesial identity. The very rituals that make a person a member of the Church are themselves the building blocks for a theological understanding of the Church itself: what makes a person a Christian is at the same time what makes the Church the Church.

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137 Rowan Williams, *On Christian Theology* (London: Blackwell, 2007), 204. Similarly, Avis sees Christ’s baptism as inaugurating the chain of events that led to the church’s birth, making baptism foundational to ecclesiology. *Identity of Anglicanism*, 110. See also *Sacrosanctum concilium*, no. 2 [Tanner, 2:820]; *Lumen gentium*, no. 11 [Tanner, 2:857].


139 Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 321–323 (on “radical involvement”), and 409 (on instituting the church’s identity).

In this section, I bear out my contention that initiation is a sharing in the paschal mystery and in ecclesial mission through examination of two ritual patterns of Christian initiation.

**The Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults**

I begin my examination with the Roman Catholic *Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults (RCIA)* because as Maxwell Johnson notes:

There is no question but that the dominant and most ecumenically influential of the modern reforms of the rites of Christian initiation have been those of the Roman Catholic Church, especially the RCIA. Understood by many as the most mature fruit of all the liturgical reforms mandated by the Second Vatican Council, it is this Roman Catholic restoration of the adult catechumenate and especially the recovery of the integral and unitive sequence and sacramental connection of baptism, confirmation, and first communion in the RCIA which clearly underlie all of the modern liturgical revisions of Christian initiation in other churches.\(^{141}\)

As Susan Wood notes, in ecumenical perspective, baptismal practice is not simply a matter of liturgical patterns, but of a deeper *ordo*, which is discernible across numerous and diverse ritual patterns.\(^{142}\) The RCIA is a particularly clear example of this *ordo*.

At the Second Vatican Council, *Sacrosanctum concilium* directed that the rites of initiation be revised. Of particular note are the directives to restore the catechumenate and to revise the rite of confirmation in such a way as to clarify its close connection with the whole process of initiation.\(^{143}\) The fruit of these revisions is the RCIA. However, McGrail notes that the RCIA’s most prominent conciliar influence is the missionary decree, *Ad

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\(^{141}\) Johnson, *Rites of Initiation*, 296.


Ad gentes.\textsuperscript{144} Ad gentes recognized that in mission territories, conversion to Christ was a process, and directed that this process be liturgically marked by such events as admission to the catechumenate, and receiving the sacraments of initiation. In fact, the decree envisions the unified sequence of sacramental initiation whereby “they are freed from the powers of darkness; they die, are buried and rise with Christ; they receive the Spirit who makes them adopted children, and celebrate with the entire people of God the memorial of the death and resurrection of the Lord,” that ultimately finds its expression in the \textit{RCIA}.\textsuperscript{145}

Further, the liturgies of Lent and Easter are to be revised for the purpose of leveraging them for the initiatory process. The entire Christian community is to be involved in this process, rather than just the clergy and candidates. Because the church is apostolic, those who are joined to and joining the church are called upon to share in its apostolic mission and bear witness to Christ even throughout the period of the catechumenate.\textsuperscript{146} From the outset, then, the \textit{RCIA} is informed by a missionary context.\textsuperscript{147}

The \textit{RCIA} begins with a general introduction to the theology of initiation, which draws heavily from the council’s documents, particularly \textit{Ad gentes} and \textit{Lumen}.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[144] McGrail, \textit{Rite of Christian Initiation}, 120. See further Bevans, “\textit{Ad Gentes},” 40–41.
\item[145] \textit{Ad gentes}, nos. 13–14 [Tanner, 2:1021–1023]. See also Brechter, “Missionary Activity,” 132–133; Bevans, “\textit{Ad Gentes},” 40–41.
\item[146] \textit{Ad gentes}, no. 14 [Tanner, 2:1023]. I identify catechumens as joined to the church, because this is their juridical status, as \textit{Lumen gentium}, no. 14 [Tanner, 2:860] specifies, and as is noted in \textit{Ad gentes}, no 14. I identify them as joining the church because they are on their way to a fuller initiation.
\end{footnotes}
The rite is a liturgical enactment of the council’s ecclesiological vision, which means that these documents are central to a proper understanding of the RCIA. I shall, therefore, advert to them throughout my engagement. My focus here is upon the sacramental acts of initiation, and so I leave to the side the initial catechetical stages of the RCIA. Turning to the rites themselves, it becomes clear from the outset that:

The whole initiation must bear a markedly paschal character, since the initiation of Christians is the first sacramental sharing in Christ's dying and rising and since, in addition, the period of purification and enlightenment ordinarily coincides with Lent and the period of postbaptismal catechesis or mystagogy in the Easter season. All the resources of Lent should be brought to bear as a more intense preparation of the elect and the Easter Vigil should be regarded as the proper time for the sacraments of initiation.

The sacraments of initiation, then, are understood as giving a share in Christ, particularly in his death and resurrection. This is highlighted by marking out the Easter Vigil as the normative time for celebrating the sacraments of initiation. Departures from this norm are permitted, but these departures do not alter the overall paschal character of the initiation.

Similarly, the rite marks out as its norm the initiation of adult converts to the Christian faith. Alternate rites for infants, or for admitting Christians from other communions are included, but they are not normative in the same way as the adult rite.

The ordinary form provides a unified sequence of sacramental initiation: baptism,
followed by confirmation, and culminated by admission to the Eucharist.\textsuperscript{152} This marks a return to the sort of pattern discernible in the \textit{Apostolic Tradition}.\textsuperscript{153} However, as McGrail notes, this is not a simple matter of liturgical archaeology and repristination. A definite ecclesiological agenda is in place, and the revised rite serves that agenda.\textsuperscript{154} The rite evinces a greater emphasis on the church as people of God, in contrast to the older baptismal rite’s focus on the church as represented by the clergy.\textsuperscript{155} Further, the change in


\textsuperscript{153} These rites are enumerated in chapters 19–21 of The Apostolic Tradition. See Paul F. Bradshaw, Maxwell E. Johnson, and L. Edward Phillips, The Apostolic Tradition: A Commentary, ed. Harold W. Attridge, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002). On The Apostolic Tradition see Kavanagh, Shape of Baptism, 54–70, 137–142. Kavanagh generally sees the RCIA as a restoration to this primitive practice. For a different evaluation see Lampe, The Seal of the Spirit: A Study in the Doctrine of Baptism and Confirmation in the New Testament and the Fathers (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1951), 128–148, who notes that The Apostolic Tradition’s order is thus, but suggests that the episcopal “confirmation” after the baptism was a move toward devaluing baptism. The matter is significantly complicated, though, by Bradshaw’s judgment that the document is composite and reflects geographically diverse communities, making it “most improbably that it represents the actual practice of any singe Christian community,” and “therefore deserves to be treated with greater circumspection than has generally been the case, and one ought not automatically to assume that it provides reliable information about the life and liturgical activity of the church in Rome in the early third century.” The Search for the Origins of Christian Worship: Sources and Methods for the Study of Early Liturgy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 80–83 [83]. See also the discussion in Bradshaw et al., The Apostolic Tradition, 1–16. Johnson acknowledges that the complexity of the Apostolic Tradition’s history demands greater modesty in our claims about what happened in the Roman church’s initiatory rites prior to the fifth century. At the same time, though, he notes that “given the close relationship between early Roman and North African Christianity [where a pattern similar to what is evident in the Apostolic Tradition existed] in general...it is probably safe to assume that their liturgical practices were quite similar, and later Roman evidence would tend to confirm that general similarity.” Rites of Initiation, 72–85 [85].

\textsuperscript{154} McGrail, Rite of Christian Initiation, 117. This is one of the central theses of the book, that the shift in initiatory rite represented a shift in ecclesiological self-understanding. So also Faggioli, who argues that the very fact of liturgical reform destroys the illusion of a pristine ancient tradition. That the liturgy was reformed demonstrates clearly that things change in the church. True Reform, 81–82. Indeed, given the fact that current liturgical scholarship challenges the older view that the Apostolic Tradition gave a window into early third-century Roman practices (see previous note), the idea that the RCIA recovers the ancient Roman practice, tout simple, is ruled out.

tone, particularly in the prayers of exorcism, advert to a greater openness to the world, along the lines articulated by *Gaudium et spes*.\textsuperscript{156}

Within the *RCIA*, baptism represents a joining to Christ, and particularly a sharing in his death and resurrection. The rite’s instructions make it clear that the primary symbolism is not that of washing or cleansing, but of joining to Christ’s paschal mystery.\textsuperscript{157} Under ordinary circumstances this joining to Christ is immediately followed by confirmation, which is meant to underscore “the unity of the paschal mystery, the close link between the mission of the Son and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, and the connection between the two sacraments through which the Son and the Holy Spirit come with the Father to those who are baptized.”\textsuperscript{158} The invitation to confirmation reflects the Christological emphasis in baptism, and identifies sharing in the Pentecostal outpouring of the Holy Spirit as the primary meaning of confirmation.\textsuperscript{159} In other words, the *RCIA* is both Christological and pneumatological, intending to give full expression to the complex of events that is the paschal mystery.

\textsuperscript{156} McGrail, *Rite of Christian Initiation*, 129–135. On *Gaudium et spes*’s outlook with regard to the world see chapter one.


\textsuperscript{158} *RCIA*, no. 215.

The Christology and pneumatology operative in the RCIA are mutually conditioning. Christ is the messiah because he is anointed by the Holy Spirit and empowered for his missionary task—a perspective we have already discerned in the biblical material from chapter one and in Balthasar’s account of the trinitarian missions. The missionary task for which the Spirit anoints Jesus is culminated in Christ’s death and resurrection. Jesus’s mission completed, he bestows the Holy Spirit upon the church. And this Pentecostal outpouring of the Holy Spirit begins the church’s universal mission, as the Spirit “not only interiorizes Christ’s salvific work but also gives the church formed of individual members a loving impulse and movement for expansion.”

Our consideration of the pneumatology operative in the RCIA has naturally brought us to the other aspect of Christian initiation that I intend to highlight. Not only does the RCIA bring a share in the paschal mystery, it also brings a share in ecclesial mission. Moreover, the logical connection is such that sharing in mission occurs precisely because one shares in the paschal mystery. To be incorporated into Christ is to share in his priestly, prophetic, and royal offices, a reality expressed by the post-baptismal...

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160 Within the council documents this relation of the missions of the Son and the Spirit is most clearly seen in Ad gentes, no. 3 [Tanner, 2:1013]. As James B. Anderson observes, this reference to the paschal mystery leads directly to a statement about Pentecost and the mission of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, he suggests that according to the document, “Pentecost is simply the Paschal Mystery brought to completion. Christ suffered and died, rose and ascended into heaven only to communicate to us the Holy Spirit.” Vatican II Pneumatology, 284–286. Anderson refers to Ad gentes, no. 4 [Tanner, 2:1013–1014]. This pattern may also be discerned in Lumen gentium, nos. 3–5 [Tanner, 2:850–851]. As Philips contends, “It is impossible to comment on the consummation of Christ’s work without mentioning the mission of the Holy Spirit.” L’église et son mystère, 1:88 (My translation). See also Philipon, “Trinité et l’église,” 280–282; Jala, Liturgy and Mission, 270–275; Grillmeier, “Mystery of the Church,” 141–142; Hünemann, “Lumen Gentium,” 359–361. Hünemann identifies Pentecost as church forming, but distinguishes it from the paschal mystery (359).


162 Anderson, Vatican II Pneumatology, 286.
anointing that occurs on occasions when confirmation is not to immediately follow. Ordinarily this explanatory rite is not celebrated, as the normative pattern is for confirmation to immediately follow, in which case the anointing is omitted for clarity’s sake. However, because the anointing is an explanatory rite, the share in Christ’s threefold ministry is given in baptism, not the anointing. So even in cases where the explanatory rite is omitted, this theology remains operative.

This incorporation deputes Christians to the worship of the Christian religion and obliges them, as adopted children, sharing in Christ’s filial relationship, to confess the faith before others. As members of Christ, and by virtue of their share in his royal, priestly, and prophetic offices, they are called upon to take their part in the church’s mission in the world. This is true of all the baptized, lay, ordained, and religious.

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165 Lumen gentium, no. 11 [Tanner, 2:857].

166 Lumen gentium, no. 31 [Tanner, 2:875]. Lumen gentium’s development of the royal office of the people of God is somewhat ambiguous. Whereas nos. 10–11 unmistakably articulate the common priesthood and its relation to the ministerial priesthood, and no. 12 describes the prophetic role of the faithful, no. 13’s discussion of the kingdom is expressed in terms of mission, rather than the people’s royal nature [Tanner, 2:856–860]. While this obviously supports my contention that a missionary outlook is central to the ecclesiology of Vatican II and the RCIA, it is still an oddity. Smedt notes the fluctuation of vocabulary with regard to the royal aspect of Christ’s mission (“Sacerdoce des fidèles,” 420), while McGrail suggests that the hesitancy to describe the people as a whole as royal stems from a concern to retain a governing prerogative for the hierarchy. Rite of Christian Initiation, 106–108.

Following the baptism, confirmation is conferred. When the rites are administered in the absence of the bishop, the original minister of confirmation, it is still mandated that confirmation be administered immediately. Johnson notes that the mandate for presbyteral confirmation demonstrates the importance of the unity of the rite: an importance greater than episcopal administration.  

As I noted above, this sacrament is particularly associated with the mission of the Holy Spirit. In the invitation to confirmation, it is also linked to the mission of the church. Confirmands will receive the same Holy Spirit as the Apostles, who will “make…[them] more like Christ and help…[them] to be witnesses to his suffering, death, and resurrection.”

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Those engaged in ordained ministry do so at the service of the whole people of God, and perhaps more importantly within the context of the whole people of God. This perspective is borne out by the fact that Lumen gentium’s second chapter, on the people of God, is placed before its chapters on the hierarchy. For my purposes, the question of office within the church is incidental. Instead, I endeavor to show that the church in its entirety is missionary. Richard Gaillardetz likewise sees baptismal identity as foundational and as initiation into the mission of the church as a whole. “Ecclesiological Foundations of Ministry,” 27, 29. Further, as Wood notes, baptism is initiation not only into the church but into its mission. “Conclusion: Convergence Points toward a Theology of Ordered Ministries,” in Wood, Ordering the Baptismal Priesthood, 257.

168 So Johnson, Rites of Initiation, 315

169 RCIA, no. 233. See further the contention in Lumen gentium that “With the sacrament of confirmation they are bound more completely to the church; they are enriched by a special strength of the holy Spirit, and in this way are under a more pressing obligation to spread the faith by word and deed as true witnesses of Christ” (no. 11 [Tanner, 2:857] [Emphasis added]). See further Grillmeier, “People of God,” 160; McNamara, “People of God,” 126–127; Philipon, “Trinité et l’église,” 291; Philips, L’église et son mystère, 1:154–155; Kaczynski, “Sacrosanctum Concilium,” 153–154; Hünermann, “Lumen Gentium,” 380–381. Hünermann also notes that confirmation should be understood as a messianic sacrament (380).
The rite of initiation culminates in the neophytes’ first sharing in the Eucharistic communion. I defer until chapter three a discussion of the missionary significance of the Eucharist. However, for now, let us note that Eucharistic sharing is the ritual telos not only of the sacrament of baptism, but also the whole process of initiation, which is dynamically ordered towards the Eucharist. Wood helpfully summarizes the Roman Catholic pattern of initiation:

"The entire process of the RCIA represents Christian initiation in its fullness and is the lens through which initiation at any age is to be understood. In Christian initiation a person renounces sin, professes faith in Father, Son, and Spirit, receives the life of God's grace, is incorporated into the ecclesial body of Christ, undertakes a cruciform manner of life patterned on Christ's death and resurrection, and is anointed by the Spirit to participate in Christ's mission of proclaiming the kingdom of God." 

Throughout the RCIA we have seen that the theology of initiation operative in the rite is both Christological and pneumatological, and that according to it, converts come to share in the paschal mystery. This configuration to Christ is at once a coming to share in the triune life, a coming to share in the life of the church, and a coming to share in the church’s mission. Moreover, that the divine life, ecclesial initiation, and missionary responsibility are all conveyed by the same reality indicates that they should be seen as aspects of one complex reality, rather than as separate elements of the Christian life or the church’s nature.

170 RCIA, no. 217.


172 Wood, One Baptism, 143.

173 Jala comes quite close to this perspective in his affirmation that liturgy and mission share the same root and the same content—the saving purpose of God. Liturgy and Mission, 161–162. So also
Holy Baptism in the *Book of Common Prayer*

The paschal and missionary character of initiation is further borne out by the baptismal liturgy of the 1979 *Book of Common Prayer*, which Maxwell Johnson notes “provides the best window for viewing the liturgical reforms of North American Protestantism in general.” The intent of the rite is made clear from the very first liturgical instruction: “Holy Baptism is full initiation by water and the Holy Spirit into Christ’s Body, the Church.” The liturgy, then, like the RCIA, is meant to provide a unified service of sacramental initiation. Furthermore, like the RCIA, the assumption of the rite is that adult converts are being baptized, which Meyers and others recognize as motivated by a more missionary outlook in a post-Christendom context. Leonell Mitchell, one of the architects of the 1979 prayer book, notes that this is not meant to exclude other elements of initiatory process, such as the catechumenate, but rather to emphasize that the baptismal rites suffice, sacramentally, for making Christians.

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Davies, *Worship and Mission*, 71 (whom Jala follows); Meyers, *Missional Worship, Worshipful Mission*. Nevertheless, as I shall demonstrate in chapter four, I seek an even more intrinsic connection between the two than they do.

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175 *BCP*, 298. Note, though, that this instruction introduces the rite as a whole, and not simply the water bath portion of that rite. As I shall show below, the baptismal rite includes a celebration of the Eucharist and assumes that the newly baptized will receive first communion. Therefore, in evaluating what it means to call baptism “full initiation…into Christ’s Body, the Church,” this must be kept in mind.


The prayer book directs that baptism be administered within the context of the eucharistic liturgy, and further specifies that the Easter Vigil, Pentecost, All Saints’ Day, and the Feast of the Lord’s Baptism are particularly appropriate days for baptism. All of these Feasts are paschal in character: the Easter Vigil because of Christ’s death and resurrection, Pentecost because of the bestowal of the Holy Spirit, All Saints’ because the saints are the fruit of Christ and the Holy Spirit’s saving activity, and the Baptism of the Lord because it sets Jesus on the trajectory that culminates in his death, resurrection, and bestowal of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, despite designating the bishop as the ordinary minister of baptism, the prayer book makes provision for diaconal baptism in cases were no bishop or presbyter is available. Diaconal baptism is for the express purpose of allowing the sacrament to be celebrated on these days. This, then, serves to highlight the paschal character of sacramental initiation in the prayer book. So strong is the paschal character that Leonell Mitchell sets his discussion of baptism and Eucharist within the context of the Easter Vigil, where he believes the rites’ full character is most clearly discerned.

Within the prayer book’s unified rite, confirmation is no longer considered a sacrament of initiation. In its place, a postbaptismal consignation with optional

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179 BCP, 298, 312.

180 BCP, 312. Hatchett specifies that this is the intent behind allowing a diaconal celebration. Commentary, 268, 285.

181 Mitchell, Praying Shapes Believing, 87, 89.

182 The Anglican Communion is currently in a period of ferment over the proper pattern of initiation, and particularly the place of confirmation. Some (Meyers, Continuing the Reformation, 241–248; “Fresh Thoughts on Confirmation,” Anglican Theological Review 88, no. 3 [2006]: 321–40; James F. Turrell, “Muddying the Waters of Baptism: The Theology Committee’s Report on Baptism, Confirmation, and Christian Formation,” Anglican Theological Review 88, no. 3 [2006]: 341–59) advocate doing away entirely with confirmation as a distinct rite. Of particular note in this regard is Urban Holmes’s recounting that the framers of the 1979 prayer book wanted to do away with confirmation entirely, but were resisted by
chrismation combines features from the RCIA’s postbaptismal anointing and confirmation.\(^{183}\) It is Christological and pneumatological, indicating a sharing in Christ’s priesthood, and a sealing with the Holy Spirit.\(^{184}\) This combination of Christological and pneumatological aspects helps bring clarity to the rite. Jesus himself was anointed with the Holy Spirit in order to be the Messiah, the Christ. This would seem to indicate that Christians’ sharing in his royal, priestly, and prophetic office, must be pneumatological

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\(^{183}\) Mitchell notes that this anointing incorporates the matter (which he incorrectly identifies as the form) of confirmation, laying on of hands. “Theology of Initiation,” 407. Hatchett notes that the traditional elements associated with confirmation have been moved to this act of consignation. Commentaries, 279–280. Meyers puts it succinctly: “Although the Roman Catholic Church views baptism and confirmation as separate sacraments, the ritual pattern for adults and older children is identical to the baptismal rite of the Episcopal Church. That is, baptism in water is followed by prayer for the sevenfold gifts of the Spirit and consignation with anointing accompanied by a formula proclaiming that the candidate is sealed with the Holy Spirit. The difference is that the Episcopal Church calls the entire rite ‘baptism’ and administers the same rite to infants and young children.” Continuing the Reformation, 258. As Wood notes, the rite “represent[s] what Roman Catholics understand to be a confirmation rite in everything but name.” One Baptism, 135–136. Wood is engaging with the Lutheran ceremony, but acknowledges that the Anglican rite yields the same results. In fact, as Johnson notes, the Lutheran rites have been heavily influenced by the Anglican revisions. Rites of Initiation, 326–346.

\(^{184}\) BCP, 308. See Hatchett, Commentary, 276–281; Mitchell, Praying Shapes Believing, 106–107, 110–111.
as well as Christological. Configuration to Christ and sharing in the Holy Spirit are not separate realities, theologically.\(^{185}\)

That baptism is celebrated in the context of the eucharistic liturgy highlights the fact that it is ordered toward admission to the Eucharist. Both Hatchett and Mitchell note that reception of first communion is the ordinary and expected conclusion of the baptismal liturgy.\(^{186}\) That baptism leads to communion clarifies what the prayer book means in stating that baptism is full initiation. The intent is not to exclude the Eucharist from the pattern of initiation, but rather to bring the baptized into the eucharistic communion. So then, the prayer book’s rite of initiation is Christological, pneumatological, and paschal; sacramentally bounded by baptism and by the Eucharist.

What, though, of mission?

**The Baptismal Covenant**

The privileged locus for considering mission in the *Book of Common Prayer’s* baptismal liturgy is the baptismal covenant, which details the responsibilities taken on by

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In light of Rogers’s damning criticism: “The upshot of two centuries of trinitarian revivals seems to be this: Anything the Spirit can do, the Son can do better. If the Spirit sanctifies, that is more specifically expressed as following the Son. If the Spirit empowers the subjective human response, that is more concretely expressed as the power of the Son. If the Spirit consummates life together with God, that is more biblically expressed as the wedding of the Lamb. If the Spirit gathers the community, that community is of course better named as the body of Christ. If the Spirit distributes various gifts, then they are better coordinated as gifts that make members of the body of Christ...It is then only a short step to say, The Spirit is, strictly speaking, superfluous” (*After the Spirit*, 33), I want to be clear that I am not attempting to collapse pneumatology into Christology, but rather quite the opposite. My assertion is in service of the recognition that Christology is a pneumatologically constituted reality. See, e.g., Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, 126–132; “The Pneumatological Dimension of the Church,” 143–145; Congar, *Je crois en l’Esprit Saint*, 33–49; Kasper, “Esprit, Christ, église,” 58–59.

the newly initiated. It consists of a dialogical recitation of the Apostles’ Creed, five questions posted to the candidates, and prayers for the candidates. The five questions asked in the covenant elicit a commitment to communal life, including sacramental sharing; to a lifestyle of repentance; to “proclaim[ing] by word and example the Good News of God in Christ;” to service of all people for Christ’s sake; and to working for “justice and peace,” including a “respect [for] the dignity of every human being.” The baptized are bound to the church’s internal life, and to engagement in mission beyond the church. The prayers for the candidates include such petitions as deliverance from sin, filling by the Holy Spirit, adherence to ecclesial communion, “love [for] others in the power of the Spirit,” and mission “into the world in witness to…[God’s] love.”

Though not technically a part of the baptismal covenant, the greeting for the newly baptized is worth noting as well: “We receive you into the household of God. Confess the faith of Christ crucified, proclaim his resurrection, and share with us in his eternal priesthood.”

The baptismal covenant is a novel feature of the 1979 prayer book, and has garnered a fair amount of controversy. Nevertheless, I believe that, properly understood, the covenant is an important and positive development for Anglican liturgies, which more clearly highlights the missionary nature of the church. Brian Spinks has suggested that the covenant as it stands is potentially semi-Pelagian because of its placement before the water rite as if it were a pre-condition for what follows.

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187 BCP, 304–305 [305].
188 BCP, 307–308.
189 BCP, 308.
190 Spinks, Theologies of Baptism, 175.
Though the covenant, in this form, is new, it grows out of traditional aspects of the baptismal liturgy. The 1662 Book of Common Prayer inquires of candidates for baptism whether they will keep God’s will and obey his commands,\textsuperscript{191} and the baptismal covenant is meant to be an expansion upon what is entailed in doing so.\textsuperscript{192} It is worth noting that Spinks has not suggested that the 1662 rite is semi-Pelagian.\textsuperscript{193}

The Church of England has adopted a form of the baptismal covenant in its Common Worship, which does not carry the same doctrinal force in the Church of England as the Book of Common Prayer does in the Episcopal Church. In Common Worship the questions from the baptismal covenant are posed not to those about to be baptized, but to the newly baptized.\textsuperscript{194} This revised order is, perhaps, motivated by a desire to avoid semi-Pelagianism. In other words, baptismal grace is bestowed before the ethical commitments are taken up.

While by no means unacceptable, this changed placement seems unnecessary. To begin, the same logic—that responsibility can only be shouldered after receiving baptism—would also disallow the traditional renunciations and affirmations that precede the baptism. Further, the structure of the baptismal covenant precludes a semi-Pelagian interpretation. The baptismal covenant is comprised not only of the five questions, but also the Apostles’ Creed (which comes first), and prayers for the candidates.\textsuperscript{195} The

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{191} BCP [1662] (London: Oxford, 1960), 327.
\item \textsuperscript{192} Hatchett, Commentary, 274.
\item \textsuperscript{195} As Meyers notes, this arrangement provides a link between trinitarian faith and human response. Continuing the Reformation, 228.
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creed’s position at the head of the covenant sets the rest within the context of the narrative of God’s gracious salvation in Christ. The prayers at the end indicate that divine help is needed to live the baptismal life faithfully. And even the commitments are taken on with the response, “I will, with God’s help.”\textsuperscript{196} Clearly, this is not an exercise in self-reliance. Throughout, the baptismal covenant is conditioned by grace.

Frankly, it seems strange that a liturgical act beginning with a confession of faith in salvation in Christ and concluded with prayers for the help of divine grace, could be regarded as semi-Pelagian. At the same time, appeals to the baptismal covenant, including missionary appeals, must bear in mind the priority of God’s act in Christ and the Holy Spirit, and our continued dependence upon it. I believe that my paschal interpretation of mission does so adequately. In the next chapter I will return to a conception of mission as conditioned by divine grace.

Beyond the issue of semi-Pelagianism there is a controversy surrounding applications of the baptismal covenant. Colin Podmore notes that within the Episcopal Church the baptismal covenant has been the cornerstone of a definite social agenda, particularly with regard to the ordination of women and the inclusion of LGBT persons in the life and ministry of the church.\textsuperscript{197} In particular, the commitment to work for justice and peace and respect human dignity has become a rallying point for these issues, which have proven to be quite divisive within the Anglican Communion, leading in some cases, to actual schism and impaired states of communion between Provinces. The scandal of division hampers the church’s witness and mission. However, the issue is not with the

\textsuperscript{196} BCP, 304–305.

baptismal covenant, but rather with the way to which it has been appealed, and the way in which those appeals have been implemented.

Elsewhere I have provided a different reading of the baptismal covenant in conversation with Podmore. In the present context, I will simply note that this is the wrong basis for framing a discussion of ordination, which is a matter of gift and calling, rather than justice. This is an instance of the baptismal covenant being made to bear more weight than it should. Further, the ways in which these issues have been implemented, and the reactions to those implementations by those who disagree, have exacerbated the problem. The result, then, is that the true missionary potential of the baptismal covenant is obscured by misapplications and the resultant controversies. However, surely the call to justice or to respect human dignity should be uncontroversial (even if there is disagreement about what that call involves), and remains an important aspect of the church’s mission.

So then, as in the RCIA, the Book of Common Prayer’s rite of initiation is a configuration to Christ and the paschal mystery by the power of the Holy Spirit. It is a coming to share in the life of God and in Christ’s threefold office of prophet, priest, and king. It is, further, an initiation into a Christian life conceived of as missionary in the sense defined in chapter one—proclamation of Christ and holistic work for the betterment of the world.

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199 See chapter one.
Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that the *missio Dei* is best understood in terms of the trinitarian missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit, which are, in turn, best understood with reference to the paschal mystery. I bore this contention out by referring to Hans Urs von Balthasar’s paschally-oriented trinitarian theology and Bernard Lonergan’s rigorously Thomistic conception of the temporal missions as the eternal processions with a created, contingent term. Both theologies allow us to at once account for the fact that the acts undertaken in the redemption of the world—Christ’s life, death, resurrection, and ascension, as well as the bestowal of the Holy Spirit and the anticipated *parousia*—are truly the act of God, and that God does not undergo change in these acts. Instead, the change is on the side of the creature.

That the change is on the side of the creature underscores the soteriological end of the divine missions. The Son and Spirit are sent into the world so that human beings can be brought into the life of God. The eternal eucharistic dynamic that is the triune life remains the same, but now with the gratuitous addition of members of Christ. This, then, is a form of deification or *theosis*, but one that retains the basic Chalcedonian “without confusion, without change, without division, without separation.”201 Human beings remain human, even as they come to share in the divine life of the Son.202

This conception of *missio Dei* provides an understanding of the church, of salvation, and of mission as different facets of the same reality: coming to share in the

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201 “Definition of Chalcedon” [Tanner, 1:86].
202 So also Meyendorff, who writes that deification “would indeed be nothing but Hellenistic pantheism, if it did imply a confusion of the created and uncreated natures. It is in the *hypostatic union* of the two natures in Christ, and in the personal response of each human being that the true dimension of ‘deification’ (*theosis*) is to be perceived.” “Christ’s Humanity,” 19.
life of God through the paschal mystery enacted by the missions of the Son and the Spirit. In so doing it provides a conceptual bridge between the missional and the liturgical portions of my proposed ecclesiology. I have begun to bear this out through a consideration of Christian initiation. According to both the Roman Catholic Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults and the Anglican Book of Common Prayer, initiation into the church is a paschal reality, informed by the missions of both the Son and of the Holy Spirit. It is a configuration to Christ, a sharing in his own place within the triune life, and a sharing in his threefold royal, priestly, and prophetic office. The sharing in this latter represents an obligation to share in Christ’s mission to the world.

Thus far I have shown that the sacraments give a share in the paschal mystery, which involves taking part in the church’s mission. I have not yet demonstrated why coming to share in the paschal mystery necessarily involves missionary activity. I shall provide this account in the next chapter, as I consider in the Eucharist, the last of the sacraments of initiation, and the one that most clearly discloses the nature of the church.
CHAPTER III: *PER IPSUM, ET CUM IPSO, ET IN IPSO...IN UNITATE SPIRITUS SANCTI*: THE CHURCH’S MISSIONARY SACRIFICE

**Introduction: Setting the Stage/Preparing the Altar**

In chapter two I articulated a trinitarian account of *missio Dei* as the paschal mystery, which is understood as an *ad extra* enactment of God’s own eternal life. Through the paschal mystery, human beings are brought into the life of God, specifically into the Son’s place within the divine life. I ended with an account of Christian initiation as coming to share in both the paschal mystery and in the church’s mission. This chapter picks up precisely where the last left off, with a consideration of the third of the sacraments of the initiation—the Eucharist—and also accounts for *why* coming to share in the paschal mystery is also coming to share in the church’s mission. Hence, the continuity between the chapters is both thematic and theological. It is thematically continuous because it explains the phenomenon of initiation as initiation into both paschal mystery and mission we discerned in the conciliar and liturgical material of chapter two. It is thematically continuous because the Eucharist completes the sequence of initiation,¹ and is itself a mode of sharing in the paschal mystery. As Jean Daniélou has

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written, “The Christian faith has but one object, which is the mystery of Christ, dead and risen. But this unique mystery subsists under different modes.”

My argument builds upon the insights of what have been called eucharistic ecclesiologies, which recognize a constitutive role of the Eucharist for the church, but pursues its end particularly through a consideration of the sacrificial dimensions of the Eucharist. In other words, rather than simply pursuing an ecclesiology grounded in the Eucharist or pursuing a sacrificial account of the Eucharist, I am pursuing an

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4 Recent attempts to recover a sacrificial account of the Eucharist may be found in Roman Catholics such as J-M. R. Tillard, “Vocabulaire sacrificial et eucharistie,” Irénikon 53 (1980): 154–74; Flesh of the Church, Flesh of Christ, 83–144; Edward J. Kilpatrick, The Eucharist in the West: History and Theology, ed. Robert J. Daly (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1998). Max Thurian, L’eucharistie: Mémorial du seigneur, sacrifice d’action de grâce et d’intercession (Neuchâtel; Paris: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1959), though this work was produced before he entered into full communion with the Roman Catholic Church; Arnold Angenendt, Die Revolution des geistigen Opfers: Blut – Sündenbock – Eucharistie (Freiburg; Basel;
understanding of the church that is grounded in the idea of the Eucharist as a sacrifice.\(^5\) I am, moreover, pursuing this line of inquiry in the service of articulating my missional and liturgical ecclesiology.

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Of course, there is more to the Eucharist than simply sacrifice, and foregrounding one dimension of it to the neglect of the others has deleterious effects. In privileging sacrifice, though, I am not neglecting other aspects of the sacrament (e.g., communion, real presence, meal, memorial), but rather providing an organizing and integrative principle for them. In other words, sacrifice explains that in which we have communion, what is memorialized, the character of the meal, and, to an extent, what is present—not


7 Attempts to provide an integrating principle for the Eucharist include: Blessing (Lies, “Eulogia”), Memorial (Kasper, “Einheit und Vielfalt der Aspekte der Eucharistie”; Thurian, L’eucharistie, Julie Gittoes, Anamnesis and the Eucharist [throughout her argument, Gittoes alludes to, but never develops the missional implications of anamnesis]), Meal (O’Loughlin, The Eucharist); Sacrifice (Kilmartin, Eucharist in the West; Matthew Levering, Sacrifice and Community: Jewish Offering and Christian Eucharist [Oxford: Blackwell, 2005]).
simply Christ, but Christ in his act of self-giving love,\(^8\) which makes sacrifice a privileged locus for a paschal account of the Eucharist.

It is important to note that my argument is an argument \textit{from} the Eucharist as sacrifice, and not an argument \textit{for} the Eucharist as sacrifice. In other words, I accept as a given that the Eucharist is a sacrifice. I do so on two primary bases: the long history of considering the Eucharist to be sacrificial,\(^9\) and the current ecumenical convergence on eucharistic sacrifice.\(^{10}\) While it might not be quite accurate to aver that an understanding of the Eucharist as a sacrifice is uncontroversial, I think that it is safe to say that it is incontestable.

A full account of the notion of sacrifice operative in this chapter will come in my consideration of Augustine of Hippo’s theology of true sacrifice. Nevertheless, a preliminary definition, upon which I shall expand significantly, is in order. In Book ten of \textit{De civitate Dei}, Augustine defines sacrifice as “Any work which is done in order that we may be bound together in a holy society with God, referred to that final good by which

\(^{8}\) On the integration of sacrifice and presence see below.


we are able to be truly blessed,” and further specifies that sacrifice is comprised of acts of mercy.  

My approach to sacrifice is not generic, but specifically Christian. By this I mean that Christ’s death on the cross, which the Christian tradition has long described as a sacrifice, is the prime referent and controlling motif for the term “sacrifice.” In the last chapter, I articulated an understanding of the cross in terms of the eternal exchange by which the divine persons constitute the triune life. Hence, because my account of sacrifice is dependent upon my understanding of the crucifixion, and because my account of the crucifixion is in terms of the Trinity’s eternal loving exchange, my account of sacrifice is likewise trinitarian. Specifically, I understand sacrifice in terms of the Son’s return-gift to the Father in the Holy Spirit. 

This trinitarian undergirding to my theology of sacrifice means that sacrifice cannot be understood as primarily an instance of loss or deprivation. The triune kenosis is not a negative reality, but positive, and indeed, plenative. The Son’s reversion to the Father fulfills his being. Sacrifice is not “giving something up” in the colloquial sense of foregoing that which is given up. Rather, sacrifice is gift. And, while when one gives something, she no longer has it, to construe this as a loss is to undo the gift as gift. If


12 Similar attempts to understand sacrifice in terms of the divine life may be found in Kilmartin, Eucharist in the West, 370, 381–382; Robert J. Daly, Sacrifice Unveiled: The True Meaning of Christian Sacrifice (London: T & T Clark, 2009), passim; Mascall, Corpus Christi, 90–91; Dunnill, Sacrifice and the Body, 210–212. I shall discuss these accounts and how my own differs from them below, after I have fully articulated my proposal.

13 Daly makes a similar point, Sacrifice Unveiled, 1–10.
sacrifice is “giving something up,” it is so in the sense of a gift freely elevated, in a movement that fulfills rather than deprives.

My argument will not dwell upon theories of atonement or of the precise mechanism whereby the death and resurrection of Christ are saving. My position on this is already in place. This presumed trinitarian context also helps to resolve other conundrums that frequently arise in considering eucharistic sacrifice. For instance, on this account, real presence and sacrifice are integrated because the paschal mystery is itself an *ad extra* enactment of the life that God always is. For Christ to be present in the meal is for him to be present in his eternal reciprocal self-giving to the Father, which is the constitutive truth of which Calvary is a contingent term. His real presence is his sacrifice. There does not have to be a reenactment of Calvary for this to occur.\(^{14}\)

Such a perspective also resituated the question of how a historical event, such as the cross, can be present here and now. The cross is an *ad extra* enactment of the triune life. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are their eternal shared life. Therefore, the presence of Christ in any context—on Calvary, at the altar, in eternal beatitude with the

\[^{14}\text{Chauvet seems to be driving at this point in his characterization of the eucharistic presence as } \textit{ad-esse} \text{ rather than } \textit{esse}. \text{E.g., } \textit{Symbol and Sacrament}, 389–393; “Le pain rompu comme figure théologique de la présence eucharistique,” \textit{Questions liturgiques} 82, no. 1 (2001): 31–32. \text{See further the discussion in Timothy M. Brunk, } \textit{Liturgy and Life: The Unity of Sacrament and Ethics in the Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet} (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 66–75; \text{Mudd, } \textit{Eucharist as Meaning}, 27–32. \text{Note, though, Mudd’s critique that the addition of the preposition, } \textit{ad}, \text{actually enacts a rupture between the relational-communicative line that Chauvet pursues and reality. Sacraments belong to the human order, they are intended for human beings, which means that the } \textit{esse} \text{ is already an } \textit{ad-esse} (183). \text{Mudd himself comes close to this perspective with his account of eucharistic presence in terms of constitutive meaning (in the thick, Lonerganian sense): "The meaning Christ gives to his actions in the narrative [of institution] reveals that the presence is a sacrificial presence. What is made present is not brute materiality, cells, DNA, and the like, all of which are accidents, but Christ’s } \textit{body as offered}, \text{that is, the incarnate meaning of the cross, by which Christ fully reveals his mission of redeeming sins and overcoming evil through love” (187).} \]
redeemed—is the presence of this life, which takes on contingent forms, none of which change the basic dynamic form of the divine life.  

Moreover, the already established paschal context of my discussion of the sacraments, within which the paschal mystery is the whole complex of events including Christ’s death, resurrection, ascension, bestowal of the Holy Spirit, and parousia, means that my consideration of Eucharist as sacrifice is not focused solely upon the crucifixion, but upon the whole mystery of salvation.  

15 The question of the contemporary presence of a historically distant event is typically resolved by recourse to the category of anamnesis (e.g., Casel, The Mystery of Christian Worship, 9–49; Le mémorial du seigneur, passim; Joachim Jeremias, The Eucharistic Words of Jesus, trans. Arnold Ehrhardt [Oxford: Blackwell, 1955]; Thurlian, L’eucharistie, 148–193; Tillard, “Vocabulaire sacrifical et eucharistique,” 154–174; Kasper, “Einheit und Vielfalt der Aspekte der Eucharistie,” 196–215; Henrici, “Opfer Christi,” 226–235), which has proven to be quite useful in ecumenical settings. Nevertheless, while anamnesis provides a category for thinking about the matter without raising the concern of a repetition of the cross, its tendency to de-historicize the events it renders present is problematic. For a discussion and evaluation of different perspectives on how anamnesis resolves the question see Fritz Chenderlin, “Do This as My Memorial”: The Semantic and Conceptual Background and Value of Ανάμνησις in 1 Corinthians 11:24–25 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1982); Kilmartin, Eucharist in the West, 300–338. Mudd’s proposal quite helpfully upholds the historical particularity of the events surrounding the cross, while also giving a category whereby what the cross is, its “meaning” is present. Eucharist as Meaning, 183–217. Raymond Moloney likewise draws on Lonergan’s thought to articulate a similar point. “Lonergan on Eucharistic Sacrifice,” Theological Studies 62 (2001): 53–70. Mudd’s proposal, which draws heavily from Brian McNamara, “Christus Patiens in Mass and Sacraments: Higher Perspectives,” Irish Theological Quarterly 42 (1975): 17–35, bears a good deal of similarity to my own notion of how the sacrifice of the cross is present in the Eucharist. The crucial difference is that his depends upon a wholesale adoption of Lonergan’s epistemology and metaphysics (without which, appeal to “meaning” will invariably appear overly thin) and all the transpositions it necessitates, while mine does not. My position is simply a consequence of the relationship between the divine processions and missions, and my identification of the paschal mystery with the missions.

validation of aggression and violence. Within these criticisms of sacrifice, René Girard’s influence is pervasive. However, recent scholarship has demonstrated serious methodological flaws with Girard’s approach, and especially with the idea that sacrifice

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18 For a survey of the major critiques of Girard, see Angenendt, *Die Revolution des geistigen Opfers*, 81–96. Jonathan Klawans faults Girard for his reductionism: “the essence of all myth and ritual is sacrifice, and sacrificial ritual boils down to criminal violence...Moreover, Girard’s reading of myth and ritual is in truth an elegant argument ex silencio. By claiming to reveal what pre-Christian myth and ritual seek to conceal, Girard can develop his own account that finds confirmation precisely in the fact that what he reveals is not actually articulated straightforwardly in these rituals and myths. Those scholars who think that sacrifice can be explained by interpreting the evidence are simply being fooled by the sources, the purpose of which is to mislead.” *Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple: Symbolism and Supersessionism in the Study of Ancient Judaism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 22–26 [24].

Chilton, despite his manifest respect for Girard’s intellect, likewise notes this reductionism, which takes the form of an a priori commitment to seeing “sacrifice as an instance of violence, mimetic desire, and rivalry.” *Temple of Jesus*, 15–24 [24]. Moreover, “Girard makes sacrifice in the ancient world the scapegoat for violence in modern experience. The problem of his analysis is not in his isolation of violence as a datum of human culture, and therefore as a factor of which critics must be aware; the problem lies rather in his attempt to project that datum onto sacrifice, to identify an aspect of the human condition with an ancient institution with which he does not happen to enjoy sympathy. Ironically, he has mythologized what he defines as a ‘mythology’ into the Satan that modern humanity must overcome” (25).

Dunnill, noting the same reductionism as others, notes that “Unless we are convinced that Girard has said the last word about religion – that is, about the origins of violence, about the scapegoating mechanism, and about the way in which this generates religious and all other institutions – we are unlikely to be persuaded by the surprising fourth stage of Girard’s theory in which he claims he has revealed the real meaning of Jesus and the cross. The effect is in fact to imprison Christology within his bold but inadequate theory, because salvation would then come to lie, not in the cross and resurrection, but in apprehending the Girardian understanding of violence.” *Sacrifice and the Body*, 144–160 [159].

Meanwhile, Coakely notes the irony that even if Girard’s premise is accepted, the system does not work, for “the oddity of conjoining this account of sacrifice with Girard’s optimistic assertion, even in his early work, that Jesus perfects and overcomes the sacrificial system, may by now be obvious. If violence is
can simply be equated with violence,\(^\text{19}\) and/or attempted to articulate more sympathetic accounts of it as a meaningful phenomenon for those who engage in it.\(^\text{20}\)

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\(^{19}\) Beyond the literature surveyed in note 17 above, Girard’s influence is evident on scholars who do not make the simple equation of sacrifice and violence. E.g., Chauvet, “Dimension sacrificielle,” 50–54; Symbol and Sacrament, 303–310; Daly, Sacrifice Unveiled, xiv, 202–222. Even before Daly’s Girardian turn, his earlier scholarship was careful to distinguish between sacrifice and violence qua violence, noting for instance that the Levitical theology of sacrifice equates sacrificial blood with life in Christian Sacrifice: The Judaeo-Christian Background before Origen (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1978), 87–136. While the point is well taken that, theologically, atoning blood is more about the blood/life of the victim than the killing of that victim, and while ancient treatments of sacrifice tend to remain silent about the actual moment of death (so Dunnill, Sacrifice and the Body, 13–16), which somewhat ameliorates the concern, it can only take us so far. After all, were the killing a mere preliminary for procuring blood, which is how Daly characterizes it (Sacrifice Unveiled, 37), why would a non-lethal blood-letting not suffice? This tendency to soften the reality that animals were indeed killed is evidence of how deeply the “sacrifice as violence” discourse has ensconced itself in scholarship, even scholarship that wants to uphold the validity of sacrifice. This influence prevents scholars who wish to discuss sacrifice as something positive from recognizing the basic fact that, in many cases, animals had to die for sacrifices to be offered. In light of the intertwining of sacrifice and meal, which I shall discuss below, it seems that, rather than asking whether or not sacrifice is “violent,” the better question is whether sacrifice is more violent than, say, eating a roast beef sandwich, which has also required the death of an animal. So, basically, Jonathan Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 40. This perspective on blood and life is central to the argument of David M. Moffitt, Atonement and the Logic of Resurrection in the Epistle to the Hebrews (London: Brill, 2011); “Blood, Life, and Atonement: Reassessing Hebrews’ Christological Appropriation of Yom Kippur,” in The Day of Atonement: Its Interpretation in Early Jewish and Christian Traditions, ed. Thomas Hieke and Tobias Nicklas (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 211–24, though with no reference to Girard.

\(^{20}\) This is the major burden of Klawans’s argument, which attempts to apply the sort of structuralist insights Mary Douglas brought to notions of ritual purity to the discourse of sacrifice. Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, especially 17–48. Likewise Dunnill, Sacrifice and the Body, 11–29. Chilton’s scholarship occupies an interesting place in this regard. On the one hand, he locates Jesus’s outlook within the mainstream concerns of second temple Judaism. On the other hand, he has Jesus ultimately establishing the Eucharist as a surrogate of and replacement for temple sacrifice. Temple of Jesus, 91–154; Feast of Meanings, 46–74. Note Klawans’s critique of Chilton on this point. “Interpreting the Last Supper,” 1–17; Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 214–222. Daly’s early work in Christian Sacrifice remains unparalleled in terms of its careful textual analysis of the Hebrew Bible, and its sympathetic approach to sacrifice (e.g., 1–207). His later Girardian turn in Sacrifice Unveiled remains generally sympathetic to the notion of sacrifice as well. Below, I shall note some crucial ways in which the literature has moved beyond Daly’s perspective. Nancy Jay, while ultimately offering her own feminist critiques of certain patriarchal assumptions of sacrifice, first attempts to outline a sympathetic account of the practice as a meaningful phenomenon for its participants. Throughout Your Generations Forever: Sacrifice, Religion, and Paternity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). The essays in Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, The Cuisine of Sacrifice Among the Greeks, trans. Paula Wissing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989) provide social scientific approaches to Hellenistic sacrifice that exemplifies the sort of sympathetic perspective that is here in view.
Simply put, the specter against which sacrifice’s cultured despisers rail is not one that I recognize in my own account. If sacrifice is defined as the entire movement of Christ from and return to his Father in the Holy Spirit, and especially if the crucifixion is only a contingent form of this movement, then a facile identification of sacrifice with aggressive violence is ruled out. Therefore, rather than allowing these critiques to set the agenda and busying myself with answering them—a feat which would, essentially, reinvent the wheel, given the recent trends in scholarship, which I have just noted—I simply note that their criticisms do not apply to my proposal, and move forward with its articulation.

My argument unfolds in two main movements. In the first, I articulate a eucharistic understanding of communion as sacrifice. By analysis of (1) the intertwining of sacrifice and meal in the social and religious milieu in which the Eucharist emerged and (2) Augustine of Hippo’s account of true sacrifice in the Eucharist, I demonstrate that sacrifice can be understood as another way of expressing communion with God and the church. I further gain a way to speak about the life of the faithful (and especially missionary engagement) in a way that is intrinsically related to Christ’s sacrifice. In the second movement, I develop a eucharistic account of sacrifice as mission by assimilating it to the trinitarian soteriology of chapter two. This assimilation demonstrates that sharing in Christ is necessarily sharing in Christ’s mission, for the body of Christ present in the Eucharist is given away for the world’s salvation.

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21 See, similarly, Dunnill’s engagement with critiques of sacrifice brought by feminist theologies. *Sacrifice and the Body*, 162–178. While he recognizes that their concerns are valid, he also demonstrates that they cannot be leveled against sacrifice *tout simple*. 
Eucharist: Sacrifice as Communion

My argument in this section turns upon the notion that in the Eucharist communion and sacrifice are interlinked realities, and further, that they are ways of expressing the same reality. I pursue the interlinked character of sacrifice and communion by recourse to the meal character of the Eucharist, particularly within the milieu of Graeco-Roman meal practice. I develop the idea that sacrifice and communion are, in a manner of speaking, one and the same by recourse to Augustine of Hippo’s teaching on sacrifice, and particularly the way it functions within the context of his thought as a whole.

Throughout this chapter, certain methodological concerns inform my argument. For instance, Jonathan Klawans notes a pervasive and distortive evolutionist bias within scholarship on and especially scholarship critical of sacrifice, which I shall strenuously avoid. According to this evolutionism, sacrifice’s history is one in which a crude literalism (e.g., food for the gods) is eventually supplanted by more sophisticated metaphorical understandings of sacrifice, until finally sacrifice itself is supplanted by enlightened people who know better (i.e., people like “us”). This evolutionism tends to

22 Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 3–48; “Interpreting the Last Supper,” 1–17. This evolutionist conceit also comes under Dunnill’s fire, Sacrifice and the Body, 3–30, 143–178. McGowan notes how pervasively the evolutionist assumption has distorted the data from early eucharistic material. “Eucharist and Sacrifice,” 191–206. Although Daly’s account of sacrifice’s “spiritualization” is nuanced, indicating that he does not refer to an anti-material bias (Christian Sacrifice, 4–5), his treatment of the data is thoroughly evolutionist (e.g., Christian Sacrifice, 44–45, 74, 86; Sacrifice Unveiled, 69–74). Similarly, Kilmartin stresses that Christ’s death has ended sacrifice “in the history-of-religions sense” (Eucharist in the West, e.g., 184), which betrays a certain evolutionist perspective. Chauvet’s work similarly evinces evolutionism. Symbol and Sacrament, 307–310; “Dimension sacrificielle,” 61–66. This is not to deny that Christ’s death has brought about a decisively new state of affairs between God and humanity. Chauvet’s and Kilmartin’s basic insight that Christ’s death is the one acceptable sacrifice for Christians is important and will inform my discussion. However, the contrast implicit in both of their articulations of this point is infelicitously expressed. I do not contest their account of Christian novelty. That with which I take issue the notion that we can speak straightforwardly of sacrifice “in the history-of-religions sense.” Despite this
express itself in supersessionist and anti-ritualist terms, which tell us more about the outlook of the theorist in question than the data before us.\textsuperscript{23} It also tends to expend most difference, there is manifest similarity between Kilmartin’s trinitarian notion of sacrifice, Chauvet’s account of symbolic exchange, and my own articulation.

\textsuperscript{23} Klawans, \textit{Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple}, 7–8, 21–26, 213–245; “Interpreting the Last Supper,” 8–13. Dunnett’s insistence upon the importance of the body in his treatment is an attempt to avoid anti-ritual bias. \textit{Sacrifice and the Body}, 3–30. Throughout her account of sacrifice, Jay proceeds by attention to sacrificial rites, rather than just notions of sacrifice. \textit{Throughout Your Generations Forever, passim}. Despite his insistence that the last supper(s) are a replacement of Temple sacrifice, Chilton’s account takes them seriously as ritual actions. \textit{Feast of Meanings, passim; Temple of Jesus}, 137–154. Daly is far more ambiguous about ritual. On the one hand, he notes that spiritualizing sacrifice is not the same as rendering it immaterial. \textit{Christian Sacrifice}, 4–5. On the other hand, his treatment of the New Testament sees the locus of sacrifice shift from cult, e.g., the Eucharist, to ethics (498–508). However, while the importance of ethics as a locus of sacrifice in the NT is undoubted (e.g., Romans 12:1–2), to read ethics as the sole locus of sacrifice one must actually read the idea into passages such as 1 Peter 2:5, which speak of offering spiritual sacrifices. The references may be non-cultic, but are not necessarily so. Against this presumption Klawans argues that applying cultic language to non-cultic contexts is not a devaluing of cult, but rather an extension of cultic metaphors that depend upon the importance of the cult in order to work. \textit{Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple}, 220–222; “Interpreting the Last Supper,” 13. So also McGowan, “Eucharist and Sacrifice,” 191–206.

Chauvet fairs quite well against both of these charges. Regarding supersession he writes “The originality of the Christian cult is not due to the degree of interiority, of authenticity, of ‘relation to life’ that it requires: Jesus, in this respect, did nothing but prolong and affirm the critique of the prophets regarding hypocritical formalism; and the rabbinic teachings have perhaps nothing to envy from his on this subject. It is precisely that it is ‘Christian,’ that is to say that it only has value by the unique mediation of Christ and in the Holy Spirit. There lies its radical novelty.” “Dimension sacrificielle,” 66 (Emphasis added). And while he determinately focuses upon quotidian life and ethics as central to the Christian vision, he does so in a way that does not do away with cult or ritual (65–66). See further, \textit{Symbol and Sacrament}, which foregrounds the ritual dimensions of Christian life. Similarly, as we shall see, Augustine avoids the worst of these tendencies. Some account of Christ’s novelty with regard to Judaism is obviously necessary. Whether this is fairly construed as supersessionism is an issue into which I cannot go in this context. Klawans seems particularly concerned about versions of Christian novelty that hinge upon the notion that the Jewish cult was itself devoid of “spirit” or ethical concern, and for that reason had to be replaced. \textit{Purity, Sacrifice and the Temple}, 247–254; “Interpreting the Last Supper,” 8, 12. Such a characterization neither applies to Augustine, nor to Chauvet, nor to my own treatment.

of its energy on the search for the origins of sacrifice, rather than seeking to understand what sacrifice actually meant for those who practiced it, meaning that it is able to shed very little light on the actual institution of sacrifice.  

This last point, of course, means that Klawans’s work can only be formally, and not materially useful for my argument, because I am not attempting to reconstruct the sacrificial practices of either the Levitical system or the second temple, which is that with which his argument is principally concerned. However, the formal utility of the book, especially with regard to the methodological concerns I have just sketched—is great. Sacrifice must be understood on its own terms, as a coherent, symbolic practice. As interesting as its origins may be, they are not determinative for its coherence. I have selected Augustine to provide my basic definition of sacrifice, which means that his outlook is determinative for my argument.  


See also Levering, *Sacrifice and Community*, 12–28, for a genealogy of “Eucharistic idealism,” from the Protestant Reformers, through Schleiermacher and Hegel, up to Schillebeeckx and Rahner. Eucharistic idealism seeks to be free from external ritual forms, which are often glossed as Jewish. The anti-Jewish character of such idealism is not always explicit, of course.

Klawans, *Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple*, 7, 47–48. Once more, Daly evinces this tendency. *Christian Sacrifice*, 44–45. Peter Trummer likewise concerns himself with locating sacrifice’s origins in realities of warfare, which itself problematically makes human sacrifice the paradigmatic lens through which sacrifice is understood. »*Das ist mein Leib*<: *neue Perspektiven zu Eucharistie und Abendmahl* (Düsseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 2005), 13–19. Coakely’s attempt to root sacrifice in evolutionary biology may run afoul of this criticism as well, though my larger concern with her argument is the equation of sacrifice with deprivation. *Sacrifice Regained*, 21–28. As my account of sacrifice builds upon the trinitarian theology I articulated in chapter two, according to which the intra-divine kenosis is a positive rather than a negative concept, sacrifice can not be simply glossed as loss. Levering’s treatment of the Eucharist hinges upon cruciformity as the shape of communion. While I welcome this emphasis, Levering’s tendency to equate cruciformity with death and renunciation risks this same distortion. At the same time, Levering views the matrix of sacrifice as death/renunciation as a postlapsarian reality, which somewhat attenuates the concern. *Sacrifice and Community*, e.g., 29–94.

My selection of Augustine for this role owes to the fact that his authority as a doctor of the church is widely recognized; meaning that appeal to him carries weight for a variety of Christian communions. In particular, Augustine’s eucharistic teaching is indicated as authoritative in both Anglican formularies (The Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion, “Article XXIX” [*BCP*, 873]), and Catholic teaching
Klawans’s constraints indicate that sacrifice must receive a synchronic treatment (which, in my case, means that I must understand what it meant for Augustine, rather than all the different things it has meant or could mean). Further, though Augustine does serve a synthetic role in my argument, providing a theological coherence for certain data, this synthesis is not a straightforward developmental trajectory. No *grand récit* informs this argument such that earlier perspectives were simply awaiting their fulfillment in Augustine. Rather, he took elements of a tradition he inherited and forged his own synthesis with them. His theology is coherent in its own terms, as were the theologies that he synthesized into a new coherence. This is not to suggest that Augustine’s thought is discontinuous with what came before, but rather to avoid imposing a false unity upon those foregoing centuries, or to miss the coherence of Augustine’s thought by attempting to trace the origins of every element of it.

(e.g., Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests, *Presbyterorum ordinis*, December 7, 1965, no. 2 [Tanner, 2:1044]; *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1994), nos. 1372, 1398). Levering notes the pervasive influence of Augustine upon the later tradition, and especially upon Aquinas. *Sacrifice and Community*, 4–5. It is an unfortunate shortcoming of Levering’s book, then, that nearly all his citations of Augustine are not from the primary sources, but rather from Augustine as cited by Aquinas. As shall be seen, Augustine’s account of sacrifice hinges upon signification, meaning that his is the sort of symbolic system that Klawans views as essential to a proper understanding of sacrifice. Additionally, Augustine’s account of sacrifice foregrounds the ecclesiological dimension, making him particularly apt for my own ecclesiological argument. The function of sacrifice in his theology provides me the opportunity to synthesize the perspective on meal and sacrifice in the literature from early Christianity. Finally, my major interlocutor in the next chapter, Chauvet, explicitly appeals to and appropriates Augustine on this matter.

Hence, the various typologies of sacrifice, whether classifications of types of Old Testament offerings (e.g., Daly, *Christian Sacrifice*, 44–203; Chilton, *Temple of Jesus*, 45–67; Henri Cazelles, “Eucharistie, bénéédiction et sacrifice dans l’ancien testament,” *La Maison-Dieu* 123 [1975]: 7–28), or of conjunctive and disjunctive rites such as communion and expiatory sacrifices (e.g., Dunnill, *Sacrifice and the Body*, 6–11, 23–28; Jay, *Throughout Your Generations Forever*, 17–29) are not directly relevant to the question at hand. I am pursuing a particular account of Christian sacrifice, and even more specifically, an account of the Eucharist as sacrifice, rather than a general theory of sacrifice.

Meal and Sacrifice in Eucharistic Origins

That the Eucharist is a sacrifice is, as I have stated, uncontestable. Generally speaking, the sacrificial nature of the Eucharist has been sought in its association with Christ’s death on the cross. The words of institution found in the last supper traditions establish this connection (1 Corinthians 11:23–26; Mark 14:22–25; Matthew 26:26–29; Luke 22:14–23), and establish the interpretation of Jesus’s death as a death offered for others. In other words, it is the last supper traditions that mark out Jesus’s death as sacrificial.\(^{28}\) While this position is one that I will ultimately uphold, we must note that this is but one perspective among many within early Christian accounts of the Eucharist.\(^{29}\) And yet, even in traditions where no explicit reference either to Jesus’s death, or to the identification of the elements with his body and blood (i.e., whether by way of the words of institution or otherwise) may be detected, the Eucharist is still described as a sacrifice.\(^{30}\)

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\(^{28}\) This connection is so well established as to be almost axiomatic. The major treatments are Jeremias, Eucharistic Words; Xavier Léon-Dufour, Sharing the Eucharistic Bread: The Witness of the New Testament, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (New York: Paulist Press, 1987); Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 1–82. Also of note are the work of Paul Bradshaw (Eucharistic Origins; Origins of Christian Worship, 61–72), and Andrew McGowan (Ancient Christian Worship, 27–33; “Is There a Liturgical Text in This Gospel?”: The Institution Narratives and Their Early Interpretive Communities,” Journal of Biblical Literature 118 [1999]: 73–87; “Rethinking Eucharistic Origins”), both of whose treatments take into account the diversity of practice in early Christianity, and Bruce Chilton (Feast of Meanings, 109–130), who also notes early diversity, but sees the Pauline last supper traditions as establishing a sacrificial connection with the death of Jesus. See also Chauvet’s argument that the words of institution demonstrate that eucharistic presence should be understood in terms of “\textit{ad esse},” which, due to his own ambivalence towards sacrifice is not understood to be sacrificial as such (Symbol and Sacrament, 391–392), and Mudd’s contention that the “for you” of the eucharistic words indicates a sacrificial presence (Eucharist as Meaning, 187–197).

\(^{29}\) On the diversity of early Christian worship see, e.g., Bradshaw, Origins of Christian Worship; Eucharistic Origins; Klinghardt, Gemeinschaftsmahl und Mahlgemeinschaft, 1–19; Chilton, Feast of Meanings; O’Loughlin, The Eucharist, 1–17; McGowan, Ascetic Eucharists; “Is There a Liturgical Text?”; “First Regarding the Cup”; “Naming the Feast”; “Rethinking Eucharistic Origins”; “Agape and Eucharist.”

The realization that the Eucharist is a sacrifice even within traditions that do not link it to Jesus’s death requires a broadened conception of how/why the Eucharist is a sacrifice. 31 This broadened conception is supplied by analysis of the Eucharist as a meal, 32 which in turn leads to the realization that the Eucharist is a sacrifice precisely...
because it is a public meal.\textsuperscript{33} In antiquity, both Jewish and Graeco-Roman, meal and sacrifice were inextricably bound together.\textsuperscript{34} Throughout my discussion here, “meal” should be understood in the sense of a public meal, tied to the enactment of a social group’s common life, not a simple instance of eating such as one might undertake as an individual or within one’s household.

In particular, Matthias Klinghardt has demonstrated that formal public meals stood at the center of social belonging for Graeco-Roman society. Indeed, it is not so much that meals were at the center of social life as it was that meals were themselves the concrete expression of that life. The community life does not exist outside of these meals.

\textsuperscript{33} In addition to the literature surveyed in the previous note see Chilton, who locates the last supper(s) within Jesus’s program of fellowship meals and as a response to the failure of his occupation of the temple. Initially “this is my body,” and “this is my blood,” were meant as protests: as though Jesus were saying, “this meal of fellowship, rather than what is offered at the temple, is the sacrificial victim that I consider pure and acceptable.” \textit{Feast of Meanings}, 13–74; \textit{Temple of Jesus}, 137–154 (The quotation marks do not indicate a quotation of Chilton). While I concur with Klawans’s criticism that this position misconstrues Jesus’s attitude toward the temple (“Interpreting the Last Supper,” 1–17; \textit{Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple}, 214–241), Chilton’s basic point that the Eucharist is sacrifice precisely by being a meal is salutary. Also worth noting is his characterization that “For Girard, in the beginning was the mob. In my understanding the meal is prior.” \textit{Temple of Jesus}, 163–172 [163]. In other words, meal is a basic element to understanding sacrifice. See also Brian Francis Byron, \textit{Sacrifice and Symbol: A New Theology of the Eucharist for Catholic and Ecumenical Consideration} (Sydney: Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1991), 3–17, 80, 83, for the idea that Calvary is understood as a sacrifice because Jesus chose a meal, which is formally sacrificial, to interpret it.

“The meal is the community life.”35 While different theoretical content may be attached to the meal form, depending upon the community whose life is that meal, the outward form and the basic datum that the meal is the community’s life remains fairly constant.36 This leads Klinghardt to foreground the ritual actions surrounding the eucharistic meal in his treatment. It is the breaking of the bread, the pouring out of the cup, that constitutes the Christian community.37 In other words, the Eucharist makes the church,38 and it makes it by being a meal.39


36 Klinghardt, Gemeinschaftsmahl und Mahlgemeinschaft, 21–28. Klinghardt treats these various formal elements (45–157). Of particular note are his contention that the synagogue, given its hellenistic milieu, was organized remarkably like a pagan social club (254–258), and his treatment of the Corinthian meal form (275–295). See also McGowan, Ascetic Eucharists, 33–88; Ancient Christian Worship, 20–25.

37 Klinghardt’s analysis of the Greek grammar in the Lucan/Pauline last supper traditions (Luke 22:21; 1 Corinthians 11:25) leads to his conclusion that the eucharistic chalice was poured out as a libation, which is analogous to the libations that marked the transition from banquet to symposium. “Der vergossene Becher,” 33–58; Gemeinschaftsmahl und Mahlgemeinschaft, 287–288. This is, I think, far-fetched, given the fact of the cup being drunk (Matthew 26:27; Mark 14:23; 1 Corinthians 11:25–27). While this command is not present in the Lucan cup saying (Luke 22:21) it is present in all of the other instances of the words of institution in the NT. I shall return to the question of libations below, though.

Others who foreground the ritual action of the meal include McGowan, Ancient Christian Worship, 29; Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 12–15, 103–140, 247–255. Although Dix’s four action shape of the liturgy is now regarded as obsolete and inadequate for the evidence (see Bradshaw, Origins of Christian Worship, 6–8; McGowan, “Rethinking Eucharistic Origins,” 173–191; McGowan, “Naming the Feast,” 314–318; Klinghardt, Gemeinschaftsmahl und Mahlgemeinschaft, 1–19; O’Loughlin, The Eucharist, 10), nevertheless redirecting liturgical scholarship to the question of ritual action was a major watershed. O’Loughlin also foregrounds action in his account of the Eucharist (The Eucharist, 4–5, 10–17), while Chauvet’s project centers almost entirely on the event of ritual action (e.g., Symbol and Sacrament, 262–408; “Pain rompu”). Kilmartin, by focusing his entire treatment of the Eucharist around the locus of sacrifice foregrounds the sacrament as a ritual action. Eucharist in the West, 339–356). See further his contention that continual recourse to the eucharistic liturgy as liturgy helps ensure that the doctrine of sacrifice expressed has properly Christian content (353–354). For treatments foregrounding the eucharistic prayer as ritual action see, e.g., Lies, “Eulogia,” 69–97; Mitchell, Praying Shapes Believing, 148–182; Laurance, Eucharist, 159–173; de Clerck, “Plus que la présence,” 61–73.

38 Cf. de Lubac, Corpus mysticum, 103–104.

39 This focus on the ritual action of the meal leads Klinghardt to dismiss questions of “real presence” in the sacrament as absolutely excluded [überhaupt nicht] from a Pauline conception of the Eucharist. Gemeinschaftsmahl und Mahlgemeinschaft, 367, 320–321. I regard this as a false dichotomy, which is not required by the evidence. See, e.g., Léon-Dufour, Sharing the Eucharistic Bread, 211–213;
In addition to the fact that meals constituted communal life in antiquity, we must note that such meals were also inescapably sacrificial. For instance, meat was a commonly served dish, and one that was procured if not exclusively by way of sacrifice then so close to exclusively that the difference was negligible. Though the eucharistic meal involved no meat, the fact that Paul deployed it as a contrastive practice to pagan sacrifice (1 Corinthians 10:14–22), demonstrates that the association between meal and sacrifice was a strong and inescapable one. As Andrew McGowan writes:

Without accepting the suggestions that the story and the ritual of the Last Supper are a Pauline invention, we can see nevertheless that his contribution is nearly as radical as an invention would be, in that he constructs the Christian meal as one comprehensible in terms of the logic of pagan sacrifice. To participate in the Christian meal is, for Paul, to renounce the table of demons, but it is also to create another table whose logic is actually quite similar to that which he attacks (1 Cor. 10: 16–21).  

Dale B. Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 190–197, for treatments of the interplay of loaf and community as body of Christ in Paul’s thought. See also Alikin, who sets this consideration in a more historically developmental framework (“Eating the Bread and Drinking the Cup,” 119–130); and Günter Röhser (“Vorstellungen von der Präsenz Christi im Ritual nach 1Kor 11,17–34,” in Klinghardt and Taussig, *Mahl und religiöse Identität*, especially 136–144, 156–157, who interacts directly with Klinghardt). Alikin and Röhser are particularly significant interlocutors in this regard, as they share the basic “meal practices” approach of Klinghardt. My argument assumes, rather than argues for a doctrine of real presence, which is a well-established datum, and assumed by my church’s liturgies. Moreover, the later understanding of Christ’s threefold (historical, ecclesial, sacramental) body (e.g., de Lubac, *Corpus mysticum*, passim; Zizioulas, *Eucharistic Communion and the World*, 12–24, 104–109; Tillard, *Flesh of the Church, Flesh of Christ*, 26, 39–63; Frank C. Senn, *The People’s Work: A Social History of the Liturgy* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006], 167–171; Kilmartin, *Eucharist in the West*, 3–7), which will arise in my engagement with Augustine, and upon which my entire argument turns, provides an adequate response to Klinghardt’s objections


41 McGowan, *Ascetic Eucharists*, 273. Elsewhere McGowan makes more modest, though similar claims in this regard. *Ancient Christian Worship*, 32–33. So also Klawans, “Interpreting the Last Supper,” 14–15. Klawans’s remarks are particularly worth noting as they help to spell out the contrastive nature of Paul’s argument: “the contrast that is drawn betweenproper worship on the one hand and idolatry on the other. This contrast – which is drawn elsewhere (1 Cor 8.4–6, 13; 2 Cor 6.16) – is instructive, and it allows us to juxtapose the picture of early Christian worship in a Pauline diaspora community with Acts’ picture of the apostles’ worship in Jerusalem. In Acts 2, we are presented with a picture of early Christians performing both eucharistic and Jewish sacrificial rituals. In 1 Cor 10, we are presented with a different picture: that of Gentile Christians in Corinth who do not have the option of performing sacrificial rites and eucharistic rites. Jewish sacrificial devotion outside of Jerusalem is out of the question. Other local forms of sacrificial devotion are equally out of the question, because they are idolatrous. And what is Paul’s
The contrast between the Eucharist as Christian sacrifice and pagan rites as illicit sacrifice continues throughout the early centuries, and forms a significant aspect of Augustine’s treatment of sacrifice (on which see below). Recently Edison Kalengyo has revived it within the context of competing religious practices in Uganda. In other words, this aspect of the Eucharist remains basic to its meaning, rather than being a mere curiosity attached to its origins.

Furthermore, while bread was not necessarily a sacrificial element (though it certainly could be), wine tended to be invariably associated with sacrifice, due to the prominence of libations. In fact, as McGowan demonstrates, the alternative practice of

message? That early Christians must choose one or the other: it is either idolatry or the worship of God, either sacrifice or eucharist” (14). See also Coutsoumpos, Paul and the Supper, 83–101; Léon-Dufour, Sharing the Eucharistic Bread, 204–213. With these judgments Chenderlin concurs, and indeed throughout his argument, the contrast between Eucharist and magic/theurgy figures prominently. Do This as My Memorial, 175–177, but with the reservation that a Jewish, rather than pagan pattern must be in view (145–146). On the Jewish/pagan distinction, see Klinghardt’s argument for formal similarity above. Additionally, as my basic point is to establish the sacrifice-meal connection, this distinction leaves my argument untouched either way.


Kalengyo, “Sacrifice of Christ and Ganda Sacrifice.”

E.g., the grain offerings of Leviticus 2:1–16; 6:14–18; 7:9–10; 10:12–13. See further Daly, Christian Sacrifice, e.g., 13–18, 24–28; Douglas, “Eucharist,” 209–224; McGowan, “Eucharist and Sacrifice,” 191–206. McGowan notes that when Ignatius of Antioch speaks of sacrifice, it is typically in terms of grain/bread sacrifice (e.g., Epistle to the Romans 4.1 [Apostolic Fathers, 228], cf. 5.3 [Apostolic Fathers, 230], which shows that his use of bread sacrifice language is not due to a reticence regarding gory death). He notes the same phenomenon in Justin Martyr (Dialogue with Trypho 41.2–3 [Justin Martyr: Dialogue avec Tryphon: Édition critique, traduction, commentaire, ed. Philippe Bobichon, vol. 1, Paradosis: Études de littérature et de théologie anciennes 47 (Fribourg: Academic Press Fribourg, 2003), 286]).


43 Kalengyo, “Sacrifice of Christ and Ganda Sacrifice.”

44 E.g., the grain offerings of Leviticus 2:1–16; 6:14–18; 7:9–10; 10:12–13. See further Daly, Christian Sacrifice, e.g., 13–18, 24–28; Douglas, “Eucharist,” 209–224; McGowan, “Eucharist and Sacrifice,” 191–206. McGowan notes that when Ignatius of Antioch speaks of sacrifice, it is typically in terms of grain/bread sacrifice (e.g., Epistle to the Romans 4.1 [Apostolic Fathers, 228], cf. 5.3 [Apostolic Fathers, 230], which shows that his use of bread sacrifice language is not due to a reticence regarding gory death). He notes the same phenomenon in Justin Martyr (Dialogue with Trypho 41.2–3 [Justin Martyr: Dialogue avec Tryphon: Édition critique, traduction, commentaire, ed. Philippe Bobichon, vol. 1, Paradosis: Études de littérature et de théologie anciennes 47 (Fribourg: Academic Press Fribourg, 2003), 286]).

bread and water Eucharists seems to have been motivated by anti-sacrificial concerns. Avoiding wine allowed groups with anti-sacrificial outlooks to practice the Eucharist without the risk of it appearing to be a sacrifice.\textsuperscript{46} Such groups also tended to downplay the institution narrative, which gave the meal a more sacrificial flavor than their comfort would allow.\textsuperscript{47} Those who opposed the bread and water Eucharists tended to both sit more comfortably with the idea of sacrifice, and appeal to the notion of sacrifice in their opposition.\textsuperscript{48}

So, then, the Eucharist is not simply a meal or a sacrifice, but a sacrificial meal. It is a sacrifice by being a meal and a meal by being a sacrifice. As Kilmartin puts it:

The meal character is bound to the sacrificial character of the eucharistic celebration. Insofar as Jesus instituted the memorial of his self-offering in the symbolic actions of the Last Supper, the sacrificial and meal aspects are inseparable from one another. A sacrificial event is constituted in the form of a ritual meal process. This means that the meal character belongs to the shape of the celebration, because the meal has to do with the \textit{modus quo}, not the \textit{id quod} of the celebration. Insofar as the meal contains formal elements of meaning, these elements are already part of the essential traits of sacrifice and communion.\textsuperscript{49}

In other words, sacrifice and communion belong together. This is so because the

Eucharist, as a communal meal, is both community-generative and sacrificial. In the next\textsuperscript{46} McGowan, \textit{Ascetic Eucharists}, 142–217.

\textsuperscript{47} McGowan, \textit{Ascetic Eucharists}, 272–273.


section I shall move beyond the fact that the Eucharist is sacrificial to explain what is meant by sacrifice. Doing so will help to further synthesize the connection between sacrifice and communion.

**Augustine: True Sacrifice of the Totus Christus**

Saint Augustine of Hippo’s account of the eucharistic sacrifice forms the theological core of my argument in this chapter. His explanation of sacrifice provides a theological synthesis for the foregoing treatment of how communion and sacrifice go together as well as providing a means for connecting this data with both the trinitarian soteriology sketched in chapter two and the overarching ecclesiological concern of this work. Moreover, Augustine’s understanding of the totus Christus provides me with a means to describe mission as a sacrifice offered by the faithful, which is itself a participation in the one sacrifice of Christ. My exposition of his doctrine of sacrifice shall unfold through a close reading of book ten of *De civitate Dei*. In order to properly understand Augustine’s account of sacrifice, though, I must first set it within the broader context of his thought. 

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The Eucharistic Context of Augustine’s Doctrine of Sacrifice

With almost no exceptions, Augustine’s treatments of sacrifice are eucharistic in context. While there are occasional passing references to Christ’s death as sacrifice that have no eucharistic or polemical referent, most often sacrificial language is used in contexts where Augustine combats the attraction of pagan worship, and particularly theurgy. Through the mediation of the dæmons, procured through sacrifice, theurgy offered a means of purification for its participants, by which they were elevated beyond the constraints of their passionate existence. Daemons, who as spiritual, yet passible


53 On theurgy see Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995); Toulouse, “Le vrai sacrifice,” 169–223; Sara
beings were in an ontologically intermediate position between humans who are bodily and passionate, and God who is spiritual and impassible. Augustine, ever the pastor, resolutely opposed such association with the demonic.\textsuperscript{54} It is typically in such settings that he appeals to the concept of sacrifice, which at once opposes the practice of theurgy and delivers on the purification that the pagan rites are unable to provide. Hence, Augustine’s doctrine of sacrifice is positioned within a larger framework of purification. Indeed, as François Dolbeau puts it, “The \textit{Contra paganos} is in fact a \textit{Contra sacrilegas purgationes philosophorum}, aimed at the Neoplatonists, before culminating in the finest surviving pastoral exposé \textit{De uero mediatore Christo}.”\textsuperscript{55}

Not only is the Eucharist and/or opposition to theurgy the locus where discussion of sacrifice most often occurs, it is the only locus I am aware of where it is discussed in any systematic fashion. This is probably because sacrifice was the most natural concept to use in providing a contrast with theurgic rites. Rather than appease demons by sacrifice, Christians were to resist them by holding fast to Christ’s sacrifice.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{54} On Augustine as pastor see Bonner, “Augustine’s Understanding of the Church,” 39–63. Markus notes the key role that association plays in Augustine’s account of both Christian sacramentality and pagan magic. \textit{Signs and Meanings}, 105–146. Conventional signs depend upon interpretive communities for their communicative efficacy. Participation in magical rites forms and depends upon a communal association with demons. Opposed to this community is the church, which is also an interpretive community with its own effective signs. So also Andrew Louth, “Augustine on Language,” \textit{Literature and Theology} 3 (1989): 152; Dodaro, “Christus sacerdos,” 384–387 (building upon Markus).

\textsuperscript{55} Dolbeau, “Nouveaux sermons de saint Augustin” 69 (My translation). Dolbeau is here speaking of \textit{Sermon} 198, which bears a striking resemblance to \textit{CivDei}.10, which it predates by at least a decade.

\textsuperscript{56} Augustine, \textit{CivDei}. 10.22 [BA, 34:502, 504]. Augustine insists upon this rather strongly in \textit{Sermon} 198, 53 where he also argues that not only are demons unable to mediate salvation, neither should bishops be considered in mediators. Christ is the sole mediator, and the entire church is priestly through Christ’s unique priesthood [Dolbeau, 132–133]. On this see Dodaro, “\textit{Christus sacerdos},” 392–392.
means of doing so was itself a rite, the Eucharist, which Augustine sees as intrinsically related to the sacrifice of the cross.\textsuperscript{57}

In fact, the Eucharist appears in nearly every discussion of sacrifice.\textsuperscript{58} Not only this, the only places where sacrifice occurs without any trace of anti-demon polemic are eucharistic in nature: for example, in the mystagogical homily of Sermon 227 and in Monica’s request that the eucharistic sacrifice be offered for her after her death.\textsuperscript{59} In addition to the connection with his anti-pagan polemic, I would suggest that a major factor in this Eucharist-sacrifice pairing is the lengthy tradition of identifying the Eucharist as a sacrifice that Augustine has inherited.\textsuperscript{60} Though he tended to reserve sacrificial language for polemical contexts, he could not help speaking of the Eucharist as a sacrifice even when not engaged in polemics, which means that his doctrine has potential application outside of those contexts. All of this seems to indicate that in discussing sacrifice in Augustine, the eucharistic referent and the concern for purification must be central because apart from such contexts, he tends not to speak of Christ as sacrifice.

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{57} See below. Note also the formal similarity between Augustine’s polemical use of the Eucharist and the one adduced in 1 Corinthians 10:14–22, above.
\item\textsuperscript{60} See previous section.
\end{itemize}
The Journey Motif and the True Mediator

I have just located Augustine’s understanding of sacrifice and the Eucharist within the broader context of purification, which means that in order to understand the work sacrifice does in Augustine’s thought, we must first understand his account of purification. It is against this backdrop of purification that sacrifice will be intelligible. Perhaps the best entrée for this context is found in De doctrina christiana, where Augustine conceives of salvation as a journey to our true homeland, the triune God. This journey is undertaken not through local motion, but rather through one’s interior dispositions and comportment, particularly as one learns to distinguish between things that are to be used and things that are to be enjoyed. In the latter category Augustine places the Trinity. The former category is composed of everything else. By using created things in order to enjoy the uncreated God, one is carried along through the world until at last the true homeland is reached. Instrumental in this journey is the Incarnate Christ, who has adapted himself to our condition. We are disposed towards enjoying

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62 Augustine, De doctrina 1.5 [BA, 11:184, 186].

63 Augustine, De doctrina 1.22 [BA, 11:202, 204]. Human beings and angels are in a slightly ambiguous place in this schema, as they are to be enjoyed, but only for the sake of God (1.33 [BA, 11:224, 226]).

64 Augustine, De doctrina 1.10 [BA, 11:192].

material things, which ought to be used. To remedy this, the immaterial and enjoyable
God takes upon himself the materiality toward which we are disposed, so that we might
pass through his visible humanity to the invisible God.\footnote{Augustine, \textit{De doctrina} 1.11–14, 34 [BA, 11:192, 194, 196, 226, 228]. On the passage from the
material Christ to the immaterial God see Bavel, \textit{Christologie de saint Augustin}, 75–78; Daley, “Humble
Mediator”; Barnes, “Visible Christ and Invisible Trinity,” 335–336, 347; Ayres, \textit{Augustine and the Trinity},
152–155; Meconi, \textit{The One Christ}, 123–124.}

This journey motif remains a key component of Augustine’s thought throughout
his career, appearing in early and later works.\footnote{In addition to \textit{De doctrina} 1–3 (397), it appears in at least \textit{Conf.} 7.18 (398) [\textit{Les confessions: Livres I–VII}, ed. Martin Skutella and A. Solignac, trans. E. Tréhorel and G. Bouissou, BA 13 (Bruges:
Desclée de Brouwer, 1962), 626–632]; \textit{DeTrin.} 4, \textit{Præmium} (404) [BA 15: 338]; \textit{DeTrin.} 13.7 (417) [\textit{La
290–292]; \textit{In Johannis Evangelium Tractatus XXVI,} 1–5 (418–420) [\textit{Homélies sur l’évangile de saint Jean:
XVII – XXXIII}, ed. M. F. Berrouard, BA 72 (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1977), 480–496].} At this point, I wish to highlight two
features of it in particular. The first is that the journey to God is conceived of in terms of
a volitional dynamism. The second is that Christology is central to this account. Christ
purifies us, and it is through this purification that our return to God is carried out. This
purification has both interior and exterior aspects.

\textbf{Interior Purification by Faith}

Above I outlined the basic contours of the journey motif found in \textit{De doctrina}. This conceptuality serves as the basic framework for the Augustinian trope of interior
purification by faith. By passing from Christ’s incarnate humanity to his invisible
divinity, we are purified and carried along on the way back to God. The centrality of faith
for this vision of purification becomes clearer by connecting it to book four of \textit{De
Trinitate. In book four Augustine employs the same basic journey motif, but within a different polemical context. Whereas De doctrina was a catechetical work on biblical interpretation, Michel Barnes identifies De Trinitate 4 as informed by anti-Homoian polemic. The Homooians attempted to exploit what Barnes identifies as a “double-bind” in earlier Latin Christology, which had interpreted the Old Testament theophanies as appearances of Christ. According to the Homoians, this was warrant for subordinationism: that Christ appeared in the theophanies shows that his divinity was of a different sort than the Father’s. Christ was the visible God.

In the face of the challenge presented by the Homoians, Augustine affirmed their first point (that divinity is invisible), and denied their second (that Christ’s divinity is visible). Instead, all that is visible in Christ is his humanity. In this connection faith becomes of central importance. Faith is not a species of knowledge, because it is not a type of sight. Instead, faith in looking at the human being, Jesus, believes that this human being is also God. It forgoes direct vision of God. Building upon Jesus’s promise in Matthew 5:8 that the pure in heart will see God, Augustine notes that the beatitude is eschatological in orientation. Until the eschaton, one has faith in, but not vision of God. And it is this faith which purifies the heart. In consenting to the deferral of vision and the

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68 Barnes, “Visible Christ and Invisible Trinity,” 330. So also Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, 143–144, 171–173; “The Christological Context of Augustine’s De Trinitate XIII: Toward Relocating Books VIII–XV,” in Studies in Patristic Christology, ed. Thomas Finan and Vincent Twomey (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1998), 105. Ayres follows Barnes in the identification of Homoianism as the polemical context. However, his argument also notes that Augustine’s concerns for purification, and his basic outlook on how it works, are found in a variety of polemical contexts (e.g., 96–98).


impossibility of direct vision/knowledge of God, faith is seen as a type of humility.\(^{71}\) And it is precisely this humility that purifies us, as it consents to be carried back to God through the humble mediator. Note, then, the inversion of theurgy’s logic. The daemons were seen as viable mediators precisely because of their ontologically intermediate status as spiritual beings. In Augustine’s view, the true mediator saves not by being ontologically intermediate, but by humbling himself to share in humanity’s material existence.

One more facet of interior purification by faith will suffice before moving on to the other type of purification involved in Augustine’s account of Christ as mediator. Returning to book four of *De Trinitate*, Augustine sees Christ’s physical death as providing the solution to humanity’s spiritual and physical death caused by the soul’s withdrawal from God in sin.\(^{72}\) Christ’s crucifixion provides for the interior renewal of humanity, as he is both the *exemplum* and the *sacramentum* of our humble purification and return to God.\(^{73}\) Here, and in book thirteen, Christ’s death demonstrates the depth of God’s love for humanity, which motivates the faithful to make their return to God in

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\(^{72}\) Augustine, *De Trin.* 4.3.5 [BA, 15:348]

Christ. Book thirteen explains that Christ’s humanity enables him to die, while his divinity demonstrates that he did not have to die. This voluntary death shows God’s love, bolsters our confidence, and leads us on, by faith, through interior renewal, to God.

Exterior Purification by Death’s Destruction

Augustine’s treatment of Christ’s death in De Trinitate 4 and 13 provides a transition point for considering his other major account of Christ’s mediation, which is the destruction of death by Christ’s immortal life. The destruction of death likewise purifies humanity, but this time in a more “ontological” way, as the human nature is appropriated by Christ and healed through his resurrection into indestructible life. At times, this destruction of death trope is in the service of purification by faith, as we have already seen in De Trinitate 4 and 13, which means that the two are closely related. However, it does have its own logic.

At times, Augustine simply states the fact that death has been destroyed by Christ’s death and resurrection, which enables us to share in his immortality. However, he typically appends an explanatory framework to the discussion. In De Trinitate 4 and 13, he appeals to Christ’s overcoming the devil by justice, rather than power. Through Christ’s innocent, voluntary death, the devil forfeits his claim on the rest of humanity and

74 Augustine, DeTrin. 4.1.2, 7 [BA, 15:340, 368]; DeTrin. 13.9 [BA, 16:298, 300].

75 Augustine, DeTrin. 13.14 [BA, 16:314–316]

76 This schematization is formally similar to Tarscisius van Bavel’s twofold account of Christ’s redemption, in which the incarnation provides the ontological ground and basis for a second, mystical type of redemption where the faithful dwell in Christ by charity (Christologie de saint Augustin, 79–85), as well as Richard P. Hardy’s schema of an exterior movement of revelation (the incarnate Christ and the outer word of Scripture), which is complemented and completed by an interior movement (Christ the inner teacher and acceptance of the word by faith) (Actualité de la révélation divine, 111–196). See also Studer, “Sacramentum et exemplum,” 89–101.

77 Augustine, InIo. 26.10 [BA, 72:504].
they are now able to go free. At other times, though, Augustine appeals to the notion of sacrifice to provide the explanatory framework for death’s destruction. It is to this that I now turn.

**City of God and True Sacrifice**

Though Augustine speaks of Christ as a sacrifice in a variety of contexts, his account of true sacrifice is perhaps most clearly articulated in book ten of *De civitate Dei*. Book ten continues his argument against the powerlessness of any but God (in particular the daemons) in bringing beatitude to humanity. Augustine argues that the worship termed *latreia*, should be offered to none save God. Because beatitude can be found only in God, any being besides God who would desire our worship must be wretched, and, therefore a poor candidate for worship.

God, on the other hand, does not need our worship, which is precisely why he is the appropriate candidate to receive it. Because God has in himself perfect blessedness, he does not need anything from us. And because God has in himself perfect blessedness, he can share that with us. Therefore, according to Augustine, sacrifice is not for God’s

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78 Augustine, *DeTrin.* 4.12.17 [BA, 15:380, 382, 384]; *DeTrin.* 13.13 [BA, 16:310, 312]. See discussion in TeSelle, *Augustine the Theologian*, 165–169; Levering, *Theology of Augustine*, 177–178. Given the importance of the Epistle to the Hebrews for Augustine’s idea of Christ as sacrifice, and given the close association between destroying the devil who holds the power of death, and the idea of Christ as high priest in Hebrews 2:14–18, it is worth asking whether Augustine’s account of overcoming the devil might be best understood as itself an example of sacrifice, rather than a distinct conceptuality.


80 Augustine, *CivDei.* 10.1 [BA, 34:424, 426].

benefit but for our own. In articulating this, though, Augustine must negotiate two potential obstacles. On the one hand, he must repudiate pagan sacrifice, which is the point of the work. On the other hand, he must deal with the fact that while Christians now reject Jewish sacrifice, these acts of worship had their own validity before Christ’s coming. So, then, he cannot simply dismiss sacrifice.

To navigate these waters, Augustine taps into the “anti-sacrificial” polemic found within the Old Testament itself in several prophets and psalms. It is absurd to think that God needs or desires the flesh and blood of slaughtered animals. After all, God has no needs whatsoever. However, there is a sacrifice that God desires. It is the sacrifice of our hearts: our self-giving to God. This sacrifice benefits us, not God. Visible sacrifices, like those of the Old Testament are sacramenta of this true, interior sacrifice. These visible sacrifices have given way to Christ’s sacrifice of himself as the true sacrifice. Augustine’s solution, then, is to interiorize sacrifice.

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82 Augustine, *CivDei*. 10.5 [BA, 34:438, 440].


84 Augustine, *CivDei*. 10.5 [BA, 34:440, 442]. See also Bonner, “Doctrines of Sacrifice,” 103. Klawans writes against the tendency to simply equate the prophetic critique as anti-cult, *Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple*, 75–100. On this point he is surely right. However, I do not find his solution, that the prophets were primarily concerned with questions of proper ownership of the animals offered in sacrifice (a point which he shares in common with Chilton, *Temple of Jesus*, 100–111; *Feast of Meanings*, 46–63), persuasive. While proper ownership may indeed have been part of the concern, the prophets were clearly concerned with ethical behavior and matters of justice beyond mere matters of ownership. On this see Daly, *Christian Sacrifice*, 77–79, 86; *Sacrifice Unveiled*, 69–74. This is Augustine’s basic perspective. As I shall show below, his understanding cannot be understood as somehow betraying an anti-ritual bias.

85 Augustine, *CivDei*. 10.5 [BA, 34:440]. The sacramentality of sacrifice, then connects it back to the conceptualities of *De doctrina* and its concern for signification.

86 Augustine, *CivDei*. 10.20 [BA, 34:498].
However, this interiorization must not be understood in a facile or anti-material or anti-cultic sense. The distinction is not simply between interior and exterior or visible and invisible. Both the cross and the Eucharist are identified as true sacrifice. Moreover, the crucifixion and the Eucharist are both exterior and visible acts, one of them cultic. In fact, given the polemical context I have established, it is precisely as cultic that the Eucharist serves the purposes of Augustine’s argument.

Later in book ten, Augustine will identify the true sacrifice of the incarnation and redemption as a sacramentum, and the true sacrifice of the Eucharist as the sacramentum of Calvary. So, then, despite the move toward interiority, for a sacrifice to be visible or a sacramentum does not make it untrue. Rather, in true sacrifice there is a coincidence of exterior and interior. The sacramentum that coheres with the interior disposition is itself a true sacrifice. This occurred perfectly in Christ’s sacrifice with

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88 Augustine, CivDei. 10.20 [BA, 34:498].

89 Augustine, CivDei. 10.25 [BA, 34:510].

90 Augustine, CivDei. 10.20 [BA, 34:498].

which the Eucharist has an intrinsic relationship, allowing them both to be considered true sacrifices.92

Having interiorized his account of sacrifice, Augustine proceeds, “A true sacrifice is any work which is done in order that we might be bound together in holy society with God with reference to that final good, by which we are able to be truly blessed.”93 Sacrifice, then has social dimensions as its contours and blessedness in God as its end.94 A human being consecrated to God is a sacrifice. The human body, engaged in self-denial, is likewise a sacrifice, as can be the soul.95 These considerations lead Augustine to identify any act of mercy (provided that it is referred to blessedness in God) as a true sacrifice. From this it follows that the entire redeemed city, that is the congregation and society of the saints, is offered to God as a universal sacrifice by the great priest, who also offered himself in his passion for us, according to the form of a servant, in order that we might be the body of such a head. Indeed this he offered, in this he was offered, according to this he is the mediator, in this the priest, in this the sacrifice.96

So then, Christ is at once the one who offers (priest) and the offering (victim), but the logic does not stop there, for the church is also the sacrifice. Christ’s self-sacrifice on the cross is for the sake of being able to offer the church as the body of which he is the head.

92 On this see especially Teske, “Sacrifice in CivDei,” 159–160.

93 Augustine, CivDei. 10.6 [BA, 34:444]. Lawrence Frankovich identifies two generic aspects of true sacrifice for Augustine—its being directed towards God, its being expressive of interior dispositions—and a third “special sense” which identifies Jesus’s death on the cross as a true sacrifice. “Augustine’s Theory of Eucharistic Sacrifice” (Ph.D. diss, Marquette University, 1976), 79–83. See also Studer, “Das Opfer Christi,” 96–100.


95 Augustine, CivDei. 10.6 [BA, 34:444, 446]. Once more, that the body can be a sacrifice shows that Augustine’s interiority cannot simply be glossed as immateriality.

96 Augustine, CivDei. 10.6 [BA, 34:446]. See also Studer, “Das Opfer Christi,” 100–101; Lafont, “Le sacrifice de la cité de Dieu,” 204–205; Levering, Theology of Augustine, 122–123.
Further, the phrase “according to this he is the mediator,” indicates that the telos of the incarnation is sacrifice. Christ is the mediator between God and humanity so that he can and because he does offer humanity in sacrifice to God.97

Christ’s offering of humanity to God occurs as the movement of his own self-offering. Two statements from Augustine clarify what this means. The first is that Christ, our true mediator, who “reconciling us to God by the sacrifice of peace, remained one with him to whom he offered, and was made one in himself with those for whom he offered. He himself was the one who offered and what he offered.”98 The second was quoted above, that as the priest he is also the head of the body. So in offering humanity to God, Christ is offering himself, and in offering himself he is also offering humanity. This is expressed by the image of Christ as head of his body the church. This offering of humanity is then identified with the Eucharist.99 Hence, Christ’s sacrifice is his passion on the cross, and his offering of the redeemed city to the Father, and the offering of the Eucharist.

When Augustine speaks of the body of Christ in the context of the Eucharist, he typically identifies it with the church, exhorting his congregation to see themselves on the altar, and to receive what they are in receiving Christ’s body.100 Further clarity on this

97 See also Augustine, CivDei. 10.24 [BA, 34:508], where Christ assumes humanity in order to offer it as a sacrifice for purification. See also Studer, “Sacramentum et exemplum,” 140–141. All of this recalls Augustine’s words in De Trinitate 4, where he offers four components of every sacrifice: “to whom it is offered, by whom it is offered, what is offered, for whom it is offered,” DeTrin. 4.14 [BA, 15:388]. What is offered—in this case Christ’s humanity—must be taken from those on whose behalf it is offered. In other words, Christ becomes human so that he can offer his humanity on the behalf of humanity. See further TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian, 171–176.

98 Augustine, DeTrin. 4.14 [BA, 15:388].

99 Augustine, CivDei. 10.6 [BA, 34:448].

100 Augustine, Sermon 227 [SC, 116:234, 236, 238]; Sermo CCLXXII [Sancti Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis Episcopi Opera Omnia, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, Electronic, Patrologia Latina 38 (Chadwyck-
point is furnished by the twenty-sixth Tractate on John, where Augustine distinguishes between the sacramentum and the virtue sacramenti of the Eucharist. One may come to the altar and receive the former without receiving the latter, which accounts for those who eat and drink, but nevertheless perish.\(^{101}\) As he warns his auditors: the Holy Spirit gives life to and animates the body. Therefore, those who desire to have life must not neglect to be members of Christ’s body the church.\(^{102}\) The food and drink of which Christ speaks is the church, and the Eucharist is the “sacramentum of this reality, that is, the unity of the body and blood of Christ.”\(^{103}\) Those who partake of this reality, which is glossed as both sharing in Christ and sharing in the church, will have everlasting life in Christ.\(^{104}\) Hence salvation is sharing in Christ is membership in the church. These are not two realities but one.

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\(^{101}\) InIo. 26.11 [BA, 72:508].

\(^{102}\) Augustine, InIo. 26.13 [BA, 72:516]. Indeed the ecclesiality of sacrifice is underscored by the fact that the Eucharist is a sacramentum of Christ’s sacrifice, which locates it within Augustine’s general theory of signification in De doctrina. The reason that conventional signs function as signs for Augustine is their embeddedness within interpretive communities. In fact, a major distinction between the magical rites offered to demons and the sacraments of the church is the difference in interpretive communities within which they take place they bind their participants, De doctrina 2.23–25 [BA, 11:292, 294, 296, 298, 300, 302]. On this see Markus, Signs and Meanings, 32–43, 105–120, 125–146. See further Lienhard, “Sacramentum and the Eucharist in St. Augustine,” 190–192. See also Toulouse, “Le vrai sacrifice,” 208–209. Meconi quite helpfully presses the collocation of ecclesial unity and charity as the referent of the Eucharist. The One Christ, 228–231.

\(^{103}\) Augustine, InIo. 26.15 [BA, 72: 20, 522 (522)].

Augustine and the *Totus Christus*

In order to grasp this account of salvation as sharing in Christ/the church, and particularly the way it gets expressed as Christ offering humanity to God, something must be said of Augustine’s notion of the *totus Christus*. For Augustine “Christ” is not simply the historical person Jesus of Nazareth, but rather the whole Christ, head and members, an exegetical principle he has appropriated from Tyconius.\(^ {105} \) According to Tarsicius van Bavel, Augustine developed his conception of the church as the whole Christ primarily from Paul’s words in 1 Corinthians 12:12–27, writing:

> In his interpretation of this text of Paul, Augustine rightly remarks that here Paul is making more than a comparison; Paul is describing a reality…Augustine draws attention to the fact that Paul says: “so also is Christ”, or: “so also is the Anointed One”. That means: Christ *is* Head and Members together; and not: the relationship between Christ and us bears a resemblance to the relationship between the head and the other members of the body.”\(^ {106} \)

So, for instance, in his Exposition of Psalm 68, Augustine contends that the speaker is Christ, i.e., the whole Christ, including his members.\(^ {107} \)


Obviously a variety of Pauline texts lie behind this idea of the “*totus Christus caput et corpus*.” Romans 12:4–8 describes Christians as one body in Christ and notes the various charisms they might possess for the common good. Similar to this is the already cited 1 Corinthians 12:12–27. Likewise the Epistle to the Ephesians has the church as the fullness of Christ (Eph. 1:22–23), and expresses the hope that all Christians will together grow as one body into the fullness of Christ its head (Eph. 4:10–16). There is, then, an inseparable unity between Christ and his body, the church. Together they form one person, which is bound together by the Holy Spirit, who animates the body of Christ.

Regarding the important pneumatological dimension of the *totus Christus*, Augustine writes, “We are indeed, both singly and all together, his temple, because he deigns to inhabit us all together harmoniously and singly; he is not greater in the whole than in the single, because he is neither expanded by the mass nor diminished by the partition.”\(^{108}\) The *totus Christus* owes its existence not just to the incarnation of the Son, but also to the indwelling of the Spirit, by whose agency the whole body is united.\(^{109}\) As Wilhelm Gessel notes, “Body and head live from one Spirit, the Holy Spirit, which is the soul of the church.”\(^{110}\)

*Totus Christus* and Sacrifice

With our notion of the whole Christ in place, we are in a better position to understand what Augustine is doing with sacrifice in this context. The *totus Christus* concept means that the sacrifice of Christ is not just the historical event of the cross, but

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\(^{108}\) Augustine, *CivDei*. 10.3 [BA, 34:434].


rather involves all of the church as well. The entire redeemed city will be offered to God, an action which is intrinsically related to the cross. Augustine understands this offering of the redeemed city in the context of the Pauline exhortations to present one’s body as a living sacrifice to God (Romans 12:1), and then writes, “This is the sacrifice of Christians: the many are one body in Christ. This the church also continually celebrates in the sacrament of the altar, well known to the faithful, where it is shown to them that in what it offers, it is itself offered.” So then, the cross, the offering of the whole Christ, the offerings of the individual faithful, and the Eucharist are bound together in a single stroke.

The Eucharist is a daily *sacramentum* of the res of Christ’s sacrifice in which the church learns to offer itself through him. Gerald Bonner writes:

> The complexity of construction of the argument of this passage is remarkable, even by Augustine's standards. Starting from his premiss [*sic*] that a sacrament [*sic*—read: “sacrifice”] is every act which is designed to unite us to God in holy fellowship, he argues that acts of compassion are sacrifices, and immediately applies this conception to the eucharist, in which Christ, the priest, offers his Body, which is at the same time the human body which suffered on Calvary; the bread and wine on the altar, which are offered by the Faithful; and the Faithful themselves.

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111 Augustine, *CivDei*. 10.6 [BA, 34:448]. Also *Sermon* 227 [SC, 116:236, 240]; *Sermon* 198, 53–54 [Dolbeau, 132–133]. Cf. *In Io.* 26.13 [BA, 72:516–518], where “body of Christ” is glossed as the church, but without explicit recourse to sacrificial language. In these contexts, especially *Sermon* 227, Augustine trades upon the idea of many grains coming together to form one loaf found in, e.g., *Didache* 9:4 [*Apostolic Fathers*, 358]; Cyprian, *Epistle* 63 [CSEL 3:711–712], etc. This image is itself an expansion of the Pauline notion that the church is one body of Christ because it shares in one eucharistic loaf (1 Corinthians 10:16–17).

112 Augustine, *CivDei*. 10.20 [BA, 34:498].

It is particularly through the eucharistic communion that we come to share in Christ’s “divinely humble flesh,” and hence, in his sacrificial life. For Augustine this offering of Christians has both corporate and individual implications. On the one hand, the whole redeemed city, including the saints on earth and in heaven, is the sacrifice offered by Christ to God. On the other hand, though, individual acts of piety undertaken by individual Christians are likewise conceived of as sacrifices of this sort, a binding together of the rational/spiritual [λογικῆν] offering of one’s body in Romans 12:1–2 with the body of Christ language from elsewhere in the Pauline corpus.

The intertwining of individual and corporate dimensions is important to remember because it helps maintain continuity with the definition of sacrifice established in City of God 10.5–6: “True sacrifices are acts of mercy …which are referred to God.” On its surface, the Eucharist does not seem to fit this description. While, one could argue that the sacrament’s relationship to the cross grants it this character, still this quality as an act of mercy is not readily apparent. Moreover, the cross would seem to be God’s act of mercy towards us, while Augustine sees the Eucharist as a sacrifice offered by the church as well. Hence, at first blush, applying Augustine’s definition of sacrifice to the Eucharist seems strained at best.


114 Meconi, The One Christ, 226.

115 CivDei. 10.6 [BA, 34:446]. See also the commentary by Bardy (BA, 34:617); Lafont, “Le sacrifice de la cité de Dieu,” 204–205.

Two elements of Augustine’s thought allow us to overcome this impasse. First, the *totus Christus* concept helps to ameliorate the concern about whose act of mercy is in view. The actions undertaken by Christ’s members, whether the corporate actions of the church or the individual actions of particular Christians, are undertaken in union with Christ the head. They are indeed acts of Christ. Second, the pious acts of individual Christians offered “on the altar of the heart”\(^{117}\) are the result of the church learning to offer itself through Christ in the Eucharist. \(^{118}\) The intrinsic connection between these two modes of sacrifice, one of which is more explicitly concerned with merciful activity on Christians’ part, allows us to see the Eucharist as exhibiting the characteristics of true sacrifice that are not apparent at first glance. As Teske notes, “The theme of the whole Christ (*totus Christus*) underlies the unity of the many acts of sacrifice with the one sacrifice of Christ.”\(^{119}\)

**Sacrifice as Synthesis**

I have identified two types of purification in Augustine: interior purification by faith and purification by the destruction of death. The concept of true sacrifice provides a framework that integrates both types of purification. The way Augustine normally applies it is in the context of the destruction of death. However, because his doctrine of sacrifice involves an interior turn, it is just as much about inward renewal. Sacrifice is about interior dispositions, just like purification by faith is. Sacrifice, then, is another way of talking about the volitional movement that comprises the journey to the homeland. That

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117 *CivDei*. 10.3 [BA, 34:434].

118 *CivDei*. 10.20 [BA, 34:498].

119 Teske, “Sacrifice in *CivDei*,” 167. *Contra* Daly, who views the connection to the Eucharist as more tenuous, even suggesting that Augustine leaves any connection between the Eucharist and “works of Christian love” inchoate. “Sacrifice in Origen and Augustine,” 152–153 [153].
sacrifice is intrinsically connected to the crucifixion demonstrates that Christ does not merely show us the way, but rather carries us along the way. Sacrifice is another way of saying that Christ brings us back to God.

In other words, for Augustine salvation consists in enjoyment of God, which occurs through the humanity of the incarnate Christ. Sacrifice is another way of talking about this communion with God. Sacrifice is not simply something that Christ does to save humanity. Rather, sacrifice is itself salvation: sacrifice as communion. As David Meconi puts it, “The *conuersio* of all creation becomes the *communio* of the faithful as Christ draws them into his own sacrifice, not as mere spectators but as participants in this supreme act of worship…Through the Eucharistic sacrifice, Christ continues to be with his faithful on earth, thus uniting them to his offering of self to the Father.”

**Sacrifice as Communion: Conclusions**

The evidence from eucharistic origins leads to the conclusion that in the Eucharist meal and sacrifice are one, which also means that sacrifice and communion are inextricable, for meals were expressive and constitutive of communal life in antiquity. In the earliest Christian centuries the understandings of eucharistic sacrifice were diverse—ranging from understandings of sacrifice that traded upon a connection with Christ’s death to those with no explicit connection to the cross. Nevertheless, as a communal

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120 Note the similar findings of Meconi, who sees deification language in Augustine as carrying the same freight as his other soteriological motifs, such as recapitulation, adoption by God, the exchange of humanity and divinity in Christ, and the exaltation of humanity. *The One Christ*, 79–134, and especially 129. For further treatments of deification in Augustine see Gerald Bonner, “Augustine’s Conception of Deification,” *The Journal of Theological Studies* 37 (1986): 369–86; Robert Puchniak, “Augustine’s Conception of Deification, Revisited,” in *Theòsis: Deification in Christian Theology*, ed. Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov, vol. 1 (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2006), 122–33. My suggestion is that sacrifice similarly names coming to share in the divine life.

121 Meconi, *The One Christ*, 225.
meal, it was inevitable that the Eucharist would be understood as a sacrifice. This diversity must be recognized and respected. Nevertheless, Augustine’s definition of sacrifice allows for a synthesis of these diverse strands of sacrificial thought, for any act directed toward the communion of God and humans qualifies as sacrifice.

Moreover, the Augustinian synthesis provides an important and irreversible advance because of the way the *totus Christus* concept binds these diverse understandings of sacrifice together with the work of Christ upon the cross. “The Holy Spirit unifies all Christian characteristics into Christ. This vital component of Augustine’s ecclesiology safeguards against any temptation to attribute Christian holiness or virtue to the creature. In the ‘whole Christ’ the holiness of Christ and of the Christian are not separated.”122 In other words, on the basis of Augustine’s theology of sacrifice we are able to both affirm the genuinely salutary character of Christians’ lives and activities, of the Eucharist, etc., and to do so in such a way that the sole basis of Christian salvation is Christ’s life, death, and resurrection. These various “sacrifices” are intrinsically related and assimilated to the one sacrifice of Christ on the cross. To reneg on this synthesis risks a Pelagianism where spiritual benefits accrue from some source other than the paschal mystery.123

The sacrifice of the Mass provides a way to talk about the self-offering of Christians in a way deeply connected with Christ’s sacrifice. It provides an account of humanity’s return to God in Christ, and hence, of salvation as communion. However, the treatment thus far has had little direct connection to mission. It shall be my task in the

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remainder of this chapter to demonstrate that in addition to sacrifice as communion, the Eucharist also carries the weight of sacrifice as mission.

Eucharist: Sacrifice as Mission

In this section, I provide a missional expansion to the last section’s account of sacrifice, and do so in two ways. One flows from the argument I have made in this chapter, by demonstrating that the Augustinian definition of sacrifice with which I am working can and should be understood in missionary terms, even though this was not explicit in Augustine. The second flows from the trinitarian soteriology I sketched in chapter two, and shows that this soteriology demands a missional understanding of the eucharistic sacrifice.

A preliminary warrant for interpreting mission in terms of sacrifice (and vice-versa) may be found in Paul’s description of his apostolic ministry in Romans 15:16. He has received grace, “In order to be a liturgist of Christ Jesus to the Gentiles, serving in the priestly ministry of the gospel of God, in order that the offering of the Gentiles might be acceptable, being sanctified by the Holy Spirit.”

language makes explicit what might otherwise be implicit in our Augustinian account of missionary sacrifice. For Augustine any merciful deed carried out with reference to a holy society between God and humanity is a sacrifice. Mission, of course, fits this description. Paul, however, specifically names it as such.

One significant difference obtains between my argument and the Pauline statement. For my argument, sacrifice names our own participation in mission. The missionary sacrifice is a self-offering, which takes the shape of missionary engagement. The church, as the body of Christ, is offered to God and to the world. For Paul, though, it is the Gentiles, the objects of mission, who are offered. These two viewpoints are not incompatible, for both ideas—self-offering, and the offering of the Gentiles—are Pauline. Indeed, both are found in Romans (12:1–2; 15:16). Moreover, the parenetic section of the epistle, within which the passage in which Paul describes mission in sacrificial terms,


With regard to these verses in Romans, Robert Jewett understands Paul’s use of cultic terminology to be a “transformation of cultic terminology.” Romans: A Commentary, ed. Eldon Jay Epp, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 906–908 [907]. He further notes that this transformation is not driven by anti-cultic polemic (730). Douglas Moo (The Epistle to the Romans, NICNT [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996], 889–891), and James Dunn (Romans 9–16, WBC 38a [Dallas: Word Books, 1988], 859–860) see Paul as contrasting his apostolic ministry with Old Testament cultic activity. Dunn notes that Paul’s usage signals a transformation that does away with a cultic-secular distinction (859–860). This is right, so far as it goes, but it goes to far in assuming that this must further mean that there is no cult. Cranfield does not view Paul’s ministry as directly priestly, but rather as quasi-Levitical service in an auxiliary capacity to Christ the high priest. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, vol. 2, ICC (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1979), 755–756. See Thomas Schreiner’s rebuttal of such a viewpoint. Romans, BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), 766. However, even in such a case, the fact that mission is conceived as sacrifice is enough for my purposes at this point.

125 So, rightly, Jewett, Romans, 906–908; Cranfield, Romans, 2:756–757; Schreiner, Romans, 766–767. Dunn prefers to read “ἐθνῶν [Gentiles]” as an objective genitive, but thinks it could plausibly be a subjective genitive as well. Romans 9–16, 860–861. Similarly, Moo prefers the objective genitive, but notes the possible connection between the “offering of the Gentiles” in verse 16 and the “obedience of the Gentiles” mentioned in verse 18. Romans, 890. This connection suggests that the synthesis of the two understandings of sacrifice as mission could be even more Pauline than it first appears. Brendan Byrne, simply opts for a subjective genitive. Romans, Sacra Pagina 6 (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1996), 436.
begins with the imagery of self-offering in Romans 12:1–2. What I propose, then, is reading the cultic description of apostolic activity in light of the cultic description with which the ethical section of the letter begins. The Augustinian theology of the *totus Christus* allows me to make such a synthesis. In the next chapter, my reading of the eucharistic prayer will provide further support for synthesizing these two images of sacrifice.

Since Augustine’s doctrine of sacrifice is a means by which he describes our return to God and our coming to share in the divine life through the humanity of the incarnate Christ, it is easily assimilated to the trinitarian soteriology sketched in the last chapter. By his incarnation, death, resurrection, ascension, and bestowal of the Holy Spirit, the Son of God has joined us to himself, enabling us to share his place in the eternal life he shares with the Father and the Holy Spirit. This life is one characterized by a “eucharistic” dynamism of donation-reception-redonation. Sacrifice, then, in its most basic character is communion in the triune life of God.

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126 So also Jewett, *Romans*, 724–731, who sees the introduction of sacrifice in the ethical section as a move that “sustains the missional imperative of the letter as a whole” (724), and makes explicit connection between the two passages; Cranfield, *Romans*, 2:595–605; Schreiner, *Romans*, 640–648. Dunn views Romans 12:1–2’s sacrificial language as paradigmatic for the section, but also as a decisive move away from cult such that later applications of sacrifice to eucharistic contexts is retrograde. *Romans* 9–16, 708–710, 716–717. Similarly, Moo, *Romans*, 748–754, but with the understanding that Paul is expanding, rather than abrogating cultic activity. See Byrne’s statement that to see Paul’s argument as being directed against cultic activity as such is a significant misconstrual of the apostle’s priorities in this context. *Romans*, 602. So also Cranfield, *Romans*, 2:602.

127 Indeed, this is, essentially, what Augustine has already done with the various Pauline uses of “body.” Even in Paul, the individual Christian body of Romans 12:1–2 is offered, as is the eucharistic/ecclesial body of the Corinthian correspondence (1 Corinthians 10:15–22; 11:17–34). Augustine has merely assimilated the imagery. On the one hand, Augustine goes beyond Paul, as the connections are not made explicit in the Pauline letters. On the other hand, such assimilations are latent in the Pauline corpus. For instance, immediately after the exhortation to offer one’s body as a living sacrifice in Romans 12:1–2, Paul appeals to the image of a body to describe the Christian community in Romans 12:3–8. Clearly these realities were associated in his mind. See, additionally, Dale Martin’s treatment of the interplay of individual Christian bodies, the eucharistic species, the body of the Lord, and the body of the church in the Corinthian correspondence. *Corinthian Body*, 194–196.
Through the divine missions we are invited into and come to share in God’s life. This is our sacrifice, and by the incarnation, it is at one with the sacrifice that Christ eternally is. By baptism we are introduced, deputed, and destined to this life. By the eucharistic sacrifice we continue to be shaped by it, not merely as individuals, but as the church, which is Christ’s body. Through the eucharistic sacrifice this body of Christ, the church, is offered in the same sacrifice which Christ offered on the cross. And, as the Pauline description of apostolic ministry shows, this sacrificial offering can be given a missionary application.

Two further aspects of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theology will allow me to make the missionary connection explicit and unavoidable. They are the eucharistic universalization of the Christ form and the bi-directionality of the Holy Spirit’s procession.

**Eucharist as Universalizing the Christ Form**

In chapter two I appropriated Balthasar’s eucharistic account of the trinitarian processions and his soteriology of bringing humanity to share in the life constituted by those processions by way of the divine missions. This is, of course, accomplished by the events of the paschal mystery, which are themselves an *ad extra* enactment of the divine life, and in which we ourselves come to share by the sacraments, particularly the

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sacraments of initiation. In Balthasar’s terms, we come to share in the Christ form, which is another way of saying that we come to share in the pattern of his life shared with the Father and the Holy Spirit. Moreover our coming to share in Christ’s life is also a coming to share in his mission, which characterized his life.  

It is because Christ’s life was characterized by his mission of bringing humanity to share in him, and hence in the life of God that Balthasar states, “Only the Eucharist really completes the Incarnation,” because the Eucharist serves the incarnation’s goal of bestowing Christ and his life upon human beings. “Bread and wine do not hide the flesh and blood of Christ, rather, they reveal precisely how essentially Christ wishes to be nourishment for us, how deeply he incorporates himself into us, in order to take us up into himself.”

The Eucharist “liquefies” Christ so that he may be distributed universally. It is a particular work of the Holy Spirit to universalize Christ in this way. Recall that in the eucharistic account of the trinitarian processions, the Holy Spirit is the Son’s return-gift to the Father. The economic form of that shared life is the making of that life universally

129 All of this is established and documented in chapter two. Beyond the argument of chapter two, I also note that Balthasar’s references to the sacraments are replete with language of expropriation for the task of mission: e.g., Glory of the Lord, 7:403–420, 506; Theo-Drama, 3:349, 356, 429–436; Theo-Drama, 4:402–410. Rather than reproduce his thought on this matter, I focus on but one aspect of his eucharistic thought.


available. This, then, is a mission that extends to the ends of the earth, and which can never cease until all have been made partakers of the life of God through the incarnate Son, and in the Holy Spirit.

In sum, the divine life is eucharistic in shape. Its enactment *ad extra* is likewise eucharistic, and it is particularly through the Eucharist that we are taken up into Christ to share in this divine life. However, our partaking of this life through the Eucharist shares the same *telos* of that life, which is to extend it to others so that they might be incorporated into it as well. The movement of the Incarnation is completed through the eucharistic distribution of Christ’s flesh and blood, and our reception of Christ’s life in the Eucharist brings us into the same movement. Being taken up into Christ and made his members—which, following Augustine I have glossed as sacrifice—means striving to extend that life in Christ to all people. This missionary extension of Christ occurs not simply because it is the right thing to do, nor as a movement of response, but as *what it means to share in Christ*. This is sacrifice as mission.

**Bi-directionality of the Return Gift**

Not only is the movement of universalizing Christ an intrinsic component of sharing in Christ, it is the same movement that constitutes our return to the Father in Christ. In his eucharistic self-distribution, Christ has bound these two together. On the one hand, his life of filial obedience to the Father is fulfilled in his crucified dispossession. On the other hand, his mission of bringing life to humanity is fulfilled in the giving of himself as the eucharistic food.\(^\text{134}\)

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At the crucifixion, Jesus offers his life up to the Father. At the Last Supper, by which he interprets his impending death, he offers this same life to the disciples, giving them the body that the next day he will give to his Father. In most versions of the words of institution Jesus is said to simply give his body and blood to the disciples (1 Corinthians 11:24–25; Mark 14:22–24; Matthew 26:26–28). The Lucan version adds some complexity by having Jesus give the bread and then say, “This is my body, which on your behalf is given” (Luke 22:19). In each case, the last supper has Jesus giving his body to the disciples, while Luke suggests that the body given to them is also the body given for them. And so, by the same act of donation Jesus offers himself to the Father and to humanity.

Furthermore, once the theology of the *totus Christus* is in place, it becomes impossible to conceive of the church as not also given away to the Father and to humanity. Christ has come, after all, precisely to unite us with him in this movement. The sacramental body of Christ around which the ecclesial body of Christ gathers and on which it feeds brings a share in the historical body of Christ, which was given for the world’s salvation. If the church becomes what it receives in the Eucharist, then the church too must be at the Father’s disposal for the life of the world. Just as the Eucharist distributes Christ universally, the church is to be dispersed throughout the world so that all may come to share in Christ. All of the church’s efforts to spread abroad the life of

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God are integrated into the sacrifice of Christ, for the church is the body of Christ its head, who as the high priest offers the whole redeemed city to God, a sacrifice which is at one with his own. And that every act of mercy directed towards this communion between God and humanity may be considered a true sacrifice allows us to uphold the holistic character of mission established in chapter one.

In many regards, my proposal is similar to that of Edward Kilmartin, who likewise seeks a trinitarian basis for the eucharistic sacrifice. According to Kilmartin:

The *transitus* of the liturgical community to the Father is expressed liturgically in the Eucharistic Prayer…Holy Communion enables sacramental communion with Christ as the one who gives himself to the Father for humanity. He gives himself as the “man for others” to draw believers into personal communion with himself and so into communion with the Father…sacrifice…is, in the first place, the self-offering of the Father in the gift of his Son, and in the second place the unique response of the Son in his humanity to the Father, and in the third place, the self-offering of believers in union with Christ by which they share in his covenant relation with the Father.\(^\text{137}\)

Where I differ from Kilmartin, though, is significant. His trinitarian theology of sacrifice remains solely at the level of the economy, while mine is thoroughly bound up with the processions themselves.

Moreover, while Kilmartin acknowledges that, as the Eucharist gives a share in Christ’s body it also, “draws [the community] into the fate of the body of Christ”\(^\text{138}\)—an affirmation that could most certainly be given a missionary application—the trinitarian soteriology I am advancing more readily lends itself to the missional. I say this because the dual movement towards God and the world has its basis in the triune life. The Son’s return-of-gift in the spiration of the Holy Spirit is at once his reversion to the Father and


\(^{138}\) Kilmartin, *Eucharist in the West*, 381.
his going forth from the Father, such that this joint spiration is “the utmost removal from the Father and, in the accomplishment of the mission, the final stride toward him and into him,” showing “the path away from God as the path to God.” For this reason, worship as directed to God, and mission as directed to the world, cannot be pitted against each other because Christ has bound them together. His exitus from the Father is at one with his reditus to the Father. This identity holds whether we are considering the processions or the missions, because the missions are the processions with a contingent term.

This further differentiates me from E. L. Mascall and John Dunnill, who not only provide a trinitarian account of sacrifice but also take the processions into account. Mascall’s and Dunnill’s positions lack a consideration of the spiration of the Holy Spirit as the Son’s return gift. This identification provides three advantages to a trinitarian theology of sacrifice. First, it hypostasizes love. The return gift is not generic, but is rather fully personal. Second, because it is a joint spiration, the Son’s response of love is undertaken in common with the Father. Sacrifice is not an act of “pure” response. It is

139 Balthasar, Theologik, 2:223 (My translation).
140 So also Williams, Eucharistic Sacrifice, 30–31.
141 On the exitus-reditus schema see Vagaggini, Theological Dimensions of the Liturgy, 191–246; Coffey, Deus Trinitas, 35–45, 48–53 (whereas Coffey pits mission-procession models of the Trinity against “return” models, my perspectives sees them as united, for the divine missions are directed towards the return of creatures to God); Kilmartin, Eucharist in the West, 358–359, 368–382. For its prominence in Balthasar, see Healy, Eschatology of Balthasar, 1–6; and Coffey, Deus Trinitas, 139–148.
142 Mascall simply glosses the Son’s “filial response” as return gift. Corpus Christi, 90–91. Dunnill, however, writes that the Father “begets…the Son and generates [sic] the Spirit, and they exist together in a union of love, receiving their being from the Father and making as a return gift their response of love.” Sacrifice and the Body, 210–212 [212]. Joseph P. Cassidy, on the other hand, does identify the Holy Spirit in these terms: “the life offered and re-offered is so utterly personal that the exchange eternally constitutes another person, the Holy Spirit.” “The Post Communion Prayer—Living Sacrifice,” in Living the Eucharist: Affirming Catholicism and the Liturgy, ed. Stephen Conway (London: Darton, Longman, & Todd, 2002), 109.
always conditioned by and enabled by the initial gift. While within the co-equal Godhead this may seem like a pedantic distinction, it becomes especially important when we come to consider humanity’s sharing in sacrifice. Our response is always conditioned, accompanied, and empowered by divine grace. The *filioque* gives a basis for this fact in the triune life itself. Finally, it allows us to establish the bi-directionality of the Son’s return to the Father. The *reditus* is not mere return, but rather return by way of going forth, a going forth in which the church participates by way of mission.

Moreover, because salvation consists in sharing in the Son’s return to the Father, being brought and offered by him to his Father (sacrifice as communion), and because the Son’s return to the Father is also his movement through the world in mission, our return to the Father in Christ also takes the form of mission (sacrifice as mission). The Eucharist discloses both of these facets of the mystery of salvation. The eucharistic sacrifice not only enacts the church as the body of Christ, but enacts it as a body which is given both to the Father and to the world for the world’s salvation.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has carried forward the trinitarian soteriology of chapter two by connecting it to the sacrament of the Eucharist, and in particular to the eucharistic sacrifice. A consideration of Augustine’s theology of sacrifice, set against the backdrop of the intertwining of meal and sacrifice in antiquity, yielded the notion of sacrifice as communion. It is not only because of, but precisely *in and as* Christ’s sacrifice that human beings are incorporated into the divine life. The sacrifice of the Mass is not
merely the offering of Christ, but of the whole Christ, as the head presents his members to the Father.

I then synthesized this account of sacrifice with my trinitarian missiology. Because Christ’s self-offering is directed at once to the Father and to humanity, it follows that in the Eucharist we are also dealing with sacrifice as mission. From Augustine we learn that the eucharistic sacrifice is another way to talk about sharing in Christ. We further learn that not only our liturgical acts, but also our extra-liturgical virtues, pieties, and ethical actions are integrated into Christ’s sacrifice. This integration of extra-liturgical life into the one sacrifice of Christ means that our mission can also be a sharing in Christ’s sacrifice, which is the sole basis of our return to God. This integration avoids any Pelagianizing of mission, which would posit a salutary action on our part that is not undertaken in union with the paschal mystery.

Augustine demonstrates that this integration of mission into Christ’s sacrifice can occur. Balthasar’s account of the Eucharist as universalizing Christ, in concert with my own observations regarding the words of institution, demonstrates that this sharing in mission is itself part of the immanent intelligibility of coming to share in Christ’s sacrifice. To make our return to the Father in Christ is to pass through the world on mission. This, then, returns us to the concerns of chapter one, where I noted the holistic character of mission and argued that the church is necessarily implicated in missionary engagement with the world. In the next and final chapter, I shall return once more to the relationship between church and world by considering the missionary consummation of the liturgy and the eschatological consummation of the missional church.
CHAPTER IV: SICUT ERAT IN PRINCIPIO, ET NUNC, ET SEMPER: THE CHURCH’S MISSIONARY CONSUMMATION

In the last chapter, I marshaled Augustine of Hippo’s theology of true sacrifice to argue for a missionary understanding of the eucharistic sacrifice. On the one hand, sacrifice names that movement whereby human beings are brought to share in the communion of God’s own life.¹ On the other hand, sacrifice is also mission, for the movement back to God and the movement into and through the world in mission are a unity, and the sacrifices of Christians’ ethical/missionary lives are integrated into the one sacrifice of Christ. This chapter picks up precisely where the last left off in considering mission as the fulfillment of the eucharistic gift. It does not stop there, however, for the Eucharist’s fulfillment is ultimately eschatological.² Hence, the consummation of all things must also inform this chapter’s perspective.

¹ See chapter two for my articulation of this trinitarian soteriology and its connection to the notion of missio Dei.

I shall proceed by examining the missionary dynamism implicit in the eucharistic prayers of the *Book of Common Prayer*. Grounding my argument liturgically provides an important complement to my theological argument in chapter three, which was more abstract and theoretical. The sacrament of the Eucharist is not a concept, but rather a liturgical act of the church, and therefore the liturgy according to which it is celebrated remains determinative of its meaning. This liturgical grounding ensures that my claims are not the idiosyncratic musings of a private theologian, but are indeed the understanding implicit in the church’s sacramental celebration. Finally, I shall articulate an understanding of the continuity between the pilgrim church’s historical life in mission and its final eschatological destiny by way of a systematic articulation of the missional ecclesiology constructed over the course of this study.

**Parameters for the Relationship Between Liturgy and Mission**

The proof of the pudding, as they say, is in the eating. Similarly, it is in the actual eucharistic meal that my proposal of a missionary understanding of the eucharistic sacrifice will prove its adequacy or lack thereof. Therefore, in this chapter, I investigate the eucharistic prayers of 1979 *Book of Common Prayer* to demonstrate that my missional appropriation of the sacrament is not an imposition upon the liturgy, but rather arises naturally therefrom. This is, of course, only an approximation, because, just as the

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3 So, e.g., Schmemann, *For the Life of the World*; Lathrop, *Holy People: A Liturgical Ecclesiology*; *Holy Things: A Liturgical Theology*; Ploeger, *Celebrating Church*; David W. Fagerberg, *Theologia Prima: What Is Liturgical Theology?*, 2d. ed. (Chicago / Mundelein: Hillenbrand Books, 2004). Note further Kilmartin’s insistence that continual recourse to the eucharistic prayer is needed to ensure that a Christian account of sacrifice remains truly Christian. *Eucharist in the West*, 353–354. This is not meant to indicate that God is not the ultimate determiner of the Eucharist’s meaning (On which see the discussion in Mudd, *Eucharist as Meaning*, 175–192). Instead, I am making the rather more modest claim that the liturgies for celebrating a given sacrament are expressive of the church’s understanding of what this action intends to accomplish.
Eucharist is not simply a concept, the eucharistic prayer is not simply a text. It is meant to be enacted, to be offered. A theological argument can analyze the text, or refer to ceremonial, in explaining what is involved in the rite, but it can go no further. So, to take the image of pudding and its proof a bit further, the real test comes in the actual life of the church, both in the liturgies it enacts, and in the veri-fication of these liturgies in its missionary comportment to the world. Nevertheless, this approximation can be provided, and, to the extent that it accurately reflects the eucharistic prayer’s intent, it does indeed show what God accomplishes through the Mass.

My consideration of mission as fulfillment of the eucharistic prayer necessarily raises the question of the relationship between liturgy and mission. My goal is to pursue the relationship implicit in the liturgy rather than appeal to a meta-liturgical construct. Nevertheless, briefly considering the major viewpoints regarding the relationship between liturgy and mission will provide bearings for this examination. It will, further, provide a few parameters that a satisfactory account of this relationship must respect.

**Liturgy and Mission can Neither be Separated nor Equated**

Much has changed since J. G. Davies’s lament about the separation between liturgy and mission in his seminal 1966 book, *Worship and Mission*:

Worship and mission are treated as two totally distinct objects of theological investigation; they are placed in isolated compartments without the possibility of cross-fertilization and without the question of their unity being raised at all. Nor is this the total picture—it would not be difficult to produce passage after passage from the writings of liturgiologists and missiologists which appear to be

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4 The notion of the liturgy being “veri-fied” in life shall prove central to my argument and is drawn from Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, e.g., 277. For Chauvet, this veri-fication involves more than simple confirmation, but also enactment of a truth. I follow him in hyphenating the term to indicate when I am using it in the same manner he does.
irreconcilable, suggesting not so much the unity of worship and mission as their complete dichotomy and even incompatibility.\(^5\)

Davies’s solution to this problem of separating liturgy and mission was to recognize that they “are not to be conceived as two distinct activities, the one theocentric and the other anthropocentric; [rather,] both are aspects of a single divine activity in which, through Christ, we are included.”\(^6\) In other words, Davies appeals to the concept of *missio Dei*, introduced in chapter one. God is on a mission to bring humanity to share in the divine life, and this mission includes both the liturgical activity of the church and missionary engagement in the world. In the decades since *Worship and Mission*’s publication, this perspective has gained the ascendancy.\(^7\)

Indeed, consensus now prevails that there is a definite connection between liturgy and extra-liturgical Christian living.\(^8\) In this regard, the way was paved by such figures as

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\(^7\) Davies’ lament and argument is carried forward by, e.g., Jala, *Liturgy and Mission*; Senn, *Witness of the Worshiping Community*. Senn’s book sets out to expand upon Davies’ argument, but also to adapt “it to indicate ways in which worship is itself an aspect of the mission of God” (5). This, in itself, is laudable, however, at several points Senn’s debt to Davies extends to near-verbatim reproduction without acknowledgement. Thomas H. Schattauer draws upon Senn in “Liturgical Assembly as Locus of Mission,” in *Inside Out: Worship in an Age of Mission*, ed. Thomas H. Schattauer (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 1–6. Recently, Ruth Meyers has drawn from Schattauer’s work to articulate her own understanding of the relationship. “Unleashing the Power of Worship,” *Anglican Theological Review* 92 (2010): 55–70; *Missional Worship, Worshipful Mission*, 29–38. Bevans and Schroeder likewise draw upon Schattauer in their attempt to articulate a comprehensive account of mission. *Constants in Context*, 361–368.

Virgil Michel, Don Saliers, and Paul Ramsey, particularly the latter pair’s landmark

1979 essays on the relationship between liturgy and ethics in the Journal of Religious


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Ethics. To the *lex orandi* and the *lex credendi* has been added the *lex vivendi* or *lex agendi*, which includes missionary engagement. To my mind, Chauvet’s threefold structure of Christian identity—composed of the poles of Scripture (the history of God’s saving activity), sacrament (the ritual enactment of faith in the history narrated in the Scriptural pole), and ethics (the concrete living out of Christian identity in daily life)—is the best account available of this relationship, for the elements cohere in a complex equipoise and cannot be abstracted away from each other. These poles of Scripture, sacrament, and ethics correspond roughly to the *lex credendi*, *lex orandi*, and *lex agendi/vivendi*, respectively.

Because my concern is to develop a missional ecclesiology, I shall simply speak of the relationship between liturgy and “mission,” which falls under the broader category of ethics, rather than constantly differentiating between mission, ethics, and other aspects

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12 My discussion of Romans 15:16 in relation to Romans 12:1 in chapter three should suffice to establish the claim that the ethical dimension of the Christian life includes missionary engagement.

13 Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 190–265. As stated, my goal is to identify the relationship native to the liturgy itself, rather than appeal to a meta-liturgical construct. So my use of Chauvet will be only insofar as he illuminates the liturgy. The best treatment of Chauvet’s viewpoint in this regard is Brunk, *Liturgy and Life*.
of Christian life. I shall, moreover, focus upon explicitly missionary applications of the
principle, addressing the ethical only when it proves illustrative of missionary concerns.

At times the relationship between liturgy and mission can still appear tenuous. For
instance, while John Flett contends that worship is an indispensible aspect of the
misisonal Christian community, he evinces an allergy toward “the intractability of settled
liturgical form,” which he opposes to “Worship in Spirit and in truth,” because it
“excludes missionary practice as basic to the life of the community.” 14 Similarly, Nathan
Kerr speaks of the doxological and liturgical character of Christian mission, but redefines
liturgy such that it is the missionary encounter ad extra rather than a cultic act. 15 I shall
return to Flett and Kerr below, for they offer important correctives to certain
understandings of the liturgy-mission relationship. For now I note that despite their
unease with cult and liturgy, they are illustrative of a new consensus that sees a definite
connection between liturgy and mission, for even their demurral is expressed in liturgical
terms.

This presumed relationship between liturgy and ethics/mission is often depicted as
intrinsic, 16 but without an adequate account of why or how this is so. For instance, some

14 Flett, Witness of God, 280. Below I will suggest that this opposition between the Spirit’s
freedom and the constraints of form are evidence of a Joachimite perspective. On Joachim of Fiore and his
legacy, see especially Henri de Lubac, La postérité spirituelle de Joachim de Flore: de Joachim à nos


16 Davies, Worship and Mission, 9–21; Senn, Witness of the Worshiping Community, 5–23;
Jacques Dournes, L’offrande des peuples: Recherches et remarques sur le binôme activité missionnaire –
action liturgique (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1967), 13; Benedict XVI, Sacramentum caritatis: On the
Eucharist as the Source and Summit of the Church’s Life and Mission, Vatican Website, February 22, 2007,
nos. 83–86, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_exh_20070222_sacramentum-caritatis.html; Emeis, “Liturgie und Diakonie,” 84–86; Hauerwas,
argue along the lines that the compassion of God directed towards Christians in the liturgy is also directed towards the world in mission, so that encountering this compassionate God leads Christians into compassionate action in their daily lives. 

Or, in other cases, liturgy is held up as a facet of the overarching missio Dei. God’s mission to bring humanity to share in the divine life is expressed in both the world and in the church. In both the liturgy and in missionary activity, Christians are invited to participate in this comprehensive mission of God. Still others note that the word addressed to the liturgical assembly is identical in content to the word that is proclaimed in missionary activity. Yet all these accounts do is to show that there are points of connection. They do not show explain precisely how or why this connection works, which leaves such...

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Brunk’s observation, at the conclusion of a survey of Vatican II documents, and the theologies of Karl Rahner, Edward Schillebeeckx, Bernard Häring, Juan Luis Segundo, Vegen Guroian, Don Saliers, and Virgel Michel characterizes the situation well, “How does sacramental ritual as ritual inform the identity of believers or the ethical claims that all of these figures in some measure associate with worship? None of them “examines why or how it is that the reception of a gift seems to give rise to an absolute obligation that human beings both worship God in ritual and serve their neighbor.” Liturgy and Life, 9–42 [42]. The rest of Brunk’s book points to Chauvet, and particularly his notion of symbolic exchange in concert with the threefold structure of Christian identity, as providing the needed account of why and how. I concur with this judgment. This is similar to Morrill’s judgment that both Alexander Schmemann and Johann-Baptist Metz want to see memory as transforming praxis, but neither gives an account of how this occurs. Anamnesis as Dangerous Memory, 144–145.
accounts vulnerable to the reintroduction of problematic gaps between liturgy and mission, to which I turn below. My reading of the eucharistic prayer will, I hope, provide a clearer answer to the “why” of the connection between liturgy and mission.

**A Threefold Heuristic for Discerning the Relationship and its Limitations**

Thomas Schattauer provides a threefold typology of ways the relationship between liturgy and mission could be conceived. While ultimately limited, this framework still provides a helpful schematization. The first paradigm, “inside and out,” views worship and mission as two separate tasks of the church: worship directed inward and mission directed outward. In worship Christians are formed and prepared for mission. The two meet insofar as liturgy prepares for mission, and mission supplies additional participants for the liturgy.\(^{21}\) The second, “outside in,” paradigm attempts to make worship itself an instrument of mission, as the liturgy is leveraged to be accessible to outsiders, and thereby evangelistic.\(^{22}\) Finally (and this is the paradigm for which Schattauer advocates), the “inside out” viewpoint sees mission as the *missio Dei*, of which the liturgy is an aspect:

The liturgical assembly of God's people in the midst of the world enacts and signifies the outward movement of God for the life of the world. Note that in this approach, the relationship between worship and mission is not instrumental, either directly or indirectly, but rather the assembly for worship *is* mission. The liturgical assembly is the visible locus of God's reconciling mission toward the world.\(^{23}\)

\(^{21}\) Schattauer, “Liturgical Assembly as Locus of Mission,” 2.

\(^{22}\) Schattauer, “Liturgical Assembly as Locus of Mission,” 2–3.

\(^{23}\) Schattauer, “Liturgical Assembly as Locus of Mission,” 3. This approach also corresponds to the position articulated by Davies, *Worship and Mission*, 9–21; and Senn, *Witness of the Worshiping Community*, 5–23. Note the concern for instrumentalization, to which I shall return below.
In such a paradigm, the salvation enacted in the liturgy signifies what God is doing for the whole world.

Schattauer’s argument has been picked up by Stephen Bevans and Roger Schroeder, whose seven-fold articulation of mission as *missio Dei* includes liturgy as one of its aspects, and by Ruth Meyers, who uses the images of a Möbius strip and a spinning top to illustrate the principle of worship flowing into mission and drawing mission back to itself. As she puts it: “worship is mission is worship.”

However, this manner of casting the relationship has certain limitations. In particular, it runs the risk of eliding liturgy and mission. This elision can take two forms. The first, which the “inside out” paradigm successfully avoids, would be to simply state that mission is fulfilled by liturgical observance. This requires a certain sleight of hand, whereby “mission” is seen in terms of “purpose,” as in the phenomena of “mission statements,” rather than in terms of “sending.” In such a viewpoint, the church’s mission/purpose is to celebrate the Eucharist, and in so doing, the church fulfills its mission. While liturgy may indeed be an aspect of mission, a recognition demanded by the Matthean Great Commission’s command to baptize, there is more to mission than mere liturgical observance. Chapter one argued for a comprehensive account of mission,

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26 Wood raises a similar concern about the conflation of liturgy and ethics in “Unity in the Sacraments and Unity in Ethics,” 66, and similarly suggests that Chauvet’s model more adequately accounts for the relationship between these two modalities of the church’s life (67–71).


28 See chapter 1.
which extends beyond liturgical celebration. Therefore, an understanding of mission that sees the mission fulfilled in the church’s liturgy, full stop, fails to meet the criteria established for a missional ecclesiology.

The other manner in which the elision can occur is to simply make everything “mission.” Recall that, in chapter one, in the interest of avoiding “panmissionism,” I explicitly set the parameters for what “counts” as mission in this study as encompassing the church’s activity directed beyond itself. Hence, Sacrosanctum concilium differentiates between the liturgy, from which and towards which all the church’s activities flow, and those activities that flow from and tend toward the liturgy: “Liturgy is not the only activity of the church,” but indeed presupposes the missionary task, which calls people to “faith and conversion.”\footnote{Sacrosanctum concilium, nos. 10, 9 [Tanner, 2:823]. See further Kaczynski, “Sacrosanctum Concilium,” 72–73.} I shall return to the Constitution on the Liturgy below. At this point I simply point out its distinction between liturgical and extra-liturgical activity. While I desire to bind these together, I believe that confusing them only serves to obscure matters, for then the liturgy becomes a potential alibi for mission ad extra. After all, in such a consideration, the liturgy is itself mission.

I believe that Meyers’s phrase “worship is mission is worship,” while perhaps unhelpful, is not fatally so, for her understanding of mission is not simply accomplished by worship. Similarly, Davies, Schattauer, Bevans, and Schroeder’s understandings of liturgy as an aspect of mission still allow for a holistic conception of mission, and an emphasis on its ad extra dimensions. Nevertheless, I believe that such conceptions are prone to terminological slippage, and to panmissionism. “Mission” runs the risk of becoming an amorphous umbrella term.
In contrast, by parsing *missio Dei* as paschal mystery, my own proposal gains a greater specificity. The liturgy and mission are both participations in the paschal mystery, both share the same eucharistic dynamism, and both are rooted in the divine missions, but they are not the same thing, nor can the one be subsumed by the other. Moreover, discussing mission under the locus of sacrifice allows the mission and the liturgy to be integrated without also being equated. Their integration is Christological and soteriological, rather than dependent upon more tenuous points of connection such as shared goals, or a shared proclamatory content.

**Gaps and Instrumentalization must be Avoided**

At a *prima facie* level, it makes sense for the liturgy’s relationship to mission to be one in which the liturgy forms and prepares participants for mission, but such an understanding has significant shortcomings. On the one hand, it reintroduces the gaps that chapter two’s trinitarian account of *missio Dei* as paschal mystery sought to close. Once a two-staged approach to the relationship is introduced and once mission can be deferred until the liturgy has done its work, it becomes conceivable for mission to be deferred endlessly. Indeed, as the liturgy’s work is never fully completed short of the eschaton, it

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might even be \textit{necessary} to endlessly defer mission, which would be absurd. As I noted in chapter two, because the church is constituted by the divine missions, it is necessarily always already engaged in mission. No gap can be introduced.

A far more serious problem with this viewpoint, though, is its tendency to instrumentalize the liturgy. Hence Kerr’s criticism:

My worries have to do with the political \textit{ontologization} of the church, on the one hand, and a concomitant \textit{instrumentalization} of worship, on the other hand…First, there is the danger of intensifying the Christian community’s concern for its own interior \textit{identity} overagainst the world…[which] requires such intense focus upon the ‘internal activities’ of the church that its engagement with the world cannot help but be conceived in a subsidiary and conjunctive way…Second, this concentric structure instrumentalizes doxology…[making it] first according to the gathering of an internal cultus, one \textit{function} of which is commitment to a certain mode of political ‘construction’. Third, this instrumentalization of worship tends to lead…to a direct correlation of the work of the Spirit with the Church’s practices of worship, whose primary function is to make of the Christian community a ‘habitable world’…[Such a view] presumes a stable ‘centre’ to the church’s identity, according to which Christ’s lordship is discernible as operative in a mode of ecclesiological (and so pneumatological, political, and liturgical) ‘gathering’ that occurs \textit{in advance of} encounter with ‘the world’.\footnote{Ekklesiologie von Henri de Lubac, Regensburger Studien zur Theologie 22 (Frankfurt am Main; Bern; Las Vegas: Peter Lang, 1979), 113–132.}

Note then, that instrumentalized worship not only trades upon the gaps my proposal has sought to eliminate, but also fails to embody of the sort of church-world relationship sketched in chapter one, because of its construal of the church as non-world.

In particular, Kerr faults Stanely Hauerwas for such instrumentalized accounts of worship.\(^{32}\) Hauerwas’s penchant for the formative nature of Christian practices, and particularly their role of counter-formation, producing a contrast-society in distinction from modern liberal democracies,\(^{33}\) means that Hauerwas’s ecclesiology is ironically overdetermined by liberalism.\(^{34}\) Whether or not this critique is fair is beyond my purview here.\(^{35}\) What I do want to establish is the problematic character of instrumentalized liturgy.


\(^{34}\) Kerr, *Christ, History and Apocalyptic*, 116–125. This is a similar, though perhaps inverse judgment to Radner’s observation that “The liberal state is not the antithesis of the Christian church, but it nonetheless was partially driven, in its evolution by the Church's failures of integrity. As the weaknesses of the liberal state's decision-making processes become more evident in the form, not so much of canonized disagreement as of simply unworkable disagreement with respect to necessary divisions on common life, the Church's failures stand as a mirror image of the state's incapacities.” *Brutal Unity*, 344.

\(^{35}\) Two observations ought to ameliorate Kerr’s critique somewhat, though. First William Cavanaugh’s argument in *Torture and Eucharist* is a fairly Hauerwasian one. But the counter-formation he notes is not of a church in contrast to liberalism, but rather in contrast to the Pinochet regime. It is difficult to see such an ecclesiology as over-determined by liberalism. Second, Hauerwas himself expresses disapproval for attempts to instrumentalize the church’s liturgy, “Worship, Evangelism, Ethics,” 102. Yet, note my question below about whether Hauerwas has truly banished the specter of instrumentalized worship.
To view mission as the outcome or fruit of liturgy can make it appear to be a subordinate concern for the church, another instance of the “gap” we are trying to avoid. At the same time, to instrumentalize liturgy so that it serves missionary ends, subordinates the liturgy to mission in an equally problematic manner. The church’s liturgy is offered for the glory of God and the salvation of human beings. While God is glorified and human beings brought salvation through mission, giving mission and liturgy a coherence on this point, to posit their relationship such that one is subordinated to the other smacks of a mercenary mindset. Worship, because it is a matter of divine grace, cannot be a matter of bartering between God and humanity. Salvation does not result from the liturgy in a do ut des manner, but is rather a gift freely given. The same holds for mission, and all the more so because on the account of mission and salvation I am advancing, mission is itself a form of salvation, a form of sharing in the divine life through the paschal mystery.

While many share this concern regarding an instrumentalized account of the relationship between liturgy and mission, their concern is almost always expressed in terms of the somewhat vulgar attempt to make the liturgy appeal to outsiders and thereby

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36 Noted by Emeis, “Liturgie und Diakonie,” 85. See also Kerr, Christ, History and Apocalyptic, 171; Flett, Witness of God, 280.

37 Sacrosanctum concilium, no. 7 [Tanner, 2:822]. See also Jungmann, “Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy,” 14. Note particularly, Kaczynski’s observation that, in this dynamic, the glory offered to God is dependent upon God’s prior gift of salvation to humanity. “Toward the Reform of the Liturgy,” 225–227; “Sacrosanctum Concilium,” 68–69. This likewise undercuts any notion of bartering, which I address immediately below.

38 Chauvet speaks quite ably of grace as existing outside the realm of “thing,” or “value” or “calculation,” or “utility.” Symbol and Sacrament, 44–45 [45], a recognition which leads him to set his account of grace and sacrament within the framework of symbolic exchange (267–268). I shall develop this below in my reading of the eucharistic prayer. Similarly, John Milbank articulates a theology of gift which exists beyond crude mercantilism. “Can a Gift Be Given?,” 119–51. Catherine Pickstock appropriates Milbank’s account of “gift” in particularly eucharistic terms. After Writing, 240–252. See also Saarinen, God and the Gift, 5–35.
make it evangelistic. Yet, insofar as the relationship between liturgy and mission remains solely one of formation, I suspect that a more insidious, because unrecognized, instrumentalization of the liturgy remains.

In a somewhat unique situation in this regard is the recent work of James K. A. Smith in his “Cultural Liturgies” project. Smith articulates a philosophical anthropology wherein human beings are “Desiring, Imaginative Animals.” We function not from disembodied reason fueled by didactic instruction and “worldview,” but rather from embodied desire, which is shaped by embodied practices, which he dubs liturgies. There are secular liturgies, which form their participants to participate in the marketplace, or the “Military-Entertainment Complex,” and so forth. In contrast, the Christian church has its own liturgies, which form the desires and imaginations of their participants for the City of God.

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40 Smith, Desiring the Kingdom; Imagining the Kingdom.

41 Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 37–73 [37].

42 Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 47–88; Imagining the Kingdom, 75–98, 166–189.

43 Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 89–126 [103]; Imagining the Kingdom, 137–150.

44 Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 131–214; Imagining the Kingdom, 150–191.
What sets Smith apart is that, while his account of worship is formative, it does not trade upon gaps, for the type of formation in view is irreducibly praxis-oriented.\textsuperscript{45} It occurs at a more basic level than that of cognition, within those biological structures that evolved to enable us to negotiate our lived habitats, and functions almost reflexively.\textsuperscript{46} Hence, his anthropology is one in which there is no gap between our being and our intentional being-in-the-world. We are always already implicated in praxis within the world of which we are a part.

The question remains, though, given how formation-heavy Smith’s proposal is, whether this is an overly instrumentalized account of liturgy. While I have concerns, I believe that Smith’s account is not necessarily problematic, for he is dealing with the training of affections. Insofar as worship involves cleaving to God, then the formational aspect of it is perfectly good, and indeed part of the point. Having one’s affections set on God is not a native capacity for fallen humans, and so formation towards this cannot be construed as instrumentalizing the liturgy in a vulgar sense. Rather, the liturgy forms its participants for what is their and the liturgy’s proper end—humanity’s salvation and God’s glory. This recognition that there are positive aspects to the viewpoint that liturgy is formative is an important one. My concerns over instrumentalized worship are not meant to deny this aspect of the liturgy, but rather to show that on its own it is an inadequate conception of the relationship between liturgy and mission. Worship does form. But as I shall show, it goes beyond formation, because it brings us into contact with the paschal mystery in such a way that what occurs in worship goes beyond what we can

\textsuperscript{45} Smith, \textit{Imagining the Kingdom}, 69–72, 80–84.

\textsuperscript{46} Smith, \textit{Imagining the Kingdom}, 41–46, 81–90, 110–124.
account for merely in terms of cultivating ethics, and the language of sacrifice makes this more explicit. Further, as I shall show, mission is an intrinsic element of the liturgy.

**Ambiguity in Vatican II**

I am advancing the notion that eucharistic sacrifice provides the most satisfactory notion of the relationship between liturgy and mission. My account of sacrifice avoids gaps between liturgy and mission, avoids instrumentalizing the liturgy, and provides a coherent basis for viewing the two realities of liturgy and mission as existing in an integral dynamic without merely collapsing them into one another. A sacrificial account of mission may also be found in the documents of Vatican II. In particular, the apostolic activity of the lay faithful is characterized in sacrificial terms. However, the council documents also exhibit tensions and ambiguities regarding the relationship between liturgy and mission.

47 My concerns with Smith revolve not only around the possibility of an instrumentalized view of the liturgy, but most importantly, around the fact that for Smith, the mechanisms involved are “creational” structures. *Imagining the Kingdom*, 15–20 [15]. Liturgical practice forms us, whether the liturgy in question is the liturgy of the shopping mall or the liturgy of the Eucharist. This raises the very significant question of what role divine grace plays in Smith’s conception. Though he nods to pneumatology (*Imagining the Kingdom*, 152–155), the fact is, this is not a major component of his argument. Better, then, are Morrill (*Encountering Christ in the Eucharist*, 52), and Wood (“The Liturgy: Participatory Knowledge of God in the Liturgy,” in *Knowing the Triune God: The Work of the Spirit in the Practices of the Church*, ed. James J. Buckley and David S. Yeago [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001], 95–118), who note that the liturgy works not just by formation but by bringing its participants into contact with the paschal mystery. In particular, Wood’s account appropriation of Polyani’s notion of tacit knowledge gives her account of “participatory knowledge” a similarly gapless character (100–102).


A hallmark characterization of the relationship is *Sacrosanctum concilium*’s statement that, though “Liturgy is not the only activity of the church” (because it must be preceded by “faith and conversion,” which result from missionary activity), “The liturgy is, all the same, the high point towards which the activity of the church is directed, and, simultaneously, the source from which all its power flows out.”49 Indeed, “the point of apostolic work is” that those called into the fellowship of the church may “share in the sacrifice, and…eat the Lord’s supper.”50 Hence, from the council’s outset, a fairly complex interrelationship between liturgy and mission obtains, ruling out a simple, unilinear account of liturgical formation followed by mission. Mission is not here explicitly construed as sacrifice. And yet, at the very least mission is ordered to the eucharistic sacrifice, which is “the chief means through which believers are expressing in their lives and demonstrating to others the mystery which is Christ,”51 and through which the faithful themselves become sacrifices in their daily lives.52

Beyond the Constitution on the Liturgy, though, the decree on the lay apostolate, *Apostolicam actiositatem*, makes some of the connections more explicit, but in an ambiguous way. The decree does describe mission in terms of a sacrifice offered by the

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49 *Sacrosanctum concilium*, nos. 9–10 [Tanner, 2:823]. Kaczynski notes that the statement in no. 10 about the liturgy as highpoint and source is explicitly connected to the statement in no. 9 that the liturgy is not the church’s sole activity. “Sacrosanctum Concilium,” 73–74. In other words, for the liturgy to be highpoint and source presupposes a more holistic and comprehensive understanding of the church’s mandate. Indeed, Jungmann notes that there was hesitation among the council fathers about no. 10, for fear that such a statement might obscure the provisional character of the liturgy and its ordering toward the glory of God and salvation of humanity. “Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy,” 15. As Pamela Jackson notes, the constitution winds up stating that the reason why the liturgy is the highpoint and source of the church’s life is that it is preeminently through the eucharistic sacrifice that the twin ends of God’s glory and humanity’s salvation are achieved. “Theology of the Liturgy,” in Levering and Lamb, *Vatican II: Renewal Within Tradition*, 108. See further Brunk, *Liturgy and Life*, 10–11.

50 *Sacrosanctum concilium*, no. 10 [Tanner, 2:823].

51 *Sacrosanctum concilium*, no. 2 [Tanner, 2:820].

52 *Sacrosanctum concilium*, nos. 12, 48 [Tanner, 2:824, 830].
faithful, and yet it seems to revert to a unilinear understanding of the liturgy merely nourishing the lay faithful, and empowering them for their missionary tasks. Absent is the more complex and reciprocal characterization we noted in *Sacrosanctum concilium*. *Apostolicam actuositatem*’s perspective could easily be understood as falling under Schattauer’s “inside and out” paradigm. To be clear, the issue is not whether the liturgy and sacraments nourish and strengthen the faithful for mission in the world. Of course they do. My concern is that, if this is *all* they do, we are left with an extrinsic relationship in which gaps between liturgy and mission can be introduced, or where the liturgy is instrumentalized for missionary ends. While this is a potential reading of the decree, it is not the only possible reading.

*Lumen gentium* provides a perspective that can ameliorate the concern. Whereas *Apostolicam actuositatem* spoke of the laity’s apostolate in terms of spiritual sacrifices, but did not explicitly connect these to the liturgy, except as results, the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church speaks of the faithful’s spiritual sacrifices not only being offered through witness in the world, but also states that “When they take part in the

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54 *Apostolicam actuositatem*, no. 3 [Tanner, 2:982–983].

55 *Lumen gentium*, no. 10 [Tanner, 2:856–857]. The idea of missionary effort as sacrificial can be found in Romans 15:14–19, which I discuss in chapter three.
eucharistic sacrifice, the source and the culmination of all Christian life, they offer to God the divine victim and themselves along with him.”

The statement from *Lumen gentium* recalls the Augustinian notion from chapter three that, due to the reality of the *totus Christus* the sacrifices of the faithful are bound together with the sacrifice of Christ and the sacrifice of the Mass, for these are all one sacrifice. Such an understanding avoids the concerns over instrumentalized liturgy and of gaps between liturgy and mission. While this perspective is not explicit in *Apostolicam actuositatem*, it is compatible with the wording of the decree, and preferable to the other, more unilinear reading.

Pope Benedict XVI’s Apostolic Exhortation, *Sacramentum caritatis*, provides further support for an integrated understanding of the relationship between the sacrifice of mission and the sacrifice of the Mass. Citing Augustine, Benedict writes that “The Eucharist makes our whole life a spiritual worship pleasing to God,” in which we offer ourselves. By means of the Eucharist, the whole of Christian life becomes eucharistic. Drawing from *Sacrosanctum concilium*’s language of highpoint and source, he states that the Eucharist gives the church not only its life, but also its mission, and further states that “We cannot approach the eucharistic table without being drawn into the mission which,

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57 Benedict XVI, *Sacramentum caritatis*, no. 70.

beginning in the very heart of God, is meant to reach all people. Missionary outreach is thus an essential part of the eucharistic form of the Christian life."^59

With the notion of the unity between the sacrifice of the Mass and the sacrifices of the faithful, which includes the task of mission, we have returned to the idea that mission belongs intrinsically to the liturgy, which would preclude both the gaps and instrumentalism we are trying to avoid. This prepares us to investigate the eucharistic prayer to verify this *theolegoumenon*. The route we have taken to reach this point has provided the parameters for an acceptable account of the relationship between liturgy and mission. It has also provided a preliminary solution to the problem by integrating the missionary and eucharistic sacrifices, thereby making them integrally related because they are integrated into the one sacrifice of the whole Christ. What remains to be seen is if, indeed, such an understanding is native to the eucharistic prayer.

**A Missional Reading of the Eucharistic Prayer**

The eucharistic prayers of the 1979 *Book of Common Prayer* comprise the ritual basis of my argument. ^60^ I focus upon the prayer book’s liturgies for two primary reasons. First, I write from within an Anglican context and these are the liturgies according to which the eucharistic sacrifice is offered in Anglican churches in the United States. ^61^

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^59^ Benedict XVI, *Sacramentum caritatis*, no. 84. See also Ranjith, “Source and Summit,” 37; Note the similarity to Davies suggestion that the universality of Christ’s sacrifice, which is memorialized in the Eucharist demands a missionaary commitment. *Worship and Mission*, 103.

^60^ Throughout this section, references to the *BCP* will be parenthetical within the main body of text.

^61^ The ecclesial landscape of North American Anglicanism is unfortunately complicated by a state of schism between the Episcopal Church (TEC) and the newly formed Anglican Church in North America (ACNA). The *BCP* is, formally, TEC’s, but is widely used within ACNA. I confine myself to the TEC
Second, similar analyses already exist for the various anaphorae used in the Roman Catholic Church, which makes consideration of those liturgies superfluous in this regard. In my engagement with the eucharistic prayers, I shall have recourse to Louis-Marie Chauvet’s account of symbolic exchange as providing structural insight into the dynamics of the eucharistic offering.

Once more, because I am pursuing the liturgy’s own intelligibility, rather than imposing meta-liturgical constructs upon it, I shall refer to symbolic exchange only insofar as it illuminates the logic of the eucharistic prayers. For this reason, a brief statement of what Chauvet’s position involves should suffice at this point. Symbolic exchange is a relational reality, according to which gifts are given and received in a free flowing manner. A gift given demands a return-gift, which can be as simple as grateful acknowledgement of the gift, otherwise it has not truly been received as gift. And yet in this exchange the point is not the value of the gift(s), but rather the relationship that is enacted in the process.  

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prayer book because (1) TEC is the official Anglican Province in the United States, and (2) these liturgies are the most widely used in the American context.

62 Chauvet, my primary interlocutor in this section, applies his structure to eucharistic prayer II, but suggests that the results would be more or less the same were he to utilize the other prayers of the Roman Missal. Symbol and Sacrament, 268–289 [268]. Glenn Ambrose validates this opinion by utilizing Chauvet’s framework to investigate eucharistic prayer III. The Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet: Overcoming Onto-Theology with the Sacramental Tradition (Burlington: Ashgate, 2012), 111–128. While Pickstock is focused primarily upon the use of language, her analysis of the Roman Canon provides similar results regarding the dynamics of sacrifice and gift exchange. After Writing, 238–256. The Roman Canon is, of course, source upon which eucharistic prayer I is based. Levering analyzes Thomas Aquinas’s account of the liturgy (which would be the Roman Canon), rather than any particular liturgical text, and discerns the same basic pattern. Sacrifice and Community, 168–192. This, then, covers the majority of Roman Catholic prayers.

As I shall demonstrate, Chauvet’s account of the relationship between liturgy and ethics satisfactorily avoids the gaps and instrumentalization that plague other accounts. Moreover, his structure of symbolic exchange with its gift and return-gift, is formally the same as the trinitarian analogy which forms the basis of my soteriological and missiological proposal, which highlights the eucharist as sharing in the paschal mystery, and, hence, in the triune life. This allows me to naturally integrate his contributions with the rest of my argument.

**In media res: Locating the Eucharistic Prayer**

The setting for this consideration of the eucharistic prayer is at the culmination of the Great Vigil of Easter. I have been considering the Eucharist within the broader sweep of the rite of Christian initiation, which normatively occurs at the Easter Vigil. Moreover, as Leonell Mitchell notes, the prayer book’s baptismal and eucharistic liturgies find their fullest expression and coherence within the paschal context of the Easter Vigil. This connects us to the emphasis in chapter two on the *missio Dei* as paschal mystery.

Hence the eucharistic prayer is offered in a context where the “record of God’s saving deeds in history” has been recalled (*BCP*, 288–292 [288]), and Christ’s victory over death has been proclaimed (*BCP*, 285–287, 294–295). It arises after new converts are, “Through the Paschal mystery,…buried with Christ by Baptism into his death, and raised with him to newness of life” (*BCP*, 292, 301–308), and where all the faithful have “renew[ed] the solemn promises and vows of Holy Baptism” (*BCP*, 292), which, as I


64 Mitchell, *Praying Shapes Believing*, 87, 89.
showed in chapter two, implicates them in the mission of Christ. The eucharistic prayer, then, is offered by a people who have been called to share in salvation through the mission of God, the paschal mystery, and, further, called upon to share in this mission themselves. Of course, the celebration of the Eucharist on an ordinary Sunday or weekday is no less paschal. The dynamics are the same, and excepting the rite of baptism, all these elements are included in the ordinary eucharistic liturgy. The Easter Vigil, though, sets them within a fuller context.

**The Prayers’ Structure**

Of the six anaphorae in the *Book of Common Prayer*, all of which are of the West Syrian type, two are in traditional language (Prayers I and II, in Rite I, *BCP*, 333–336, 340–343), while four are modern (Prayers A, B, C, and D, in Rite II, *BCP*, 361–363, 367–375).\(^65\) The prayers of Rite I are modeled upon the 1662 prayer book, with the key difference that they follow the Scottish pattern of having a more integrated structure.\(^66\)

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\(^{66}\) The Scottish Episcopal Church departed from the structure of the 1552/1662 rite. After the American Revolutionary War, when it was no longer practicable for the formerly colonial Anglican Church to be the Church of England, Samuel Seabury sought episcopal consecration in the British Isles. It was the Scottish Church that was willing to grant him episcopal order, with the provision that the American Church
particular, their language of self-offering is itself part of the eucharistic prayer, whereas beginning in 1552, Cranmer had moved it to a post-communion prayer, to avoid any sense of supplementation to Christ’s unique sacrifice. 67 Rite II’s prayers have various historical precedents: Prayer A is modeled on the prayer from the Apostolic Constitutions; Prayer B is amalgamated from Syrian sources and the Apostolic Constitutions; Prayer D comes from the ecumenical Porvoo Liturgy and is modeled on the anaphora used by Basil the Great. Prayer C, frequently maligned as the “Star Wars” prayer, is alone in being a wholly modern composition. 68

Though each prayer has its own distinct emphases, which will be evident in the treatment below, they also share a number of elements in common. As Marion Hatchett notes, they all share the Sursum corda’s opening dialogue; praise and thanksgiving; the Sanctus and Benedictus, the Institution Narrative, Memorial Acclamation, Anamnesis, Oblation, Epiclesis or Invocation, Supplications, a concluding doxology, and the great Amen. 69 These common elements give to the prayers a common shape and a common logic. For this reason, I shall simply follow the structure of the prayers, and note ways in adopt the Scottish order in their eucharistic prayers. See Echlin, Anglican Eucharist, 205–235. Hatchett notes that the matter was a bit more complex than this, though, in broad strokes, my characterization is accurate. Commentary, 349–360.

67 See Hatchett, Commentary, 357–358; Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 640–699, especially 656–674. I believe that the Augustinian account of sacrifice I sketched in chapter three obviates the typical Protestant concern, and, indeed, turns it back upon itself. It obviates the concern because the eucharistic sacrifice is not a supplement to Christ’s sacrifice. It turns the concern back upon itself, because it raises the question of how a self-offering that is pure response to Christ’s sacrifice, rather than being intrinsically related to it, avoids semi-Pelagianism. Joseph Cassidy reaches conclusions similar to my own, but with the 1662 prayer book as his ritual basis, the self-offering is relegated to a post-communion prayer rather than in the eucharistic prayer itself. “The Post Communion Prayer,” 106–121.


69 Hatchett, Commentary, 361–373. Note Mitchell’s statement that “Since the prayers are alternatives, they should be examined together. No single prayer can say everything that might be desirable to say in a eucharistic prayer. Each has its own emphases, but collectively the prayers present a balanced picture of eucharistic theology.” Praying Shapes Believing, 153.
which this structure is fleshed out in the different prayers. For simplicity, I shall, henceforth, simply refer to the eucharistic prayer, in the singular.

**The Prayers’ Narrative Programs**

The eucharistic prayer begins with the a dialogue, setting forth the purpose of the prayer, to *give* thanks to God (*BCP*, 333–334, 340–341, 361–363, 367–368, 369–371, 372–374). Already then the prayer’s dominant motif is that of *gift*. The goal towards which the prayer’s narrative drives is to give thanks to God. Chauvet understands the eucharistic prayer to carry out the task of giving thanks by means of three interlocking “narrative programs,” which I shall use to organize this reading as well.\(^{70}\) In semiotics, a narrative program simply schematizes an action undertaken.\(^{71}\) In each narrative program, of the eucharistic prayer an “Operating subject” gives some “Object” to a “Receiving subject.”\(^{72}\) Taken together, these narrative programs enact the *church* giving *thanks* to *God* for the redemption achieved by Christ. Each, further, focuses upon some specific modality of Christ’s *body*: historical, sacramental, and ecclesial. Furthermore, each narrative program leads to and feeds into the next. So, while each retains its own integrity by setting forth a coherent narrative (giving thanks for the redemption achieved by Christ

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\(^{70}\) Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 268–269. Ambrose likewise organizes his discussion around these narrative programs, which is unsurprising as his aim is to provide further confirmation of Chauvet’s understanding. *Theology of Chauvet*, 111–124.


\(^{72}\) Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 271.
in history, petitioning God for the sacramental body of Christ, petitioning God to become Christ’s ecclesial body), all of them, taken together, give coherence to the overall narrative frame of giving thanks to God.

**Narrative Program One**

Having determined to give God thanks and praise in the opening dialogue, the liturgy immediately does so in the first of its three narrative programs. Typically, praise is initially expressed in a proper preface, highlighting the particular occasion (they are found on *BCP*, 344–349, 377–382), though prayers C and D forego such prefaces in favor of a more invariable expression of praise, focused upon God’s splendor and the gift of creation (*BCP*, 370, 373).73

This initial praise gives way to the unending hymn of the *Sanctus/benedictus*, and then continues with a more pointed thanksgiving, focused upon the history of redemption through Christ, sometimes including the creation and fall, at other times with a focus upon the history of Israel, or even simply beginning with the cross (*BCP*, 334, 341, 362, 368, 370, 373–374). In eucharistic prayers I, II, and A, Christ’s death is specifically referred to as a sacrifice (*BCP*, 334, 341, 362), though all the prayers mention Christ’s death and resurrection as saving events (*BCP*, 368, 370, 374). Hence, the first movement of the eucharistic prayer—the whole of which is to give thanks to God—rehearses what God has first given to humanity, that for which thanks is given. In


74 The prayers of Rite I evince a Cranmerian preoccupation with the sufficiency of Christ’s sacrifice on the cross in an effort to ensure that the eucharist not be seen as supplementary to it.

particular, “We here render thanks to God for having saved us in Jesus Christ…what God gives us…[is] Jesus Christ as an historical (born of the Virgin Mary and Crucified) glorious body.” God’s gift of Christ calls forth the return-gift of thanks and praise.

**Narrative Program Two**

This first narrative program then gives way to a second, where the focus shifts from God’s gift of the historical body of Christ to his gift of the sacramental body. This movement of the prayer begins with the narrative of institution, which provides the warrant for the church’s request that God transform its gifts into the body and blood of Christ. It is because Jesus gave his body and blood to the disciples in the last supper that the church is confident in asking that this gift be given here and now. Following the institution narrative, the memorial acclamation and anamnesis occur, the saving events of Christ’s death, resurrection, ascension, and triumphant return are proclaimed, and the Holy Spirit is invoked so that the elements might be transformed (BCP, 335, 342, 363, 369, 371, 375).

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76 Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 270 (Italics original). See also Ambrose, *Theology of Chauvet*, 115–118.

77 Hatchett, *Commentary*, 365; Mitchell, *Praying Shapes Believing*, 159–162. See further my discussion of the narrative of institution in chapter three. Note also that this function of providing warrant for the rite is not far from the idea that the original purpose of the words of institution was catechetical and not directly anaphoral, which is advanced by Bradshaw, *Eucharistic Origins*, 11–15; McGowan, “Is There a Liturgical Text in This Gospel?,” 73–87.


79 Prayer C has the epiclesis precede the words of institution. Mitchell discusses the function of the epiclesis in the prayers, noting both the epiclesis upon the gifts and upon the community. *Praying Shapes Believing*, 167–171. I will return to the latter invocation below. See Hatchett for a discussion of the history of the epiclesis in Anglican liturgy. *Commentary*, 369–371. John McKenna provides perhaps the most thorough historical treatment of the epiclesis in *The Eucharistic Epiclesis: A Detailed History from the Patristic to the Modern Era*, 2d ed. (Chicago: Hillenbrand Books, 2008).
Even as the Holy Spirit is invoked, the gifts are offered to God. Significantly, the prayers mark out these gifts offered to God as themselves already gifts from God. They are his “gifts and creatures” (BCP, 335), his “holy gifts which we now offer” (BCP, 342). The church “offers our sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving...presenting...from your creation, this bread and this wine” (BCP, 369), which are offered “from the gifts you have given us” (BCP, 374). A repeating cycle of donation is in view then. The gifts of creation are offered back to God, with the request that they be re-given as the body and blood of Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit. Each gift received provokes another gift in return.

Note further that the offering of the gifts occurs precisely as the same movement of the request for their transformation. Already as we receive them we are in the mode of giving them away. As Chauvet suggests, “The anamnesis declares this [petition for the sacramental body and blood of Christ] realized, but...in an act of oblation, that is, of dispossession.” Indeed, “this reception is effected by means of oblation.” As Ambrose

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80 Prayers A and C merely call them “gifts,” leaving it ambiguous whether they are gifts from God or to God or both.

81 Hatchett, Commentary, 367–369; Mitchell, Praying Shapes Believing, 165–167. McMichael sees a distinction between the sacrifice which is “offered” and the gifts, which are “presented.” “Eucharistic Doctrine of the 1979 BCP,” 314. He particularly sees this distinction in prayers B and C, while “for Prayer D, it seems that its memorial of redemption includes more than the cross and is accompanied by remembrance and the offering of bread and wine” (315). Frankly, this seems like a hair-splitting distinction, and it casts his conclusion that “neither the sacrifice of Christ nor the sacrament of his Body and Blood” are offered in the prayer (315) into doubt. On gifts calling forth further gifts see Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 266–267; “Échange symbolique,” 277–304; Brunk, Liturgy and Life, 75–81; Milbank, “Can a Gift Be Given?,” 119–151; Pickstock, After Writing, 240–252; Saarinen, God and the Gift, 5–35.

82 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 271.

83 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 276 (Italics original). This, then, connects Chauvet to Balthasar’s understanding of “Appropriation as Expropriation.” Glory of the Lord, 7:399–415 [399]. Leamy gives this Balthasarianism an ethical gloss: “The Christian mode of appropriation is expropriation, and this is a participation in the Triune relation...this points to the Eucharistic liturgy as a kind of active metonymic
notes, the oblation is actually the “effective reception” of the gift.\textsuperscript{84} This notion of effective reception will be significant below. Within this second narrative program, God’s gift of the sacramental body and blood of Christ calls forth the return-gift of the eucharistic oblation, in which Christ’s body and blood are offered by the church to God.

Pickstock provides a helpful clarification to my language of a cycle of donation in this regard:

This movement of Consecration can be seen to continue within that of the Offertory, in such a way that the “second” offering of the Body and Blood back to God is not a return, but a consummation...of the “first” offering of bread and wine. A reading of the gift according to a spatial protocol of accomplishment might easily mistake the Consecration for the moment when God, having received from us the offerings of bread and wine, now “returns” them to us as Body and Blood...In reality, the movements of Eucharistic giving and receiving are indistinguishable: just as the Consecration is not a clear-cut “return” from God to man [sic], but an intensification of offering as that which is always already offered by God, so also all offering is a Consecration. Indeed, the word “Eucharist” repeats this ambiguity as an ontological coincidence of God’s gift of grace and our indistinguishable gift of gratitude.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{84} Ambrose, \textit{Theology of Chauvet}, 121.

\textsuperscript{85} Pickstock, \textit{After Writing}, 245 (Emphasis original). Note also Mitchell’s observation on the integral connection between the offertory and the oblation: “It is at this point in the eucharistic prayer, rather than at the offertory, that we properly speak of offering to God our sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, the eucharistic gifts of bread and wine.” \textit{Praying Shapes Believing}, 166. This is so because by locating the sacrifice interior to the anamnesis a Pelagian interpretation of the offering is avoided. These observations further undercut McMichael’s argument that neither Christ’s sacrifice nor the sacramental body and blood are offered in the anaphora (discussed in note 81 above). It further subverts Buchanan’s complaint that offering the elements to God lacks “a cogent biblical rationale,” because “The elements are God’s gifts to us, not ours to him.” \textit{Anglican Eucharistic Liturgies}, 28. This is because, as Pickstock shows, such a distinction is blurred in the logic of the liturgy. Indeed, I would suggest that the incarnation forever abolishes the separation of the two.

Dix famously advanced the theory that the ancient Eucharist involved a procession of gifts, which symbolized the unity of the self-offering of the congregation with the offering made at the altar, \textit{Shape of the Liturgy}, 110–123. However, subsequent scholarship has challenged the patristic basis of this proposal. E.g., R. P. C. Hanson, \textit{Eucharistic Offering in the Early Church} (Nottingham: Grove Books, 1979); Colin Buchanan, \textit{The End of the Offertory—An Anglican Study} (Nottingham: Grove Books, 1978). Indeed, Buchanan goes so far as to assert that “Any patristic basis for his [Dix’s] thesis (let alone any biblical one) is threadbare to the point of invisibility.” \textit{Anglican Eucharistic Liturgies}, 21. In view of my treatment of Augustine in chapter three, however, so bold an assertion as Buchanan makes is surely going too far. Indeed, Kilmartin provides evidence that the practice is more ancient than either Hanson or Buchanan are.
In addition to cohering with my observations in chapter three about the bi-directionality of the return-gift, Pickstock’s observation sheds light on an ambiguity in the eucharistic prayer. The eucharistic prayer Chauvet analyzes explicitly identifies the gift offered to God in the anamnesis as the sacramental body and blood of Christ. The prayer book, on the other hand, does not make this identification explicit, but rather offers the bread and wine, asking that they be sanctified to become the body and blood. Hence it is ambiguous whether the oblation in view is an offering of Christ himself by the church or simply an offering of the gifts of bread and wine, which will subsequently be transformed into Christ’s body and blood.

This difference should not be understood merely as a Protestant evasion of the identification of the eucharistic sacrifice with Christ’s sacrifice. Eucharistic Prayers B and D make this connection between Christ’s sacrifice and the Eucharist explicit (BCP, 369, 375), as does the fraction anthem—“[Alleluia.] Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us; Therefore let us keep the feast. [Alleluia.]” shared by all the anaphorae (BCP, 337, 364). In my own view, given the explicit identification of the eucharistic sacrifice with Christ’s sacrifice, and the explicit identification of Christ’s sacrifice as an offering of himself (BCP, 334, 341, 362), and further, given the fact that the same gifts which are willing to admit. Eucharist in the West, 4, 9, 109–115. While it would be worthwhile to further investigate the patristic basis for such an understanding, it is sufficient for my purposes to note that, in terms of what the rites intend, the prayer book liturgies presume Dix’s understanding of the offertory. See, e.g., Mitchel, Praying Shapes Believing, 147–150. In other words, whether or not the church fathers understood the offertory to work in this way, the framers of the BCP did. Meyers acknowledges the novelty, while also noting that it represents an advance in connecting liturgical life with service in the world. “Missional Church, Missional Liturgy,” 49.

Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 271.

87 The possible exception is prayer C, which places the request for transformation and the words of institution before “offering to you this sacrifice of thanksgiving” (BCP, 371). While the sacrifice is not identified with the consecrated elements in this prayer, the fact that they are earlier identified as gifts, and that all the other prayers consider them to be such would seem to favor reading the prayer in this light.
offered are also made the body of Christ,\textsuperscript{88} it makes sense to understand the offering as an offering of Christ.

Robert Daly suggests that by explicitly identifying the sacramental body and blood as that which is offered, the Roman Catholic prayer is actually a novelty. This explicit identification was not present in the ancient Roman Canon.\textsuperscript{89} While the contemporary prayer’s explicit identification may be true, theologically (and my argument in this chapter and the last has assumed that it is), Daly believes that there is something unfortunate about the lack of ambiguity. The eucharistic prayer as a whole calls for the further offering of the Christian life in the quotidian, which Daly and Chauvet cast in terms of ethics, and I extend to include mission.\textsuperscript{90} That the offering called forth in the eucharistic prayer is fulfilled extra-liturgically becomes clear in narrative program three. Daly fears that explicitly designating Christ’s body and blood as what is offered at this point obscures the need for extra-liturgical fulfilment.\textsuperscript{91}

I do not fully share Daly’s criticism of the Roman prayer on this account. Indeed, given the fact that the sacramental body is the \textit{res et sacramentum}, it is meant to signify something further, namely the \textit{res tantum}, the ecclesial body. Therefore, what happens with the sacramental body in this particular narrative program, is indicative of what ought to, and, by grace, does happen with the ecclesial body, which is the focus of the third narrative program. This helps to curtail Daly’s concerns. Identifying the offering as the

\textsuperscript{88} See Pickstock’s understanding of the unity of the offertory and the consecration-oblation, above.

\textsuperscript{89} Daly, “Ethical Implications of Sacrificial Language,” 163.

\textsuperscript{90} I established this extension of ethics into mission in chapter three’s consideration of sacrifice as mission, and particularly the recognition that Paul identifies his apostolic mission with sacrifice in Romans 15:16.

\textsuperscript{91} Daly, “Ethical Implications of Sacrificial Language,” 162–164.
sacramental body and blood at this juncture does not do away with the fact that, in the context of the eucharistic prayer as a whole, the offering is also mission. At the same time, it may be that the prayer book’s ambiguity is helpful, insofar as it more unmistakably calls forth the offering of mission.

What Pickstock’s observation does is to short circuit this entire controversy. The movement of donation—whether reception or oblation—is one. We receive by giving. Therefore, if we receive the body and blood of Christ in the eucharist, we do so in the mode of giving it back. In the same petition whereby we request the gifts’ transformation, we also offer them. And, according to Chauvet, it is only by offering this return-gift, that the effective reception of a gift is verifiable.  

Such an understanding ought to recall the eucharistic gift exchange which I argued constitutes the triune life in chapter two. The Son receives himself in the mode of dispossession, which is expressed in the Holy Spirit’s joint spiration. There is no gap between giving and receiving, because reception is in the mode of donation. The logic, then, is of a donative reception.

**Narrative Program Three**

Donatively receiving the sacramental body and blood of the Lord, offering it even in the same movement whereby we receive it, completes the second narrative program, but not the eucharistic prayer, which continues in a third narrative program, this time focused upon the ecclesial body of Christ. It is here that the fusion of sacrifice and mission will become clear. As Chauvet puts it, “the Church begs the Father to send the

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93 Pickstock likewise characterizes the eucharistic offering as drawing its human participants into the triune gift exchange of God’s life. *After Writing*, 240–252.
Spirit over it so that it may become what it has just received.”⁹⁴ Most of the prayers make explicit the request that the community be made the ecclesial body of Christ (I, II, C, D, BCP, 336, 342–343, 372, 375), while prayers A and B strongly imply it.⁹⁵ Prayer A does so by its double epiclesis. Immediately upon asking that the Holy Spirit “sanctify” the gifts to be Christ’s body and blood, it requests “Sanctify us also” (BCP, 363). Prayer B asks that the congregation be “united to…[Christ] in his sacrifice” and mentions that he is “the head of the Church” (BCP, 369).

The double epiclesis is significant, for as Glenn Ambrose observes, it constitutes “the prayer for the effective reception of the ecclesial body of Jesus Christ.”⁹⁶ In narrative program two the sacramental body is effectively received by means of oblation. Parallel to this, it must be that the ecclesial body’s effective reception is also by means of oblation. Just as the chalice and host are given away, so the church itself is given away insofar as it is effectively received. Ambrose continues, “Ultimately, the Eucharistic prayer is the goad which moves the church towards making a sacrifice not only vertically in thanksgiving to God but also horizontally in the ‘liturgy of the neighbor.’ And this horizontal dimension is nothing more than the effective reception of the ecclesial body of Jesus Christ.”⁹⁷

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⁹⁴ Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 271 (Italics original). See also, Ambrose, Theology of Chauvet, 122–124.
⁹⁵ See further Hatchett, Commentary, 372; Mitchell, Praying Shapes Believing, 174.
⁹⁶ Ambrose, Theology of Chauvet, 122.
⁹⁷ Ambrose, Theology of Chauvet, 123. Similarly, Wood, “Unity in the Sacraments and Unity in Ethics,” 69–70. See further, J. Barrington Bates, who argues that “The eucharistic event…exists to make...[missionary engagement with the world] possible...This fundamental purpose of the eucharistic liturgy—to dismiss the people for service to the world—calls us to examine the concept of ordo in a different light. No longer can we speak of what a ‘valid’ celebration must contain—for without the missionary send-off the celebration has no relevance...The ordo thus becomes a component integral to this send-off, rather than something separate from it...the ordo becomes a kind of mechanism for achieving—or
Each prayer’s supplications in this section follow the same oblative logic we saw in the last section. Prayers A and C look explicitly towards service, which prayer C locates in the world (BCP, 372). Prayers I and II use the language of Romans 12:1 to express this: “And here we offer and present unto thee, O Lord, our selves, our souls and bodies, to be a reasonable, holy, and living sacrifice unto thee [Prayer I]...we earnestly desire thy fatherly goodness to accept this our sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, whereby we offer and present unto thee, O Lord, our selves, our souls and bodies [Prayer II]” (BCP, 335, 342). Note, in particular that it is by means of the sacrifice of thanksgiving that the self-oblation occurs in prayer II.\(^98\) Prayer D applies the same language from Romans, but adds to it the notion that what is in view is “a living sacrifice in Christ” (BCP, 375). In other words, our self-offering is intrinsically connected to Christ’s own.\(^99\)

Similarly, Prayer B, with its request to “unite us to your Son in his sacrifice” marks out an intrinsic connection, and does so with language drawn from Romans 15:16, where Paul characterizes his apostolic mission in sacrificial terms.\(^100\) The petition is “that we may be acceptable through him, being sanctified by the Holy Spirit” (BCP, 369). The way in which this epiclesis parallels Paul’s description of his apostolic activity ought to fully realizing—the identity given us in baptism.” “What Is the Unchanging Principle? A Discussion of the Eucharistic Ordo in Anglicanism,” Anglican Theological Review 86, no. 2 (2004): 267–269, 271. See also Tillard’s argument that the eucharist’s sacrificial character brings the church into its mission not simply in a ritual act, but in “life in its daily unfolding,” Flesh of the Church, Flesh of Christ, 97–100, 144 [100]. So also Daly, “Ethical Implications of Sacrificial Language,” 158.

\(^98\) See Hatchett, Commentary, 374.

\(^99\) Mitchell characterizes it as “actually an extension of the anamnesis to include” our self-offering. Praying Shapes Believing, 173.

\(^100\) See discussion in chapter three.
make the missionary context explicit. Moreover, it has done so in such a way as to bind together the two understandings of missionary sacrifice I noted in chapter three. On the one hand, the Pauline objective genitive, according to which the Gentiles are offered, is in view. On the other hand, it is given an Augustinian application, as this offering is joined to Christ’s own, so that the church is offered for the nations/Gentiles. The self-oblation of Romans 12:1 and the apostolic oblation of the Gentiles in Romans 15:16 are, in this prayer, integrated.

So each prayer casts its request to be made the ecclesial body by means of sharing in the sacramental body in the same reception-as-dispossession terms that attended narrative program two’s reception of the sacramental body. Once more, a gift is received in the mode of giving it away. Here Chauvet becomes particularly instructive:

Considered in the sole context of the anamnesis, the gift of God, received by the Church in the verbal-ritual memorial that it makes of it, requires the return-gift of an offering in thanksgiving; however, considered within the whole of the Eucharistic prayer, this same gift implies a return-gift other than this ritual oblation in the anamnesis…Within the whole of the process of exchange that the entire Eucharistic prayer sets in motion, the anamnestic oblation does not occupy the position of return-gift, but that of reception…The cultic offering is only the symbolic representation of a return-gift yet to be “veri-fied” elsewhere…This return-gift…is precisely the object of NP 3 which only develops what is already implied in the ritual oblation of NP 2…In other words, the “objective offering of Christ by the Church puts the Church into an attitude of subjective offering…For, to become historically and eschatologically the body of him whom they are offering sacramentally, the members of the assembly are committed to live out their own oblation of themselves in self-giving to others as Christ did.

Chauvet contends that this is another way of pointing to the fact that the res tantum, the ultimate reality, of the Eucharist is the charitable union between the members

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101 While Hatchett notes several other biblical allusions in the prayer, he does not make the connection to Romans 15:16. Commentary, 375.

102 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 276–277 (Italics original). Within the elipses Chauvet also appeals to Augustine’s teaching in CivDei. 10.6.
of the church with Christ their head and one another. This is what is signified by the *res et sacramentum*, the reality which is itself also a sign, Christ’s real presence in the sacrament. If the sacramental body and blood (*res et sacramentum*) are meant to signify the ecclesial body (*res tantum*),\(^{103}\) then what happens with the sacramental body itself indicates what happens with the ecclesial body. The sacramental body is received in the mode of oblation. So too, then, the church’s identity as ecclesial body is received by means of self-offering. As I showed in chapter three, this return-gift is rendered at once to God and to the world.\(^{104}\)

This leads Chauvet to argue that the “ethical dimension is not simply an extrinsic consequence of the Eucharistic process; it belongs to it as an *intrinsic* element.”\(^{105}\) It is by the sacrament that one arrives at the “missionary liturgy.”\(^{106}\) And, as we have seen, in order to receive a gift as a gift one must also offer a return-gift.\(^{107}\) In narrative program one, the gift of Christ’s historical body called forth the return-gift of thanks and praise. In narrative program two, the gift of Christ’s sacramental body leads to the return gift of the eucharistic oblation of that same body. In narrative program three, the gift of the church’s identity as Christ’s ecclesial body leads to the return-gift of mission. Because of this logic, according to which reception and donation are as one, there is no occasion for gaps

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\(^{103}\) Matters are a bit more complicated than this statement would imply, because the *res ultima* is not simply the church as it exists in history, but is an eschatological reality, a problem which I tackled in my own “Threefold Body in Eschatological Perspective,” 186–204. This complexity is why this chapter will conclude with eschatological considerations.


\(^{105}\) Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 277 (Italics original).

\(^{106}\) Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 281.

\(^{107}\) Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 282, also 266–267.
to intrude between liturgy and mission. The return-gift of mission is the veri-fication that
the grace for which the church prays in its liturgy has been received. But because
reception is donation, this missionary return is itself an integral component of the
eucharistic prayer. And it is so without eliding the two such that they lose their
distinctiveness.

Moreover, the eucharistic prayer provides an integrated synthesis of the three
elements of *lex credendi*, *lex orandi*, and *lex agendi/vivendi*, which I correlated to
Chauvet’s threefold structure of Christian identity (Scripture, Sacrament, Ethics) above.
Recall that this structure is comprised not of two poles, but three. These poles are not in
opposition to one another, but rather stand in a mutually interdependent equipoise. The
pole of Scripture basically names the narration of God’s saving act in Christ (which is the
fundamental content of the Scriptural witness). This, then, refers to the *lex credendi*, for
these saving events are the core of the church’s belief.¹⁰⁸ Chauvet’s narrative analysis,
with its recognition that the act of giving thanks to God is predicated upon and expressed
in terms of God’s gift to humanity of his incarnate Son, shows that the prayer contains
within itself the scriptural pole.

Chauvet characterizes the sacraments as the “precipitate of the Scriptures.” They
facilitate “The Transition from Book to the Body.”¹⁰⁹ Obviously, as a sacramental rite, as
prayer offered to God, the eucharistic prayer is an element of the sacramental pole, or the
*lex orandi*. Ethics, comprising the concrete Christian life in the quotidian, is, then, the *lex

Rhondora E. Beaton, *Embodied Words, Spoken Signs: Sacramentality and the Word in Rahner and

significantly, the ethical pole is itself embedded within the sacramental rite. All three elements are irreducibly constitutive of the Christian identity:

without the return-gift of an ethical practice by which the subject “veri-fies” what it has received in the sacrament, Christian identity would be stillborn. Moreover, ethics draws its Christian aspect from its quality of a “liturgical” response...to the initial gift of God...an ethics which is not reinterpreted liturgically, that is to say, as a theological response to the initial grace from God—as generous as it might be—would lose its Christian identity (1 Cor 13:1–3).  

the result is that we have located mission within the very intelligibility of the liturgy without thereby collapsing it into liturgy (or vice-versa).

**Reading the Eucharistic Prayer Missionally: Conclusions**

my reading of the Book of Common Prayer’s eucharistic prayers through the lens of Chauvet’s depiction of symbolic exchange has yielded an account of the relationship between liturgy and mission that respects the parameters set forth at the beginning of this chapter. There are no gaps between liturgy and mission because the missionary dimension is itself a constituent element of the liturgy. The logic of the eucharistic prayer demands an extra-liturgical fulfillment in the “missionary liturgy.” Moreover, the liturgy is not instrumentalized to pursue missionary ends, because the symbolic exchange in view occurs beyond the mercantile realm of value.  

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112 Davies puts it well: “In order to envisage this relationship correctly, we must now repeat our emphasis, made at the beginning of the chapter, upon the necessity as contrasted with the utility of worship. If we think in terms of utility, then worship becomes an occasion of gathering preparatory to sending. Worship provides a source of power to enable Christians to engage in another activity outside the cultic act. Worship, it may be said, strengthens us for mission, the two being related as cause and effect. Against this it has to be affirmed that worship is not a means to mission; it is one facet of the divine activity which also includes mission.” *Worship and Mission*, 111. In other words, liturgy does indeed issue in mission, which is
Christian identity is an irreducible and mutually supportive whole means that the elements cannot be pitted against each other. Instead, each is involved in the others, even as each remains distinct. Hence, we have avoided the problem of panmissionism.

To summarize the structure of the eucharistic prayer, we may plot the three narrative programs along the coordinates of: Gift (Scripture), Reception (Sacrament), and Return-Gift (Ethics/Mission). The initial Gift for which narrative program one gives thanks is the “historical and glorious body of Christ,” which was given in the “Past.” The movement of reception, which occurs in narrative program two, is a reception of the “Sacramental body of Christ…under the mode of oblation or thanksgiving” in the “Present.” The Return-Gift is the “Ecclesial body of Christ,” both presently and eschatologically, and it is expressed by “living-in-grace between brothers and sisters,” (and to this I add missionary engagement) in the eschatologically pregnant “already” that awaits a greater fulfillment. As Brunk summarizes “Scripture mediates the story of Christ’s past. Sacrament mediates Christ in the present. Ethics mediates the future of Christ, the parousia which draws history forward.”

In sum, then, the eucharistic prayer unfolds according to a logic that perfectly coheres with the missional ecclesiology I have been advancing from the outset of this study. Chapter one articulated a holistic account of mission and posited that the world is the proper sphere of the church’s activity. The movement of return-gift in the eucharistic

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113 See the diagram in Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 278. All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from this chart.

114 I shall return to this point especially in the eschatological section below.

prayer likewise notes that what is symbolically enacted in the liturgy is properly fulfilled in the concrete existence of those who receive the sacrament. Chapter two developed an account of salvation as coming to share in the life of the triune God through the paschal mystery (glossed as *missio Dei*, an external enactment of God’s eternal life). Further, I characterized this life in eucharistic terms—the Father eternally gives life to the Son, who gratefully returns the gift in the joint spiration of the Holy Spirit. The eucharistic prayer’s movement of gift, reception, and return-gift is then best conceived as a participation in this loving eternal exchange. Chapter three developed this soteriology with an account of the eucharistic sacrifice which articulated the dynamic of offering as at once the form of salvation and the form of mission.

Thus far, in this chapter, I have shown that this relationship is implicit in the eucharistic prayers. The church receives the body of Christ in the sacrament so that it may be the body of Christ. The body received in the sacrament, which is *res et sacramentum* signifies the body that the church becomes in the sacrament, the *res tantum*. As Kilmartin says, “The sharing in the body and blood of Christ makes us one body and draws us into the fate of this body.”

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**The Missional Church in Time and Eternity**

While, as I have shown, the eucharistic liturgy is fulfilled in the church’s mission in and to the world, in a deeper sense, the liturgy’s ultimate fulfillment is eschatological,

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in a state where mission will be no more for God will be all in all. This fact leads John Zizioulas to deny any connection between the Eucharist and mission, “Because in the last times, which it [the eucharistic gathering] represents, there will be no mission; anyway, mission presupposes dispersal, not a gathering ‘in one place.’”\footnote{Zizioulas, \textit{Eucharistic Communion and the World}, 48.} Frankly, this is a strange criticism, for it is precisely because the ultimate reality enacted in the eucharistic liturgy is eschatological that the gathering issues in mission. The church has not yet become, in its historical being, the fullness of its own eschatological destiny. Mission occurs on the way to that destiny, even as it participates in the dynamic that constitutes that destiny.

Indeed, just as there will be no more mission in the eschaton, neither will there be sacraments, office, or any other aspect that pertains to the visible and institutional structure of the church. As \textit{Lumen gentium} states, “the pilgrim church in its sacraments and institutions, which belong to this age, carries the figure of this world which is passing.”\footnote{\textit{Lumen gentium}, no. 48 [Tanner, 2:888]. See further Paolo Molinari, “Caractère eschatologique de l’église pérégrinante et ses rapports avec l’église céleste,” in Baraïna and Congar, \textit{L’égilse de Vatican II}, 3:1193–1216. Note especially his characterization of the “orientation of the church towards the final transformation” (1193), and characterization of the church’s eschatological consummation as the sacrifice of the whole Christ (\textit{passim}). See also, Philips, \textit{L’égilse et son mystère}, 2:164–174, especially 168–169; Hünermann, “\textit{Lumen Gentium},” 505–512. Note especially his treatment of the interplay between individual and corporate eschatology (505–506). Thomas Corbett, “Eschatology,” in McNamara, \textit{The Church}, 297–316. Corbett writes of the church’s “triple orientation: recalling the past, activity in the present and a dynamic tendency towards realization at a higher non-sacramental level in the future” (311). Otto Semmelroth at first seems to divide the church’s eschatological completion from its historical life, stating that its destiny is “to merge into the heavenly consummation where the Church no longer exists except in an analogical sense, as the Church triumphant.” “Chapter VII: The Eschatological Nature of the Pilgrim Church and her Union with the Heavenly Church,” in Vorgrimler, \textit{Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II}, 1:281. However, he later clarifies that this merging of the earthly church “into its ultimate, transfigured form” is not for the church to “perish” but rather to be fulfilled. The church militant, suffering, and triumphant are all distinct, but remain united as one church (282).}
body of Christ] comprising a human and a divine element.” Mission should be understood analogously to the other elements of the church that pass away eschatologically. This shifts the terrain of Zizioulas’s critique, placing a missional understanding of the Eucharist and of the pilgrim church on footing potentially as secure as the sacraments, the priesthood, and the episcopacy in light of the eschaton. The question then becomes not “will there be mission in the eschatological consummation?,” any more than it is whether there will be the Mass. Rather, the question is how these elements that ultimately pass away reach their eschatological fulfillment, and what points of continuity remain.

These twin realities: of the church’s radical eschatological transformation and its continuity across both time and eternity— run through Henri de Lubac’s corpus, making him a particularly appropriate interlocutor for addressing this question. That all these elements of the church in its pilgrim state will pass away and be absorbed, so to speak, into the reality that they signify, does not render them dispensable. Rather, as Henri de Lubac notes especially his identification of the eucharistic gathering as a particular locus of this unity (366, 510–511). This inseparability is particularly strengthened by Alois Grillmeier’s recognition that this paragraph of the constitution is argues that the visible hierarchical structure serves to mediate grace to the faithful. “Mystery of the Church,” 147–149. In other words, they are inseparable because the one is the means of access to the other.

119 Lumen gentium, no. 8 [Tanner, 2:854]). On the inseparability of the hierarchically structured institution and the mystical body, see Charles Journet, “Le caractère théandrique de l’église: Source de tension permanente,” in Baraúna and Congar, L’église de Vatican II, 2:305–306; Philips, L’église et son mystère, 1:114–119; McNamara, “Mystery of the Church,” 99–102; Hünermann, “Lumen Gentium,” 365–369. Note especially his identification of the eucharistic gathering as a particular locus of this unity (366, 510–511). This inseparability is particularly strengthened by Alois Grillmeier’s recognition that this paragraph of the constitution is argues that the visible hierarchical structure serves to mediate grace to the faithful. “Mystery of the Church,” 147–149. In other words, they are inseparable because the one is the means of access to the other.

120 E.g., Catholicisme: Les aspects sociaux du dogme, ed. Michel Sales and Marie-Béatrice Mesnet, 7th ed. [1983], Œuvres Complètes 7 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2003), 43–50, 103–104; Méditation sur l’église, 64–68, 175–176; Corpus mysticum, 79–82, 229; Paradoxe et mystère de l’église, 48–58. According to de Lubac the transformation of the church is as radical as the transformation awaiting our bodies at the resurrection, which transformation has already embraced the church’s head (Meditation sur l’église, 65), but always noting that there are not two bodies in view, but one (e.g., Catholicisme, 48). On de Lubac’s eschatology and its relation to history, see Flipper, Between Apocalypse and Eschaton; Schlesinger, “Threefold Body.” Schnackers discusses the theme of continuity across time and eternity in Kirche als Sakrament und Mutter, 160–172. Hans Urs von Balthasar ends his theological aesthetics with a meditation on the eschatological transformation of the church, likening it to a shipwreck that results in the “splintering of its own intratemporal form,” but leaves its true and eternal form, given in Christ, intact. Glory of the Lord, 7:543. On Balthasar’s eschatology see especially Healy, Eschatology of Balthasar.
Lubac notes, they are means, provisional as all means are, and yet truly the means that God has appointed, and therefore necessary. These elements of the church must “be passed through, and not in part, but totally,” but in such a way that they “can never be surpassed or exceeded.” De Lubac reaches this conclusion because eschatology is not simply a matter of the distant future, but rather rather pervades the present, upon which it “exercises a hidden power.” Thus, Joseph Flipper concludes that for de Lubac, eschatology is “the depth dimension of the present.”

De Lubac’s account of the relation between history and eschatology is best approached by means of his theology of spiritual exegesis, which Susan Wood has demonstrated to be fundamentally concerned with the theology of history, rather than with biblical interpretation as such. However, a full exposition of either his theology of

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121 de Lubac, Catholicisme, 45; Méditation sur l’église, 53–54.
122 de Lubac, Méditation sur l’église, 175–176 (My translation).
123 de Lubac, Méditation sur l’église, 99 (My translation)
124 Flipper, Between Apocalypse and Eschaton, 218.
125 Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 17–52. This history-of-salvation-oriented approach to de Lubac is carried forward in Flipper’s work (Between Apocalypse and Eschaton), and stands in some tension with more ontological approaches to de Lubac’s thought such as, e.g., John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005); Bryan C. Hollon, Everything Is Sacred: Spiritual Exegesis in the Political Theology of Henri de Lubac (Eugene: Cascade, 2009). Oddly, such proposals tend to characterize de Lubac in Platonic terms despite his explicit self-distancing from Platonism (e.g., Catholicisme, 107–132). Moreover, Hollon’s work speaks of spiritual exegesis as an ongoing practice of the church, despite de Lubac’s explicit recognition that its time has passed, though its fruits remain in the church’s liturgies (L’écriture dans la tradition [Paris: Aubier, 1966], 11–16, 78–98). Indeed, Hollon’s characterization of the allegorical sense of Scripture “as the means through which the historical Jesus is transformed into the omnipresent, totus Christus,” and his penchant for seeking a spiritual meaning within the Christ event (Everything is Sacred, 165–172 [168]), betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of de Lubac’s thought. For de Lubac, the historical events of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection, are themselves already the spiritual meaning of the Old Testament, and absolutely must not be viewed as themselves another “literal sense.” E.g., L’écriture dans la tradition, 204, 254–255. Though Hans Boersma’s, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) fits into this Platonic and ontological paradigm for interpreting de Lubac, his treatment of de Lubac’s theology of spiritual interpretation avoids the sorts of category errors committed by Hollon (151–168), and he recognizes that de Lubac does not advocate for a return to spiritual exegesis as such (155). Hence, while he represents a different approach
history or his account of spiritual exegesis is beyond the scope of this project. Instead, a single insight drawn from this theology will allow us to establish the necessary coherence between the previous section, where mission was posited as the fulfillment of liturgy and the present one in which the eschatological consummation is so identified, namely that the fourfold sense of Scripture is, in its most basic character, a twofold sense.

According to de Lubac, the four scriptural senses are the historical or literal, which is identified with the historical events recorded in the Old Testament; the allegorical or spiritual, which is identical to the New Testament, and is the Christological fulfillment of the literal sense; the tropological or moral sense; and the anagogical sense, which represents the eschatological consummation of all things. And yet de Lubac also writes, “The Christian tradition knows two senses of Scripture; their most general appellation is that of the literal sense and the spiritual sense.” This is because the senses of tropology and anagogy are themselves interior to the allegorical sense. Rather than introducing new meaning to the Christ event, which itself gives meaning to all of history, they are the unfolding of its rich depths. The crucial point is this: the eschaton

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126 See, e.g., Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 25–52; Flipper, Between Apocalypse and Eschaton, 91–150; and Schlesinger, “Threefold Body,” 186–204 for fuller articulations of de Lubac’s theology of history as it relates to the fourfold sense of Scripture.

127 de Lubac, L’écriture dans la tradition, 14–25, 48–49, 247–274. See also Wood’s discussion in Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 26–46. At this point, it is almost a truism to note that de Lubac’s fourfold heuristic is itself an imposition upon a much more varied and diverse terminological field throughout the patristic and medieval periods (so, e.g., Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the Church, 28; Flipper, Between Apocalypse and Eschaton, 93–95), yet it probably bears repeating once more.

128 de Lubac, L’écriture dans la tradition, 115 (My translation).

129 de Lubac, L’écriture dans la tradition, 254–255, 275. See Flipper for a development of the thesis that Christ constitutes the meaning of history, Between Apocalypse and Eschaton, 129–150. This
is the full flowering of the Christ event, not something additional to it, for to propose the contrary would be a superseding of Christ himself.\(^\text{130}\)

The implications of this continuity between the Christ event in its historical unfolding and its eschatological consummation are significant for the ecclesiology I am articulating here.\(^\text{131}\) Specifically, a connection is forged between the church’s temporal existence and its eternal perfection. What the church is and does here and now is not foreign to what it will eternally be and do, and vice-versa. The two are intrinsically related. This is not only true of the church’s liturgical gatherings, where, generally speaking, we recognize an advent of the powers of the age to come, but also of its missionary life. Indeed, recall that the reading of the eucharistic prayer given here yielded a connection between ethics/mission, the ecclesial body, and eschatological becoming, all of which are subject matter in the third narrative program. The three cannot be separated, observation, that Christ is the meaning of history, should satisfy Kerr’s concern about the need for a properly Christian historicism, which does not find history’s meaning independently of the Christ event. *Christ, History and Apocalyptic*, 57–62, 134–158. Indeed, the fact that, for de Lubac, Christ’s fulfillment of history is an active accomplish on his part, where he takes to himself the Old Testament’s categories, making himself its meaning, rather than passively fulfilling them (*L’écriture dans la tradition*, 133–147), which Flipper characterizes as a “retroactive causality of Christ” (*Between Apocalypse and Eschaton*, 147), ought to further distance the eschatology I articulate here from the sort of Troeltschian project of reverse-engineering history, reducing ecclesial engagement to technique, from which Kerr rightly demurs. *Christ, History and Apocalyptic*, 23–62. Balthasar shares this conviction that no new meaning is introduced to the Christ event by either the mission of the Holy Spirit or by the eschaton, *Theo-Drama*, 5:19–54. See further Healy, *Eschatology of Balthasar*, 201–203.

\(^{130}\) This refusal to see Christ as surpassible stands at the heart of de Lubac’s career-long opposition to Joachim of Fiore, which is expressed most fully in Henri de Lubac, *La postérité spirituelle de Joachim de Flore*. See discussion in Flipper, *Between Apocalypse and Eschaton*, 189–199; Cyril O’Regan, *Theology and the Spaces of Apocalyptic* (*The Père Marquette Lecture in Theology*; 2009) (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2009), 12–29. Recognizing the legacy of Joachimism, with its longing for the spirituality which has broken free from the constraints of form and hierarchy, sets Kerr’s critiques of “ideology” in a quite different light. He opines that it is only by being free from settled form that one can guarantee the church’s freedom from ideological captivity. *Christ, History and Apocalyptic*, 161–196. Yet the genealogy of Joachimism shows that this sort of longing for Geist’s untrammeled freedom is itself part of an ideological lineage.

\(^{131}\) Wood (*Spiritual Exegesis and the Church*, 44–46), and Gerlach (“Lex Orandi,” 315–317), both recognize the connection between anagogy and ecclesiology, while Flipper goes further in developing this connection (*Between Apocalypse and Eschaton*, 234–246), as do I (“Threefold Body,” 186–204).
and, as shall become clear below, the point of connection between them is the reality of the triune life. Through the paschal mystery we share in this life, which is the driving force for both the liturgy and mission, and which is the destiny towards which liturgy and mission are both oriented.

**The End is the Beginning is the End: Concluding Synthesis**

The eschatological consummation of the church provides a backdrop against which I will provide a systematic articulation of the ecclesiology constructed in the preceding chapters. In this way, I shall draw out the continuities between the church’s mission and its eschatological fulfillment, as well as mission’s abiding significance for the church’s eternal state. These considerations will, at the same time, provide a synthetic unity to the various strands of argumentation that have run throughout this study.

**As It Was in the Beginning...**

At the heart of all reality lies the eternal life of the triune God. The loving community that is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is the one necessary reality, whereas all else that is, is contingently. In chapter two, I labored to show that, while God is intimately involved in the world and its history, particularly through the divine missions, God himself is immutable. Neither creation nor redemption bring about change in God, who ever remains the same God. Drawing upon the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar, I have construed this unchanging divine life in eucharistic terms: the Father eternally gives being to the Son, who co-eternally returns the gift in gratitude by his joint
spiration with the Father of the Holy Spirit. The triune life of God is an eternal Eucharist. ¹³²

This eternal Eucharist is the condition of possibility of all non-divine reality, for God’s being always already includes the movement of giving-being-to-another, as well as the positive letting-be of difference. Creation occurs by way of participation in the Son’s generation from the Father, the original gift of being. Similarly, creation participates in the Son’s eucharistic yes to the Father, in the return-gift of self to the God who lovingly grants being to the Son eternally, and to the creation temporally. Sin is the disruption of this eucharistic exchange, and the Incarnate Son’s mission, which is most fully concentrated in the paschal mystery, is to restore the eucharistic movement of the return gift from the side of humanity. This he does at the cross, which enacts, under the contingent conditions of sin (not his own), his filial life as he gives up the Spirit, and dies, in obedience to the Father’s will.

By living out his eucharistic filial life in this way, he takes up the distance of sin and its separation into his own eternal “distance” from the Father, thereby enabling alienated humanity to return to sharing in the divine life, by once more sharing in his eternal eucharistic response to the Father in the Spirit. Such is the basic conception of salvation operative in this missional ecclesiology: salvation as communion in the divine exchange of life and love, and particularly communion in the Son’s eucharistic gift of self.

¹³² I shall refer to the divine life as an eternal Eucharist in order to avoid confusion with the sacrament of the Eucharist, which, as I noted in the last section, is not eternal, but rather passes away with the coming of the eschaton.
...Is Now...

While this salvation awaits its final consummation when God shall be all in all, it is also enacted in the present time between Christ’s advents. In particular, I have focused upon the liturgy and upon ecclesial mission as two modes of sharing in the paschal mystery, which sharing comprises our salvation. As I demonstrated in chapter two, by the sacraments of initiation Christians are made members of Christ’s body and deputed to take part in the eucharistic sacrifice. By the same rite, they are called upon to share in the church’s mission, which chapter one demonstrated to involve witness, proclamation, and concrete work for justice in the world beyond the church.

It is not coincidence that Christian initiation’s deputation to worship and vocation to mission mark out two spheres of activity, so to speak, for the Christian life. As chapter one demonstrated, the church’s existence is interior to the world, which is the only possible location for its life to unfold. Insofar as the church is leaven, it needs dough (viz., the world) upon which to work. Missionary engagement with the world is not at the periphery, but rather the center of the church’s existence. This is because the church exists as a creature of the divine missions. Hence, it is constituted by divine engagement with the world, making such engagement part and parcel of what the church is.

It is, therefore, a false dichotomy to ask whether the church is properly conceived of as directed towards God (worship) or towards the world (mission), for the answer is both. In fact, insofar as the church is the creature of the missio Dei, the Godward and worldward movements are at one, for the Incarnate Son’s return to the Father was by way of his mission into the world. The body which he offers to the Father on Golgotha he
offers to his disciples in the Cenacle. Similarly, his body the church also returns to the Father by way of mission.¹³³

At this point it is crucial to realize that the both the sacrifice offered in the Eucharist and the sacrifice offered in mission are participations in the paschal mystery, in the Son’s eternal Eucharist. Recognizing the unity of Christian sacrifice with Christ’s own sacrifice avoids a Pelagianizing of either the liturgy or of mission, for in both cases it is Christ’s one sacrifice that achieves salvation. Liturgy and mission are simply our coming to share in that unique reality by which the world has been redeemed. Moreover, by recognizing the unity of liturgy and mission as grounded in the fact that both are participations in the paschal mystery avoids the problems of collapsing liturgy into mission or vice-versa. They remain distinct modes of sharing in the same reality. As I have shown, though, both of these modes are necessary for the fullness of that sharing to occur, for the paschal mystery is directed both—and at once—towards God and towards the world.

...And Ever Shall Be, World Without End

At the heart of all reality lies the eternal life of the triune God. The loving community that is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is the one necessary reality, whereas all else that is, is contingently. In the eternal state, when God is all in all, the salvation of humanity will be consummated by a perfect sharing in the Son’s place in the trinitarian eucharistic exchange, in this unchanging, necessary reality at the heart of all

¹³³ I establish this in particular in chapter three, though it builds upon the trinitarian account of _missio Dei_ advanced in chapter two.
that is. At this time, when “the whole redeemed city, that is the congregation and
society of the saints, is offered as a universal sacrifice to God,” mission shall be no
more, for the mission will have been accomplished. The totus Christus will be complete:
Christ and all his members will offer perfect worship to God in a sacrifice that fulfills
their existence. The Kingdom of God will be coextensive with creation, no longer
need to be extended through mission.

Until that time, the church as the body of Christ, “draw[n]…into the fate of”
Christ’s body, is ceaselessly carried along in mission by the same Spirit that came
along by the Holy Spirit, and lacking its own “place” in the world precisely because it is
constituted by its engagement with the world, the church never comes to rest until the
dawn of the eschatological day, when all the means by which the church has shared in the
paschal mystery give way to the reality itself, and the eternal eucharistic dynamic of
God’s love embraces all of creation. This eternal dynamic, this one necessary reality,
which stands at the heart of all reality will endure forever, the same as it always has been,

134 My two main interlocutors in this section, Balthasar and de Lubac, both envision salvation’s
consummation as humanity’s being enfolded within the divine life through the mediation of the incarnate
Son. For Balthasar, this is part and parcel of his soteriology as a whole (for which see chapter two, but also
For de Lubac, see, e.g., Catholicisme, 298 (note in particular that he characterizes eternal life as sharing in the
“exchanges of the trinitarian life,” and that this takes place “interior to the person of the Son” [My
translation]); Méditation sur l’église, 206 (note here the connection with being offered in sacrifice.
Elsewhere in the same work he characterizes the eschaton as the transformation of the church into “a single
sacrifice of praise in Jesus Christ” [64] [My translation]). See also Wood, Spiritual Exegesis and the
Church, 132–133; Flipper, Between Apocalypse and Eschaton, 229–231.

135 Augustine, CivDei. 10.6 [BA, 34:446] (My translation).

136 Kilmartin, Eucharist in the West, 381.

137 See chapter one on the pneumatological dimension of Jesus’s mission, and chapter two on the
church’s coming to share in the same Spirit by the paschal mystery.

138 See chapter one on the church-world relation, and chapter two on the church as constituted both
by its engagement with God and with the world.
and we creatures will find our fulfillment therein as members of Christ, who remains the same yesterday, today, and forever (Hebrews 13:8), in accordance with the Definition of Chalcedon (according to which the divine and human natures of Christ are distinguishable, but not separable), and with the classic Thomistic position on the divine missions (according to which the change brought about by the missions of the Son and the Spirit is on the side of the creature, not God).\footnote{I discuss this in chapter two.}

Amen

A missional and liturgical ecclesiology, then, is one in which the church has as its origin and its destiny the triune God, who invites creation to share in his eternal life of love. A missional and liturgical ecclesiology is one in which the missio Dei stands at the very center of ecclesial existence, and which also recognizes that the missio Dei is the paschal mystery, which stands at the heart of liturgical celebration and of missionary engagement.

By the missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit the church has its being, a being that is constituted both internally by the liturgy and externally by missionary engagement with the world. This is so precisely because the divine missions themselves are constituted by the eternal divine relations of origin and are directed outwardly \textit{by the very fact} that they are divine missions, not simply the processions. A missional church that is not liturgical would lack its constitutive reality, for it is through the sacrifice of Christ, in which the church comes to share through the eucharistic sacrifice, that the divine missions reach their \textit{telos} of bringing estranged humanity back into the life of God.
Concomitantly, a liturgical church that is not missional would lack its constitutive reality, for as Christ’s self-gift is directed not only to the Father but also to the world, the church’s own self-gift, enacted in the sacrifice of the Mass is directed both to God and to the world. Mission belongs to the immanent intelligibility of the Mass, not as a potentially dispensable afterthought, but as the verification of the effective reception of God’s gift in Christ.

A missional and liturgical ecclesiology, then, is an ecclesiology of communion, for the source and goal of all things is communion with the Holy Trinity, a communion realized in and through the body of Christ. However, this communion ecclesiology is one that realizes that it cannot remain content with communion as though it were a fait-accompli. Rather, it is an eschatological reality that must, in the interim, also take the form of mission, precisely because until the eschaton the fullness of the communion awaits its realization, and mission strives toward that realization. Hence, the church as missio is by no means something additional to its existence as communio. Indeed, as I have argued, both the communio and the missio are modes of participatio in the eternal trinitarian Eucharist that constitutes the divine life into which we are called, and which in turn constitutes the church.

While mission qua mission will not continue eschatologically—any more than sacraments or office will—the reality that constitutes it, the divine life, will. Moreover, there are two particular senses according to which the church as mission will be of abiding and eternal significance. First, the women and men who make up Christ’s body, and who will share in his eternally perfect self-oblation to the Father in the Spirit, are Christ’s members as the fruit of mission. Second, insofar as the labors of mission are
construed in sacrificial terms (which, following Paul, I have done), and insofar as those spiritual sacrifices are integrated into the one sacrifice of Christ (which, following Augustine, I have argued), and insofar as the eschatological state is itself a sharing in the Son’s place in the divine life, of which the sacrifice of the cross (and, hence, of the Mass) is an external enactment, it follows that the church’s missionary existence in time is consummated in eternity by being itself a facet of that one sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving which is eternally offered to God by Christ, in Christ, and with Christ in the unity of the Holy Spirit.  

For from him, and through him, and to him are all things: to him be glory unto the ages. Amen. (Romans 11:36)

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140 I make a similar argument regarding the eternally abiding significance of the church as congregatio fidelium in my “Threefold Body,” 200–204.
ITE, MISSA EST! A “CONCLUSION”

This study has given the contours of a vision of the church grounded in the paschal mystery and in God’s eternal trinitarian life. It is, for this reason, an ecclesiology of communion. Moreover, it has provided an account of the church as coming to share in the paschal mystery through its liturgical enactment of the sacraments of initiation—baptism, confirmation/chrismation, and the Eucharist. It is, for this reason, a liturgical ecclesiology. It has, at the same time, given an account for how all these features that make it a liturgical communion ecclesiology also implicate the church in mission to the world. Precisely because the church comes to share in the paschal mystery and the life of God through the sacraments, the church is also constituted by its missionary engagement with the world. This is not a parallel track for the church’s life, nor a second stage of ecclesial existence, but rather belongs to the intelligibility of the church’s paschal constitution and liturgical celebrations. It is, for this reason, a missional ecclesiology.

Summary of Findings

In chapter one, I provided a positive material content for the notion of mission, so that its adjectival form, “missional,” would have an actual referent. In other words, I explained what the mission that I argue is constitutive of the church involves. From an exegetical consideration of key New Testament passages on mission (Matthew 28:16–20; and Luke 4:14–21), I advanced the notion that mission is a holistic and comprehensive reality with spiritual, material, and social components. It involves proclamation of the gospel, incorporation into the church, and praxis in the service of the coming Kingdom’s
justice and peace. As I also demonstrated, this holistic account of mission has come to be shared by the Roman Catholic Church, by Evangelical Christians, and by the broader ecumenical movement (tracing this development on the Catholic side through *Ad gentes* [1965], *Evangelii nuntiandi* [1975], *Redemptoris missio* [1990], and *Evangelii gaudium* [2013], on the Evangelical side through the 1974 Lausanne Covenant to the 2010 Cape Town Commitment, and on the part of the World Council of Churches in the documents “Mission and Evangelism in Unity Today” [1999], and “Together Towards Life” [2012]).

This broad based consensus is also expressed in a common commitment to understanding mission as *missio Dei*: as fundamentally a divine activity in which the church is invited to participate. This notion shifts the conception of mission from being anthropocentric and/or ecclesiocentric to being theocentric. *Missio Dei* entered the discourse at the 1955 Willingen conference, and has become the dominant framework for mission theology. Nevertheless, it has also proven to be such a polymorphous concept that apart from further specification, it functions as little more than a *shibboleth*—a term that must be used, but not in such a way that its meaning actually matters. Conceptions of the *missio Dei* range from the deeply ecclesial (represented by, e.g., *Lumen gentium* and *Ad gentes*) to the radically secular (represented by Johannes Hoekendijk).

This question of the secularity or ecclesiality of mission led into a discussion of the church-world relationship, which I pursued with reference to *Gaudium et spes* and the perspectives offered by Latin American voices such as Ignacio Ellacuría and the CELAM conferences. The church-world relationship is a complex, reciprocal, and mutually interdependent one. The Pastoral Constitution locates the church within the real world of history, interior to the human project. The church, in short, is not non-world.
Three motifs round out this consideration of the church’s interiority to the world and indicate the necessity of engagement with the world for the church’s proper being. First, the church is leaven, which needs dough upon which to work. Apart from the world, the church—in addition to having no place to be—has no material upon which to work. Second, and related, the church’s own internal demands drive it into the world. The church engages in mission so that all truly human phenomena (all cultures, all peoples, etc.) may be brought into the comprehensive fullness that the church’s catholicity demands it embody. Finally, a theology of encounter with Christ in the world, especially in the faces of the poor, means that the church must go beyond itself in order to truly find itself. In all three cases, then, the church does not merely bring something to the world—though of course it also does that—but also stands to benefit from, and itself needs the encounter with the world to be fully itself. The church’s path to the eschatological Kingdom of God takes it through the world in mission.

Chapter two reprised my engagement with *missio Dei* theology in the service of providing a positive content for the concept. Building upon John Flett’s criticism of *missio Dei* theology for lacking any actual trinitarian substance, and his recognition that Karl Barth was neither the progenitor of, nor did he exert a guiding influence upon the concept’s development, I advanced my own trinitarian account of *missio Dei*. From Flett’s critiques of *missio Dei* theology, and my own critique of Flett, I gained the parameters that such an account must respect—continual recourse to the concrete specificity of Jesus Christ and his saving act in history, avoiding gaps between God’s being *in se* and his act *pro nobis*, and preserving the gratuity of creation and redemption.
I argued for an understanding of *missio Dei* as paschal mystery, and articulated this understanding in conversation with the trinitarian theologies of Hans Urs von Balthasar and Bernard Lonergan. Each theologian shares a commitment to the classical understanding that the trinitarian missions are continuous with the eternal processions. Balthasar’s trinitarian theology takes, as its starting point, the Christ event, and then proceeds to ask what God’s own life must be like in order for *this* to be his act. This at once attends to the concrete history of Jesus and avoids the idea of a gap between God’s being and act. Balthasar articulates an understanding of the Trinity that is eucharistic in its shape, as the Father eternally gives life to the Son, who in turn, eternally returns the gift to the Father by joining him in the spiration of the Holy Spirit. The events of the paschal mystery are *ad extra* enactments of this eternal eucharistic dynamic, and through them, humanity is brought to share in the Son’s place in that dynamic.

From Lonergan, I gained a more rigorous approach to discussing the relation between the eternal divine processions of the Son and Spirit and their economic missions. Namely, his account of contingent predication allows for a refinement of the position that the missions and processions are continuous. The economic mission is constituted by the relation of origin, and has, as a consequent condition, a contingent term. This allowed me to overcome the ambiguities in Balthasar’s language about Christ’s person being constituted by his mission. From these two theologians I not only gained a specific account of the *missio Dei*, I also articulated the contours of a trinitarian soteriology that provides an integrating concept for the rest of my argument.

With this account of *missio Dei* as paschal mystery in place, I turned to the sacraments of initiation. For both the *Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults* and the
baptismal liturgy of the *Book of Common Prayer*, Christian initiation is Christological and pneumatological, it is begun by baptism and culminates in first eucharistic communion. Moreover, in both cases, the initiatory rite is understood to give a share in the paschal mystery, *and* to implicate those who are initiated in the church’s mission. Hence, mission and paschal mystery are not only bound together in the sense that the latter is an expression of the trinitarian missions, but also in the sense that by coming to share in the one, we also come to share in the other. Coming to share in the paschal mystery, then, is at once coming to share in the divine life *and* coming to share in mission to the world. In other words the path of return to God and the path of mission to the world are one and the same.

In chapter three I continued this line of inquiry with a sacrificial account of the Eucharist. Building upon the trinitarian soteriology of chapter two, upon recent literature on sacrifice and meals in antiquity, and especially upon Augustine of Hippo’s understanding of true sacrifice in *City of God*, I advanced the idea that Christian sacrifice is another way of talking about humanity’s return to God in Christ. This is the reality operative in Christ’s sacrifice on the cross and enacted in the eucharistic meal. Augustine’s theology of the *totus Christus* gives us a resource for understanding the sacrifice of the cross, of the Mass, and of the church (both in its totality and in the lives of the faithful) as intrinsically related. They are all integrated into the one sacrifice of the whole Christ. The conceptuality of sacrifice, then, is another locus for discussing the trinitarian soteriology introduced in chapter two.

To this account of sacrifice as communion, I added the further specification of sacrifice as mission. In the first place, Paul in Romans 15 describes his apostolic mission
in sacrificial terms. This sacrificial characterization of mission can be synthesized with my Augustinian account of sacrifice such that the sacrifice of mission is intrinsically related to the sacrifice of Christ and of the Mass. Second, in Balthasar’s trinitarian theology, the *exitus* and the *reditus* of the Son are united. His path of Spirit-empowered mission in the world is at the same time the path of his return to the Father, an economic enactment of the *filioque*.

This bi-directionality is further verified by the institution narrative of the Eucharist and its continuation on Good Friday, where in the same act of sacrifice Christ gives his body at once to the Father and to his disciples. Once more, the return to God and the path of mission are the same. The Godward and world-ward movement are united. Because the church is the body of Christ, and is so because it shares in Christ’s movement of return to the Father (in this chapter’s terms, sacrifice), this same bi-directional movement constitutes its life. To be the ecclesial body of Christ is, as is the case with the historical body and eucharistic body of Christ, to be given away to and for the world.

If chapter two’s account of *missio Dei* as paschal mystery, and its attendant trinitarian soteriology, provided my argument’s lynchpin, chapter four provided its capstone, in which I specified the precise relationship between liturgy and mission. This relationship must be one in which liturgy and mission are not separated by the sorts of gaps that chapter two sought to close. Nor can it be one in which liturgy is preparatory for mission in a simplistic unilinear or instrumentalized fashion. Moreover, these realities must remain distinguishable, otherwise we are left with a panmissionism according to which mission is everything and nothing all at once. I advanced the idea that my account
of *missio Dei* as paschal mystery, and mission as sacrifice provides a specificity lacking in other accounts. It allows for an intrinsic relationship between liturgy and mission, which neither trades upon gaps nor instrumentalization, even as it upholds the distinction between the two activities.

I turned to the eucharistic prayers of the *Book of Common Prayer* to verify this understanding of the relationship between liturgy and mission. By reading the eucharistic prayer in terms of Louis-Marie Chauvet’s account of symbolic exchange, I noted that in the liturgy, gifts are received in the mode of oblation. To effectively receive a gift is, in point of fact, to render a return-gift. This understanding of symbolic exchange coheres with the soteriology of trinitarian exchange and the account of eucharistic sacrifice introduced in the previous chapters. This dynamic of symbolic exchange is played out over the eucharistic prayer’s three narrative programs, which Chauvet sees as carrying forward the anaphora’s overall narrative agenda of giving thanks to God.

The narrative program is a concept from semiotics, which is used to represent an action being undertaken. In each narrative program, of the eucharistic prayer an “Operating subject” gives some “Object” to a “Receiving subject.”¹ The prayer as a whole involves the church giving thanks to God. Narrative program one recalls God giving redemption through Christ’s historical body. The gift of salvation in Christ calls forth the return-gift of thanks and praise. The thanks-giving of the eucharistic prayer is the sign that the gift of Christ has been effectively received. Narrative program two requests and receives the sacramental body and blood of Christ, and does so in a movement of oblation: in the same petition that requests that the elements be changed,

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¹ Chauvet, *Symbol and Sacrament*, 271.
they are offered to God as a sacrifice. Once more, the gift of Christ’s body and blood is effectively received by the return-gift of the eucharistic sacrifice. Narrative program three requests that the gathered community become the ecclesial body of Christ. The effective reception of this gift demands an extra-liturgical fulfillment in the return-gift of the “missionary liturgy.”^2 Hence, mission is located as interior to the liturgy, and yet in such a way that the two remain distinguishable, as mission unfolds extra-liturgically.

I concluded with an eschatological consideration that showed how the missional fulfillment of the liturgical act coheres with its ultimate eschatological fulfillment. Though, in eternity, mission will be no more, still the underlying reality that drives both it and the liturgy—the eucharistic dynamic of the triune life—will eternally abide. Though the sacrament of the Eucharist, insofar as it is a sacrament, will pass away, the reality of which it is the sign, and the dynamic in which it participates will remain. This consideration set the stage for a synthetic statement of the ecclesiology constructed over the preceding chapters, which I articulated with reference to the church’s eternal constitution in the triune life and its eternal consummation in the triune life. Between these two eternal termini, the church unfolds by participation in the paschal mystery, a participation that is enacted both liturgically and missionally, and in which both modes of participation are integrally related.

^2 Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 281.
Implications for Theological Scholarship

Trinitarian Theology and *Missio Dei*

There are several implications of this study for theological scholarship. To my mind, the most significant contribution is my account of *missio Dei* as paschal mystery. Its significance is threefold. First, it fills a lacuna in missional theology, specifically, the lack of an actual trinitarian basis for the *missio Dei* concept, which is central to any contemporary account of mission. In the absence of such a trinitarian grounding, the concept of *missio Dei* is little more than a cipher subject to the whims of whomever is appealing to it. My account of *missio Dei* provides an alternative to John Flett’s Barthian proposal of a trinitarian grounding for the concept, a proposal which I have shown to be subject to either Hegelian necessity or voluntarist absurdity.

Second, by understanding *missio Dei* in terms of the paschal mystery, I have provided a point of contact for the sometimes bifurcated fields of liturgical theology (for which the paschal mystery is central), and missional theology (for which the *missio Dei* is essential). On my account, the paschal mystery is the driving force both of the church’s liturgical celebrations and of the church’s mission to the world. This allows me to provide a more satisfactory account of the relationship between liturgy and mission than I have seen to date, because it upholds at once their unity and their distinction.

Furthermore, my account of *missio Dei* as paschal mystery also answers the concern raised by the radical *missio Dei* theologians that liturgical form leads to a demotion and deferral of mission, such that mission becomes an ancillary concern which takes place in distinction and at some distance from the church’s proper existence. I have
shown that there is no necessary connection between liturgical form and the deferral of mission. On my account there is no “gap” between liturgy and mission that would lead to demoting mission to a subsidiary concern, which must await the church’s more proper liturgical vocation’s completion before it can get underway. The secularized understanding of *missio Dei*, which eschews the church and its structures, is shown to be one option among many. Moreover, this secularized understanding is exposed as an option grounded in matters of taste (a dislike for structure) rather than in any theological necessity.

Third, the trinitarian soteriology I derived from this account of *missio Dei* as paschal mystery has proven to have remarkable explanatory power. The same reality is seen to be operative in communion/salvation, in liturgy/sacrifice, in ecclesiology, and in mission. At its heart, the universe is eucharistic in shape, for its contingent existence is a participation in the eternal trinitarian Eucharist. In addition to the light this affirmation sheds upon ecclesiology, the sacraments, and mission theology, which this study has outlined, there are profound ramifications for theological anthropology. The true shape of life is to be found in the movement of self-oblation. One fulfills one’s being in kenosis, which proves to be a positive, rather than negative concept.

The eucharistic shape of reality further informs theological ethics and the approach to social realities. Life reaches its fulfillment in gift, in sharing. This point must not be misunderstood to in anyway valorize suffering or poverty, nor to provide an imprimatur for the unjust treatment of victims. As I noted in chapter two, realities such as injustice and material poverty are contingent states of affairs. The eucharistic shape of

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3 See also Leamy, “Balthasar and Bulgakov,” 205–220, for further elaboration of this point.
the universe in no way renders them necessary. Rather, it is in the poverty of lovingly giving away one’s riches, that life’s true shape is disclosed and one’s existence is fulfilled. This last point about the eucharistic implications for social ethics helps to forge a connection between Balthasar’s theology and the concerns of liberation theology, a theological sensibility of which Balthasar was quite critical.

**Eucharistic Sacrifice**

My account of eucharistic sacrifice also makes important contributions. In the first instance, it builds upon recent trends in scholarship that seek to provide a sympathetic account of sacrifice, notably the work of Jonathan Klawans. My account of sacrifice, like Robert Daly’s and Edward Kilmartin’s is fundamentally trinitarian and non-violent. The ultimate reality underlying sacrifice is the loving exchange of the

4 Of course, there is also the poverty that is unjustly imposed upon victims. I do not mean to suggest that this poverty is not also a sharing in Christ. Those who are involuntarily or unjustly poor also share in the eucharistic form of Christ’s life. They too find the repletion of their being in the divine life. However, their unjust poverty is not necessary for them to share in Christ’s eucharistic life.

5 E.g., Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple. Similarly, see Dunnill, Sacrifice and the Body. To my mind, the work of Robert Daly (Christian Sacrifice; Sacrifice Unveiled) occupies a more ambiguous place in this regard as he evinces the sort of evolutionist perspective that Klawans believes is endemic to much of the literature on sacrifice (see chapter three). This evolutionism tends to be allied with anti-ritual bias and supersessionist evaluations of Judaism. While I do not believe that such charges truly apply to Daly, I still consider his more evolutionist-oriented approach to differ significantly from my own.

6 Daly, Sacrifice Unveiled, 10–22; Kilmartin, Eucharist in the West, 356–383. One key difference is that my operative trinitarian theology, because it distinguishes between the life of God qua God and the contingent forms God’s life takes in the economy, allows me to hold an essentially non-violent position on sacrifice while also taking into account the fact that, in some circumstances, the sacrificial victim does indeed die. This difference is discernible in Daly’s preoccupation with explaining that the point of sacrifice is the offering of life rather than death. Sacrifice Unveiled, 26–40. On this basic point he and I are agreed. However, recognizing that animals met their deaths at the temple’s threshold is unavoidable, and not something I want to explain away. One is often left with the sense that Daly would like to both avoid and explain away this occurrence. I believe that my considerations of the relationship between meal and sacrifice sets this in a slightly different light. By and large, these animals were eaten, a difficult feat to achieve unless one first slaughters the beast. In contemporary Western societies the apparatus whereby lambs in the field are transformed into lamb chops on the dinner table is largely hidden, which can obscure our similarity to more “primitive” societies where these means are visible and often sacrificial. In the absence of widespread commitment to vegetarianism, our society is no less violent towards animals than
divine life. That, as a contingent consequence of sin, this life can take the form of the cross does not thereby inscribe violence into the fabric of the universe, for as I have shown, this trinitarian dynamic remains unchanged by any of the contingencies of history, even when God himself acts in history. In the eternal trinitarian life, this kenotic movement is a positive, and not a negative reality. Therefore, sacrifice cannot be simply equated with the destruction of victims or with loss or deprivation, but we are able to account for the contingent states of affairs in which such things occur. Sacrifice is a gift. And in the giving of this gift, the giver enters participates in the dynamic and constitutes the divine life in its fullness.

Beyond this revalorization of sacrifice, my retrieval of Augustine’s teaching on eucharistic sacrifice provides a satisfactory account of the relationship between liturgy and mission. For mission, as a spiritual sacrifice offered by the faithful is integrated into the one sacrifice of Christ, which includes Calvary, the Mass, the final offering of the 

totus Christus, and the sacrifices of Christians in the world. Moreover, this provides an important anti-Pelagian resource in considering the relationship. It establishes the positive value and benefit of the faithful’s missionary engagement and ethical behavior, but does so in such a way as to retain Christ’s sacrifice as the sole source of salvation.

This realization overturns Protestant dis-ease with the Mass as a sacrifice, which tends to worry that the sacrifice of the Mass undercuts the unique saving efficacy of were the Old Testament priests, with two crucial differences. First, the Israelites took responsibility for the slaughter, while we exculpate ourselves with the grocery store’s plausible deniability. Second, their system for procuring meat was ordered to the worship of God, while ours is ordered to turning a profit. Many of this paragraph’s insights have been drawn from a series of ongoing conversations with Richard J. Barry IV about whether or not things “turn out well” for the sacrificial victims of the Old Testament.

\footnote{Of course, to give a gift, one must actually give it. It remains no longer in one’s possession. And yet, to the extent that one construes this state of affairs as a loss, he or she is not really giving a gift.}
Christ’s death and resurrection. While inter-communion ecumenical dialogues have made headway regarding eucharistic sacrifice, there remain intra-communion reservations about the notion, particularly as Evangelical Anglicans look askance at it. I hope that my considerations here lead them to reconsider this matter. At the very least, those who reject the Eucharist as a sacrifice must find a way to avoid the Pelagianism that I fear accompanies the severing the intrinsic relationship between the various modalities of the one sacrifice of Christ. Apart from some consideration such as my own, whereby our efforts are intrinsically related to Christ’s sacrifice, we are faced with the choice between either jettisoning Christianity’s ethical imperatives, or risking a Pelagianism where spiritual benefits are gleaned from a source other than Christ.

**Chauvet and Symbolic Exchange**

In chapter four I read the *Book of Common Prayer*’s eucharistic prayers in conversation with Chauvet’s account of symbolic exchange, with the modification of reading his “ethics” in terms of mission. This change is not a radical one, for Chauvet himself speaks of the “missionary liturgy.” Nevertheless, it is a significant development in our understanding of Chauvet’s thought. We are not left with the generic and somewhat abstract category of ethics, but with a concrete practice of mission, which I have provided with positive content. If is also a significant development in our understanding of the relationship between liturgy and mission, for Chauvet provides us with a grammar for seeing these two functions of the church as intrinsic to one another without losing their distinctiveness.

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My reading achieved essentially the same results that he did in his consideration of the Roman Catholic Eucharistic Prayer II, and that Glenn Ambrose did in his reading of Eucharistic Prayer III. This provides a further vindication of Chauvet’s approach to the liturgy as symbolic exchange. This dynamic seems to be part of the deep structure of Christian liturgy, appearing across the board in these Roman Catholic and Anglican anaphorae. Hopefully, this recognition that the same logic undergirds, and the same fruits are hoped for by both communions’ prayers can serve, in some small way, the cause of ecumenism. The Eucharist at once discloses the church’s nature as the body of Christ, and as a body given away for the world’s salvation. A divided church is a scandal for and hindrance to the church’s mission, for this division undercuts the reality at the heart of the Eucharist—the gathering of Christ’s members into one body—and of mission—calling the rest of the world to share in this communion of love. If, in our liturgies we call upon the same Christ to bestow himself upon us so that we may be bestowed upon the world, if we ask to be fed by the same body, and to become the same body, with the same mission, if our eschatological destiny is to be one with each other, with Christ, and with the whole redeemed creation, how can the churches be content to remain separate now?

**Prescriptions for Communio Ecclesiology**

My argument has vindicated the ecclesiology of communion from the charge, brought by radical missional theologians, that it trades upon cleavages between the church’s life and its mission such that mission can be endlessly deferred. I have done so by appeal to the reality at the heart of communion ecclesiology—specifically, the idea of communion with the Holy Trinity—and the practices most central to the idea of the church as communion—specifically, the sacraments of baptism and Eucharist, and the
liturgies by which they are celebrated. Through this appeal, I have shown that mission is not a super-added extra to communion, but actually part of the shape that communion takes in the interval between Christ’s advents. The same trinitarian dynamic that establishes the church as communion establishes it as mission.

All that being said, it falls to the churches who understand themselves in terms of the ecclesiology of communion to veri-fy this argument by living as if mission ad extra is every bit as central to the church’s life as communion ad intra. They need to veri-fy this argument by recognizing that the path of return to God will also take them through the world in mission, and that this path of mission is not a detour, but rather the shape of the pilgrim church’s peregrination.

This can be served, of course, by catechesis and in preaching so that this understanding of the missional implications of the liturgy can become part of the faithful’s full, active, and conscious participation in the liturgy. However, I remain suspicious of overly didactic approaches to the liturgy that may view the solution as thinking the right things during the Mass or learning lessons to be applied later. This smacks of the gaps and instrumentalization I have sought to close. Instead, the liturgy itself ought to be doing this work, not because of its instructional value, but because through it we share in the paschal mystery, and to share in the paschal mystery carries sharing in mission as part of its intelligibility. Rather than teaching the right things, which, the church, of course, should do, we must be on guard against practices that hinder the missional flowering that, by grace, should result from the liturgy.

I believe that, in particular, practices consonant with the church-world relationship I articulated in chapter one need to be inculcated. To the extent that the
church positions itself as somehow non-world, to that extent it misses the opportunity to engage in mission, because it is in its encounter with the world that this missionary engagement will occur. For this reason, the boundary between church and world needs to be permeable, and any lingering ghetto mentality needs to be abandoned; not so that the church can dissipate in secularity or apocalyptic vapor, but so that it can truly discern the signs of the times, scrutinize them in the gospel’s light, and act as leaven upon the world as it is called to.

The church must move beyond itself into the world so that it can discern Christ in the face of the neighbor, and by this encounter be captivated and so carried deeper into mission. People deeply in touch with Christ through the liturgy and through encounter with the surrounding world, will carry out the mission. God desires this to happen. The church asks him to do it in the liturgy, and simply needs to be positioned and oriented with the world in such a way that this can actually occur.

**Prescriptions for Missio Ecclesiologies**

In my engagement with missio ecclesiologies, I have, at once, upheld their basic insight that mission is a constitutive reality for the church, and at the same time denied the corollary that attends the more radical construals of the church as missio: namely, that recognizing mission as constitutive for the church requires abandoning communion ecclesiology or liturgical form. I have, further, raised the issues of competence and criterion. It is all well and good for missional ecclesiologies (such as Flett’s, Kerr’s, and Hoekendijk’s) to contend that mission needs to be central to ecclesial existence, and that the church cannot afford to delay that mission. However, I do not believe that these ecclesiologies adequately account for how it is that human creatures, especially sinful
human creatures, become competent to carry out this mission. As I demonstrated in chapter one, *Gaudium et spes*’s call to scrutinize the signs of the times in the light of the gospel requires recognizing what in the signs of the times is consonant with the gospel’s light, and what is inimical. These are not capacities native to fallen humanity.

In contrast, communion ecclesiology and their liturgical celebrations can provide for both the issues of criterion and competence for mission. In the liturgy the gospel (according to which the signs of the times are to be scrutinized) is proclaimed and the sacraments of initiation (which, as I have shown, recruit their recipients for mission), are bestowed, and the sacrifice of the Mass (which, as I have shown, also offers the church) is offered. Moreover, within the communion of the church with all the saints and with Christ himself, and within the living tradition that represents that communion’s unfolding, a wealth of resources are found, which can provide the needed criteria for recognizing the work of the Holy Spirit in the world so that the signs of the times may be properly interpreted, and the mission of God faithfully joined by the church.

I have, further, shown that the objections missional ecclesiology raise against communion ecclesiology cannot be sustained theologically. In other words, missional theologians’ demurrals from liturgical form and the church as communion are merely a matter of preference. There is no weighty theological reason for them to continue to forgo the resources offered by communion ecclesiology. Indeed, their appropriation of these resources could be instrumental in enabling *communio* ecclesiology to embody the sort of missional comportment that I have argued they should have.
“All the World’s an Altar”: Mission as the End of the Mass

The Mass, as I have already noted, takes its name from the dismissal with which it concludes: *Ite, missa est!* The Mass issues forth in mission. The people do not merely disperse, they are commanded to “go.” And not only do they go, they are sent on mission. Having effectively received the sacramental body and blood of Christ by means of the eucharistic sacrifice, and having been constituted as the ecclesial body of Christ by this reception, the people of God, gathered around the altar, are sent forth to the world.

It is the world that Christ has come to redeem. It is in the world that the mission shall be lived out. It is in the world that the effective reception of the church’s identity as the body of Christ shall be veri-fied, as the church lives out its mission in an act of oblation intrinsic to the one in which it has just participated. Having received Christ at the altar, the church at once takes Christ to the world *and* meets him in this encounter with the world, for in this mission, he is always already ahead of them through the Spirit’s operation.

With the *missa est!* the Mass does not end, so much as it enters another movement. This is a movement that will carry the body of Christ forward until the next eucharistic gathering, and, indeed, a movement that will carry the body of Christ forward until the Mass is indeed ended, along with the mission. In the end both will give way to the true sacrifice that even now comprises their inmost reality.
Liturgies, Conciliar Decrees, and Other Ecclesiastical Texts


Ancient Sources


Contemporary Sources


Palazzi, Félix. “Hope and the Kingdom of God: Christology and Eschatology in Latin American Liberation Theology.” In *Hope & Solidarity: Jon Sobrino’s Challenge*


