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The Ethics of Paul Weiss

Virginia C. Hill

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THE ETHICS
OF
PAUL WEISS
by
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to the Philosophy Department of
Marquette University for
undergraduate credit.

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INTRODUCTION

The ethics of Paul Weiss is both the focal point of his philosophy and the impetus for its present refinement. As Weiss puts it, "The object of philosophical inquiry is to become a philosopher in fact." But a philosophy must have permanence, Weiss insists. Therefore, it cannot grow only out of a practical situation. Rather, a philosophy must spring from a view of the essential nature of all that is. From this view the philosopher can determine man's place in the world, the work which man must do, and the ideal toward which he must strive. This, in Weiss's mind, is ethics, and it is the purpose of this thesis to explicate and to evaluate the ethical doctrine of this contemporary American philosopher.

Although Man's Freedom, Weiss's major work in ethics, furnishes a fully developed view of his moral theory, it would be difficult to understand the ethics and to appreciate the force of Weiss's conclusions on the strength of this work alone. Man's Freedom delineates the bounds and breadth of human moral activity and hints at practical applications of Weiss's ethical theory, but it offers no information on the metaphysical viewpoint of the philosopher. Since a theory of man and his behavior in the world depends ultimately on a certain view of the world, it is necessary to understand this view before attempting to appreciate or to criticize the ethics. Weiss has expounded his metaphysical viewpoint in Modes of Being. Since, however, Man's Freedom was published eight years prior to Modes of Being, one might perhaps wonder how an as yet incompletely
formulated metaphysics could underlie this fully expounded ethics. We shall therefore preface our critical account of Weiss's ethical doctrine with a brief historical consideration of his major writings; this review will show that Weiss's ethics must be understood in the light of his metaphysics and will justify the exposition of this latter undertaken in Chapter I.

In 1939 Weiss published *Reality*, wherein he viewed the world as a multiplicity of incomplete beings, each being seeking fulfillment from others yet all beings acting contemporaneously. If each being has thus its own future and its own career, what could guarantee that beings would interact at the proper moments with one another? What could keep the many beings together without destroying the individuality of each?

*Nature and Man*, published in 1946, explained that all beings could sustain their individualities while working with one another if all were moving toward the same objective. Weiss named this objective the Good. Each being is thus moving toward the same goal, but the goal is in each case specified according to the being pursuing it, and each being is good for the Good in that it gives the Good what it cannot have of itself: that is, each being gives the Good specificity.

*Man*, whose place in the world is barely mentioned in *Reality*, is seen as an integral part of nature and as a product of evolution in *Nature and Man*. As part of nature, man's prime objective is the Good, yet he is distinct from all the rest of reality in kind, and not merely in degree, because he alone has a persistent self.

That self stood out over against the body and the rest of the world because it alone was persistently occupied with the realization of that single, all-inclusive objective, the Good. And because he had a self... man had a self-identity, and was capable of self-discipline and self-criticism, privileges which were outside the reach of any other being in nature.
This view of man set the stage for ethical problems which Weiss could only resolve in terms of a metaphysics more complete and more inclusive than that presented in Reality. In 1948 Weiss wrote an article, "Sacrifice and Self-Sacrifice," in which he pondered the dilemma of man, who needs his "self" to realize the Good yet who recognizes that the realization of the Good might entail the loss of "self." Weiss asserted, could be justified only if it resulted in a good greater than that which was lost in the process. But what good could be equivalent to the value of man's own "self"? Weiss concluded that one could not will to give up his own being, but that he could risk this being at the prospect of realizing a greater good; one could not choose to destroy what is of great value, but he could choose to retain or to promote a great value, the action for which might involve the risk of something else of value.

In 1949 Weiss struggled with another traditional ethical problem: that of the existence of evil in a supposedly good world. "Good and Evil," the article in which he summed up his ideas on the problem, stated that evil did exist in the world, most notably as suffering, injury and disease, but that evil was the result of conflicting goods. It was in the next year that Weiss published Man's Freedom, already referred to above as his most complete ethical investigation. While Nature and Man had pointed out that man was able and was indeed bound to bring about the Good, in Man's Freedom Weiss argued further that man strives towards this Good through agencies unique to him, i.e. through desire, preference, choice and will.

But in 1954 Weiss published an article, "God, Guilt and Perfection," in which he stated his realization that man is involved in a nearly
impossible moral situation. Man ought to do what is absolutely right, but no man has sufficient power or knowledge to do so. Without losing his freedom, man cannot relinquish either his moral obligation to strive for the Good or the guilt he must experience in the realization that he cannot achieve all the good he faces as possibility. In the face of this moral paradox Weiss said:

I find this paradox intolerable. My struggle with it led me to see my previous speculations as part of a much wider four-dimensional whole. Suggestions of the nature of these four dimensions can be found in Reality and in other places, but they became clear to me only when I turned to the study of ethics and saw the full force of the paradox that a man had obligations which he could not himself fulfill.

The "four-dimensional whole" which had thus revealed itself to Weiss during his ethical investigations was finally given its definitive exposition in Weiss's major work of philosophical synthesis, the Modes of Being. The Modes of Being, then, is an outgrowth of ethical questions; but since the paradox posed in Man's Freedom demands resolution in terms of Modes of Being, the view of man and of the world presented in the latter must be the basis of Weiss's ethics, even though it was formulated after Man's Freedom was written. It therefore becomes an absolute necessity for the present thesis to examine, at least in cursory fashion, the basic metaphysical doctrine of the Modes of Being as the framework within which the ethics of Paul Weiss becomes intelligible.

The thoughts in Our Public Life, a book published in 1959, concerning man's endeavor to realize the Good in a social context, and the thoughts in a lecture on "Natural and Supernatural Law," given in 1962 on the relationships among men and those between men and the whole cosmos follow from the premises set forth in Man's Freedom and in Modes of Being.

In this brief historical resume of Weiss's work we have tried to show both the place of ethics in his philosophy and the importance its
metaphysical basis has in its formation and development. In Chapter I, we will endeavor to expound this metaphysical doctrine in such a way that the connection between the doctrine and the ethics becomes apparent.

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF BEING AS THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK FOR THE ETHICAL THEORY OF PAUL WEISS

To appreciate the four modes of being, namely actuality, ideality, existence, and God, one must approach the notion of being as Weiss approaches it. Of course, it is impossible to begin where Weiss did, for he began without four modes, while his readers must begin with his assertion that there are four. As a result, the reader is forced to analyze the four-dimensional "structure" Weiss synthesized and proposed as true. By consideration of the atoms of this structure, that is, by consideration of each of the modes, one should be able to see that there must be four, not only four, modes of being. Because we are dealing with a structure and not with a simple entity, our study cannot be limited to the modes as isolated. Rather, Weiss's metaphysical entities must be examined both according to their similarities to, and differences from one another, and according to their interaction with one another.

"Actuality" is the name Weiss gives to the mode which is evident to some knowledge. Actualities have or are bodies, they are beings in space, they are beings in time, and they have characteristic natures. Because rational beings external to these are able to distinguish them, Weiss cites apples, men, horses, and teapots as examples of actualities. According to Weiss, no actuality is perfect; that is, no actuality contains or is complete and exhaustive reality, for if an actuality were perfect there would be no room in the scheme for any other. But there are others, and
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these others condition one another, so that a world of multiple beings (actualities) provides both a backdrop for individual activity and the characters with which the individual can interact.\(^4\)

As an individual which both exists on its own and projects itself into the world, an actuality exhibits three types of unity: a private unity, which accounts for its substantial core; a public unity, which accounts for its oneness in spite of its extension into time and space; and a unity of its private and public unities, which accounts for its oneness in the face of both private and public existence.\(^5\)

An actuality is a unity in space, a unity in time, a private unity within, a public unity on the outside, and a unity of its private and public sides. It is all of these at the same time. This means that an actuality is always more than a mere "numerical" or designable unit. If simple, it is nevertheless extended in space and time, has a substantial core, and an outside or shape. All these are "synthesized" in the Actuality, kept together in it. If the actuality is complex it must, in addition, confine, order, and control the natures and activities of its parts.\(^6\)

If actualities are many, then what is Actuality? To Weiss it is not an abstraction but a meaningful reality which manifests itself in the individual actualities, but which is plastic enough to avoid a tag of "collection." While individual actualities come and go, change and effect change, Actuality maintains its nature, and, hence, its identity. Actuality, however, is not the other-world ideal of Platonic philosophy, because individual actualities need not and cannot strive to attain Actuality, for they already participate in it and are transcended by it. At the same time individual actualities maintain their identities, because to be actual is to be concrete and unified.

There are two basic kinds of actualities, which are distinguished by modes of activity: active or primary actualities, which are final, irreducible, active and which exist over a period of time; and compound actualities, which act not from a single vital principle, but through the
conjoint effort of their parts, which each have an activity.?

Active or primary actualities, in turn, are of two kinds: simple primary actualities and complex primary actualities. The first type is incapable of ontological division: that is, while it may allow a mathematical division, it can never be physically divided and still maintain its identity; nor can any of the parts by themselves constitute a unity in any way relevant to the whole. Complex primary actualities, on the other hand, have parts and allow for a degree of ontological division.8 The outstanding characteristic of complex actualities, however, is that they act as vital units with a single principle of vitality; complex actualities are organic beings such as men, animals, birds and fish.

Any category or seemingly elemental "area" of being which is not precisely one of the four modes is a derivative of one of them. Actuality has its own derivatives, which fall into three classes. Analytic derivatives, such as color, are features with no being of their own, since they are abstracted from actualities. Produced derivatives are products of the interplay of actualities. Space is a good example of a produced derivative because, to Weiss's mind, space is made possible by the actualities which occupy it.

Actualities are spatial, and they are in space. This space in which they are is a domain of symmetrical, extended relations. There are no relations, however without terms, and spatial relations are no exception. The being of space is inseparable from the actualities which are related in and by means of space.9 The third type of derivative is the Residual derivative, which is an actuality deprived of a vital feature. Historic facts, which acknowledge the former existence of certain actualities, but which are not spatial beings, fall under this third heading.

"Ideality," another mode of being, is a realm of all-inclusive real possibility, that is, of a possibility that can be.10 Such possibility
makes two demands: first, it must be logically self-consistent; second, it must be ontologically possible. This name, "possibility," might suggest that the being so designated is actually unaccomplished or unfulfilled, but such is not necessarily the case:

Real possibilities have a being exterior to actualities and whatever else there be.\(^{11}\)

... if possibilities could pass away without ever having been realized, they would be possibilities which in fact were permanently excluded from the world, and thus in fact were not possibilities for that world at all.\(^{12}\)

To Weiss, therefore, a possibility has being just as certainly as an actuality does, because if possibilities were merely possible there would simply be no way to make them become real as an actuality; merely possible possibilities would be resigned forever to being no more than that.\(^{13}\) If a possibility has real being, as Weiss insists, then it cannot pass away; the world must always provide a place for it.\(^{14}\)

All possibilities are indeterminate and all are relevant to actualities, i.e. they point to actualities in which their actualization lies. As such possibilities engulf actualities in a sort of layered universe, whose layers become more indeterminate as they stand at a further remove from the core of determinate actualities. Unaccomplished possibilities exist in the future for actualities, and as actualities change, possibilities adjust in order to retain this relevance to actualities. But as they adjust, some possibilities must leave the future. Some of these possibilities are realized in actualities, and as such become ingredient\(^{15}\) possibilities, which have reality, for whatever is must be possible. The rest of these possibilities—those possibilities that cannot remain in the future because of changes wrought in actualities when the actualities actualized some other possibility—must still maintain being somewhere.
Above all, they must be realized, for whatever is not realized was never capable of realization. Possibilities which no longer pertain to actualities and which have not been realized by actualities are realized by God, who knows that actualities ought to realize those possibilities, and who knows that actualities are unable to realize all the possibilities confronting them.

While Ideality is broadly expressed as a realm of all-inclusive real possibility, it has a special meaning for each other mode of being. As relevant to Existence Ideality is the future, because Ideality provides a direction or a "place" to which Actuality can go.16 Existence is ingredient in Actuality, and since it is necessary that Existence perpetually divide and thus change, Actuality must change if Existence is to fulfill its proper function. Since Actuality cannot change except in terms of its possibilities, and since possibility is but another way of expressing Ideality, Ideality is the future for Existence. With reference to God, Ideality is the principle of perfection.17 God perfects or fulfills whatever cannot be fulfilled by the other modes, and as such he is in a position to judge how well actualities have fulfilled the possibilities relevant to them. Using the total range of possibility, i.e., Ideality, God is able to judge actualities by comparing what they themselves fulfill to what he has to supply in order to give possibilities the necessary reality.

As relevant to actualities, the all-inclusive possibility, or Ideal, is the Good. In this context the Good has three aspects. Primarily, it is fulfillment. But actualities themselves are realized possibilities, and so the Good is ingredient in them; because this ingredient good is necessarily determined according to the determination of an actuality itself, it points to certain possibilities more than to others; as doing this, the Good is normative for actualities.
These secondary considerations flow from the primary one, namely, that to be good is to be absolutely full and complete. Actualities will never be the Good, nor will they ever reach a point at which they cannot have more good, because they will never realize all their possibilities. The Ideal will never be the Good, except as the fulfillment of actualities, because the Ideal is ever seeking realization, and so is not itself all it can be. Ideality, or all-inclusive possibility, is the Good for Actuality, but it is not the Good for itself; Actuality is the fulfillment of possibility, yet it is doomed to failure because some determinations will always exclude other determinations. Existence, too, which is the ever-dividing "prime matter" underlying all that is, can never be all that it ought, because Existence is bounded by the determinations of Actuality. Yet, if Existence were not ingredient in Actualities; that is, if Existence were not bounded, it could not perform its function of enlivening. Therefore, Existence is not the Good. Even God is not the Good, because he does not have every fulfillment. God, for instance, cannot engage in the activities of actualities, for then he would be identical with actualities and he would not be God.

The Good is a norm, since some fulfillments are better than others. If all fulfillments were equally desirable there would be no order to actualities, but there is an order, and actualities have at least a tendency to some fulfillments rather than to others. Among the various Actualities, man is unique in that he is aware of the Good and is capable of refusing to do what is consonant with the Good. The Good appeals to him, moving him to realize it in any of four ways. First, because all fulfillment is good, and because man must always realize some possibility, the Good makes man desirous of fulfilling as such. Second, the Good
shows man that some fulfillments are better than others, and man prefers these things because of their goodness rather than for their own sake as he did when he was merely desirous. 23

What is felt in preference is the allure of the Good, and this is compatible with the Good actually taking the limited form of a goal not in fact desirable. 24

Third, the Good enables man to choose it for its own sake, and yet under the guise of some other end. Moreover, the Good causes man to choose even repugnant means for the sake of the end seen as good. 25

An end, of course, is not identical with the Good. There are many ends and only one Good. An end is the Good, distributed over the whole range of items in some one of many possible ways. 26

Fourth, the Good can make man a being who wills creatively by making him choose the Good itself as his end. This will make him the best possible man, because what he will be willing for himself is not an arbitrary end which he has fixed, but his greatest possible fulfillment. The Good that the creatively willing man realizes will necessarily be limited, because man is but one limited being, yet it will be the greatest good that he can attain. 27

"Existence," as one of the four modes of being specified by Paul Weiss, has not the same meaning as that assigned to it in traditional Aristotelian or Thomistic metaphysics. As a mode, Existence is being engaged in the activity of self-division. Weiss compares Existence to Aristotle's prime matter because, like prime matter, it is undifferentiated in itself and is available only as bounded or constrained by some other feature of being. 28 While this constraining element is substantial form for the Aristotelian, it might be any of the three other modes for Weiss.

Existence is a dynamic continuum which would expand endlessly
by self-division were it not for the other modes.

Were Existence to be entirely sundered from the other modes of being, it would divide itself endlessly, make every part of itself, without end, stand over against every other part. But Existence can never be entirely sundered from the other modes. They restrain its tendency toward self-division, making that division stop at some finite length, thereby dictating a limit to the extent to which the universe can expand. 29

This continuum has no holes or blank spaces, for as it escapes the bounds of one restraining mode it is bounded by another, and as the modes each give Existence a determination of its own kind, Existence repays by bestowing vitality to each mode according to that mode's capacity for being vitalized.

Actuality restrains Existence by dictating the areas of space, time and energy in which the vitality of Existence is to be expanded. Reciprocally, Existence gives actualities the vitality which enables them to act both on their own and with other beings. In so doing it makes actualities contemporaries, and it gives them a spatial field in which to operate.

Ideality restrains Existence by dictating the manner in which the energy of Existence is to be used, since possibilities are of a certain kind because they are possibilities for actualities, which are determinate, and because Existence can divide and exert its vitality only by changing that in which it dwells. 30 Existence, on the other hand, gives Ideality a future.

The Ideal in itself is not caused; but the Ideal is caused to have the status of the Future by virtue of the difference which Existence makes to it. Existence stains the white radiance of Ideality by making it into a cosmic Future, which, because Existence is exterior to actualities, must be exterior to those actualities as well. The Future is a perpetual effect of the causal power of Existence, converting an otherwise irrelevant (or relative to nature, indeterminate) Ideal into a relevant prospect, thereby providing limits to what nature can become. 31

God restrains Existence by making it to be always essentially the same, that is, confined to being the plastic sort of thing that adjusts
itself to confinement within the straits the other modes impose upon it yet vital within those straits. While Actuality does harness and bind Existence to actualities, the termini it sets up are inadequate to maintain Existence's essence; to do this is God's function. Existence, in turn, gives to God his cosmic vitality, and in so doing Existence makes God omnipresent, for Existence permeates everything. At the same time Existence gives God the advantage of being over against all else that is, so that pantheism is impossible. For a being to have Existence as God is to let him be God and nothing else.

Weiss's "God" is at once finite and omnipotent, and manages to relate to all else that is while remaining other than all else.

The most adequate idea of God is one which puts him over against all else as a unity large enough to encompass not only Actual individuals but the Ideal and Existence as well. For us to have an adequate idea of him we must solidify what we grasp of ourselves in our privacies with what we discern of other beings.32

Singular, he is despite his individuality, no contingent striving actuality. Determinate and inward, he is, despite his perfection, no mere Ideal. Not spatio temporal, he is, despite his Existence, simple.33

God is an intrinsically and essentially unified being, and as such is the only one of the modes to be entirely individuated, that is, absolutely self-identical throughout. As actualities, possibilities, and Existence in its myriad forms are ever engaged in re-forming and shifting, God is always one and dynamic. Yet since God is ever reconstructing actualities in himself in such a way as to realize the otherwise unrealized Good for them, he cannot be static. His identity remains untouched by his relationship with other beings because he is other than they, and must always be other than they if he is to be God. But despite his dynamism, which comes to him from Existence, and despite his essential goodness, which he expresses through the Ideal by fulfilling it, God is
finite. This finitude results from his separation from the other modes. God is limited to being himself, so that he can in no way be the other modes or do the things they do.

Since God is only one of four basic realities, he is evidently a limited being. Like the others he needs the rest in order to be himself. Unlike them though he can meaningfully contain all the others as part of his very essence.

Considered with respect to God actualities are the divine self-identity endlessly multiplied and combined, the Ideal is an avenue for expressing his essence, and Existence is his creative energy. Reciprocally, God keeps possibilities realizably relevant to actualities, so that those possibilities which are not actualized are nevertheless possibilities which could have been actualized. He gives Existence its essence of being self-divisible and vital, and he gives individual actualities their self-identity. He also keeps the Good, a relevant norm, exterior to actualities so that they can be measured by it.

This consideration of the four modes has presented the foundation upon which the ethics of Paul Weiss is grounded because all that is must fit into the framework of the modes, and in so doing must function as a participant in one or another mode. Moreover, this presentation of Weiss's metaphysical theory has set up the bases of certain tensions which will pervade his entire ethics, and which will be resolved in terms of the grand scheme of the modes.

We turn now to a consideration of man, the ethical being as located in the cosmos and as thus battling cosmic tensions.
The two modes of being most pertinent to the investigation of Weiss's ethics are Actuality and Ideality, because ethics is concerned with the behavior of man, an actuality who strives for the Good, or Ideality. From this description two approaches to ethics can be derived. First, because Weiss's world view is essential to his view of man and therefore of ethics, it is important to approach ethics from the vantage point of the modes, that is, by viewing the ethical relationships between Actuality and Ideality in terms of cosmic value. The second approach involves man himself as he approaches the Good through the realization of his own goods.

Value, because it is an abstract term, is difficult to explain or to define, and perhaps for this reason Weiss never says precisely what value is. He uses the word frequently, nevertheless, and he uses it in reference to a manifold of things which are not in any way identical with value. He is convinced that everything that is has value or is valuable because value is a relationship to the Good and everything that is was once a possibility (except God and Existence) and is therefore a realization of the Good. It is because an actuality is better than the possibility of it that actualities come to be in a cosmos where the Good is a fulfilling principle. In the light of the Modes of Being value is that ingredient.
power of the Good that keeps actualities reaching for more good in terms of their own fulfillment. It is this attraction of the Good for itself in the best possible "condition," namely as actualized, that is responsible for the whole dynamic interactivity of the modes.\(^2\)

But at the same time that this dynamic attraction of the Good for itself manifests itself on the cosmic scale it is taking hold of individuals, which have a vision of the Good only in the limited form that their individuality will allow; this means that the individuals have a sort of ontological awareness of their value.\(^3\) They seem to be sufficiently convinced of this value to sustain themselves as they are accosted from all sides by the demands of other individuals. Thus, because an individual is somehow apart from others and has itself as its center of value and unity, the individual will fight to maintain itself. To the individual there can be no point of reference beyond itself so far as value goes, because it is linked to the Good as a concrete realization of the Good. Consequently, the non-conscious being can have an awareness of the Good only in terms which will satisfy its lacks as a determinate realization of the Good. As one ascends the ladder of actualities from the inanimate through the animate to man, the awareness of self-valuation becomes more evident to the individual itself. Thus, individuals on the higher echelons of self-awareness will become selective in approaching alternative fulfillments.

Referring briefly to the doctrine of the four modes one can now see more easily the way in which the Good operates. The Good as possibility is attractive to actualities because they are themselves the Good realized in limited fashion. Moreover, the Good holds this sort of sway because beings seem to be relentlessly seeking that completion or fulfillment which the Good both presents to and is for them. In short, all being seems to be seeking reconciliation, but each being is seeking this fulfillment in
its own terms, that is, in terms of the possibilities relevant to it.

Tension mounts, therefore, because beings which are first of all concerned with their own value struggle to maintain themselves against all sorts of odds; no matter how a being is accosted it tries to maintain itself and to complete itself in terms of possibilities immediately before it. Because each being posits its own value it tries to enhance value in the only way it can—in terms of itself and of its own possibilities. At this point conflict is inevitable. There are innumerable individuals seeking their own goods, and their seeking can put them in conflict with one another for certain goods. Besides the tension among individuals, which inevitable results in unrealized goods for some of them, there is a private tension which afflicts every actuality. Each individual is caught in a situation that demands it realize every possibility (for every possibility is good for it) and yet that imposes the exclusion of some goods by the very fact that other goods are realized.

The battle for realization of the Good both between individuals and among them is responsible for the existence of evil in the world. According to Weiss, there can be no question that evil is real and despicable. Pain, death, and sorrow, for instance, can only be intrinsically evil, although they might be instrumentally responsible for the realization of some good.

Pain, suffering, disease, death, sorrow, injury are intrinsically evil... These various evils ought not to be. No matter how effective they might be in preventing the existence of greater evils or in promoting the attainment of goods, they are and continue to be intrinsically evil, evils which remain evils whether needed or not.

Weiss rejects theories of evil propounded by both modern and classical theology. Both admit the existence of evils in the world and the existence of a good God who created all that is.
The moderns . . . are forced to view evil as inexplicable, a taint in the divine being for which there can be no explanation . . . . According to (the classical theologians) evil is a derivative fact, the outcome of the desirable exercise of good powers on the part of angels or men . . . . The existence of evil is treated as basic, undeniable truth. But it is affirmed that evils did not have to be, and even that there actually was a time when no evils were. Had angels or men not abused their absolutely good will, nothing . . . but good would be. Their position, however, cannot be maintained.7

Weiss argues that in the last resort the classical theologians must presuppose one inexplicable evil from which all the others flow and they must assert that if men were innocent or good there would be no natural calamities like tidal waves and toothaches. Yet he cannot uphold the modern theologians.

If evils are required in the nature of things, if their absence would compromise the existence of the universe, they are ontologically necessary. If evils are required in order that good should be, if their absence would mean that there would be less good than otherwise, they are valuationally necessary, indispensable instruments for the production of good. Only if man created the universe would all ontologically necessary evils have some relevance to man. As it now is, only valuationally necessary evils need have any relation to him.8

Therefore, the universe is good because it can stand alone without reference to anything beyond it; if it is not good, then nothing can be good. Moreover, the universe is good because its creation as half-good is an impossibility. Finally, the universe is good because it has no ontological need for evil.

But there is evil, and Weiss asserts that it exists because individuals are striving for goods whose realization involves either public conflict, private conflict, or both. The virus in a man's body is seeking its good when it multiplies and feeds on him; the man is seeking his good when he tries to fend off the virus.

As long as there is a dynamism of individuals within the universe there will be this battle and consequently there will be evil—an evil which is the product of clashing goods, and which is at once ontologically unnecessary and valuationally necessary.
To summarize these considerations of the relationships between actualities and Ideality, we may say that there is a brutal tension between individual beings, each of which strives to sustain its intrinsic value, and Actuality as a whole, which relentlessly strives for the Good which is ingredient in possibilities. Yet, ironically, this Good can be realized only through the destruction of some possibilities and/or actualities.

Because actualities are so totally engaged in the attempt to resolve this tension, they are not themselves aware that such resolution is really impossible. They are therefore able to come to be and to leave the realm of actualities without doing more than providing a ground or a field for the tension, for if they should succumb to either term of the tension they would be either annihilated or frozen in inactivity. Now it is precisely because he is an actuality who is aware of this tension that man has a unique place among actualities; to him the tension manifests itself as guilt, ambition, energy, frustration, and other such psychic awarenesses. In addition to his awarenesses man has the ability to choose among the various possibilities that present themselves to him; he is not forced to realize this possibility or that. In short, men are capable of transforming reality; the world of men is a world of acts, while the world of other actualities is but a world of events. To understand the reason for this distinction we must now consider in some detail Weiss's view of man or of "human nature."

In spite of their great freedom and in spite of the peculiarities of individual men there is a human nature which is common to all men. Weiss defends this thesis by insisting that man is indeed an actuality, but that man holds a unique and powerful position in this realm.
To look at man as a free actuality one must first see the way in which actualities in general can be free, and one must recognize that actualities have graduated abilities to express this freedom. To be free an actuality must be able to change.\textsuperscript{9}

Freedom is a power by which the indeterminate is made determined, the general specific, the abstract concrete, the possible actual.\textsuperscript{10}

And yet, to be free is not to be unlimited, for then there would be nothing into which an actuality could change; the actuality would encompass everything and have nothing possible to it. The limits, which are essential to freedom, are imposed on the individual by its own determinateness, the determinateness which allows it to be an actuality in the first place. Limitations do more than to guarantee freedom as such; they also guarantee the maintenance of this changing individual, for a radical change in an actuality would change it into another actuality, destroying the original and its freedom in one instant. Moreover, Weiss insists (in Reality) that a being is incapable of putting itself out of existence, although it can create or allow conditions which might do so. Freedom is then the positive power of an actuality to reach for its own fulfillment and to realize this fulfillment in a limited way. Freedom is the positive aspect of the tension created between striving Actuality and dynamically fulfilling Ideality, and it allows an actuality to change only to the brink of losing its identity as an individual and as a determinate actuality.

At any given moment each actuality has a certain "concern," a focal point for activity which partially corresponds to the Aristotelian final cause or end, because concern is the area of possibility on which a being focuses or is focused and toward which an actuality moves.\textsuperscript{11} Final cause or end presumes, however, that a being's ultimate good is inherent in it
as a potentiality that is determined by the being's nature. In Weiss's philosophy, concern is as extrinsic to the actuality as are its possibilities, and since possibilities are subject to change with changes in the actuality to which they are relevant, or with changes in other possibilities, concern is almost certain to change. An actuality's final status is not determined wholly by what that actuality is, although an individual cannot contradict itself and still exist. Somewhere between total freedom and its own identity lies a being's radius of change; but this radius extends far beyond the kind of predetermined nature implied in Aristotelian philosophy chiefly because Weiss does not acknowledge any kind of intelligent first cause. In Weiss's philosophy there is no room for a grand scheme of order in which each being is what it is because it was made that way; Weiss's actualities are "just there" and they are in charge of all the future realizations of possibility.¹²

Change in an actuality as it is at a given moment can occur only when its concern is altered by changes in actualities around it. For instance, at some point a globule of inanimate chemicals were forced to concentrate themselves on a different concern than that of merely interacting with one another, perhaps because one ion was bumped into a molecule in a new way, and life came to be. Weiss asserts that this sort of change from inanimate to animate is going on all the time. Likewise, all higher beings come from lower ones by a free act in which concerns and objectives of the lower are so altered that the beings are able to use their mutated bodies; all evolutionary change comes after some mutation.¹³

There will, therefore always be a "missing link" in the usual story of evolution, for the transition to man, just like the transition from any lower to any higher being occurs while and because mutated bodies remain unchanged.¹³

Evolution is not in the bodily change, but in the adjustment of the organism
to life under the condition of its body, and as such, evolution is a product of freedom. Life is the result of the exercise of freedom and it continues only "... so far as a being conquers the opposition which its body puts in the way of a continued exhibition of a concern for goods pertinent to itself and other beings."¹⁴

Beings die not because they have been deprived of a divine spark or mysterious breath; they die either because there is nothing on which they can act or because their bodies act too well, insistently behaving as a cancer does, without regard to what the total concern requires.¹⁵

The problem of the origin of life is to understand how a change in circumstance will enable a non-living being to become a living one. The answer lies in the fact that the body of an inanimate being can become so recalcitrant to its concern that the only way of having an effective concern is for the being to change the nature of that concern.¹⁶

As life progresses to animals there is a new development which is expressed as a psyche, which unifies an animal's feelings and correlates pleasurable and painful objects.¹⁷ Just as the inanimate being faced with compulsion becomes living to sustain its freedom, the animate being is faced with an inadequate expression of its psyche and in order to continue as free it becomes man, whose whole existence is an expression of itself. At this point, the Good has manifested itself most adequately, for a limited realized good, the actuality man, is able to be aware of this Good, which at first he knows only in terms of his own existence, and then to perpetuate it for other actualities than himself.¹⁸

Man is above all a self, whose consciousness has arisen because a sensitive being has freely kept its concerns steady despite changing bodies. This is to say that man is the one actuality who is aware of his unity and identity in the face of all the changes within and without him. Although the animal quickened its body and sustained itself in terms which its psyche offered; or, to put it another way, while the animal sought only
to preserve itself and its offspring by means of a crude unity of instincts and impressions, man's body is quickened by the self, which, being the realized Good in limited form, is aware of more than its own value and needs.

A self—and thus a human being—arises when an embryo, because of the resistance of its body to a sensitive concern, freely changes that concern into one which can be expressed in and through that body. It is a change from a being which can act sensibly into one which can act ethically, from a being which utilizes a living body so as to promote the welfare of itself or its kind into a being which can utilize a living body so as to promote what ought to be realized on behalf of whatever may exist.

However, when the self encounters an obstacle, it cannot become a different kind of being, because the self is both related to the Good and a determination of it. The self does become a superior type of being.

How does the self operate in man so as to be an ultimate actualization of the Good? Also, does the fact that man has a self make him so radically different from the rest of actualities? To answer these questions is to at last explore the notion of man as a self.

A very common tendency in philosophy is to pose man as a unity of more or less opposing parts like the soul and body, or the mind and body. In science there is a tendency to split man into chemical, psychological physiological and even atomical parts, and thus to identify him with a collection of these parts. To Weiss, both these "separated" views of man are completely wrong, and lead to a wrong understanding of man's unity as a self. Although the self seems to owe its existence as an actuality, that is as a realized good, to its body and mind and will, these latter three aspects of man are no more than expressions of a human self. What is more important, there is no faculty or power for each of these, and they are known to the self only so far as they are in conflict with one another.

The body is an expression of the self which maintains the self in
time and space. As such, the body is the means by which the self
expresses the Good ingredient in it through human actions: only through
the body can man bring more good into the world, yet man is not his body,
he merely has a body.

Man's mind is, like his body, an incomplete expression of the self
—incomplete because the self is too full to be presented in a one-sided
expression. As a realization of the Good, the self is too dynamic to
be manifested simply in body, as the determinateness of an inanimate
actuality is, or in a sensitive body, as the psyche of an animal is. The
self has too much freedom to be fettered by the compulsion of a body or
the one-dimensional, flat expression of a psyche.

The mind is the self external to itself, the individual as
organized and restructured apart from the body and in part as
a result of his own activity. The mind's function is to think, but it is not always engaged in this
activity, because at times of great excitement or unconsciousness it
ceases to function. The mind comes to be as a result of human freedom,
and this mind grows as men grow. In the baby and in the small child
the expression of mind has perhaps begun to occur, but it is not until
a certain maturity is reached that a person really expresses himself
through his intelligence or mind. Intelligence, as the ability to
relate experiences, is part of the self since the self is a unifying
thing. However, only when man uses this ability does it develop to
the extent that it is effective in helping man determine the best goods
for him to realize. Moreover, the developed mind cannot be acquired
without society, because the relating of experiences demands realization
of their significance and conceptualization of them, and no man can do
this alone. Mind can be acquired only when this acquisition is begun
in infancy when the child grasps the meaning of some of the items he
encounters through the agency of his senses.

Mind is intelligence reinstated, made pertinent to vital activities, given body and driving force, enabling a human being to be at once an independent individual and a part of the social whole. It is intelligence employed despite and in the face of the demands of group existence. It is the agency by which the individual overcomes the resistance which the infectiously shared concerns of others offer to what it intelligently and sensitively discerns.22

Mind is the power of treating content as having one significance in one context and another significance in another context. It is first employed when the perceived is treated as pertinent to the sensitively discerned, as at once something we expected and something another expects. By being related to the sensitively discerned as having this double meaning, the perceived acquires a double import, signifying a future as at once pertinent to us and to other beings.23

Despite the fact that they are separate expressions of the self and as such have different ways of operating, mind and body, however, do not operate without influencing one another: indeed, were it not for this mutual influence men would not be able to distinguish them. As it is, mind and body are both expressions of the self, but each has its deficiencies in that each is a sort of one-dimensional expression of the total self. The self infects each with its concern, but each mode of expression adapts the concern to itself, so that often the separate concerns of the mind and body do not coincide, and a man feels the resulting tension as emotion. Thus, when the body sees rest as the Good for it at the same time that the mind is still adjusted to the Good in the form of a certain study in which it is engaged, there is an internal annoyance. In the same manner a mind facing a difficult problem might seek rest while the active body might interject its demand for continued activity with a resultant frustration or despair.

The cooperation between mind and body is also operative in the
case of desire. A desire is the means by which man offers an object of
the mind to the body or an object of the body to the mind; desire is
not a force but a channel through which two conflicting forces are drawn
together. In the examples already given, the tired body offers the
prospect of rest to the mind so that the mind sees rest as good enough
to grant it to the body. The mind, for its part, can make the body
desirous of rest or at least of relaxation. Resolution of the desire
seems to come in terms of the self, which is simultaneously expressing
the want for two goods, and which is able to determine the better good.
Nevertheless, even when the Good as expressed through one mode of expression
has triumphed, another good has been lost. Thus the self can never express
itself as fully as it ought because it has to express itself by means of
multiple expressions which are sure to clash.

The will, another chief mode of the self's expression, presents
objects to the body or to the mind, but the objects presented are those
to which the body or the mind is already directed in some way. However,
the presentation only provokes action upon real possibilities for the
individual, and it operates in such a way as to provoke bodily or mental
movement to an object consonant with it. While to desire an object is
to see it as a possible object of willing, to will something is to
provoke the mind or body to the extent that neither can resist the
provocation. Just as there is no faculty of mind or of body, there
is no faculty of willing; there are only acts of willing, which are
certain expressions of the same self that also expresses itself through
body and mind.

... there are no instincts or reflexes, no separate
potentialities or capacities, but only a single concern which
is subdivided and distinguished in the course of being realized.
Weiss therefore recognizes no "mind-body" problem in the sense of post-Cartesian philosophy, nor does the question of man's substantial unity constitute for him the problem that it poses for the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of man. The self is absolutely unified, and it unifies all that its own expressions present to it, so that the self is always "in the now," is always constant.

The will is focused on the Good-for-the-self which it expresses. One of the chief reasons the will has such sway over activities of mind and body is that being is always seeking unity, so that any interior conflict between expressions of mind, body, or will must be resolved if the self is to survive.

A self is concerned with the Good as absolute, abstract and unlimited, pertinent to all beings. It itself is that good realized in a limited way, and thus as concrete, determinate and relativized. As a concrete form of the absolute Good, each self is a unity of which all objectives are independent, partial illustrations. Because, then, the will is an expression of the Good realized through the self, it can provoke the mind or body to any sort of good. Moreover, it can be both creative and subject to habit.

A creative will is one which frees itself from any habit except one which would always induce it to choose the Good for its own sake. Although the will is at its best when it is attached consciously to the Good, it can function in three other ways. It can provoke the mind and body to do what is simply desirous because every possibility has an aspect of the Good, or again, to do what is preferable because some possibilities are better for an actuality than others, or finally, to use certain means because they are the best for a chosen end. While the will can provoke all these things, it is at its best when it is
creatively willing because this creative disposition leaves the self most free, whereas desire permits the self to be harnessed by impulse, preference makes the self a slave to select objects, and choosing ends binds the self to those ends. Moreover, dedication to the Good as it is accomplished by the creative will is superior to any dedications the will makes in desire, preference or choice. This dedication of the creative will is the best for the self, because the greatest possible fulfillment for the self, as a realized good, is the Good. No matter how an individual's possibilities change, he will never have to change his commitment if he is dedicated to the Good, because the Good is the realm of all possibility. No matter how conditions change, and no matter how the concern of the self changes, the will always remains free to seek the greatest enhancement of the self when it dedicates itself only to that enhancement, which appears in the guise of fulfillment, or the Good.

The will, however, can always be habituated to something. It is easier for the will to provoke the mind or body to act in some previously set way than to act in a way which might cause a change in direction. What happens concretely is that the entire self becomes habituated to some action and then to a series of related actions, until it is somehow fettered by these habits. Chapter III will deal with this problem in more detail.

To the extent that he can deliberately change his habits, the man is the ruler of his destiny. His habits can also be changed and combined by modifying the structure of the body and the environment, and by varying the conditions which stimulate activity. Because a man is overrun with habits he can be guided down a number of specifiable paths. Because his habits can be controlled from within and are in part formed under the pressure of the environment without, each man is at once the master of his fate and a creature of circumstances.
Thus, while theoretically man is bound only by his self and its identity, in the practical moral situation he is bound by his past, his body, his fellows and his environment. He is as free as his will makes him, but he is also a highly impressionable being whose great freedom occasions great attachments.

To summarize the preceding discussion on the activity of the will, let us recall that the will acts in four ways which correspond to the four ways in which the Good infects actualities. First, the will expresses the self by immediately specifying resolution of the mind-body conflicts instigated by desire. Second, the will acts habitually in order to realize what it prefers. Third, the will helps man to act well habitually for certain objectives which are willed. Finally, the will presents the Good itself to the self for consumption and allows the Good to dictate means, ends and immediate decisions.

Man may therefore be described as a self expressed as body, mind, will, desire, and emotion; because of the tensions created by these various expressions of the self, man finds himself in a difficult moral situation. He cannot satisfy all the goods that each expression demands, he cannot satisfy all the possibilities that even the unified self presents to him, and he cannot even begin to satisfy all the goods which do not relate directly to his self but which are in his capacity to realize. In short, man is obligated to realize every good that presents itself to him simply because every possibility ought to be realized if it is a real possibility; meanwhile, he is an actuality—a single being—bombarded with countless possibilities, of which he can realize very few. Weiss insists that this insufficiency on man's part leaves man forever a hopelessly guilty being.
Thusfar, we have seen man as he is related to the cosmos. Man, however, has a private or an interior dimension, which is the self-as-focused-on-its-concern. The following chapter, then, discusses man as a private being who is, nevertheless, subject to all the tensions that trouble him as a cosmic being.
For Paul Weiss, man himself, the conscious actuality and the moral agent, is the primary object of ethical investigation. The preceding chapter dealt with man, but with man considered (we may say) as "cosmic:" that is, as a part of all that exists and therefore within the framework of the modes of being. In that perspective, man is unique among beings, but he cannot stand apart from them, for he is subject to the same ontological conditions under which they find themselves. In Chapter II man was seen as a member of a system so cosmic and so vast that he seemed dwarfed in it. What was considered was the cosmic "structure" of the modes, man's evolution in the structure, man's function in it, and, in general, man's relationship to the four modes of being. Because Weiss is concerned with a Good of cosmic proportions which is fulfilled cosmically as well as specifically, the modes as a whole, and therefore man as a being within the modes, form an essential consideration within Weiss's entire ethical theory. To the minds of Weiss and most ethicists, however, the core of ethical concern is man himself, because he is the individual who can govern a situation rather than be governed by it. Because man has a self endowed with consciousness or awareness both of itself and of the world which it inhabits, and because he can unify all of this world in terms of that self, he alone is at once capable and culpable when it comes
to realizing the Good. Therefore, this consideration of Weiss's ethics must concentrate on man considered precisely as a moral agent charged with the realization of the Good.

The question has presented itself already: can man, in general, be a valid topic for philosophic discussion, i.e. is it possible to speak of a human nature without denying the very freedom which such a nature dictates? This problem is not insuperable to Weiss, especially in light of the manner in which he has been able to allow for both the comprehension of each of the modes and for the identity and unity of every being. Weiss has outlined human nature in terms of freedom and boundary. From the side of behavior, Weiss contends that the high degree of predictability of human actions pitted against the impossibility of certain prediction attests to both the validity of speaking of man in general and the enduring freedom of man.

Man is a self, that is, a determination or actualization of the Good, who is aware of himself and therefore aware of the Good in a limited sense. Every possibility for man is therefore normative for him; man is obligated to fulfill every possibility in the sense that every possibility demands fulfillment and man is the being to whom his own possibilities are most relevant; God, of course, can fulfill man's possibilities, so in this sense these possibilities are relevant to God, but they are first and foremost relevant to man. This is so because every possibility, precisely to be possible, must be capable of actualization; otherwise it is an impossibility.

From these premises Weiss formulates one of his basic ethical principles, namely that "can" implies "ought" and that "ought" implies "can." The deepest theoretical basis for this assertion comes from the nature of the Good as self-fulfilling and aggressively dynamic. "It is good for the Good to be fulfilled," because actualization is a possibility for the Good and therefore a fulfillment of what it is. Since the Good is at the root
of all movement, and since the only real activity the modes engage in is movement, and since without movement there is no fulfillment and thus no more Good, can implies ought. To put it another way, every possibility must be fulfilled if it is a possibility at all; it every possibility is something that can be achieved; therefore, can implies ought.

Man's whole career, therefore, consists in enhancing the determination of the Good that he is and in enhancing all Good that there is, since man is conscious of what the Good is and as "part" of it shares in its drive for fulfillment.

"Can implies ought" is a principle dictated from the side of Ideality, because it is derived from the need of all possibility to be realized in some way. The principle becomes pertinent to man in the form of what Weiss calls the absolute and primary ethical principle, which says, "It is absolutely wrong to reduce value." Weiss arrives at this principle from one which he says all men accept and whose contrary is absurd, namely, "It is absolutely wrong to kill a friend wantonly." This principle gives a hint as to Weiss's view of value and what value means to man. Value is in some way analogous to the Good, but it denotes a certain quantitative nature, which springs from a relationship between things. That is, something cannot be considered quantitative except in a relative context, for if something is to be more or less it must be more or less than something.

It seems that the self is taken by each individual to be the standard of value for him, while at the same time the individual is able to realize or to be aware of all other value because it is related to him. More simply, man, because he is a determination of the Good, knows what Good is. But since man is still an individual who seeks to maintain his individuality, he cannot strive for cosmic good as such, and he can only be aware of the
Good in terms of the kind of determination of it that he is. Here, once again, we find an instance of the tension between the individual, who strives to maintain his identity, and the Good, which for its part strives to embrace all that is.

In view of man's relation to the Good and of his awareness of good, it is not difficult to see how Weiss derives "it is absolutely wrong to reduce value" from "it is absolutely wrong to kill a friend wantonly."

For a friend, after all, is seen as a self worthy of one's attention. Thus, if one posits and acknowledges his own value, and if he devotes this self of value to another, he acknowledges a like value in the object. It then becomes a destruction of one's own value to destroy a value to which one has attached oneself, and since one's own self is the root of all value one knows, no one will be able to destroy either himself or a value to which one is attached, ethically speaking.

... it is absolutely wrong to kill a friend wantonly. To deny this is absurd. No one, no matter what his background, his upbringing, his appetites, and his aims can cancel or reduce the ultimacy of this fact. To reject it as error is impossible; to attempt to circumvent it foolish. This does not mean that he who says it is right to kill a friend wantonly has produced a logical clash between terms antecedently defined in opposite ways. "Friend" has a wide range of possible meaning; the idea of killing is neither contained in or excluded from it. The combination of it with killing does not include or preclude the idea of wantonness, and the combination of these terms with wantonness is similarly neutral with respect to right and wrong.10 There is logical absurdity of an intended denial of a formally defined, necessary truth, of an attempt to hold together terms which had been antecedently defined to be antagonistic; and there is existential absurdity, the absurdity of trying to maintain something to be true though the affirmation requires the destruction of the possibility of making the affirmation.11

The attempt to justify the wanton killing of a friend is therefore existentially impossible.

What is valuable is therefore whatever is a good relative to the self; and thus it follows that "the valuable" cannot be any of those

supposed values on which many ethical systems have been built. Happiness, for instance, cannot be called the chief ethical value for man because happiness is achieved only by not being sought; \textsuperscript{12} happiness, Weiss asserts, is not what men really seek. Man's good "lies in part in losing himself, in not fulfilling himself in himself, in not being merely happy."\textsuperscript{13}

Nor is pleasure an ultimate value, because it is often valuable to undergo pain, the opposite of pleasure. Moreover, pleasure can result in evil.\textsuperscript{14}

This is not to say that the Good does not sometimes appear to a self under these guises of happiness and pleasure, but it is to say that men do not seek the guises but the good beneath them. This is true even when men think that they are pursuing other "valuables" because it is the Good as ingredient in these other things that makes them attractive to men. In other words, men are always pursuing the Good as long as they are pursuing anything at all.\textsuperscript{15}

But why is it that men come to choose the Good under such differing aspects? In the first place, each man is an individual self who has his own set of possibilities, each has his own past, each has his own power of achievement, and each has his own concern. In short, each individual is determined by what he is at any given moment. But to say this much is to reveal only part of the complexity of the moral situation; for man is able to choose the next moment's activity and thus to alter himself for the following moments. Because men decide what they are to be with every moment's decisions, and because there is freedom in these decisions, and because the Good has several ways of appealing to man, there are four basic ways in which men choose the Good for themselves.

First, man can be moved to choose the Good by desiring alternatives which the Good makes desirable. But when a man desires an object, he does so without any reference beyond his immediate mental or bodily attraction
to the object and he looks upon the object as no more than a satisfaction of a lack he experiences at the moment the desire presents itself. Using the terminology drawn from the modes and their interaction, one might say that desire involves an actuality seeking possibility indiscriminately and chiefly for the immediate benefit of the actuality. To realize a desire is to take account of nothing beyond the lure of the desire; it is to ignore any consequences beyond that of satisfaction of desire. In yielding to this kind of immediate desire the self still yields to the Good, because every possibility for man is something of the Good, but this sort of activity is at the lowest level of possible actualization of the Good, because it takes no account of the economy of the Good involved. That is, desire involves no selectivity and thus no consideration of the advantage of one possible actualization over another.

The second way in which men choose the Good for themselves is preference. When a man prefers some possibility to another he considers, at least in a limited way, the value of the possibility as actualized, or, in Weiss's language, the preferring man makes the future more internal to himself. Instead of immediately responding to a possibility before him, he holds his activity of realizing the possibility in abeyance. In his holding back he expresses his self more fully, because he allows the self to realize a good more pertinent to it than some rejected good happens to be. The self is here expressing itself as a certain determination and not just as a determination seeking a fulfillment. In the second and higher level of moral actualization, the self is freer than when it was moved by desire, because it is not distracted in the activity of realizing possibilities which are less pertinent to it. When a man prefers one object to another he places a certain distance between himself and the object.
Choice is the third means men use to actualize the Good for themselves. When a man chooses, he makes a single possibility into his self's concern, and he thereby identifies this possibility or end with the Good-for-him. As a result, means to this end become valuable only in so far as they conduce to the end, and a man might find himself enduring very unpleasant means for the sake of that end. When a man makes use of this way of realizing the Good, he becomes still freer than he was when he used only preference, because he has further disencumbered himself from the effort of effecting realizations which do not bring about the fulfillment of his self in the best way. However, he has also made himself a more responsible individual, because he has declared himself willing to risk the loss of all the values involved in the means he will take for the sake of the realization of the chosen end. This implies that he must not deviate from his course which points to the end, for if the end is not realized, he will have lost not only the value of its realization but also the values attached to the means he employed. There will be no self-fulfillment for him.

Before considering the fourth, and in Weiss's opinion, the most adequate way for man to realize the Good, it is necessary to see the disadvantages of desire, preference, and choice from the viewpoint of the Good. All disadvantages or unfavorable consequences of these ways of realizing the Good might be summarized in the expression "Loss of Values." Because the Good is essentially fulfillment, the most complete fulfillment is the greatest realization of the Good, and so values are lost whenever a fulfillment is not the best one available. When one only desires, he misses the opportunity of realizing himself as specifically as possible, and therefore the desiring man can never complete himself. Because, however,
he is not destroying anything for the sake of a distant end he is not risk­
ing the loss of value. But he is nevertheless losing value because he will miss some opportunities to realize the Good while he is engaged in satisfying his immediate desires. When one prefers, he can realize a good which is more fulfilling to the self, because the self has been allowed to express the preference (which it must do in terms of itself), and yet the self will probably fail to achieve some of the best fulfillments, which require extended attention and effort. Obviously, the self which is attending to myriad possibilities of which some are merely preferable to others is unable to engage in the sort of prolonged effort needed to realize some very great and deeply fulfilling good. Yet, the man who prefers is not risking the loss of values that the choosing man risks. When one chooses, he creates the possibility for a greater good, but he risks a greater failure. In choosing he can achieve a determinate end which expresses the self deeply, but if he fails he has lost both the end and the values risked in any means he might have taken to that end. Even if one should achieve his chosen end, however, he might have lost values unnecessarily, because while he was blindly heading for the end to which he had committed himself he was forced to ignore any new possibilities which might even have altered the value of his chosen end. For instance, if a young man had decided to become an artist and had wagered all his time, talent, and education on this end he would be morally bound to realize this end as far as he could. In moving toward it, however, he might pass up chances to become a sculptor, or to help his brother become educated, or to take care of his health. He might, therefore, have ignored possibilities for greater realization of the Good than his work as an artist could ever bring about, and yet, because he had identified his self and his concern with "artist" he was no longer
free to bring about any of the other realizations; to do so would have been to risk his identity as artist.

From these considerations one can see how desire, preference, and choice fail the Good by not guaranteeing its greatest realization and how they fail man by not guaranteeing the greatest fulfillment of his self. But Weiss offers a fourth way in which man can respond to the Good, a way which at once satisfies realization of as much of the Good as possible for any individual, is within the reach of each individual, and will never subject man to loss of his greatest amount of fulfillment. This way is creative willing,¹⁹ and it amounts to dedicating oneself to the Good as end. This involves far more than just succumbing to the Good as presented in desire, because dedication to the Good involves finding the Good in its best possible way for each individual. This in turn supposes taking stock of what can be done at any given moment, of what conditions are needed if one is to be always ready to achieve the Good in whatever form it presents itself, and, most of all, it supposes that the individual take stock of what he really is as an actualization of the Good. More concretely, dedication to the Good as end-in-itself presupposes that the dedicated individual will have his mind, body, and will conditioned to the greatest possible extent for whatever possibilities that present themselves, that he will know the extent of his effectiveness so that he does not try to over-reach his powers, and that he is flexible enough to change directions and attachments when he must. In short, the creatively willing man controls his situation rather than letting his situation control him.

The will is that power by which a man reaches beyond the focused objectives of mind or body to an objective which is appropriate to both. It is a limited will so far as the objective it adopts is an objective of the mind or the body used to elicit an appropriate action by the body or the mind. Were the will
unlimited, the objective adopted would be the absolute good, lying beyond and outside both mind and body and appropriate to them and all other beings. The will is effective so far as the actions which it elicits actually serve to bring about the objective; ineffective, so far as, though capable, the body or mind fails to act to bring about the common objective. It is a flexible will if the elicited actions serve also to realize limited objectives while realizing the absolute good; inflexible if it is a limited will, or if, when unlimited, it does not elicit activity serving to realize the objectives appropriate to others. Finally, the will is creative if both effective and flexible and thus also unlimited.20

Although there is no way to arrest the movement of an individual in order to measure the degree of goodness he has achieved or to predict absolutely what he will achieve, men who have good habits can quite regularly be counted upon to remain good and men who have bad habits can be counted on to stay that way. Weiss says that there is this predictability because it is easier for the self to maintain a single mode of action in the face of the tensions which it confronts than to constantly readjust. To understand this constancy in human behavior one must consider two questions: How do habits produce their effects? and, Is man free in spite of his habits?

First, a habit can be formed because the Good seeks fulfillment of itself, and the self adjusts continually to intervening conditions in order to keep itself steadily focused on its concern; a resulting tension of the self as directed toward that concern elicits from the will an habitual response to similar situations and causes the will to even handle different situations with a constant sort of attitude. Concretely, this means that after an act has been done once it is easier to do it the second time and so on. Thus the attraction of good for good in the form of self reaching towards concern is analogous to the attraction of the Good for its fulfillment in the form of actualization, an attraction which persists throughout the Good. But just as there is a separation of the individual
from the cosmic Actuality, and just as this individual strives to maintain its identity, the self as man is autonomous and asserts itself against possible goods because possible goods are not as good as actual goods of which the self is one. In the event of deviation from a habit, therefore, the self is still prone to retreat to the earlier and stronger attraction of the tension (habit). By the same token, a habit can be broken because if one consistently and consciously effects a series of deviations, the initial tension is upset and a new one is in the making. On the basis of this theory of habit it might seem that habits and the creative will are mutually exclusive, but such is not the case. Habits belong to the mind, the body, or the will; but the creative will is an expression of the self in a freer sense than mind, body, or will can be, because the creative will is the self as aimed toward the Good indefinitely, while the other three expressions of self are more definite and necessarily adjust according to any adjustment the creative will makes. Many habits in fact promote the work of the creative will. For instance, the habits of preparedness and of attention and of concern work directly to allow the creative will to achieve the realizations that it suggests to the self. Many specific habits can of course inhibit the work of the creative will; habitual attachment to any end can jeopardize the freedom of the creative will by drawing the self's attention to that object rather than to the best fulfillment of the Good.

From the previous considerations one can see that man is unique among actualities by virtue of his self-consciousness and of his freedom to determine his own way of being. But man stands apart from other actualities in a more significant way in that he, being a self-aware actualization of the Good, can be aware of the Good for others than himself.
Now while each actuality must realize its own possibilities, man can work to promote the Good for other actualities by insuring them as much freedom from external constraint as possible, and by creating new possibilities for other actualities.

In this chapter we have tried to explicate man's role as it appears on a private scale. We have shown that Ideality or the Good provides the future and thus the raw material (in a manner of speaking) for Actuality and especially for man, the self-conscious actuality. This raw material, possibility, is used by man in four ways: in desiring, in preferring, in choosing, and in creatively willing. It is in this last way of actualizing the Good (possibilities) that man is most free, and it is in creatively willing that man realizes the greatest possible amount of the Good.

We also pointed out that man is aware of the Good for others, and that by both promoting the freedom of others and providing new possibilities for them he helps them to realize their goods. So far, we have seen man in a cosmic context and in a private context; in the next chapter we will consider man in a public context, that is, as he interacts with other actualities to both resolve and create tensions.
Previous discussion has shown that every actuality is forever reaching out of itself to grasp and to realize its possibilities under the guise of the Good, which has infected each of the possibilities by making each a fulfillment for the actualities to which it is relevant. Man, the unique actuality who is aware of the Good by being aware of himself and who is able to realize goods after evaluating them, is thus subjected to a double tension that is experienced within the self: as an actuality he is attracted to all goods, yet he knows himself adjudicator among possible goods, not all of which can be realized. Man is therefore limited in his capacity to achieve the Good, and he is conscious of this limitation.

Concretely, this awareness, attraction, and limitation disposes man to take stock of himself in order to realize the greatest possible good as he watches innumerable other goods slip by him as unrealized possibilities. In the face of the guilt and failure incurred by a limitation which he can neither remedy nor make compensation for, man sees that he has failed. And yet he has recourse to greater ways of actualizing the Good than by his limited efforts, because he realizes that other men are able to do what he himself, in many cases, cannot do. The concrete moral situation is therefore this: by joining forces against the onslaught of
possibilities men are able to realize more for the unit of men, that is, for society, than they can achieve by working in isolation as individuals. This cooperative effort is accomplished by division of labor, to the extent that each man concentrates his efforts on a task done for the sake of society. Since the individual benefits from society, and since his task helps support the society, his task also serves him. Even on this ideal level, however, society cannot satisfy the dilemma of individual man because society demands certain goods that a group of men operating individually would never encounter; for instance, its own administration and a means for securing its relations with other societies and with individuals. Consequently, the group will face a greater number of possibilities and will fail to realize a greater number of them. There will also be new possibilities for individuals, as related to society, which will go unrealized.

Originally, says Weiss, men entered into societal relations for the sake of self-preservation; that situation still obtains, but at a more sophisticated level. Modern societies are created to preserve an individual as a certain sort of individual. At the international level there are political ideologies under which people unite or are forced to unite; at the cultural level there are societies devoted to preservation of certain levels of human development; at the economic level there are groups devoted to changing or to maintaining certain fiscal standards and practices; and at the personal level, there are families and microcosmic societies devoted to the development and preservation of each member for his own sake.

The significant point that this description of society makes is that every social relationship has a certain purpose or end toward which it is orientated, and that the group is bound together both by this common aim.
and by a personal link with the other individuals in cooperation or perhaps even in love. But the simplicity of the theory does not carry through to the practical realm, because the practical world demands that every individual be attached to many societies, each of which is making demands on him. While individual members are therefore certainly the binding power of any society, they are, by reason of their multiple obligations to societies, the upsetting factors in any single society. The complexities of individual obligations multiply as society advances, because with progress come new possibilities which stand side by side with the old ones, many of which men are slow to dismiss.

The situation is therefore an imposing, and even a frightening one. Here is man, who, prior to his commitment to any group relationship, must first of all come to terms with himself. This he does either 1) by realizing every good as it comes along; or 2) by realizing whatever good is preferable among those which present themselves; or 3) by attaching his sight and energy to some end as all-inclusive for him and subordinating means as they hinder the realization of that end; or 4) by attaching himself to the Good and at any given moment trying to actualize whatever possibility will best fulfill him. But this man is also confronted with his inevitable membership in all sorts of societies, each of which he can treat in a number of ways.

He is somehow aware that membership in any society implies his participation in the operations of that society to the extent that he derives benefits from it. The maximum good one could do, from the viewpoint of the individual's relationship to the group would be to totally dedicate himself to the society and its aim, choosing to make its end his end. The minimum he could do would be to avoid harming the society in
any way by complying with its laws. Between the maximum and the minimum there are countless levels of social participation, many of which allow the individual to participate in many societies without voiding his membership in any. Weiss sees society from the side of its participants as divided into four groups. First, there is the empowered class which controls the society. These individuals manifest a high degree of dedication to the society as it stands, for its status is their status. Second is the class of reasonable men, who provide a good standard of what should be done in a given society.

The members of a class of reasonable men are sane and decent; they know and care what acts are productive of ill effects in their society. As a consequence they try to live and speak in such a way as to make evident that what is productive of ill effects on others can, through the acts of some of those others, be expected to have ill effects on the agents themselves.¹

The third class Weiss discriminates is the prestigious class, which aims at new values.

The prestigious class offers a test of what is important and what is not. It expresses itself in attitudes and expressions of approval and disapproval which are no less effective in determining the ways of other men than are the appeals to reason or the use of force.²

The fourth class Weiss recognizes is the productive class, which is the backbone of society and which is the most essential element of a society at a given moment, for without individuals who are actualizing the aims and goals of society, all the standards, new values, and powerful people are meaningless. One might note a certain correspondence of these four classes to the four modes of being: the empowered class corresponds to Actuality, the prestigious class corresponds to Ideality, the reasonable class corresponds to God, and the productive class parallels Existence.

Society, then, involves an interchange of values, and because value
is involved, moral obligation is at issue. That is, by membership in society an individual makes use of the products of another's efforts, and thereby destroys certain values. He is bound, consequently, to restore or to increase these values if he is to be true to himself (or to his self), because the self as a determination of the Good is aware of and seeks realization of more Good, since it is good for the Good to be realized. But while the individual thus owes society a return of values, society for its part owes its members an opportunity to continue their private lives; society owes individuals certain rights, because society is of and for its members and the Good. The rights that society bestows on its members are not given with the nature of man as a self-with-a-concern, for they are assigned according to the concern of the society. This is not to say, however, that there are not certain native rights. Native rights are those which all men ought to have, according to the general opinion of most men, and they are grounded in private man, who is trying to realize the Good in his way. Native rights bear a certain relationship to society, however, for they are all those rights which enable man to benefit from public existence and to be a human being who can realize the Good. These rights can never be alienated collectively, although in certain private instances they are alienated for the good of the whole.

Native rights are so many different claims made on behalf of essential parts of a man. . . Alienation of native rights is actually a dis-alienation of oneself, a proper recovery of one's proper being with a private self and bodily abilities, organs, and appetites. One could in fact not literally give up native rights without losing body, mind, will and emotions, for the rights are integral to these. Their alienation is but the abandonment of a perspective not altogether appropriate to public life.

Just as there are rights bestowed by society which differ from
rights springing from man as a private being, so there are laws which society imposes which may or may not correspond to man's private needs. While such public laws are based on the concern of society, private law or natural law is based on the present concern of an individual at a given moment. To Weiss's mind there is no natural law in the sense of a law based on a fixed nature of all existents, such as the natural law St. Thomas Aquinas proposes, because Weiss does not recognize a static nature in any individual. Actualities are not governed by a static end which lies in them as potential, but by the Good, which lies outside actualities while being realized in each actuality to a limited degree. The "law of nature" proposed by Weiss is dictated by what an actuality is and demands at a given moment; he refuses to ground any moral obligation on a natural law which might be restrictive, "supernatural or subjective, a matter of fiat or design, of private decision or individual will. A law of nature is a law in nature," and not somewhere in the future embedded in a being as a potential and final end of that being.

Laws of nature offer intelligible links between a present and a relevant future. They exhibit the qualification of a purely formal structure of time by an implication linking present objects with their characteristic prospects. The laws of nature are thus a logico-mathematically infected time, a time germane to the things that now exist as well as to what they can become. The laws do not make anything conform to them.

Societies may thus be set up in accord with the natures of their members as reflected over a certain span of time, but such societies will not be permanently ordered because the members are dynamic, not static, beings. Just as concerns of individual selves change with changing possibilities, so the concerns or goals of societies change.
constantly, however minute and subtle such changes may be. The best society, moreover, is that which adjusts fluidly to the changing horizon of possibility: such a society allows attention to be focused on the best Good, among the various possible goods available to it at any moment, just as the creatively willing individual within the society is enabled to focus freely on the Good because he is not focused on the attainment of a particular possibility.

Societal existeme poses formidable ethical problems to individuals. In the first place, man is necessarily a member of many different societies: he belongs simultaneously to his family, to the society of his country, to his civic community, etc. And while he is bound by obligations to these various societies, he must further, as an individual, realize his individual or private responsibilities. Out of these two areas of responsibility arises, finally, a third problem of moral responsibility: how, in this situation, he is to coordinate his public and private lives. His foremost responsibility is to his private self.

No matter how immersed a man may be in the public world, there is something of him that remains over. He is and continues to be a private being no matter how public his existence and interests. His privacy can never be exhaustively expressed in public; if it could, he would be able to turn himself inside out.9

At his innermost a man is a sheer self, a being who is over against all others and whole expressions are therefore unconditioned by what lies outside. He is therefore one who is essentially free.9

No matter what public right allows, therefore, and public law imposes, man is bound by his nature as a self to realize the self's native possibilities before he approaches those which are the product of societal life. But the fact remains that he must benefit from some societies if he is to stay alive and progress, because civilization has become so complex and tasks have become so specialized that men depend heavily on one another for even
life's necessities. Even a man who decided to become a hermit would have a difficult time separating himself from society, because now society has control of lands, of raw materials, of education and of tools. Every individual is obligated to contribute to society according to the benefits he reaps from it, if he is not to be responsible for a loss of value. It seems, however, that in some cases a man can do so much good in private life—for instance, as an artist or as a religious man—that he can justify the values he loses on behalf of society by neglecting his specific social duties like being informed on public matters or paying taxes or supporting his family. But even in these special cases the individual artist or religious man retains his responsibility to bring about all the good he can. To justify himself in such cases the individual must be devoted to his single private good to the extent that it takes priority over all else and subordinates all else to it. By his concentrated effort this individual artist or religious man will provide the society with works of art or religious example which will be realized goods, the use of which is at society's disposal. In this way he may be considered to make a real contribution to society, even though he did it by pursuing a private good.

All such actions and decisions come under the evaluative "eye" of God, who measures actualized Good against possible Good which he has fulfilled. God uses Ideality, therefore, to determine whether or not man has fulfilled his responsibility to realize as much of the Good as possible. It is in this way that the cosmic value of man's activity is determined, and that his deficiencies are remedied by a God who realizes all unrealized possibilities. There are, however, two types of unrealized possibility: there is that which man could not realize because he was engaged in realizing a greater one, and there is that which man could have realized but did...
not through his own negligence. In the first instance God simply fulfills what man could not; in the second he judges this man as an inadequate man. Weiss, however, does not make mention of the consequences of this judgment.

The general principle which satisfies the Good best is still the use of the creative will. Obviously, with the addition of social or public responsibilities, an individual is caught in endless dilemmas springing from conflicting demands upon him. To honor one obligation is often to ignore another because man, as an actuality, cannot be in more than a single place at a single moment. By realizing possibilities as he encounters them the desirous man puts countless values into jeopardy because he does not bother to consider values; he does a certain amount of good, and with luck he can realize great goods, but he risks far too much. The preferring man realizes possibilities more discriminately, but since he considers only immediate alternatives his concern is not fixed on the results of his acts, but on the acts themselves. He too, therefore, can be responsible for great losses of value. The choosing man is in a far better position to accomplish great good, for he concentrates all his efforts on a projected good as embodied in some long-range end. He subordinates means to this end, choosing the means according to their contribution to the realization of the end. But even choice can prove unsatisfactory, for if the moral agent changes the end-in-view he loses all the values wagered on that end, and if he clings stubbornly to an already established end he is in danger of foregoing new and better goods as they present themselves. The creatively willing man, however, will always achieve the greatest amount of good possible in whatever situation he encounters, because he can adjust to changes in possibilities. As long as a man aims at the best possible fulfillment (or the Good-as-a-norm-for-him) rather than at
determined fulfillments, he is not bound by any momentary involvement, and he is thus not restrained from actualizing the best possibilities when and as they present themselves.

The more surely we grasp what the Absolute Good is and what it demands and allows, the more surely we are able to answer man's three burning, perpetual questions: Who am I? How can I live with myself? What ought I do?  

The creatively willing man is therefore adjustable and flexible enough to coordinate the demands of societies with the demands of the concern of his self in accord with the greatest possible realization of the Good for his public and private existences.

In effect, then, Weiss is advocating a very common-sense and a very dedicated approach to life. Real moral action is possible when a man decides that he wants to be as good as possible; this decision presupposes that man has reflected on ethical behavior rather than merely reflecting on concrete things to be done. The consequence of the decision is that henceforth this man will judge all his actions and possibilities in terms of what best fulfills his self.

We have shown in this chapter that man is necessarily public and necessarily social. We have shown, moreover, that his membership in societies is accompanied by obligations, some of which he cannot fulfill; because man's public situation is in this way analogous to his private one, he can best do what he ought by becoming a creatively willing man—a man who is prepared to realize the best fulfillments the Good offers to him.
CONCLUSION

Weiss's ethical theory is attractive because it seems that the theory can be applied by anyone and because the theory is consistent with the philosopher's philosophy of man. This ethical theory is subject to certain negative criticisms, however, because Weiss's view of man expresses a complex reality too simply. Weiss does allow for man's constant failure and for his amazing freedom, but in his attempt to generalize about the "nature" of man he loses contact with the basis of the human ethical problem: namely the origin of practical judgment. The self as related to the Good can explain a great deal of the core of human ethical tension and of the attractions which cause man to pursue this or that activity, but this basic tenet of Weiss's philosophy of man and of his ethics cannot account for the real individual origin of decision and activity. Why does an individual appear so unlike every other individual? What in his autonomous self accounts for his becoming this or that kind of a man? It seems that Weiss has failed to define what man really is, because he has over-simplified the situation of man in attempting to account for every aspect of human behavior. In short, Weiss has not allowed for the mystery of human individuality, and because he cannot pose a static nature of man he cannot focus on man with sufficient intensity to recognize this basic fact.

There are also criticisms which one can make of Weiss's theory from a more practical standpoint. First, is the decision to do good in
other ways than desire made consciously by the individual, or is it made for him, or is it not a decision but an inborn inclination? Second, is the sort of detached reflection which is presupposed for such a decision really possible? It seems that man might find great difficulty in arriving at moral principles apart from his day-to-day situation and apart from his own psychological prejudices. Third, Weiss locates responsibility for doing good in the individual's judgment of what best fulfills Actuality at a given time. This says little more than that man should do what will help him to do what he thinks is best at the time; it does not demand the extensive theoretical underpinnings Weiss has proposed.

It has been the aim of this thesis to expound Paul Weiss's ethical theory and to comment on the consequences and the validity of his conclusions. This has been done by locating the ethics within its metaphysical foundation as this foundation gives rise to a philosophy of man. We have, therefore, seen Weiss's systematically consistent doctrine from its origin to its terminus, and it has been from these two endpoints that we have criticized the theory.
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FOOTNOTES

To facilitate the understanding of certain major technical terms in the philosophy of Paul Weiss, there is appended to this thesis a Glossary of terms. In the following notes, reference will be made to this glossary without further explanation.

Introduction

1Paul Weiss, Reality (New York: Peter Smith, 1949), p. 15. (Hereinafter cited as Reality.)

2"Because there are multiple beings, to be is to be incomplete . . ." Reality, p. 209. Also, Reality, pp. 169-170, 172.

3This notion will be clarified in Chapter II.

4See: THE GOOD, Glossary.

5See: SELF, Glossary.


7Here Weiss is considering a sacrifice which involves loss of life. It is necessary to be mindful that the self is capable of that which it is obligated to do. Therefore, it is paradoxical to risk the self for anything whatever because loss of self dissolves the self's ability to reach toward the Good. Weiss is non-commital about the possibility of and the mode of human immortality.

8For instance, a man struggling on a raft in mid-ocean could elect to save his drowning friend nearby or to remain on the raft and possibly save himself. If he jumps in after his friend in order to preserve the friend's life (and therefore the friend's value for him), he is not justified in surrendering his own life and value. He is at once obligated to maintain both values. He can, however, try to save his friend without surrendering his own value; if he is lost in the action he is justified because he did not relinquish value since it was taken from him.
Refer to discussion of evil, infra Chapter II, pp. 18-19.

Infra Chapter I, pp. 11-12; Chapter II, p. 30; and Chapter III, pp. 36-41. See also: DESIRE, PREFERENCE, CHOICE, CREATIVE WILL, Glossary.

If a man were so constituted that he could achieve all the Good that faced him, he would not have any alternatives from which to choose, because the Good for man is the realm of all possibility-for-him and it is precisely in this insufficiency to achieve all his possibilities that man fails the Good. See: THE GOOD, POSSIBILITY, ULTIMATE END, GOAL, Glossary.

Paul Weiss, Modes of Being, (Carbondale, Ill.; Southern Illinois University Press, 1958), p. 15. (Hereinafter cited as Modes.)

Chapter I

See: MODES, Glossary.

The reader will note that the use of the word Actuality in Weiss's work does not correspond to customary meanings given it; this technical term is not to be confused with the everyday word, actuality, which usually refers to that which is the case as opposed to what is a probability or a fiction. In Weiss's mind there is the realm of being which is far wider than Actuality. Note also that Actuality and other terms designating modes of being are capitalized only when they refer to the modes themselves and not when they refer to members of the modes. We have taken care not to use Weiss's technical terms for the modes in any popular context. See: ACTUALITY, Glossary.

Note that nature in Weiss's terminology is not the same as nature in the Aristotelian sense. Weiss, however, is a realist and as such declares that the fact that things can be rationally distinguished bears witness to the fact that they have distinct natures. See: NATURE, Glossary.

See: INDIVIDUAL, Glossary.

See: PUBLIC WORLD AND PRIVATE BEING, Glossary.

Modes, p. 30.

Any organic being is a simple actuality, whereas a machine is a good example of a compound actuality.

Any one-celled organism is a simple primary actuality.

Modes, p. 21.

Reference here is to something that is possible existentially. For instance, Caesar crossing the Rubicon at age 30 is existentially possible, because there was a 30-year-old Caesar to cross the river; Caesar crossing the Rubicon at 75 is logically possible, but it is existentially impossible because there was, in fact, no 75-year-old Caesar to do the crossing.
To say a possibility is real is to say that it is a possibility for some actuality. But while an actuality is real and determinate, a possibility is real and indeterminate. Both actuality and ideality (possibility) are real modes of being. Possibility is not a hazy fiction because real possibility is determinate to the extent that it points to a distinct actuality in an actual situation.

Weiss seems to presuppose that no being passes away, but that all being is in flux. For instance, an actuality may seem to disappear but it still has at least derivative being as an historic fact, an actuality deprived of existence.

This will become more clear as we study existence. See: IDEALITY, THE GOOD, EXISTENCE, Glossary.

This will be clarified in Chapter II. See: DESIRE, Glossary.

Although the norm Weiss proposes is fulfillment, at no time does he indicate just what this fulfillment ought to be, aside from the theoretical explanation of fulfillment as that which fills up the lacks in actualities. There are no archetypes or ideal existents which set the pattern for such completion. This leaves considerable leeway for deviation from any specific "natures" (q.v.).

The Good appeals to man's self and not merely to his cognitive faculties. This will be clarified in Chapter II. See: DESIRE, Glossary.

1See: VALUE, Glossary.
2See: MODES, Glossary.
3See: INDIVIDUAL, Glossary.

Although an actuality will always realize some possibility even if that be the possibility of not changing, the conflict among individuals puts desirable possibility out of reach for some individuals.

5See: PUBLIC WORLD AND PRIVATE BEING, Glossary.


7Man's, p. 242.
8Man's, p. 256.
9See: FREEDOM, Glossary.
10Man's, p. 199.
11See: GOAL, END, CONCERN, Glossary.
12See: NATURE, Glossary.

14Nature, p. 75.
15Nature, p. 75.
16Nature, p. 73.
17See: PSYCHE, PLEASURE, PAIN, Glossary.

18Paul Weiss does not say precisely how the conscious self can be free as an individual, i.e. how this individual can have his own freedom. Infra, pp. 54-55.
Note that the force of provocation results from a channeling of the force of Actuality-striving-for-completion and of Ideality-striving-for-realization. The will merely channels this force in such a way that it becomes irresistible.

Faculty is understood by Weiss to be a distinct power as part of a set nature. The distinction between Weiss's notion of will and the Aristotelian notion of such a faculty is subtle, but it is surely a real one. In Weiss, will can only be an expression of certain directings of tension on the part of the conscious individual. With Aristotle the faculty is built-in, while with Weiss it appears only as the need for it demands such an activity.

Chapter III

Relevance of possibilities indicates their proximity to realization. To be relevant, therefore, to a certain actuality, a possibility must have a possible actualization in that actuality, and the most relevant actuality to any possibility is that wherein it is best realized.
Although people seem to have adopted happiness and pleasure as values, Weiss is justified in denying the value of these things because they are for the self. He contends that no one really adopts those values of happiness and pleasure, but that one only seeks the Good in them. The Good is always the goal, and since it is both inside and outside man Weiss can speak of the Good as objective and subjective. See: SELF, GOAL, ULTIMATE END, Glossary.

Weiss remarks that the self is always in a state of disliked disequilibrium. A habit holds fast, therefore, because it helps to create a sort of equilibrium. See: HABIT, Glossary.

CHAPTER IV

Paul Weiss, Our Public Life (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1959, p. 39. (Hereinafter cited as Our.)
9 Cur, p. 233.


11 Cur, p. 243.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

The terms in this Glossary are technical terms which Weiss frequently uses in his writings. In most cases each term will be followed by a brief definition and by quotations from our source material to clarify the definition or to indicate the sense in which Weiss uses the term. In most cases, understanding of the terms depends upon acquaintance with related terms; we have tried, therefore, to cross-reference the terms as far as it was profitable to do so.

ACTION: freedom manifest in the face of obstacles; follows from actors and circumstances; achieves its character when and as it occurs.

ACTUALITY: the realm of empirically encountered time-space beings which are both determinate and unfulfilled. (Ideality, Possibility, Existence, God, Modes, q.v.)

... have characteristic natures which enable them to be known and distinguished. (Modes, p. 25)

... is unified. (Modes, p. 30)

... affect other beings. (Modes, p. 31)

... seeks to adjust itself to possibilities. (Modes, p. 33)

CHOICE: an action by which a self provides a reason for "an act by which an alternative is justified by being related to an end one is thenceforth obligated to realize." (Modes, p. 93); commitment to an end whose achievement will justify values lost for the sake of it; distinct from: desire, preference, creative will (q.v.)

The reason for choosing an act is produced in the choosing; it is the acceptance of a commitment to a justifying end. The reason for choosing the end is provided at the same time; it is the acceptance of some act as the best possible. (Modes, p. 93).
the creative act in which some alternative is altered by being made inseparable from a justifying end. (Man's, p. 121)

Unless men can freely choose among equally valuable, equally objective ends, they cannot be responsible for what they choose, and they cannot freely choose if what they choose must be the inevitable outcome of the natures they have, whether those natures be acquired at once or be gradually achieved with or without the help of some external force. (Man's, p. 117)

that at which a self aims its activity; that possible good partly determined by the self and partly determined by natural boundaries; that toward which a being directs itself at a given moment and which must change as possibilities change, because it is a possibility as adopted-for-realization by an actuality; related to self, freedom, possibility, the Good, (p.v.).

the state of freely deeping a steady concern despite constant upheaval; a state possible in a being which has a psyche, (p.v.).

arises when sensitive beings freely keep their concerns steady despite changing bodies. (Nature, p. 102).

A living being is conscious if it feels, in the form of pain and pleasure, an increase or decrease in the opposite between the demands of sensitive concern and the state of its body. (Nature, p. 105)

the self as dedicated to the Good as its only goal and thereby willing the best possible harmony of existents at any given time-span; distinct from: desire, preference, and choice (p.v.).

the will is creative if both effective and flexible and thus also unlimited. (Man's, p. 226)

the means by which we offer an object of mind or body to the other; an act of self, which encounters resistance of mind and body because each has its own object while desire offers another; the Good as localized; a sign of the Good encompassing actualities;
DUTY: what our ultimate end requires us to do so that values will not be lost unnecessarily; relative to ultimate end and to values (q.v.).

It is the compelled outcome of a free, often unknown commitment to an end, to an absolute moral good. (Man's, p. 111)

What a living being ought to do is an intrinsic or extrinsic fact about it. It is intrinsic if the being has a characteristic concern for a possible good. It is extrinsic if the good it "ought" to realize is what other beings prefer it to realize. In that case if a living being fails to do what it ought, it fails to conform to a possibly irrelevant condition of excellence imposed from without. (Nature, p. 89.)

EVIL: the outcome of a clash of opposing goods; that which opposes yet is relevant to the Good (q.v.).

EXISTENCE: a mode of being; the vast field that holds actualities—as-realizing-the-Good, plus the Good as future to those actualities, plus God as the essence of Existence; endless expansion bounded only by the other modes; as a mode of being, distinct from: Actuality, Ideality, God (q.v.); compared by Weiss to Aristotle's notion of prime matter.

... being, as engaged in the activity of self-division. (Modes, p. 185)

The ideal in relation to Existence has the guise of a single cosmic future which is diversely specified and realized by the various objects in Existence. (Modes, p. 190)

FREEDOM: the power to radically alter the character of things; that power which demands boundaries in order to be; demands a nature, in Weiss's sense of nature (q.v.).
Freedom is a power by which the indeterminate is made determined, the general specific, the abstract concrete, the possible actual. (Nature, p. 199)

FUTURE: The future is the Good as general, abstract, absolute and alterable. It is the Good, since it is a harmony of all possibilities of all the beings in existence, the very structure of perfection. ("Good and Evil" The Review of Metaphysics)

The Good as absorbed into the future is part of the future for Existence. It does not there exist as a separate unit. (Modes, p. 123)

GOAL: that which we select as the terminus for a certain range of activity; relevant to: end, choice, the Good (q.v.).

We identify ourselves with our goals ... giving them the status of accepted (but not final) goods ... (Man's, p. 66)

By deciding for ourselves what a goal is to mean to us, we make ourselves into moral, accountable men, men who move through the morass of contemporary fact burdened by the vision of what we would like to be and would like to have real. (Man's, p. 60)

GOD: that being who constitutes a mode of being as evaluator of actualities, fulfillment of possibilities and essence of Existence; distinct from: Actuality, Ideality, and Existence (q.v.)

There is no need to refer to God in ethics than except at the point where all human and natural powers fail and then one cannot be sure that what he does will sustain what ethics demands. (Modes, p. 364)

One can never reach him as he exists in himself, an eternal being permeated with value, conserving all that is excellent. But neither can he wholly probe our depths and reach us as we exist in and by ourselves. (Modes, p. 361)

... in the very nature of things, there must be a God who guarantees realization of the Good. (Modes, p. 354)

It is when men see what they cherish pass away that they turn to God for assurance that it still remains. (Modes, p. 359)

If all the Good is to be done, actualities must be made one with God as the being who inevitable realizes whatever part of the Good is not realized by actualities and Existence. (Modes, p. 124)
THE GOOD: all possibility as relevant to actualities and as ingredient in them (because actualities are each realized possibilities); fulfillment of what is not yet actual in actualities; relevant to: possibility, Ideality, ultimate end, goal (a.v.).

exists... are inseparable from the absolute Good. ("Good and Evil," The Review of Metaphysics)

The Good is an all-inclusive possibility, or Ideal, as relevant to actualities. The realization of the Good by diverse actualities allows for the production of multiple evils. (Modus, p. 120)

The Good itself is not perfectly good. The Good is a possibility and therefore as yet indeterminate, but capable of gaining determinateness and value by being realized. (Modus, p. 99)

HABIT: an accumulation of similar decisions which help to determine the character of an individual; relevant to choice, self, individual, creative will (a.v.).

Habits are acquired as a result of action; this in turn is the result of an attempt to realize an object of concern. The nature of habit is determined in part by the structure of the body, for the body provides a limited number of channels through which a concern can be expressed. (Nature, p. 157)

To the extent that he can deliberately change his habits, the man is the ruler of his destiny. His habits can also be changed and combined by modifying the structure of the body and the environment, and by varying the conditions which stimulate activity. (Nature, p. 157)

A conscious being tries to act to decrease the tension it suffers and there is eventually habitual response to continued tensions. (Nature, p. 164)

HAPPINESS: that which is achieved only by not being sought; that which we find for ourselves by seeking it for others; not to be identified with the Good (a.v.).

Happiness is a state in which one enjoys only good pleasures, pleasures brought by improving or at least not injuring others and himself. A genuine happiness is the happiness of interlocked and mutually dependent humans, infecting and altering one another's private tonalities. (Man's, p. 95)
... the good of socially interlocked men interplaying with things for mutual benefit. (Man's, p. 96)

**IDEALITY:**
the mode of being which is fulfillment for Actuality, the future for Existence, the principle of perfection for God; the perpetual standard which evaluates God and by which God evaluates actualities; distinct from: Actuality, Existence, God (g.v.); related to: the Good, possibility, future, (g.v.).

**INDIVIDUAL:**
a determinate being (actuality) which has a private concern and a public relationship with other individuals.
The essence of an individual consists ... in a tendency to incorporate within itself whatever others there may be, so that it may become self-complete. (Reality, p. 213)

... can be publicly other than it now publicly is, for its unitary private being is not necessarily affected by the guise it now publicly has. It is a privacy capable of multiple public forms which arise due to the nature of the relations which intervene between it and the rest of the universe. (Reality, p. 131)

**INGREDIENT:**
intrinsic; part of an individual's or a possibility's makeup (possibility is contained ingrediently in an actuality).

**LIFE:**
the persistence of a being against the opposition which its body creates between the being and the being's concern; life is sustained ...

... so far as a being conquers the opposition which its body puts in the way of a continued exhibition of a concern for goods pertinent to itself and other beings. (Nature, p. 75)

**MAN:**
that actuality who distinguishes himself from the rest by having a self which can be at once directed and adjustable, a self which remains self-same with a single essence and career despite many activities; relevant to: self, mind, body, emotions, will, desire (g.v.).
A man is not a body (nor a will, a mind, an emotional being, or a psyche). He has a body, and that body is necessary and desirable. (Nature, p. 133)

... faces an all-comprehensive possibility and limited possibilities, the latter providing delimited, determinate specifications of the former. (Man's, p. 24)

... a being in double disequilibrium, with an essence partly in the future and an existence partly at a distance. (Man's, p. 23)

... a product of evolution. (Modes, p. 47)

... can evaluate himself in terms not exemplified by him. (Modes, p. 49)

MIND:

The mind is the self external to itself, the individual as organized and restructured apart from the body and in part as a result of its own activity. (Nature, p. 215)

MODES (cf being): the four ways in which being can be manifest: Actuality, Ideality, Existence, and God (c.v.).

Each mode of being exerts a characteristic power. Each reaches towards another in an act which is primarily like the being itself, and which, at its terminus, is primarily like the being in which it terminates. In between it is primarily like the other modes. In between all four modes there would have to be all of the modes together, which is being qua being, being which is not being at all. (Modes, p.e 115)

The modes of being need no reconciliation since they, together in a fourfold way, exhaust whatever there is or could be. (Modes, p. 320)

The togetherness of the various modes is all of them intermixed. This togetherness can be viewed as a neutral relation connecting each with the rest, or as a togetherness of all which is possessed by each and terminates in the others. (Modes, p. 114)

NATURE:

Nature is primarily the domain of interplaying things in space and time; it possesses whatever traits may accrue to things in the situations in which they in fact are. (Man's, p.109)

No nature is exhaustively in the present. (Man's, p. 17)

To have a nature is to be related to future external possibilities... (Man's, p. 19)

Nature is an artist who has lost his skill and is quite content with whatever he may achieve, driven on merely by the necessity to be at all, haltingly and blindly echoing the wisdom contained in a sculptor's fingers. (Reality, p. 120)
The nature of every actuality is an expression of the way in which it partly frees itself from the influence of the dominant world about it so that it may attain that which it needs, despite the distinctions and the compulsions which the environment imposes. (Reality, p. 262)

Related to: Actuality, possibility, concern, freedom, value, (a.v.)

NORM: a standard of value; from the start of his conscious life man is aware of a norm, for he himself has value and compares one way or another with all things; related to: value, duty, (a.v.)

. . . the Ideal component in Existence, freed, maximized, and made historically relevant. (Modes, p. 253)

The maximum good a being has a right to attain is that which would result from the enhancement of itself proportionately to its present value, in consonance with the proportionate enhancement of the rest. (Weiss's normative maxim, Nature, p. 263)

PLEASURE: a consequence of a successful affirmation; produced when one's concern is being expressed in one's body more adequately than before; distinct from pain, happiness, the Good (a.v.)

PAIN: the feeling of losing (at least) control of a part of the body; arises because something being lost is still pursued with original enthusiasm; related to pleasure, body (a.v.)

The living being has a body which it sensitizes and through whose medium it can become sensible of particular things. It is never the perfect mask of its body, however. That is why it has moods, and why it can become conscious of its pains and pleasures. (Nature, p. 104)

POSSIBILITY: that which is not determinate, but which is relevant to (an) Actuality which can make it determinate; the realm of possibilities; distinct from: Actuality, Existence, God (a.v.); related to: Ideality, the Good (a.v.).

. . . possibilities are not extra facts inside the beings; they are the very beings themselves made indeterminate, as having been subjected to an idealization. (Modes, p. 100)
Real possibilities have a being exterior to Actualities and whatever else there be. (Modes, p. 107)

... must be internally coherent. (Modes, p. 105)

... change in the course of time. (Modes, p. 109)

... are relevant to other realities. (Modes, p. 108)

... are systematically connected. (Modes, p. 111)

... are relevant and realizable. (Modes, p. 108)

No possibility can be wholly determinate; but also none can be wholly indeterminate. It is relevant to and realizable in this being or that. (Modes, p. 113)

... a possibility is general, allowing for endless divergent determinations which always add content and sometimes radically change the meaning of that possibility. (Nature, p. 36)

PREFERENCE: taking one of a number of alternatives offered because of an extra lure in the one taken; a way in which the self is moved to realize the Good; distinct from: desire, choice, creative will (q.v.).

... an act of the self, not of the mind, though it usually begins and ends with known goals and means. It is possible to a man because he has an ambivalent relationship to the future. (Man's, p. 73)

Because we approach all alternatives as possible means to an adopted goal, we are in a position to add to their ingredient appeal something of the appeal of that goal. (Man's, p. 65)

PSYCHE: that which makes an animal conscious, at least of pleasure or pain; unifies feelings; correlative to pleasureable and painful objects.

... a function of the insistence of some of the needs of the body, but it is inseparable from and merges into the body because the body has some degree of fluidity. (Reality, p. 272)

PUBLIC WORLD (and Private being) the world common to none but embracing all; as opposed to the individual or private being having an inside which is aimed
at a private concern; each individual has and is an outside
(public being relating to others), while it remains a single
being; relevant to: Actuality (q.v.)

SELF:
the constant, non-material, undetermined unity of a man;
aimed at the Good under the guise of many possibilities and
through the agencies of desire, preference, choice or creative
willing; related to: concern, man, the Good, desire, choice,
preference, creative will (q.v.); distinct from: body,

mind, will, emotions (q.v.)

... reaches from the present to the future and strives
to make that future present. (Nature, p. 244)

It is the body itself as private, concerned and unified,
capable of limiting, enlivening, and controlling the
various bodily parts and the movement of the body as a whole.
(Modes, p. 52)

... has the responsibility of giving universal embodi­
dent to the absolute Good. (Nature, p. 261.)

... is that Good realized in a limited way, and thus
as concrete, determinate and relativized. As a concrete
form of the absolute Good, each self is a unity of which
all objectives are independent, partial illustrations.
(Nature, p. 257)

... needs the help of reason in order to be able to know
the demands of the Good, and it needs the help of the body
to realize that Good in the world that now exists ... also
needs a will. The self, under the stimulation of a conflict
between mind and body, expresses itself as a will to bring
that conflict to an end. (Nature, p. 259)

ULTIMATE END:
Our ultimate end ought to be a harmony of perfected beings.
("Sacrifice and Self Sacrifice," The Review of Metaphysics)

That absolute morality, a single, all-encompassing possibility,
is pertinent to everything we do. To make it internal to
ourselves is to treat it as an ultimate end, at once
defining our duties and justifying our choices. (Man's, p. 103)
An end, of course is not identical with the Good. There are many ends and only one Good. An end is the Good, distributed over a whole range of items in some one of many possible ways. (Modes, p. 127)

All ends have some degree of value, for all are harmonious totalities of whatever values there are. (Man's, p. 116)

Relevant to: creative will, the Good, norm, value (q.v.)

VALUE: realities in nature saturating each being both in itself and in relation to others; relevant to: norm, the Good, Ideal (q.v.)

Nature is saturated with values. Each being in it has a value both by itself and in relation to others; each has some degree of excellence; each has some bearing on the preservation or enhancement of the excellence of others. All point to and are inseparable from an all-encompassing possible value, a common abstract good, an ultimate end, the object of an absolute morality, enabling them all to be compared and making it possible for a man to be subject to inescapable duties (Man's, p. 110)

WILL: an expression of the self as directed toward a concern; a power which, through mind and body, moves man to act; distinct from: mind, body, desire, self (q.v.)

The will is the self expressing its concern for the Good, so far as this is relevant to what now is. (Modes, p. 101)

... presents to the body or mind an object towards which the body or mind is directed, but only so far as they are capable of attaining it and in such a way as to provoke a bodily or mental movement toward it. (Nature, p. 228)

So long as the mind can be made to think of an object focused on for the sake of making us think, we are exercising a will, and making it possible for the mind to act in conformity with the body ... there are no instincts or reflexes, no separate capacities, but only a single concern which is subdivided and distinguished in the course of being realized. (Nature, p. 229)