Gary Dorrien, Stanley Hauerwas, Rowan Williams, and the Theological Transformation of Sovereignties

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by

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A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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May, 2016
ABSTRACT
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David W. Horstkoetter, B.S., M.A.
Marquette University, 2016

Christianity’s political voice in US society is often situated within a simplistic binary of social justice versus faithfulness. Gary Dorrien and Stanley Hauerwas, respectively, represent the two sides of the binary in their work. Although the justice-faithfulness narrative is an important point of disagreement, it has also created a categorical impasse that does not reflect the full depth and complexity of either Dorrien’s or Hauerwas’s work. Their concerns for both justice and faithfulness differ only in part because of their different responses to liberalism and liberal theology. Under all those issues are rival accounts of relational truth that indicate divergent understandings of reality. At the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s theologies and differences are the issues of God’s sovereign agency and humanity’s subjectivity and agency. Dorrien emphasizes love, divine Spirit, human spirit, and freedom for flourishing. Hauerwas stresses gift, triune creator, human creaturehood, and flourishing in friendship. Those divergent positions issue forth in rival responses to political sovereignty. Dorrien’s panentheistic monism is integrated with the modern nation-state’s sovereignty. Hauerwas rejects the state’s hegemonic sovereignty as an attempt at autonomy that rejects God’s gifts and aspires to rival God’s sovereignty.

While Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s discussion might then appear at an impasse, it can be opened and developed in reference to Rowan Williams’s horizon. Although his political work overlaps with much in Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s positions, Williams goes beyond them by calling for the transformation of the modern nation-state’s sovereignty and by supplying a vision of it transformed. Williams’s advance opens Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement by freeing them from their common assumption, the permanence of state sovereignty. Williams’s political horizon is underwritten by his theological horizon, which fuses love and gift within triune mutuality and plenitude. This account offers critical help to issues that Dorrien and Hauerwas find problematic in each other’s position. Such development thereby opens the possibility of a fresh and fruitful discussion. Therefore, Williams’s work offers important help for Dorrien and Hauerwas to address the heart of their disagreement over divine and political sovereignty, and human subjectivity and agency.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

David W. Horstkoetter, B.S., M.A.

I have accrued so much social debt over this project’s long gestation period that I fear I cannot pay it all back, or even simply mention everyone. So in particular I would like to thank Dan Morehead, Dr. Jeremy Blackwood, and especially Dr. Sean Larsen for their editorial comments and patient discussion. Dr. Sharon Pace, Dr. Mike Higton, Dr. Benjamin Myers, Dr. Christopher Hadley, and Ben Suriano all graciously gave special insight on certain figures or issues. Dr. Gary Dorrien and Dr. Stanley Hauerwas have each, on a couple of occasions, listened to me and offered feedback. By naming them, I simply mean to call attention to their gracious and helpful input, not to imply that they endorse what they have not yet seen in full. Of course I am grateful to my board members: Fr. Bryan Massingale, Dr. Danielle Nussberger, Fr. Thomas Hughson, and the chair Dr. D. Stephen Long. I would like to thank Fr. Hughson and Dr. Long in particular for their encouraging, patient guidance, without which this dissertation would not have come to fruition. Last but not least, I owe so much to those who are literally and figuratively near and dear to me for your caring love and patient grace. And so I will say out loud while I still have the chance, I dedicate this project to a Jesuit in his retirement years, to my mother in her (hopefully long) twilight years, and to the hope of the future, three little toddlers—one in Wisconsin and two in Alaska.
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LIST OF BOOK ABBREVIATIONS

Gary Dorrien

BRMT The Barthian Revolt in Modern Theology: Theology without Weapons

DSV The Democratic Socialist Vision

EDE Economy, Difference, Empire: Social Ethics for Social Justice

KRHS Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern Theology

MALT, 1 The Making of American Liberal Theology, vol. 1, Imagining Progressive Religion, 1805-1900

MALT, 2 The Making of American Liberal Theology, vol. 2, Idealism, Realism, and Modernity, 1900-1950

MALT, 3 The Making of American Liberal Theology, vol. 3, Crisis, Irony, and Postmodernity, 1950-2005


OQ The Obama Question: A Progressive Perspective

RCG Reconstructing the Common Good: Theology and the Social Order

RET The Remaking of Evangelical Theology

SEM Social Ethics in the Making: Interpreting an American Tradition

SS Soul in Society: The Making and Renewal of Social Christianity

WTM The Word as True Myth: Interpreting Modern Theology

Stanley Hauerwas

AC After Christendom?: How the Church is to Behave if Freedom, Justice, and a Christian Nation are Bad Ideas
AE  Approaching the End: Eschatological Reflections on Church, Politics, and Life
AN  Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society
BH  A Better Hope: Resources for a Church Confronting Capitalism, Democracy, and Postmodernity
CAV  Christians Among the Virtues: Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics
CC  A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic
CCL  Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics
CDRO  Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary: Conversations between a Christian and a Radical Democrat
CET  Christian Existence Today: Essays on Church, World, and Living in Between
CSC  Cross-Shattered Christ: Meditations on the Seven Last Words
CSCH  A Cross-Shattered Church: Reclaiming the Theological Heart of Preaching
DF  Dispatches from the Front: Theological Engagements with the Secular
DT  Disrupting Time: Sermons, Prayers, and Sundries
HC  Hannah’s Child: A Theologian’s Memoir
HS  The Holy Spirit
HR  The Hauerwas Reader
IGC  In Good Company: The Church as Polis
LGVW  Living Gently in a Violent World: The Prophetic Witness of Weakness
Matt  Matthew
NS  Naming the Silences: God, Medicine, and the Problem of Suffering
PF  Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of Nonviolence
PK  The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics
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**Rowan Williams**

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INTRODUCTION

I. The Conventional Problem in Theology and Social Ethics: The Impasse between Social Justice and Christian Faithfulness

A simplistic binary of either social justice or faithfulness structures much of the discourse about the political meaning of Christianity in the United States. Some have used this binary to describe a split between academic theologians and the churches, respectively. Ethicist-theologians Gary Dorrien and Stanley Hauerwas can be construed as representing this justice-faithfulness binary. Although that description of Dorrien and Hauerwas is oversimplified and superficial, the binary is exacerbated and re-enforced by the theological milieu.¹

Dorrien’s project seems to be an argument for social justice. He has written two significant books on the history of social ethics. In both he argues that social ethics as a discipline began as, and largely continues to be, a progressive movement of liberal theology for transforming society through the pursuit of justice and related ideals. Further, he understands himself to be in continuity with liberal theology—the mainstream of social ethics—and its transformative mission. Dorrien consistently argues for

¹ For the academy-church differentiation, see Raphael Warnock, The Divided Mind of the Black Church: Theology, Piety, and Public Witness (New York: New York University Press, 2014). As here, sources to support sentences without quotes will be placed at the end of the paragraph and generally in an order that matches the paragraph. Citations associated with a sentence that has a quote in it—although not necessarily for the quote itself—will be directly attached to the sentence with the quote. The source of the quote will be cited first and set apart from the other sources for the sentence that follow. This citation strategy enables a significant reduction of footnotes and the repetitive naming of the same sources. The latter saves significant space beyond the norm not only because Gary Dorrien, Stanley Hauerwas, and Rowan Williams have each written a great deal. But also, when they make their normative, constructive arguments, they do so in what is functionally an essayist style. That includes even Dorrien. His articles, wherein he is often more explicit about his normative position, are the tip of the iceberg, the rest of which are his histories upon which his articles draw and sometimes summarize. So in order to connect his normative voice to his historical descriptions, much less connecting different issues spread across different articles and books, one can see how simply citing Dorrien could become long and complex. That does not include Hauerwas and Williams on their own, or even more burdensome, putting them all together. But as much as space is saved, I have endeavored to maintain the connection between what I argue and what I cite. This link is achieved by generally mirroring the flow of the non-quoting sentences in the paragraph in the order of the cited works in the footnote to the end of the paragraph, and by immediately citing the quoted source distinct from but still with other sources supporting issues in the same sentence as the quote. By following these two citation methods, the amount of the citations are spread out and reduced while still connected to the argument.
economic justice like his social gospel forbearers, as well as for liberation theology and ecological process theology. Like Reinhold Niebuhr and Union Theological Seminary (NYC) formed by his legacy, Dorrien articulates what Hauerwas calls “advocacy ethics,” social ethics in support of critical activism for liberative justice.\(^2\) Social ethics for transformative, liberative social justice has indeed been crucial to Union’s place, if not mission, in the theological world. Such focus is why Dorrien embraced his appointment to the Niebuhr chair there in 2005. The subtitle of Dorrien’s recent *Economy, Difference, Empire: Social Ethics for Social Justice* makes Dorrien’s project clear.\(^3\)

In contrast, Hauerwas has broken from social ethics as a discipline and instead seems concerned with faithfulness to Christian identity rather than justice. He agrees that justice is central to social ethics as a discipline, but he points out that such a focus is problematic. The goal of social ethics as a discipline is about “making America work,” which is about transforming society or making Christianity relevant on the United States’s terms instead of Jesus’s.\(^4\) Generally ‘making America work’ is achieved by deriving a universal, moral ethic from Christianity in order to serve US interests or to make society more just. Implicit here, according to Hauerwas, is the disconnection of Christian social ethics from the church and ultimately from Jesus. Liberal theology’s diverse positions, he continues, are unified by their agreement about the pursuit of justice,

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\(^2\) Stanley Hauerwas, *A Better Hope: Resources for a Church Confronting Capitalism, Democracy, and Postmodernity* (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2000), 61 (hereafter *BH*).


not doctrinal topics like the Trinity. Furthermore, a disconnection between ethics and the church allowed Christian ethics to move from seminaries to graduate schools. But the result has been that Christian social ethics has forgotten its theological roots and has become a vague religious ethic among other university disciplines. Hauerwas concluded, therefore, that Christian social ethics “has come to its end.” He was so disillusioned with it as a discipline that he abandoned the book he was writing on its history.

In response, Hauerwas’s project is about maintaining the theological core: to remain within the church and explore what it means to be faithful to the Christian part of Christian ethics because “only theology overcomes ethics.” Rather than propound a Christian theory of social ethics to augment US interests, Hauerwas has long argued that the “church does not have a social ethic; the church is a social ethic” as it faithfully embodies Jesus.

So Hauerwas abandoned the path Dorrien has developed. In contrast to Dorrien’s *Soul in Society* (1995), once used as history of social ethics, Hauerwas wrote *In Good Company: The Church as Polis* (1995) and *A Better Hope* (2000). In contrast to Dorrien’s mature history of social ethics, *Social Ethics in the Making* (2009), Hauerwas co-edited *The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics* (2004), where the focus is on “the practices of Christian tradition” rather than “the turn to the subject.”

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7 Hauerwas, *BH*, 117-128. See also Hauerwas, AN, 9-10, 23-44.
Hauerwas, consequently, seem to be in conflict over whether the church should have a social ethic or be a social ethic.\textsuperscript{10}

Even worse, they appear to be in irresolvable conflict in light of the Niebuhr brothers’ immensely influential legacy. Hauerwas’s variation on Anabaptism holds that the world does not know it is the world without the witness of the church being the church. This ecclesiology has been panned by critics over the past few decades as a fideist, tribalist, sectarian withdrawal from society. Yet the substance of those criticisms is not new. H. R. Niebuhr’s \textit{Christ and Culture} typology developed the substance of his earlier, Weberian and Troeltschian charge that the Anabaptists are “sectarian.”\textsuperscript{11} R. Niebuhr made the same critique nearly two decades earlier. Although he granted that the Anabaptists’ “sectarian perfectionism” was an important witness, it was also an unrealistic political vision that leads Christianity into an irresponsible withdrawal from society, and thereby Christianity into irrelevance.\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, Dorrien has criticized Hauerwas for “isolationism” based on his rejecting the biblical command to pursue social justice and on his “dichotomizing the world between Christians and pagans.”\textsuperscript{13} In fact, Dorrien once argued that Hauerwas is the mirror opposite to R. Niebuhr. But Hauerwas argues that Niebuhr’s quest for securing Christianity’s relevance in society ironically

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\textsuperscript{10} Stanley Hauerwas, \textit{In Good Company: The Church as Polis} (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995) (hereafter \textit{IGC}).
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\textsuperscript{13} Dorrien, SS, 359. See also ibid., 374-375. I will return to Dorrien’s critiques of Hauerwas in chapter one.
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made Christianity irrelevant through deep unfaithfulness. Under the guise of reality’s
demands, R. Niebuhr allowed political liberalism’s versions of justice, freedom, and
unity to supersede the politics of Jesus in the public sphere. Thus, the appearance of an
incompatible division between Dorrien’s social justice and Hauerwas’s faithfulness stems
from unresolved conflict within the Niebuhr brothers’ legacies.¹⁴

This appearance of incompatibility makes it difficult to perceive any deeper,
substantive difference between Dorrien and Hauerwas than the reified dichotomy social
justice versus faithfulness. But even worse is that the incompatible appearance has been
promulgated in the theological milieu in such a way that incompatibility turns into
impasse. Consequently, the milieu surrounding Hauerwas and Dorrien exacerbates, and

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Nearly another ten years after Dorrien and Albrecht, similar concerns were noted by Jeffrey Stout, *Democracy and Tradition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). Stout’s and others’ criticisms of Hauerwas will be later.
perhaps creates, the appearance of conflict along the lines of faithfulness versus social justice.\textsuperscript{15}

Hauerwas’s rhetoric has been his own worst enemy in contributing to the theological milieu’s divide. His polemical rhetoric is integral to his “aporetic” pedagogy intended to challenge fundamental assumptions.\textsuperscript{16} But his intended offensives to provoke can distract from his subtlety, or whatever sympathy he has for the position he critiques. For instance, Jeffery Stout faults Hauerwas’s rhetoric, in part, for disconnecting justice and faithfulness in \textit{After Christendom}, where Hauerwas has his (in)famous chapter on justice.\textsuperscript{17}

Even Hauerwas’s rhetoric in his constructive work has undercut its reception. He once likened the church to a colony in order to set the church and world “in stark contrast.”\textsuperscript{18} Yet colony gives the impression of faithfulness through seclusion, even though he qualifies the colony metaphor by stressing the active, outgoing ways that the


\textsuperscript{18} Hauerwas and Willimon, \textit{RA}, 94. See also ibid., 12, 49, 71-72, 78, 91-92, 131-132, 139-140, 146, 171-172.
church should engage the world. Hauerwas appears to have recognized the problematic baggage of colony language, because he replaced it with other metaphors like *polis* and wandering in the wilderness. But the damage had already been done. Stout’s *Democracy and Tradition* concludes with the colony metaphor to make Hauerwas look like a reclusive, sectarian over-reaction to John Rawls’s liberalism.\(^\text{19}\)

Stout’s line of argument typifies the criticisms made of Hauerwas by theological liberals, liberationists, and hybrids of the two that follow the Niebuhrian critiques of Anabaptists and pacifists. Miguel De La Torre’s critiques of Hauerwas are a particularly helpful illustration of the incompatible appearance shaping an impasse in the theological milieu. Although God is for justice, De La Torre argues, Hauerwas is ultimately not because he withdraws into a sectarian fantasy, rather than engages society with a liberative vision. That critique does not make a critical advance. Instead, it solidifies the limited justice-faithfulness narrative in the theological milieu because De La Torre distills the criticism for both teacher and student audiences.\(^\text{20}\)

Other aspects of De La Torre’s constructive work and critical engagement with Hauerwas are more fruitful. But also reflecting the impasse in the milieu, De La Torre’s critiques of Hauerwas are fatally dated. It is as if Hauerwas and Hauerwas ‘types’ have not made important developments and clarifications since Jeffery Stout’s criticism of

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\(^{19}\) Hauerwas and Willimon, *RA*, 51-52; Hauerwas, *IGC*, 58-59; the metaphors *polis* and wandering in the wilderness are from the titles of *IGC* and *WW* respectively (Hauerwas drops the colony metaphor when explaining RA in *IGC*, 54), Stout, *Democracy and Tradition*, 296. In later work Stout re-emphasizes that his problem with Hauerwas is the latter’s “rhetoric.” See “Response by Jeffrey Stout” in “Pragmatism and Democracy: Assessing Jeffrey Stout’s *Democracy and Tradition*,” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 78, no. 2 (2010): 441.

\(^{20}\) Miguel De La Torre, “Stanley Hauerwas on Church,” in *Beyond the Pale: Reading Ethics from the Margins*, ed. Stacey M. Floyd-Thomas and Miguel A. De La Torre (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 219-223; Miguel De La Torre, *Latina/o Social Ethics: Moving Beyond Eurocentric Moral Thinking* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010), 21-27, 30-31; Floyd-Thomas and De La Torre, introduction to *Beyond the Pale*, xxi. Also see the back cover: “This book offers a reader-friendly introduction to Christian liberationist ethics.” Even though De La Torre is a liberationist, that does not disqualify him since Dorrish argues, as I note in chapter one, for making liberal theology a subset of liberation theology.
Hauerwas in *Democracy and Tradition*, if not earlier. Unfortunately, the initial but old points of disagreement and not present developments are still the primary lens for interpreting either side.21

So it is as if Hauerwas-types and liberals-liberationists are preoccupied with their own projects. If they ever come near each other, they pass like ships in the night, or ships at war. Or they stand silently side by side in an elevator, as Hauerwas and Gloria Albrecht once literally did. Yet, the narrative of impasse between social justice types and faithfulness types is rooted in a misunderstanding about the real source of conflict, which keeps the theological discourse fragmented and distracts us from crucial work. Despite the prevalence of the social justice versus faithfulness narrative, I reject it because I will show that it is, at best, a partial truth that pervades and shapes the theological milieu.22

21 De La Torre’s recent *The Politics of Jesus: A Hispanic Political Theology* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015) offers an important advance in Christology for liberation theologies in the US. Also, when De La Torre takes more time within his hermeneutic of suspicion to engage Hauerwas, De La Torre puts forward more original critiques and interesting readings of Hauerwas (*De La Torre, Latina/o Social Ethics, 26-27, 127 n. 11*). For the rest of the paragraph: Miguel De La Torre, *Doing Christian Ethics from the Margins*, 2nd ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2014), 82; De La Torre, *Latina/o Social Ethics*, 21-27, 127-128 notes 9, 10, and 12; De La Torre, *The Politics of Jesus*, xiii, 12; De La Torre, “Stanley Hauerwas on Church.”


Neither Dorrien nor Hauerwas are so simple as the standard narrative. The justice-faithfulness impasse should raise justified frustration in those who carefully read either of them. Dorrien is not just “one of the finest interpreters and theologians of liberalism writing today.”

Although he has yet to do more than to briefly and occasionally sketch out his normative theology, it unites the diverse plurality of voices in liberal theology’s history and in liberal theology’s current, “unnoticed renaissance.” Dorrien thereby offers hope that liberal theology can still be a viable project and a coherent movement rather than continuing to subsist in disconnected theological niches. But Dorrien also acknowledges Hauerwas’s significance. Hauerwas’s bristling rhetoric contains a constructive, post-Christendom, Protestant alternative to Protestants like Dorrien.

This acknowledgment is based on the fact that their real place of disagreement lies deeper than the surface grammar, hasty interpretations, or the conventional boundary lines marked by trenches and foxholes. Relocating the difference makes all the difference for upsetting the fictional impasse and the actual disagreements. The divide between Dorrien and Hauerwas is, I will argue, ultimately over divine and political sovereignty, and human subjectivity and agency. For Dorrien and Hauerwas to get out of their fractured discussion, I will contend, they need to further account for Rowan Williams’s political and theological work.

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25 Dorrien, 35, 360.
II. Chapter Summaries

There are many complications that are ultimately fatal to the justice-faithfulness dichotomy. But I am not concerned with further addressing directly the standard narrative of social justice versus faithfulness. Doing so would grant its superficial, categorical impasse that leads to silence in an elevator. I will, therefore, show implicitly the standard narrative’s poverty in chapter one by going beyond it. Sometimes the standard narrative is broken through when the ‘social justice’ side proclaims that they are attempting to be faithful too. But the discussion generally ends with that proclamation. So near where that leaves us, I argue in chapter one that Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s concerns for faithfulness to different accounts of relational truth undergird their rival evaluations, sometimes similar critiques, and wildly divergent responses to liberalism and liberal theology. Near the end of chapter one, I contend that their accounts of relational truth are actually rival descriptions of reality.\(^\text{26}\)

But even reality, humanity’s relational existence, is created and shaped by some-‘thing’ more. Chapter two shows that divine sovereignty and human subjectivity and agency are at the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s different theologies. Dorrien characterizes divine sovereignty in terms of universal Spirit and love; Hauerwas maintains divine sovereignty in terms of the triune gift-giver revealed by Jesus in his particularity. Both accounts construe divine sovereignty as creating and shaping human subjectivity and agency, and in turn, intra-human relations. But Dorrien and Hauerwas differ by construing humanity’s existence as reducible to spirit or creature, humanity’s

\(^{26}\) For the theological faithfulness of social justice work, see Dorrien, SS, 374-375.
relational agency as underwritten by love or gift, and humanity’s flourishing as realized in relations for human freedom or relations in friendship.

Chapter two touches on politics since human relations are politics broadly construed. Chapter three, however, focuses directly on political sovereignty. I will contend that Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s differences over divine sovereignty and intra-human relations issue forth in strikingly divergent positions on political sovereignty. Dorrien’s critiques of empire notwithstanding, his understanding of Spirit’s sovereignty is integrated with the modern nation-state’s sovereignty at a basic level. But Hauerwas argues that the state’s sovereignty is hegemonic. Under the guise of keeping unity and peace, the state seeks to secure and expand its power over citizens, self-interest, and death by marginalizing and replacing Christianity.

I add my own work on the state’s raison d’être (reason for being) and raison d’état (reason of state) for two reasons. First, the French political concepts initially develop Hauerwas’s position. Second, my larger end is to show how much further Dorrien and Hauerwas diverge on how to respond to political sovereignty because they diverge on how to understand the relation between divine and political sovereignty. Such divergence is not simply a separation; it is a significant fracture. Yet there is hope that it can be overcome. Both Dorrien and Hauerwas have a political surplus; that is, their positions cannot be fully understood in terms of political sovereignty’s status quo.

So how can their political fracture be overcome? How can their visions of radical democracy be realized for a more fruitful discussion? Those questions drive chapter four. Despite Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s dramatic difference over state sovereignty, I will contend that they still assume, in their own way, the permanence of the state’s
sovereignty as it stands today. Rowan Williams’s work on procedural secularism and interactive pluralism supplies a political horizon that, on the one hand, meets Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s concerns and engages their political surplus. On the other hand, Williams’s political horizon goes beyond them by challenging the permanence of the state’s self-serving sovereignty and by avoiding Constantinian presumptions. Williams seeks to transform the state’s hegemonic sovereignty into a pluralist form of subsidiarity. The latter is oriented by the common good found through public discussion among not only individuals, but also social bodies.

To transform state sovereignty may seem far-fetched, despite my focus on a practical way to do so. Even I am still in shock that I ended up with such an argument that I affirm. However—besides all the other reasons I will raise—the transformation of state sovereignty is indeed very much necessary if I am correct about the depth of Dorrien and Hauerwas’s difference and about the character of their political surplus.

So chapter four is about freeing Hauerwas and Dorrien from the source of their political impasse. But if that were the final end, it would reduce Williams’s work to strictly a political position for pragmatically bridging between two ethicist-theologians. Such a pragmatic bridging is unacceptable since I hold that ethics and theology are united, and Christian faith is inherently political. All politics is, then, theopolitics. The final conclusion returns to focus on divine sovereignty, the God-human relation, and intra-human relations. This time, however, the horizon is Williams’s trinitarian work and his according theopolitics. I argue, to one degree and another, that his trinitarian fusion of love and gift in God’s triune mutuality and plenitude constructively challenges issues in Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s thought that are important for developing their respective
projects and their discussion. I hope, then, that those influenced by Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s work can have a more interesting, fruitful, and fresh discussion than one formed by the faithfulness versus social justice. Such a discussion opens the possibility of addressing the real fractures that plague the theological milieu and the political voice of US Christianity.

In light of the argument, the subtitle to this project, “theological transformation of sovereignties,” is actually somewhat misleading. Transformations, although breaking grammatical convention, would more accurately reflect a multiplicity of changes found directly and indirectly in chapter four and the final conclusion. The obvious change is that Williams provides an alternative, transforming vision of state sovereignty that shifts the framework in which Dorrien and Hauerwas discuss state sovereignty. Williams offers that vision on the basis of divine sovereignty in terms of gift, love, mutuality, and plenitude. This account can initially call for development in Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s understanding of God’s sovereign agency. That development—although briefly suggested in chapter four and more implied than delineated in the final conclusion—shifts aspects of their theopolitics and, in turn, transformatively reverberates throughout their whole frameworks. In the interest of brevity, those transformations are developed to one degree or another. In particular, I will have to leave for later a more developed argument focused on Williams’s account of divine sovereignty directly in relation to Dorrien and Hauerwas. But even with that direct argument left for later, my return to the church-world issue in light of Williams, I believe, shows enough development to support my hope: that the theological fracture can be transformed into fresh, fruitful discussion.
III. Method and Clarifications

This is a dissertation in systematic theology, but my argument addresses questions in political theology. I do not see a conflict, however, for two reasons. First, there is no contemporary consensus over what is political theology. There used to be a consensus of sorts within each of the first two academic generations, cross-generational variations notwithstanding. But now what constitutes political theology is contested since the meaning of political theology has broadened. With the recent influx of a few important readers and attempts at introductory volumes, some emphasize still the continental discussion, some use political theology to describe what many others have called social ethics, and some emphasize a historical discussion reaching back to Augustine and earlier. Contemporary, constructive volumes share only the term political theology emblazoned on the cover. So political theology as a term currently appears to be fluid rather than definitive.27


For contemporary, constructive volumes, see Sergii Bulgakov: *Towards a Russian Political Theology*, ed. Rowan Williams (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999); John B. Cobb, Jr., *Process Theology as Political Theology* (Manchester, England: Manchester
Second, the lack of consensus allows me to explore my own understanding of political theology. It is the attempt to think through and to practice the inherent political (in the broad sense of polis) implications of Christian theology in ways that engage fundamental assumptions about social, philosophical, political, and economic theories and practices that inform everyday life. Political theology as such may appear to be social ethics in the sense that both would lead to practices like solidarity with marginalized immigrant workers on the picket line. What differentiates political theology and social ethics is their foci and methods. Political theology stresses scripture, Christian doctrine, and theological traditions with their practices and basic categories (systematic theology) of Christianity. From that position of orthodoxy and orthopraxy, political theology attends to fundamental assumptions in society, and then tailors action to contemporary contexts. Social ethics today generally assumes a set of theological principles within a

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moral compass for navigating its focus on important political and socioeconomic details. That guiding of individual consciences is for the goal of empowering nongovernmental organizations in policy lobbying and other forms of activism.\textsuperscript{28}

Social ethics, then, mostly focuses on analyzing nongovernmental organizations. But as a work of political theology, here I examine fundamental assumptions about state sovereignty. My starting point is the doctrine, the practices, and the basic categories of Christian tradition in history rather than first to historical projects like the liberal state that requires theologians to be in disguise. So even though Dorrien and Hauerwas both hold ethics chairs, I will be engaging their theological positions as well. There is plenty of warrant for doing so, despite the disciplinary boundaries between contemporary theology (Hauerwas), historical theology (Dorrien), and ethics (Dorrien and Hauerwas). In fact, I will argue that at the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement is a theological issue.\textsuperscript{29}

The definition of political theology and the problem of disciplinary boundaries raise a few other issues that require clarification. Less fluid a term than political theology, theopolitics is often used by Hauerwas’s students and their students to indicate that “every ethic presupposes a sociology.”\textsuperscript{30} Or as Braden Anderson has put it, “every


\textsuperscript{29} For more on my starting point, see David Horstkoetter, “Getting Back to Idolatry Critique: Kingdom, Kin-dom, and the Triune Gift Economy,” \textit{Union Seminary Quarterly Review} 64, no. 2-3 (2013): 86 n. 2, 88, and 88 n. 9.

\textsuperscript{30} Hauerwas, \textit{WW}, 109. For the use of the terms theological politics or theopolitics, for the most part in distinction to political theology, see György Geréby, “Political Theology versus Theological Politics Erik Peterson and Carl Schmitt,” \textit{New German Critique} 35, no. 3 (2008); William T. Cavanaugh, \textit{Theopolitical Imagination} (London: T&T Clark, 2002); Rasmusson, \textit{The Church as Polis}. For a further description of the difference between political theology and theological politics see, Thomas Ekstrand, “Political Theology, Theological Politics,” in \textit{Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions}, ed. Anne L. C. Runehov and Luis Oviedo (New York: Springer Reference, 2013), 1782-1785. Although I have my reservations about Ekstrand’s description of theological politics as less radical than political theology.
salvation narrative entails a politics, and every politics presumes a salvation narrative.”

On those terms the problem is competing politics of salvation. My sympathy for theopolitics as such distinguishes this work from what is commonly called “public theology.” It emphasizes cooperation, sometimes critical, with the state in pursuit of the common good but without a clear or systematic emphasis on competing salvific claims. Since Williams’s theopolitical vision of transforming the state’s sovereignty is about moving the state away from its hegemonic salvific claims and toward the common good, I use theopolitics more loosely as a short-hand for the inherent politics of deep theological doctrines. This is still consistent with Hauerwas because he writes, “if theology is done faithful to the gospel, it will not only be political but it will be so in a particular way.”

With Williams, I hold to a theopolitical vision of particular human bodies who are created and their relations are shaped by the triune God, whose loving self-gift and self-giving love is the source of both superabundance and mutuality.

That tips some of my hand. I affirm Hauerwas’s emphasis on Jesus’s particularity, gift, non-violence, and a robust ecclesiology that is counter-cultural and non-Constantinian. But interpreting Hauerwas as a theologian, much less engaging him appreciatively and critically, can be a precarious endeavor. Besides his polemical rhetoric, his theological assumptions are sometimes underdeveloped in comparison to his emphasis on their ‘political’ implications. While I am not one to so easily delineate

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33 Hauerwas, WT, 171. Therein Hauerwas also finds problems with political theology. For his older criticism’s of political theology, see AC, 2; WW, 219. For his theological politics, see Stanley Hauerwas, Approaching the End: Eschatological Reflections on Church, Politics, and Life (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2013), 73-74, 78, 82-86 (hereafter AE).
between theological and political, the issue of those assumptions leads me to agree with part of Nicholas Healy’s assessment for engaging Hauerwas. There is a significant interpretive difference between those who know Hauerwas personally and those who do not. The former can fill-in the unstated assumptions or less developed positions with unwavering confidence. I do not have the luxury of an ‘inside track’ with Hauerwas himself in any significant manner. Yet, I am not claiming that closeness or distance is better than for interpreting him, only that more people read his books than he has the time to be friends with. So like Healy, I have focused my argument to Hauerwas’s published work. Dorrien is the only figure with whom I have an ‘inside track,’ insomuch as I was once his student at Union Theological Seminary (NYC). But I keep largely to his published work too. Even though they are far from reducible to their published work, it serves as the ground to prove what I argue about them and from them.  

Although my sympathy for Hauerwas’s theological work runs deeper than mine for Dorrien’s, my debt to Dorrien is by no means small. I affirm his stress on love divine, liberation theology, and an activist church. I am also deeply sympathetic with his democratic socialism, which is one of the aspects in the social gospel I still find alluring. It is because of my deep appreciation for Dorrien that I will attempt to engage him as a constructive theologian, not only as an ethicist or historian. No one has done that. In fact, even Dorrien’s histories have yet to be engaged in any significant way other than in evaluative book reviews, in a symposium on his The Making of American Liberal

34 Nicholas M. Healy, Hauerwas: A (Very) Critical Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2014), 3-4. As for my own reading and critiques of Hauerwas, those differ quite a bit from Healy. I do not, however, have the space to address those differences in this project. There are also complications when citing Hauerwas. His essayist mode requires multiple citations. Since those make the footnotes already burdensome, I have kept most citations in reference to his books, even though often the book chapters were previously published as articles—sometimes even years before the book is published.
Theology trilogy, and more recently in Christopher Evans’s work. That lack of engagement is not because Dorrien is not respected, but presumably because his normative position, theological and often ethical, is developed indirectly through historical recovery. Further complicating my task is that his subtle editorial voice creates difficulty in proving the details of his normative position. Thankfully, he has quickly stated his normative position framed by brief appeals to historical figures. But his appeals and his historical work are sometimes separated by hundreds of pages of historical work and sometimes even different publications. These appeals also mean that Dorrien’s position cannot be sufficiently described without noting other figures. To address these issues and still support my argument, I cite his relevant historical work and his normative appeals to it at the same time. I also, as needed, develop his position in light of specific movements, like the social gospel, personalism, and liberation theology, and in light of specific figures he engages, like Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, Walter Rauschenbusch, and Nels F. S. Ferré. Even then I have not been able to indicate the full breadth of Dorrien’s sympathies, especially his work on the hard sciences and process theology.  

Since the dissertation’s argumentative limits prohibit simply reconstructing Dorrien’s position, since Dorrien’s normative voice is often too subtle to cite as proof of

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the reconstructed position, and since I have some more theological sympathies with Hauerwas than Dorrien, I fear—rightly or not, I am unsure—that Dorrien’s position might appear as a foil. I have tried my best to keep that from happening. My intention has always been to do right by Dorrien, especially because no one has yet to gather together his whole normative position, from Spirit to economics, in extended detail.

But how can I be sympathetic to both Hauerwas and Dorrien? There is little room to be so as the discussion stands now. Yet there can be room if one, first, goes ‘all the way down’ to the categorical disagreement, as in chapters one through three. Then, second, one shifts a few of the categories and follows the reverberations ‘back up’ while still attentive to Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s concerns, as in chapter four and the final conclusion.

The shifts to their work are not arbitrary, but instead they flow from their concerns about each other’s projects. My argument is then an attempt at “ad hominem practical reasoning,” which is also what I understand William’s political vision to be about.\(^\text{36}\) Further, I have in mind other discussions as well. Williams’s theopolitical framework is similar to the views of Luke Bretherton, an English citizen who has been working in the US for a few years now. Although chapter four does not have the space to


The difficulty of ad hominem practical reasoning is that it “requires the attempt to articulate the implicit presumptions that shape the character of those making the arguments” (Hauerwas, \(WT\), 14). I hold in high regard the character of Dorrien, Hauerwas, and Williams; however, I am not out to judge their character. The issue of presuppositions is my concern in this project about their positions. But that raises another issue. Hauerwas is wary of the term “position” because it “names the attempt by a theologian to develop a theological system that can bear his or her name. Accordingly the ‘position’ becomes more important than what the position is alleged to be about, that is, God” (Hauerwas, \(WT\), 25-26). I agree with Hauerwas. I would use terms like “perspective” instead of “position” as I do, except that my use of “position” allows Dorrien his own space for his technical use of perspective. I also use the term position because they do maintain different viewpoints that have been solidified over time, such as liberal theology or theological liberalism. But my own tension with the term position should be visible in the fact that I use phrases such as Hauerwas-types or Hauerwas’s students in an attempt to avoid some sort of monolithic, formal position conned by something like ‘Hauerwasians.’
raise Bretherton’s recent, more concretely focused work on community organizing, chapters four and the final conclusion together begin to meet his equally recent call for trinitarian arguments to undergird the transformation of political sovereignty.\(^{37}\)

Other works focus on the divide between the ‘schools’ represented to varying degrees by Dorrien and Hauerwas. John Allen Knight has taken up the epistemological issues between liberal theology and postliberal theology. In a Catholic framework Kristin E. Heyer addresses the divide in the figures of J. Bryan Hehir and Michael Baxter who, respectively, stand in for John Courtney Murray and Hauerwas. But Knight’s focus on epistemology and Heyer’s on the public limit the literal space they have to probe theological assumptions with sufficient depth. Ephraim Radner has gone deeper theologically, and there is thematic overlap between his work and my project here. However, there are simple and complicated divergences between us over quite a few crucial issues to the point that we end up in rather different places.\(^{38}\)

Most of these differences I will have to make clear at another time. But one place of divergence is over liberalism, which requires some clarification from the start. I do not


like to traffic in words that end with “ism” because they give the appearance of an all
encompassing and general label that is too often vague. But I initially use the term
liberalism to help describe significant disagreement between Dorrien and Hauerwas, and
so, as the argument proceeds, a description of liberalism shifts and changes accordingly.
Liberalism is partly defined in the first chapter in terms of autonomy and abstract
universality common to both Dorrien and Hauerwas. More frequently, however, the term
liberalism is used in connection to Hauerwas. Perhaps his most holistic and succinct
description of liberalism in one place is the following. It is the name for the

impulse deriving from the Enlightenment project to free all people from the
chains of their historical particularity in the name of freedom. As an
epistemological position liberalism is the attempt to defend a foundationalism in
order to free reason from being determined by any particularistic tradition.
Politically liberalism makes the individual the supreme unit of society, thus
making the political task the securing of cooperation between arbitrary units of
desire. 39

Chapter one takes up those themes, and it qualifies the issue of foundationalism by
following Dorrien’s turn from Immanuel Kant to G.W. F. Hegel. Chapter two indirectly
furthers Dorrien’s definition of liberalism by way of his political economy’s debt to,
again, Kant and Hegel. Later chapters develop other themes in political liberalism
relating to the nation-state’s sovereignty and to Rowan Williams’s critical, partial
acceptance of liberalism. Hauerwas maintains, even recently, that the fear of death is used
to legitimate coercion of people into liberalism’s political order. Williams stresses
liberalism insofar as it emphasizes creative participation in governance through dialogue.
Hauerwas similarly emphasizes a local politics in discursive practical reason, but he does

39 Hauerwas, AN, 18.
not attribute that politics to liberalism. So each major figure has at least a somewhat different description of liberalism, which develops over the course of my argument.

Another important term is liberation theology. In a Catholic context, it is often limited to liberation theologians contextually situated in Latin American such as Gustavo Gutiérrez, Jon Sobrino, and others. To differentiate this liberation tradition from others, adjectives like black, feminist, womanist, ecofeminist, queer, etc. are used to qualify the label. But I understand Latin American liberation theology as one of many types of liberation theology for the same reason that I do not feel the need to always use an adjective to specify the type of liberation theology that I am discussing. Liberation theologies began to converge decades ago after Latin Americans—predominately Catholic—working on economics and African Americans—predominately not Catholic—working on race discovered the interrelation of the issues that they were addressing and the similarity of their constructive frameworks. I do not intend to gloss over important differences among liberation theologies. For instance, queer theology’s rejection of binaries can be in tension with most other liberation theologies that began and largely still do—with significant qualification and nuance—work on the premise of an oppressed-oppressor dynamic. Although Dorrien is attentive to sexuality issues, he has not written much on them in his own voice. He focuses mostly on race, gender, economics, and ecology. So in reference to those issues and the broader horizon of liberation, I will use the terms liberation and liberation theology broadly. I add adjectives like Latin American or simply ecofeminist whenever I aim for specificity.40

In reference to Williams’s position, I use the metaphor “horizon” to indicate a large but implicit whole that is, on the one hand, composed of a general orientation, a number of assumptions, and a cluster of secondary sources. On the other hand, the whole and some of its parts are not a stated or systematically defined frame of reference by the figure who supplies the horizon. The metaphorical phrase “going beyond” indicates the avoidance of the pitfalls of a politically or theologically problematic horizon or horizons by extricating their thought from just such horizon(s). This extraction is achieved partly by taking on another, more fruitful horizon. In chapter four, Williams’s political horizon is more fruitful than Dorrien’s or Hauerwas’s since it constructs a political framework for pluralism as an alternative to state sovereignty as it is generally understood today. In the final conclusion, Williams’s theopolitical horizon is more fruitful because it coheres with and realizes best a trinitarian theology that fuses love and gift.

I can see how one might conceive of “going beyond” as a Hegelian framework, wherein Williams’s horizon sublates Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s. I do put Williams in discussion with Hauerwas and then with Dorrien because Williams’s horizon overlaps with theirs but avoids some of their problematic assumptions and/or articulations.

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For Dorrien on sexuality, see “Theology in a Liberal, Post-Kantian, Postmodern Spirit,” 49.
However, I do not think that Williams’s “going beyond” Dorrien and Hauerwas sublates their work in a Hegelian synthesis. “Horizon” and “going beyond” are related, intentionally spatial metaphors that need not connote progress. Not only does Williams’s horizon have its own lacunae that I simply do not have the space to delineate. But also I actively eschew that I am attempting to resolve Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement. Even if I was trying to resolve the disagreement, my work lacks Hegel’s dialectic of double negation, or even the popular misreading of it as thesis-antithesis-synthesis. Instead, Williams’s function is to open space for fresh dialogue between Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s horizons in the hopes of some kind of future reconciliation. That attempt to open space is potentially like Williams’s appropriation of Gillian Rose’s Hegelian mutual recognition and discussion. However, opening space for reconciliation is not Hegelian progress through sublation.41

41 For Hegel’s dialectic, see Dorrien, KRHS, 205-206.
CHAPTER 1
Faithfulness, Truth, and Reality

Gary Dorrien is an unabashed liberal theologian and ethicist concerned with social justice. Stanley Hauerwas in equal measure rejects liberal theology and emphasizes Christian faithfulness. Or so goes the standard narrative as raised in the introduction to the dissertation. The narrative is insufficient since it does not adequately address that Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s difference has more to do with their differing evaluations, but not so much descriptions, of liberalism and liberal theology as they have been commonly narrated. Dorrien asserts repeatedly that “the way beyond liberalism is through it.” Hauerwas proclaims “that Christians would be ill advised to try to rescue the liberal project either in its epistemological or political form.” Such an evaluative disagreement may still sound conventional, even well trodden, but the truth is more interesting. Their sharp disagreements and some critical agreements over the legacies of liberal theology and liberalism proceed from a common goal. Both Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s “alternative” trajectories to each other are for cultivating a faithful, post-Christendom, Protestant Christianity in the US. How can their disagreement and agreement as well as their alterity and faithfulness be explained? I will argue that the issue is Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s different accounts of relational truth, which in the end can be understood as rival accounts of reality.

42 Dorrien, EDE, xii. For a variation on that quote which is clearly normative, see Gary Dorrien, The Word as True Myth: Interpreting Modern Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 9 (hereafter WTM) For other sources that are more descriptive, see Dorrien, EDE, 297; Gary J. Dorrien, Reconstructing the Common Good: Theology and the Social Order (N.p. Orbis Books, 1990; repr. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2008), 167-168 (hereafter RCG); Dorrien, SS, 263.
43 Hauerwas, AC, 35.
44 Dorrien, SS, 360. I mention Protestant in order not to ignore Catholicism. Otherwise it would appear as if Catholicism is not even present in the US. Even though none of the major figures—Dorrien, Hauerwas, and Rowan Williams—are all Episcopal/Anglican, some figures I draw on later are Catholic.
I begin with defining liberal theology in order to establish Hauerwas’s critiques of it and liberalism, and to argue that his critical position is derived from Christian faithfulness to a hierarchy of truth known in relation. Then I raise Dorrien’s position as a response to Hauerwas initially and then to conventional liberal theology. Dorrien’s critique of Hauerwas’s arguments is sandwiched by Dorrien’s agreement with important criticisms that Hauerwas directs at liberal theology. But rather than side with Hauerwas, Dorrien’s normative project is about recovering aspects of liberal theology that are not directly at the center of Hauerwas’s critiques and are not promoted by most liberal theologians in the US today. Dorrien’s recovery, I argue, is about faithfully maintaining a multiplicity of truths in mutual relation. Finally, I contend that Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s differing accounts of relational truth signal rival accounts of reality. By showing how the divide between Hauerwas and Dorrien is really based on different accounts of truth and reality, I implicitly demonstrate how the social justice-faithfulness narrative is a simplistic and superficial divide.

**I. Dorrien’s Three Layers of Liberal Theology**

Liberal theology is historically and intellectually part of the liberal project of emancipatory freedom for the sake of autonomy. Significantly, Dorrien and Hauerwas agree that liberalism and liberal theology did not fully arrive until the middle Enlightenment when Immanuel Kant gave the philosophical underpinnings for both. I will employ Dorrien’s definition of liberal theology since he has given a far more thorough treatment of it and liberalism than Hauerwas. For Dorrien, liberal theology is primarily a method. It is a “three-layered,” “mediating theology” that navigates “between orthodox over-belief and secular disbelief” by privileging “reason and experience” rather
than “external authority.” The three layers are described in the table below, which I will develop in order.

The Layers of Liberal Theology

Layer 1  Liberalism’s Principle of Autonomy

Layer 2  1. Axiom: The Necessity of Faith

2. Mediating Dialectic Between Autonomy (Layer 1) and Axiom (Layer 2)

Layer 3  Repercussions of the Mediating Dialectic

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46 Dorrien has articulated his definition of liberal theology in a number of different places with sometimes different emphases. The quotes above are from the following sources: Gary Dorrien, “Modernisms in Theology: Interpreting American Liberal Theology, 1805-1950,” American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 23, no. 3 (2002): 205; Dorrien, KRHS, 4; Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 21. For other places where Dorrien puts forward variations on the definition, see the following. “Modernisms in Theology” was adapted from the introductions to MALT, 1:xxi-xxiii; MALT, 2:3, 530; MALT, 3:2-3 for Dorrien reflecting back on MALT, 1 and MALT, 2; Dorrien, KRHS, 5-8; Dorrien, EDE, 358; Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology: Crisis, Irony, Decline, Renewal, Ambiguity,” 456, 458, 471-472; Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 52; Gary Dorrien, “Response to Ralph Aliberg,” Conversations in Religion and Theology 6, no. 2 (2008): 186.

In the citations above, it is worth noting that Dorrien refers to liberal theology as a “third way theology.” He also calls postliberal theology a “third way theology” too. The difference is that the post-liberalism third way is not so much a mediating theology, but rather works to “revive the neo-orthodox ideal”; “aims to be neither conservative nor liberal, and to offer fresh approaches to scripture and Christian life.” Gary Dorrien, “The Origins of Postliberalism: A Third Way in Theology?”, Christian Century, Jul. 4-11, 2001, 16.


Of course there are qualifications to make. The primacy of Kant, his project setting the framework for liberalism, is not intended to act as if Kant was the sole beginning of philosophical underpinnings of liberalism. Dorrien and Hauerwas both point to Pelagius (Dorrien, KRHS, 4, 530; Stanley Hauerwas, FY, 31). Dorrien and Hauerwas also raise early modern figures, like John Locke and Thomas Hobbes respectively. But those figures are given limited attention in comparison to Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s focus on Kant. Dorrien, KRHS, ix, 1-2, 5-12, 23, 38, 108-119, 530-531; Dorrien, MALT, 1:xxvi; Dorrien, WTM, 10-11; Hauerwas, AE, 128; Hauerwas, CC, 78; Hauerwas, PF, 147; Hauerwas, STT, 29-32; Stanley Hauerwas, War and the American Difference: Theological Reflections on Violence and National Identity (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011), 8-10 (hereafter WAD); Hauerwas, WGU, 37-38; Hauerwas, “On Doctrine and Ethics,” 30.

Much of Dorrien’s historical work has been precisely to define and develop liberal theology, with emphasis on the US context. Yet, definition is somewhat off the point for Hauerwas. He objects to definition to the point that the word and its cognates are almost entirely absent in his essays. He rejects definitions precisely because they give the appearance of definitively grasping a timeless, universal truth in its entirety. Such definition ends conversation and potentially abstracts content from its particularity. Accordingly, Hauerwas eschews definitive books to write ad hoc, conversational essays in theological ethics. They allow him to refine, even shift, his thought over time in response to diverse issues, particular contexts, and liberalism’s multiplicity and ever changing nature. For those reasons Hauerwas is reticent to give a single or full definition of liberalism. Instead, Hauerwas critiques liberalism and liberal theology through describing and re-describing the basic themes that constitute liberalism as the context warrants. Hauerwas, AN, 18; Hauerwas, DF, 6-7; Hauerwas, PF, 22; Hauerwas, PK, 20; Stanley Hauerwas, Matthew (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2006), 20-21 (hereafter Matt); Hauerwas, SU, 4; Hauerwas, WW, 87, 97, 168 n. 8, 229-238; Stanley Hauerwas, Working with Words: On Learning to Speak Christian (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2011), 100 n. 14, 103 including n. 21 and n. 22 (hereafter WW).
The first layer places liberal theology squarely within liberalism. Simply put, liberal theology roots “all claims to truth” in the primacy of reason and experience over the “appeal to external authorit[ies]” such as revelation or tradition.\(^48\) How this fits within liberalism requires a short elaboration on the goal of liberalism itself and its philosophical support. Dorrien and Hauerwas agree that the liberal project is one of emancipatory freedom for autonomy. Positively, autonomy means that human freedom is its own end. Negatively, autonomy outright rejects or subtly relativizes contingent determinations like history or “mythic imagination” that impede “free self-determination.”\(^49\) Dorrien’s analysis of the philosophical basis for autonomous subjectivity as such begins with Kant’s philosophy of the human being, reason, and experience. Three points are important for this.\(^50\)

First, Kant’s understanding of the human knower leads to the “active self.”\(^51\) For Kant, “we know only what we create” because the subject participates in forming its own understanding, and eventually itself, by reasoning through “transcendental categories” that order sense experience.\(^52\) But the subject’s knowledge is not only an internal ideal.


\(^{49}\) Dorrien, *KRHS*, 531; Dorrien, *WTM*, 162.


\(^{51}\) Primarily describing Kant, Dorrien uses the “active self” in an “ontological framework” of gift (which yielded the *noumena-phenomena* distinction), rather than in a “cognitive” framework (*KRHS*, 541). I use active self in reference to the primacy of the subject’s own perceptions, its ordering of sense-data, and its autonomy, the “self-origination of law” (ibid., 541). That last point of autonomy keeps my use of the active self from collapsing Kant’s complexity. Dorrien argues that autonomy “is a type of causality” that unifies both Kant’s *phenomena-noumena* worlds and his ontological-epistemological self (ibid., 541-542).

\(^{52}\) Dorrien, *KRHS*, 206, 537. See also ibid., 38-47, 56, 530-531; Dorrien, *WTM*, 13, 18-20. I will raise later the post-Kantian shift that assumed but also complicated the issue of autonomy on relational terms. Suffice it to say now, Kant and the post-Kantians begin with presupposing the idealist subject-object distinction and the subject’s experience of and reasoning through its own cognitional
Such knowledge must first pass through an account of the subject’s active role in forming its knowledge, rather than an account of the subject’s knowledge passively received from revelatory declarations by an “external authority.”53 In this constructive epistemology of the active self, the experiential and rational activity of the subject replaces external authority with self-awareness. Crucial for liberal theology is the theological import of the active self: “the religious bias in favor of spiritual creativity ha[s] a philosophical ground.”54 So Dorrien takes Kant’s account of the active self as the beginning of autonomous self-determination. Thereby, the active self is the first philosophical component of the autonomous subject.55

Second, hand in hand with the active self is a separation between form and content. Kant construed the active self within his assumption that only phenomena can be known. The post-Kantians rejected his noumena-phenomena distinction, but they embraced Kant’s privileging of the active self in an immanent frame (e.g., nature), which meant an emphasis on experience and reason. Kant’s, Friedrich Schleiermacher’s, and G. W. F. Hegel’s various forms of idealism privileged individual or corporate experience and reason. However, as idealists they all assumed that universal, objective truth is more basic than any individual’s particular experience. The truth of reality is located more in a universally general idea—the abstract content, category, concept, or ideal like Kant’s mind, Schleiermacher’s feeling, and Hegel’s Spirit—than how truth is manifested in the particularity of a specific form. This separation of form and content allows for creative

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53 Dorrien, KRHS, 531. See also ibid., 219, 549.
54 Ibid., 533.
55 Ibid., 531-532, 549. For agreeing and supplementing, see Hauerwas, AC, 53-54, 96; Hauerwas, CET, 229, 242; Hauerwas, PF, 125; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 79.
insight into the experiences of the active self, and further relativizes external authority. For the active self to perceive the universal “essence” of the truth (the abstract content) unmarred and translatable for anyone, it is necessary to either simply eliminate or dialectically transcend the facade of the particularity in which content like theological doctrine is expressed (the particular form). Dorrien calls the obscuring form “over-belief,” presumably drawing from William James. This abstracting of truth from particularity in order to recognize or construct an abstract, universal truth is vital to liberalism and the autonomous subject it posits. For both Dorrien and Hauerwas, accordingly, abstract universals (ideals) are the lifeblood of liberalism and liberal theology, even when liberal theology claims to be realist.

Third, the active self, which abstracts experiential and/or empirical data into generalized universals, depends on an equally universal and autonomous reason. The active self rationally orders and interprets the true nature of reality in order to leave behind over-belief and to apprehend abstract, universal, and objective truth. Reason can play such a role for two reasons. First, it is the objective tool inherent to finite humans for

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56 Dorrien, KRHS, 101. See also ibid., 89-90, 101, 107, 171, 191-195, 388-389; Dorrien, MALT, 2:17; Dorrien, WTM, 19-20; Hauerwas, AN, 24, 27; Hauerwas, WW, 182.


58 Sometimes the form-content distinction is articulated in terms of fact-value or is-ought, so here are citations for all three. Dorrien, KRHS, 37, 41, 160, 167-168, 218, 533, 549; Dorrien, WTM, 27-30; Hauerwas, BH, 231 n. 21; Hauerwas, AC, 63-65; Hauerwas, AN, 24, 27, 41; Hauerwas, CET, 85 n. 4; Hauerwas, DF, 138; Hauerwas, IGC, 52; Hauerwas, Matt, 20-21; Hauerwas, PF, 119, 137; Hauerwas, PK, 13; Hauerwas, JV, 11-16, 20, 23-25, 29, 32-34, 69-70; Hauerwas, WW, 100 n. 14, 103 with n. 21 and n. 22. One might object, perhaps even from Dorrien, that Hegel did not have a form-content distinction, or at least he sought to close the gap into "actuality," which was the point of absolute in his absolute idealism (Dorrien, KRHS, 205. See also ibid., 218). I will raise the issue of Hegel’s attempt to transcend picture-thinking later, which is a form-content distinction.

For the rest of the paragraph: Dorrien, KRHS, 2, 11-17, 45-47, 74, 58, 85, 87, 90-92, 98-99, 159-160, 168-169, 179, 191, 221, 231, 241, 530-533, 387, 533, 536, 542, 549, 555; Dorrien, SEM, 261, 271, 273-274, 280; Dorrien, MALT, 2:529; Dorrien, WTM, 20. For agreeing and supplementing, even within an overall critical position, see Hauerwas BH, 34, 118, 222 n. 30; Hauerwas, DF, 100-102; Hauerwas, STT, 29; Hauerwas, WGU, 68-71, 85, 102, 110.

accessing abstract, universal truth. Second, then, reason is universally normative for 
human life within an immanent frame, or at least beginning with immanence. This form 
of reason is “autonomous.”\(^\text{59}\) It determines its own method and object; it is self-
grounding like the active self rather than conditioned by external authority. Construing autonomous reason as essential to truth results in a mutually informing interplay between 
autonomous reason and autonomous subjectivity. On one hand, the autonomy of reason is 
key because it is constitutive of the autonomy of the subject. Only through reasoning 
unencumbered by claims of super-sensible knowledge can one discern one’s will in 
accordance with universal law and then choose the action to fulfill one’s will. On the 
other hand, the autonomy of the subject is crucial to the autonomy of reason. If over-
belief is determining the subject, then a partisan facade obstructs reason’s autonomy, and 
reason becomes suspect. Many post-Kantians, like Hegel, broke from Kant’s “mechanical 
realism” and opted for “intellectual intuition” in which reason is dialectically 
contingent and autonomous.\(^\text{60}\) But even then the goal of using reason is still to achieve 
autonomy by perceiving a generalized universal within particularity.\(^\text{61}\)

Truth is articulated in universals abstracted from one’s perception of will or 
nature through rationally examining the mind and experiences and/or through reasoning 
between particularities for insight into the whole rather than through external revelation. 
This stress on nature, will, experience, and reason is integral to the account of autonomy. 
Rationally abstracting a universal within a solely immanent reality places the subject’s

\(^{59}\) Dorrien, \textit{WTM}, 10. 

\(^{60}\) Dorrien, \textit{KRHS}, 535-536. 

\(^{61}\) Dorrien, \textit{KRHS}, 7, 36-37, 48-49, 50-52, 56-61, 71, 74, 221, 230, 531-532, 535-536, 540-542. For agreeing and supplementing, even 
within an overall critical position, see Hauerwas, \textit{CC}, 130-131, 274 n. 24; Hauerwas, \textit{AC}, 27, 53, 75; Hauerwas, \textit{AN}, 18; Hauerwas, 
rational will to act autonomously within a corresponding autonomously natural ground. External authority is not even in the picture. So the form-content distinction and autonomous reason not only roots the subject in a natural foundation, but also extricates the subject from external authority as the particularities of over-belief. This sense of autonomy, reason, and experience is what liberal theology accepts when it begins with the primacy of reason and experience, over the “appeal to external authority,” for “all claims to truth.” The embrace of liberal autonomy in liberal theology, however, is best illustrated in the next two layers.

Kant and the post-Kantians combined a philosophy of the mind, of abstract universals, of immediate sense experience, and of reason all within an immanent frame. Their purpose was to free the subject to apprehend universal truth. That made it possible to transcend one’s limited epistemological subjectivity for Kant (to a degree) and Schleiermacher, and also to develop consciousness for Hegel. The Kantian and post-Kantian subject is constructed out of abstract universals joined with the active self that orders its knowledge and its subjectivity through the capacity of objective, autonomous reason. This unity created an epistemological hermeneutic of an immanent, active subject that did two things. First, it broke the subject’s connection to particularity and relegated faith to rational morality. It thereby excluded external authoritative determinations like tradition, and at least qualified previous notions of communal determination and revelation. Second, it provided the space to rationally discover (or posit) an abstract

62 Dorrien, KRHS, 4.
63 Ibid., 36, 48, 50-51, 92-93, 98-99, 230, 531, 536. For agreeing and supplementing, even within an overall critical position, see Hauerwas, AC, 15-16; Hauerwas, PK, 11, 13; Hauerwas, VV, 33-34.
anthropological foundation and its constitutive categories. The subject is now free to construct itself; the subject becomes its own sovereign. 64

*The Second Layer of Liberal Theology*

Yet strictly adhering to autonomy excluded even rational theology, not just orthodox over-belief. The second layer of “integrative mediation” answers how to retain faith so that one can be both liberal and Christian. 65 The second layer is, on the one hand, its own axiom: “the viability and necessity of an alternative to orthodox over-belief and secular disbelief.” 66 On the other hand, that axiom also explains how one can operate within the first layer. Born out of apologetic and survivalist concerns, liberal theology began in the German theology that sought to meet the criticisms of the enlightenment deists and atheists on their own terms. The German approach used reason and experience to mediate between over-belief and disbelief. Starting with Kant and the post-Kantians, liberal theology combined “freethinking” with theological conviction to produce a third way: human experience and reason largely apart from external authority was privileged for critically reasoning about God and for developing an account of how humanity ought to live. 67 If faith is primarily based on the external authority of a particular revelation or tradition, faith is noncompliant and threatens autonomous reason at the heart of autonomous subjectivity. This understanding of faith is rejected as unscientific, irrational belief because it cannot be objectively verified by science. It may also be rejected as over-belief because the partisan form makes it incapable of articulating the fullness of

65 Ibid., 7-8.
66 Ibid., 7-8.
universal, objective truth. To make faith compliant and find the universal truth one needs to apply reason, not the biased particularity of tradition or community, to faith in experience and/or history. This process strips away or reinterprets the legacy of faith in Christian history under the rubric of liberal values.68

One result of this distinguishing project is the demythologizing of faith, which strips or radically reinterprets doctrinal formulations considered mythological or oppressive in a modern, scientific world. What remains is the perceived true essence of faith configured according to experience and modern understanding. Schleiermacher, for instance, may have believed the resurrection occurred, but whether it happened or not for him is beside the real point, “to know Christ as redeemer.”69 While this first result is a critical implication of autonomous reason, a second result is constructive. Reason and experience reconfigure faith into rational morality or feeling and theology into apologetics. Faith may participate in society by contributing to choosing moral norms, like choice itself. But faith’s public participation depends on separating faith from its particular form in order to explain itself within liberal categories and values to society. For the most part, Kant and most post-Kantians, accordingly, construe Jesus as an exemplar or moral teacher of enlightenment for and through freedom. For the more

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To detail the specifics concerning history, Kant strips away history. Hauerwas notes specifically that Kant’s work is not only ahistorical, but anti-historical (WW, 72, 156. See also Dorrien, KRHS, 58.). As for Schleiermacher and Hegel, they reinterpret history by privileging, respectively, feeling or historical development. But they both do so to abstract content from the past and present (Dorrien, KRHS, 91-92, 98-103, 182-183, 186-187, 191-194, 203-207, 214). This trajectory continues in more recent work. Hauerwas notes that both Rudolf Bultmann and R. Niebuhr, despite their emphasis on history, also had a “peculiar ahistorical character”: “what is important is how history exhibits eternal characteristics rather than how concrete historical figures or movements actually changed the world” (WW, 47 n. 9). I will show later that Dorrien’s The Word as True Myth is about the struggle to recover some legacy of faith within the liberal theology’s larger framework of stripping.

69 Dorrien, KRHS, 107. See also Dorrien, WTM, 12-16, 19-20. More radical demythologizing entirely dismisses or explains away Jesus’s miracles and resurrection. Dorrien, KRHS, 244, 249-250, 258; Dorrien, WTM, 22-31.
mystically inclined then and now, Jesus is a symbol. Traditional faith, then, is deemed over-belief, unscientific, and irrational when such faith is not reshaped by autonomous reason. But through autonomous reason, faith can be rationally cured from over-belief to become a rational morality congruent with abstract, universal truth and modern knowledge.70

The Third Layer of Liberal Theology

The third layer is a catch-all category for the transformative shockwaves once autonomous reason and experience supplanted external authority in liberal thought. Thereby liberal theology is further distinguished from other theologies. The first and second layers, as ways of taking up the liberal project, mean for Dorrien that liberal theology “is open to the verdicts of modern intellectual inquiry, especially historical criticism and the natural sciences.”71 The ramifications of this are extensive for Dorrien. Liberal theology, first, “reconceptualizes the meaning of Christianity in the light of modern knowledge and values” like the idealist philosophy of the mind and the notion of the free, autonomous subject.72 Second, liberal theology “is reformist in spirit and substance, not revolutionary.”73 Change comes from within humanity’s self-development, and so liberal theology works with society rather than opting for divine apocalyptic in-

70 Dorrien, KRHS, 5, 48-50, 52, 90-93, 101-102, 105, 107, 165-166, 190, 213, 244-260, 316-330, 334-356, 408, 469-499, 531-533; Dorrien, WTM, 10, 15-16, 101-114, 119-120, 203-208; Dorrien, EDE, 357; Dorrien, MALT, 2:502-506, 534-536, 548-549; Dorrien, MALT, 3:chp. 6. For agreeing and supplementing, even within an overall critical position, see Hauerwas, AC, 29, 53; Hauerwas, AN, 77; Hauerwas, CC, 40-42, 235-236 n. 27, 271 n. 14; Hauerwas, BH, 231 n. 21; Hauerwas, PK, 7-8, 13; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 20-21, 99, 101; Hauerwas, TT, 16-18; Hauerwas, WW, 47 n. 11, 60-61 n. 47, 132, 150. There is one qualification: Dorrien notes that Hegel later shifted away from Jesus as exemplar (KRHS, 221). But for now I simply concerned with a general definition of liberal theology.

71 Dorrien, KRHS, 5. See also Dorrien, MALT, 2:1-10 for a sketch of what the openness looks like.

72 Dorrien, KRHS, 5.

73 Ibid.
breaking over and/or against society. Third, for liberal theology to be progressive within a liberal status quo, “it conceives Christianity as an ethical way of life, it advocates moral concepts of atonement or reconciliation, and it is committed to making progressive religion credible and socially relevant.” Consequently, liberal theology is first defined by reason and experience over-against external authority. But that is far from the totality of its work. Liberal theology seeks to plumb the theological depths of liberal autonomy.  

II. Hauerwas Against the Unfaithfulness of Liberal Theology

Hauerwas decisively rejects both liberalism and liberal theology. He does so, I will argue, because he maintains a hierarchical and relational understanding of truth. Jesus, in his particularity, is the truth and is known through particular relations. Since Hauerwas has not articulated his specific opposition to liberal theology in terms of Dorrien’s definition, I show that Hauerwas’s account of truth informs his rejection of liberal theology’s three layers. Against layer one, he finds that liberalism’s autonomous subjectivity and rationality are deceptive, incoherent, and hegemonic. Under the hegemonic pressure to conform, in layer two liberal theology takes on an incoherent “double mind” by attempting to balance liberalism’s deception and incoherence with

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74 Ibid., 5, 105. For an example of working within society, see Dorrien, SS, pp. 1-4 and chp. 6. Also, based on what I have already noted, liberal theology can be further characterized by these core themes: emancipating and unifying freedom; idealism and subjectivity; historical development vis-à-vis progress and an evolutionary mindset; truth and relativity; and a spiritual center (Dorrien, KRHS, 1, 3, 9).
Christian faith.\textsuperscript{76} Liberal theology’s incoherence in layer two then begets deep unfaithfulness to Jesus in layer three.\textsuperscript{77}

**Hauerwas Against the First Layer**

Like Dorrien, Hauerwas recognizes that the idealist turn to “the mind” and the active self is about autonomy.\textsuperscript{78} But he rejects this first layer of liberal theology since he rejects as deceptive the idealist epistemological turn to the active self, the autonomous subject, and the autonomy of reason. Kant’s rational autonomy is deeply problematic and is far from liberating. It uses rational idealism—or in Hauerwas’s terms, a “disembodied ‘rationality’”—to ignore the contingency of history, of tradition, and an “ultimate telos” of life in order to clear space for autonomous self-construction through rules and autonomous choice.\textsuperscript{79} For Hauerwas, that anthropology and its corresponding politics refuses to acknowledge a fundamental reality. The subject is relationally constituted by the historical particularity of social bodies and social contexts, and by the particular God-givenness of life, of meaning, and of value. So Hauerwas rejects, accordingly, the construed of human freedom as self-grounding, as the right to arbitrary choice, or what would be more specific to Dorrien, freedom as its own end. In fact for Hauerwas, Kantian

\textsuperscript{76} Hauerwas, review of *Soul in Society*, 420. In case “double mind” appears to be out of context, Hauerwas also uses the term “double-think” to describe an incoherent tension in liberalism between autonomy and external sources. Hauerwas, “Christian Practice and the Practice of Law in a World without Foundations,” 748.

\textsuperscript{77} Hauerwas’s criticisms of liberalism are legion but they coalesce around major themes: abstract universals and neutral objectivity; autonomous freedom and autonomous reason for self-determination; morality replacing faith; the fear of death to justify the liberal political order; loyalty to the state superseding loyalty to Jesus; and the distinction between private and public. The following section on Hauerwas’s rejection of the first layer touches on all of those themes from one degree to another, but in the frame of deception, incoherence, and hegemony.

\textsuperscript{78} Hauerwas, *PF*, 125. See also Hauerwas, *CC*, 269 n. 14.

autonomy is a “lie,” a “self-deception.”" In contrast to truth, “lies are nothing less than contradictions of the word of God and the reality that is created by God.” Then what is the truth? How is it known? Hauerwas maintains truth hierarchically ordered. Jesus, crucified and resurrected, is the truth that shows “there can be no truth more determinative” than him and his work. An account of Jesus as such focused on his particularity constitutes Hauerwas’s relational understanding of truth.

Against Kantian and Hegelian accounts of knowledge as essence and rational-epistemological abstraction, Hauerwas contends that what is “true cannot be secured by a theory of truth more determinative than the faith itself.” Otherwise he quips: “if you think you need a theory of truth to underwrite the conviction that Jesus was raised from the dead, then worship that theory—not Jesus.” That idolatry of theory creates an “ideological distortion,” an abstraction of divinity in accordance with a general, religious, or moral sensibility which Jesus and/or his kingdom is then made to exemplify. In contradistinction to theory and abstraction, Hauerwas stresses that Jesus in his particularity is simultaneously God incarnate in history and the universal truth. For Hauerwas, the particularity of Jesus is the truth essential for Christians to be able “to call

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85 Hauerwas, *CSCH*, 144. See also Hauerwas, *DT*, 215, 227.
God creator or redeemer.”

Jesus is inseparable, even theoretically, from his embodiment and from his teachings of God’s kingdom, for he is the “autobasileia.” That is, the particular ‘shape’ of Jesus is the ‘shape’ of God’s kingdom present in human history. Accordingly, Jesus-for-all is the revelation of God-for-all in God’s cosmic kingdom. Jesus as the autobasileia reveals within human history “how God rules” and loves.

Thereby, Jesus is God’s transformative speech that makes divine peace real in humanity and to the world.

Truth, then, is not bound up in a general theory or list of abstract propositions.

Nor is truth ‘neutral,’ autonomous data. Instead, truth is known in humanity’s relation to the “living God.” Jesus, in his particularity, is the living truth who shows humanity “the truth of ourselves as sinful and misunderstanding.” Accordingly, to known such truth requires living in both relation and particularity. The truth is made known in one’s relations to others, in the stories of those relations, and in the relational process of re-

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87 Hauerwas, PK, 62. See also ibid., chp. 5; Hauerwas, CET, 16; Hauerwas, DT, 36; Hauerwas, WAD, 173-174.
89 Hauerwas, PK, 83. Emphasis original. See also ibid., 72-76, 85-87; Hauerwas, CC, 40; Hauerwas, US, 87-88, 95-96.
92 Hauerwas is not against a correspondence ‘theory’ of truth, meaning accuracy to the thing itself. Rather, the issue for him is that correspondence cannot ignore relations—such as community—and those relations shaped by speech-acts and (a Wittgensteinian account of) language. Hauerwas, AN, 5; Hauerwas, CET, 230-231; Hauerwas, DF, 7; Hauerwas, PF, 22-25, 62-63, 67; Hauerwas, PK, xxi; Hauerwas, STT, 188-189 n. 26; Hauerwas, SU, pp. 47-50, 86, 94-99, and chp. 4; Hauerwas, WW, 20 n. 17; Hauerwas, WW, 89. For a secondary accounts of Wittgenstein’s influence on Hauerwas, see Kallenberg, Ethics as Grammar, Emmanuel Katongole, Beyond Universal Reason: The Relation between Religion and Ethics in the Work of Stanley Hauerwas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 154-162. For a secondary an account of Hauerwas and speech-act, see Ariana Baan, The Necessity of Witness: Stanley Hauerwas’s Contribution to Systematic Theology (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2015), chp. 3.
93 Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 55. See also ibid., 77; Hauerwas, AN, 5; Hauerwas, CC, 93; Hauerwas, WAD, 173.
telling and acting those stories. Jesus is made known in and through the church, a living community in a particular tradition that re-tells the particular story of Jesus by embodying it. Truth is then found in one’s contingent, always-particular, “historical existence” rather than particularity as an incomplete facade for universal truth.\(^{93}\) Both that particular storied tradition and its faithful embodiment are required to know the truth. Truth, then, refers to human beings’ relation to God and to other human beings.\(^{94}\)

However, liberalism’s autonomous subjectivity and reason undermine the possibility of a particular tradition. The autonomous subject’s freedom is limited to its self-interest since meaning and value are dependent on the subject and self-construction is achieved through choice. Neither Kant’s encouragement to be more rationally dutiful nor Hegel’s more rigorously plumbing of consciousness through the active self perceiving its relation to the whole will save one from self-deception or move one beyond self-interest. Not only does autonomous reason fail to develop the habits and skills necessary to act in accordance with virtues supplied by the true story embodied in a community, but also the position that “one can judge all belief prior to having any,” like standing outside a “tradition,” is “illusory.”\(^{95}\) That illusory assumption dismisses the


\(^{95}\) Hauerwas, _DF_, 22; Hauerwas, _DT_, 194. See also Hauerwas and Willimon, _RA_, 98-100; Hauerwas, _STT_, 185, 221. Hauerwas’s charge of illusion may stem from an external critique, but it also has an internal critique. He acknowledges that the rational, lawful, dutiful, ahistorical, and universal characteristics of Kant’s morality are supposed to keep it from succumbing to arbitrary desires in the subject’s pursuit of autonomy. However, Hauerwas argues that Kant’s rational morality is ironically all the more arbitrary and illusory because it centralizes individual self-interest by privileging choice. Hauerwas, _CC_, 271 n. 14; Hauerwas, _PK_, 3, 10-11; Hauerwas and Willimon, _RA_, 98; Stanley Hauerwas, _Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, the Mentally Handicapped, and the
“contingent” rationality of tradition in order for reason to apprehend abstract universals over-against the contingency and particularity of storied tradition. Accordingly, autonomous reason explicitly (Kant) or subtly (Hegel) overrides particularity and tradition with abstract universals that form autonomy, that narrow and thin morality, and that distort reason into an instrument for serving self-interest in choice. Hauerwas concludes, then, that autonomy’s denial of tradition for self-interest, reduction of morality to choice, and instrumentalization of reason recapitulate the “illusions” of “self-deception.” Autonomy itself is neither liberation nor the truth.

Hauerwas finds that autonomy’s self-deceptive illusions and its ironic incoherencies are concomitant. His most common criticism of liberal autonomy’s incoherencies focuses on its refusal of tradition. As shown already, liberalism rejects the “transcendent perspective of the kind associated with traditional Christianity” on the grounds of autonomy. Liberalism’s largely immanent and ‘natural’ cosmology, understood through a corresponding autonomous and ‘neutral’ rationality, desacralizes the world from external sources and over-belief. This deception, however, “fostered its own tradition” in the centuries-long pursuit of autonomous self-transcendence. Indeed, not only is autonomous reason an oxymoron, despite liberalism’s rejection of a

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Church (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 130, 134 (hereafter SP); Hauerwas, TT, 16-19, 24-25, 55; Hauerwas, VF, 31-35; Hauerwas, WW, 93.

* Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 98. See also Hauerwas, CC, 97; Hauerwas, IGC, 105; Hauerwas, STT, 184-185; Hauerwas, TT, 25-26; Hauerwas, WW, 73-74.

* Hauerwas, TT, 86-87. See also Hauerwas, TT, 63; Hauerwas, VF, 31-32.

* Hauerwas, CC, chp. 4 and pp. 217, 271 n. 14; Hauerwas, CSCH, 148; Hauerwas, DF, 166-167; Hauerwas, DT, 194; Hauerwas, IGC, 135; Hauerwas, PK, 7-9; Stanley Hauerwas, “Christian Practice and the Practice of Law in a World without Foundations,” 748; Hauerwas, PF, 125; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 98-103; Hauerwas, TT, 63-64, 82-88; Hauerwas, PF, 125-127; Hauerwas, PK, 10-12, 20-24; Hauerwas, TT, 10, 16-21, 24-30, 48-56, 73-81, 87-88, 95-96; Hauerwas, AN, 43; Hauerwas, CET, 82-84, 128 n. 2; Hauerwas, DF, 138-139; Hauerwas, IGC, 171; Hauerwas, STT, 184-185; Hauerwas, TT, 15-19, 63.

* Hauerwas, WW, 231.

* Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 100. See also ibid., 99; Hauerwas, CC, 83; Hauerwas, WW, 103.
“transcendent perspective.” Hauerwas also points out that liberalism aspires to achieve the same transcendent perspective through autonomous self-transcendence.101

Starting with this fundamental incoherence, an ironic hegemony over political arrangements rows and perniciously polices Christianity by both explicitly excluding and subtly supplanting it on liberal terms. Informed by Hauerwas’s account of hierarchical and relational truth established above, I focus here on his critique of political liberalism’s incoherent ironies that begin with autonomy rivaling the transcendent perspective and end with excluding it. In Hauerwas’s rejection of liberal theology’s second layer I address the issue of supplanting.102

Hauerwas’s reflection of death is one way he has developed a critical connection between liberalism’s incoherence and its political order. Death grounds liberalism’s desacralized autonomy by replacing ‘external authorities’ with death as the basic reality of existence. Although liberalism may then appear bound by death, liberalism’s attempt to overcome death legitimizes liberalism’s re-sacralization, the attempt to achieve a transcendental perspective. The threat of death justifies political liberalism’s forcing of people into its political arrangement as citizens with nothing in “common” but “their fear of death.”103 Desacralizing the world legitimates the liberal nation-state’s claims to autonomous ownership of and sovereignty over death and life through the state’s

101 For the quote: Hauerwas, WW, 231. For the rest of the paragraph, see Hauerwas, AE, 124-129; Hauerwas, BH, 13-15; Hauerwas, CC, 78-79; Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches, Christians Among the Virtues: Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 67 (hereafter CAV); Hauerwas, IGC, 200-201; Hauerwas, STT, 150-151, 191, 221; Hauerwas, VV, 232 n. 25; Hauerwas, WAD, 7-11; Hauerwas, WW, 52-54; Hauerwas, AE, 114-116; Hauerwas, DF, 22; Hauerwas, STT, 221; Hauerwas, WW, 84. For Hauerwas’s other accusations of liberal incoherence, see CC, 99; IGC, 170-171; TT, 55; WW, 112.
102 In relation to the modern nation-state, chapter three will develop issues raised within the theme of exclusion here.
103 Hauerwas and Pinches, CAF, 169. See also Hauerwas, AE, 64-67; Hauerwas, AE, 124; Hauerwas, DT, 213; Hauerwas, WAD, 48; Hauerwas, WW, 86. The fact that this forcing is far from voluntary marks a shift in Hauerwas’s work. See Hauerwas, CC, 231 n. 10; Hauerwas, VV, 219.
monopoly on policing violence and its claims to ensure peace. Since such an autonomous attempt to overcome death is an attempt at self-transcendence, for Hauerwas the liberal political order is no less than a sacral order that aspires to be an alternative contrary to Jesus.  

The question for political liberalism is how should a politics be constructed that is both autonomous and transcendental? How does one affirm the autonomy of individuals and still unify them in order to keep the peace? Political liberalism answers with a minimalist anthropology of autonomy and a political order that reflect Kant’s universal morality as reason and rules. Persons are reduced to rational “individuals…[as] a particular unit of arbitrary desire”; the good is reduced to one’s right to freely pursue arbitrary desires.  

These reductions to arbitrary desire are realized through political rules that are arranged and enforced by the neutral modern nation-state. Key to this political arrangement is a concept of negative freedom for self-construction by each and all to construct themselves. In such an arrangement, the major issues are the autonomy of the individual and the self-serving procedure of rational rules rather than the substance of the various desires themselves. By reasoning within this empty apparatus, liberalism ensures political unity. Liberalism immediately affirms individual freedom on the one hand, and rationally resolves disputes between the conflicting, diverse desires of

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In order to focus on Hauerwas’s critique of liberalism’s incoherence over the issue of death, I have had to leave more implicit than explicit another facet of his critique. Neutral, objective immanence is a desacralizing endeavor at the service of a larger project, gaining political power for the ideology of the modern nation-state. This larger project I will take up in chapter three.


autonomous subjects on the other hand. Justice is the name for this procedural negotiation between conflicting desires in order to secure freedom and unity.\footnote{Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 98-101; Hauerwas, WW, 86; Hauerwas, AC, 64-66; Hauerwas, CC, 78-84, 217; Hauerwas, AE, 125-128; Hauerwas, PK, 9; Hauerwas, VV, 31-32; Hauerwas, “Christian Practice and the Practice of Law in a World without Foundations,” 746-748; Hauerwas, DT, 213; Hauerwas, IGC, 105; Hauerwas, STT, 184; Hauerwas, WW, 86; Hauerwas, BH, 31; Hauerwas, DF, 161; Hauerwas, AC, 46-48, 61-62; Hauerwas, DT, 213; Dorrien, KRHS, 531.}

Hauerwas grants that the liberal political order \textit{claims} to be an “empty” “system of rules” since it does not supply “moral content.”\footnote{Hauerwas, CC, 78; Hauerwas, DF, 160; Hauerwas, WW, 119. See also Hauerwas, CC, 83, 217.} But he notes a deep irony in the difference between the lacunae within the procedural apparatus and the assumed morality \textit{in} the apparatus’s procedural \textit{structure}. The emptiness of the apparatus depends on an ideology of negative freedom, which itself presupposes liberalism’s autonomous, universal anthropology called human dignity. What is “moral” is “to satisfy our ‘wants’ and ‘needs,’” but everyone determines their own wants and needs.\footnote{Hauerwas, CC, 80. See also ibid., 76.} So autonomous, rational, and “universal principles,” such as human dignity, are the basis for an autonomous, rational, and “universal ethic,” typified by the idea of universal human rights.\footnote{Hauerwas, STT, 182-183. See also Hauerwas, IGC, 188-189; Hauerwas, PK, 61; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 98; Hauerwas, WW, 86.} All the while dignity and rights are framed in terms of morality. In fact, liberalism collapses the differences between morality, human dignity, and rights in order to constitute a public morality. Exemplified by Kant, liberal public “morality only has meaning when considered as a schema of laws or principles self-evident to any reasonable person.”\footnote{Hauerwas, DF, 138.} In that framework, what is morally wrong (injustice) is violating an individual’s rights and the rules for ensuring those rights. Doing so contravenes the two ideals ensured by autonomous rational morality. The first ideal is the social space of
negative freedom for pursuing self-interest. The second ideal is the underlying principle of the individual and one’s freedom as ends in themselves (human dignity). There is a moral order then, but it extends no further than individual autonomy and rules necessary to ensure it. Moral behavior is reduced to following legal procedures in the pursuit of self-interest.\textsuperscript{111}

Nearly every step in liberalism’s political-moral order is deeply problematic for Hauerwas. Political liberalism presupposes but neither supplies nor gives its own account of virtues, of character, of the family unit, and of the other moral contributions to social life. So although liberalism’s desacralized world denies external sources, liberal society’s morality is ironically “parasitic” on sources like Christianity that are external, even contrary, to autonomy.\textsuperscript{112} That irony, Hauerwas contends, creates harmful ironies as liberalism incorporates issues, ideas, people, and politics by redefining them in terms of autonomy. The flashpoint that (in)famously characterizes Hauerwas’s critical position on liberalism is his rejection of human dignity and rights language. But his position is more complex than his infamy might lead one to believe.\textsuperscript{113}

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I do not have the space above to address further problems created by the new morality, which only reinforces or masks liberalism’s incoherence. So here is one example of those issues. The new morality conflates or makes subservient honor and truth to human dignity as self-interest, as opposed to human freedom directed by love, the true, and the good (Hauerwas, \textit{CET}, 224-231; Hauerwas, \textit{DF}, 160-162; Hauerwas, \textit{IGC}, 131-135, 145; Hauerwas, \textit{PK}, 7-12; Hauerwas, \textit{VV}, 38-41; Hauerwas, “Christian Practice and the Practice of Law in a World without Foundations,” 745). If virtues are even present, they are abstracted from “the community context that makes them intelligible,” and there is “little or no analysis of how” virtues “form or are possessed by the self” (Hauerwas,
His hierarchy of truth in particular relations, on the one hand, affirms human
dignity in terms of the *imago Dei* and the creaturehood of human bodies. But on the other
hand, he rejects the abstraction or autonomy of them as ends in themselves construed as
rights within liberal politics. This affirmation and rejection Hauerwas derives from an
historicized, relational frame. Humans are historical creatures constituted by their relation
to God the creator who, as incarnated, entered history to bring about reconciliation. A
“common humanity” does not name the abstract universal of humanity derived from the
species’s universal capacity to reason, a presumption important for liberal peace-
making.\(^{114}\) In other words, human dignity is rooted in receiving and giving gifts in
relation to God and other human creatures, not in pursuing self-interested desires. So
Hauerwas affirms human dignity relationally because he affirms it in light of Jesus, of
human community, and of “friendship with God” as the creature’s “*telos*.”\(^{115}\)

Hauerwas’s relational account of human dignity contrasts sharply with a
fundamental incoherence found in the link between liberalism’s language of human
dignity and rights language. In accordance with the idea that human dignity is its own
end, rights language separates people into individuals and “trains us to pursue our
interests as ends in themselves.”\(^{116}\) The emphasis on individuals and their self-interests

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\(^{CC}\), 97-98. See also Hauerwas, *STT*, 117). Consequently, the “appearance of virtue” is deemed sufficient, but being virtuous is
tangential at best (Hauerwas, *CET*, 195).

For Hauerwas’s recent summary of his problems with rights language, see *WT*, 195 n. 9, 196-198. There Hauerwas touches
on some issues which I do not develop here, such as a rationalist “moral psychology…often presupposed by those who use [rights]
language” (ibid., 197). For the issues of human dignity, rights language, rationality, the mentally handicapped, children, and care for
them, see Hauerwas, *STT*, 148-150; Hauerwas, *SP*, chps. 7, 9-12. But later Hauerwas argues against abstraction, which I do address
(*WT*, 201). Human dignity, as an abstract universalized norm used by liberal law in terms of rights in order to secure equality, actually
obliterates difference rather than ensure relationality in one’s difference (Hauerwas, *DF*, 203 n. 19; Hauerwas, *SP*, 212-213).


\(^{115}\) For the quote, see Hauerwas, *BH*, 183. Emphasis original. See also Hauerwas and Pinches, *CAV*, 105-107; Hauerwas, *CET*, 72;

\(^{116}\) Hauerwas, *SP*, 130. See also Hauerwas, *CET*, 227.
not only undercuts the possibility to see “common interests or beliefs” and ultimately undermines the common good.\textsuperscript{117} More basically “the concept and ethics of dignity, if pressed too consistently, finally begin to erode the essential sociality of the human on which any sense of identity is possible.”\textsuperscript{118} So political liberalism eliminates the very social ground that it parasitically assumes in its attempt to secure the possibility of peaceful relations.

From that incoherent irony follows a second: the suppression of difference. In order to unify disparate individuals and their rival self-interests, political liberalism employs the liberal epistemology of abstract universals in the political vocabulary of human dignity and rights. However, those two abstract universals actually hide significant differences, rather than ensure relations among those with significant differences. The whole point of rights language, as a public morality in order to secure individual autonomy, is to employ abstract universals in order to mark off ‘interests’ as fundamentally private. That re-definition creates a minimal political-moral order which reduces differences and external sources to private desires.\textsuperscript{119}

By reducing difference to private desire, the constructive suppression of difference supposedly ensures both autonomy and unity without being “coercive.”\textsuperscript{120} But for Hauerwas, such “Kantian-like” power dynamics establish an ironic and pernicious hegemony over public space in the name of ensuring autonomy.\textsuperscript{121} For instance, the pattern of employing abstract universals in order to mark off ‘interests’ as fundamentally

\textsuperscript{117} Hauerwas, \textit{SP}, 130. See also Hauerwas, \textit{WT}, 197.
\textsuperscript{118} Hauerwas, \textit{CET}, 227.
\textsuperscript{120} Hauerwas, \textit{DF}, 166-167.
\textsuperscript{121} Hauerwas, \textit{AE}, 129. See also Hauerwas, \textit{DF}, 166-167.
private is imposed on Christianity through the category of ‘religion,’ an abstract universal that construes Christian faith as one kind of individual, private interest. This classification is done in order to make Christianity cohere with “modern democratic assumptions” of autonomy vis-à-vis the citizen-consumer. Yet that continuity undercuts discipleship as learning the “craft” of following Jesus from within a tradition and a masterful community. The consequences of that undermining are catastrophic. The privatization of faith explicitly excludes the particularity of Christianity from the public sphere, thereby rendering “invisible” Christianity’s distinctiveness. This political, external policing of Christianity then works its way into US Christianity. Faith, construed as an interior, principled belief by individuals “separable from the social form,” undermines the church as a socio-political body and the social salvation that the body of Christ is supposed to embody. Liberal autonomy and privatization dissolve the socio-political constitution of the church, crucial to social salvation, into little more than a private, “voluntary association” of autonomous individuals. So religious freedom can be a Trojan horse. It polices, silences, and ultimately distorts Christianity by refashioning Christian self-understanding as a ‘religion’ limited by the state’s category of free but private belief. Liberal hegemony, Hauerwas concludes, ultimately creates a superficial pluralism in the liberal order.
Recall that Dorrien defines liberal theology’s second layer with reference to the necessity of faith, and the union of faith with liberal autonomy. Hauerwas describes such a union with the terms “double mind” or “double-think.”\textsuperscript{128} Under the guise of apologetic concerns, liberal theology seeks to explain Christianity by making it reasonable, “relevant,” and even “credible” on liberal society’s terms.\textsuperscript{129} In order to do so, liberal theology knowingly and willingly self-polices external authority out of bounds in order to accommodate the liberal assumptions of autonomous subjectivity, autonomous reason, and experience. Liberal theology, then, not only accepts the deception and incoherence of liberalism. In doing so liberal theology also becomes itself incoherent to both non-theological liberalism and to Christianity.

For Hauerwas, granting too much credence to liberal categories ironically makes liberal theology incoherent for non-theological liberalism. If abstract universals are objectively true and can be known through the neutral objectivity of autonomous reason apart from the supposed bias of particularity, then theology does no more than provide mythological “confirmation” or “opinion” about what more experiential and rational disciplines already articulate.\textsuperscript{130} Whether liberal theology begins with human feeling
(Schleiermacher) or speculatively reasons about human history in order to transcend it (Hegel) over-against ‘external authority,’ liberal theology makes all theology a natural theology that is “tested” or “validated” in light “of the human condition” (R. Niebuhr). Theology no longer begins and ends with the particularity of Jesus. Rather, theology contemplates “‘nature’” through and for constructing an abstract, unifying principle or principles. Such theology is, for Hauerwas, open to Ludwig Feuerbach’s critique. Theology is no more than the product of sociological formation from psychological wishing for something more than sheer immanence. Theology, then, is divested of what it thinks makes it theological because it really is anthropology in disguise. Theology as such becomes ultimately unnecessary now that it is tantamount to a perverse soft science, philosophy, or politics according to secular standards. So Hauerwas argues that liberal theology’s successful mission of accommodation has ultimately reinforced non-theological liberal presuppositions about Christianity. It is a private affair that poorly expresses natural reality which are better accessed by other means than faith. The apologetic mission of liberal theology, ironically, made it incoherent and self-defeating. That is, liberal theology tacitly affirmed that it should be ignored in its pursuit of relevance. Hauerwas rejects the need to cooperate with the demands of liberal rationalism in order for faith to justify what liberalism deems “irrational.” He focuses instead on the

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131 Hauerwas, WGU, 115. See also Hauerwas, STT, 30-32, 185. My noting of external authority, particularly in relation to experience (feeling) and reason, is following Dorrien’s definition of liberal theology. I do not intend to ignore Hauerwas’s emphasis on ecclesial locality and unity—a congregationalism with bishops (Hauerwas, AE, 111-112).
132 Hauerwas, CSCH, 153.
134 Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 100-101. See also Hauerwas, AN, 5; Hauerwas, BH, 184; Hauerwas, TT, 15.
“content of belief” in order “to make the world credible to the gospel.” Hauerwas’s position on truth in hierarchy and relation emphasizes the distinctiveness of Christian witness in the church’s faithful, embodied imitation of Jesus. The church should first seek to be an alternative to the world because the church aims for faithfulness to Jesus’s story by embodying Jesus. Jesus’s story is not an ethic judged by effectiveness; instead, his story “is a social ethic.” So rather than first pursuing justice outside of the church, “the church is a social ethic.” That is, the church is a new “polity” which “demonstrate[s] that Jesus has made possible a new world, a new social order.” The communal faithfulness to Jesus calls for true reconciliation in the form of friendship among human creatures, among human communities, and between humanity and God. In the church’s faithfulness to that polity, the church embodies God’s invitation to the “sinsick” world so that it may see itself in a saving relation to Jesus. For Hauerwas, then, the distinctive and robust embodiment of discipleship and not some external standard of rationality measures the church’s credibility, makes its convictions intelligible, and proves the truth of those convictions. So theological discourse is about

137 Hauerwas, CC, 37.
138 Hauerwas, PK, 99. See also ibid., 100-102, 104-105, 131-132; Hauerwas, AN, 74-75; Hauerwas, CC, 10-11, 91-92; Hauerwas, DF, 113-114.
139 Hauerwas, CC, 49-50. See also Hauerwas, PK, 102; Hauerwas, STT, 261.

In contrast to Hauerwas’s account of truthful witness, he argues that liberal theology integrates itself into society not by finding common ground but by “speak[ing] back to our society baptized idealizations first learned from society itself.”\footnote{Hauerwas, \textit{DF}, 7. See also Hauerwas, \textit{AN}, 42; Hauerwas, \textit{CC}, 75, 79; Hauerwas, \textit{DT}, 40; Hauerwas, \textit{IGC}, 71, 73; Hauerwas, \textit{STT}, 79-80, 157, 163, 166, 223, 250; Hauerwas, \textit{WW}, 115.}{\footnote{Hauerwas, \textit{DF}, 7. See also Hauerwas, \textit{PK}, chapter 5, esp. pp. 94-95.}} Granting too much credence to liberal categories results in a catastrophically incoherent redefinition of Christianity. Allowing autonomous reason to “unwarrantedly expand the realm of the irrational” sets liberal theology on the path of a natural moralism that defines, critiques, and demythologizes ‘over-belief.’\footnote{Hauerwas, \textit{TT}, 15.}{\footnote{Hauerwas, \textit{DF}, 7. See also Hauerwas, \textit{AN}, 42; Hauerwas, \textit{CC}, 75, 79; Hauerwas, \textit{DT}, 40; Hauerwas, \textit{IGC}, 71, 73; Hauerwas, \textit{STT}, 79-80, 157, 163, 166, 223, 250; Hauerwas, \textit{WW}, 115.}{\footnote{Hauerwas, \textit{DF}, 7. See also Hauerwas, \textit{PK}, chapter 5, esp. pp. 94-95.}} Hauerwas’s reaction against liberal theology’s project is multi-layered. He rebuffs the presupposition of demythologization: that Kant’s abstract, neutral reason purifies Christian over-belief into a set of abstract, modern ideals that better access universal truth. That expansion of “the irrational” raises more fundamental problems. Christianity is situated as another voluntary belief system “aimed at making our lives more coherent” with a liberal and capitalist logic of Kantian autonomy as choice.\footnote{Hauerwas, \textit{DF}, 7. See also Hauerwas, \textit{PK}, chapter 5, esp. pp. 94-95.} To construe faith as such, Hauerwas argues, misunderstands that Christianity “is a constitutive set of skills that requires the transformation of the self to rightly see the world.”\footnote{Hauerwas, \textit{DF}, 7. See also Hauerwas, \textit{AN}, 42; Hauerwas, \textit{CC}, 75, 79; Hauerwas, \textit{DT}, 40; Hauerwas, \textit{IGC}, 71, 73; Hauerwas, \textit{STT}, 79-80, 157, 163, 166, 223, 250; Hauerwas, \textit{WW}, 115.}{\footnote{Hauerwas, \textit{DF}, 7. See also Hauerwas, \textit{AN}, 42; Hauerwas, \textit{CC}, 75, 79; Hauerwas, \textit{DT}, 40; Hauerwas, \textit{IGC}, 71, 73; Hauerwas, \textit{STT}, 79-80, 157, 163, 166, 223, 250; Hauerwas, \textit{WW}, 115.} Deeper still, the mediating apologetics of liberal theology implies that the goal is “to make God intelligible to
‘modern man,’ whoever that may be.”¹⁴⁶ This theological privileging of autonomy, Hauerwas argues, sets theology on a Pelagian trajectory where “any life-directing attraction toward God’s creative and redemptive being becomes unintelligible.”¹⁴⁷ Instead, Hauerwas maintains that “theology’s task” is “to make ourselves intelligible to God.”¹⁴⁸ Hauerwas does not advocate for a high Christology over a low Christology; he eschews just such a dichotomy. Rather, he rejects the impulse within liberalism to control the church by separating it from the particularity of Jesus and marginalizing the church under the guise of apologetics. Thus the incoherence of liberal theology is produced by and at the service of the liberal project.¹⁴⁹

So from layer one, liberalism’s hegemony of privatizing Christianity and rendering it invisible means that any public explanation of Christianity on its own terms is not credible for liberal society. In layer two, liberal theology’s endeavor to make Christianity intelligible and thereby credible to society on liberalism’s terms is an accommodating endeavor that renders Christianity irrelevant and incoherent. That rendering is advanced by a third aspect in both liberalism’s hegemony and liberal theology’s accommodation. Political liberalism’s pressure to translate Christianity’s language into secular idioms further establishes Christianity’s invisibility. When that translation is accommodated by liberal theology, it becomes “functionally atheistic.”¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ Hauerwas, STT, 38. See also Hauerwas, AN, 24; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 20-21.
¹⁴⁷ Hauerwas, JV, 31.
¹⁴⁸ Hauerwas, STT, 38. For examples, see Hauerwas, STT, 80, 156, 199, 247; Hauerwas, IGC, 211-212.
What expresses and ensures liberalism’s limited public morality is a “neutral,” public language, or “third language.” It stands over any public discussion between two other particularities such as the languages of particular communities or traditions. The third language, then, is what the ‘bias’ of Christian language must be translated in order to receive a public hearing. However, for Hauerwas the third language and the public square are “anything but neutral” or objective, no matter whether translation is described positively or negatively. Positively, Christian faith translated into a rational morality of rules and choice reformulates the historical story of God’s work and human response into a set of ahistorical propositions that assume a religious essence and that distill it into moral beliefs. Negatively, the third language divests faith of the particular language that constitutes its meaning. Any acceptable public talk of God is subject to autonomous reason and abstract universals that reduces God to the void of an abstract ‘god.’ Privatization demands that any public utterance of faith not be identified as religious. According to liberal reason, then, speech must be translated into a third language, the abstract idiom of morality that is safe for the ‘neutral’ (autonomous) public square. Whatever private ‘beliefs’ the liberal order allows in public must be transformed first to align with public procedural morality. So not only does the abstract, universal category of religion “domesticate” Christianity through privatization, but also translation further domesticates Christianity by supplanting its particularity in public with the liberal moral order.

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151 Hauerwas, BH, 27, 119; Hauerwas, SU, 58 n. 1. See also Hauerwas, CC, 220; Hauerwas, DF, 97; Hauerwas, TT, 16-17.
152 Hauerwas, SU, 58 n. 1. See also Hauerwas, CC, 220; Hauerwas, WW, 119.
153 Hauerwas, AC, 88. See also ibid., 84. For the paragraph, see Hauerwas, DF, 139; Hauerwas, PK, 61; Hauerwas, STT, 184; Hauerwas, SU, 58; Hauerwas, AN, 38; Hauerwas, BH, 26-27, 118; Hauerwas, STT, 193; Hauerwas, AN, 24, 41; Hauerwas, DT, 214; Hauerwas, PK, 24-26, 61-62; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 20-21; Hauerwas, IV, 69-70; Hauerwas, WW, 47 n. 9 and n. 11; Hauerwas, AN, 5; Hauerwas, BH, 34; Hauerwas, IGC, 202; Hauerwas, WW, 80, 90; Hauerwas, BH, 27, 118-119; Hauerwas, CC, 217-219.
Liberal theologians and ethicists like Dorrien find parallels between Christianity and the liberal order in categories like equality, human dignity, and justice for the oppressed. But for Hauerwas, the liberal version of those categories is “a universal that... tempts us to substitute... some moral ideal” or “external standard” like human rights “for our faithfulness to God” and God’s kingdom that realizes true freedom, justice, equality, and peace.\(^\text{154}\) The consequences of substitution through translation are catastrophic. As Hauerwas fatally asked of Walter Rauschenbusch, R. Niebuhr, and many other liberal theologians, if translation indicates that rhetoric, not substance, is the true difference between Christian language and secular idioms, “then why bother saying it theologically at all?”\(^\text{155}\) But Hauerwas’s socratic point has an even more incisive edge. When liberal theology bows to liberalism’s hegemonic demand to translate Christian language, liberal theology becomes a co-participant in supplanting Christian identity with the procedural morality of the liberal order. Through the likes of Rauschenbusch and Niebuhr, liberal theology translated Christian faith into “an ethic for ‘anyone’” in order to be a universal, democratic morality for co-operative participation in the “civilizing project” of liberalism.\(^\text{156}\) To justify this project, liberal theology asserted that Christianity’s mission to universally “make things right” can avoid the political chaos feared by liberal theology and political liberalism.\(^\text{157}\) But ironically, when the liberal standard is normative and Christianity is privatized, “what Christians believe or do not


\(^{155}\) Hauerwas, \textit{AN}, 25. See also ibid., 38.

\(^{156}\) Hauerwas, \textit{STT}, 33-34. See also Hauerwas, \textit{AN}, chp. 2; Hauerwas, \textit{BH}, chp. 5 and 253 n. 144; Hauerwas, \textit{DF}, chp. 4; Dorrien, \textit{WTM}, 182.

\(^{157}\) Hauerwas, \textit{CET}, 183.
believe about God” is made “irrelevant” while justice through violence is accepted as necessary and “responsible.” Christianity in the US, accordingly, took on the role of justifying the nation-state as Christian ethics became a branch of US society for US interests. So Christian ethics became unmoored from Jesus and hitched to liberal procedure, privatization, and translation. The incoherencies of liberal theology and the supplanting of Christianity, Hauerwas judges, are the source of liberal theology greatest unfaithfulness.  

Hauerwas Against the Third Layer

The second layer’s shockwaves reverberate in the third layer. On Hauerwas’s view, liberal theology’s embrace of the first layer and liberal theology’s subsequent incoherence create its unfaithfulness. Liberal theology becomes unfaithful by embracing the pernicious hegemony of the liberal order that supplants Christian loyalty to the non-violent particularity of Jesus with the moral-political order of liberalism as the mechanism for peace. Hauerwas’s most repeated concern is that liberal theology, as part of liberalism’s civilizing project, is “Constantinian.”

In short, Constantinianism is “making the faith credible to the powers-that-be so that Christians might now have a share in those powers.” The Constantian project is

158 Hauerwas, WAD, 100-101. See also Hauerwas, BH, 32-33.
160 Hauerwas, IGC, 54.
possible for liberal theology because the Constantinian presupposition that “God
is…available to anyone, without moral transformation and spiritual guidance” parallels
the liberal assumption that knowledge is an abstract universal which construes
“Christianity as a truth separable from truthful witness.”\(^{162}\) So for both Constantinianism
and liberal theology, one can be a “Christian without training.”\(^{163}\) Christianity as such
mimics political liberalism’s assertion that justice can be attained by procedure rather
than by God’s justice, which for Hauerwas is Jesus and his reconciling work embodied
by the church. Further coherence between the Constantinian project and political

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Constantinianism is much more complex than I have initially made it out to be for the sake of space. For instance, the “cultural lags” that Goshen College “represent[s]” is “made possible as much by ethnic identity as by theological convictions and practice. Which is only a reminder that ethnic identity, which in one context is a form of Constantinianism, in another context can be a resource for Christian resistance to the powers that would subvert the Gospel. Roman Catholics are a fascinating example of such a process in America” (Hauerwas, \(\textit{DF}\), 16). The same could be said of both the English state church and the wider Anglican communion as well. Chapter four will argue that Rowan Williams, as the preeminent archbishop of a caesepapist church, argued for a non-
Constantinian transformation of state sovereignty. (It is worth noting that Dorrien has long been an Episcopal priest and that Hauerwas became an lay Episcopalian not long after I started this project.)


\(^{163}\) Hauerwas, \(\textit{AC}\), 98. See also Hauerwas, \textit{SU}, 172.
liberalism undergirds the justification of Constantinianism as being “politically responsible.” Such legitimacy is based on a Christianized version of political liberalism, which fears that political chaos will erupt and that human freedom will be undercut without Christian involvement.

The allure of responsibility and justification of chaos are difficult to abandon if one holds to similar assumptions typified by R. Niebuhr’s realist project. Parallel to liberal desacralization, he started with original sin as the “universal condition” of humanity and the one “empirically verifiable” doctrine of Christianity. Beginning as such furthered desacralization in two ways. First, he circumvented the biblical and Christian fact that one cannot know that one is a sinner apart from Jesus’s work. Second, Niebuhr’s empirical original sin eventually led to his claim that Jesus’s love ethic is impossible in the public sphere, to Niebuhr’s argument for democracy as the means for peace, to his critical support for national interests. So he fulfills liberal theology’s presupposition that its “fundamental task [is] to make America work.” Both Dorrien and Hauerwas note that despite Niebuhr’s sharp criticisms of liberal theology, his assumptions placed him in fundamental continuity with it. Like the social gospel, Niebuhr’s anthropology beginning with sin reflects liberal assumptions about death’s importance. In response, also similar to the social gospel, Niebuhr understood that the mission of Christianity is to transform society through social justice. Rather than Jesus, then, the liberal order serves as the peacemaker, either as an international community

164 Hauerwas, WAD, 100. See also Hauerwas, VT, 204-205, 211, 214.
165 Hauerwas, AC, 63-64, 68; Hauerwas, WAD, 100-106, 113-114, 116; Hauerwas, AC, 27; Hauerwas, CET, 183; Hauerwas, WW, 55.
166 Hauerwas, DT, 214; Hauerwas, WW, 44. See also Hauerwas, WGU, 104-105, 109-111, 117-120, 129, 138.
167 Hauerwas, BH, 33. See also ibid., 62,
(e.g., Kant, the social gospeler, and Dorrien) or the nation-state (e.g., Hegel and Niebuhr). Since liberal theology is more amenable to non-theological liberalism, the liberal order can use an accommodated version of Christianity to secure peace.168

Hauerwas calls Constantinianism liberal theology’s apologetic and socially transformative project, because liberal theology yokes Christianity with state power in order to “make history come out right.”169 However, as Hauerwas is quick to note, liberal unity and progress have not led to more peace. Instead, liberal theology has historically been guilty of significant participation in US colonialism.170 For a long time liberal theology has mistakenly conflated redemption with “progressive process” and US violence.171 Even Niebuhr, despite his deep criticism of naive progressivism, argued for a progressive realist project that critically supported the state through translating Christian categories into liberal categories. But in doing so he inadvertently made the US his church, which blinded him so that he ultimately capitulated to US interests.

Constantinianism, then, is tantamount to taming Christianity with what Dietrich Bonhoeffer called “cheap grace.”172

168 Hauerwas, AN, 32-33; Hauerwas, DF, 214-215; Hauerwas, JGC, 139; Hauerwas, PK, 32-33, 58; Hauerwas, STT, 66, 194, 239-240; Hauerwas, WW, 182; Hauerwas, WwW, 23 n. 40; Hauerwas, BH, 25, 38, 234 n. 15, 278 n. 25; Hauerwas, DF, 98-104, 141-142; Hauerwas, WW, 44, 49, 54-58; Dorrien, EDE, 41-42, 44, 61-62; Dorrien, MALT, 2:435-436, 453-454, 479-480, 549, 551; Dorrien, SEM, 226, 244, 270-272, 278, 478; Hauerwas, AN, 30-31, 82 n. 19; Hauerwas, WW, 7, 17 n. 9; Dorrien, EDE, 4-5, 17, 19; Dorrien, MALT, 2:121-123, 522-523, 536-537; Dorrien, SEM, 246-248, 255-258, 279, 321; Dorrien, RCG, 39-40, 46-47; Dorrien, SS, 147-148, 150; Hauerwas, BH, 13-14, 93; Hauerwas, DF, 130; Dorrien, EDE, 18-19, 31; Dorrien, SEM, 244, 249-250, 263, 271, 674-676; Hauerwas, AN, 27-31, 131 n. 3; Hauerwas, BH, 94-99; Hauerwas, DF, 102; Dorrien, EDE, 251; Dorrien, SEM, chp. 4, pp. 675-683; Dorrien, “Theology in a Liberal, Post-Kantian, Postmodern Spirit,” 48; Hauerwas, AN, 111; Hauerwas, WW, 49-51, 53-54.

Dorrien is worth noting here also because Hauerwas describes Dorrien’s chapter on Niebuhr in SEM (chp. 4) as “definitive.” But what Hauerwas overlooks is that the SEM chapter takes much from Dorrien’s earlier work, specifically chp. 7 in MALT, 2. Hauerwas, WGU, new afterward (2013), 247 n. 4.

169 Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 87.

170 Hauerwas, WW, 194-195.

171 Hauerwas, WW, 33. See also ibid., 195.

Hauerwas’s rejection of Constantinianism is predicated on his hierarchical and relational account of truth. For him, living in God’s reign is about “truth and illusion” rather than, as the social gospelers emphasized, about whether or not God’s kingdom is “realized and unrealized.” The same pattern of contrast goes for Niebuhr and Hauerwas. The former was framed by what could be realized, even though he despised idealist kingdom language. But for Hauerwas, Niebuhr mistakenly confused sin and relevance for what truly creates and shapes humanity, thereby undercutting the church’s witness to the world. Contrary to Niebuhr, Hauerwas maintains that one cannot know that one is a sinner until it is revealed by Jesus. Since the church knows Jesus, the world only knows it is in sin if the church lives as a faithful witness to the truth.

Hauerwas’s ecclesiastical politics accordingly diverges from Niebuhr’s. The church’s embodiment of the truth, Hauerwas argues, challenges the US’s racial imagination, its capitalist mindset, and its foreign policy. Without embodying the distinctiveness and challenges of Christianity, US Christians become sentimental and cooperative US citizens in the pursuit of individual and national self-interests. The church, therefore, should not side with illusion by taking on the role of a “helpful, if sometimes complaining, prop for the state” as liberal theology does under the guise of gaining credibility, being effective, and/or achieving relevance. Instead, the church’s “first

SEM, 293, 478, 677; Dorrien, SS, 349-350; Hauerwas, AC, 40; Hauerwas, AN, 47 n. 22; Hauerwas, BH, 246 n. 4; Hauerwas, DF, 141-142; Hauerwas, WGU, 137-139; Hauerwas, WW, chp. 3. 173 Hauerwas, TT, 141. See also Hauerwas, AN, 108-110, 116-117, 120 n. 4, 196-197.
task” is to live truthfully together so that it can fulfill the “correlate,” confessional task of
telling the world about its sin and the better hope of Jesus.176

III. Dorrien’s Response to Hauerwas and Shift to Liberal Theology

Dorrien is nothing if not dialectical. This method produces a liberal theology that
is simultaneously continuous and discontinuous with contemporary liberal theology. His
dialectical position, therefore, makes possible a different engagement with Hauerwas and
liberal theology than is the norm. I will begin by situating Dorrien’s work as a response
to Hauerwas’s insights in both his constructive project and his critiques of liberal
theology. In doing so, I complicate not only Hauerwas’s critique of liberal theology
insofar as it concerns Dorrien, but also complicate Dorrien’s dated critique of Hauerwas.
These complications will initially show that Dorrien’s concern for faithfulness and
Hauerwas’s concern for justice differ because of their rival evaluations of liberalism.177

In the complications are, however, more important agreements and disagreements
that illuminate Dorrien’s concern for and understanding of truth. Hauerwas once
applauded Dorrien for seeing that translation to achieve relevance “is no longer tenable
and the issue finally is one of truth.”178 Nevertheless, as Dorrien notes, he and Hauerwas
offer “alternative” trajectories for post-Christendom, Protestant Christianity in the US.179

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176 Hauerwas, WAD, 68, 168. See also ibid., 170; Hauerwas, BH, chp. 13; Hauerwas, CC, 74; Hauerwas, DF, 112, 135; Hauerwas, HR,
533-534; Hauerwas, PF, 56; Hauerwas, PK, 46, 99-100; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 45-47; Hauerwas, STT, 164, 192; Hauerwas,
WWW, 57, 295. For the paragraph, see Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 143, 157-159; Hauerwas, STT, 239; Hauerwas, SU, 178.
177 For Dorrien’s explicit admission to a dialectical method, see Gary Dorrien, The Remaking of Evangelical Theology (Louisville,
178 Hauerwas, review of Soul in Society, 420. For the same statement in reference to Max Stackhouse, see Hauerwas, AC, 90.
179 Dorrien, SS, 360. In this case book titles and their publication date are particularly illuminating. Hauerwas’s After Christendom?
was originally published in 1991 and Dorrien’s Soul in Society in 1995; then a few years later, Dorrien’s The Word as True Myth was
Countermanding with equal vigor Hauerwas’s proclamation that liberal theology is incoherent, Dorrien declares that “the original idea of liberal theology is as relevant and coherent today as it was a hundred years ago.”¹⁸⁰ Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s disagreement ultimately concerns their differences over truth. In contrast to Hauerwas’s hierarchy of truth, Dorrien maintains a plurality of truths in a mutually informing pattern. In order to do so, Dorrien recovers underdeveloped and lost aspects of liberal theology, and he creatively incorporates non-liberal sources into his liberal theology.

This creative recovery means that Dorrien is not at the center of Hauerwas’s critique of liberal theology. Yet Dorrien’s shift to contemporary liberal theology does not entirely elude Hauerwas’s critiques either. In contrast to Hauerwas’s argument that liberal theology has demythologized itself into irrelevance, Dorrien provides a re-mythologized vision through a mutual interplay of multiple truths. But between what Hauerwas critiques and what Dorrien supplies, there is enough agreement and difference that the calcified outer layers of normal discussion are cracked open. Through the crack, at the end of this chapter, we can move into deeper depths crucial to reach the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement. Their different accounts of relational truth are rival understandings of reality, not simply differences over liberal re-mythologization or the church-world relation.

*Dorrien’s Agreement with and Critique of Hauerwas, and Complications Therein*

Dorrien’s dialectical method roots both his appreciation and his critique of Hauerwas’s project. Hauerwas’s criticisms of liberal theology have not gone unheeded.

Dorrien dethrones and replaces liberal theology’s longstanding impulse to pursue success and to prioritize integration with the powers that be.

In a critical mode he effectively avoids some hallmarks of Constantinianism. He eschews the endeavor to control history as he maintains that the contemporary church is a “partial manifestation” of the eschatological kingdom. Like Hauerwas, Dorrien proclaims that “success’ is not a theological category,” and he critiques the concern for credibility that underwrites success. For the same reasons and with words very similar to Hauerwas, Dorrien critiques R. Niebuhr’s project of translating Christianity into the idioms of secular society. “If the meaning of Christian faith can be translated into secular terms, why bother with Christianity? Niebuhr’s strategy left progressive Christianity without enough to say or do in its own language, in its own way, and for its own reasons.” Like Hauerwas, Dorrien observes that Protestant US Christianity’s mainline withered dramatically as it was ordered by loyalties to nationalism and to relevance concerns as the assumed cultural Christendom declined. So Dorrien shares Hauerwas’s worry about US Christianity conflating itself with “liberal political arrangements.” For them, political relevance or social credibility ought not drive Christianity, lest it become unfaithful. The question is, how is one to be faithful?

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183 Dorrien, SEM, 677. See also Dorrien, SS, 348-349, 352; Hauerwas, AN, 25, 38. David Hollinger notices both Dorrien, as “the most persuasive analyst of Niebuhr's contributions to Protestant theology,” and Dorrien’s critical analysis, in particular the point above. David A. Hollinger, After Cloven Tongues of Fire: Protestant Liberalism in Modern American History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 219-220.
184 Hauerwas, CSCH, 148. See also Dorrien, SS, 83.
185 Dorrien, EDE, 4-5, 43-45, 60, 62-64, 361; Dorrien, SEM, 288, 676-677, 680-683; Dorrien, SS, 349-350, 366; Dorrien, WTM, 70-72; Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 52; Hauerwas, AE, 91; Hauerwas, AN, chp. 2; Hauerwas, DF, chp. 4.
Dorrien’s constructive answer first parallels and then breaks from Hauerwas. Instead of success and credibility, Dorrien argues that liberal theology should not only be “prophetic,” but also be “counter-cultural.”\textsuperscript{186} But rather than give up on liberal theology as Hauerwas advocates, Dorrien asserts that liberal theology must uphold counter-cultural values because the mission of “progressive Christianity” today “is to hold out for the possibility of a divine good that is too religious for our secular friends and even more alien to many American Christians.”\textsuperscript{187} This pattern of Dorrien paralleling and breaking from Hauerwas continues into issues on which the typical social justice versus faithfulness narrative dwells. However, the pattern also shows the poverty of that narrative insofar as it relates to Dorrien. On the basis of the social gospel’s kingdom theology, he has granted that, “as Hauerwas remarks, the church in the biblical understanding is a social ethic.”\textsuperscript{188} Dorrien then challenges Hauerwas to be more faithful based on the theological commonality Dorrien identifies. To proclaim that the church is a social ethic “cannot mean that the biblical command to create a just social order is relativized, since the ethic of the kingdom requires action that struggles for justice for the poor. In Scripture, the crucial sign of the presence of the kingdom is that justice is brought to the poor and oppressed.”\textsuperscript{189} Dorrien argues further for obedient witness to “the biblical imperative to pour yourself out for the hungry and satisfy the desires of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{186} Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 22.
\item \textsuperscript{187} Ibid. See also Dorrien, “Theology in a Liberal, Post-Kantian, Postmodern Spirit,” 48-49.
\item \textsuperscript{188} Dorrien, SS, 371; Gary Dorrien, “Communitarianism, Christian Realism, and the Crisis of Progressive Christianity,” 376. Emphasis original. See also Dorrien, SS, 83.
\item \textsuperscript{189} Dorrien, SS, 371; Dorrien, “Communitarianism, Christian Realism, and the Crisis of Progressive Christianity,” 376. See also Dorrien, SEM, 486; Dorrien, SS, 357-358, and esp. 375: “The social ethic of the way of Christ is an ethic of faithfulness to the prophetic biblical ideals of freedom, equality, community, and redemptive love.”
\end{itemize}
afflicted.”¹⁹⁰ These statements indicate Dorrien’s understanding of how to be faithful even as they serve his critique of Hauerwas.¹⁹¹

The issue of social justice is Dorrien’s first of three critiques directed at Hauerwas published in 1995 and 1997. Dorrien argued that Hauerwas’s “polemic against social justice politics [is] unbiblical and ethically unacceptable, and…he [has] wrongly disparaged the social ethical concern for the ‘right ordering of the world.’”¹⁹² The deeper, second criticism is that Hauerwas’s work creates “isolation” from “a moral responsibility to work with non-Christians to create a just social order in a pagan world.”¹⁹³ The third critique underlies Dorrien’s charge of isolation. “Hauerwas’s version of a kingdom ethic” maintains a “sharp dichotomy” between church and world that unbiblically “strips Christianity of much of its social meaning.”¹⁹⁴

These critiques reflect Dorrien’s continuing concerns. But his 1995 critique was overstated even then. Hauerwas affirmed that “the church must pursue societal justice”;

¹⁹¹ Dorrien, SS, 374-375.
¹⁹² Dorrien, SEM, 486. See also ibid, 487; Dorrien, SS, 357-359; Dorrien, “Communitarianism, Christian Realism, and the Crisis of Progressive Christianity,” 376; Dorrien, “Unintended Aid.”
¹⁹⁴ Dorrien, SS, 356, 359; Dorrien, SEM, 486. Dorrien’s charge of isolation parallels criticisms of Hauerwas made by Gustafson, Michael Dyson, Albrecht, and Stout. Dorrien notes his similarity with Albrecht and Stout (SEM, 486–487). What similarity there is between Gustafson and Dorrien is that the latter only employs the term “quasi-sectarian” once and apart from his main critique of Hauerwas nearly 350 pages later (SS, 18, 351-360, 371-372, 374). Later Dorrien does use the term “sectarian” in quotes in the description that “Hauerwas burnedished his own credentials as a dissenter by playing up the ‘sectarian’ aspects of Yoder’s stance” (SEM, 473). Dorrien also uses “isolated” to frame Gustafson’s critique of Hauerwas (SEM, 482). But like Dorrien careful account of Hauerwas in Social Ethics in the Making, Dorrien’s critical charge is a more sophisticated internal critique of Hauerwas’s work up to 1995. Dorrien acknowledges that Hauerwas “shares more with activist strains of the Mennonite and Brethren traditions,” and that his ecclesial witness “does not withdraw from the world” (SS, 359). Dorrien’s attention here reflects Hauerwas’s own rejection that his work is about withdrawal from the world (Hauerwas, CET, 6). Even before 1995 Dorrien seemed to suggest that the charge of sectarianism does not fit in his review of Hauerwas’s Against the Nations. Gustafson, “The Sectarian Temptation”; Michael Dyson, Reflecting Black: African-American Cultural Criticism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 287; Albrecht, The Character of Our Communities; Stout, Democracy and Tradition; Gary Dorrien, “Post-Liberal, Post-Nuclear,” review of Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society, by Stanley Hauerwas, Sojourners, Jun. 1987.

For secondary accounts addressing the critiques by Gustafson, Albrecht, and/or Stout, see Kallenberg, Ethics as Grammar, chp. 4; Debra Dean Murphy, “Community, Character, and Gender: Women and the Work of Stanley Hauerwas,” Scottish Journal of Theology 55, no. 3 (2002); Rasmussen, The Church as Polis, chp. 11; Ryan, The Politics of Practical Reason, chp. 4; Samuel Wells, Transforming Fate into Destiny: The Theological Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 1998), 68-73.
his concern was that social justice as abstraction would circumvent discipleship.\(^{195}\) For Hauerwas, back then the issue of social justice was about priority. All proper calls to the world for justice are predicated on \textit{first} a faithful community embodying God’s justice, which is a polity faithful to the politics of God’s kingdom. This framework Hauerwas has since solidified and developed by arguing that Jesus is God’s justice, that justice is righteousness-reconciliation, and that the church is the embodiment of Jesus’s reconciling work. Because of God’s reconciling Word to human beings, the latter can become friends of one another and of God. Thereby reconciliation serves the proleptic, partial embodiment of transfiguring \textit{theosis} in contrast to a sinful world.\(^{196}\)

There are still significant differences between Dorrien and Hauerwas here, in particular regarding the use of the prophets for supporting liberal justice. But Hauerwas’s biblical account of justice is not only relational, it is also solidaristic in the best way possible. Friendship is the increasing sharing with one another, and reconciliation for

\(^{195}\) Hauerwas, \textit{PK}, 113. See also ibid., 105, 112, 114.


Two issues are raised above that require explanation. First, Dorrien narrates Hauerwas’s development in light of Stout’s criticism in \textit{Democracy and Tradition} and Hauerwas’s turn to radical democracy (\textit{SEM}, 487-488). Presumably due to how going from a final manuscript to publication takes time, Dorrien’s 2009 account relies on Hauerwas’s \textit{The State of the University} (chap. 10) published in 2007 rather than Hauerwas’s book with Romand Coles (\textit{CDRO}) published in 2008. Dorrien is also to be forgiven missing that Hauerwas notes his affinity for radical democrats as early as 1970 since that was not well developed in such terms until 2007. The end of chapter three and the much of chapter four is devoted to addressing radical democracy. Hauerwas’s \textit{“Politics, Vision, and the Common Good”} (1970) was reprinted in \textit{V\textsc{V}} (1974), see esp. 224-225, 236 n. 31, 239.

Second, Hauerwas tends to shy away from the word transfiguration in \textit{The Peaceable Kingdom}, using only transformation. I use the word transfiguration here because, first, he uses it, albeit rarely and normally through quotes of others, in reference to the church: Hauerwas, \textit{BH}, 124; Hauerwas, \textit{PF}, 107; Stanley Hauerwas, \textit{Without Apology: Sermons for Christ’s Church} (New York: Seabury, 2013), 90 (hereafter \textit{WoAp}). In \textit{BH} Hauerwas is quoting Robert W. Jenson, \textit{Systematic Theology}, vol. 2, \textit{The Works of God} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 296; in \textit{PF} Hauerwas is quoting Nicholas Lash, \textit{Believing in Three Ways in One God: A \textit{Reading of the Apostles’ Creed}} (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 111. Second, transfiguration can be connected \textit{theosis} because those uses of transfiguration can be connected to time, to resurrection, to Pentecost, to new creation (or perfection), and to friendship with God elsewhere in Hauerwas’s work (\textit{BH}, 183; \textit{PK}, 99, 107; \textit{CET}, 51; \textit{CDRO}, 230; \textit{WoAp}, chp. 12; \textit{WAD}, 104-105). There is a distinction to make between transformation and transfiguration—the former a general category and the latter an ambitious change that is at the same time, transformation and more, a material change. Hauerwas is largely careful to keep the distinction as he opts for the word transformation throughout the corpus of his work, but there is some blurring of the boundaries. This matches well with his proclivity to stress, within the already-not-yet character of God’s kingdom, that God’s reign is present and changes humanity right now. It is not entirely opaque today, nor is it relegated to an intangible, future hope for the recreation of humanity at the end history. The result of God’s economy is that human time is “transfigured, rather than evade[d]” in the gift of God’s time (Hauerwas, \textit{PF}, 99. Also see ibid., 105.).
friendship includes “living with” and “suffering with” the handicapped, the elderly, the infirm, and the poor. This much Dorrien could appreciate considering that his emphasis on solidarity informs and shifts his understanding of liberal justice. So the difference between Dorrien and Hauerwas is not the pursuit of justice. Even their disagreement over what justice is and how it is achieved is not so simple.

Rather, on the level of social justice, the issue is their different evaluation of Christianity’s participation in political liberalism. For Hauerwas, forgiveness and friendship require love, truth, mutual vulnerability, time, remembrance, patience, constancy, and obedience. They make possible the difficult, confrontational work of reconciliation necessary to truly be friends in God’s peace; the alternative is to risk succumbing to the false appearance of friendship and to peace secured by violence and oppression. Hauerwas notes that the requirements and vision of reconciliation are similarly found in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. However, he concludes that such work appears “far too demanding,” and that remembrance is “a deeply illiberal idea.” Reconciliation exists for the common good and “resist[s]...
injustice” only through a true healing work rather than through the procedures of liberal justice. Hauerwas’s development here, as well as his more recent work that I will address later, meets Dorrien’s 1997 comment. He grants that Hauerwas’s work contains “considerable promise” for openness to “working with non-Christians to create a more just social order.” Thus there is warrant for Hauerwas’s gentle rejection of Dorrien’s critique of isolation.

But as they both noted, “the question is…how” Christianity, Hauerwas emphasizing its “distinctiveness” and Dorrien stressing the connection to society, contributes to a just social order. Dorrien affirms the importance of love, remembrance, community, and stubbornness—the latter implying patience and time—to achieve justice. However, his project for politically realizing justice through liberalism co-inheres with liberal theology’s legacy. The social gospelers’ articulated Christian language in terms of morality and democracy in order to bridge the gap between Christian language and secular idioms. R. Niebuhr crossed the bridge and then destroyed it when he led a generation to reject the social gospelers’ idealistic moralizing. Dorrien wants to carefully reconstruct the bridge. He does not want to ignore Niebuhr’s insights about human sin, democracy, and equality. However, Dorrien also relativizes Niebuhr’s

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200 Hauerwas, *CET*, 96. See also ibid, 92-93; Hauerwas, *PF*, 60, 229-230.
201 Dorrien, “Communitarianism, Christian Realism, and the Crisis of Progressive Christianity,” 378 n. 1. See also Hauerwas, *PF*, 229 and the last sentence of n. 28.
thin theology and nationalist politics with the social gospelers’ thicker, idealist understanding of Christianity’s moral presence in the local society and the international community for the common good. Accordingly, Dorrien’s affinity for the social gospelers’ understanding of morality maintains some translating of Christian ideals into public morality (“enough common moral ground to make an intelligible appeal to those who are not already converted”) as part of creating a just social order.204

So Dorrien is vulnerable to Hauerwas’s critique of liberal theology presuming the importance of morality. But remember Dorrien’s dialectical method. He is still attentive to the problems of invisibility, of functional atheism, and of capitulation to the status quo created by translation. The reason for his attention is not answerable in the bare fact that he and Hauerwas agree over the importance of the question about how Christianity should contribute to a just social order. Rather, they both notice that the question as a speech-act raises the deeper issue of truth.

Hauerwas argues that theological accommodation to modernist epistemology and progressive politics is dangerous even concerning those, like Dorrien, who emphasize society, the prophetic, economic justice, and equality. For Hauerwas, even critical accommodation “avoid[s] questions of truth” in order to achieve autonomy and political

expediency. 205 He argues that truth was pushed aside in the pursuit of justice by theological movements from the social gospel to liberation theologies. The neglect of truth goes hand in hand with theological reduction or narrowness. The social gospel reduces Christianity to morality while liberation theology narrows Christianity to the oppressor-oppressed dynamic. 206

205 Hauerwas, AC, 90. See also Hauerwas, CET, 161; Hauerwas, WW, 2; Stanley Hauerwas, "The End of American Protestantism," ABC Religion and Ethics, Jul. 2, 2013, http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/07/02/3794561.htm, in light of the whole article see especially the last few paragraphs. The argument of this article parallels, but should not be confused with "The End of Protestantism" in AE, 87-97.


Hauerwas appreciates the connection between theology and politics by Gustavo Gutiérrez, José Segundo, and Jon Sobrino. Hauerwas is simply concerned with how to connect theology and politics, worrying for instance, about Gutiérrez’s three types of liberation (liberation from oppression in politics/economics, in the individual’s psyche, and in relation, which is liberation from sin for relation with God and humanity) capitulating to political liberalism. That capitulation, which I will briefly note later, is linked for Hauerwas to his equally central and less qualified critique of liberation theology, that it is too narrow (which by the way, he also once leveled at political theology). However, there are of course qualifications concerning liberation theologies. Some of his criticisms of them, beginning with the issue of narrowness in terms of truth, have not always been on the mark, or were at least quickly proven wrong. Emilie Townes’s defense of liberation theology over truth in “Ethics in Our Time” also defends implicitly against Hauerwas’s claims in "The Ethicist as Theologian." In the latter Hauerwas wrote: "The rhetoric of ‘liberation theology’ often makes it appear that the goal of the Christian life is to free us of all limits. That theology’s proponents fail to discern that the gospel does not free us of all limits but rather provides us with the skills to embody our limits in nondestructive ways. ‘Liberation theology’ tends to become a theology without the cross. This kind of point is hard to make, of course, without appearing to be in bad faith, since the church has become the church of the strong” (412). That was in 1975, the very year that James Cone published God of the Oppressed, in which linking not homoousia but black experience to the cross was crucial to Cone’s arguments. But for the sake of argument, even if Dorrien was long ago correct, both in his interpretation of Cone as countermarching redemptive suffering in the cross and, in turn, Dorrien’s use of Juan Luis Segundo to correctly critique Cone, Dorrien would be the first in line now to note Cone’s recent The Cross and the Lynching Tree. Similarly, besides even Hauerwas’s acknowledgement of Gutiérrez’s development, some of Hauerwas’s criticisms of liberation theology are now quite dated concerning Gutiérrez. This much David Kamitsuka notes too as he defends Gutiérrez’s more mature work from Hauerwas’s earlier criticisms, and as Kamitsuka draws parallels between Gutiérrez’s and Hauerwas’s work on faithfulness and truth in their respective contexts. Arthur McGovern also clarifies the issue of truth concerning Gutiérrez in terms of praxis. Taking that a step further, Bretherton shows the similarity of Hauerwas’s emphasis on practical reasoning with Gutiérrez’s construal of orthopraxy, as well as those respective positions connected to orthodoxy. Given the importance of practical reasoning in an oppressive context, Hauerwas’s critique on the limitation of the liberation metaphor should be significantly qualified. But he does have a point for Kamitsuka, who agrees with Hauerwas’s concern about liberation as the only or primary metaphor. There are of course developments by those like Mary Grey who recognizes the limitation of liberation alone, and accordingly there has been more recent expansions or additions. So in terms of theology, the very best liberation theologians are not adequately described by many of Hauerwas’s dated critiques that may have been true at one point. However, Hauerwas and Dorrien’s largely old critiques still ring true concerning the theological milieu. For instance, Joerg Rieger admits that he and his co-authors lacked attention to churches in Beyond the Spirit of Empire.

Hauerwas’s contention concerning truth may seem to contradict Dorrien’s deep sympathy for the social gospelers’ thick morality and liberation theologies’ concerns. (The latter will be developed below.) But Dorrien also agrees that for a century liberal and liberation theologies, in general, have almost entirely pushed aside truth in favor of pursuing justice. He observes that “since the generation of Rauschenbusch and Mathews” liberal theology “has often downplayed the question of religious truth” in order to democratize and translate religious experience for the wholesale pursuit of justice. This shift has led liberal theology to lose its spiritual ground—the “confessional center” of its “transcendental, biblical voice”—and the “spiritual power” of its “spiritual conviction about God’s holy and gracious presence, the way of Christ, and the transformative mission of Christianity.” Liberal theology was already long on moral idealism and short on spiritual conviction before the waning of evangelical liberalism and personalism, and the waxing of process and liberation theologies in the 1960s and 70s. To make matters worse, the new theological configuration’s moral ideals did not, on the whole, sufficiently develop sacred myth’s truth as truth and its spiritual conviction in a way that would preach well in the US churches, on the whole. Rather, the neglect of truth and spiritual conviction had a concomitant narrowness that “reduce[d] Christian ethics to political or ideological causes.” As a result “progressive Christianity has not had

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207 Dorrien, SS, 373. See also ibid., 360-362; Dorrien, EDE, 360-361; Dorrien MALT 2:551; Gary Dorrien, “Not Dead Yet,” review of Reinventing Liberal Christianity, by Theo Hobson, Commonweal, Oct. 11, 2013, 27.


209 Dorrien, “Not Dead Yet,” 27. See also Dorrien, RCG, 118-120. There, interestingly enough, Dorrien’s charge of narrowness to ideology and sectarianism directed at Segundo could also extend to Hauerwas. In contrast to both Segundo’s narrowness and sectarianism, Dorrien defends Gutiérrez from both charges (Dorrien, RCG, 122).
enough to say or do in its own language, in its own way, and for its own reasons.”210

Dorrien concludes, then, that the century-long project has been detrimental to liberal theology, especially in contemporary society where belief in Jesus is no longer assumed. In other words, progressive Christianity has ironically isolated itself from the church and from society.211

210 Dorrien, “Not Dead Yet,” 27. See also Dorrien, SS, 366-367, 373.
211 Dorrien, MALT, 3-p. 8 and chp. 9; Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology”; Dorrien, MALT, 3:2, 8, 523, 529, 538; Dorrien, SS, 361; Dorrien, WTM, 191-199; Dorrien, SS, 247; Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology,” 472-473; Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 13, 17, 20-21; Dorrien, MALT, 2:551; Dorrien, SS, 373; Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology,” 478. The concluding sentence of the paragraph is an extension of Hauerwas’s reversal of the isolationist critique, which can also be seen in Dorrien’s own work. Hauerwas, review of Soul in Society, 420; Dorrien, SS, 360-367.

Dorrien does give a qualification that explicitly recognizes the first generation and implicitly later developments: “With the partial exception of feminist theology, none of [the liberationist and postmodernist] movements gave much attention at first to the problems of interpreting myth and the sacred” (Dorrien, WTM, 197). Prior to that claim and partly in contradiction to it, Dorrien not only summarizes a chapter on Gutiérrez as him “ultimately preoccupied with the recollection of Christ in the spiritual struggles of the expected” (RCG, 126). Dorrien also spends time on the influence of scripture for James Cone as he emerged from his Barthianism (SS, 243-245), which Dorrien prefaces briefly with Cone’s The Spirituals and the Blues (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1991). Dorrien then concludes that chapter with a pitch for liberative liberal theology by way of the same first-wave feminists of liberal theology that he pointed to in the quote above, and by way of a quote of Gutiérrez that parallels Dorrien’s summary of him in the quote above (SS, 263-281).

There are a few points to note here. First, Dorrien’s argument would have been enriched if he had reckoned with Gustavo Gutiérrez’s The Truth Shall Make You Free: Confrontations, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1990); however, I have not been able to find Dorrien ever mentioning it, much less engaging it. Dorrien’s Reconstructing the Common Good may be excused since it was published in the same year by Orbis as Gutiérrez’s English translation was published by Orbis. But Dorrien’s Soul in Society, that notes the languishing of truth and takes a cue from Gutiérrez on reviving the social gospel in US Christianity (360), does not quite follow through on Gutiérrez’s account of truth.

Second, as I will show later, Dorrien’s perspectivism is too broad for the contextual-communal confines of Cone’s work on scripture and economics, even after he shrugged off sympathy for Barthian revelation (SS, 244, 248; KRHS, 402-409; RCG, 161-164; EDE, 308-309). On the issue of black theology and liberation here, I suspect that Dorrien falls much in line with J. Deotis Roberts since Dorrien’s account of Roberts’s own position and of his agreement with Cone fits so many of Dorrien’s hallmarks that will be addressed in this chapter and the next (MALT, 2:166-172). That account may qualify the quote from Dorrien above about no “attention at first…to…myth and the sacred.” However, to what extent Roberts is formally a liberationist is not quite clear, and in fact perhaps not quite the case, since “Roberts identified with theological liberalism” whereas “the black theology movement of the 1970s and beyond mostly did not” (ibid., 173). So in some respect on the issue of true sacred myth, Dorrien seems to be judging black liberation theologies on his own terms rather than theirs. While in The Spirituals and the Blues Cone accepts the historical separation of the spirituals and the blues in terms of pre- and post-civil war consciousness respectively without quite bringing the spirituals to the present, and while he differentiates the spirituals and the blues in terms of sacred and “secular spiritual[s]”: respectively, they are theologically linked by what is functionally a kind of embodied personalism (100). That is, in the face of oppression, both “affirm the someworldliness of black people, and they preserve the worth of black humanity through ritual and drama” (ibid., 105). That “experience” is not only “the Truth” (ibid., 106); the experience is an experience of the truth, of its sustaining and transforming power, even if the latter is delayed. Such experience is not simply how Dorrien understands myth, it is how Dorrien understands humanity’s encounter with God’s Spirit moving mysteriously—not always seen or even strictly in reference to scripture, although the latter is normative for Dorrien (WTM, 238-239). So in Dorrien’s terms that I will define and use later, the spirituals and the blues correlate respectively with the evangelical (gospel faith) and modernist (Enlightenment rationality) heritages of liberal theology. But whereas Dorrien already had the benefit of the social gospelers’ fusing the two heritages, Cone had to construct his Martin-Malcolm duality after he cleared the ground for black resources, like the spirituals and the blues, from the incursion of white sources. In effect, on Dorrien’s terms, Cone continued his work on the basis of living the sacred myth.

Third, more recently, work such as Bryan N. Massingale’s Racial Justice and the Catholic Church (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2010) is not only marked by Gutiérrez’s and Cone’s influence, but also stresses the importance of both the black experiential truth and theological—including even liturgical and doctrinal—truth (chps. 2-3). However, at the same time, the fact that Massingale’s book was ground-breaking for US Catholicism does indicate how little an affect liberation theology has had in many US churches. So as I noted earlier in terms of both Hauerwas and Dorrien, they may have once been and may still be more correct than not about the theological milieu. But there are individuals who break the mold at the very least, and there has been some important development. Dorrien may even contribute further to the latter with his forthcoming second volume on the black social gospel, since it will give a
How can Dorrien assume the importance of a thick morality and deeply critique it at the same time? Again the answer is a dialectic. Vital for Dorrien “is whether or not progressive Christians have a passionate, clear, convictional spirit. The question cuts two ways, in terms of spiritual conviction and the ethical imperative of struggling for social justice, but they go together, each being indispensable to the other.”

The issue for Dorrien is to recover liberal theology’s “spiritual conviction,” its spiritual ground in truth. Here his agreement with Hauerwas concerning the importance of truth turns into a complicated disagreement over the ancient question, what is the truth?

*Truth in Perspectivism and Plurality*

Dorrien once described his understanding of truth as “perspectivist and pluralist” rather than either “absolutist” or “relativist.” The latter two are opposing extremes. Absolutism maintains that “universal truths” can be perceived and have purchase on the perceiver apart from any “historical or cultural context.” Relativism rejects absolutism’s universal truths, and it holds that truths are limited to “the particular assumptions and contexts from which they derive.” Perspectivism drives in-between absolutism and relativism. Positively, perspectivism affirms the importance of both universal truth socio-historical contexts. Negatively, perspectivism qualifies the absolutists’ anthropological hubris and “relativizes the relativizers” ironic universal claim about relativity.

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full-orbed portrait of Martin Luther King, Jr. The account would be much more complete and detailed than either Dorrien gave in *SEM* or *MALT*, 3.


Dorrien, *SS*, 17.

Ibid., 17.

Ibid., 17.

Ibid., 17. See also Dorrien, *RCG*, 161.
Dorrien has not revisited perspectivism as a term since 1995, but his successive work employs a perspectivist framework that can be described as a relational non-foundationalism. So like Hauerwas, Dorrien gives a relational account of truth. In fact, Dorrien claims that Hauerwas holds to perspectivism, or as Hauerwas calls it, a “soft-perspectivism.” But there are two complications in terms of their relation to one another over perspectivism/non-foundationalism.

First, Dorrien’s perspectivism/non-foundationalism places him partly out of the realm of Hauerwas’s critiques of liberal theology and philosophical liberalism, which have been directed largely at foundationalism. Part of Dorrien’s perspectivism/non-foundationalism, I show below, is informed by Hegel and Karl Barth. But despite my occasional injection of Hegel above, Hauerwas largely avoids explicit engagement with the post-Kantians, rarely mentions Hegel in particular, and attributes as much significance to Kant as possible. Dorrien acknowledges that Kant is vital. Dorrien also admits that “of the five main traditions of German liberal theology...Hegel has been the smallest, by far, in the United States.” So Hauerwas’s critiques are not necessarily misguided considering his US audience. Nevertheless, Dorrien contends that Hegel provided the philosophical ground, directly or indirectly, for the greatest developments in the following centuries. Dorrien further argues that Hegel not only fulfills and supersedes Kant, but also that Hegel is more promising for liberalism than Schleiermacher because

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219 Dorrien, EDE, x-xii, 258, 303; Dorrien, KRHS, 12, 272, 565-567; Dorrien, MALT, 3:2-8; Dorrien, SEM, 674; Dorrien, WTM, 198.
Hegel reclaimed speculative reasoning to develop accounts of reason, social subjectivity, and a dynamic, panentheist *Geist.*

Hauerwas misses Dorrien’s argument because, from Dorrien’s position, Hauerwas commits Karl Barth’s mistake of focusing on Schleiermacher but not taking seriously enough the Hegelian vein of liberal theology. Accordingly, Hauerwas critically accepts George Lindbeck’s characterization of theological liberalism as “experiential-expressivist,” while Dorrien rejects that formulation as too narrow. So, from Dorrien’s position, Hauerwas does not fully appreciate social subjectivity within liberalism. Liberalism and liberal theology is not always individualist. But since the post-Kantians are both indebted to Kant and break from Kant, some critiques of Kant can be viable critiques of the post-Kantians. To that critical end and to put Hauerwas and Dorrien in more interactive conversation, below I will on occasion extend lines of critique from Hauerwas’s criticisms noted above without belaboring the point.

Second, Dorrien claimed that his and Hauerwas’s perspectivist positions differed since Dorrien is “open-ended,” vulnerable to “outside criticism,” whereas Hauerwas is not. I will address Dorrien’s critique of Hauerwas later. Here Dorrien’s openness is the concern. Dorrien uses the term “spiritual center” to describe a cluster of convictions that

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224 Dorrien, *SS,* 18.
“provide...whatever sense of meaning, coherence, or direction one possesses.” His spiritual center is “a gospel-centered theology of personal spirit” that is attentive to liberation. This center is built on a plurality of truths. Both are framed by Dorrien’s account of liberal theology as a relational dialectic, so I begin with the dialectic. It establishes that, for Dorrien, the relations between multiple truths are much more mutual and therefore flatter than Hauerwas’s hierarchy of truth.

*The Two Heritages of Liberal Theology, and Dorrien’s Relational Dialectic*

Recall that liberal theology mediates between the two poles of over-belief and disbelief by internalizing sacred and the secular resources in a mutually informing interplay. Somewhat following convention, Dorrien categorizes these two resources as “two heritages.” Broadly construed the first heritage is “evangelical,” focusing on transcendence, and the second is “modernist,” focusing on immanence. The evangelical heritage’s role is to keep liberal theology Christian. Evangelical “affirm[s] a personal transcendent God, the authority of Christian experience, the divinity of Christ, the need of personal redemption, and the importance of Christian missions.” The modernist heritage corresponds to the secular worldview that began in the middle

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227 For Dorrien’s openness as the concern, see Dorrien, *RCG*, 161.


229 Dorrien, *MALT*, 2:10-11. Others have called these categories “transcendental” and “naturalist,” but the issue is still the same (ibid., 13).

230 Ibid., 11.
enlightenment. Modernist “emphasize[s] the authority of modern knowledge, affirm[s] the continuity between reason and revelation, champion[s] the values of humanistic individualism and democracy, and usually distrust[s] metaphysical reason.”  

For Dorrien, the two heritages allows liberal theology to retain Christian belief and reconfigure it according to “a modern philosophical and/or scientific worldview that satisfies modern tests of credible belief.”  

That way, Dorrien argues, the best of liberal theology answers “challenges to belief and deal[s] with them as creatively and faithfully as possible.” But recall Hauerwas’s contention that liberal theology and Dorrien in particular are trapped in a “double mind.” Dorrien admits that there is a dialectical tension between the evangelical concern for “essential continuity with the historic Christian tradition” and modernist “discontinuit[y].” So if one is to be faithful to both seemingly contradictory heritages, how should they be related? Dorrien argues that historically both “broad theological tendencies” (heritages) in liberal theology were built on the union of faith with human freedom (human reason and experience). And both heritages articulated the fusion in both secular and sacred terms that mixed both heritages. Dorrien’s own work follows suit. He resolves the tension between the two

231 Ibid., 10-11. The modernist heritage, which Dorrien also calls the “enlightenment heritage,” is rooted specifically in the middle to late enlightenment of Germany, England, and Scotland (Dorrien, MALT, 1:xvi-xvii; Dorrien, KRHS, 1).

Dorrien’s relational dialectic can be placed within his three tiered definition of liberal theology. He resists making any one principle or dichotomy the defining feature because any “single issue” is reductive (“Modernisms in Theology,” 216). So for him, there are “two factors” that “define” liberal theology: “the authority principle and the principle of integrative mediation” (“The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 3). The former, autonomy in the first layer, was noted above. It is about privileging autonomy while resisting external authority and overt revelation. The latter, mediation in the second layer, was noted as well, but was underdeveloped. Dorrien’s relational dialectic addressed in this section develops the second layer.

232 Dorrien, MALT, 2:15.


234 Hauerwas, review of Soul in Society, 420.

235 Dorrien, MALT, 2:14. See also ibid., 548-549.

236 Ibid., 15. See also ibid., 531-534; Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 5. Dorrien’s nuancing and uniting of the two heritages, in contrast to other works in the field, has been affirmed and employed by Evans, Liberalism without Illusions, pp. 6, 14, and chp. 2.
heritages by situating them in mutual interrelation rather than in opposition. As much as liberal theology pulls from divergent worldviews, it does so through its own consciousness—the second layer axiom in the definition of liberal theology—that takes ownership of the gospel, reason, and experience for its own vision.237

That is Dorrien displaying the historical and theological acumen for which he is rightly, deeply respected. Yet since Dorrien has been received as an historian, his own constructive interrelation of the heritages goes largely unnoticed. Accordingly, the significant value and originality of his work has been missed. Dorrien’s dialectical proclivity united with his historical bent has indeed produced very good historical works. But they are also the ground for his constructive theological contribution that goes beyond the limits of historiography. Dorrien’s historical narratives of liberal theology’s relational dialectic are for guiding the present. He critically evaluates and recovers the promising aspects of the two heritages that sometime go unseen today.238

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238 For respect paid to Dorrien, see below. For the rest of paragraph, see Dorrien, WTM, 9; Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 51; Evans, Liberalism without Illusions, 121; Dorrien, WTM, 9. Dorrien’s critical recovery is similar to the Hauerwas’s observation about Charles Taylor and Oliver O’Donovan as doing “project[s] of retrieval and ‘re-membering’” for constructive work today (WW, 203). As for Dorrien’s voice, sometimes his critical historical retrieval can be quite subtle or is most clear in the preface of a volume or at the end of a volume or article. But retrieval is nonetheless shot through all of his work—like his focus on evaluating a figure’s position in light of liberationist concerns (race, gender, etc.). Dorrien, DSV, x; Dorrien, EDE essentially in its entirety; Dorrien, KRHS, ix, 3, 12-13, 542-549, 567; Dorrien, RCG, 13-15; Dorrien, SS, 19-20; Gary Dorrien, The Barthian Revolt in Modern Theology: Theology without Weapons (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000), 10, 165-166, 192-196 (hereafter BRMT); Gary Dorrien, The New Abolition: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Black Social Gospel (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), chp. 1 (hereafter NA); Dorrien, WTM, chp. 6; Dorrien, SEM, p. 5 and chp. 10; Dorrien, MALT, 1:xxiii-xxv, 2:9-10. Aside from liberationist concerns, Dorrien’s trilogy on American Liberal Theology is written for showing that liberal theology is still very much alive. Dorrien, MALT, 3:p. 8 and chp. 9; Gary Dorrien, “Not Dead Yet,” 25. For personalist theology that Dorrien thinks should be recovered, see Dorrien, MALT, 3:8, 535-539.

The following is a selection of sources that show deep respect for, and many lavish praise on, Dorrien’s scholarship. For Hauerwas’s attention to Dorrien’s work, see Hauerwas, BH, 233 n. 33; Hauerwas, WW, 17 n. 9; Hauerwas, WGU, 53 n. 27, 150 n. 22, 151 n. 24, 155 n. 32, and in the 2013 afterward, 247 n. 4; Hauerwas, review of Soul in Society, 418-421.

Dorrien’s mediation, then, has a *somewhat* different shape than mediation in contemporary liberal theology on the whole. On the one hand, the root of the tension between the evangelical and modernist heritages concerns Christian intelligibility.

Dorrien’s dialectical mediation between the heritages is precisely about being intelligible *in* the modern society at least partly on its terms. On the other hand, Dorrien is attempting to be faithful to the Christian truth of liberal theology in a context where contemporary liberal theology has languished precisely because crucial aspects of its past have been proportionally underplayed and forgotten, in particular Hegel and the evangelical heritage respectively.  

Within the frame of the two heritages united by a relational dialectic, I argue next, can be found what truths that Dorrien holds to, how each heritage supplies truth that are mutually informing for him, and what truths he incorporates that are outside the conventional bounds of liberal theology. The idealist concepts of spiritual truth, apophatic truth, re-mythologized truth, and relational truth from the modernist heritage

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239 Dorrien, *WTM*, 236; Dorrien, review of *Liberal Theology*, 541.
contribute to both the evangelical heritage’s and Dorrien’s spiritual and social idealism. Much of those truths can be attributed to the post-Kantians, but Dorrien also incorporates Barth. The evangelical heritage maintains not only the truth of God’s kingdom, but also the heritage is the site where liberal theology historically and Dorrien presently fuse the two heritages. That truth and fusion Dorrien attributes to the social gospel, which is very dear to him. Yet he also incorporates liberation theology in such a manner that I argue is initially a hierarchy of truth. Ultimately, however, his perspectivism leads him to situate liberative truth in mutuality with the social gospel.

*The Modernist Heritage, Apophatic Monism, and Relational Truth*

Kant’s transcendental, subjective idealism with objective and realist elements laid the ground for the post-Kantians’ objective, absolute, social, and transcendental religious idealisms that creatively configured religious experience, reason, and the divine. This post-Kantian version of the modernist heritage helped reconfigure the evangelical heritage into an idealist and social spirituality.²⁴⁰

Historically, liberal theology incorporated the modernist focus on reason and experience to the degree that eventually reason and experience were at least raised up to the level of scriptural authority and external authority was largely rejected. Doing so gave liberal theology not only more credibility in the eyes of liberalism, but also flexibility not allowed within the bounds of Christian tradition. The post-Kantians were crucial to the project, and for Dorrien, Hegel played a central role. Hegel’s rationalist method

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recovered truth in a way that both valued and went beyond the theological limitations of “picture thinking,” the facade of sensuous particularity that cannot sufficiently grasp universal truth.\textsuperscript{241} “Spiritual reality,” instead, “is the land of true explanation”; it is where humanity as spirit comes to know that Spirit (God) is love.\textsuperscript{242} In that framework are four truths vital to Dorrien which are worth explicitly noting now. Spiritual reality, or the category of spirit, is itself true because it describes three other truths: the (1) relation between God and humanity illuminates that (2) God is Spirit, and that (3) humanity is spirit. These truths of S/spirit are summed up in the term monism, the category of spirit is “a single underlying reality” to everything.\textsuperscript{243} Chapter two will focus on Spirit, spirit, and the character of their relation. Here the question, how Hegel could employ speculative reason to construct a monist account, requires some explanation considering Kant’s legacy and Dorrien’s critical sympathy for them. Out of the latter stems two of Dorrien’s truths and then a broader, relational account of truth.\textsuperscript{244}

\textsuperscript{241} Ibid., 195. See also ibid., 194, 220-221; Dorrien, \textit{MALT} 2:18. Hegel did not flat out reject pictures like Fredrick Strauss (Dorrien, \textit{KRHS}, 257).

\textsuperscript{242} Dorrien, \textit{MALT}, 3:52. See also ibid., 42; Dorrien, \textit{KRHS}, 220; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 49. The quote is technically from Nels F. S. Ferré leaning on the later Søren Kierkegaard. Nels F. S. Ferré, \textit{Christ and the Christian} (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), 126. However, as I will note later, Dorrien’s position comports with Ferré’s on the latter’s major themes, which is an unusual personalist variation on Hegelian divine Spirit and human spirit. As for the Kierkegaard-Hegel connection, see Dorrien, \textit{KRHS}, 278-279, 281-282 on Hegel-Climacus (Kierkegaard) that throws in relief all the more Kierkegaard’s “reject[ion]” of “idealist[ic] impulse, which he absolutilized” (ibid., 302-303).

\textsuperscript{243} Dorrien, \textit{KRHS}, 74.

\textsuperscript{244} Dorrien, “Modernisms in Theology,” 213; Dorrien, \textit{KRHS}, 2-4, 7-8, 10, 47-49, 91-94, 98-105, 107, 109, 115-119, 136-137, 145, 162-163, 211, 213, 216-221, 223, 225-226, 230-231, 343, 347, 379-386, 390, 418, 531-542. For clarity, it is important to note how I use and capitalize or lowercase Spirit, spirit, the category of spirit, the Holy Spirit, Whole, and whole. I capitalize “S” Spirit to denote the Whole or God when addressing Hegel, and to indicate God in terms of the category of spirit when addressing Dorrien. Lowercase “s” spirit stands for humanity. Sometimes Spirit is prefixed with divine and spirit with human because it seems prudent, particularly at the beginning of a sentence. As for particular phrases like the category of spirit and its variations, they are not about human spirit but the basic level of truth and reality for Dorrien’s monist idealism. When I use “S/spirit” I am indicating both divine Spirit and human spirit, but not the category of spirit because the part of the point about Spirit and spirit is about agency. My use of capitalization and phrases such as “category of spirit” follow Dorrien’s thought, even though he does not always capitalize and lowercase “S” to indicate God and humanity respectively. I do not adjust my quotes of Dorrien to fit my capitalizing and lowercasing scheme. I add “Holy” to Spirit when referencing or quoting Hauerwas and Williams in order to avoid confusing their understandings of the Holy Spirit with Dorrien’s Spirit. Like the issue of Spirit and spirit, Whole capitalized indicates the totality including in terms of Spirit, whereas whole lowercased denotes everything. Again, I do not change the capitalization in the quotes.
Hegel’s formula of Spirit relating to spirit is predicated on a form of reasoning called intellectual intuition, “a source of metaphysical knowledge about eternal forms.”

Dorrien grants that Kant was an enemy to both intellectual intuition and monism because he rejected that one can know the *noumena* and he privileged that “sensible intuition” can still access the *phenomena.* But Dorrien also argues that Kant, in the second and third critiques, still “appeared to authorize an understanding of appearances, sensibility, things-in-themselves, understanding, nature, and freedom as aspects of a single underlying reality.” This “opened the door” to “a Kantian basis for apophatic monism.” In this framework of granting and sublating Kant for an apophatic monism are two truths, first a negation and second a construction.

The first truth for Dorrien is what I will call an “apophatic reserve”: human views of the world and human knowledge of God are relativized and even negated on the basis of God’s ineffable mystery. This reserve cuts between Kant and Hegel. Like any apophatic theology, for Dorrien, human finitude cannot fully apprehend, much less comprehend, the infinite expanse of God. That truth of humanity’s incapacity in Dorrien’s apophaticism is the product of his liberal starting point, the axiomatic conviction that privileges human reason and experience over-against a *thick* and *positive* account of revelation. This assumption may appear Kantian, but Dorrien also wants to avoid the foundationalism of Kant’s rationality and the metaphysical limitations of his

245 Dorrien, *KRHS,* 536. See also ibid., 535.
246 Ibid., 47. See also ibid., 46.
247 Ibid., 74. See also ibid., 60-61, 535-536.
248 Ibid., 74. See also ibid., 535-536.
249 While the term “apophatic reserve” is partly of my own making, see Dorrien, *KRHS,* 565; Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 252, 270; Dorrien, “Idealism, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 46-47.
two-worlds framework. So Dorrien expresses his apophaticism in line with the early Hegel’s emphasis on negation in his dialectic. But rather than adopting a conventional left-wing or right-wing Hegelianism, Dorrien argues for theology’s importance as he mines the “critical principle that subverts its own pretensions to systemic completion.”

For Dorrien’s normative position “the negation of the negation” does not produce a full-orbed, *positive* account of Spirit, as in God. Otherwise Dorrien would succumb to a number of problems found in Hegel, chief among them being the later Hegel’s over-realization of mystery that is absolute Spirit. In other words, a violation of divine mystery is “idolatry” for Dorrien.

To avoid idolatry Dorrien takes his perspectivism seriously, incorporating a source that is outside the conventional bounds of liberal theology. Barth’s non-foundationalist, evangelical, and apophatic position—which Dorrien argues is more Hegelian than Barth admitted—Dorrien joins with his development of Hegel’s legacy in an apophatic reserve. Like Hauerwas, Dorrien appreciates Barth precisely for what Dorrien would call postmodern anti-foundationalism: Barth’s rejection of any method and any epistemology that over determines the truth. But whereas Hauerwas argues that Barth holds together both the apophatic and cataphatic in Jesus’s particularity, Dorrien merges his apophatic reserve with Barth’s rejection of method born from their resistance to “reduc[ing] God to an element of a system.” What can be said is that “revelation”—

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250 Dorrien, *KRHS*, 160. See also ibid., 12-13, 177.
251 Ibid., 229. See also ibid., 205-206; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 47.
252 For the quote, see Dorrien, *SS*, 17; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 47. See also Dorrien, *WTM*, 238. For the paragraph, see Dorrien, *KRHS*, 12-13, 229; Dorrien, *WTM*, 198; Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 252; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 47.
253 Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 260. See also Dorrien, *KRHS*, 563; Dorrien, *WTM*, 239; Hauerwas, *WGU*, 154, 156-170, 164 n. 50, 183-191, 199 n. 55, 200-204, 207, 216; Hauerwas, *WwW*, 80-83, 89. Of course Dorrien’s historical accounts of Barth’s work are not overrun by Dorrien’s creative appropriation of Barth. Even Hauerwas notes that Dorrien’s book on Barth is a great resource for
using the word as lightly as a liberal informed by Barthian would—is a “negation for a
negation.”\(^{254}\) The presence of God’s Word reveals the Word’s hiddenness that disabuses
humanity’s idolatrous presumptions: that humanity can definitively associate the Word
with any single, fleshy point, and that humanity can definitively speak in any way about
divine mystery other than that it is ultimately ineffable mystery known only “in and
through the movement of Spirit.”\(^{255}\) Or in another frame, Dorrien accepts Hegel’s account
of “relational Spirit” because it maintains the relation between God and humanity without
tying God’s self to the framework of being.\(^{256}\) So Dorrien creatively employs Barth in
order to avoid idolatry. But in order to secure the ineffability of divine mystery, Dorrien
holds to an apophatic reserve that pre-empts, and thereby relativizes or sometimes
negates, cataphatic claims about God.\(^{257}\)

Can Dorrien then say anything constructively positive about God? Yes, in the
second, constructive truth. Within Dorrien’s apophatic reserve, he affirms the importance
of “metaphysical audacity” since “faith is a form of daring.”\(^{258}\) Even though Dorrien is
for “radical immanence,” his understanding of it is not without spiritual and divine

\(^{254}\) Dorrien, \textit{BRMT}, 189; Dorrien, \textit{WTM}, 239.
\(^{255}\) Dorrien, \textit{WTM}, 239. See also Dorrien, \textit{BRMT}, 196.
\(^{256}\) Dorrien, \textit{KRHS}, 12.
\(^{257}\) Dorrien, \textit{SS}, 17-18; Dorrien, \textit{BRMT}, 189-196; Dorrien, \textit{KRHS}, 13, 500-502, 565-567; Dorrien, \textit{WTM}, 232, 236, 238-239; Dorrien,
216; Dorrien, \textit{WTM}, 239; Dorrien, \textit{BRMT}, 13, 186. For more on the issue of Barth, see, Dorrien, \textit{KRHS}, chp. 8 and pp. 272, 565-566;
\(^{258}\) Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 46.
transcendent remainders that desacralization denies.\textsuperscript{259} To this end, Dorrien, like Paul Tillich and R. Niebuhr, argues for the value of myth in contrast to many of their liberal forbears. Dorrien’s book on reason, truth, and myth, \textit{The Word as True Myth}, culminated with him arguing for truth transcendent (or abstract in Hauerwas’s terms) made known in mythic imagination through intellectual intuition, immanence, and the Word as Spirit. In that frame Dorrien incorporates into his spiritual center a personalist-Hegelian version of a long-held staple in liberal theology, the evangelical heritage’s constructed account of personal Spirit. Rather than the particularity of Jesus, Dorrien emphasizes the Word in order to attribute a personally relational character to Spirit that humanity knows in the mode of spirit. Instead of affirming the hypostatic union, Dorrien reformulates Barthian Logos Christology into a Spirit Christology of true myth that fits with modern experience and reason. Jesus was “divine” insomuch as he was directed and empowered by the Spirit, while Jesus himself was not the incarnation as understood in the creeds.\textsuperscript{260} Hence, Dorrien uses the missional title “\textit{Christ},” rather than the name Jesus, for referring to the Word qua Spirit—the ideal of “the kingdom bringing Spirit”—active in human history.\textsuperscript{261}

Chapter two will address further the issue of \textit{personal} Spirit, which has been largely ignored by contemporary liberal theology. But for now, two initial conclusions


can be drawn from Dorrien’s dialectic of apophatic reserve and metaphysical audacity. First, with his reserve wiping clear the theological slate and his metaphysical audacity supplying the new content of monism, Dorrien’s thought fits within the narrative of the modernist heritage liberating the evangelical heritage from over-belief. In some respects, then, Dorrien appears to parallel demythologization. Second, however, Dorrien offers a re-mythologization. Hauerwas’s rejection of liberal theology’s desacralizing trend is warranted as a critique of the liberal legacy. But his critique does not extend quite so easily to Dorrien’s recovery of myth and sacred transcendence. So their difference here is actually about what kind of sacralization Hauerwas and Dorrien affirm in response to desacralization.

Dorrien’s privileging of myth attempts to fill the gap between abstract truth and concrete particularity, between “meaning” and “event” in a way that is both historical and unique to faith. But his use of “Christ” rather than Jesus is a telling substitution. Hauerwas opposes approaching Jesus through an abstraction often called Christology, much less a universalism of “some univocal Being” or “generalized spirit” that reflects a generalized religious or moral sensibility as with Kant and Hegel. To extend another critique Hauerwas has made of others, that generalized sensibility is produced by the private “meaning we give it,” which Hauerwas pejoratively calls spirituality. However, Dorrien is not dismayed about spirituality on his terms because it describes the truth of not only monist Spirit, but also Spirit in a panentheist frame. Crucial to that spirituality is

262 Dorrien, WTM, 212. See also ibid., 8-9, 237-238.
263 Dorrien, SS, 19; Dorrien, WTM, 238-239.
264 Hauerwas, IGC, 37; Hauerwas, PF, 86. See also Hauerwas, DF, 150; Hauerwas, DT, 215; Hauerwas, IGC, 158; Hauerwas, PK, 6, 62-63, 72; Hauerwas, STT, 30, 213-216; Hauerwas, US, 90-96; Hauerwas, WW, 162-163; Hauerwas, WwW, 88-91, 119-121.
265 Hauerwas, STT, 118. See also ibid., 117, 159; Hauerwas, AE, 179-180; Hauerwas, DT, 178.
an account of speculative reason grounded in relational truth. That account is F. W. J. Schelling and Hegel’s socialized development of intellectual intuition.\(^{266}\)

“Schelling and Hegel…threw the door” that Kant cracked “wide open” to “apophatic monism,” Dorrien argues, by socializing intellectual intuition for speculative reason and absolute idealism.\(^{267}\) Schelling and Hegel turned intellectual intuition into a method of reflecting on one in relations to others (subject-object) as part of “one see[ing] all of nature acting through one’s self” and “knowing one’s identity with[in] the universe as a whole.”\(^{268}\) This method and the two quotes are vital to Dorrien’s spiritual center and truth about Spirit. The emphasis on interrelation in “nature acting through one’s self” corresponds with Dorrien’s claim that “anything that I think or do is ultimately God thinking and acting through me.”\(^{269}\) Then through that interrelated permeation one apprehends one’s self “within the whole.”\(^{270}\) The “whole” here is two-fold: the whole that is everything in relation and ultimately that whole in Spirit (Whole), the noumenal content of “revealed religion and speculative reason.”\(^{271}\) In this acceptance of contingency, not only does “one grasp…the unity of universal and particular, the ideal and the real.”\(^{272}\) One ultimately comes to recognize her or his “absolute dependence” on Spirit, who is “the dynamic inter-subjective in itself.”\(^{273}\) So through relation Dorrien’s

\(^{266}\) Although monist, panentheist Spirit is not quite explicitly stated in Dorrien’s earlier work, it is there in Dorrien, WTM, 239.
\(^{267}\) Dorrien, KRHS, 74. See also ibid., 535-536.
\(^{268}\) Ibid., 536. See also ibid., 167-177, 181-182, 194, 257.
\(^{269}\) Ibid., 536.
\(^{270}\) Ibid. See also Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 46, 49.
\(^{271}\) Dorrien, KRHS, 194. See also ibid., 536; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 49.
\(^{272}\) Ibid., 536.
\(^{273}\) Ibid., 12, 217.
theology moves from “I know myself” to the truth of “God transcendent,” who is “the eternally self-identical, the absolute ‘I AM.’”274

Here Dorrien has given an account of truth about Spirit that is apprehended relationally. With Hegel, for Dorrien the Spirit is panentheist, “irreducibly dynamic and relational.”275 But to hold onto his apophatic reserve in accordance with intellectual intuition, Dorrien maintains an “intuition of God as the holy unknowable mystery of the world.”276 This allusion to consciousness, however, might appear to give merely private meaning, as Hauerwas points out in terms of spirituality. That may be the case, yet Dorrien’s dialectic mode escapes at least some aspects of private meaning. His apathetic reserve is also based on the Spirit’s dynamism and relation that both makes known and is made known in the truth of the Word’s hiddenness. This relational turn, even in the negative, still mirrors Hegel’s privileging of intellectual intuition and speculative reason that moved from thinking in picture to apprehending Spirit in relation to human spirit. So through a framework of relational truth Dorrien comes to a vision of monist Spirit in a panentheist frame but without what he sees as Hegel’s baggage.277

There is one more advance by the modernist heritage vital to Dorrien’s merging of the two heritages. Schelling’s and Hegel’s idealist theory of social subjectivity also created a social awareness that helped establish the ground for social idealism. The fruit of their social awareness was later combined with gospel ideals by the evangelical heritage in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The social gospelers’ fusion

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274 Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 46, 49. In that article, Dorrien is appropriating without explicitly naming Samuel Taylor Coleridge (which Dorrien argues was a British version of Schelling) and William Temple (Dorrien, KRHS, 136, 436).

275 Dorrien, KRHS, 12. See also ibid., 160.

276 Ibid., 12-13. Emphasis is mine.

277 Dorrien, WTM, 239; Dorrien, KRHS, 191, 194-195, 217, 220-221, 347, 387-390, 418; Dorrien, MALRT, 2:18; Dorrien, KRHS, 12-13, 160. Chapter two will address how human freedom figures into this relational framework, in terms of both Spirit relating to spirit and spirit relating to spirit.
created the ground-breaking insight of social salvation realized in their social mission to transform society. Social structures had recently been ‘discovered,’ but many, especially predatory capitalism, were in need of redemption since they were neither just nor peaceable. The social gospelers reasoned that “if evil is socialized,” then “salvation must be socialized” as well.278 One’s socialization towards God and the kingdom, which is a “commonwealth of co-operative service,” orients one towards humanity with a structurally transformative vision of the common good where all are equal and free.279 The social gospelers, then, sought to actualize idealist, social truth in human relations.280

So the spiritual and social contributions of the modernist heritage reflect Dorrien’s summation of the Kantian and post-Kantian work as “mapping the epistemological and spiritual ground of freedom and imagining a cosmopolitan commonwealth of freedom.”281

*The Evangelical Heritage, Fusing the Two Heritages, and Liberation*

Although the spiritual idealism of Hegel’s Spirit is important for Dorrien, it is not sufficient to account for liberal theology’s spirituality. The evangelical heritage is crucial

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280 Dorrien, KRHS, 180-191, 390-391, 425-426; Dorrien, SEM, 39-41; for one specific instance of the Hegel-social gospel connection, Walter Rauschenbusch maintained a “neo-Hegelian” historicism (Dorrien, RCG, 38; Dorrien, MALT 2:110; Dorrien, EDE, 3-4, 6, 11-13; Dorrien, MALT, 1:311; Dorrien, MALT, 2:11-12, 71, 199; Dorrien, SEM, 1, 6, 21-22, 39-41, 51, 60-61, 70; Dorrien, “Society as the Subject of Redemption,” 43-44; for an example of social mission, see Walter Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis* (New York: Macmillan, 1907; repr. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1991), 415-420; Dorrien, MALT, 1:314-318; Dorrien, SEM, 1, 7, 17-18, 39-41, 69-73; Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 14-15; for Hegel’s legacy in all but name informing the navigation of Darwinian influence, see Dorrien, MALT, 1:316-318; Dorrien, MALT, 2: 110; Dorrien, SEM, 72-73.

281 Dorrien, KRHS, 14.
to liberal theology, and to Dorrien in particular, even with experience and reason relativizing biblical authority and negating Christian tradition’s authority.

Theologically, liberal theology needs its evangelical heritage in order to be faithful to Christian truth. Soon after Dorrien delineates his perspectivist understanding of truth, he writes that his “religious perspective is founded upon the way of Christ and the reality of Christ’s kingdom-bringing Spirit.”\(^{282}\) For him, “social gospel is ultimately precious…because it recovers the fullness of the spiritual reality and ethic of the kingdom of Christ” that has and will come.\(^{283}\) Without evangelical truth such as this, liberal theology has become unmoored from what grounds and animates it.\(^{284}\)

Methodologically, liberal theology’s second layer is only possible with both heritages. But simply construing the evangelical heritage as one of two poles cuts short the importance of the evangelical heritage and the social gospel. Historically, the evangelical heritage “sustain[ed] the original merger” of the two heritages “that gave rise to liberal theology” and “made liberal Christianity compelling to millions.”\(^{285}\) In more recent terms, the social gospel is Dorrien’s exemplar for unifying the modernist and evangelical heritages. The social gospelers “fused” modernist and evangelical heritages in the “spiritual power” of “spiritual conviction” to create the largest movement in the history of US liberal theology.\(^{286}\) The social gospelers articulation of social salvation was

\(^{282}\) Dorrien, SS, 19.
\(^{283}\) Ibid. See also, Dorrien, RET, 11. For this point related to faithfulness within Dorrien’s overlap with and critique of Hauerwas, see Dorrien, SS, 374-375.
\(^{284}\) Dorrien, RET, 4; Dorrien, MALT, 3:538; Dorrien, SS, 373, 375-376; Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology,” 477-478.
\(^{285}\) Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 4-5.
\(^{286}\) Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology,” 477. See also ibid., 478; Dorrien, MALT, 3:538; Dorrien, SEM, 60; Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 53. In terms of “evangelistic and pietistic”—like revivals—Hauerwas agrees with Dorrien (BH, 234-235 n. 1).
derived from the modernist insight about social structures and from a sense of mission given by the “transcendental, biblical voice.”

The social gospelers could sustain the merger because they were as much pastoral and activist as they were intellectual. The social gospelers’ massive theological movement arose in parallel to the development of sociology and socialist communes, but the movement itself was birthed from the pulpit’s response to social turmoil. The white social gospel addressed primarily the ongoing class warfare, instigated by the then rising global capitalism, and to a much lesser extent racism and patriarchy than did the black social gospel and first-wave feminism. The trajectory from biblical-ethical preaching to movement exemplifies Dorrien’s claim that “whenever liberal theology finds a large audience, it speaks a gospel of personal faith in biblical terms.” With that spiritual ground the social gospelers’ pastoral community organizing achieved significant political advances and a lasting legacy to match.

Just such kinds of spiritual ground and pastoral activity are crucial, Dorrien argues, for “liberal Christianity...to regain its public voice.” He can see that the evangelical heritage has long been overlooked because faithfulness guides his normative understanding of liberal theology. His “normative” definition of liberal theology requires a critical emphasis to keep liberal theology from losing its theological content.

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287 Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology,” 478. See also Dorrien, EDE, 6; Dorrien, MALT, 1:chp. 5, esp. p. 311; Dorrien, MALT, 2:chp. 2, esp. 199; Dorrien, SEM, chp.2; Dorrien, “Society as the Subject of Redemption,” 43.

288 Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology,” 477. See also ibid., 466-476; Dorrien, MALT, 2:18-19; Dorrien, MALT, 3:523-528, 535-538.


290 Dorrien, SS, 376. See also ibid., 375; Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology,” 477-478.

291 Dorrien, review of Liberal Theology, 541.
However, as opposed to Dorrien’s *historical* definition of liberal theology, he has not fully articulated his own *normative* definition of liberal theology. If he were to, it would look something like this. Liberal theology “unit[es]... the sacred and the secular” in a “relational” dialectic, such that the sacred and secular mutually shape each other, positively and critically, for a progressive and “critically constructive” transformation of society.292 Liberal theology as such is faith continually evolving by and for two ends: to take into account the contemporary world-view and to work for the transformation of society in some measure. In order to evolve and transform, liberal theology integrates itself into liberal philosophy and politics.293

But such integration is dialectical for Dorrien. He refuses to allow liberalism to overrun theology and ethics. His resistance occurs in two ways other than his insistence on the evangelical heritage vis-à-vis the social gospel. The first is his apophatic reserve. Dorrien grants that mediation is how liberal theology is “friendly to something called ‘the modern world-view.’”294 However, with “Barth’s voice in [Dorrien’s] head,” Dorrien’s apophatic reserve qualifies the extent to which he holds to a world-view.295 The second is ethics. Liberalism is critiqued on ethical grounds in order to arrive at social transformation in line with theological ideals. The social gospelers’ ideas of social salvation and political activity to achieve it took root. Dorrien’s own politically inclined spiritual center is a “gospel-centered” personalist faith found in the progressive liberal

292 Dorrien, *KRRS*, 566-567; Dorrien, *MALT*, 2:15; Dorrien, review of Liberal Theology, 541. Dorrien’s rejection of success and disillusionment with cultural progress resists a wholesale, high-soaring idealistic progressivism. Yet he is still for the progress. In that tension is equivocation: “For us, history must be about struggle, not progress; or at least, as Frederick Douglass put it, “without struggle, there is no progress”” (“Society as the Subject of Redemption,” 74).


294 Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 244-245.

295 Ibid., 270.
theologies of both the social gospel that worked for economic equality and the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s that fought for political liberation.296

Political liberation raises another truth. Despite Dorrien’s broad critique of liberation theology noted above, he proclaims a truthful insight about God because of liberation theology. “God is the partisan, liberating power of the oppressed in their struggle for justice.”297 This truth decisively constitutes Dorrien’s spiritual center. But how does liberative truth fit in his project?298

Born from his attention to outside criticism, his privileging of liberation theology creates an initial hierarchy of truth. He argues that liberal theology should become a subset of liberation theology. His normative position on liberalism and liberal theology shift accordingly. While he opts for justice as “right order,” he also questions the veracity of a “universal theory of justice” since “oppression is multifaceted, concrete, and particular.”299 His insistence on liberation and justice in concrete particularity configures the church’s mission. It “is called in the Spirit to prefigure a new society and emancipate the poor and oppressed.”300 In these ways the truth of liberation theology keeps Dorrien plumbing the theological and political depths of what it means to be attentive to the flourishing of all.301


297 Dorrien, “The Lure of Love Divine,” 43. For more on liberationist truth, see Dorrien, RCG, 114.

298 Dorrien, SS, 280-281.

299 Dorrien, EDE, xi-xii. This advance on the nature of justice is grounded in his perspectivist understanding of truth. Dorrien, SS, 17-18.

300 Dorrien, SS, 372. See also Dorrien, “Communitarianism, Christian Realism, and the Crisis of Progressive Christianity,” 376 where Dorrien gives, again, this ecclesiological account in appreciation and critique of Hauerwas.

The shift to a hierarchy of liberationist truth has a significant implication for liberal theology’s method of mediation. On the one hand, liberal theology’s method of mediation has led, and arguably still could lead, to an insufficiently critical embrace of the status quo. On the other hand, the mediating method can also move in the other direction by placing liberal theology under liberative truth. Liberal theology must stay true to the truth of liberation experience precisely because experiences of oppression are “not what liberal theology has been about” on the whole. In this latter framework, for Dorrien, contemporary social gospelers move in the direction of the antebellum abolitionists who were too fiery about slavery to be socially acceptable by the status quo. This shift forms some of Dorrien’s deepest political ideals, which lie somewhere between progressive and radical.

Part of the reason why Dorrien lies in between progressive and radical is because the liberation hierarchy of truth is only initially a hierarchy. Like Dorrien’s merging of the modernist and evangelical heritages, his method to join liberation and liberal theologies is also deeply dialectical. As far back as 1990, Dorrien argued that liberation theology lacks the social gospelers’ necessary, broad “moral discourse” of economic democracy (sometimes called democratic socialism), which is “larger and more inclusive than the discourses of countercultural vanguards.” So Dorrien once proclaimed:

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303 Dorrien, EDE, 400-404; Dorrien, MALT, 1:52-56, 128-133, 188-189, 195-202, 218; Dorrien, MALT, 2: 94-96, 102, 111-112, 118, 120; Dorrien, RCG, 43; Dorrien, SS, 5; Dorrien, WTM, 71; Dorrien, “Communitarianism, Christian Realism, and the Crisis of Progressive Christianity,” 365, 375; Dorrien, MALT, 1:1, 52-56, 101-130-133, 182-183, 218, 283, 408-409; Dorrien, RCG, 158-159. This is not to say that the abolitionists on the whole got everything ‘right’ for Dorrien. They were, for instance, divided over feminism (Dorrien, MALT, 1:219-220). And even today the story of John Brown’s violent abolitionist work is polarizing. Ted A. Smith, Weird John Brown: Divine Violence and the Limits of Ethics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 25.
“liberation theology needs to be shaped, informed, and limited by the theology of the Social Gospel”; “liberation theology needs a praxis of democratic socialism.”305 Recently Dorrien has reiterated that same line of argument in terms of “Christian socialism,” particularly “guild socialism,” with the implication of the social gospel and its economic democracy.306 What Dorrien is doing here can be reconciled by his “open-ended” perspectivism, blurring the boundaries between liberal and liberationist.307 He opts for hybridity, a liberative liberal, that comports with how Dorrien understands one of his heroes, Martin Luther King, Jr. King was in many ways both the culmination of American Protestant liberalism and a representative of liberative work. He was a black church pastor, a social activist, and a liberal, personalist theologian who incorporated the social gospel, pacifism, and to a degree R. Niebuhr. Dorrien’s own constructive project is already “identify themselves with the socialist tradition,” and thereby “they transform this tradition through their commitment and criticism” (ibid., 171-72).

I will address economic democracy in chapter two. But some clarity may be helpful here since Dorrien has referred to economic democracy as democratic socialism, “market socialism,” and “democratic empowerment” (DSV, 164; RCG, vii, 15). Long ago Dorrien was adamant that “socialism” in democratic socialism should not be given up: “it must be used and redeemed” (DSV, 1). However, the fact that economic democracy no longer seems prevalent is because economic democracy, under the title democratic socialism, was incorrectly deemed to be “discredited” by the fall of communism, even though economic democracy was very much a part of theological liberalism (Dorrien, SEM, 5). Over time Dorrien has shifted from the use of democratic socialism as a term. More recently, for instance, Dorrien has distanced himself from the term “socialism” because the ideology is “dubious and unitary,” which are the exact opposite of what is needed (ED, 141). But despite rhetorical shifts, the substance of what Dorrien has been arguing for is still largely the same. From his early work to his contemporary work, he argues for democratic socialism/economic democracy’s recovery and relevance and against its discredited evaluation by neconservatives and realists. Dorrien, DSV, esp. p. x; Gary Dorrien, review of A Future of Socialism? Political theology and the “Triumph of Capitalism,” by Harold Wells, The Journal of Religion 78, no. 1 (1998): 155-156; Dorrien, SEM, 624-626, 674-675, 683-684; Dorrien, RCG, esp. 12; Dorrien, SS, 292. In addition to those sources (DSV, EDE, and SEM in particular), see also articles on the recovery and relevance of economic democracy: Gary Dorrien, “A Case for Economic Democracy,” Tikkan, May/Jun. 2009, 36-37, 75; Gary Dorrien, “Beyond State and Market: Christianity and the Future of Economic Democracy,” Cross Currents, Summer 1995, 184-185, 188-202; Gary Dorrien, “Commonwealth Economics: Christian Socialism as Tradition and Problem,” Tikkan, Jan./Feb. 2010, 48-51, 75; Dorrien, “Economic Democracy and the Possibility of Real, Healthy Change,” 138-145; Gary Dorrien, “Financial Collapse: Lessons from the Social Gospel,” Christian Century, Dec. 30, 2008, 28-29; Gary Dorrien, “No Common Good?: Moral Community,” Christian Century, Apr. 19, 2011, 24-25; Gary Dorrien, “Liberal Socialism and the Legacy of the Social Gospel,” Cross Currents, Fall 1989, 340, 347, 349-354. 306 Dorrien, RCG, 144, 164. See also ibid., 10-11, 30, 47, 109-113, 140-143, 145, 157-159, 161-163; Dorrien, “Beyond State and Market,” 187. 307 Dorrien, EDE, 309. See also ibid., 133-137, 140-141. 308 Dorrien, SS, 18. See also ibid., 280-281, 360, 375; Dorrien, EDE, 169, 298; Dorrien, RCG, 161, 174-175; Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 52, 55-56; Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 23. Dorrien has also sought to develop similarities between the social gospel, liberation theology, and political theology (RCG, 10, 107, 141, 158-159). In particular, Dorrien has raised repeatedly Gustavo Gutiérrez’s positive evaluation of the social gospel, and initially Jürgen Moltmann’s observation that Walter Rauschenbusch “represented the most instructive precedent for a North American theology of praxis” (Dorrien, RCG, 10. Also see Dorrien, SS, 6, 360.).
largely in direct continuity with King. The social gospel and liberation are not only related, they are fused together.\textsuperscript{308}

The embrace of diverse, marginalized voices and the emphasis of liberation are “the new sine qua non of progressive theology.”\textsuperscript{309} However, Dorrien’s concern for truth makes him unusual in contemporary liberal theology. Dorrien fuses the modernist and evangelical heritages partly through his complex definition of liberal theology that recovers under-recognized theological work from the past, and partly through his perspectivism open to figures and traditions that have been historically outside of conventional liberal theology. Dorrien’s work, then, moves him somewhat out of Hauerwas’s critical spotlight set on liberal theology. Like Hauerwas, Dorrien holds to truth known in relation. But they differ over what those truths are and how they are related. Where Hauerwas has an account of truth that is hierarchical and relational stemming from the particularity of Jesus, Dorrien places truth mutually related in Spirit qualified by an apophatic reserve rooted in human finitude. Even when Dorrien has a kind of hierarchy of truth, it is ultimately part of his perspectivism rather than an abrogation of it.\textsuperscript{310}

\textsuperscript{308} Dorrien, \textit{EDE}, xiv; Dorrien, \textit{NA}, x; Dorrien, \textit{MALT}, 3:143-161; Dorrien, \textit{SEM}, 391-396; Dorrien, \textit{SS}, 280-281; Dorrien, \textit{RCG}, 42, 162, 171-175. Of course Dorrien is aware of, for instance, James Cone’s distinction between Martin and Malcom (Dorrien, \textit{MALT} 3:163-167; Dorrien, \textit{SEM}, 396-411, esp. 410; Dorrien, \textit{SS}, 236-245, 250). I do not have the space to delineate the following, but it is worth noting: the fusion should be understood as a “plurality of consciousnesses” in a complex layering that maintains the social gospel-liberation dialectic instead of a monolithic whole or a simplistically incorrect version of Hegel’s dialectic as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. For “plurality of consciousnesses,” see Dorrien, \textit{SS}, 18-19. Dorrien is quoting Mikhail Bakhtin, \textit{Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics}, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 6; Mikhail Bakhtin, \textit{The Dialogic Imagination}, ed. Michael Holquist and trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981). See also Dorrien, \textit{KRHS}, 205-206. Dorrien’s complexity here should be appreciated for two reasons. First, it implicitly acknowledges space in liberation theology for those who are not in liberal theology. Second, the issue of relating the heritages and truths is even more complex, perhaps even dialectics within dialectics. The modernist heritage is crucial too. The personalist advance on Spirit and spirit recovers “a robust sense of divine presence” that Dorrien leverages in support of “movements that lift up the poor and oppressed and that contribute to the flourishing of all people and creation” (ibid., 3. See also ibid., 390-393.).


\textsuperscript{310} Dorrien, \textit{RCG}, 161, 175.
IV. Complications: From Liberation and World to Truth and Reality

There are issues to address which are more complicated than Dorrien indicates in his 1995 claim that his “open-ended” perspectivism to “outside criticism,” specifically liberation theology, differs from Hauerwas’s closed off perspectivism.311 Dorrien’s critique of Hauerwas goes hand in hand with Dorrien’s proclamation that “the insistence on dichotomizing the world between Christians and pagans marks the essential difference in spirit between Hauerwas’s theology and [Dorrien’s] progressive social Christianity.”312 Their alternatives for a US, post-Christendom, Protestant Christianity, in Dorrien’s account, differ because his position on God’s kingdom “takes more from [Walter] Rauschenbusch than Hauerwas” and is “inspired and shaped by liberationists movements that Hauerwas spurns.”313 For Dorrien, “to believe in the reality of the indwelling kingdom of Christ does not require that one regard the rest of the world as unregenerate or deprived of grace.”314 But to that position Hauerwas “gives short shrift to those who press him,” calling it “‘a liberal question…. You’re worried about non-Christians because you’re a liberal.”315

While I do not doubt Dorrien’s summary of their conversation in the last quote, Hauerwas at his best has a more interesting relationship with liberation theology and a more complex account of the world. I will address those complications to initially show that the liberation-world connection is not exactly what Dorrien made of it in 1995. He

311 Dorrien, SS, 18.
312 Ibid., 359.
313 Ibid., 360.
314 Ibid.
315 Ibid., 360-361.
overstated his case when he declared that “Hauerwas spurns” liberation theology.\(^{316}\) And by using that mistake as proof of Hauerwas’s “dichotomizing between Christian and pagans,” Dorrien reversed the fact that Hauerwas’s appreciation of liberation theology is complicated when liberation is joined to the world.\(^{317}\) These interpretive problems are also partly the result of Hauerwas’s polemical rhetoric and silence. As a consequence of Dorrien’s reversal and Hauerwas’s language, in 1995 Dorrien was at best correct by half concerning Hauerwas’s account of the church-world distinction.

Those initial problems obscure a more significant issue. Hauerwas’s account of truth not only underwrites his church-world distinction, but also his account of truth is his account of reality. That pattern is the same for Dorrien as well, but they disagree over truth in either a hierarchical arrangement or a mutual arrangement. Their differing accounts of truth indicate rival positions over the nature of reality because Hauerwas and Dorrien differ over what is truly significant.

*Liberation, Church, and World*

Hauerwas’s lop-sided engagement with liberation theology is exemplified by his critical article on Gutiérrez in 1986 and by his appreciative endnote on Jon Sobrino in 1981. Although that lop-sidedness is problematic, it is not a dismissal of liberation theology as Dorrien claimed in 1995. Rather, Hauerwas’s appreciation for liberation theology is not often easily accessible. One could have the wrong impression that he has largely nothing to say on a slew of social issues based on Dorrien’s summaries of

\(^{316}\) Ibid., 360.
\(^{317}\) Ibid., 359; Hauerwas and Quirk, *DT*, 213-214.
Hauerwas, the selections of *The Hauerwas Reader*, and even some of Hauerwas’s books by his own admittance. Hauerwas’s habit of “silence through presence,” and therein participatory listening, contributes to the possibility of misimpression.\(^{318}\) The endeavor to listen there is not only consistent with his emphasis on relational reconciliation, but also there is wisdom since, for instance, “gender is tricky for Hauerwas—and at his best, Stanley knows that.”\(^{319}\) However, his attempt at silence, thankfully, has not been entirely successful prior to and even more so after 1995.\(^{320}\)

There is consistent and specific evidence in Hauerwas’s own work for his sympathy with liberation theology—“that [they] share far more in common than [they] differ”—besides his stated general appreciation for it on the whole and for specific liberation theologians in particular.\(^{321}\) From subtly to explicitly, he has consistently shown that integral to his work is the common good and solidarity. In one of his two recent chapters on poverty, he connects the common good and solidarity with the poor through Pope Francis’s call for the church to “the option for the poor” and to become

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\(^{320}\) Hauerwas, *CC*, 233 n. 4; Hauerwas, “Some Theological Reflections on Gutiérrez’s Use of ‘Liberation’ as a Theological Concept.” Hauerwas has had to work against his lopsidedness. For instance, in 2004—again in a footnote—he notes his sympathy for liberation theology by reminding his audience about his particular appreciation for Gutiérrez in the 1996 preface to *After Christendom?* (Hauerwas, *AC*, 9-10; Hauerwas, *PF*, 220 n. 9).

As for *The Hauerwas Reader*, the editors admit that the volume has “nothing on issues of race, gender, or the environment” for which they then suggest readings that were not included (10 and n. 12). But the reader does have a chapter on homosexuality (chp. 25), a short discussion on Malcom X and whiteness (218-219), occasional reliance on liberation theology (410 n. 23, 436, 601-602 n. 8), and summaries of his other work on liberation theology (“Selected Annotated Bibliography”). As for Hauerwas himself, he and Willimon admit that they did not make clear in *Resident Aliens* their “kn[ow]ledge” from firsthand experience that the black church had long known how to be resident aliens in a racist world” (“A Reply”).

\(^{321}\) Hauerwas, *BH*, 258 n. 20. See also Hauerwas, *AC*, 9-10 (Preface to the 1996 edition); Hauerwas, *BH*, 228 n. 43, 229 n. 12; Hauerwas, *CC*, 233 n. 4, 234 n. 16; Hauerwas, *PF*, 220 n. 9; Hauerwas, *WW*, 258. It is worth pointing out that Hauerwas could be construed as a kind of liberationist from liberalism. See John B. Thompson, *The Ecclesiology of Stanley Hauerwas: A Christian Theology of Liberation* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003); De La Torre, *Latino/a Social Ethics*, 127 n. 11. But what I think is more interesting is interpreting other, more constructive avenues of Hauerwas’s work along liberationist lines. He has functionally shown a preferential option for the mentally ‘handicapped’ among the issues of the common good and solidarity (*DF*, 185-186; *WT*, 203).
poor with the poor.\textsuperscript{322} That ecclesial account is not only prefigured by Hauerwas’s work in 1983, but also correlates with his more recent accounts of his normative politics. He advocates for a deliberative “democracy…that refuses to silence the voice of the poor” and for “justice” that “imitates the divine partisanship on behalf of the poor, the widow, and the orphan.”\textsuperscript{323} That affirmation of the preferential option for the poor in all but name includes “God’s unrelenting desire to liberate us from sin.”\textsuperscript{324} Hauerwas is also attentive to, and at times parallels, other liberation theologies. Although Hauerwas’s work is not visibly marked by eco-feminism or queer theology, he has written one chapter on ecology against “anthropocentrism,” another on liturgical formation provoked by a group of nuns, and two chapters on homosexual people—one of which showed the immense value of friendship with them.\textsuperscript{325} He has provided one popular article in favor of the black power movement, two chapters about racial reconciliation, and two chapters about a martyred “saint of the church,” Martin Luther King, Jr.\textsuperscript{326} Hauerwas has also described Cesar Chavez as a “hero.”\textsuperscript{327} Against European colonialism and the US liberal extension of it, he has affirmed communal self-determination by oppressed communities (African Americans, Native Americans, and women), which is probably surprising to many

\textsuperscript{322} Hauerwas, \textit{WT}, 226-228. See also Hauerwas, \textit{SU}, chp. 12 (reprinted Hauerwas, \textit{CDRO}, chp. 10). Hauerwas developed some of the earlier theme of becoming poor in \textit{PK}, 104-105.

\textsuperscript{323} Hauerwas, \textit{SU}, 10; Hauerwas, \textit{WAD}, 106.

\textsuperscript{324} Hauerwas, \textit{WAD}, 106. For another affirmation of the preferential option for the poor in all but name, see Hauerwas, \textit{TT}, 134. For that, implicitly liberation from sin, and explicitly life in the kingdom—in Hauerwas’s theopolitics—see Hauerwas, \textit{US}, chp. 7.

\textsuperscript{325} Hauerwas, \textit{IGC}, 188. See also ibid., chp. 12; Hauerwas, \textit{DF}, chp. 8; Hauerwas, \textit{PF}, chp. 6; Hauerwas, \textit{STT}, chp. 6.

\textsuperscript{326} Hauerwas, \textit{WW}, 232. See also Hauerwas, \textit{BH}, chp. 9; Hauerwas, \textit{CDRO}, chp. 4; Hauerwas, \textit{WAD}, chp. 7; Hauerwas, \textit{WW}, chp. 14; Stanley Hauerwas, “The Ethics of Black Power,” \textit{Augustana Observer}, Feb. 5, 1969. See also Hauerwas, \textit{BH}, 234 n. 37; Hauerwas, \textit{CC}, 252-253 n. 36, 272 n. 15; Hauerwas, \textit{CET}, 214; Hauerwas, \textit{WW}, 184 (for King’s martyrdom), 258. In fact, Hauerwas got in trouble at his first academic appointment for his “‘activism’ on behalf of the African American students”—his advocating for at least one African American on the all white faculty and administration—because those students “needed someone besides [Hauerwas], a white guy, to talk through the challenges of being an African American” (\textit{HC}, 80). This ‘activism’ corresponds with Hauerwas’s affirmation of the distinctiveness of “being black”: “to be ‘black’ is to be part of a history that should be cherished and enhanced” (\textit{SP}, 213).

\textsuperscript{327} Hauerwas, \textit{CET}, 214.
considering he repeated rejects notions of autonomy as self-determination. He not only has no “objection to feminine imagery for God,” but also has made occasional remarks that uphold women’s ordination. 328 Further but still occasionally, Hauerwas has made remarks that reject the domination of women, that question his white privilege because of Malcolm X, that critically highlight the sin of racism, that pay attention to the racism of racial categorization itself, that advocate pacifist involvement in countermanding African American enslavement and its legacy, and that lambaste Native American genocide by US empire.329

Although those chapters and remarks are proportionally few for a long academic career, they are not off-hand. Dorrien once recalled in class a conversation he had with Hauerwas. Hauerwas made a sympathetic observation about the plight of African Americans in the US, and Dorrien replied that Hauerwas needed to actually publish it. I do not know if Dorrien’s urging was the cause for Hauerwas to put it in writing, but Hauerwas did publish his point. “I marvel at the miracle that African Americans do not each day have to refrain from killing a white person. . . .[which is] a testimony of the depth of God’s love that has and continues to sustain them.”330 God’s sustaining love, Hauerwas continues, is the hope of reconciliation without violence between “children of slaves” and “children of slaveholders.”331

328 Hauerwas, WW, 29. See also Dorrien, SEM, 478; Hauerwas, HC, 212, 214, 229, 255, 279.
329 Hauerwas, AC, 53-54; Hauerwas, AN, 196; Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, chp. 5; Hauerwas, CET, 15; Hauerwas, PF, 209; Hauerwas, PK, 90-91; Hauerwas, UV, chp. 12; Hauerwas, WAD, 140-146; Hauerwas, AC, chp. 6, esp. p. 136; Hauerwas, BH, 222 n. 25; Hauerwas, CC, 83, 145, 252-253 n. 36; Hauerwas, CET, 29; Hauerwas, DF, 137; Hauerwas, IGC, 59, 166; Hauerwas, FF, 97; Hauerwas, US, 90; Hauerwas, WAD, xvii, 33 n. 33, 120 n. 13; Hauerwas, WW, 195. These sorts of statements by Hauerwas affirm Linda Woodhead’s estimation that his “unsystematic theology” is indeed “responsive” to and “develops in relation to context and particularity. Linda Woodhead, “Can Women Love Stanley Hauerwas?: Pursuing an Embodied Theology,” in Faithfulness and Fortitude, 187.
330 Hauerwas, BH, 153.
331 Ibid.
So perhaps even with Dorrien’s input, his point of conflict with Hauerwas over liberation theology has a lot less to do with liberation than Dorrien presupposed in 1995. Instead, their disagreement has a lot more to do with Hauerwas’s suspicion of liberalism’s impact on liberation theology. Hauerwas finds that liberation as a category is too abstract, that liberation in some forms is too similar to Kantian autonomy, and that liberation is too often articulated in the Constantinian terms of liberal justice. Indeed, when marginalized voices are connected to the world as liberal society, Hauerwas’s relation to liberation theology is overridden and Dorrien’s critical account of Hauerwas’s position is incomplete.332


In terms of a history of social ethics, Hauerwas and Dorrien have a very different way of interpreting the relation between social ethics as a discipline (social gospel, R. Niebuhr, etc.) and liberation theology. Dorrien sees the liberationists developments as “disruptions” to be included within social ethics and, in turn, liberation shapes the discipline (Dorrien, SEM, chp. 6, pp. 4, 674). However, Hauerwas sees a sharp distinction between them (“with the possible exception of Rauschenbusch and Yoder”) and, in turn, chastises the discipline (BH, 68, 234 n. 37). His rejection of uniting liberalism and liberation theology explains his other criticisms of the latter. Liberationist appropriation of liberalism is internally conflictual because liberalism inscribes the problems, such as freedom and equality as an ends unto themselves, that both the best liberation theologians and Hauerwas aim to overcome (Hauerwas, TT, 232-233 n. 1; Hauerwas, “Some Theological Reflections on Gutierrez’s Use of ‘Liberation’ as a Theological Concept,” 69-70; Hauerwas, “Where Would I Be Without Friends?,” 328). Hauerwas has argued the same in another key: “the social policies determined by liberalism,” which were aimed “to ensure that the Holocaust never happens again,” “ironically undercut the particularity of the claims necessary to remember the Holocaust rightly” (AN, 12-13). But again, some of Hauerwas’s criticisms are dated, or at least not all encompassing. Besides Dorrien’s argument that Gutiérrez has eschewed Constantinianism (RCG, 124), Dorrien raises that Miguez Bonino critiques liberal theology and the social gospelers’ for their abstraction (RCG, 152).

So it would be immensely beneficial to the reception of Hauerwas’s work if he made his sympathy for liberation theology more explicit and accessible all at once, such as a chapter, rather than implied citation or brief preface, devoted to reflecting on how his relation to liberation theologies has shifted and not shifted since his appreciative endnote on Jon Sobrino and his critical article on Gutiérrez. Considering Hauerwas’s sympathy for Sobrino’s Christological focus, then Hauerwas would presumably be interested in Sobrino’s more recent work on Jesus and his kingdom, and perhaps be interested even De La Torre’s The Politics of Jesus. There have also been interesting shifts and expansions in liberation theology. Decades ago Dorrien noted that Juan Luis Segundo and Gutiérrez have taken seriously the critique of Constantinianism. So has Cornel West. I expect that Hauerwas would find interesting parallels with and would be quite critical of Leonard Botff’s recent book on virtues. There is another interesting tension. If Hauerwas’s students represent development of Hauerwas’s work, as he claims, then it is worth noting not only Daniel Bell, Jr., whose account is suffering unto death for some liberationists such as Ivan Petrella, but also worth raising is D. Stephen Long. The latter, although Petrella intentionally overlooks him, gives an account of liberation theology that is longer and more explicitly appreciative than Hauerwas while still similarly critical at times. Petrella raises the importance of historical projects, which fell by the wayside as Latin American liberation theologians focused on theology. Hauerwas’s position might appreciate the critique insomuch as the aim to historical and concrete, but he would reject Petrella’s solution: for theologians to become invisible theologians in other disciplines. Obviously, then, some of the same themes are at issue, but the milieu has shifted enough to make possible a sufficiently different discussion. So in some ways, what I am pointing towards is not unlike, and actually would be helpful in meeting, Derek Alan Woodard-Lehman’s call to Hauerwas for a more explicit engagement with race and racism for radical democracy. In fact, meeting Woodard-Lehman’s call would still be helpful, even though Hauerwas has not only since again addressed racial reconciliation and King but also much earlier affirmed black power as Michael S. Northcott reminds us. Despite Johnathan Tran’s defense of Hauerwas’s silence from Woodard-
For instance, Linda Woodhead argues that Hauerwas misses much of sociology and feminism in particular because his theology frustratingly looks at the church and the world each within their own “homogenizing discourse.” Yet even then it was not true that Hauerwas wholly neglected sociology or feminism. In 1981, he maintained that “the influence of some of the work in sociology of religion and knowledge is beginning to have a fruitful effect on the kind of work that is done in New Testament ethics.”

Despite Hauerwas’s concern about the metaphor of liberation, in 1988 he wrote that “most of the charges made against male-dominated culture are both fair and just.” But he could be weak on the issue of gender. So in response to Woodhead, Hauerwas confessed his earlier failures to understand feminism and affirmed her critique that his work should pay more attention to women in the church. This confession and affirmation suggests that the hermeneutic-of-mostly-silence for participatory listening may be a more significant factor in his engagement with gender than the issue of homogeneity.

Lehman’s call, the latter’s challenge is pre-dated by similar enough critiques made towards Hauerwas by Michael Eric Dyson and James Logan.


Woodhead, “Can Women Love Stanley Hauerwas?,” 183. For similar feminist critiques of Hauerwas, see Albrecht’s The Character of Our Communities, “Myself and Other Characters,” and review of In Good Company; Elizabeth M. Bounds, Coming Together/Coming Apart: Religion, Community, and Modernity (New York: Routledge, 1997), 63-64. For defense of Hauerwas from the critiques of Albrecht and Woodhead but also, in light of those criticisms, a sometimes friendly critique and development of him on the issue of feminism, see Murphy, “Community, Character, and Gender: Women and the Work of Stanley Hauerwas.”

Hauerwas, CC, 237 n. 44. See also ibid., 110; Hauerwas, CET, 12.

Hauerwas, CET, 28-29.

However, the link between homogenization and liberal society is more complex. On the one hand, what Woodhead calls homogenization is in fact Hauerwas’s hierarchy of truth ordering historical, social, and political work. Within that hierarchical frame, Hauerwas’s response to Woodhead and in his work elsewhere show his openness to the contributions that the world can bring to the church. So there is a complex relation between the world and the church. On the other hand, Hauerwas’s response to Woodhead uses the phrase “world of liars” to emphasize the importance of truth telling and nonviolence. That “sharp dichotomy” between the church and the world seems to confirm, from a perspective like Dorrien’s, Woodhead’s critique of homogeneity in Hauerwas’s church-world distinction. Hauerwas has further contributed to such readings when, from time to time he has privileged provocative polemics. Even after Dorrien made his 1995 critique, Hauerwas claimed that “Christianity is unintelligible without enemies.” Lines like that only reinforce an overly simple understanding of his church-world construction. But it does not represent Hauerwas at his theological best.

So what is Hauerwas’s nuanced account of the world? It is inseparable from his accounts of creation, privation, and ecclesiology. The world and the church describe creatures in “God’s creation” differentiated by “loyalty” and agency: whether human creatures are turned toward either sin or holiness. The world is those creatures who “reject Christ” by a disobedient perversion, refusing to love God by turning God’s given
“creative gifts” to humanity against God.342 And “the result of sin” is “the violence that grips” the world.343 The church is those creatures who confess Jesus, and in seeking to imitate him, those creatures become heirs and heiresses of his kingdom. Accordingly, to live faithfully is to live non-violently in peace, which is “what the world can be.”344 Hauerwas has summarized this world-church distinction as “not an ontological difference, but rather a difference of agency,” a “duality without dualism.”345 But here Hauerwas’s articulation of that framework becomes complicated, forking into two but connected lines of argument that become two accounts of the church-world relation. One avoids an ontological dualism while the other appears to raise a different kind of dualism. In 1995 Dorrien missed the former and feared the latter like so many other famous critiques of Hauerwas.346

From Dorrien’s 1995 position, Hauerwas’s world-church framework appeared to create a dualism in terms of the world as totally depraved today and doomed to perdition, the church as unique today since it is perfected eschatologically, and Hauerwas’s ecclesial isolation as a flippant concern for the world. However, in 1995 and 2009 Dorrien overlooked Hauerwas’s 1983 normative rejection of the world as totally depraved, of the church as perfected, and of the “enmity” between them wherein the

343 Hauerwas, WAD, xii.
344 Ibid., xiii. See also ibid., xii; Hauerwas, DF, 137; Hauerwas, DT, 183-184; Hauerwas, PK, 102; Hauerwas, US, 122.
346 Hauerwas, AC, 36-37; Hauerwas, CET, 39, 60-61; Hauerwas, PK, 76-95. The final conclusion to this project will address how Hauerwas equivocates on the issue of the world through his many, inconsistent uses of it.
church retreats from or overtakes the world.\textsuperscript{347} But Hauerwas not only continues that line of thought when he shows an openness to non-Christians in 1998. Before his account of all creation as “sinsick” in 2000 that was hinted at in 1992, 1993, and 1998, in the early 80s he complicated the very idea of the world as separable from any human creature.\textsuperscript{348} Buried in a 1981 endnote, Hauerwas writes that “Christian judgment of the world is always self-referential, as we can never forget that the world is not ‘out there’ but in us.”\textsuperscript{349} Or in other words, as he writes upfront in 1983, “the world is those aspects of our individual and social lives where we live untruthfully by continuing to rely on violence to bring order.”\textsuperscript{350} Christians can be disobedient just like other creatures. So the difference of agency seems to be framed by covenant. The disobedient creatures who confess Jesus are being unfaithful.\textsuperscript{351}

But in order to confess and be faithful to Jesus, Hauerwas’s account can slide into a kind of solidified duality “between Christians and pagans.”\textsuperscript{352} Rather than ontological dualism, the duality is a dichotomy between traditioned communities that culminates in the disparate politics of Christians and pagans. At the beginning of the 1980s Hauerwas’s account of the church began with emphasizing the uniting of story and character for the church to form a disciple in the “narrative traditions” of a particular community, an

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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\item Hauerwas, \textit{CC}, 247 n. 8. See also Hauerwas, \textit{PK}, 101 for a similar line.
\item Hauerwas, \textit{PK}, 101. See also Hauerwas, \textit{DT}, 144.
\item Dorrien, \textit{SS}, 359. For an instance where loyalty to God means self-critique sliding into traditioned community dualism, see Hauerwas, \textit{DT}, 78.
\end{thebibliography}
“institutional space,” distinct from but still in the world.\textsuperscript{353} As that church peaceably embodies its distinctively traditioned space, the church illuminates that the world is “divided” and displays that Christianity is true to the world.\textsuperscript{354} Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, Hauerwas closed the respective gaps between story and particular community and between virtue and particular tradition. In the 80s Hauerwas argued that the church, in a relational account of embodied truth, is the truthful story of salvation history found in Israel, in Jesus, and in the new creation. In doing so Hauerwas further solidified the separation of the church and the nations. He preached that, from Jesus and Pentecost, the church’s witness of peaceable alterity to the violent nations is a proleptic reversal of disobedient Babel and of the successive fragmentation. The church thereby continues the particular mission of the Abrahamic covenant to be “a light to the nations.”\textsuperscript{355} In the 90s Hauerwas emphasized all the more the importance of particular “traditions” for virtue in order to undo the weaponizing of virtue serving the nation-state’s violence.\textsuperscript{356} But similar to Hauerwas’s separation of the church and the nations, his stress on particular traditions has the consequence of splitting pagan and Christian virtues. Pagan courage, as articulated by Aristotle, “faces death with indifference” in

\textsuperscript{353} Hauerwas, \textit{CC}, 92, 96. See also ibid., 91-96; Hauerwas, \textit{PK}, 102. Good character and good virtue are of course tied together, all of which Hauerwas argues are achieved through skill derived by training from a “master craftsman,” directed by the community, and listening to its story (\textit{CC}, 115. See also ibid., 95, 116-119.).

\textsuperscript{354} Hauerwas, \textit{CC}, 91-92. See also ibid., 93-94, 106.

\textsuperscript{355} Hauerwas, \textit{CET}, 50. I recognize, as editors to the \textit{The Hauerwas Reader} note, that this chapter “signals a significant shift for Hauerwas in the mid-1980s, distancing him from formal appeals to the notion of narrative (or, for that matter, character) and emphasizing the material specification of the Christian narrative in the lived experience of the church. Hauerwas reminds us that, philosophically speaking, narrative does not refer, people do” (\textit{HR}, 142). But as I show above, that shift is more of a development rather than a complete break. For whatever inconsistencies Hauerwas might have, he maintains a thematic continuity, with some of the same points between \textit{CC}, chp. 5 and \textit{CET}, chp. 2. Much later in 2013, Hauerwas gives a description of tradition that parallels the Abrahamic covenant noted above: “the beginning of a tradition consists in authority being bestowed on certain texts and people” (\textit{AE}, 115 n. 43).

\textsuperscript{356} Editors, \textit{HR}, 289. See also Hauerwas and Pinches, \textit{CAV}, 150. What Hauerwas began earlier (\textit{CET}, 264-265), as the editors of \textit{The Hauerwas Reader} note concerning \textit{CAV}, chp. 9, Hauerwas later works “to distance himself from the increasing popularity of an ethical theory known as ‘virtue ethics’” by arguing “that ‘virtue ethics’ is not enough—that virtues can only be adequately inculcated and displayed within traditions of moral inquiry” (\textit{HR}, 289). But this does not mean that Hauerwas gave up working on virtues. For more recent instances, see \textit{AE}, chp. 9; \textit{HC}, 284; \textit{IGC}, 160; \textit{PF}, 15, 153, 156-158, 181-182; \textit{STT}, 236; \textit{SU}, 46; \textit{WGU}, 239 n. 80.
battle since one “sees no other good.” Christian courage, as articulated by Aquinas, “is martyrdom.” Pagan and Christian accounts of courage differ—in fact, “the world of the courageous Christian is different from the world of the courageous pagan”—since they maintain “differing visions of the good that exceeds the good of life itself.” Over the course of the 90s and 2000s, Hauerwas suggests that the pattern of different visions and their different virtues extends to two traditions: the church’s life in concrete particularities and political liberalism’s abstracting, warping, and supplanting of the virtues of “concrete traditions.” So for Hauerwas the question is to whom is one “loyal”? Is one’s loyalty to God’s peaceable kingdom and the community that embodies it, or is one loyal to “people and institutions” (“the world”) that assert the necessity of self-securing violence? For Hauerwas, “of course,” the answer is “the church…that community that rightly commands our loyalty in a manner that relativizes all other loyalties.” So one can see that Hauerwas is susceptible to Dorrien’s 1995 critique of “dichotomizing…between Christians and pagans.”

However, Dorrien’s focus on the church-world distinction missed two important issues. The first is a basic tension in service of asking how the world might understand the truth rather than be bound by illusion. Hauerwas proclaims that the world should

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357 Hauerwas and Pinches, CAF, 160. See also ibid., 151-156.
358 Ibid., 160. Emphasis original. See also ibid., 156-162.
359 Ibid., 160. Hauerwas has updated his account of virtues, writing that “Christians expect to discover the virtues in our non-Christian brothers and sisters. Moreover, in this time when we are all ‘wayfarers,’ the embodiment of virtues in the lives of Christians cannot help but be disordered. But the difference between those who are Christians and those who are not is that Christians have been made part of God’s economy sufficiently to locate for one another the disordered character of our lives” (WGU, 25). On the one hand, this account allows for seeing virtues and the church-world distinction in terms of agency. On the other hand, this account at the end implicitly raises the issues of community and illusion (or lies). Such issues comport with the second account of the world.
360 Hauerwas, WW, 103. See also ibid., 102; Hauerwas, IGC, 147-149, 208, 213-214; Hauerwas, PF, 148-149, 223-227.
361 Hauerwas, AN, 129.
362 Ibid. See also ibid., 128, 198; Hauerwas, DF, 152.
363 Hauerwas, SU, 31. See also Hauerwas, AC, 36-37.
364 Dorrien, SS, 359. For Babel and Pentecost, see Hauerwas, CET, 47-54, 60-62.
“place [itself] under the discipline of Christians who are trying to learn how to live peaceably.”

But that seems to conflict with Hauerwas’s breaking down the world-church separation. Resources in Hauerwas’s work might resolve the tension, such as his consistent concern of the world/violence within Christians, or his position of “ultimate realism” which I note below, or his account of creation which I address more in the next chapter. The final conclusion to this project returns to the church-world relation because my constructive critique differs from Dorrien’s in light of what will be covered in chapters two through four.

Yet, to focus here on the church-world framework or on resolving directly the tension misses a second, fundamental issue indicated by Hauerwas and Charles Pinches’s claim that “the world of the courageous Christian is different from the world of the courageous pagan” in relation to violence. The hierarchy of truth that Hauerwas maintains is either obediently received and then orders lives according to God’s peaceful “aeon” or is disobediently rejected and then rises the world’s violent “aeon.” Yet for Hauerwas “there is only one true history…God’s peaceable kingdom. Christians can admit no ultimate dualism between God’s history and the world’s history.”

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365 Hauerwas, DF, 5.
366 My argument above concerning two accounts of the world through the church-world distinction could be made in reverse. In fact, I believe that it would be more faithful to the order of knowledge of Hauerwas’s position. That is, to begin with Hauerwas’s traditioned communities dualism and show how it should be understood within his underplayed but consistent concern about the world/violence within Christians, or his account of creation which I will address more next chapter, or his position of “ultimate realism” which I will note below (Hauerwas, DF, 180; Hauerwas, PK, 113). However, I did not use that order because I followed the emphases in his publications and because of two issues raised by the quote: “the world of the courageous Christian is different from the world of the courageous pagan” (Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 160).
367 Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 160.
368 Hauerwas, CC, 238 n. 52. See also Hauerwas, AE, xi n. 5, 28-29; Hauerwas, AN, 194-195; Hauerwas, HR, 437-438; Hauerwas, PF, 213; Hauerwas, PK, 88-90; Hauerwas, STT, 261; Hauerwas, WAD, xii; Hauerwas, WW, 41.
369 Hauerwas, AN, 196. See also Hauerwas, PF, 214. While the denial of dualism may initially appear extreme, it is not about collapsing humanity’s historical existence. To the contrary, the denial of dualism is the recognition of God working within human history in order to transfigure it into part of God’s history. Hauerwas, CET, 51; Hauerwas, PF, 99, 105, 208-214 (which helps interpret Hauerwas, DT, 5-6, 54-57, 64, 75-78); Hauerwas, WW, 47 n. 11. There is an interesting, potential overlap between Hauerwas and Gutiérrez on the point of a single history, as Dorrien raises concerning the latter (RCG, 150).
assertion of one history and rejection of dualism expresses what Hauerwas calls “ultimate realism.” Rather than the church living in a “fantasy or illusion,” instead he asserts that “the so-called world-as-it-really-is is itself fantastic” since the world asserts its autonomy from “the resurrection of Jesus [that] is the absolute center of history.” Dorrien recognized this framework all too briefly in 2009, minus an explicit note about a hierarchy of truth. He mentioned that Hauerwas’s pacifism rooted in God’s peaceable kingdom is quite different than “the social order of ubiquitous violence described by [R.] Niebuhr and other social ethicists that liberalism sought to manage.” That difference is less about a church-world distinction and more about two very different views of reality, or as Dorrien notes for Hauerwas, which account describes “the real world.” Similarly, Dorrien and Hauerwas’s disagreement over the church and world is predicated on their different understandings of the nature of reality because they differ about what is truly significant. What is truly significant for them depends on what they argue is truly determinative of humanity, what ultimately creates and shapes humanity’s relational existence. So in other words, Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s differing positions on relational truth are actually rival accounts of reality.

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370 Hauerwas, DF, 180; Hauerwas, PK, 113. Hauerwas describes his position as “qualified epistemological realism” (CET, 10).
371 Hauerwas, DF, 180; Hauerwas, PK, 90. For ultimate realism in a positive inflection, see Hauerwas, AN, 15, 165; Hauerwas, BH, 209; Hauerwas, CC, 50, 110; Hauerwas, OT, 85; Hauerwas, HR, 437-438; Hauerwas, STT, 192, 198-200; Hauerwas, WAD, xii.
372 Dorrien, SEM, 483. Dorrien is understandably brief when it comes to the difference between Hauerwas and Niebuhr here since it was to be the argument of Hauerwas’s history of Christian social ethics that he abandoned. The problem is that the way Dorrien writes his very good section on Hauerwas gives the appearance as if the book’s thesis is not tied to the church-world distinction when Dorrien raises it later (SEM, 483-487). Gustafson saw the issue of reality, but barely addressed it and not generously. James M. Gustafson, “A Response to Critics,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 13, no. 2 (1985): 196; Gustafson, “The Sectarian Temptation,” 86.
373 Dorrien, SEM, 483. Dorrien uses quotes to mark off “the real world” but does not give a citation. For a longer account of Hauerwas’s connection between reality and truth, see Kallenberg, Ethics as Grammar, 238-245.
374 As I use the term reality here and later, it is the collective name for the forces that determine—that create and shape—human beings. From another vector, reality is the name for what contingencies constitute human existence. My use of determine and contingent does not mean logical determinism, nor dependency without freedom. Chapter two addresses how Dorrien and Hauerwas understand divine and human freedom, along with the Hegelian point of recognition.
True Reality

For Hauerwas, what is truly determinative of humanity is that Jesus as *autobasileia* is the truth, and that humanity’s new agency emerges from within God’s kingdom. Liberalism is significant only insofar as the church in the US is more beholden to the liberal assumption of violence than to practices that embody Jesus’s nonviolence. However, this hierarchy of truth has been misinterpreted in light of contemporary forces in human existence. Some have argued that Hauerwas’s stress on the church’s alterity indicates that he is over determined by his rejection of liberalism. Hauerwas’s account of the church as an “alternative” to political liberalism is indeed about setting the church in continuity with God’s “cosmic” kingdom and against political liberalism.375 But it is somewhat misleading to say, even though Hauerwas often does, that he portrays Jesus and the church as alternatives to liberalism. The converse is the case.376

For Hauerwas, the Christian confession that “God, not humanity, is the ultimate determiner of human history” is a universal, “metaphysical claim about the way things


One of the reasons I do not agree with Reno is connected to the issue of sovereignty that I will raise later. To say that Jesus and God’s kingdom as more determinative than violence, an “exception” to “a more profound peaceableness,” is to functionally hold to evil as privation in traditional Christianity; “Evil is always parasitical on the good”; “just as the lie lives parasitically off the truth, so violence cannot be named or identified unless our lives are constituted by more determinative practices of peace” (Hauerwas, *PF*, 170, 182; Hauerwas, *DT*, 174; Hauerwas, *PF*, 171-172). Or in words, “evil is bounded by a greater good” (Hauerwas, *BH*, 207). So instead of contrarian complaining, Hauerwas’s criticisms are about a loss made evident by his positive project. Hauerwas, *CSCH*, 148; Hauerwas, *PK*, 61; Hauerwas, *WAD*, 122; D. Stephen Long, *The Goodness of God: Theology, the Church, and Social Order* (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2001), 102-103.

Another reason that I do not agree with Reno is because of Dorrien. The source of missional impulse that Reno attributes to liberal theology is actually, as Dorrien argues, the evangelical heritage that liberal theologians maintained even after they switched from conservative to liberal theology (Reno, “Stanley Hauerwas and the Liberal Protestant Project,” 324; Dorrien, *MALT*, 1:31; Dorrien, *MALT*, 2:11). Moreover, Reno’s main argument about Hauerwas’s debt to liberal theology was not only already made by Dorrien, but also outstripped by Dorrien too. Dorrien, *SS*, 354-360; Dorrien, “Unintended Aid.” For Hauerwas’s debt to, for instance, Walter Rauschenbusch, see *AV*, chp. 6.
are.”

Jesus, in his particularity, is of utmost significance because he is the truth that is “more determinative” than any other truth. The actual alternative has always been sin, the perverting of humanity through the fearful lie of human autonomy as an alternative to God’s sovereignty. In Hauerwas’s words: “grace is a more profound word than sin.”

This complicates Dorrien’s 1995 critique that, contrary to Hauerwas, one need not “regard the rest of the world as unregenerate or deprived of grace.” For Hauerwas, because Jesus determines and works “with the grain of the universe,” “our sins cannot determine God’s will for our lives,” “justice is deeper than injustice,” and “forgiveness is a more determinative reality than punishment.”

The church can, therefore, proleptically live in the nonviolent, eschatological peace of God rather than live determined by liberalism’s political order and its violence. In the face of illusion the church reveals the truth that the world is still God’s and that it remains “bounded by God’s goodness” despite sin.

So Hauerwas’s position is that “the ultimate sign [of] our salvation comes only when we cease trying to interpret Jesus’s story in the light of our history, and instead we interpret ourselves in light of his.” But what then of Dorrien’s 1995 critique that

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377 Hauerwas, BH, 43; Hauerwas, CET, 49. See also Hauerwas, “Why Truth Demands Truthfulness,” 304.
378 Hauerwas, WAD, 173. See also Hauerwas, AN, 5; Hauerwas, CC, 93.
379 Hauerwas, US, 75. Emphasis original. Technically that quote is Hauerwas describing Paul Tillich. What differentiates them is flesh versus symbol (ibid., 80), which Hauerwas uses to then place the church in a position not accepted by the world and, thereby, contrary to Tillich’s emphasis on acceptance (ibid., 74, 82-83). However, for “grace as more profound than sin” in other but similar terms, in Hauerwas’s own voice, and in addition to other quotes in the body of the text, see BH, 198; PK, 170, 184.
380 Dorrien, SS, 359.
382 Fore the quotes, see Hauerwas, PK, 100. See also Hauerwas, BH, 207; Hauerwas, STT, 192. For the rest of the paragraph, see Hauerwas, PK, 31-32, 47; Hauerwas, US, 124; Hauerwas, DT, 85, 241; Hauerwas, PK, 126-128. The paragraph above and its preceding paragraph is why Wells rightly starts with divine sovereignty for constituting human existence and, in turn, the church-world relation (Transforming Fate into Destiny, chp. 5) and why I will address divine sovereignty and human existence next chapter.
383 Hauerwas, PK, 90.
Hauerwas’s perspectivism is “quasi-sectarian” rather than “open-ended.”384 Hauerwas’s account of hierarchical truth is complex and open, not monolithic.385 He argues that theology as the “‘queen’ of the sciences” requires an openness and humility, including that “theology has to learn from other disciplines.”386 He allows for “antecedent moralities,” meaning moralities that one’s cultural context holds.387 Even before 1995 he affirmed an account of “the self…constituted by many different roles and stories.”388 So rather than Jesus extracting the church from society, the question is how Jesus orders the church’s navigation of a complex milieu. The answer for Hauerwas is, of course, the faithful witness of embodying Jesus makes Jesus known in everyday relations.

Hauerwas’s account of truth in hierarchy and relations is, then, his account of reality. In contrast, Dorrien dethrones a hierarchy of truth. What determines human existence is a multiplicity of forces that are mutually related. Although they are qualified by an apophatic reserve, the reserve actually re-institutes the mutuality.

Dorrien assumes two basic truths found in line with his perspectivism that shape his understanding of reality. The first is that in the “world…everything is relative because everything is related.”389 I contended above that Dorrien’s mediating dialectic places truths in a mutually determinative relationship to one another. This “relational” dialectic rejects “Kant’s dichotomy between pure and practical reason,” but assumes that Christian truth and society are generally on the same plane when it comes to shaping one’s

384 Dorrien, SS, 18.
385 Hauerwas, CET, 12.
386 Hauerwas, SU, 30-31. See also Hauerwas, WGU, 212.
387 Hauerwas, BH, 127.
388 Hauerwas, CC, 132. See also ibid., 126; Hauerwas, CET, 36-42.
389 Dorrien, KRHS, 567; Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 263; Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 16; Dorrien, “Theology in a Liberal, Post-Kantian, Postmodern Spirit,” 46. See also Dorrien, EDE, 258, 303; Dorrien, MALT 3:296; Dorrien, SEM, 243; Dorrien, SS, 359-360, 373.
subjectivity.\textsuperscript{390} Theology asserts the importance of gospel truth. But theology must also be open to and engage modern knowledge in order to reflect on what is known and imaginable. Through the gospel and open reflection one can more readily participate in the movement of personal and panentheist Spirit within which all humanity relates to itself.\textsuperscript{391}

This account of reality as mutual relationality frames and propels Dorrien into a host of different kinds of human interrelations such as ecology, economics, interfaith dialogue, and discussions between science and religion. Dorrien supports, for instance, John Cobb Jr.’s “mutual transformation” as a model for holding together process theology’s sense of cosmological and ecological interrelatedness within an emphasis on liberation theologies and interfaith dialogue.\textsuperscript{392} But for Dorrien, social justice largely guides the forms of human interrelation. He asserts that the “best sign” of living in the mystery of universal, personal Spirit’s love is “a passion for social justice and the flourishing of life.”\textsuperscript{393} His progressive theology of justice works against oppressive injustice in order to work towards what people and their relations should become.\textsuperscript{394}

Dorrien might then reflect Hauerwas’s summation of “Christian Realism” as stated by Robin Lovin: “in the end truth about God must be consistent with every other kind of truth we can know.” However, this consistency is not the case for Dorrien. For him, “worldviews are relative, limited, fallible, passing, and thus not really the point.” Rather, “the incomprehensible Spirit of the Whole” will eschatologically transfigure “our [incomplete] strivings to live into the truth and advance the flourishing of life.” This eschatological variation on Dorrien’s apophatic reserve keeps him from “taking any of [his] worldviewing or activism too seriously, especially the battle of isms.” Thus, his apophatic reserve’s relativizing of the relativist perspective qualifies his mutual relation between Christianity and society.

Such a qualification might indicate a truth that orders all others, a kind of hierarchy in the negative. But there is more to what the reserve does. Remember that the specific basis for his reserve is both the limitations of human experience and reason and the relational apprehension of the Word’s hiddenness. These mean that Dorrien’s reserve is itself perspectival. The reserve is about the relativity of his position, that his perspective is absolutely relative and that it is inherently relational. So he must be open to others in order to broaden his perspective. The apophatic reserve, therefore, reinforces the importance of mutual relationality. Thereby it serves implicitly as a description of reality “where everything is relative because everything is related.”

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395 Hauerwas, WW, 48.
397 Ibid. See also ibid., 244.
398 Ibid., 270.
399 For the quote, see Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 263. For the rest of the paragraph, see Dorrien, SS, 17-19; Dorrien, WTM, 239. This framework explains why, in 1995, Dorrien blasts Hauerwas’s “Christian—non-Christian dichotomy…as a way of speaking about non-Christians that smacks of religious arrogance” (SS, 359. See also ibid., 18.).
But what about Dorrien’s metaphysical audacity, his re-mythologizing of Christ’s kingdom in Spirit? Although an account of Spirit inherently stresses relationality, does not simply the idea of Spirit undercut the claim that “everything is relative” in respect to objective, absolute, and universal truth? 400 The answer depends on which relation that one is referencing. 401

Dorrien’s normative theological position, by his own admission, is one position within liberal theology. Right after he calls for recovering a theology of personal Spirit and outlines his own spiritual center, he then writes, “more important than any particular proposal is whether or not progressive Christians have a passionate, clear, convictional spirit.” 402 Relativizing his own theological position comports with not only his definition of liberal theology united by method rather than doctrine, but also his perspectivism in an apophatic reserve. “Only a healthy pluralism in philosophy and rhetorical forms can free theology to do the work of locating the correspondence between human word and divine truth.” 403

So might Dorrien’s relativizing of his own position “make relativism a new monism”? 404 Hauerwas rejects just such a postmodern enterprise. But Dorrien is not that postmodern. Paralleling Hauerwas’s concern about liberalism in the university, Dorrien argues that “trying to convince deconstructionists that theology is a legitimate academic enterprise” has distracted, if not cut off, liberal theology from its evangelical heritage. 405

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400 Dorrien, KRHS, 567. See also Dorrien, WTM, 183-186, 191-192; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 49.
403 Dorrien, “The ‘Postmodern’ Barth?,” 339.
404 Hauerwas, WGU, 225.
That critique is about what conviction liberal theology should have. His normative theological position for liberal theology is that “it…should be a clear and convicting word about following Jesus and worshipping God as the divine Spirit of love without having to believe any particular thing on the basis of external authority.”406 This quote exemplifies Dorrien’s metaphysical audacity.407

Dorrien may then appear in a dialectical bind between his position and his conviction. At worst, as essential as Dorrien’s described conviction is to his position, his conviction is not simply filtered through but perhaps always subject to his apophatic reserve. Yet there is more if we are to take Dorrien’s conviction seriously. In the quote about his conviction is a small but crucial hint that, to use Rowan Williams’s words, Dorrien and Hauerwas disagree not only over “reality as it is” but also, more fundamentally, “the truth which encompasses it.”408 That is, Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s different understandings about the nature of reality are shaped by rival understandings of some-‘thing’ besides the human forces that determine human existence. As a speech-act, Dorrien’s account of Jesus and loving Spirit above subtly implies that Spirit shapes human relations. Divine creating, the other half of determination, can be identified in terms of the source of life that for Dorrien, I explicitly but briefly showed above, links divine transcendence and divine determination. Hauerwas’s account of God’s particular grace, that is Jesus, is explicit about determining humanity. So the issue is how Dorrien

407 For Dorrien’s eschewal of postmodern relativism, see Dorrien, KRHS, 272; Dorrien, SS, 17-19.
408 Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000), 124 (hereafter OCT). See also Hauerwas, “Why Truth Demands Truthfulness,” 304-305. Technically the quote is out of context, but it is directly applicable. “The grammar of our talk about the Holy Spirit…is the grammar of ’spirituality’ in the fullest sense of the emasculated word, the grammar of the interplay in the human self between the given and the future, between reality as it is and the truth which encompasses it” (Williams, OCT, 124). For Williams’s account of the Holy Spirit and of spirituality—both connected to Jesus—see Williams, OCT, 120, 125-126; Rowan Williams, Open to Judgment: Sermons and Addresses (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1994), 267-268 (hereafter OJ).
and Hauerwas account for the fact that “human reality exists…within God’s reality”: that “we are contingent beings whose meaning and significance is determined by something, something other than ourselves.” The next chapter will focus on their difference over the divine determination of humanity and the differences that stem from it.

V. Conclusion

I have shown that Hauerwas and Dorrien aim to be faithful to their relational accounts of truth. Yet their differences over truth create differences over how to be faithful to it. Hauerwas rejects liberal theology’s three layers because he privileges Jesus in his particularity as the truth who is known in particular relations. This relational account of hierarchical truth contrasts sharply with Dorrien’s account of multiple truths in mutual relation. These differences explain their differing evaluations of and responses to liberalism and liberal theology. However, what truth(s) Hauerwas and Dorrien focus on are often overlooked in terms of truth, while their differences over faithfulness are discussed in terms of liberation theology and the church-world relation. I addressed the latter issues to show not only that are they more complicated in Hauerwas’s work, but also that such considerations are insufficient for understanding the difference between Hauerwas and Dorrien. Instead, undergirding Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s differences over the church-world relation are their differing accounts of truth that imply rival understandings of reality.

However, even their difference over reality only begins to introduce but does not quite reach the heart their disagreements or theologies. Chapter two will show that at the

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409 Hauerwas, PF, 86; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 67.
heart of their theologies and their disagreements are the issues of divine sovereignty, human subjectivity, and human agency. There I show how divine sovereignty creates and shapes human subjectivity, and in turn, how that shapes human agency in intra-human relations. Dorrien focuses on Spirit, human spirit, and love. Hauerwas emphasizes Jesus, the triune creator, human creaturehood, and God’s particular grace. From Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s differences on those points, chapter three will argue, issue forth rival accounts of political sovereignty and participation with it.410

410 Long, Speaking of God, 267.
CHAPTER 2
The Heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s Disagreement:
Divine Sovereignty and Human Subjectivity and Agency

Chapter one concluded that Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement over the church-world distinction presupposes a more basic difference: the relational nature of reality informed by a hierarchy of truth for Hauerwas or a democratized plurality of truths for Dorrien. I briefly noted then that these differences over reality and truth are created and shaped by an even deeper difference. Dorrien emphasizes love and Hauerwas stresses gift within their respective frameworks of the Spirit’s universality and Jesus’s trinitarian particularity. These different emphases, I will argue, characterize their rival accounts of divine sovereignty creating and shaping human subjectivity and agency, and in turn, intra-human relations. Their different positions here mark the heart of both their theologies and their disagreements with one another.

I. Divine Sovereignty

Divine sovereignty is theology’s term for God’s supreme authority understood in two vectors. First, God determines—created and continues to shape—humanity. Second, humanity does not, at least fundamentally, create and shape God. This vector is undergirded by the recognition of partly human finitude but ultimately divine freedom. God is not a being or created, nor is anything necessary other than God for God to ‘be’ God. I endeavor in the first half of this chapter is to show that crucial to Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s projects is how they construe the relation between God’s supreme authority
and human agency. To show this importance and to narrow the scope of inquiry, it is worth stipulating five ways of understanding divine sovereignty.411

The first issue of divine sovereignty is Dorrien and Hauerwas’s affirmation of divine freedom. Yet Dorrien may not succeed where Hauerwas does on divine freedom, I will argue, precisely because of their respective construals of love and gift. However, divine freedom will be more integrated into my argument below rather than be the primary focus. This is because divine freedom is less prominent in their thought than divine sovereignty in terms of God’s sovereign agency in relation to humanity. So I will focus most on the latter.

The second understanding of divine sovereignty is divine lordship. Dorrien and Hauerwas’s kingdom theologies hold that God is the Lord over the cosmos. Despite lordship being the conventional description of divine sovereignty, lordship qua lordship is not the focus here. Instead, I follow Dorrien and Hauerwas. My focus is their re-

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411 The reason why I must make the argument concerning the importance of divine sovereignty is that Dorrien and Hauerwas largely assume both vectors of divine sovereignty; however, they do not explicitly develop a robust account of the doctrine of divine sovereignty itself in proportion to the rest of their work. That curious combination of divine sovereignty as both essential and rare is not uncommon in recent, mainstream US systematic theology and ethics. For instance, “an aura of neglect hovers over the theological notion of Providence; and yet in fact many of the clearest voices in contemporary theology make the doctrine central to their work.” See Philip Ziegler and Francesca Murphy’s introduction to The Providence of God: Deus Habet Constilium, ed. Francesca Aran Murphy and Philip G. Ziegler (London; T&T Clark, 2009), 1. The same neglect can be said of divine sovereignty in general, as does James S. Spiegel, The Benefits of Providence: A New Look at Divine Sovereignty (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2005), 9. The centrality of divine sovereignty can also be found in less doctrinally systematic or discussions, like political theology. See for examples: Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereignty: God, State, and Self (New York: Basic Books, 2008); Antonio González, God’s Reign and the End of Empires, ed. Rafael Luciani, trans. Joseph V. Owens (Miami: Convivium, 2012). Divine sovereignty in contemporary US systematics is most frequently treated by conservative/fundamentalist Calvinists and their Monilist, Armenianian, and open theist interlocutors. But I do not let the reformed terms of their debate set my project. See for examples: Paul Helm, The Providence of God (Downers Grove, IL: InverVarsity Press, 1993); Dennis W. Jowers, ed., Four Views on Divine Providence (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011). Others address sovereignty, directly or indirectly, through the issues of process, immutability, impassibility, and or providence. But in the milieu of recent, mainstream US systematic theology and ethics, there are only a handful of recent volumes dedicated to the doctrines of divine impassibility or providence, with the latter often in terms of the doctrine of creation but sometimes in terms of the Word. See D. Stephen Long and George Kalantzis, eds., The Sovereignty of God Debate (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2009); Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2000); Hugh J. McCann, Creation and the Sovereignty of God (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012); Alexander S. Jensen, Divine Providence and Human Agency: Trinity, Creation, and Freedom (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014); Darren M. Kennedy, Providence and Personalism: Karl Barth in Conversation with Austin Farrer, John MacMurray, and Vincent Brümmer (Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang, 2011); Terry J. Wright, Providence Made Flesh: Divine Presence as a Framework for a Theology of Providence (Milton Keynes, England: Paternoster Theological Monographs, 2009). A list of works on divine sovereignty would balloon if one were to cite historical and biblical theology; however, I will forgo doing so in the interests of space and scope.
description of lordship, to varying degrees, in trajectories other than as God ‘lording
over’ creation.412

Their re-descriptions occur in points three and four, which are, respectively,
God’s creative work and divine providence. In the former, God is sovereign as the one
who is the source of creation and who brought creation into existence. In the latter,
providence, God continues to sustain creation and to oversee creation’s development.
Both Dorrien and Hauerwas have a transcendent and immanent, creative and redemptive
understanding of divine sovereignty. They refuse to make God subject to ontology while
they emphasize God’s sovereign work as undergirding the existence of the cosmos and
overseeing the transformative growth of humanity. But Dorrien and Hauerwas differ
about the details. Although Dorrien and Hauerwas will make appeals to grace and love
respectively, for the most part Dorrien stresses Spirit and love, while Hauerwas
emphasizes Jesus and particular grace. Those differences are the focus of what follows
about Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s understanding of divine sovereignty.

Fifth, divine sovereignty determines both human subjectivity, in terms of
ontology (e.g., nature and creaturehood), and human agency. Both Dorrien’s and
Hauerwas’s accounts of human subjectivity revolve around relations among human

412 I also emphasize re-descriptions of lordship because of, on the one hand, my own sympathies for feminist insight. On the other
hand, I agree with Dorrien who “do[es] not accept the verdict that Christian kingdom language or Christianity itself is unredeemable
for feminism” (55, 19). For instance, Dorrien defines “the Kingdom of God” in terms “commonwealth” and “kin-dom”—the latter two
Dorrien uses as synonyms (Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 25). Commonwealth recovers the
social gospeler, and kin-dom attends to Ada Maria Isasi-Díaz, the late mujerista theologian. While Dorrien fits better than Hauerwas
with the feminist reconfiguration of God’s kingdom, I will show that Hauerwas construes Jesus’s non-violent peacemaking as re-
defining lordship itself. That re-definition and Dorrien’s own position, I will note, at least implicitly parallel ecofeminists’ constant
emphasis on a metaphor of care. Even though ecofeminists tend to identify God with the Earth in order to avoid a hierarchical
relationships of dominating abuse and anthropocentrism, maternal earth-care can be a kind of cultivation to characterization of God’s
sovereign agency. So the issue of cultivation that will be focused on in my main argument. Horstkoetter, “Getting Back to Idolatry
Critique,” 89-93; Ada Maria Isasi-Díaz, Mujerista Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996), 166 n. 9; Aruna Gnanadason,
Listen to the Women! Listen to the Earth! (Geneva, Switzerland: World Council of Churches Publications, 2005), 96-103; Aruna
Gnanadason, “Yes, Creator God, Transform the Earth!: The Earth as God’s Body in an Age of Environmental Violence,” Ecumenical
beings because God’s sovereign relating to humanity in turn shapes human relations. Both Dorrien and Hauerwas understand the divine relation to humanity in terms of love and grace. But, again, Dorrien focuses on love and Hauerwas on particular grace.

In the next few sections, I will explicate Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s latent understandings of divine sovereignty framed in terms of God’s creating and shaping relation to humanity. I show how those understandings are characterized by Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s respective emphases on love and particular grace. But first, the distinctiveness of Dorrien’s position cannot be sufficiently appreciated without noting the middle to late twentieth-century shift in liberal theology. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s life and assassination marked respectively the climax and collapse of two of liberal theology’s three wings: the social gospel, which carried on evangelical liberalism, and personalism, which provided the metaphysical backing for the social gospel. Process theology, the third wing and heiress to the Chicago school, was all that was left. That puts into relief Dorrien’s critique of Whiteheadian process theology ultimately construing God as the highest and most exemplary being or “creative process,” but still as “subject” to process nonetheless.\footnote{Dorrien, \textit{MALT}, 3: 63-65; Dorrien, “The Lure of Love Divine,” 43. See also Dorrien, \textit{MALT} 3:75-76, 87, 352, 538; Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 269; Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 16.} So when faced with a choice of giving up God’s goodness (love), omniscience, omnipotence, or immutability/impassibility, process theology often gives up the latter implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, despite the distinction between “God’s primordial nature” as immutable and “God’s consequent nature” as mutable.\footnote{Dorrien, \textit{MALT}, 3:65, 248. See also ibid., 64, 73, 75-76, 78-79, 85, 193, 198-199, 233, 249, 352. While those citations support the text above, in them one can also see the distinctions and complexities of various figures in process theology besides simply Alfred North Whitehead. Some process theologians give up goodness or omnipotence as a solution to theodicy (ibid., 130-131, 234-238). The same issues of divine finitude and mutability can be said of some personalists (Dorrien, \textit{MALT}, 2:319-320).} While Dorrien does not directly address impassibility or omniscience in his constructive work
directly and nor will I do below either, he nevertheless breaks from process because of
divine freedom. It is crucial, then, to establish the importance of divine sovereignty in
Dorrien’s position and to show how he develops it with his account of loving Spirit. The
development of his position provides the ground for the subsequent, more direct
engagement between him and Hauerwas on God’s sovereignty and creation. I explicate
Hauerwas on divine sovereignty partly because his reliance on it needs to be supported,
but also partly because divine sovereignty’s character of gift has been under-recognized.
Gift is a significant golden thread in Hauerwas’s unsystematic web. The triune God is the
one who gives particular gifts; human existence starts with gift; human creatures exist
through gift-giving; and gift runs accordingly to the end of Hauerwas’s ethics. Only then
can I proceed to a more thorough account of their understandings about human
subjectivity and agency in terms of intra-human relations as they are framed by
humanity’s relation to divine sovereignty.415

II. Dorrien on Divine Sovereignty

Dorrien’s account of gospel-centered personal Spirit (God) relating to spirit
(humanity) is predicated on the sovereignty of love, the universality of Spirit, and the
universal category of spirit. Most of these issues were raised in chapter one, but they
were only briefly noted. They were not explicitly brought together, nor were they framed
by sovereignty. I argue here that Dorrien’s articulation of panentheist, personal Spirit as

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415 For the rise of process theology, see Dorrien, MALT, 3:5-6, 8, 29, 133, 145, 149-154, 158, 514; Dorrien, SEM, 323; Dorrien, “The
Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 4-10, 13-17. As for grace, I am not alone concerning its importance for Hauerwas. Michael
Cartwright, Kallenberg, and Wells have raise it, and Wells ties it to divine sovereignty. But the importance of grace and of divine
sovereignty, much less the combination of the two, have yet to be given an extended focus in reference to Hauerwas, Michael
Kallenberg, Ethics as Grammar, 70, 126, 218, 237-238; Wells, Transforming Fate into Destiny, 2, 91, 156-157, 174-175.
love is the source of existence and shapes it. The following is a brief stipulative overview of Dorrien’s framework before I develop it.

The Spirit is not a being nor is it subject to process. Spirit is the source of existence, and Spirit works within historical process because underneath all existence is the category of spirit. With the Spirit as source of and its activity in human spirit, there are three aspects to ontology: being, nonbeing, and becoming. The Spirit’s oversight of these aspects is part of how the Spirit is sovereign. Spirit is the creative source of being, Spirit is greater than the void of nonbeing, and Spirit guides human becoming through the dialectic of being and nonbeing. This ontological typology and account of the Spirit’s sovereignty are not possible without an account of love. Being is made possible by love. Here love is the Spirit’s openness to difference from itself, that is human beings and their autonomy. Love has no exact corollary to nonbeing itself; however, love is in the Spirit’s creative work between being and nonbeing to guide human becoming. Love is the Spirit’s caring endeavor undergirding humanity’s development. Spirit calls humanity to love on the one hand, and on the other hand Spirit affirms human autonomy rather than violates it. In light of human autonomy, loving Spirit begins by laboring impersonally within the consciousness of humanity. Impersonally here means a non-personal presence. The Spirit’s impersonal work in human consciousness is how human beings apprehend that, nonetheless, their autonomous nature involves existing in mutual relations. Humanity can then realize that its development towards freedom is achieved through relations transformed by living in love’s openness and care. This pattern is typified by the Spirit’s personal, spiritual work in Jesus. Finally, then, humanity can begin to see its absolute dependence on personal Spirit. So love is essential to the Spirit’s sovereignty and
humanity’s developing existence. Love is openness both to others and to their autonomy. Love is also caring work for them to achieve free flourishing through the development of autonomy-in-relation to others.

Now to support my claim about the sovereignty of Spirit-love in Dorrien’s theology and to show the details of Dorrien’s framework. I begin with his understanding of divine freedom in terms of creative, universal Spirit. This places God above process while still the source of being. Dorrien can hold such a position because he understands the Spirit in both personal and impersonal terms: as love (personal) and universal (impersonal). This is also the ground for God working in process to transform it. However, Dorrien’s understanding of nature and grace ultimately places love before grace in order to make room for human autonomy, a point which will contrast sharply with Hauerwas. I then note that a spiritual perichoresis between divine Spirit and human spirit undergirds Dorrien’s understanding of transformation. Divine Spirit is sovereign, for Dorrien, because its universality and its creative love are the source of humanity and its means of transformation. In light of all this, then I can return to the issue of divine freedom.

Dorrien combines gospel, process, and personal Spirit for a kind of panentheist God who ‘exists’ in an “immanent transcendence,” always related to the world, but with a mysterious transcendent “more.” That framework is an account of divine sovereignty because, informed by two divergent schools of thought, Dorrien joins immanence and

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416 Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 269. See also Dorrien, WTM, 229.
transcendence with divine creativity and freedom. On the one hand, Whiteheadian
process theology’s emphasis on the creativity of God and the development of matter
affects Dorrien’s view of immanence. On the other hand, Barth’s rejection of human
attempts to control God affects transcendence. Dorrien’s dialecticism is not evenly
weighted here. Although process theology has outlived all other schools in liberal
theology, Dorrien is not a fully-fledged process theologian because he ultimately leans
toward Barth’s stress on transcendence (divine freedom) over process theology’s
reductionary emphasis on immanence. God is transcendent “power” over “being,” that is
life or existence, and over “nonbeing,” that is both death/nihil and potential.417 Yet,
Dorrien’s affirmation of divine transcendent power and his rejection of God “subjected to
process” are why Dorrien can maintain divine immanence active in process.418 God is the
creative source of being and is creatively at work in-between being and nonbeing for
humanity’s “becoming.”419

This account of God’s sovereign transcendence undergirds issues raised in chapter
one. Dorrien’s critique of God’s participation in process being subject to ontology or
process is the ground upon which Dorrien simultaneously embraces and relativizes the
modern world view. Chapter one also noted that Dorrien attributes his apophatic reserve
to Barth’s influence. But Dorrien can still incorporate process because his monism

417 Dorrien, MALT, 3:520; Dorrien, WTM, 229, 238; Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 269; Dorrien, “The Lure of Love Divine.”
418 Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 16; Dorrien, “The Lure of Love Divine.” See also Dorrien, WTM, 229;
419 For the quote, see Dorrien, “The Lure of Love Divine.” See also Dorrien, MALT, 3:520; Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 269.
For the rest of the paragraph, see Dorrien, KRHS, 430-431; Dorrien, WTM, 229; Gary Dorrien, “Metaphysics, Imagination, and
Creative Process: Bernard Meland and Chicago School Theology,” American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 25, no. 3 (2004);
Lure of Love Divine”; Dorrien, KRHS, 430, 565; Dorrien, MALT, 3:8; Dorrien, WTM, 229; Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 246,
describes God as “the ultimate ground of all categories, not merely all that is excellent or surpassing.” This indicates that ultimately undergirding Dorrien’s apophaticism is a complex fusion. He combines Barth’s understanding of divine freedom and the early Hegel’s construal of Geist that privileges negation. However, there is also tension in that Barth-Hegel fusion. Although Dorrien asserts divine freedom, his normative accounts have not addressed an implicit necessity of divine relation to humanity in accounts of panentheist monism. But the issue of necessity can only be addressed in light of answers to other questions. How exactly is Spirit creatively the source of and involved in process but not subject to it? And how is human subjectivity understood and incorporated? \[421\]

*Love and Spirit; Personal and Impersonal*

Dorrien has yet to give his own robust and detailed account of Spirit. But he has indirectly through his historical work on and his normative appeals to Nels F. S. Ferré. Dorrien’s descriptions of both his normative position and Ferré’s work track not only theme for theme, but often even word for word. So here I delineate their position often through Ferré but still connected to Dorrien. However, there is some difficulty in delineating what is to come. Dorrien rightly describes that “Ferré’s academic works were long on spinning concepts out of concepts.”\[422\] Dorrien’s historical interpretation of Ferré is clearer but it and Dorrien’s brief, normative appeals to Ferré still follow the conceptual pattern. That propensity combined with—and in fact due to—their apophatic reserve can lead to some rather abstractly vague accounts. What “metaphysical audacity” that can be

\[420\] Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 269-270.
\[422\] Dorrien, *MALT*, 3:46.
articulated is limited by “apprehending…indirectly,” by seeing “through a glass darkly.” So the following must be faithful to their idealist language of S/spirit. For them loving Spirit, personal and impersonal, is how God is universally and creatively sovereign over and through process. I begin with love and then address S/spirit, personal Spirit, and impersonal Spirit. These connected issues together form an account of the Spirit’s sovereignty and the ground for its relation to humanity.

In Ferré’s parlance, “God is sovereign love.” “Love is ultimate” because, as agape, divine “love is a self-existing and self-directed form of energy” that is both the

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423 Dorrien, MALT, 1:377-378; Dorrien, MALT, 2:306; Dorrien, SS, 17; Dorrien, WTM, 239; Dorrien, “Idealism, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 46. Of course the quote about glass is Dorrien quoting 1 Cor 13:12 (SS, 17).

Depending on whether one is reading the earlier or later Ferré, or at least in the way Dorrien summarizes Ferré’s thought, the ultimate of love and Spirit appear to be privileged over the other in some ways. The early Ferré stressed that God is love, but Ferré also held that God is love should also be understood as God is Spirit (Dorrien, MALT, 3:45). However, the later Ferré focused on more the universality of spirit and Spirit, in which he included love. That blazed a trail upon which Dorrien’s Spirit-Christology travels. I follow this developmental flow in my main argument. But in reference to Ferré’s earlier development, I include Ferré’s later work as support in reference to love partly because I need to compress Ferré’s position and partly because Dorrien finds Ferré’s later work so alluring. Ferré’s The Universal Word “was a revelation to [Dorrien]. It renewed [Dorrien’s] suppressed conviction that a liberal Logos theology can be the basis for a compelling theology of universal faith and world religions” (Dorrien, “Response to Ralph Ahlberg,” 188). But they are even more similar than Dorrien lets on. In order to see Ferré and Dorrien’s striking similarity, I have italicized the repeated words in the quotes below. But even many of non-repeated words have, as the reader will see soon, can be quite similar. Dorrien summarizes “Ferré’s usual themes” as: “God is creative and personal Spirit, motivated by love; the incarnate Word is the God of personal love and the all-inclusive Spirit; love is the final meaning of spirit and the personal; the spirit of cooperation must replace all forms of individualism and authoritarianism; creation is a pedagogical process that stretches into eternity; eternity is the life of divine love; being is not the best ultimate, either as substance or process; theology must move beyond the categories of substance and process; and spirit is the most inclusive and universal ultimate” (Dorrien, MALT, 3:54; “Theology of Spirit,” 26; “Making Liberal Theology Metaphysical,” 243). For Dorrien’s normative theological position: “Instead of privileging the categories of being or process, one might privilege the fluid, dynamic, and yet ultimate concept of spirit, and within that concept the categories of personality and love, interpreting experiences of the Holy as expressions of universal Spirit” in MALT, 3:538-339 is preceded by an appeal to Ferré and begins a brief account that Dorrien has truncated elsewhere. “God is creative and personal Spirit, motivated by love; Jesus is divine by virtue of the fullness of God’s Spirit in him; love is the final meaning of spirit and the personal; evil is the lack and nihilating negation of the flourishing of life; a passion for social justice and the flourishing of life is the best sign of living in the divine light; spirit is the most inclusive and universal ultimate; eternity is the life of divine love” (“Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 55). Dorrien also restates his theology as: “God is creative and personal Spirit, the transcendent holy mystery of love divine; Jesus is divine by virtue of the fullness of God’s Spirit in him; love is God’s very self in action; the lure of feeling and ultimate meaning of spirit; evil is the lack and nihilating negation of the flourishing of life; a passion for social justice and the flourishing of life is the best sign of living in the divine light; spirit is the most inclusive and universal ultimate; eternity is the life of divine love” (Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 22).

There are others who maintain similar themes as Ferré’s variation on Hegelian personalism, like Douglas Clyde Macintosh, Andrews Seth Pringle-Pattison, and William Temple. The relation between Ferré and the Boston Personalist school is more complicated because the latter, in Ferré’s judgment, often privileged spiritual personality rather than personal spirit, as will be addressed later. Dorrien, MALT, 2:237-256, 307; Gary Dorrien, “Imagining Empirical Theology: D. C. Macintosh, Epistemological Realism, and the Chicago School of Naturalistic Empiricism,” American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 24, no. 2 (2003); Dorrien, KRHS, 386-393, 425-426; Dorrien, “Hegelian Spirit in Question,” 9-11; Dorrien, DSP, 33, 42-43.
source of other’s distinction and the unconditional orientation toward the other.\textsuperscript{426} This initial understanding of love is about God in se and pro nobis. For Ferré, “God is love” because God is known in God’s “personal,” “creative,” and transfigorative love.\textsuperscript{427} This outgoing love begins with divine love as “the ‘category of categories.’”\textsuperscript{428} Divine love unifies the category of personality, which is “purpose or meaning,” with the category of spirit, which undergirds “being and nonbeing.”\textsuperscript{429} Love’s injection of purpose into the relation of being-nonbeing creates a directed form of becoming, a new existence. So the sovereignty of divine love is twofold. First, love is about openess for and to the other. That is, love recognizes the distinction between subject and object, and love is the subject open to the object. From this follows, in terms of the Spirit’s openness to being, the difference of being itself. Second, love is caring work for the other’s flourishing. From this follows, in terms of the Spirit’s care for being, the development of being (becoming).\textsuperscript{430}

Throughout the different variations of personalism, personality is “centered on the metaphysical primacy of consciousness.”\textsuperscript{431} However, Dorrien opts for Ferré’s minority position within personalism that rejects the primacy of personality. Ferré does so partly because “two personalities can[not] occupy the same place at the same time either in

\textsuperscript{427} Dorrien, MALT, 3:44-45.
\textsuperscript{428} Ibid., 44.
\textsuperscript{429} Ibid., 46. See also ibid., 44-45; Ferré, The Christian Understanding of God, 17; Ferré, The Universal Word, 125.
\textsuperscript{431} Dorrien, MALT, 3:11. See also Dorrien, MALT, 2:505, 508. Personality can be difficult to define further in part because it was made intentionally broad: “A movement person to the end, [Albert C.] Knudsen was willing to define personalism broadly enough to include realist-leaning theists like Georgia Harkness in the movement” (Dorrien, MALT, 2:353). Edgar S. Brightman offered a succinct definition of personality: “a self-conscious unity of self-experience; a person is a conscious unity” (Ibid., 323). For a more detailed account, in terms of “individuality,” “consciousness,” “will,” and “self-control,” see Ibid., 325.
physical or in psychic space.”

But this issue implies a further problem. When he asserts that “God is not even a thinking and acting substance,” Ferré is rejecting “a ‘separate Personality’ concept of God modeled on the supreme being of classical theism.” So for Ferré, the primacy of personality is still bound by the limits of “substantialist metaphysics,” despite claims to the contrary—some correct and some not—by the Boston school personalists. To avoid these problems of personality, Ferré construes love in terms of personal, which is “self-conscious, nonspatial purpose.” The immediate difference between personal and personality is “adjectiv[e]” and noun, respectively. If personal was not “qualitative” but instead quantitative, it would still be bound to some of the same substantive baggage of personality that would limit the extent to which panentheist Spirit permeates being. So what “quantitati[ve]” non-spatial, non-thing is personal modifying? Ferré and Dorrien need something else to make love a thoroughgoing universal, to stress the interrelatedness within the Whole, to strengthen their account of process, and to avoid anthropomorphizing or limiting God to radical immanence.

For Ferré and Dorrien the answer is monism: God is Spirit and the general category of spirit. The Spirit is the most basic form of divine reality, Spirit is the source of existence, and the category of spirit encapsulates the whole of reality. There are three,

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433 Dorrien, *MALT*, 3:55; Ferré, *The Universal Word*, 80, 143. See also ibid., 147.
435 Ferré, *The Universal Word*, 144. See also ibid., chps. 6-7.
436 Ibid., 143-144.
437 Ibid., 145.
438 Ibid., 142. See also ibid., 56, 129.
related implications in this framework. First, Spirit is universal as “the ultimately inclusive ultimate.”[440] Second, the ultimate ground of each human being is ultimately spirit, not material being. Third, Spirit relates to humanity in spirit. Ferré rejects idealism’s conventional “subject-object relation.”[441] He argues instead for “Subject-subject object and Subject-subject object relations” that are “in one dimension identical” as S/spirit, “and in the other distinct” as Spirit and spirit.[442]

Divine Spirit and human spirit as such is effectively what I will call the “similarity of spirit.” By similarity of spirit I mean that, on the level of spirit not being, God and humanity are equalized in terms of type, spirit, but are distinguished in terms of capacity or ‘existence’ (infinite Spirit-finite spirit), origination (Spirit the source of spirit), and “nonsubstantial personal awareness.”[443] This framework shares affinities with both analogy and univocity of being without being wholly either because the category of spirit is not being but rather the ineffable, monistic ground of everything. One can see the similarity and dissimilarity of analogy within the differentiation of capacity/existence and origination. In fact, I presume that Dorrien would want to argue for greater dissimilarity since he “take[s] for granted that [his] concepts do not correspond univocally to divine reality or any reality.”[444] Dorrien appears to take that reserve a step further as he does

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[442] Ferré, The Universal Word, 146-147. For the rest of the paragraph, see Ferré, The Universal Word, chp. 5; Dorrien, MALT, 3:52-54, 532, 538-539; Dorrien, WTM, 239; Dorrien, MALT, 3: 51-52; Ferré, The Universal Word, 55-56, 130-131, 138-139. One might interpret the “Subject-subject object” quotes in their original context strictly in terms of God in se. But even if that is the case, one should not forget that Ferré is a panentheist, and that the quotes in context serve as an introduction to the rest of the chapter where each human is supposed to move from “spiritual personality to becom[e] a personal spirit” (Ferré, The Universal Word, 152). The following pages make clear that even when focusing on the personal and appealing to analogy, there is still a fundamental similarity, a “coherence” in terms of spirit, in order to achieve a framework of “contrapetal” “panentheism” (ibid., 140, 148-153, 158-159). The similarity of spirit is fully realized eschatologically (ibid., 63-64).
with his readings of Barth rejecting analogy of being and opting for “dialectical reasoning” to the end of his life.\textsuperscript{445} Framed by the latter, recall that Dorrien’s apophatic reserve qualifies but does not keep him from re-mythologization. He gives of an account of God and humanity as divine Spirit and human spirit in those terms precisely because they are incomplete concerning the fullness that is God and humanity. Can something then be said? There is a correlation between God and humanity that is, for the same reason, not adequately described by the univocity of being. The level of spirit is supposed to be about the \textit{relationship} between God and humanity that is rooted in a panentheist monism, that is partially realized now in human consciousness, and that will be fully actualized non-spatially in the eschaton on the level of spirit. But that account of relational “coinherence” between divine Spirit and human spirit situates both as a \textit{fundamentally similar type} (or in Hegelian terms, “essence,” and in Ferré’s “the essence of sameness”) on the level of spirit in order to delineate a “contrapletal” panentheism in monist Spirit.\textsuperscript{446} I will return soon to the issue of Spirit-spirit’s coinherence and human development therein.\textsuperscript{447}

For now Ferré and Dorrien join the two ultimates, love and Spirit. Ferré claims that “God… is \textit{Spirit}. The \textit{form} of Spirit is personal; the \textit{content} of Spirit is \textit{Love}.”\textsuperscript{448} To say that “God is Spirit” is a claim that everything is included in the Spirit’s infinite expanse.\textsuperscript{449} “Personal” emphasizes the distinctive relational nature of Spirit and avoids

\textsuperscript{445} Dorrien, \textit{KRHS}, 470. See also ibid., 471-472, 566; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 47.

\textsuperscript{446} Dorrien, \textit{KRHS}, 211; Ferré, \textit{The Universal Word}, 122, 125, 134-135, 140, 148-153, 158-159, 181. For Ferré, the univocity of spirit is fully realized eschatologically (ibid., 63-64). Dorrien may want to say “method” rather than “type” since he writes: “Just as we are immanent in our bodies yet also transcend them through the power of self-consciousness, God has a similar relationship to the universe” (“Dialectics of Difference,” 269).

\textsuperscript{447} Dorrien, \textit{WTM}, 239; Ferré, \textit{The Universal Word}, 56, 63-64.

\textsuperscript{448} Ferré, \textit{Christ and the Christian}, 129. See also Dorrien, \textit{MALT}, 3:52.

\textsuperscript{449} Ferré, \textit{The Universal Word}, chp. 5.
some vague notion of Spirit. “Love” makes distinctions on the levels of spirit and
being. There is human spirit and human being because love recognizes the difference
between divine Spirit and humans as spirit and being. But also, implicitly, love is a sense
of caring for difference as different and for its development.

When it comes to universal and personal Spirit relating to spirit, love as caring
recognizes a crucial fact. There can be interpenetrative unity between Spirit and spirit on
the level of spirit, but not on the levels of personality or substance because, again,
multiple personalities or substances cannot exist in the same space. To avoid Spirit
overriding the psychic space of human spirit, Ferré’s solution is not only Spirit as
personal. Divine Spirit is also “present impersonally or semi-personally in man’s moral
urges and the workings of conscience” (e.g., intellectual intuition) in order to protect
spirit’s distinctive difference and its autonomy from overbearing Spirit. So God is
present personally to humanity as loving Spirit and present impersonally in humanity as
impersonal Spirit directed by love. This “contrapetal” framework is how love, even
though it is personal, can be universally present.

Dorrien’s normative accounts emphasize personal Spirit because it is the heart of
Spirit. But even though Dorrien himself never explicitly employs the framework of
impersonal Spirit, it is still necessary to his normative position for a number of reasons.
Here it is worth noting that Dorrien matches Ferré’s construal of impersonal Spirit and

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450 Ibid., pp. 128-129, chp. 6.
451 Ibid., chp. 7, esp. 161.
452 Ibid., 161.
453 Ibid., 133. See also ibid., 207; Dorrien, MALT, 3:53.
454 For the quote, see Ferré, The Universal Word, 134, 138-139. For the paragraph, see Ferré, The Universal Word, 166; Dorrien,
the autonomy of spirit’s difference. On the one hand, Dorrien describes the ground of intellectual intuition as “anything that I think or do is ultimately God thinking and acting through me.”

On the other hand, Dorrien seeks to maintain humanity’s autonomous subjectivity in a dialectical relation with humanity’s absolute dependence on panentheist, loving Spirit who is over being and nonbeing.456

**Humanity’s Dependence and Autonomy; the Spirit’s Apophatic Grace and Cataphatic Love**

Dorrien has long held to an epistemology of God’s universal accessibility to humanity through spirit’s experience of love and its rational reflection on it. Dorrien does so to keep divine sovereignty from overriding human autonomy. This has led him to ultimately emphasize love over grace to the point that grace, gift, or any other synonym rarely makes an appearance in Dorrien’s constructive theology. He privileges love and down plays grace for three reasons.457

First, Dorrien’s opting for universal accessibility to God leads to rejecting cataphatic revelation in Barth. Dorrien notes Barth’s understanding that “truth is grace” means that truth is only known through grace.458 Dorrien also recognizes the problem Barth saw in idealism: “If theology is to remain grounded in God’s revelation, then the idealist is going to have to dampen his ardor for a generally accessible truth, and to join

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455 Dorrien, *KRHS*, 536. See also Dorrien, *WTM*, 238-239.
456 For Dorrien’s emphasis on personal Spirit, see for instance Dorrien, *MALT*, 3:538-539.
458 Dorrien, *WTM*, 234.
forces with the realist.”

But Dorrien’s answer is to emphasize idealism’s universalism and reasoning rather than to accept a full-blown realism or Barth’s cataphatic articulation of grace. Humanity perceives its “absolute dependence” on God through socialized intellectual intuition and speculative reason, not so much through receiving cataphatic grace from an external authority. So in Dorrien’s constructive theology, humanity’s intellectual intuition and speculative reason apprehend that the nature of God is personal Spirit and love. Dorrien appears, then, to do away with grace. Yet, there is still room for Barth’s emphasis on grace in an apophatic frame.

Second, Spirit’s universality and humanity’s finitude makes grace largely a spiritual and ontological reality that proceeds from an epistemology about the spiritual reality of divine love. Years before his publications on Ferré, in 1997 Dorrien used Barth’s apophaticism and theology of the Word to construct a Spirit Christology. The Spirit is both hidden and universally known through its gracious work of spiritual self-revelation and transformative love in one’s mind and the concrete world. This constructive account emphasized many of Dorrien’s later hallmarks. The 1997 difference is that Dorrien actually wrestled with the issue of grace.

Grace appeared to ground his constructive theology because of his debt to Barth’s apophaticism. However, like Ferré, Dorrien also had reservations about Barthian grace. Barth’s truth-grace relation led to “a rather contrived and reductionist definition of myth” as “biblical ‘saga,’” in contrast with “monist mythologies of other religions and

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460 Dorrien, KRHS, 217. See also ibid., 4, 99-101, 103, 176, 535-536; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 49.
461 Dorrien, WTM, 238-239; Ferré, The Christian Understanding of God, 176-177; Ferré, The Universal Word, 50.
philosophies.” Instead, similar to Ferré, for Dorrien grace is necessary because of human finitude and God’s transcendence. But grace as such is largely an apophatic ‘revelation’ about the mystery of God’s hiddenness. Dorrien recently expressed his apophatic reserve in terms of grace: “Even if one begins with the given reality of God, the truth about God’s reality is not given.” Rather, grace illuminates in human consciousness the hiddenness of God, the transcendent ineffability of Spirit. But recall that Dorrien’s apophatic reserve does not negate “metaphysical audacity.” In 1997 he stresses that God is Spirit truly known only on the level of spirit. Dorrien characterizes that Spirit later in terms of personal, loving Spirit. So in love the Spirit is open to human spirit. Therefore, the net effect of an apophatic grace and cataphatic love makes grace a product of love.

This production of grace by love can be seen even in Dorrien’s explicit articulation of grace in the positive. Love is “life-giving.” Grace as such is one component of the Spirit’s universal love, which grounds Dorrien’s fight for justice and human flourishing. Such love and grace are also the reason why Dorrien proclaims that “we are not in control. It is not up to us to fulfill God’s will for the world. In drawing closer to God we are thrown into work that allows others to share in the harvest, and that is enough.” So in love the Spirit cares for human spirit by nurturing humanity’s

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462 Ibid., 236.
463 Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 47.
464 Ibid., 46.
465 Dorrien, WTM, 235-236, 238-239, esp. 236 and 239; Dorrien, MALT, 3:538-539.
466 Dorrien, WTM, 238. For the same point, see Nels F. S. Ferré, Know Your Faith (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 68; Ferré, The Christian Understanding of God, 26, 64; Ferré, The Universal Word, 161, 164, and esp. 174: “Love is a gift of life, a gift of love, a bestowal from Love.”
development in love. Grace, therefore, issues forth from love, the Spirit’s universal openness and care.

Third, for Dorrien, if love is to be “life-giving” for human development, then grace is shaped by human autonomy. Dorrien seeks to protect human autonomy from overbearing divine sovereignty in a way that overlaps with Ferré’s contention that Spirit relates impersonally to spirit. Dorrien contends that R. Niebuhr undercuts the liberation brought by autonomy because his stress on divine grace and sovereignty over determines humanity. In contrast, Dorrien’s understanding that “God is the lure of love divine” parallels his summary of Alfred North Whitehead: “God lures us to make creative, life-enhancing choices, but God does not negate our freedom to make choices.”

Emphasis on the “lure of love” and “choices” might not seem consistent with an account of grace, but the space for the freedom to choose is Ferré’s account of grace. Ferré construes divine grace as “God withdraws” God’s personal presence to be present only impersonally in humanity so that humanity can use its “God-given capacity” to make choices. If Spirit were personally present in spirit, that would compete for the psychic space in human consciousness.

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470 Dorrien’s critique of Niebuhr above (SS, 348) simultaneously applies the brake of Kantian apophatic monism to an overbearing cataphaticism, parallels Dorrien’s apophatic criticism of Hegel and Dorrien’s emphasis on negation in Hegel’s dialectic, and mirrors Pringle-Pattison and Søren Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel for losing individual spirit within Spirit (Dorrien, KRHS, 74, 387, 470).
Spirit Christology as Spiritual Perichoresis, 
and a Return to Divine Freedom

How then do Spirit and spirit relate? On the basis of the universality of both Spirit and the category of spirit, Ferré supercharged the relation between loving Spirit and spirit into a relation of interpenetration transforming spirit. The Spirit as personal and impersonal works on all levels of love—agape, eros, and altruism—and unites them together. This unity initially brings the human spirit’s erotic and altruistic love in line with Spirit’s agape, but the result exceeds the initial conclusion. A “Spirit-coinherence,” the “interpenetration of Spirit and spirit,” makes a new existence in human spirit: “co-subjects” with Spirit as modeled by the adoptionist “picture” of Christ.\footnote{Dorrien, \textit{MALT}, 3:51-52; Ferré, \textit{Christ and the Christian}, 54, 79, 91, 125. See also ibid., p. 126, chp. 4; Ferré, \textit{The Universal Word}, pp. 57, 153, 181, chps. 8-9, esp. pp. 198-213, 218-220, 224-232.} The “coinherence,” the “perichoresis” of Spirit and spirit in spirit, is a theology of spiritual transformation in continuity with intellectual intuition about Spirit.\footnote{Ferré, \textit{The Universal Word}, 229. See also ibid., 137, 152-153, 269-270; Ferré, \textit{Christ and the Christian}, 133. Again, this transformation into “perfect perichoresis or coinherence” is fully realized in the eschaton (Ferré, \textit{The Universal Word}, 64, 164-165).} In other words, this perichoresis of Spirit and spirit is a “spiritual” perichoresis because the perichoresis of Spirit and spirit is at the heart of Ferré’s description of Christian spirituality.\footnote{Ferré, \textit{The Universal Word}, 63. Emphasis original. See also ibid., 61-62, 64, 164-165, 269-270.} The perichoresis of Spirit and spirit is Ferré’s understanding of the incarnation in contrast to what he judges are Chalcedon’s idolatrous problems of substance and Hegel’s overbearing Spirit.\footnote{Dorrien, \textit{MALT}, 3:45-46; Nels F. S. Ferré, \textit{Christianity and Society} (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), chps. 4, 6; Ferré, \textit{The Christian Understanding of God}, 44-45; Nels F. S. Ferré, “Nygren’s Theology of Agape,” in \textit{The Philosophy and Theology of Anders Nygren}, ed. Charles W. Kegley (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), 257; Dorrien, \textit{MALT}, 3:52; Ferré, \textit{Christ and the Christian}, 50, 221; Ferré, \textit{The Sun and the Umbrella}, chp. 1 and p. 83.}
Dorrien’s Spirit Christology is in fundamental agreement with Ferré’s framework above. The ultimacy of Spirit and its love of all is the “universal Word,” which is “normative truth” for Ferré and Dorrien; indeed, the universal Word is at the heart of Dorrien’s Spirit Christology. In particular, Dorrien affirms Ferré’s account of spiritual coinherence and his apophatic concern about Chalcedonian ‘idolatry’ obscuring the truth of Spirit, when Dorrien writes “Jesus is divine by virtue of the fullness of God’s Spirit in him.” That is the heart of Dorrien’s Spirit Christology. What can be said about “the triune mystery who has power over the void,” is that “the presence of Christ’s Spirit calls for ongoing transformation in the form of life-giving works of love. The Word becomes true myth in order to redeem all history through ongoing transformations of the human spirit.” So both Ferré and Dorrien develop a similar pneumatology of sovereign love that creatively relates Spirit and human spirit. Ferré and Dorrien’s goal is also similar: the transformation of humanity into a new existence like Christ, despite how incomplete humanity’s faithful work may be. “God is the lure of love divine for creative transformation and the flourishing of life.” Specifically, since Dorrien’s theology seeks to be faithful to the truth and since that is about living in the Spirit as Christ did, “a passion for social justice and the flourishing of life is the best sign of living in the divine

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475 Dorrien, MALT, 3:54. See also ibid., 538-539; Dorrien, WTM, 239; Dorrien, “Response to Ralph Ahlberg,” 188; Ferré, The Universal Word, 77.
477 Dorrien, WTM, 229, 238; Dorrien, “The ‘Postmodern’ Barth?,” 342.
light” of sovereign love. But that raises the issue of intra-human relations in love to be taken up later.

With spiritual perichoresis as a capstone to the whole framework of S/spirit and love, an issue concerning divine freedom can be raised in full. For the latter, trouble occurs in his cataphatic account of S/spirits’ interrelationality and love. To construe God as Spirit and humanity as spirit assumes an inherent connection between Spirit and spirit and between spirit and spirit from the beginning. Without that connectivity, God is not Spirit or the Whole, humanity is not spirit in the whole and Whole, and so the category of spirit is not itself. Love is crucial here since it makes the distinction between Spirit and spirit, and in turn, love establishes a panentheism rather than a pantheism. But even in that distinction, love is an internal distinction on the level of spirit. Love cannot achieve an articulation of what grace in its negative inflection does: divine freedom. “If God is not free from us in some way that makes God’s power transcend the world, God cannot be free from us in our suffering and mortality. God cannot sustain life beyond death if God’s transcendence does not include power over nonbeing.” But in that apophatic framework is also an implicit characterization of divine freedom, here specifically election, analogous to what political liberalism calls negative freedom. While such a claim may seem tenuous in light of only the quote, my claim is one specific way of developing Dorrien’s deep sympathy for the larger apophatic vision of Meister Eckhart,

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481 Dorrien, WTM, 229.
who “refused to apply the names of the Father, Son, and Spirit to the ‘God above God.’”\textsuperscript{482} For instance, Dorrien still holds to thrust of those two quotes above, even though the first was in 1997 and the second was in 2009; however, other points surrounding Dorrien’s position seems to have changed. Whereas in 1997 he held to “triune mystery who has power over the void,” by 2014 he asserted that “all thinking about God is inadequate, a mere pointer to transcendent mystery. …Even if one begins with the given reality of God, the truth about God’s reality is not given.”\textsuperscript{483} The latter quote explains why, in 2009, Dorrien overlooked Karl Rahner’s dictum that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice versa in order to include Rahner in the list of “apophatic mystics” crowned by Eckhart.\textsuperscript{484} Yet it is one thing to maintain an apophatic emphasis. It something else entirely to privilege apophaticism in such a manner that undoes an account of the Trinity and to employ a metaphysical audacity that over time replaces the Trinity with “creative and personal Spirit, the transcendent holy mystery of love divine.”\textsuperscript{485} In other words, Dorrien’s construal of grace in the negative sets forth an apophatic account of divine freedom. Such ineffable mystery he supplements then with a cataphatic account of \textit{experiencing} loving Spirit. The latter account he affirms unabashedly in terms of agency \textit{pro nobis} but more tentatively in terms of \textit{in se} because of divine freedom in the negative—the mystery of “I AM.”\textsuperscript{486}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[482] Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 260. See also ibid., 261.
\item[483] Dorrien, \textit{WTM}, 229; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 47. See also Dorrien, \textit{WTM}, 5, 231-233, 236-239.
\item[486] Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 46, 49. Although I do not think Dorrien sees problems where I do, I believe that I have truthfully described Dorrien’s position. But if his normative position has not shifted, at least his publication record has shifted
\end{footnotes}
Response from Hauerwas’s Position

Hauerwas has not explicitly addressed Spirit Christologies, has rarely addressed personalism, and has only once mentioned Ferré. But a response can be derived from what he has written about love. Hauerwas emphasizes love’s priority in the sense that God is love, that God commands humanity to love, and that humanity is oriented to God by love characterizing friendship and ordering the virtues. But Hauerwas rejects most approaches to the primacy of love. They produce a vague, if not sentimentalized, notion of love without truth because they often abstract love from its particular triune and “cruciform” definition in order to maintain the human individual’s autonomous agency.487 There is persuasive evidence that Dorrien’s emphasis on truth seeks to avoid sentimentalizing love, but there is warrant for a potentially devastating response by Hauerwas on his terms. As chapter one showed, abstraction creates Christological problems. Hauerwas argues that “love, justice, or some other monistic principle as all-determining for ethical rationality and judgment” reductively replaces particularity with

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487 Hauerwas, AE, 117; Hauerwas, DT, 103. See also Hauerwas, AE, 117; Hauerwas, BH, 33-34; Hauerwas, CET, 92; Hauerwas, STT, 109; Hauerwas, VV, p. 4, chp. 6; Hauerwas, WT, 126 n. 5; Hauerwas, WW, 61 n. 47; Hauerwas, WW, 119, 140-141.
generic universality.\textsuperscript{488} That replacing is a “spirituality” which ultimately supplants Jesus with self-creation for self-interests under the guise of human experience.\textsuperscript{489} Dorrien’s Spirit Christology would then be a problematically “weak Christology” in Hauerwas’s view.\textsuperscript{490} But for Hauerwas, “Jesus is not the teacher of love; rather, he is the the herald of the Kingdom whose life makes possible a new way of existence.”\textsuperscript{491}

That allusion to Jesus as the \textit{autobasileia} is not the same as spiritual coinherence. Yet the new life that he gives is one of love since, for Hauerwas, “Jesus’s Lordship is exercised as a rule of love that prohibits the killing of the neighbor.”\textsuperscript{492} That “love is deeper and more profound than the evil we find in the world.”\textsuperscript{493} Then how might Hauerwas’s position be better distinguished from Dorrien’s account of love? One might continue to try in terms of abstraction and particularity since Hauerwas articulates love as friendship and stresses the “concrete fleshy” particularity of Jesus as constitutive of Christian love.\textsuperscript{494} But the details make differentiating Dorrien and Hauerwas more complex. For Hauerwas, Jesus’s love is a self-“dispossessed,” “nonviolent apprehension” in openness to all that shows the truth of God’s gracious openness to and care for the

\textsuperscript{488} Hauerwas, IGC, 172. See also Hauerwas, \textit{DT}, 174-175; Hauerwas, \textit{VV}, 120; Hauerwas, \textit{WT}, 25.
\textsuperscript{493} Hauerwas, \textit{CET}, 214. See also Hauerwas, US, 90.
other.\(^\text{495}\) That description of love simultaneously shares with Dorrien a similar characterization of love and indicates another difference alongside the issue of particularity. Hauerwas argues that love should not only be intimately connected with truth, but also with gift. Love requires the concepts of truth \(\text{and}\) gift in order to be intelligible. For the relation between love and gift: “love is a gift.”\(^\text{496}\) Accordingly, I will contend that love proceeds from gift for Hauerwas, in contrast to Dorrien’s account of gift proceeding from love.\(^\text{497}\)

### III. Hauerwas on Divine Sovereignty

Hauerwas claims that he has not “abandoned the central Christian contention of the priority of God’s grace.”\(^\text{498}\) Hauerwas also “ha[s] no intention of qualifying the necessity of God’s grace for the beginning, living, and end of the Christian life.”\(^\text{499}\) Those quotes raise this chapter’s thesis, that at the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s respective positions and their differences is divine sovereignty and human subjectivity and agency. So it is instructive to show their differences in light of their similarity over the relationship between God’s sovereignty and human existence. In Dorrien’s position above, God’s determination of humanity occurs in two relational forms. God as the source of being asserts in less traditional terms that ultimately God is the creator of human subjects. God also determines humanity by God’s impersonal relation indirectly shaping humanity towards the goals of transforming humanity and of humanity

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\(^{495}\) Hauerwas, \(PK\), 81, 91. See also ibid., 85-89, 105, 144-146.

\(^{496}\) Hauerwas, \(WwW\), 140. See also Hauerwas, \(VV\), 114, 117.

\(^{497}\) Hauerwas, \(AE\), 117-118; Hauerwas, \(VV\), 114, 118, 120.

\(^{498}\) Stanley Hauerwas, \textit{Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics} (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), xxxi (hereafter \(CCL\)).

\(^{499}\) Ibid.
perceiving personal Spirit. A similar point about the relationship of God’s sovereignty and humanity is at the heart of Hauerwas’s work. Hauerwas’s claim, that “the triune God is the origin and ultimate goal of all things,” is much like Dorrien’s way of framing the broadest relationship of God and humanity. But Dorrien and Hauerwas differ over significant details. Dorrien’s non-Chalcedonian Spirit Christology is grounded in the universality of spirit and sovereignty of love. For Hauerwas, Jesus-\textit{autobasileia} reveals that the triune Creator, through the divine economy of particular grace, creatively determines the cosmos as creation and redemptively transforms human creatures together into friends of God. In turn, Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s different characterizations of divine sovereignty, I show later, shape different understandings of intra-human relations. These differences, linked together, issue forth dramatically divergent responses to political sovereignty in the next chapter.

Here I will begin by contrasting Dorrien’s ultimates of Spirit and love with the heart of Hauerwas’s portrayal of divine sovereignty in Jesus and in gift. Then I will demonstrate Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s differences on how Jesus reveals God, how Jesus relates to creation, how God is free, how Hauerwas rejects the nature and grace distinction, how God’s relationship to humanity shows God’s sovereignty, and how Hauerwas understands the goal of God’s relating to humanity. By addressing those issues, I conclude, the heart of Hauerwas’s work is a theology of the trinitarian God who,

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\footnote{Hauerwas, \textit{BH}, 213. See also Dorrien, \textit{WTM}, 228, 239.}
\end{footnotes}
as gracious creator, positively determines humans to be creatures that are redemptively shaped in the particularity of God’s gracious work past, present, and future.  

*The Particularity of Jesus, Gift Preceding Love*

Whereas Dorrien personalizes the generalized universality of Spirit, for Hauerwas, Jesus in the particularity of his life, death, and resurrection fully reveals the distinctiveness of God’s sovereignty. God rules and redeems in Jesus on a “cosmic” scale. For Hauerwas, Jesus’s life and work as the *autobasileia* is God’s distinctively particular but still universal invitation for humanity to participate in God’s kingdom. Because Jesus the *autobasileia* is the truth, the living God incarnate, he reveals “to us how God would be sovereign.” Humanity comes to understand in Jesus that humanity is determined by gift instead of death, since “our existence and the existence of the universe itself is a gift” from the “Lord of the universe” upon whom all creation depends. Further, the cosmic character of Jesus’s lordship “totally reconfigured” what kingship means in contrast to *and* over-against sovereignty predicated on the fear of chaos and death. Divine kingship is sovereign not by coercion or violence, but through the gift of Jesus’s self-dispossessed openness to those considered outsiders or enemies “because God has valued ... all life.” The cosmic character of Christ’s revelation makes the rule universal and it redefines sovereignty.

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502 Theologically gift is a synonym of grace (Hauerwas, *CET*, 49; Hauerwas, *PF*, 117). But Hauerwas’s use of gift is often more specific. It is about maintaining the particularity of grace in terms of Jesus (*DT*, 193; *STT*, 13; *WT*, 262) and maintaining the dynamic of gift, forgiveness, and response in order to reflect the triune creator’s gift economy that determines the cosmos (*DT*, 20; *PF*, 98; *US*, 90). Therefore, I use either gift or particular grace for the most part when I refer to Hauerwas’s understanding of grace.


505 Hauerwas, *PK*, 27, 142.


507 Hauerwas, *PK*, 88. See also ibid., 81, 85-87, 91, 144-146.
Dorrien’s understandings of the creative, universal Spirit and the sovereign love are no less than cosmic. But how he gives that account is based on the correlation between the primacy of love as openness and an epistemology of God’s universal accessibility to humanity. This ground leads Dorrien to construe gift predicated on love. Hauerwas, however, makes love a function of gift because Jesus’s kenotic openness is a gift, because love is the Holy Spirit’s gift, and because humanity’s learning how to love is accordingly dependent on having been given it and reciprocating it in a particular community. The difference on the relation of love and grace may seem to be nothing more than a chicken versus egg dichotomy. But this disagreement undergirds other differences to follow.508

The Sovereignty of God’s Particular Grace Framing Creation and Divine Freedom

Contrary to Dorrien, Hauerwas has consistently rejected any natural theology not beginning with the particularity of Jesus. Hauerwas does so because he argues from the primacy of Jesus’s lordship over creation to a trinitarian basis of creation. Against abstraction, Hauerwas refuses to “separate” both creation and human knowledge of it from “Christ’s lordship”: “the cross determines the meaning of history”; “Jesus is the resurrected Lord of all creation”; “in Christ’s bodily resurrection nature and history are made forever inseparable.”509 With Jesus as Hauerwas’s focus, he maintains that Jesus is indicative of the Christian confession that there is no creation apart from the triune creator. The alternative, which results from abstracting God as creator from Jesus, is a

508 Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 45-46; Hauerwas, PK, 91; Hauerwas, US, 89-90, 95, 97-98; Hauerwas, WW, 140.
509 Hauerwas, CC, 11; Hauerwas, CET, 17; Hauerwas, US, 54. See also See also Hauerwas, PK, 27; Hauerwas, STT, 13, 44-45.
theistic or deistic divinity that causes the natural world. God as such is then used to
“underwrite an autonomous realm of morality separate from Christ’s lordship.”510 In that
case, nature names what can exist independently of God. But Hauerwas’s understanding
of particular grace resists this for two reasons.511

First, Hauerwas’s theology of God’s cosmic politics is a graced creational
theology rather than Dorrien’s more natural-spiritual theology of love. Hauerwas rejects
the nature-grace distinction insomuch as he understands the sovereignty of Jesus as lord-
creator in terms of gift-giving. Simply put, “life” both “belongs to God” and is “God’s
free gift.”512 Grace is, therefore, clearly determinative of ‘nature’ for Hauerwas; the
issues are why and how. He rejects the modern bifurcation of “human knowledge of
God” as either “from the bottom up” ... [or from] ‘the top down’” because that created an
“ahistorical” split between ‘nature’ and grace.513 Instead the two can only be understood
in “mutual interpenetration,” based on the “analogical and historical ordered uses of
language by which God’s relation to God’s creation is articulated.”514 So Hauerwas and
Dorrien both have an account of “mutual interpenetration” or perichoresis respectively.
But whereas Dorrien frames the elevation of being (nature) into spirit (‘supernatural’)
through love, for Hauerwas both ‘nature’ and revealed grace are “set within the purview
of God’s ‘grace-full’ dominion.”515 That is, Jesus reveals that God’s sovereign work of

510 Hauerwas, CET, 17. See also Hauerwas, STT, 254.
511 Hauerwas, IGC, 185-197; Hauerwas, PF, 85-89; Hauerwas, STT, 43-53; Hauerwas, WGU, 15-17, 25-41, 73-78, 125-131, 135-141,
141-241, and chps. 6-8 especially pp. 144-146, 156-168, 175-176, 180-184, 188, 190, 208-215; Hauerwas, DF, 111; Hauerwas, IGC,
512 Hauerwas, HR, 134; Hauerwas, STT, 39. See also Hauerwas, CC, 130; Hauerwas, SU, 74; Hauerwas, TT, 107. The quote “life
belongs to God” from HR, 134, is a rephrasing of “life is God’s” from PK, 88.
513 Hauerwas, STT, 44, 54. See also ibid., 43, 45, 53, 55-58; Hauerwas, PK, 27, 55-57, 66; Hauerwas, VW, 119; Long, “Capitalism and
Fetishizing the Particular;” 57.
514 Hauerwas, STT, 44. See also ibid., 13-14, 42 n. 16; Hauerwas, PK, 27, 62, 66.
515 Hauerwas, STT, 45.
creating a world with a God-given eschatological *telos* is just as much a gift as God’s sovereign redeeming of creation. So instead of the ‘nature and grace’ distinction, Hauerwas writes in terms of creation and God’s cosmic kingdom, for God generated creation in grace and continues to relate to it in grace.516

Second, Hauerwas’s understanding of divine freedom is found in the gracious character of God’s determinative reign. Hauerwas argues that creation is dependent on the triune God by siding with a Thomistic-Barthian account of divine freedom and rejection of method on a *cataphatic* basis, rather than an *apophatic* basis as in Dorrien’s *apophatic* reserve. Hauerwas’s cataphatic basis is the link between God acting out of divine freedom and that act as fundamentally gift. God freely gives God’s self, and thereby gives creation, because kenotic giving open to difference is a given extension of the triune life. Through God’s self-gift, God freely gives and determines “time and space” (e.g., “*creatio ex nihilo*”), which includes humanity and “human history.”517 God cannot be “judged by an external standard to God” (e.g., method).518 Instead, “life is God’s” gift, and life is redeemed in the gift of God’s kingdom-time, not in attempts of human self-creation like at Babel that refuse God’s gifts.519 For Hauerwas, then, divine sovereignty is God’s free and gracious rule that determines and redeems creation,

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518 Hauerwas, *STT*, 56. See also ibid., 19, 32-33.

revealed in a cosmic politics of particular grace. This gift established creation, saved the world in Jesus, and continues to work salvation in human history. Hauerwas’s understanding of the God-human relation relies on this account of particular grace. Accordingly, his configuration of the God-human relation contrasts sharply with Dorrien and Ferré’s account of the interpenetration of Spirit and spirit.\(^{520}\)

_Human Creatures and Agency, Divine Sovereignty as Gardener, and the Trinitarian Economy_

Dorrien and Hauerwas both configure divine sovereignty over creation in terms other than lordship, but their configurations differ from each other. Hauerwas understands lordship in terms of divine creating and a particular kind of “providential care” that embraces the difference in substance by maintaining the creator-creature dynamic.\(^{521}\) Since “God is Creator, eternal Lord of all,” human existence and contingency are a result of being creatures—dependent subjects—growing within the gift of God’s story and time.\(^{522}\) That emphasis on God as creator is one way of situating the creator-creature relation in divine sovereignty. But both the relation and sovereignty cannot be separated from particular grace. Human beings are “contingently constituted” as God’s creatures because Jesus’s lordship is realized as gift.\(^{523}\) The importance of particular grace is seen in the relativization of human aspirations. Creaturehood extends to all


\(^{521}\) Hauerwas, _DT_, 88; Hauerwas, _STT_, 192; Hauerwas, _WW_, 165.


\(^{523}\) Hauerwas, _US_, 90.
humans; anything less is “bondage.”524 Or said another way: “any account of agency that excludes the givens of our life, which often come in the forms of gifts, is insufficient.”525

Hauerwas’s description of humanity’s creaturehood presupposes an account of greater distinction than similarity between God and humanity. Hauerwas describes as true “the…profound inequality” between God’s “infinite” sovereignty and “God’s flawed, finite creatures.”526 So on the one hand, Hauerwas’s rejection of the univocity of being can be understood as similar to Dorrien’s contention that God is over both being and nonbeing. On the other hand, Hauerwas’s account of human creaturehood subordinates humanity to God more fully than Dorrien’s dialectic in the similarity of spirit. Yet the inequality and subordination of creature to creator does not disparage or undermine creation’s difference. Creaturehood is a good for it is God’s way of accepting humanity’s God-given “otherness.”527

Hauerwas’s emphasis on God’s gift of otherness in terms of creaturehood indicates God’s creative grace. Creative grace is just as much a gift as God’s redemptive grace because both kinds of grace are fused in Jesus, in whom God draws close to humanity as self-gift. Gift in the form of particular intimacy marks a major difference from Dorrien position on divine gifts as God’s personal withdrawal in order to give space for human choice and as God’s work as luring humanity to make choices for flourishing. This difference of relation is reflected accordingly in Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s understandings of divine sovereignty. Dorrien eschews any account of divine sovereignty

524 Hauerwas, IGC, 192. See also Hauerwas, CET, 185.
525 Hauerwas, STT, 94.
526 Hauerwas, BH, 183-184.
527 For the quote, see Hauerwas, WW, 165. For the rejection of univocity, Hauerwas, BH, 38, 183-184.
that overwhelms human autonomy. But for Hauerwas, such conceptions of autonomy result in “serving any powers but the true one” and rejecting “loyalty to the truth” inherent in creaturehood.\textsuperscript{528} Even God’s disrupting of Babel was a gift so that humanity could realize its creaturehood. Might that example of gift look like God ‘lording’ over humanity? Perhaps from Dorrien’s position. Yet for Hauerwas, divine intervention is God’s gift for cultivating humanity.\textsuperscript{529}

Hauerwas holds that “Jesus has totally \textit{reconfigured} kingship” by inverting the established power structures and that he has reconfigured politics by establishing his alternative.\textsuperscript{530} Since Jesus’s reconfiguration was achieved through the gift of his kenotic “care” for humanity, Hauerwas maintains that lordship is not the only metaphor for God as sovereign creator.\textsuperscript{531} In fact, an “almost exclusive concentration on kingship and rule” is problematically narrow.\textsuperscript{532} In order that “images of God’s care of and love for creation” will reshape the images of “‘kingship’ and ‘rule,’” Hauerwas suggests “horticultural images and descriptions as gardening and vine dressing,” as well as “the profoundly central pastoral image of shepherding.”\textsuperscript{533} Admittedly he rarely writes explicitly about God as a gardener or shepherd. But easily complementing themes like gardener or shepherd, Hauerwas consistently emphasizes human development under divinely directed friendship. God’s given direction and time makes possible friendship among human creatures, and humanity’s obedient friendships fulfill its God-given \textit{telos}

\textsuperscript{528} Hauerwas, \textit{PK}, 31.
\textsuperscript{529} Hauerwas, \textit{CET}, 49; Hauerwas, \textit{SU}, 70.
\textsuperscript{530} Hauerwas, \textit{WwW}, 58. Emphasis original. See also ibid., 121-124.
\textsuperscript{531} Hauerwas, \textit{DT}, 88; Hauerwas, \textit{WW}, 212.
\textsuperscript{532} Hauerwas, \textit{WW}, 212.
\textsuperscript{533} Ibid. Hauerwas also uses the metaphors of “sharecropper” (\textit{CDRO}, 342) and of healing (\textit{AN}, 56; \textit{CET}, 54).
to become friends of God. Thus, for human creatures to be is to be under the gift that is God’s caring rule.\(^{534}\)

For Hauerwas, the doctrine of creation is one way that Christianity describes God as “pure act, an eternally performing God” who created creation and continues to relate to creation.\(^ {535}\) But describing God as such is inseparable from an account of the Trinity. That emphasis on the Trinity provides a crucial contrast not just to Dorrien’s account of Spirit since, for Hauerwas, Trinity means that God is not “generalized spirit,” even as personal Spirit.\(^ {536}\) Dorrien’s emphasis on the sovereignty of love before grace is reversed by Hauerwas, for love is defined in terms of “self-giving.”\(^ {537}\) In other words, the fact that friendship with God is the Good depends on the fact that God’s gifts stem from the Trinity.\(^ {538}\)

Recall how Dorrien creatively appropriates Barth in order to assert that “even if one begins with the given reality of God, the truth about God’s reality is not given.”\(^ {539}\)

Hauerwas takes note of Barth’s apophatic inclination, but within that there is for Hauerwas a cataphatic basis by way of seeing speech-acts in the traditional ordo cognoscendi. The gift of Jesus, pointed to and supported by the gift of the Holy Spirit, reveals the triune giver. The truth of the incarnation and of the Holy Spirit (missio) is an invitation to friendship that reveals the triune God whose internal life is “self-giving”

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535 Hauerwas, PF, 77. See also ibid., 86. While grace qua grace is not mentioned on 77, grace is implied in Hauerwas’s account of God’s “invitation” to humanity later in the paragraph.
536 Hauerwas, IGC, 37. See also Hauerwas, PF, 86; Hauerwas, WW, 88-90.
537 Hauerwas, CSC, 63; Hauerwas, VV, 114.
538 Hauerwas, IGC, 191-192; Hauerwas, PF, 77, 86; Hauerwas, WW, 9, 192; Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 161; Hauerwas, PF, 77, 86.
539 Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 47.
That is, the different trinitarian persons embrace and maintain distinction-in-unity through loving self-gift and reciprocating in kind.\textsuperscript{541} The Trinity’s difference-in-relational unity is, in turn, the source of God’s establishing and accepting creaturely difference. Since the triune economy is one of eternal “overacceptance” and “reincorporation,” the economy is one of “overflowing plenitude” without end.\textsuperscript{542} Proceeding from that abundance is the gift of creation’s difference. God then extends further gifts to creation as an invitation for a positive response from creation to participate in the triune life. Jesus’s resurrection overcoming death showed “God’s refusal to accept the loss of any difference” both in se and pro nobis.\textsuperscript{543} So the triune economy of difference and unity in gracious relation is, for Hauerwas, the way God establishes, sustains, and redeems creation.\textsuperscript{544}

\textsuperscript{540} Hauerwas, CSC, 63; Hauerwas, \textit{VF}, 114. See also Hauerwas, \textit{CET}, 52; Hauerwas, CSC, 29-33, 44, 77, 87; Hauerwas, \textit{PF}, 86, 88; Hauerwas and Willimon, \textit{Re}, 171; Hauerwas, \textit{US}, 89-90; Hauerwas, \textit{WT}, 44-46; Hauerwas, \textit{WW}, 191. Hauerwas’s chapter on the Trinity and creation does not develop an account of Trinity \textit{qua Trinity} (\textit{IGC}, chap. 12). Trinity certainly is present in the chapter, but through largely through Jesus—the Holy Spirit is mentioned twice and the Father never by name (ibid., 193, 195). Some may see this as fundamentally flawed, and there are. But the chapter does show that Nathan Kerr’s assertion, that Hauerwas lacks a sufficiently Christologically focused account of mission, was not the case even before Hauerwas’s response to him (Hauerwas, \textit{WAD}, chap. 12). Hauerwas’s articulation of the Trinity through Jesus (as the \textit{missio}) is extended into Hauerwas’s account of the imago Dei as a mission (“purpose”) of ordering creation towards God’s eschatological end rather than \textit{imago Dei} as “some unique human capacity or ability, such as rational ability” (\textit{IGC}, 187-188, 193-194). The combination of Jesus, mission, and \textit{telos} ultimately connected to the church (ibid., 194-195) is proof that not only has Hauerwas indeed “assumed that the church is in mission wherever she may be” (\textit{WAD}, 168). But also, the mission is historical and fleshy because the creatures’ mission is Christological. Kerr, however, overlooks this \textit{In Good Company} chapter. Nathan Kerr, \textit{Christ, History, and Apocalyptic: The Politics of Christian Mission} (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2009). For more on purpose and doxology, see Hauerwas, \textit{WW}, 164-165.

\textsuperscript{541} Hauerwas, \textit{WGU}, 180-191; Hauerwas, \textit{HR}, 437; Hauerwas, \textit{IGC}, 192-196; Hauerwas, \textit{US}, 61; Hauerwas, \textit{WT}, 43-45, 260-262; Hauerwas, CSC, 63; Hauerwas, \textit{PF}, 88-89, 92-95; Hauerwas, \textit{STT}, 255; Hauerwas, \textit{US}, 90-91, 96; Hauerwas, \textit{VF}, 114; Hauerwas, \textit{WT}, 42-43, 45; Hauerwas, \textit{WW}, 190. Presumably attentive readers of Hauerwas would raise that he describes the immanent Trinity as one of love, particularly in his longest accounts of the Holy Spirit. So Hauerwas’s difference from Dorrien may appear as if the issue is not God’s \textit{internal} life, but God’s \textit{relation} to the \textit{cosmos} in terms of \textit{first love} proceeding from gift or gift proceeding from love respectively. However, Hauerwas’s accounts of the \textit{immanent} Trinity as love tend to be rather vague in terms of love, except that he frames the immanent Trinity’s love by the Holy Spirit descending on Jesus at his baptism. That descent implies self-gift, which is precisely how Hauerwas has described the immanent Trinity’s love (CSC, 63; \textit{VF}, 114). Crucially, Hauerwas holds that the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity. It follows, then, that he has described God’s agapic love for humanity as not simply self-gift (HR, 437) but “erotic self-giving” (Hauerwas, \textit{WwW}, 142). Accordingly, love (\textit{philia} and \textit{agape}) in the church must be “given” precisely because love is not to be possessed or self-given (Hauerwas and Pinches, \textit{CAV}, 82. See also Hauerwas, \textit{WwW}, 136-137, 140). This implies dispossession, which in turn recalls the dispossessive discipleship based on Jesus’s own dispossessive service (Hauerwas, \textit{PK}, 81, 86). For Hauerwas’s accounts of the immanent Trinity, see Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon, \textit{The Holy Spirit} (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 2015), 12-13 and 21 (hereafter \textit{HS}) for the affirmation that the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity; Hauerwas, \textit{WT}, 42-45; Hauerwas, \textit{WwW}, 141.


\textsuperscript{543} Hauerwas, \textit{PF}, 88.

The issue of particularity notwithstanding, Dorrien could affirm much about such trinitarian difference since love establishes difference. In fact, Trinity is the image of love-difference in unity for Ferré. The disagreement between them and Hauerwas arises out of their differing accounts on the God-human relation in terms of love or gift respectively. When this difference is set within how God accounts for humanity’s subjectivity and agency, the flashpoint is the concern about God overriding human autonomy in Ferré’s and Dorrien’s terms, or coercively consuming humanity in Hauerwas’s terms.545

Remember that for Ferré and Dorrien, Spirit is personal but it graciously withdraws its personal aspect and relates impersonally to spirit in order to affirm the autonomy of spirit (difference). This construal of grace as negative freedom is ordered by the Spirit’s love of the openness and care for humanity. The Spirit’s openness and care is manifest in its personal work with and impersonal work in human consciousness and relations so as to transform human communities into images of God’s love.

On those terms, Hauerwas’s understanding that the Trinity joins ‘personal’ and universal in a way that affirms differences such as human freedom without the need to construe God impersonally. For Hauerwas, the triune distinction between the persons in relation is both the source of difference and the reason why difference is peaceably present rather than coercively consumed in God. Accordingly, Hauerwas has emphasized triune difference because the positive relationality between triune persons reveals how

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God acts in unity. But mostly Hauerwas emphasizes the triune economy in relation to human agency.  

    God hospitably makes room for human participation through the church, a community of recipients of grace who reciprocate it with one another in friendship. Gift for intimacy, then, is the life blood of God’s economy. But also consider the ways that God’s invitation to “shar[e]…God’s very life as Trinity” makes humans creatures free in the process of transforming them into friends of God.  

    Humanity is free when it is “constituted by more determinative practices of” God’s “peace,” love, and truth, rather than the world’s violence and lies. From the gift of divine forgiveness, humanity learns to forgive and live peaceably within God’s forgiving work. In that work “wrongs” and “resentments” cease to determine the identities of individual humans, communities, and all of human history. Such forgiveness and human agency is under the gift of not only God’s direction but also God’s time, which I will take up soon.

    A Response from Dorrien’s Position

    Dorrien’s deep sympathy for process and ecofeminism could affirm Hauerwas’s horticultural understanding of divine sovereignty. There is also warrant for some overlap between Hauerwas and Dorrien on participation in the triune life. For Dorrien, both intellectual intuition and the pursuit of justice participate with the Spirit; and he has called God “triune mystery” on a rare occasion, even though he may have since left

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546 Hauerwas, PF, 86-89; Hauerwas, CET, 52; Hauerwas, HS, chps. 1-4; Hauerwas, US, 61, 80-83; Hauerwas, WW, 193-194.
547 Hauerwas, US, 61.
548 Hauerwas, PF, 171. See also Hauerwas, CET, 92-96; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 66-68.
549 Hauerwas, CET, 92.
Trinity behind. Yet there still remains a sharp contrast between Hauerwas on the Holy Spirit and Dorrien on the Spirit. Hauerwas’s emphasis on Jesus’s particularity not only shapes a pneumatology that “point[s] to Jesus.” The Holy Spirit is also present today “so that Jesus might continue to be present with us.” In contradistinction to that Christological pneumatology, Dorrien’s prioritization of the Spirit construes “the way of Christ” in terms of “Christ’s kingdom-bringing Spirit.” Dorrien further maintains that it is the Spirit present today, ordered by sovereign love, that works for transformation. The framework of Spirit relating to spirit has an inherent, positive openness to both autonomous spirit and the Spirit’s work in the world. This framework thereby opens attention to the interrelatedness of humanity and to its transformation. So from Dorrien’s perspective, Hauerwas’s emphasis on particularity is an exclusive claim that drives a church-world distinction and that, in turn, eschews a constructive relationship between church and world.

IV. From Divine Sovereignty to Intra-Human Relations

In order to complete my argument about divine sovereignty and human subjectivity and agency in Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s positions and disagreement, I will show how they understand that God’s determining of humanity is realized within intra-human relations. Dorrien and Hauerwas have a deep sense of humanity’s interrelatedness that creates and shapes human subjectivity and agency. But they differ on the character of human interrelatedness because of its dependence on and relation to divine sovereignty. I

552 Hauerwas, _WT_, 39. See also Hauerwas and Willimon, _HS_, 29.
553 Hauerwas, _CET_, 52.
554 Dorrien, _SS_, 19.
555 Dorrien, _EDE_, chp. 14; Dorrien, _SS_, 308-316; Dorrien, _WTM_, 213, 218-229; Dorrien, _SS_, 359.
will argue that Dorrien sees a dialectic in human subjectivity, which I call “autonomy-in-relation.” Human spirit is autonomous, but also a human spirit is interrelated with other human spirits within the Whole. I delineate the dialectic as a metaphysical account at work in humanity’s material existence. I then argue that Hauerwas’s account of human subjectivity and agency is determined by the gifts of God’s time and tempo. In order for human creatures to be representative witnesses of God, God gives time and direction that requires humanity’s patience and obedience. That divine determination and human contingency are necessary for human creatures to develop their interrelated mutuality into friendship.

The immediate material differences in their understandings of human subjectivity and agency are as follows. Dorrien’s democratic political economy is a framework of interrelation that serves the liberative equality necessary for flourishing in freedom. For Hauerwas, human freedom occurs in and serves friendship. These differences in their political arrangements fit their differing accounts of divine sovereignty. Dorrien’s love, his openness and care, for the mutual and free flourishing of human spirits matches his understanding of loving Spirit uniting all while ensuring spirit’s autonomy. For Hauerwas, the triune God’s gracious, cosmic politics orders and develops friendship in human creatures so that they may become friends of one another and of God.

V. Dorrien on Human Subjectivity and Agency as Autonomy-in-Relation

The beginning of this chapter established that Dorrien understands human subjectivity as autonomous spirit in relation to personal Spirit. The complexities of that personalist-Hegelian position, focused this time on human subjectivity and agency, are worth a short exploration in order to frame in terms of spirit and love the subsequent
account of Dorrien’s position on intra-human relations informed by sovereign love. What can be derived from the Spirit’s relation to spirit is a framework of human subjectivity and agency where autonomy and relation are not only connected, they are essential to one another.

The Spirit’s life-giving love is the source of, and respect for, human autonomy. The latter humanity apprehends and achieves on the basis of loving relationships attentive to autonomy. But even if human autonomy is its own end in one way, it is not originally self-generating. Here Dorrien’s apophaticism employs two forms of reason. The first, in the terms of Paul Tillich and Ferré, is “‘ecstatic reason,’ the eschatological, mystical experience of being grasped by the unconditional.”

This sense of human finitude in relation to ineffable mystery is why Dorrien, like Ferré, frames “the personal and moral in terms of spiritual aliveness.” The concept of personality would over-define human consciousness and Spirit as well as control their relation. But the human as personal spirit acknowledges a ‘space’ for the spiritual presence of transcendence “immersed in world process” and the creative possibilities therein. Therein, on the one hand, “[hu]man as spirit is basically the capacity for freedom.”

That is, “freedom is self-determination, the power to become a self through finite choices” in both “concrete realities” and “imagined realities.” But on the other hand, one’s “openness to Spirit becomes sensitivity to the world.” Accordingly, the personalist variation of Hegelian spirit is related to human development in light of a second form of reason, the framework of

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556 Ferré, The Universal Word, 152.
557 Dorrien, MALT, 3:538; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 49. See also Ferré, The Universal Word, 152.
558 Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 49.
559 Ferré, The Universal Word, 170. See also ibid., 105.
560 Ibid., 171.
Hegel’s *socialized* intellectual intuition. Through one’s own free choices in relation to another, a person develops from an *isolated* self-consciousness (“spiritual personality”) to a distinctive person in loving relation (“personal spirit”) toward the whole.\(^{562}\) The latter, “personal spirit,” is both “the image of God” and the *telos* of humanity.\(^{563}\)

That conclusion raises two issues. First, the conclusion is what Ferré called “unimunity.”\(^{564}\) He merged “unity” and “community” to describe “the richest possible variety of difference” “perfectly coinhering” within the multidimensionality of Spirit; Spirit, in turn, “penetrates and partakes of all personal entities.”\(^{565}\) This unimunity is love, “where the self is always fully included but never at the expense of the other.”\(^{566}\) Unimunity as such is just as much about the common good and a new community as unimunity is about the image of God and the *telos* of humanity. Second, unimunity confirms the importance of divine sovereignty. The process of realizing freedom through relation allows one to ultimately perceive that one’s autonomy is in absolute dependence on the Spirit’s life-giving love.\(^{567}\)

Dorrien does not give a metaphysical account of human as spirit, as spirit relating to spirit, nor such a metaphysics connected to material existence. However, essential to Dorrien’s account of intra-human agency is not only self-determination and choice, as I will show below. But also in parallel to Ferré’s account of unimunity, Dorrien’s employs John Cobb’s work on “mutual transformation” for the common good in racial, national,


\(^{563}\) Ibid., 152. See also ibid., 163-164, 170-172, 175.

\(^{564}\) Ibid., 135.


\(^{566}\) Ferré, *The Universal Word*, 168. See also ibid., 163-167.

\(^{567}\) For unimunity as common good, new community, etc. see ibid., 135, 167-173, 333-334, 341-342, 346-356.
imperial, economic, environmental, and interfaith issues. To address these emphases of both autonomy and relation, I will develop what I call a framework of autonomy-in-relation: both the recognition of the inherent autonomy in each person and the work to achieve their autonomy depend on relations attentive to human autonomy and to communities within the Whole. When it comes to Dorrien’s work, autonomy-in-relation is present in humanity’s concrete reality shaped by the Spirit’s love. Thereby Dorrien’s political economy for the common good charges through the door opened by Ferré and their forbearers: Kant, Hegel, and the social gospelers.

The Common Good: Free, Equal Self-Determination in Free, Equal Choice

Dorrien holds to human autonomy and agency in terms of freedom as equal self-determination through the free and equal capacity to choose. Freedom as such is a common good, and to achieve it, individual rights are “foundational.” That is the

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569 Because what I am arguing above concerning Dorrien and spirit is my own constructive interpretative argument, it may require further justification for someone like Dorrien. Since he interprets Tillich’s religious socialism to coinhere with his theology of religions, there is warrant for identifying within material existence some elements for a metaphysical account about the connection between human as spirit and the interrelatedness of the world. But despite Dorrien’s sympathy for Tillich’s theology of religions, that is not the frame here since Dorrien’s theology of religions is ultimately for Ferré’s account of spirits in uniminity within Spirit. The issue of Spirit raises, however, the possibility of using Hegel’s work for my answer instead of Ferré. For Hegel, the Spirit develops from consciousness to self-consciousness to Absolute Spirit through material reality. Since the Spirit does so, in that same pattern the subject’s consciousness “actualizes itself” in a free, outward act that orders “the external concrete world.” But personalists critiqued Hegel for collapsing spirit and Spirit, which undercuts an account focused on intra-human relations. So I employ Ferré to frame the development of the answer in order to provide what can constructively be said about human spirit itself and about spirit in relation to spirit. For the quote, see Gary Dorrien, Logic and Consciousness: The Dialectics of Mind (New York: Hastings Press, 1985), 39. For the rest, see Dorrien, RCG, 51-57; Dorrien, MALT, 3:54-55, 538-539; Dorrien, “Response to Ralph Ahlberg,” 188; Dorrien, KRHS, 179-191, 389-392, 397.

570 Dorrien, EDE, xii.
political fruit of Kantian autonomy which Dorrien assumes within his social gospeler call for “a democratic transformation” to economic democracy.⁵⁷¹

For him, “democracy has to do with the character of relationships constructed on the principles of freedom and equality.”⁵⁷² Yet rampant economic and social inequality makes impossible equal self-determination through free and equal choices. So Dorrien argues for his liberal interpretation of the common good, stating that “the principle of equality is central, and [that] there is no equality of individual opportunity without approximate equality of condition.”⁵⁷³ Key to achieving the latter is Dorrien’s vision of economic democracy. It “is about giving substance to the principle of self-determination for all people. It extends this principle across all sectors of social existence, including racial and sexual justice, and refuses wars of empire and aggression, forging a common ground for social justice movements.”⁵⁷⁴ That makes economic democracy, Dorrien proclaims, “the system most compatible with human freedom.”⁵⁷⁵ Freedom gives economic democracy the logical ground to be about self-determination and therefore choice.⁵⁷⁶

The point of economic democracy is to pragmatically realize choices that are broader and more substantive than offered by banal capitalism. Economic democracy

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⁵⁷² Dorrien, EDE, 281. See also Dorrien, “Beyond State and Market,” 195, 201; Ferré, The Universal Word, 110, 115.

⁵⁷³ Dorrien, EDE, xii. See also Dorrien, DSV, 7-8, 11; Dorrien, OQ, 221; Dorrien, RCG, 4.

⁵⁷⁴ Dorrien, EDE, 285; Dorrien, “Economic Democracy and the Possibility of Real, Healthy Change,” 142. See also Dorrien, DSV, x, 166; Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 22.

⁵⁷⁵ Dorrien, DSV, 15. See also Dorrien, EDE, xvii, 129-130, 281.

itself is an alternative choice to “neoclassical theory [that] promises but does not deliver” on “choices for workers.”\textsuperscript{577} Critically, both kinds of choice together apply “a brake on human greed and domination” by resisting the exploitation of the worker.\textsuperscript{578} Positively, both choices together not only make possible, but are also themselves the kind of “creative, life-enhancing choices” which “God lures us to make.”\textsuperscript{579} The principle of equal self-determination through free and equal choices is a common good; self-determination and choices in equality are necessary for each individual to freely flourish.\textsuperscript{580}

\textit{The Common Good: Together}

But as the issue of democracy indicates, the principle of choice is “co-constitutive of the self’s being.”\textsuperscript{581} Drawing from Gregory Baum, Dorrien maintains that “each person needs others to become oneself; every person comes to be through dialogue and communion with others.”\textsuperscript{582} The same can be said for the common good, it “emerges through discussion and struggle.”\textsuperscript{583} When both choice and relation are transposed into the frame of democracy, “robust democracies”—which are themselves relational—\textit{“seek

\textsuperscript{577} Dorrien, \textit{EDE}, 184. See also Dorrien, \textit{DSF}, 150; Dorrien, “Beyond State and Market,” 200; Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 23-24; Dorrien, “Economic Democracy and the Possibility of Real, Healthy Change,” 143. \textsuperscript{578} Dorrien, \textit{EDE}, 181. See also 183. \textsuperscript{579} Dorrien, “The Lure of Love Divine,” 43. Since the quote in context is in reference to Whitehead and then liberation, but not directly to economic democracy itself, see the following sources about economic democracy, some in connection to Christianity, that are described by just such a quote: Dorrien, \textit{EDE}, 22-27, 133-142, 167, 182; Dorrien, “A Case for Economic Democracy”; Dorrien, “Beyond State and Market”; Dorrien, “Commonwealth Economics”; Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 22-26. \textsuperscript{580} Dorrien, \textit{EDE}, 179, 183, 365. \textsuperscript{581} Dorrien, \textit{EDE}, 365. In classic Dorrien fashion, the paragraph cited is off-set from Dorrien explicitly delineating Baum. The paragraph \textit{might} be read as simply Dorrien further interpreting Baum, but given Dorrien’s other work, I interpret his off-setting of the paragraph and the tone of the writing as indicating his normative position. In addition to what is shown in the body of the text, see ibid., 364 for Dorrien’s admiration of Baum. See also Dorrien’s connection between democratic socialism and self-determination by the poor (\textit{DSF}, 19), and his connection between base communities and self-determination (\textit{DSF}, 93). \textsuperscript{582} Dorrien, \textit{EDE}, 365. \textsuperscript{583} Dorrien, \textit{OQ}, 220. See also ibid., 221, 226.
to maximize freedom and equality for all people.”

Dorrien’s vision of economic democracy follows accordingly. As if to fulfill Ferré’s emphasis on concrete and imagined realities, Dorrien maintains that economic democracy’s “imagining [of] new forms of social and economic organization…is fundamentally about creating concrete and viable new democratic choices.” So freedom is gained by autonomous persons (spirit) in and through mutual, “deliberative” relation with other, immediate autonomous persons (spirit) and the broader, social whole. That is autonomy-in-relation, a version of Hegel’s socialized intellectual intuition where the focus is human subjectivity and agency in community and for freedom. But Ferré’s frame helps better illuminate two important points about spirit relating to spirit within Dorrien’s work.

First, recall that unimunity is about love as the recognizing of and caring for distinction within the whole. In accordance with autonomy, Dorrien’s attention to love means recognizing (openness) and securing (care) the human dignity of free self-determination and choice for all. Dignity as such must accordingly be secured politically and economically, even though dignity is a position about what is natural to human consciousness. But love’s emphasis on the individual also has a social dimension. Dorrien situates self-determination for the liberation of the marginalized within the larger whole of the common good. He argues that a “decentralized,” economic democracy puts into practice the liberal principle of equality, which he correlates with proleptically

584 Dorrien, EDE, 281.
585 Ibid., 179.
586 Dorrien, OQ, 221.
587 Ferré, The Universal Word, 168.
realizing the biblical vision of the eschatological banquet. Dorrien fights for liberative common good because he, like other social gospelers and personalists, sees other individual persons and communities within the Whole. That fight and recognition is socialized intellectual intuition in response to the Spirit’s agape at work. Like Rauschenbusch, R. Niebuhr, and many other liberal theologians and ethicists, Dorrien understands love as the force that calls humanity to recognize the dignity of all persons, to fight for their recognition, and to sustain those in that struggle. So the Spirit’s love in openness and care shapes Dorrien’s understanding of human relations in mutual recognition.

Second, aspects of this autonomy-in-relation framework are directly related to economic democracy. Dorrien’s economic politics of inter-connective subsidiarity is, I claim, effectively spirit relating to spirit. In terms of intellectual intuition as an interrelated whole of reality, economic democracy collectively situates individuals within the whole. Or this framework stated in economic terms, economic democracy unites collectivism and freedom for the common good. That re-statement is precisely how Ferré frames economics in terms of unimunity for the common good. How does this break from


Hegel? Rather than Hegel’s account of the greater good depending on a slaughter-
“altar,” Dorrien holds to the common good.590 There is no self-determination and
liberation without mutual interrelation creating an “approximate equality of condition.”591

Economic democracy is autonomy-in-relation that achieves the common good of
liberative equality for freedom. Economic democracy privileges the principle of equality
by fusing co-working and co-owning in cooperatives. What is necessary, Dorrien argues,
is democratic transformation achieved through democratization and localization of
investment and power in the community, in the workplace, and in the banking structure.
He maintains a special focus on unionization and production since community enterprises
and worker ownership usually take the shape of local cooperatives, union movements,
and economic rights. As for the “mutual fund or public bank enterprises” of social
ownership and investment, Dorrien has always put forward Sweden’s Meidner Plan.592
But he also includes cooperative firms or networks, like Mondragon, and state owned
banks, like North Dakota’s state bank.593

**Multiple Levels: Local and Global**

The emphasis on communities such as local cooperatives, unions, and worker-
owned corporations also assumes relations among communities in their local, societal,

and global contexts. So autonomy-in-relation must accordingly expand, or scale up, to include communities and their relations. Or as stipulated earlier, human communities are within the Whole (everything-in-relation within Spirit). Otherwise, the autonomy-in-relation framework would parallel “a religion that lacks…a sense of the Spirit of the whole,” which “does not interest” Dorrien.\(^594\) And going hand in hand with a vision of the Whole is the pursuit of social and economic justice. So justice endeavors for the common good expand accordingly. How Dorrien does so is in the link between economy and ecology.

Dorrien’s vision of economic democracy, focused on the community for the common good, cannot be separated from economic democracy’s service to ecotheology. His work for democratic transformation is partly to resist the “turbo capitalism” that consumes people and natural resources as if they are in infinite supply.\(^595\) The ecological turn is key to understanding Dorrien’s concept of subjectivity. Ecology maintains Kant’s international scope by expanding and further characterizes Hegel’s horizon of interconnectivity between spirit and spirit. This multivalent horizon of humanity’s global reality develops autonomy-in-relation. To transpose it into an ecological frame, the common good of equal relations qualifies free choice when private ownership is placed over against equal self-determination.\(^596\)

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\(^{594}\) Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 46.


Eschewing the anthropocentrism of the self-determined subject, ecotheology begins with the principle that to value life means recognizing the finitude and interconnectedness of reality. In unchecked global capitalism, most of humanity loses finite, natural resources for the unsustainable benefit of a select “few” who act as if “the destructive aspects of its activity [are] somebody else’s problem.”\(^5\) This greed is economically driven. But that structural evil is “at war not only with the world’s natural ecology.”\(^6\) It also fragments the global and local “social ecology.”\(^7\) In the effort to commodify cheap labor on a global scale, international and local relationships are subject to capitalist colonialism rather than the common good.\(^8\)

To address global capitalism, Christianity “must offer a new myth of healing, relationality and embodiment that counters the bad myth of sovereignty and domination sustained by the perpetrators of the worldwide ecological crisis—ourselves.”\(^9\) Generally, in liberalism’s terms, oppressive determination is an external force that violates the autonomy of human subjectivity. But the turn to ecology illuminates that oppression countermands a larger, social vision of the common good that the gospel Spirit calls Christians to work toward. The common good requires all voices, but oppression undercuts the common good by silencing people and communities with an externally determining framework. Although some aspects of the common good builds on Kant’s anthropology, for Dorrien, self-determination is part of achieving liberation for

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9. Dorrien, \(WTM\), 224. The quote is Dorrien working with Sallie McFague’s project, but I understand the quote above to also be his own position as well, considering: his positive estimation of her work (ibid., 227–228), his later development of divine sovereignty with Barth and C.S. Lewis (ibid., 229, 233, 235, 238), his argument for pluralistic methods and discourse (ibid., 224, 227, 232, 235), his other work on Barth (\(BRMT\), 196), and above all, his criticism of “a U.S.-level lifestyle” that “the earth’s ecosystem cannot sustain...for more than one-fifth of the world’s population” (\(OQ\), 219).
the common good. This implies that the common good is communal and, in turn, relational. How can that be since self-determination is often construed as an individual’s act? Self-determination is also dependent on relationships between individuals who positively and negatively determine one another in their local environment. Self-determination, then, is best understood not only as attending to an individual, but also to liberating a community’s collective voice. The latter is the necessary first step towards a “cooperative commonwealth.”602 Or in Ferré’s terms, unimunity liberates marginalized communities. The freedom and distinctiveness of the other in loving relation to another are realized through and bounded by the Spirit’s love.603

VI. Hauerwas on Human Subjectivity as Interrelated Agency

Like Dorrien, Hauerwas holds that human subjectivity is found in relations. They both further stress mutual recognition for human flourishing in the common good, in history, and in God’s kingdom. Those affinities are partly due to Hauerwas sharing some common interests with Hegel’s emphases on history, teleology, and social subjectivity as mutual relations in-and-for freedom. At the same time, Hauerwas sharply diverges from this common ground because of his emphases on creaturehood, God-given time, and friendship. Within these similarities and differences, I will argue that Hauerwas emphasizes intra-human friendship framed by his account of God’s sovereignty. I begin by briefly establishing that human creatures are to be, for Hauerwas, representative witnesses of the creator through intra-human friendship. To this end, Hauerwas argues,

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God gives time necessary for human creatures to learn how to be friends through obedience and patience to God’s timing. These themes, I show, mark a significant divergence from Hegel and Dorrien. That disagreement also exposes another, significant difference. For Hauerwas, friendship, not freedom, is the point of humanity. So Hauerwas situates human freedom as a necessary component of friendship, but freedom is reconfigured by friendship. Freedom is not the end result of friendship.

*Human Subjectivity as Creatures and Human Agency as Friends in God’s Time*

Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s alternative conceptions of the relation of divine and human agency follow from variant ideas of divine sovereignty and human subjectivity. Dorrien’s Spirit relates to and transforms spirit in love. For Hauerwas, Jesus the *autobasileia* reveals that God’s particular grace determines the world’s being as creation and redemptively transforms the world as creatures through participation in God’s economy. In that account of humanity’s *subjectivity* as creatures, the general framework for Hauerwas’s understanding of human *agency* is friendship. Describing that framework as such emphasizes the often implicit themes of creaturehood and friendship in Hauerwas’s emphasis on the necessity of faithful embodiment in the church’s representative witness. There is, however, one more vital subtext that over time has occasionally become more visible in the sprawl of Hauerwas’s work: the triune economy of gift. Since I developed it earlier, here the issue is how, for Hauerwas, the triune God’s gifts determine human creatures for intra-human friendship. The triune God gives the human creatures the time for obedience and patience in accordance with God’s timing. After delineating the difference between Hauerwas, Hegel, and Dorrien on time, I show
how Hauerwas understands human freedom within friendship cultivated by obedience and patience. Such friendship is representative witness. 604

*Human Subjectivity as Human Agency in the Gift of God’s Apocalyptic and Eschatological Time*

To develop how human representation in friendship is dependent on receiving God’s gifts, Hauerwas connects witness and friendship to human participation within the triune economy. He does so by emphasizing the economy in time rather than in a “timeless model.” 605 Time is a particularly important issue for Hauerwas because “sheer contingency” without a telos “has rendered the notion of God’s rule more or less unintelligible.” 606 To recover God’s rule in terms of time, Hauerwas employs Rowan Williams’s characterization of God’s gracious work as a performance that takes time like any music or theatrical play. 607

Human performance in God’s play frames human participation in the triune economy, which in turn determines humanity’s interrelated subjectivity. Human creatures as representative performers move to the “gift” of God’s tempo. 608 Specifically, human agents act through virtues in accordance with the time-filled, community told story of God’s work. This framework is how human creatures have room to actively participate in the triune economy, and thereby have agency in becoming friends of one another and of God. But the virtues must be learned; discipleship is process. So God gives the time


605 Hauerwas, *PF*, 96. See also ibid., 96 n. 68, 107.

606 Hauerwas, *WW*, 219 n. 4.


necessary for people to learn the virtue-filled, skilled craft of embodying peace by practicing under a master’s instruction. The virtues of obedience and patience are especially vital since human creatures participate in God’s play by moving to God’s tempo that “takes time” rather than by human creatures creating their own performance or timing.\textsuperscript{609} Thereby obedience and patience are virtues by which humanity receives and responds to God’s gifts of forgiveness and peace.\textsuperscript{610}

Hauerwas’s account above offends not one but two aspects of both liberalism and liberal theology. First, just as Dorrien critiques R. Niebuhr, Dorrien would presumably worry that Hauerwas’s account of divine sovereignty and human “submission” to it overruns human autonomy.\textsuperscript{611} I will return soon to Hauerwas’s account of obedience because not only is it more complex than it may seem, but also because what contributes to its intricacy is another complex difference between Dorrien and Hauerwas.\textsuperscript{612}

Second, obedience to the triune God also offends liberalism’s abstract universals that dismiss ‘picture thinking’ for generalized ideals to be progressively achieved. Yet, crucial to Hegel and Dorrien are accounts of teleology and progress that initially seem to operate like Hauerwas’s sense of human agency within God’s time. But for Hauerwas not


\textsuperscript{611} Dorrien, \textit{SS}, 348. That is certainly an unexpected twist since Hauerwas rejects Niebuhr’s dismissal of impossible ideals on the grounds of divine sovereignty (\textit{PK}, 142). However, Hauerwas does appreciate that “Niebuhr saw that sin results from our inability to live as creatures—as contingent” (\textit{PK}, 32). Hauerwas then quotes Niebuhr at length on sin, finitude, and freedom that Hauerwas uses to address self-deception. All that is in the context of God’s sovereignty and human creaturehood (ibid., 31-33).

\textsuperscript{612} I will also return to Hauerwas’s reliance on divine command and human obedience in in the final conclusion to this project since my critique differs from Dorrien’s.
only is the perfecting of humanity framed as ecclesial friends on a “journey” of character development towards a particular theological end. Such maturation also occurs in God’s apocalyptic-eschatological time, rather than Hegel’s progressive-teleological vision or Dorrien’s progressive-eschatological orientation.

Hegel’s progressive Spirit makes time thoroughly teleological, but also, in Dorrien’s estimation, dangerously all-encompassing. Hauerwas’s critique of “metanarrative” is probably the closest he comes to paralleling Dorrien’s critique of Hegel. But unlike Dorrien, Hauerwas explicitly rejects Hegelian “presumptions that each tradition must share with all other traditions some final rational state.” Hauerwas also seems to reject Hegel’s teleology since it replaces eschatology with “continuous, or even progressive, process.” In contrast, Hauerwas’s appreciation of telos is more or less Thomistic. The God-given telos of all people in relation to God is to be “friends with God,” which is achieved by the God-given telos of intra-human relations, to be “friends with one another.” Those teloi are revealed in the incarnate and resurrected Jesus who “embodied” “God’s ‘grace-full’ dominion.” The church as human creatures “serving one another” in turn “serve[s]” the more immediate end of witness to “the kingdom of God.”

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613 Hauerwas, BH, 181; Hauerwas, CCL, xxvii-xxviii; Hauerwas, STT, 127 and n. 15.
614 Hauerwas, CDRO, 341-342. Hauerwas has long countermanded the position of “story of stories” (CC, 97); yet sometimes, when it comes to the church-world distinction and the church’s witnessing task, Hauerwas does say that: “There was a beginning because there is an end. We were not created for no purpose, but rather for the glory of God. That alone is the story of stories” (PF, 146. See also 149).
615 Hauerwas, STT, 185. See also Dorrien, KRHS, 182-187, 191-195.
616 Hauerwas, WW, 33. This point is inferred from Hauerwas’s critique of R. Niebuhr because Hauerwas notes, in summarizing Karl Löwith’s critique of Niebuhr, that Niebuhr’s historicizing of Christianity’s superiority in terms of symbol appears “more Hegelian than Christian” (ibid., 34). For more on Hauerwas’s argument about Niebuhr’s progressivism and for a brief note that Hauerwas opts for eschatology over Hegel’s progressivism, see ibid., 36-42, 179-180.
618 Hauerwas, STT, 27, 55. See also ibid., 45; Hauerwas, BH, 181-183; Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 44-51, 68-69, 106-109; Hauerwas, PF, 181.
619 Hauerwas, STT, 45. See also Hauerwas, CET, 17.
620 For the quote, see Hauerwas, IGC, 192. See also Hauerwas, STT, 45. For Dorrien’s critique of Hegel, see Dorrien, KRHS, 12-13.
Dorrien is, however, more theologically complicated. Particularly important for Dorrien is the social gospelers’ hope for the eschatological kingdom progressively realized in their time, to one degree or another, through human cooperation with God. But Dorrien also breaks with their, for the most part, politically naive postmillennialism. Their overreaching moral rhetoric overemphasized the realization of the kingdom, and overestimated their work in realizing it. More careful social gospelers, like Rauschenbusch, recognized an apocalyptic aspect to the kingdom but also saw that “the perfection of the kingdom was reserved for a future epoch.” Dorrien similarly holds that human work is superseded by the Spirit’s work of completely actualizing the eschatological banquet in some sort of eschaton. One might construe such a vision in Hegelian terms of Absolute Spirit. Even if that is correct, the theological source is not directly Hegel. Dorrien’s embrace of Barthian apophaticism and his resistance to “control” history make room for some measure of transformative revelation in the new creation. But Barth is only one element within Dorrien’s much larger framework. His definition of liberal theology, his sympathies for transcendence in immanence, and his normative account of Spirit eschew a cataphatic, apocalyptic in-breaking in the present.

Hauerwas agrees with Dorrien that God’s kingdom is already present but not yet fully realized. Hauerwas also argues for a transcendent “eschatological orientation” over an immanent yet “incomplete telos” in order to oppose liberal theology “assuming the

621 Dorrien, SEM, 92. See also ibid., 91.
623 Dorrien, EDE, xiv-xv, 12, 14-15, 21; Dorrien, SEM, 44, 86-87, 674-676; Dorrien, SS, 19; Dorrien, WTM, 21; Dorrien, SEM, 30, 60, 73-79; Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 270; Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 25-26; Dorrien, KRHS, 4-5; Dorrien, WTM, 239.
responsibility (which is clearly not theirs but God’s) of ensuring that the story comes out right.”

624 But unlike Dorrien, for Hauerwas redemption from “self-deception…must come to us externally.”

625 In other words, Hauerwas’s frequent argument against human agents attempting to control history arises from his emphasis on apocalypse in the present. Apocalypse reveals, Hauerwas proclaims, both “the way the world is meant to be” and “a time that makes all things new” in history rather than a “point outside history where we can secure a place to anchor our moral convictions.”

626 The cross shows that God’s loving patience endures “our frightened and prideful refusal to worship a crucified savior,” while through the resurrection “the very destiny of the cosmos is determined.”

627 The conclusion of the cross and resurrection together is that Jesus’s apocalyptic (re)ordering of (disobedient) creation historicizes it within the story of divine history. So not only does Hauerwas emphasize that creation is irreducibly material and thereby social, as opposed to the position in which “our ability to be spirit—that is, to be more than our physical or biological nature—is exactly what is necessary for us to historic.”

628 Hauerwas also argues against human history reduced to a “seamless web of casual relations” that cannot truly change since God’s material creation has “an end” in being created anew that is “inaugurated” by Jesus and that is proleptically realized “at Pentecost.”

629 Apocalypse, therefore, is the salvific revelation of and embodiment of

624 Hauerwas, _PF_, 96-97. Emphasis original.
625 Hauerwas, _Wf_, 166. Lest the context of the citation seems too dependent on contingency of intra-humans relations, for the connection of the church to an apocalyptic, ultimate realism frame, see also Hauerwas, _DF_, 108-110, 112-115.
626 Hauerwas, _DT_, 6; Hauerwas, _PK_, 62, 85. See also Hauerwas, _DF_, chp. 5; Hauerwas, _DT_, 113; Hauerwas, _US_, 137.
627 Hauerwas, _DT_, 98; Hauerwas, _US_, 53. See also ibid., 52.
628 Hauerwas, _PK_, 35. See also ibid., 36-37, 157 n. 1; Hauerwas, _AE_, 183; Hauerwas, _STT_, 84-89; Hauerwas, _WAD_, 125-132; Hauerwas, _WT_, 203-206.
629 Hauerwas, _CET_, 51; Hauerwas, _DF_, 109, 200 n. 44; Hauerwas, _US_, 52. See also Hauerwas, _BH_, 151; Hauerwas, _WAD_, 130-133.
God’s kingdom, predicated on God as the redeeming creator revealed in Jesus’s patient work.\(^{630}\)

**Freedom and Interrelated Mutuality within Friendship**

So for Hauerwas, God orders human existence by putting it in step with God’s particular work and timing. How does that ordering extend to intra-human relations? A helpful entrance to answering that question is addressing part of the next question. How does Hauerwas’s answer differ from Dorrien’s Hegelian informed position that emphasizes humanity’s free agency achieved through choice and mutual relations? An answer to the latter question may seem initially obvious since obedience to the *triune* God’s time countermands human autonomy and abstract universals. But the issues are more complex because Hauerwas holds to an account of mutual recognition between human beings.

Throughout Hauerwas’s work he *appears* to sympathize with what would be Hegel’s account of mutual recognition. The whole section of *The Peaceable Kingdom* titled “Freedom as the Presence of the Other” more or less relies on mutual recognition and a kind of double negation between subject and object (“other”) within community for character development.\(^{631}\) With that framework, Hauerwas’s description of love, “the

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\(^{631}\) Hauerwas, *PK*, 44-46. Hauerwas then extends mutual recognition and double negation to address sin: self-deception, distrust, and violence that stem from “unbelief” (ibid., 46-49). Later Hauerwas addresses God’s response in terms of double negation: “Raising Jesus from the grave, God rejects our rejection” and “God uses our sin to offer us a new life, free from the fear that fuels violence,” to which Christianity witnesses (*US*, 122). That gives the appearance of leaning on Hegel’s account of double negation, which necessitates evil because the negative-as-foil enables growth and which turns that negating conflict into a positive position (Dorrien, *KRHS*, 205-206, 229). But Hauerwas at his articulate best does not hold to double negation since he maintains that evil is privation (*DF*, 176). God’s response is always a positive contribution—not a theodicy that rationalizes evil—because God always is and doing the good. Specifically in responding to sin, God still does the good, full stop. That is in spite of sin rather than re-interpret sin under Hegel’s progressive-teleological rubric (ibid., 85).
nonviolent apprehension of the other as other,” is similar in some respects to Rowan Williams’s embrace of Gillian Rose’s Hegelian account of mutual recognition. Once Hauerwas even employed Hegel’s master-slave dialectic in order to delineate Christianity’s political position as the “peasant” (non-Constantinian) rather than the “master” (Constantinian). Mutual recognition also appears in Hauerwas’s more recent work. He appropriates Williams’s argument that justice requires recognizing the other and listening to their voice as the triune “God sees us.” In continuity with accounts in The Peaceable Kingdom (1983) and After Christendom? (1991), Hauerwas even characterizes human agency as mutual recognition within the frame of God’s time (2004). Constitutive to the patience of obedient performance is the dispossessive opening of one’s self to another through attentive listening. This “repentant attention” is constituted by “reverence toward one another and receptivity to God.” Repentant attention—which is Hauerwas quoting Williams—appears awfully similar to mutual recognition and potentially absolute dependence.

But there are major differences between Hauerwas’s view and an Hegelian view of recognition that significantly qualify their similar affinities, even if Hauerwas was or is an unacknowledged Hegelian in any strict sense. In “Freedom as the Presence of the Other” and the following section, Hauerwas emphasizes calling into question the

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632 Hauerwas, PK, 91. Williams’s position on mutual recognition will be covered in chapter four and the final conclusion in terms of politics and the imago trinitatis, respectively. I will not be raising Rose because, against Alexander Sider’s argument for uniting Rose and Yoder, Hauerwas finds that employing Rose on patience and holiness does not comport with remembering “scars” and maintaining difference (AE, 154-155). The latter two are not the case for Williams, although I will focus on the importance of difference in his work. J. Alexander Sider, To See History Doxologically: History and Holiness in John Howard Yoder’s Ecclesiology (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2011), 205.

633 Hauerwas, DF, 105.

634 Hauerwas, STT, 35. See also ibid., 36.

635 Hauerwas, PF, 100.

636 Hauerwas, AC, 54; Hauerwas, PK, 27, 81, 86-87; Hauerwas, PF, 100-102, 107; Williams, OJ, 200.
idolatrous self-deception of autonomy (sin) by the truth-telling church under God’s sovereign gifts.\textsuperscript{637} This indicates a break from Hegel. Hauerwas’s understanding of mutual recognition, in terms of repenant attention, is not about the turn towards interiority for achieving autonomy, as in Hegel’s development of consciousness. Rather, for Hauerwas, “mutual recognition” is between the particularities of bodies.\textsuperscript{638} Accordingly, Hauerwas frames repenant attention in a public language of virtues in order to avoid “self-invention.”\textsuperscript{639} Obedience requires the skills of listening to and receiving from others; patience coheres with the play’s tempo and the other actors rather than violate them by attempting to satisfy one’s impatience. Obedience and patience, then, are active rather than passive, and they are ordered towards one another outwardly instead of inwardly. Obedience, patience, and openness to the other are not only markers of God’s time; they are vital to the gift of God’s pedagogy that forms a community into a “long-haul” “apocalyptic people” living God’s peace.\textsuperscript{640}

\textsuperscript{637} Hauerwas, PK, 45, 48.
\textsuperscript{638} Hauerwas, AE, 183. In Hauerwas’s most extensive but still brief engagement with personalism, his emphasis on bodies breaks from personalism’s emphasis on personality (WT, 199-203). My argument concerning Dorrien in this chapter should at least question that he fits so easily within Hauerwas’s critique. Worth noting here is that Williams’s account of communicative bodies and rights is appreciatively delineated by Hauerwas after his critical engagement with personalism (WT, 203-206).
\textsuperscript{639} Hauerwas, PF, 100.
\textsuperscript{640} For the quote, see Hauerwas, DT, 55. For the paragraph, see Dorrien, KRHS, 188-189; Hauerwas, PK, 37; Hauerwas, PF, 100, 104, 107. The reason for conceding the possibility that Hauerwas was or is a Hegelian in a strict sense—for the sake of argument—is partly because of the following. Stout argues that Hauerwas’s ecclesiology is effectively a stillichkeit, an ethical community (Democracy and Tradition, 160). There is warrant for Stout’s insight, aside from Hauerwas’s strong and consistent emphasis on the church’s peacemaking as faithfulness to God and as witness to the world. Very earlier in Hauerwas’s work, his account of the common good was dependent on “politics as a moral concept” (VV, 236). That differed from “political realism” because the latter, “by denying the ‘moralistic abuse’ failed to appreciate the real morality of the political as the creation of the common good” (ibid.). A number of years after that quote, shortly after critiquing Kant, Hauerwas describes agency as “local[ing] his action within an ongoing history and within a community of language users” (PK, 41-42). Later Hauerwas unites virtues (ethical life) with friendship (community) as he rejects the privatization of virtues in order to contribute to the church on the issue of sexuality (STT, 117-121); “friendship is at the heart of [his] understanding of the moral life”; “an ethic of virtues…is unintelligible without friendship”; “friendship…names the relationship by which we become good”; “friendship…is a moral enterprise” (ibid., 108, 116). Even Hauerwas’s more recent work on the trinate economy and God’s time appears to presuppose an ecclesiology of decentred subjects that is ethical to the extent that they are decentred by their faithfulness to and precise speech about the trinate God’s time (see the juxtaposition between BH, 110 and 120-122; also see STT, 150-151). In other words and in a positive inflection: “The ongoing performance of the church is God’s life in the world, exactly to the extent that the church’s own performance is of one piece with a trinitarian grammar that bespeaks a life of ‘mutual inclusion’” (PF, 103). But besides what I address in the body of the text, there is further warrant for seeing Hauerwas as not so limited to Hegel. As Hauerwas stated in an interview: “I am often called a communitarian, but I think that is a mistaken description. I am not for a rediscovery of community as an end in itself. Such a rediscovery can be as dangerous as it can be good. Rather, I try to
That obedience is, for Hauerwas, nothing short of freeing. But even then he is not so easily distinguished from Hegel and Dorrien, since in Dorrien’s accounts, they maintain in their own way an emphasis on obedience as the source of freedom. Dorrien stresses that Hegel’s politics was one of duty. In Dorrien’s own project, he calls for “stubborn types” who, as briefly characterized in chapter one and showed above, are being obedient witnesses in their proclamation of and work for the Spirit’s liberative vision.\textsuperscript{641} So how might then Hauerwas’s understanding of human subjectivity be further distinguished from Hegel’s and Dorrien’s?\textsuperscript{642}

The answer is Hauerwas’s account of freedom and mutuality in friendship. For Hegel and Dorrien, freedom is \textit{achieved through} autonomy-in-mutuality. But for Hauerwas, freedom is \textit{realized in} the contingent mutuality of human friendships and in the cultivating determination of God’s invitation for friendship with humanity. Hauerwas not only rejects construing human freedom as self-grounded autonomy because of humanity’s contingency and creaturehood. He also countermands freedom as the right to choose since he opposes freedom “an \textit{end in itself}.”\textsuperscript{643} That is, “the language of choice [is] facile” for Christianity because “Christian freedom” is about being \textit{given} the “power” to act within a specific, already given narrative and under “direction from a master.”\textsuperscript{644} So freedom is a “gift,” and it is for much more than equality necessary for all to pursue

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\textsuperscript{642} Hauerwas, CC, 131; Dorrien, KRHS, 208.
\textsuperscript{643} Hauerwas, PK, 8. Emphasis original. See also Hauerwas, CC, 79-83, 130; Hauerwas, IGC, 131-132, 202; Hauerwas, STT, 148-151.
\textsuperscript{644} Hauerwas, CC, 115, 131; Hauerwas, JW, 115. See also Hauerwas, CC, 130, 147; Hauerwas, CET, 103; Hauerwas, CSCH, 148; Hauerwas, TT, 108.
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their self-interests. In sharp contrast to an account of autonomy-in-mutuality, the humility of creaturehood and of relational dispossession are gifts of friendship that are truly freeing. Thereby interrelated mutuality comes by friendship, and interrelated subjectivity makes freedom for friendship.

Dorrien might respond that solidarity and equality are still deeply similar to dispossession. He would be correct to a significant degree since friendship shares life with others, a “living with” that includes “suffering with.” But this politics of friendship is countermanded by racial “classification,” an inherently racist division that separates human friends in God’s “new creation.” The interrelatedness of friendship and the rejection of division Hauerwas extends to the church catholic when he assumes the importance of “Africa and Asia” for the US’s “reception of the gospel.” Thereby the church’s diasporic existence dispossess any privileged status for US Christianity.

What, then, is Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s difference? The gift of friendship for human relations. Although gift is present in Dorrien’s work and friendships support his writing, he lacks his own normative account of human agency with the union of gift and friendship. For Hauerwas, “agency rides on the back of friendship.” Friendship, in effect, is another name for humanity living together in the peaceful triune economy. This

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645 Hauerwas, CC, 131. See also Hauerwas, PK, 9; Hauerwas, STT, 198.
646 Hauerwas, AC, 53-54; Hauerwas, CC, 131; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 79-80; Hauerwas, STT, 198-199; Hauerwas, AC, 54; Hauerwas, PK, 81, 86-87; Hauerwas, TT, 108; Hauerwas, US, chp. 11. The issue of virtue further differentiates Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s respective frameworks of freedom-through-contingency-for-autonomy and freedom-in-contingency. Kant opted for human dignity qua the autonomous subject knowing the good—in continuity with Pelagius—over and against Aristotelian virtue where the good qua virtues is given (Dorrien, KRHS, 4, 531; Hauerwas, JV, 31). Construing Dorrien for Kantian human dignity and Hauerwas for Aristotelian virtue is a clear dividing line but all too neat. As I have endeavored to show, a less neat but far more accurate differentiation is: Dorrien as a post-Kantian with a Hegelian stripe and a Barthian inflection; Hauerwas as a Barthian with a Thomist stripe. Here the issue is how Hauerwas does not have a Hegelian stripe.
647 Hauerwas, AE, 233-234; Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 74, 76, 82, 86, and 195 n. 20; Hauerwas, WT, 213. See also Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 46-48; Hauerwas, CC, 22; Hauerwas, PK, 91; Hauerwas, STT, 87-88, 143-144; Hauerwas, WWW, 282-283.
648 Hauerwas, CDRO, 98-99. See also Hauerwas, WAD, 120 n. 13.
649 Hauerwas, CDRO, 325.
650 Hauerwas, WAD, 146, 149.
651 The quote is from a conversation with Hauerwas.
divine economy not only makes human creatures into friends of God by the gift of time necessary for humanity to participate in God’s life. The human participants themselves are also transformed into friends of each other, because together they embody Jesus’s story of befriending humanity through his kenotic self-gift. To be friends together is to give as Jesus gave and receive one another as gifts of God. As such friendship expands and develops, permeating and forming reality in accordance with the gracious truth of God’s love that is Jesus and his work of forgiveness.652

So Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s difference here is their respective emphases and how they relate them. Dorrien stresses equality because freedom is how humanity flourishes, but flourishing is difficult to think about in a world rife with deadly injustice that creates inequality. It is love that brought Dorrien to the fight for equality, and it is love that keeps him in the fight. However, Hauerwas sees the gift of friendship as the beginning and end of what it means to be human. He frames freedom in relation to truth which is a gift of friendship. And he argues for actually living in friendship as the first task of Christianity. So out of love Dorrien seeks transformation for equality, choice, and ultimately free flourishing. Hauerwas argues that the practices of friendship, such as reconciliation, are transformative.

Those differences create different accounts of the common good and of the politics to realize it. In 1995 Dorrien blasted Hauerwas, claiming that “he calls for a

social Christianity that renounces moral responsibility for the common good” because he refuses “to accept responsibility for the right ordering of society.” By contrast, Dorrien opts for justice as “right order” and John Stuart Mills’s stress on equality, because Dorrien’s moral direction is taken from Christianity’s love for the common good and from his assumption that “the principles of freedom and equality” are constitutive to the common good. Hauerwas has a retort. The common good cannot be grounded in abstract ideals such as freedom and equality, which are in fact “common interests”—“the sum of our individual interests”—that liberalism misinterprets as “goods in common.” But this critique goes hand in hand with the fact that, contrary to Dorrien’s criticism, Hauerwas has been for the common good since at least 1970.

For Hauerwas, the common good is found in the time-filled process of mutual “discovery,” of discussion and friendship. So working towards the common good is a journey in community, truth-telling, and hope, which requires patience and stubbornness.

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655 Dorrien, SS, 358.
656 Dorrien, EDE, xii; Dorrien, RCG, 4. See also RCG, 3. While Dorrien notes “the principle of equality” in EDE (xii), “the principles of freedom and equality” from RCG (4) is Dorrien quoting Chantal Mouffe, “Towards a Radical Democratic Citizenship,” Democratic Left, Mar./Apr. 1989, 7. Considering Hauerwas’s critique above, Mouffe’s quote in full is warranted: “The defense of pluralism, the emergence of the individual, the separation of church and state, and the development of civil society are all crucial elements of modern democracy. They require that we distinguish today between the domain of the private and the domain of the public, the realm of morality and the realm of politics. As a consequence, the common good cannot be conceived of in a way that implies the acceptance of one single substantive idea of the good life in all fields of society. It must be understood to refer exclusively to the share political ends of a democratic political community, i.e., the principles of freedom and equality for all” (ibid.). That leaves Dorrien in a bind since, as he argues just a few pages later, that ecclesial accommodation to the private-public distinction leaves “churches without a social mission” (RCG, 8). That same critique, with the addition of ecclesial invisibility in the public sphere, Dorrien has also leveled at R. Niebuhr explicitly (SEM, 676-677; SS, 349). Dorrien’s potential solution of discursive politics, noted earlier, is similar to Hauerwas’s addressed above. But Dorrien has not developed a robust account of such a politics. Chapter four will address how his communitarianism is economic but not so much political.
657 Hauerwas, BH, 182; Hauerwas, PF, 229. See also Hauerwas, VV, 237; Hauerwas, WAD, 102; Hauerwas, WT, 180, 189.
658 Hauerwas, “Politics, Vision, and the Common Good,” (1970); repr. Hauerwas, VV, chp. 12. For Hauerwas’s most recent and focused work on the common good, see WAD, chp. 10. Important for those like Dorrien, Hauerwas notes that “for any society and the public authorities (what is sometimes identified as the state) who have responsibilities to serve the goods in common, which include punishment” (PF, 195). So Hauerwas does have an account of justice that is tied to the common good (ibid., 197). Although Hauerwas does not address systemic issues like the new Jim Crow, chapter four will address Hauerwas’s argument about transforming the public authorities’ punishment practices. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, rev. ed. (New York: The New Press, 2012).
659 Hauerwas, AC, 29. Since that citation is about the loss of the common good as Hauerwas understands it and its process, see also Hauerwas, BH, 182; Hauerwas, CET, 15, 258-260; Hauerwas, CDRQ, 112; Hauerwas, HR, 454; Hauerwas, PF, 229; Hauerwas, SU, p. 146, chp. 10; Hauerwas, WAD, 136, 140-144; Hauerwas, WT, 179-186, 227-228; Hauerwas, WwW, 123.
in the parlance of Hauerwas and Dorrien respectively. However, Hauerwas’s contention that justice is confessional healing is simultaneously more precarious and assured than Dorrien’s firm ground in human rights and his hope for progress through justice. Truth is essential to humanity’s pursuit of God’s peace, but truth is not always readily available. It is only found by positioning oneself with, by exposing oneself to, and by caring for others rather than securing oneself over them. Since human creatures are social beings determined by one another, what it means to be a human being is to be in a vulnerable position.658

Here then are two forms of human equality. The first is creaturehood. The mutual friendship of equal creatures and gift-giving grounds Hauerwas’s work on the elderly, children, medical ethics, disabilities, and death.659 The second is the vulnerability of creatureliness.660 Humanity has a penchant for power plays in which one party is invulnerable and oppresses the already vulnerable. When one person, in their self-righteousness, asserts a dictatorial authority over another in order to force the oppressive submission of the perceived offender, vulnerability is used to legitimate asymmetrical power plays. Hauerwas works against these asymmetrical relations through his constructive vision of mutual vulnerability. All parties, even the “wronged,” “confront one another as sinners,” and therefore they “share” in the “need to be and have been forgiven.”661 That account of mutual, “radical subordination” may seem like a platitude,
or worse a way of legitimizing an oppressive status quo. However, the recognition of sin and the need of forgiveness are how, he argues, Christianity can face the horrors of its anti-Semitic past and can work towards reconciliation “between Christians and Jews.”

Given that the church does not secure God’s peace through violence but rather shows God’s peace through truth and forgiveness, the work to embody God’s peace may appear tenuous and risky at best. Indeed, the Christian life is ambitious. It is only knowable and possible when one is “incorporated into a community constituted by the stories of God” that practices kingdom virtues. Yet Hauerwas is all the more confident. The embodying of God’s peace and justice is not only possible, it is the church’s mission and is creation’s reality because the triune God is sovereign.

VII. Conclusion

I have argued that at the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s theologies are an account of divine sovereignty. However, they still sharply differ on divine sovereignty. Dorrien incorporates an account of grace according to the primacy of the Spirit’s universality and love. Hauerwas assumes an account of love ordered by the particularity of triune grace. These different accounts of divine sovereignty are intimately linked to their different descriptions of human subjectivity and agency responding to God and to other human spirits or creatures. For Dorrien, love orients autonomous spirit in a creative relation to autonomous spirit in accordance with his understanding of creative interpenetration between ineffable Spirit and autonomous spirit in love. For Hauerwas,

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662 Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 148. Hauerwas is referencing Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, chp. 9. For elsewhere Hauerwas employs Yoder’s radical subordination, see CC, 70-71; STT, 171.
663 Hauerwas, CET, 94.
664 Hauerwas, DF, 137. See also Hauerwas, AN, 42-44; Hauerwas, DF, 112.
creaturehood and friendship are the way things are for humanity because the triune creator gives particular gifts for friendship. These different accounts support their different political realities. Dorrien argues for economic, liberative, and ecological justice in order to secure equality, freedom, and the common good from his beginning point in love. Hauerwas maintains the primacy of friendship and obedient patience within a community that moves to God’s tempo. In that framework is found freedom, but the beginning, middle, and end is friendship.

One might be tempted to turn to the church-world distinction at this point. However, doing that now would fall back into overlooking the complexity of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement. Dorrien’s 1995 critique of Hauerwas’s “dichotomizing the world between Christian and pagans” was built on the accusation that Hauerwas eschews the common good. But Hauerwas’s concern for the common good complicates Dorrien’s assertion that how they understand the church-world distinction separates them. A better diagnosis is to locate their differences about how reality is made of intra-human relations created and shaped in light of God’s sovereign, participatory agency. The next chapter shows that their different accounts of divine sovereignty and human subjectivity and agency issue forth in rival accounts of political sovereignty. One might be tempted to summarize such different accounts of theological and political sovereignty as a church-world distinction. However, that again could easily be a misleading generalization. Although the issue is specifically the modern nation-state, I conclude with Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s similar turn to radical democracy for the common good. Any narrative of the church-world distinction must be significantly qualified by Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s

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666 Dorrien, SS, 358-359.
disagreement over reality as determinative interrelation concerning particular institutions.

A better account of their difference is how the relation between divine sovereignty and intra-human relations is positively realized or negatively undercut by the modern nation-state’s claim to sovereignty.
CHAPTER 3
Integration or Hegemony:
God’s Sovereignty and the Modern Nation-State’s Sovereignty

Previous chapters argued that Dorrien and Hauerwas’s concerns for faithfulness presuppose truth and reality, which assume, in turn, an account of divine sovereignty. Their disagreements are rooted in differences about the character of divine sovereignty and about human subjectivity and agency. These deep differences, I contend here, issue forth in strikingly divergent positions about the modern nation-state’s sovereignty. Dorrien integrates his account of the Spirit and Christian agency with the state, while Hauerwas rejects the state’s sovereignty as hegemonic.667

I spend the bulk of this chapter on Hauerwas’s position partly because he has written much more about the nature of the modern state than Dorrien and partly because I offer a constructive development of Hauerwas’s position on state sovereignty. By political or state sovereignty, I mean the modern state’s claims to both its own autonomous sphere (politics) and its final authority for governing its citizens and lands. Such claims include not only the state’s monopoly on legal violence and the state’s enforcement of its boundaries, but also the state’s pursuit of autonomous power to secure its claims. The state’s claims and its pursuit of them are necessary, asserts political liberalism, because of the state’s mission to keep the peace and to secure national and individual interests. I problematize this legitimization, particularly on the issue of the

667 Their differences are why Charles Mathewes is correct to raise that how God and state relate is crucial, but wrong to put aside the issue of fidelity. Over the course of this chapter, the reader will be able to see that Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s difference over divine and political sovereignty connects back to fidelity and infidelity as raised in chapter one and to intra-human relations realized at the end of chapter two. Charles Mathewes, A Theology of Public Life (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 162.
state’s pursuit of self-serving power, in light of Hauerwas’s position and my development of it.

My development serves two further points. First, I aim to show that the trajectory of Hauerwas’s work takes him even further from Dorrien. Both their positions on political sovereignty are interrelated with their respective understandings of divine sovereignty. Dorrien’s conception of divine sovereignty is not, but Hauerwas’s can be, understood apart from the sovereignty of political liberalism’s modern nation-state. As a consequence, Hauerwas is able to and does reject the legitimacy of the state’s sovereignty, whereas Dorrien cannot or would not want to.

Second, by splitting them on the issue of political sovereignty, I can conclude where the end of chapter one began: Dorrien and Hauerwas are fractured over the issue of sovereignty. Two vectors, divine and political sovereignties, are at work here based on chapters two and three respectively. Dorrien’s theology—loving Spirit interrelates with spirit in a way that transforms the world—is inherently open to perceiving the sovereign state as a constructive force for positive transformation. Hauerwas’s theology of particular grace sees the hegemonic state as humanity’s disobedient attempt to rival God. Hauerwas’s rejection assumes a better hope: Jesus is the truth of the triune God who is sovereign through gift-giving. The theological projects of integration with or rejection of the state’s sovereignty are not independent phenomena. They are instead different responses to the state’s pressure to conform. Dorrien opts for liberalism’s subtle supplanting of Christianity, while Hauerwas rejects the hegemony of liberalism’s policing of Christianity.
These differing theological and political positions within the two vectors are the source of their theopolitical fracture made evident in issues like the church-world distinction. Yet, I end with hope rather than despair. I emphasize the two vectors in order to highlight their importance and then to undercut them. The vectors and the different responses to them, in their current manifestations, obscure the surplus of political thought in Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s theopolitical positions. The fullness and similarities of their constructive works are only visible within a horizon wider than what the status quo discussion centered on political sovereignty. Necessary, then, is work that opens up a horizon within which their discussion can relax in an unconfined space, and through which the promise of their thought can be explored in a fresh discussion. The next chapter shows that Rowan Williams provides just such a horizon.

I. Dorrien’s Divine Sovereignty Integrated with the Sovereignty of the Modern Nation-State

Chapters one and two addressed Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement over how to characterize the relational nature of reality because of their differences over the God-human relation, intra-human relations, and the connection between the two. These relations—indirectly the God-human relation and directly reality and intra-human relations—underlie Dorrien’s definition and contextualization of liberal theology. Through the modern heritage, the modern world is more or less as determinative as the evangelical heritage. But that dialectic only covers the internal workings of liberal theology. Dorrien also contextualizes “the founding of modern theology [as] an aspect” of philosophical, political, and economic liberalism. Philosophical liberalism set the

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668 Dorrien, KRHS, 4.
concepts of autonomy and human dignity for everyone. Political liberalism sought to ensure autonomy and dignity through equal freedom, human rights, and tolerance. Economic liberalism attempted to establish autonomy through private ownership rather than political equality. Dorrien fits within just such a narrative, except for his emphasis on political equality over private ownership since private ownership undermines equal freedom. Like the social gospelers, Dorrien argues for economic democracy because equality through democracy is already an ideal in political liberalism. Implicitly, then, they assume an account of political sovereignty.669

But how are divine sovereignty and political sovereignty interrelated for Dorrien? He has yet to give an answer. However, considering his claims that unity is on the level of spirit, that the world is interrelated, and that liberal theology is part of liberalism’s project, Dorrien must have an understanding of how divine and political sovereignty together form a liberal subjectivity. Chapter two already addressed subjectivity by equating Dorrien’s co-operative economics with his understanding of spirit relating to spirit. I argued so in terms of autonomy-in-relation for freedom. That human subjectivity-agency for equal freedom in politics and economics is achieved through liberal justice ordered by the need for liberation. But as chapter one argued, justice is not the totality of Dorrien’s concerns. For him, liberation comes about by not only raising oppressed voices and concomitant deep socioeconomic analysis, but also by those informing his union of theological morality and political liberalism. Yet that union is still hazy in terms of divine and political sovereignties. So how are those interrelated for Dorrien? Dorrien’s account of a gospel-centered personal Spirit, I will argue, operates within Rauschenbusch’s

669 Dorrien, RCG, 112.
configuration of the kingdom, state, and church. Rauschenbusch’s tripartite configuration allows for a sometimes critical but fundamentally complementary interaction between God’s sovereignty and political liberalism’s sovereignty in order to produce social transformation. This framework is why Dorrien is correct to note that “in its short term politics the social gospel was a theology of the state.” So it should not be a surprise that, accordingly, loving Spirit’s transformative work in intra-human relations is achieved through the political sovereignty of the modern nation-state.

*Dorrien Assumes Rauschenbusch’s Kingdom-Church-State Configuration*

Some context is required before explaining Rauschenbusch’s tripartite configuration since Dorrien is fundamentally an *updated* social gospeler. He critiques more subtly and lists more frankly the social gospelers’ faults to a greater extent than even the (in)famous critiques by R. Niebuhr. Yet Dorrien observes that Christian Realism was a reaction to the social gospel which, unlike the social gospel, “inspired no hymns and built no lasting institutions.” By contrast, the social gospel, a 50 year movement and “a third Great Awakening,” “produced a greater progressive religious legacy than any generation before or after it.” The social gospelers, not Niebuhr, “paved the way for everything else in social ethics”; the social gospel, not Christian Realism, was “the greatest surge of social justice activism ever waged by the mainline churches in this country.” The concerns of the social gospel’s kingdom vision were broad: “peace,

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671 Dorrien, *EDE*, 5; Dorrien, *SEM*, 60; Dorrien, “Society as the Subject of Redemption,” 45.
social justice, cooperative relations, healthy families, international order, and the spirit of Jesus.”674 All but family are core foci in Dorrien’s constructive work, and he often gives similar answers as the social gospelers. In fact, Dorrien participated in the National Council of Churches’s most recent update and expansion of the “The Social Creed of the Churches” (1908 and 1932), the social gospelers’ famous ecumenical document that made their vision of a Christianized social order into a platform of concrete, social goals.675

Dorrien is deeply indebted to Rauschenbusch in particular. Dorrien asserts that Rauschenbusch was the “greatest social gospeler.”676 He “provided the movement’s most powerful case for” a theology of social salvation.677 According to Dorrien, Rauschenbusch “represents…the kind of idealism that is needed today, because he struggled unfailingly to promote and fulfill the ends of attainable justice in a fallen world.”678 The issues of idealism (kingdom) and of justice exemplify how and why Dorrien assumes Rauschenbusch’s tripartite configuration of kingdom, church, and state.

Constitutive to that configuration is Rauschenbusch’s multi-layered understanding of God’s kingdom. Rauschenbusch privileged the kingdom as a spiritual reality in which God is ultimate, “the common basis of all our life.”679 The kingdom was “initiated” in

674 Dorrien, MALT, 2:127.

676 For the social gospelers’ faults, see Dorrien, EDE, 4-5, 10, 14-15, 22, 28, 400-404; Dorrien, MALT, 1:xxv, 310-311, 318-334, 407-411; Dorrien, MALT, 2:51, 57, 60-61, 70-71, 84, 94-96, 102, 104-105, 110-11, 120, 124, 141, 145-146; Dorrien, SEM, 29-32, 60-61, 73-79 92-93, 146-147, 163, 184, 674-675; Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 14; Gary Dorrien, “Kingdom Coming: Rauschenbusch’s Christianity and the Social Crisis,” Christian Century, Nov. 27, 2007, 28; Dorrien, “Society as the Subject of Redemption,” 44.
677 Dorrien, SEM, 146.
678 Dorrien, EDE, 5. See also Dorrien, SS, 6; Dorrien, “Society as the Subject of Redemption,” 44.
679 Dorrien, RCG, 9-10.
679 Rauschenbusch, A Theology of the Social Gospel, 186.
Jesus’s “personality,” a new human personality of hope and love in line with “his consciousness of God.”\(^680\) Within the kingdom as “commonwealth of co-operative service,” humanity could be organized together, into a “world-wide consciousness” of “solidarity,” for the common good.\(^681\) The character of the kingdom, for Rauschenbusch, was a multi-faceted composite. He recovered previous understandings of the kingdom: “the kingdom of heaven,” the kingdom as “the inner life of the spirit,” the kingdom indistinguishable from the church, the kingdom outside the “existing work of the church,” and the kingdom identifiable with the parousia.\(^682\) Then he combined those facets of the kingdom with “the apocalyptic aspect of the kingdom hope and the kingdom as an ongoing ethical project” for both personal and social salvation.\(^683\) All of these are hallmarks of Dorrien’s spirituality and ethics, most of which I have noted already.

Dorrien’s theology and politics of loving, universal Spirit fit with how Rauschenbusch conceives of the kingdom permeating the church and state in their separate roles. Rauschenbusch’s social gospel answers “the central ethical question” of “how to exercise power in a morally responsible way” since the kingdom pervades social structures and empowers them in a just direction.\(^684\) The details, however, make all the difference. In Rauschenbusch’s tripartite structure, the kingdom, as “the master fact,” informs both the church and state in their respective and distinct roles.\(^685\) The “Kingdom

\(^{680}\) Ibid., 139, 151, 155. See also ibid., 152, 165, 174-175, 259, 273; Rauschenbusch, The Social Principles of Jesus, 17-28, 31-44.

\(^{681}\) Rauschenbusch, A Theology of the Social Gospel, 103, 161, 186.

\(^{682}\) Dorrien, MALT, 2:92.

\(^{683}\) Ibid. See also Dorrien, EDE, 3.

\(^{684}\) Dorrien, SEM, 70.

\(^{685}\) Rauschenbusch, The Social Principles of Jesus, 50. See also ibid., 51, 59-60; Dorrien, MALT, 2:102. I do not mean to exclude the family or education here. Rauschenbusch included the family because he was a good Victorian. I simply mean to focus on the kingdom, church, and state here because it is the church working with the state that takes on the rival of the kingdom: mammon, the unregenerate economic sphere. Walter Rauschenbusch, Christianizing the Social Order (N.p.: Macmillan, 1914; repr: Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2011), 152, 459.
of God is not a concept nor an ideal merely, but a historical force. It is a vital and organizing energy now at work in humanity. Its capacity to save the social order depends on its pervasive presence within the social organism.\textsuperscript{686} However, he rejected what he saw as an over identification between the kingdom and church. The kingdom is “not confined within the limits of the Church and its activities” because the church’s role is “fellowship for worship” and the kingdom’s is “fellowship of righteousness,” the “fellowship of justice, equality, and love.”\textsuperscript{687} The kingdom actually empowers and saves, but the church’s mission is to push for a spiritual and moral vision of the kingdom in individuals and society, respectively.\textsuperscript{688} As for the church-state relation, there can be cooperation between church and state because society and state are not “hostile to Christianity.”\textsuperscript{689} At the same time, there is also separation between the church and state because of their different roles. The church works to achieve its mission as a “diffused force” for “justice and mercy,” but the church does not enact justice because justice is the purview of the state.\textsuperscript{690}

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Hauerwas gives the impression that Rauschenbusch account of Christian ethics was dependent on Ernst Troeltsch (\textit{BH}, 66-67; “Why Christian Ethics was Invented,” 32). Dorrien acknowledges the importance of Troeltsch’s \textit{The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches} (1912) for its connection to the social gospel then and now (\textit{MALT}, 1:407-408; \textit{SEM}, 5; SS, 4-5). But Dorrien also notes that “Troeltsch’s quickly renewed account of the background to social Christianity was published five years after Rauschenbusch’s electrifying \textit{Christianity and the Social Crisis} (1907) became the manifesto of a burgeoning Christian Social movement” (SS, 5). Also, even though 1914 is the publication date given in the citation above for the reprint of Rauschenbusch’s \textit{Christianizing the Social Order}, it was actually printed originally in 1912, the same year as Troeltsch’s \textit{The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches}. As noted in chapter one, the social gospel came about in the US through its evangelical mission, pastoral concerns, lived activism, and academic thinking. So while Troeltsch is important to interpreting the social gospel, he is not the generator of its framework. The same pattern goes for Troeltsch’s connection to Rauschenbusch’s tripartite structure.


\textsuperscript{686} Rauschenbusch, \textit{A Theology of the Social Gospel}, 165.


\textsuperscript{689} Rauschenbusch, \textit{Christianity and the Social Crisis}, 203. See also ibid., 380.

\textsuperscript{690} Ibid., 206. See also ibid., 182-187, 206-208, 380; Rauschenbusch, \textit{Christianizing the Social Order}, 151-153.
Fitting this tripartite configuration, for Dorrien, love transforms all on the basis of Spirit-love permeating all. This fit is best seen in light of how Dorrien’s theology of the Spirit’s transformative love aligns within Rauschenbusch’s construal of the church as a prophetic handmaiden witnessing to the state. Rauschenbusch frequently appealed to the “law of love and service,” but he was often vague, or at least indirect, on exactly what is love. From his various descriptions of love, he characterizes it as self-gift and self-sacrifice within a social framework where love is recognition of value in the other, is orientation of care to the other, and is solidarity with the other. What Rauschenbusch then repeatedly stressed is that love is an equalizing force that “creates fellowship.”

Dorrien’s views are largely the same. Martin Luther King, Jr. was the religious figure who grabbed Dorrien’s attention and seared “self-sacrificing love” into him. But he discovered a home in the social gospel because, he argues, King drew from Rauschenbusch. As Dorrien dug deeper, he found Rauschenbusch’s *Christianity and the Social Crisis* as energizing as the Civil Rights movement. Dorrien is of course attentive to feminist concerns about kingdom language and self-sacrificing love, but the kingdom vision and its love for the liberative justice of equality is still at the center of his work. On this basis of Spirit-love permeating and transforming all, Dorrien engages the political status quo in order to realize its role as the guarantor of justice. Like Rauschenbusch, Dorrien’s kingdom theology is permeated by a Hegelian account of Spirit interrelated with the world in a way that transforms the world. This allows for Dorrien, like Rauschenbusch, to be more positive than Hauerwas towards the state and its justice, and

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691 Rauschenbusch, *Christianizing the Social Order*, 141. See also Dorrien, *EDE*, 23.
692 Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, 67. See also ibid., 68-71.
693 Dorrien, *EDE*, xiv.
more basically civil society. But Dorrien’s positive outlook is best seen framed by 
critique about the Spirit and state’s interrelation merged with Dorrien’s own critique of 
the social gospelers.  

Complications and Internal Critique

Rauschenbusch’s argument for redeeming US society attempted to avoid 
conflating the Christianized society with the church by distinguishing between political 
(state) and religious (church) spheres. Although Dorrien judges that Rauschenbusch 
“equate[d] the kingdom with a particular socioeconomic system,” his attempt to avoid 
conflation is crucial for Dorrien since “to absolutize or univocally identify the kingdom 
of God with any relative construction is demonic.” But for someone like Hauerwas, 
Rauschenbusch’s political-religious distinction assumes a disturbing relation between the 
kingdom and state. The church’s role is to press the state towards the kingdom ethic, but 
the church itself does not exactly mediate the relationship between the state and kingdom. 
Rauschenbusch resisted the framework of medieval Christendom, in which the church 
supposedly “ruled and guided” society. Instead, he saw that the kingdom, like Hegel’s 
Geist, “realizes itself” in “the family, the industrial organization of society, and the 
State.” The state is to be under and forcibly uphold the “law of service” or “law of 

694 Dorrien, MALT, 2:110; Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Crisis, 186-187; Dorrien, SS, 360, 370-375; Dorrien, WTM, 
Love Divine,” 43; Rauschenbusch, A Theology of the Social Gospel, 54-55, 143; Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Crisis, 
67-71; Rauschenbusch, The Social Principles of Jesus, 9; Dorrien, EDE, 22; Dorrien, MALT, 2:110; Dorrien, RCG, 42; Dorrien, EDE, 
x-xii, xiv-xv, 53; Dorrien, SEM, 5, 675-677; Dorrien, SS, 19, 348; Dorrien, WTM, 238; Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and 
Liberal Necessity,” 55-56; Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 22; Dorrien, OQ, 2; Dorrien, SS, 1-4, 10-13, 302- 
308; Dorrien, MALT, 2:110; Dorrien, RCG, 38; Dorrien, SS, 19; Dorrien, WTM, 233-239.
695 Dorrien, SS, 17, 372. See also Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 47.
696 Rauschenbusch, A Theology of the Social Gospel, 145. See also Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Crisis, chp. 4.
Christ”; in this way, the state is also “a Christian community” but not a church.\textsuperscript{698} These definitional roles for the church and state imply that both have access to and are empowered by the kingdom. Whether or not the state \textit{must} act according to an ecclesial vision is debatable because the state as a democracy \textit{is} “Christianized” already.\textsuperscript{699} Whether or not the state must go through the church is far more clear: not the church but the state secures democratic justice in the political and economic spheres. While that implication of Rauschenbusch’s distinction may still appear innocuous, or simply Hegelian, the ramifications were bloody and oppressive.\textsuperscript{700}

For the social gospelers in their time, their success in their Manifest Destiny to democratize—to “intervene,” “liberate,” and “civilize”—the world was simply proof that Christianity was influencing the humanity towards a better future.\textsuperscript{701} However, Dorrien argues that the term “Christianization” was problematic and is “inappropriate today,” particularly in light of US imperialism.\textsuperscript{702} The social gospelers’ mission of Christianizing and their equation of US democracy with the kingdom inflated the narcissism of American exceptionalism. It also supported the related colonial endeavor of Manifest Destiny. The extension of US Anglo-Saxon sovereignty westward over the North

\textsuperscript{698} Rauschenbusch, \textit{A Theology of the Social Gospel}, 113-114, 117. See also ibid., 111-112; Rauschenbusch, \textit{Christianizing the Social Order}, 152-153.


\textsuperscript{701} Dorrien, \textit{SEM}, 77. See also Dorrien, \textit{MALT}, 1:319-326, 332-334, 409; Dorrien, \textit{SEM}, 48, 73-79, 82, 93-94, 162-163; Dorrien, “Society as the Subject of Redemption,” 44.

American continent and beyond was legitimated not only by the conflation of national interests with kingdom interests. The social gospelers also served the US’s colonizing endeavors by “baptiz[ing]” them in terms of spreading the morality of the Christian spirit that is democratic.\(^{703}\) So as Dorrien observes even in Rauschenbusch, the social gospelers conflated “‘Christianize,’ ‘moralize,’ ‘humanize,’ and ‘democratize.’”\(^{704}\) That exemplifies Dorrien’s agreement with both Niebuhr and Hauerwas. The social gospelers on the whole over-identified God’s kingdom with the US order. The social gospelers were often “sentimental, moralistic, idealistic, and politically naive.”\(^{705}\) Dorrien even grants that Rauschenbusch’s “optimistic temperament led him to overestimate the degree to which U.S. Society had already become democratized.”\(^{706}\) In fact, Dorrien’s critiques of the social gospel are more frank, exhaustive, and excoriating than most of the criticisms mounted by Niebuhr and Hauerwas.\(^{707}\)

**Theology Supplying a Moral Vision that Informs State Justice**

But even with those significant reservations, Dorrien appears to still embrace Rauschenbusch’s configuration itself. Dorrien maintains that politics “has a relation to redemption—the healing of life and the world (Hebrew tikkun)—only through its connection to social justice.”\(^{708}\) Of course “social justice” is in continuity with

\(^{703}\) Dorrien, *SEM*, 60; Dorrien, “Society as the Subject of Redemption,” 44. Emphasis mine. See also Dorrien, *MALT*, 1:334; Dorrien, *SEM*, 75-77.


\(^{705}\) Dorrien, *EDE*, 4; Dorrien, *SEM*, 60. See also Dorrien, *MALT*, 2:145; Dorrien, SS, 148.

\(^{706}\) Dorrien, *RGG*, 46. See also Dorrien, *MALT*, 2:115.


For Dorrien’s critiques of the social gospelers, see *EDE*, 4-5, 10, 14-15, 22, 28, 400-404; *MALT*, 1:xxv, 310-311, 318-334, 407-411; *MALT*, 2:51, 57, 60-61, 70-71, 84, 94-96, 102, 104-105, 110-11, 120, 124, 141, 145-146; *SEM*, 29-32, 60-61, 73-79 92-93, 146-147, 163, 184, 674-675; “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 14; “Kingdom Coming,” 28; “Society as the Subject of Redemption,” 44. For Niebuhr’s critiques of Rauschenbusch, see Dorrien, *SEM*, chp. 4 passim and pp. 675-677; Dorrien, SS, chp. 3 passim and p. 356. For some of Hauerwas’s engagements with Rauschenbusch, see *AN*, pp. 28-29, 34-36, chp. 6; *BH*, pp. 18, 24, 55-56, 64, 67-68, chp. 5 and the endnotes 234-256; *CET*, 152-157, 161, 175-177; *DF*, chp. 4 passim and p. 193-194 n. 18; *SST*, 209-210. Also for Hauerwas on Rauschenbusch, see Dorrien, *SEM*, 481; Dorrien, SS, 356.

\(^{708}\) Dorrien, *OQ*, 2. Emphasis original.
Rauschenbusch’s role of the state in relation to the kingdom. But “only through” is equally important, indicating Dorrien’s qualified continuity with Rauschenbusch. The social gospel still has purchase for how to understand Christianity’s involvement. However, the social gospel must be recovered with care and attention to criticisms made against it by liberation theology. This adjustment is possible since the “corrective” to Rauschenbusch’s “optimistic temperament,” Dorrien argues, “was present in Rauschenbusch’s work.”

So the Christianizing rhetoric should not obscure what positive meaning that still remains accessible today. For Dorrien, the social gospel’s persistent value is a compelling vision of social redemption of the kingdom Spirit that works to transform structures from within. A vision is always essential. It moves people by a spiritual conviction that orients them towards a greater future. Vision is the fuel to sustain the slow, difficult work for change. If there was one thing that the social gospel had, it was vision of the beloved community connected to social justice.

In particular for Dorrien, the social gospel’s spirituality of a kingdom-commonwealth provided “a vision of economic democracy that is as relevant and necessary today as it was a century ago.” This vision, its moral call, and/or its economic solution show up in nearly all of Dorrien’s books. These emphases, when combined with his “only through” qualification, suggest a vision of a robust civil society and far more limited state. Yet the state is still crucial. How the vision, morality, and economics support present action is particularly illuminated in his 2012 pitch for the

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709 Dorrien, RCG, 46.
710 Dorrien, EDE, xiv-xv; Dorrien, RCG, 42, 47, 162-164, 172-175; Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 49.
712 Dorrien, OQ, 2. See also Dorrien, RCG, chap. 7, esp. pp. 161-162, 164, 168-175.
necessity of progressive liberals’ role in re-electing President Obama and shaping his second term. Michael Harrington died too soon to be the needed strong, progressive flank for the centrist president Bill Clinton. Similarly, Obama’s centrism needs someone like Harrington as well for the same reason: to keep Obama looking towards progressive goals rather than giving into extortion. So Dorrien challenged progressive liberals not to give up on Obama as some already had. That was the aim of Dorrien’s *The Obama Question*. Therein he rarely notes faith; it is presupposed and translated into another register. Morality is the ground upon which he makes his appeal to further realize social justice in politics and democratic justice in the economy. Therefore, *The Obama Question* implements the project of US Protestant liberalism’s performative role, to inject *morality* into the soul of society in order to realize justice within the state’s sphere.  

How the kingdom, church, and state are ordered matters. The kingdom is the ideal, and the church does not stand over the state. This framework, looking back, is in accordance with Dorrien’s commitment to idealism, his rejection of Hauerwas’s church-state distinction, Dorrien’s presupposition of truths in plurality, and his dedication to a relational dialectic in reality. But important here is political sovereignty. Christianity proclaims truth, a prophetic word of love, informed by the eschatological banquet that offers a political vision of equality and liberative justice. The realization of this vision is achieved, albeit limited and incomplete, in the state’s sphere by the work of the Spirit. Those roles for Christianity and the state are why Dorrien is both concerned about Christianity maintaining its spiritual center and generally oriented positively towards

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state sovereignty. Without a spiritual center attentive to the Spirit’s work, there can be no positive vision to inform the state nor ground to critique the state.

A Response from Hauerwas’s Position

In the past Hauerwas granted “that liberalism has, sometimes almost in spite of itself, some beneficial results.” He also appreciates Rauschenbusch and Dorrien’s emphasis on the kingdom and on truth. But towards Dorrien’s position there are a slew of criticisms that emerge from Hauerwas’s work. On the particular point of the church’s relation to the state, Hauerwas’s primary concern is whether or not the church is “capable of saying no to the state.” Dorrien’s appeal to the social gospel’s emphasis on morality resists R. Niebuhr’s deeper acceptance of translation but does not yet overcome the problems of Constantinianism, privatization, and translation. That capitulation, Hauerwas would presumably contend, is because Dorrien argues for integration on the basis of compatibility with and service to US democracy. Like Rauschenbusch and R. Niebuhr, Dorrien argues that Christianity’s ideal of love shares the values of democracy, especially equality. Since both democracy and equality are necessary for justice and peace in the face of sin, the promotion of democracy is a good. From their assumptions and point of view, Hauerwas concedes that “the modern nation state is an extraordinary invention for peace since at least it limits the number of warring factions on this limited globe.” Nevertheless, Hauerwas rejects that political liberalism can bring “world peace.”

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714 Hauerwas, AN, 18.
715 Hauerwas, AC, 71.
716 Hauerwas, AN, 17.
717 Ibid.
Liberal democracy does not truly unify the US, rather liberal democracy is used to justify a US empire. In the latter, unity is compelled by the “fear of death” and by the commitment to use violence (war) in order to secure self-interests. These unifying forces and imperial designs are not anomalies; they go hand in hand with what Hauerwas identifies as essentials in US liberal democracy. Liberalism’s autonomous anthropology (the “common citizen”) denies external authorities in the name of equality. Liberalism’s politics of desire, under the guise of tolerance, has a thin conception of the good at best. Liberalism’s values, like autonomy and self-interest, police Christianity by privatizing faith and forming the church into a liberal democracy and capitalist economy.

Fundamental to Hauerwas’s break from political liberalism is the nature of politics related to the sovereignty of God. Hauerwas rejects the assumption that “all politics presupposes violence,” which underlies the necessity of democracy for R. Niebuhr and Dorrien. Instead, “God created all that is with a desire to be nonviolent” and Jesus transforms the meaning of politics. Hauerwas frames Christian ethics accordingly. He refuses to “begin with [the] assumption” “that the subject of Christian ethics in America is America.” Instead, he begins “with the claim that the most

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718 Hauerwas and Pinches, CAF, 169; Hauerwas, DT, 213. See also Hauerwas, AC, 29, 33; Hauerwas, AN, 182; Hauerwas, DT, 186, 213; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 32-36; Hauerwas, WAD, chp. 1 and p. 48.
719 Hauerwas, AC, 97. Emphasis original. See also ibid., 95-96, 98, 102.
721 Hauerwas, DF, 129. See also ibid., 130; Dorrien, EDE, xiii, 38-39, 142.
722 Hauerwas, DT, 184. See also ibid., 183; Hauerwas, WW, 121.
723 Hauerwas, DF, 11.
determinative political loyalty for Christians is the church.”724 That Christian citizenship is always first found in God’s reign for reasons ranging from God’s sovereignty, as chapter two delineated, to the church’s mission to be a social ethic in order to be a faithful witness of Jesus, as chapter one noted.725

But as chapter one noted as well, Dorrien affirms to one degree or another Hauerwas’s emphasis on counter-cultural witness. Hauerwas also grants Dorrien’s assumption that God’s kingdom is more determinative than the church. So what marks their difference here? Hauerwas’s self-described position of “theocrat” makes liberals “nervous.”726 The nervousness is not simply derived from “‘Jesus is Lord’…[as] a determinative political claim.”727 The implication of that claim does not grant the state its own “autonomous” sphere.728 But that autonomy is precisely what the state claims and pursues. For Hauerwas, then, humanity’s pursuit of autonomy opposes divine sovereignty by raising against it humanity’s own autonomous, hegemonic corollary and “most nefarious brand of tribalism—the omnipotent state.”729 Under the guise of peace-making, the modern nation-state jealously undercuts Christian citizenship as part of the state’s attempt to secure its own autonomous power from divine sovereignty. Accordingly, not only has “modern politics...rendered the notion of God’s rule more or less unintelligible.”730 For, as Hauerwas observes, Christians “have lost the ‘sources,’ the

724 Hauerwas, DF, 11. See also ibid., 132-135, 152, 154-155; Hauerwas, AN, 15.
725 Hauerwas, AN, 7-8; Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 29; Hauerwas, PK, 33; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 90-91; Hauerwas, US, 96;
727 Hauerwas, AE, 82.
728 Hauerwas, CET, 16-17.
729 Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 42.
730 Hauerwas, WW, 219 n. 4. See also Hauerwas, WW, 53-54. While I will focus below on Hauerwas’s account of the modern state’s antagonism to divine sovereignty, Hauerwas also notes that humanity’s understanding of God’s character (“morally perfect”) and rule (“all-powerful”) is shaped to “legitimate the ‘necessity’ of [emperors’] rule” (Hauerwas, NS, 58). See also Hauerwas, AC, 43.
practices, necessary to sustain our conviction that God is the origination and end of our existence.”\textsuperscript{731} But also replacing that loss and conviction is “the idolatry most convenient to us”: “the presumed primacy of the nation-state.”\textsuperscript{732}

**II. Hauerwas Against the Hegemony of the Modern Nation-State’s Sovereignty**

Chapter one framed Hauerwas’s argument about liberalism policing Christianity in terms of subtle supplanting and negating exclusion. From above one can see that functionally Dorrien works within the supplanting frame in order to avoid Christianity’s exclusion from politics. But Hauerwas illuminates the depth to which Dorrien’s approach is built on accepting the modern nation-state’s sovereignty. Hauerwas rejects both supplanting and excluding because they are two prongs of the same hegemonic project. Dorrien argues against US imperialism, but Hauerwas’s focus on loyalty to Jesus is predicated on the more basic disagreement. The sovereignty of liberalism’s modern nation-state conflicts with Jesus’s sovereignty. Since chapter two and above already covered Jesus’s sovereignty, here I focus on the modern nation-state’s attempt to undercut and replace divine sovereignty. In lieu of God’s sovereign gifts, the state attempts to secure its self-interests over and through death in the guise of protecting the individual’s peaceful pursuit of one’s self-interests.\textsuperscript{733}

\textsuperscript{731}Hauerwas, WW, 167.
\textsuperscript{732}Hauerwas, CC, 110. For the kingdom as more determinative than the church, see Hauerwas, CET, 61.
\textsuperscript{733}Hauerwas, AC, 90-91; Hauerwas, AN, 196; Hauerwas, CET, 182; Hauerwas, IGC, 163. This line of argument above develops the issue of sovereignty underlying Hauerwas’s contention that “Christians train or should train their children to resist the authority of the state, not in the name of their ‘rights’ as individuals, but because the ‘justice’ of the state is to be judged against God’s justice” (CC, 150. See also ibid., 151.).
In effect, the liberal state creates to the very problem that it claims to solve, which in turn, legitimates the state. To differentiate people in terms of self-interested desires dissolves relations between “friends” so that only “strangers” in pursuit of their individual self-interests are left. But for political liberalism, such fragmentation threatens to actualize Thomas Hobbes’s fear of political chaos. So liberalism’s political order asserts that it must be strong enough to at least ensure the primacy and fullness of autonomy against chaos. This presumed necessity, in turn, ironically establishes homogeneity and hegemony. The confluence of liberalism’s universal anthropology, autonomy, and strong unity means that liberal unity depends on accounting for everything on liberal terms in order to ensure autonomy. That accounting establishes a social homogeneity through a political hegemony. Some liberals, Hegel in particular Hauerwas notes, acknowledge that gaining more freedom coincides with an equal rise in national “homogeneity” that suppresses the sources of difference—other social groups—in the name of brokering difference. This hegemonic homogeneity is, in turn, part of an attempt to secure autonomy. In the name of unity, political liberalism aims to “create an independence against contingency” through a regulatory strategy, “a mastery” of all through a “panoptic practice” that orders and polices everything on liberal terms. So liberalism relies on a hegemonic homogeneity to achieve autonomy. Liberal unity depends on cooperation by individuals under the principle of autonomy. The many

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individuals need to conform to autonomy (homogeneity), and in turn they must support what it takes to secure autonomy (hegemony). Thus the framework of homogeneity necessitating hegemony serves to legitimate the autonomy of political sovereignty.\(^7\)

However, Hauerwas rejects the autonomy of political sovereignty and its legitimating narrative of the wars of religion, the presumed specter of religious violence that threatens homogeneity. He also criticizes its legitimizing claims of efficiency, among other critiques that I will address later. But rather than simply reiterate his criticisms of the autonomy of political sovereignty, the wars of religion, and the claim of efficiency, I will place them within the frame of the French political concepts of *raison d’être* (reason for being) and *raison d’état* (reason of state). *Raison d’être* and *raison d’état* illuminate the yet unnoticed developmental continuity in Hauerwas’s work. I will contend that this development has resulted in overturning the state’s self-justification for hegemonic sovereignty. A latent aspect of Hauerwas’s thought can be expounded by using *raison d’être* and *raison d’état* to emphasize the underlying continuity of monopolizing sovereignty between the early and contemporary modern state-nation. This argument contributes to understanding Hauerwas by connecting together his robust rejection of the wars of religion and his limited criticism of state efficiency.\(^7\)


\(^7\) I also develop state sovereignty in terms of *raison d’être* and *raison d’état* for other reasons that will become apparent when I raise Rowan Williams on the issue of state sovereignty in the next chapter.
Explaining Hauerwas’s Critique of the State’s Legitimacy through Raison d’être and Raison d’état

Hauerwas’s account of political liberalism draws on Thomas Hobbes. From Hobbes onward, death is the “determinative” measurement for the “meaning” of life because death is the ultimate limit to be overcome by liberal politics. The state, accordingly, seeks to “control” death in an ironic attempt to self-transcend human nature. The control of death is achieved through a biopolitics that regulates and violently enforces who lives and dies. One might construe biopolitical control as one of many missions of the modern nation-state. But for Hauerwas such control is at the heart of the modern nation-state’s reason for being. A primary, if not the primary, characteristic of state sovereignty and its function is a “monopoly on violence” within its borders in order to police death for securing peace. So for Hauerwas, the fear of death and the monopoly over violence together are employed to justify the state’s sovereign power.

A tradition in French political theory can help to interpret and develop Hauerwas’s claim. Officially from around the time and through the work of Cardinal Richelieu on (1585-1642), the state’s raison d’être (reason for being) and raison d’état (reason of state) have been understood to be mutually informing. Raison d’être outlines the state’s mission and responsibilities, such as keeping the peace and controlling death respectively. Raison d’état is a claim that the state has its own basic, autonomous interests, such as power and securing it. Those interests have their own, self-grounding

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form of reason that is not based in divine reason and that is more specific than a
generalized natural reason. So in short, raison d’état is about delineating that sphere of
human relations called politics, and that it is autonomous with its own interests and
reason. 742

Political liberalism’s conventional narrative often more implicitly than explicitly
maintains that, as Richelieu assumed, the state’s raison d’être requires raison d’état. The
modern state’s mission is to create and sustain the peace for the flourishing of
liberalism’s aspirations (raison d’être). Yet the state cannot enforce its raison d’être
without first attaining the power to do so. The state must therefore seek the necessary and
autonomous power to police (raison d’état). Hauerwas has also described that liberal
construction in 1984 in all but name and in 1988 when he explicitly used the French
terms: “the state’s raison d’état depends on its raison d’être.” 743 But Hauerwas

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countermands that narrative. *Raison d’état* not only preceded the modern nation-state’s mission. The state’s *raison d’être* of peacemaking is used to legitimate the tautology of *raison d’état*, the state’s autonomous power and seeking more of it. Hauerwas makes three moves to note here. First, the modern nation-state’s policing for peace includes “a bureaucracy that is more intrusive than the most absolute monarch,” which is “legitimated by its promise to be efficient and effective” for securing the self-interests of its citizens.\(^{744}\) Second, Hauerwas moved from presupposing that “Christians need to develop a theory of political authority” to the contrary by agreeing with John Howard Yoder’s view that the state and its authority simply exist as a fact of reality.\(^{745}\) But even in this change, Hauerwas still questions the legitimacy of the modern nation-state’s mission to produce “‘peace and security’ promised by” state “power.”\(^{746}\) That suspicion overlaps with his point on efficiency since he notes that “the first responsibility of the president of the United States is to protect the United State’s self-interest.”\(^{747}\) Third, Hauerwas has long rejected liberalism’s separation of disciplines into their own autonomous spheres of reason, which is reflected in the autonomy of the state and its *raison d’état*. He explicitly rejected a “self-validating,” “autonomous created order…to legitimate the state as an end in itself.”\(^{748}\) The points of efficiency and autonomy I will

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\(^{744}\) Hauerwas, *AC*, 64, 66. See also ibid., 33-34; Hauerwas, *CC*, 80. However, Hauerwas has not significantly focused on the issue of efficiency since, with merely an aside about it in 2000 and a brief mention of it in 2007 (*BH*, 226 n. 31; *SU*, 175).


\(^{746}\) Hauerwas, *DF*, 133. Rome is the state that object of Hauerwas in the quote, but it can be extended to the modern nation-state due to the context and surrounding pages (132, 134). See also Hauerwas, *CET*, chp. 14 (esp. pp. 256-257, 264-265) for an earlier iteration in terms of legitimating the nation-state pursuing arms and employing them to secure peace, which of course conflicts with divine sovereignty.


\(^{748}\) Hauerwas, *CET*, 16. See also Hauerwas, “Epilogue: A Pacifist Response,” 173-177. For brief note about the separation of disciplines, see Hauerwas, *STT*, 148. Hauerwas’s third point is worth quoting: “the very idea that there exists an economic sphere distinct from the political is the creation of modernity and derives from the same sources as the notions of sovereignty so elemental to the nature of the modern state” (*AC*, 48. See also ibid., 17.). Here Hauerwas closely summarizes Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, 150. To write as much relies upon Giddens’s earlier account of state sovereignty in chapter 4 that assumes reason of state (ibid., 93-103, 113).
take up later in terms of autonomous exception. But for now, between the three points
Hauerwas undercuts important aspects of raison d’état.479

More recently Hauerwas effectively overtures the liberal configuration that the
state’s raison d’être to secure national interests requires the self-interested power of
raison d’état. Even though Hauerwas does not explicitly argue the reversal in so many
words, he does so by following Michel Foucault’s work on power and others’ on the
state’s commitment to war. Hauerwas describes that the state’s ‘neutral’ position of
determining who lives and dies for peace (raison d’être) is to ensure freedom as self-
interest. That framework, Hauerwas argues, is little more than a biopolitics for securing
state power through the same power dynamics “manifested in war” (raison d’état).750

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479 For Richelieu, see Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, 85; Engster, Divine Sovereignty, 100; Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in
Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2001), 118; The Political
Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, chap. 3. For an example of someone arguing that raison d’être requires raison d’état in political
liberalism, see Thomas Poole, Reason of State: Law, Prerogative, and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), chps.
7-8. For Hauerwas on the elements of the tutelage in one way or another, see Hauerwas, AV, 185; Hauerwas, DF, 127, 222 n. 27;
Hauerwas, DT, 186; Hauerwas, STT, 180; Hauerwas, WW, 51. For a summary of the tutelage of the state’s hegemonic sovereignty,
see William T. Cavanaugh, “A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House: The Wars of Religion and the Rise of the State,” Modern
reason delineated the state as both its principle and its objective, as both its foundation and its aim,” and “the state as always being its
own end”; Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin
Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 95; Hauerwas, BH, 226 n. 31; Charles Tilly, “War Making
and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol

One might see a parallel between my argument concerning Hauerwas and the infamous critical description of “grandiose
tautology,” as describing the reality of raison d’état masked by raison d’être in all but name, by Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social
University Press, 2004), 370-371. What differentiates my argument from Luhmann’s is his focus on the tutelage of liberal law in a
binary that is broken by raison d’état (ibid., 185). Accordingly, he only touches on raison d’état by name, choosing instead to focus
on the state and the law mutual parasitic relation as a tautology (ibid., 370-371). By contrast, Hauerwas once described the tautology—
the state as “an end in itself”—in reference to the US; however, his description was limited to the Enlightenment with the exclusion
of Europe (CC, 247-248 n. 9).

478 Hauerwas, AE, 124. See also Hauerwas, AC, 33-34; Hauerwas, DF, 145; Hauerwas, WW, 57; “Hauerwas on Hauerwas and the
Law,” 249-250. In AE, 124, Hauerwas is quoting Michel Foucault, “Society Must be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France
Carl von Clausewitz’s claim, that “war is the continuation of politics by another means,” and Foucault’s “inversion” of it, that
“politics is the continuation of war by other means,” in order to illuminate the “silent war” of politics (Hauerwas, AE, 121, 123-124,
128; Hauerwas, WAD, 47-51; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976), 87; Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended, 15-16).

Michael S. Northcott’s and my developments of the Hauerwas-Foucault connection show that David Baer is incorrect in his
estimation that Hauerwas’s pacifism and eschewal of theory “duck the question of political power all together.” James King gives
a similarly limited account on Hauerwas’s critique of the state. Among some of the problems in Baer’s and King’s critiques has to do
with their only partial readings of Hauerwas. They either simply overlook Hauerwas’s turn to Sheldon Wolin and A. D. Lindsay, or
neglect to notice that Hauerwas’s turn to them is nothing new. It can be dated at least as far back as 1970. Instead of attempting to
This ‘turn’ countermands the liberal narrative, exposing that the state’s *raison d’être* is predicated on the state’s tautological *raison d’état*. But rather than delineate Hauerwas’s use of Foucault, Hauerwas’s critique of the wars of religion is a more faithful and clearer way to show his implicit reversal of the modern nation-state’s narrative of *raison d’être* requiring *raison d’état*. Unlike Foucault, Hauerwas’s critical view of the modern nation-state is always related to the state’s policing of Christianity. He also does not set out “to develop a theory of political authority.” Instead, he develops his turn in his arguments about the modern nation-state as historically formed out of and as continuing to be unified by self-interested war. So Hauerwas ‘backs into’ reversing political liberalism’s *raison d’être-raison d’état* narrative by engaging historiography on the wars of religion narrative and by critiquing political liberalism’s use of the narrative to police Christianity.

Both Dorrien and Hauerwas agree that liberalism understands itself as a response to the narrative of the early-modern European wars of religion. The conventional story goes that 16th and 17th century Europe erupted into religious wars following the

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Hauerwas, *DF*, 137-139, 150; Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, chp. 10 and pp. 290, 354. After quoting from Foucault’s “Governmentality” (95) about the modern nation-state having no concern for the common good but for securing the self-interests of citizens, Hauerwas then writes: “‘Governmentality’ does not mean that the state is any less inclined to go to war, but that wars fought by such states, as Hegel says, become ends in themselves. That is, war having no end other than itself becomes the reason for the state to exist” (Hauerwas, *BH*, 226 n. 31).

Hauerwas, *DF*, 132.

Hauerwas, *AC*, chp. 2, esp. pp. 64-68; Hauerwas, *AE*, chp. 7; Hauerwas, *SU*, 59-65, 170; Hauerwas, *AE*, chp. 7; Hauerwas and Willimon, *RA*, 33-35; Hauerwas, *SU*, 63; Hauerwas, *WAD*, xvi, 6-11, 47-51, 57-58; Hauerwas, *WWW*, 134; Hauerwas, “Epilogue: A Pacifist Response,” 176-177. While Foucault’s point on the specific relation between war and politics is important to Hauerwas, other reasons for not developing it here are that it is too dense to sufficiently elaborate on it directly in the space I have here, and that it is less explicitly prevalent than Hauerwas’s increasing focus on the wars of religion. On the latter, although Hauerwas notes Foucault’s “Governmentality,” it is effectively a brief summary of *Security, Territory, Population* but without the explicit and sustained focus on *raison d’état* found in the latter (Hauerwas, *BH*, 226 n. 31). Accordingly, Hauerwas’s minimal engagement with *raison d’état*, explicitly or implicitly, does not address its history or Foucault’s lengthier work on it. But doing so would have been helpful since, even though Foucault’s primary concern is the genealogy of state power, he touched on—at the same time actually—both the wars of religion and the relation between *raison d’être* and *raison d’état* (*Security, Territory, Population*, chps. 8-11).
Reformation. With Protestants and Catholics at each others’ throats, Europe was thrown into political chaos and the presumed foundations of reality were overturned. Established hierarchies, their claim to authority in revealed, objective truths, and even revelation itself were called into question. In the light of ‘reason,’ the scandal of violence between Christian traditions suggested that traditions and their appeals to revelation were subjective and irrational rather than objective and rational. Pre-modern religious truth was eventually deemed to be largely fideistic assertion. Religion itself was declared a destabilizing force in society because of its proclivity to demand loyalty and attempt to convert adherents from other religious traditions. So the liberal narrative runs that the wars of religion revealed that religion is inherently violent and a danger to society because it is exclusionary, partisan, and irrational passion. Christendom, then, could not keep the peace. But conveniently, starting with the peace of Westphalia (1648), liberalism claimed that it could make and keep the peace through the autonomous nation-state privileging the autonomous subject, especially her or his reason and experience, while excluding the irrational and oppressive external church authorities from public life. In the aftermath of the wars of religion, major figures in liberalism argued that crucial to peace-making is the political, universal freedom of the individual supported by a strong state sovereignty to ensure freedom. In order to maintain the peace for the arbitrary pursuit of self-interest over and against a primordial, chaotic force like religion (raison d’être), the newly created nation-state demanded loyalty to its claim of “administrative
monopoly” (*raison d’état*) over its boundaries and the use of violence within to ensure its neutral and objective policing of the public square.\(^{754}\)

Leaning on William Cavanaugh and others, Hauerwas argues that the wars of religion *narrative* is essentially a historical fiction that is “anything but innocent,” despite its prevalence in political liberalism historically and today.\(^{755}\) The ‘wars of religion’ were not the impetus for the rise of the modern nation-state to save Europe from chaos. Rather, the violent conflicts attributed to religion were more so the “birth pangs” of the modern nation-state as it redefined its sovereignty by solidifying state power and eclipsing ecclesial power.\(^{756}\) The state’s solidifying and eclipsing are exercises of *raison d’état*.

The narrative is fundamental to the state’s *raison d’être* because the narrative “legitimates the power of the nation-state in the West to wage war” and “to save us from the violence of religion.”\(^{757}\) Liberalism contends that the “secular orders are” universal, rational, and “inherently peaceful” while religion is partisan, irrational, and divisive rather than peaceful.\(^{758}\) The liberal order can therefore bring peace if it has the power to

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\(^{755}\) For the rest of the paragraph, see Dorrien, *KRHS*, 4, 110-111; Hauerwas, *AE*, 129-132; Hauerwas, *SU*, 62-63; Hauerwas, *WAD*, 8-11, 58; Hauerwas, *WW*, 90-91. Some of those citations by Hauerwas note the connection between the wars of religion and the category of religion. The latter will be addressed later. Also, in those citations, Hauerwas draws upon a number of figures, but in particular is Cavanaugh. For some pages relevant to the argument above in *addition* to what is addressed below, see Cavanaugh, *The Myth of Religious Violence*, 17-54, 124-141, 194-225; Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, chp. 1; Cavanaugh, “A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House,” 397-398.


\(^{758}\) Hauerwas, *AE*, 132.

\(^{759}\) Ibid. See also ibid., 126-127, 129; Hauerwas, *WW*, 90-91.
enforce its moral-political order. However, Hauerwas argues the converse against the modern nation-state’s self-legitimating claim that it created a peaceful order over medieval chaos and continues to limit the Hobbesian state of nature. The modern nation-state arose and continues to exist in order for leaders to control a population and economy, in particular go to war for self-interest, without the interference of ecclesial oversight or mediation. Such self-interest, especially the pursuit of autonomy and autonomous power, is tautological by definition. Irony then abounds when that tautology is justified by its liberal determined raison d’être, for “the state defends us from threats which it itself creates.”

So the wars of religion narrative masks that the liberal narrative of raison d’être requires raison d’état is wrong. Not only did the state’s securing of its strength historically precede it securing anything else. That historical insight also uncovers an ideological commitment. The state’s self-interested raison d’état employs raison d’être in order to support the larger, self-justifying narrative: that the state’s reason for being as peacemaker requires the state to secure its self-interested power for policing. However, as much as raison d’être and raison d’état are helpful interpretations of Hauerwas’s work, there is more to them and more in Hauerwas’s criticism of the modern nation-state than so far has been realized even in his recent publications. I will develop Hauerwas’s work

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through the relation of *raison d’être* and *raison d’état* to clarify a future step in his critiques that fundamentally question political liberalism. Those French political concepts are not simply political theory; they have a history that goes hand in hand with the development of the modern state to today.\(^760\)

*Bobbitt’s Discontinuity on Raison d’être and Raison d’état*

Hauerwas leans on Philip Bobbitt’s work in two major ways. First, Hauerwas has absorbed Bobbitt’s thesis that “the modern state came into” being through coercion and war-making for self-interest.\(^761\) This helps flesh out Hauerwas’s account of the wars of religion and maintains in some ways continuity with the present. But Bobbitt’s thesis notwithstanding, in *substance* Bobbitt downplays that the nation-state *never* turned from its roots in pursuing self-interested power. This problem occurs in his categories for the different evolutions of the modern state.

Second, Hauerwas employs Bobbitt’s distinction between the state-nation (1776-1870) and its successor, the nation-state (1861-1991). In the state-nation, the state musters “a national, ethnocultural group to act on behalf of the state,” with the example being Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) rallying the French.\(^762\) But in the nation-state, “the state [is] for benefit[ing] the nation it governs.”\(^763\) The state-nation and nation-state distinction is important and helpful. So are Bobbitt’s other, chronologically preceding

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\(^762\) Hauerwas, *AE*, 123; Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles*, 146.

categories of the state: the princely state (1494-1572), the kingly state (1567-1651), and the territorial state (1649-1789). However, Bobbitt is less helpful when he implicitly relegates the various forms of reason of state to the early modern age of the princely state *(ragione di stato)*, the kingly state *(raison d’état)*, and the territorial state *(Staatsraison)*.\(^{764}\)

This historical relegation of reason of state, I will show, creates a rupture between the early modern state and the contemporary nation-state. Bobbitt’s historical account only pays lip service rather than robustly develops the fact that the transition from kingly state to territorial state to state-nation to nation-state did not mean that the power dynamics and the state’s self-serving legitimation of its sovereignty were changed in a fundamental way. *Raison d’état* is not only a political doctrine of sovereignty crucial to the rise of the early modern state’s birth through self-interested war. But also, by paying only lip service, he overlooks that *raison d’état* remains vital to the modern nation-state.\(^{765}\)

My break here from Bobbitt begins my development of Hauerwas’s thought beyond Bobbitt. Hauerwas sides with Foucault’s contention that “politics is the continuation of war by other means” to overcome Bobbitt’s view that “war simply *is*.”\(^{766}\) But whenever Hauerwas appeals to Foucault’s work, Hauerwas does not include Foucault’s treatment on *raison d’état*. Perhaps this is because, like Bobbitt, Foucault

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\(^{764}\) Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles*, 75-143, 346. I use *Staatsraison* for consistency with Bobbitt, rather than other common spellings, *Staatsraison* or *Staatsraison*.

\(^{765}\) Hauerwas once noted that he was “impressed... by Anthony Giddens’s account of the discontinuity in the change from the absolutist to the modern nation-state” (*WW*, 94 n. 7. See also Hauerwas, *AC*, 33-34; Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, chp. 4, esp. p. 121.). I do not aim to conflate historical differences, but to show amidst them a line of continuity concerning state power. There is warrant for that much even in Giddens since he writes: “France expanded in a relative stable way across the centuries from the Île de France, and it [is] surely not accidental that the most powerful and centralized absolutist state is also the one which the lineages of modern nationalism can most easily be discerned” (ibid., 119). Giddens’s example is the French state’s endeavor, particularly Richelieu’s, to make Parisian French the language of the country, which I will address in a later note (ibid.).

describes political liberalism in the nineteenth as breaking from *raison d’état*. Yet unlike Bobbitt, Foucault robustly argues that *raison d’état* still subtly continues today. It was not only fragmented and diffused into aspects of the state’s sovereign mechanisms over civil society, but also part of that process was developed by the rise of a political economy birthed from the principles of *raison d’état*. I will, however, leave the link between *raison d’état* and political economy for another time. I also have to leave a historical genealogy of *raison d’état* from its roots in antiquity and medieval Europe to today for another time. Instead, after addressing Bobbitt, I will show how focusing on *raison d’état* deepens Hauerwas’s critique of the past and present modern *state* without Bobbitt’s problems.\(^\text{767}\)

Bobbitt carefully distinguishes, chronologically and ideologically, between *ragione di stato* associated with Italian “princely states,” *raison d’état* with French “kingly states,” and *Staats raison* with German “territorial states.”\(^\text{768}\) *Ragione di stato*, he summarizes as, “rational, unprincipled justification for the self-aggrandizement of the State.”\(^\text{769}\) *Ragione di stato* “distinguish[es] the state code of behavior from the moral code of the prince (such as deceit or treachery) when the state takes on the role of the prince

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\(^{768}\) My development here will put Hauerwas on the *political* side of some early feminists, the Jansenist nuns a Port-Royal-des-Champs Abbey, *insofar* as they rejected the divine right of kings and the reason of state on the basis of divine sovereignty and, for that witness they were summarily thrown out onto the street through collusion of Louis XIV and Pope Clement XI. Although the Jansenists did so because of their theology, and so does Hauerwas, their doctrinal similarities and dissimilarities are more complex. Dale K. Van Kley, *Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Constitution, 1560-1791* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 11-12, chp. 1; Daniella Kostroun, *Feminism, Absolutism, and Jansenism: Louis XIV and the Port-Royal Nuns* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 14-15, chps. 3-7, and pp. 239-246; Paul Kléber Monod, *The Power of Kings: Monarchy and Religion in Europe, 1589-1715* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 6-7, chps. 3-6.

\(^{769}\) Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles*, 83-143.

\(^{780}\) Ibid., 108.
and the prince is relieved of his moral obligations as an individual."\textsuperscript{770} Raison d’État, he summarizes as, “a parallel justification [to ragione di stato] through the personification of the state, and [raison d’état] leveraged the imperatives of this justification to impose obligations on the dynastic ruler.”\textsuperscript{771} Accordingly, raison d’état represented “a reason invoked on behalf of a king justifying his acts as being those imposed on him by the State (such as aid to Protestant princes by a Catholic king); it identifies the king with the State when he takes on the role of the state.”\textsuperscript{772} Similarly, the shift from kingly state to territorial state was concurrent with a shift from raison d’état to Staatsraison. The kingly state’s raison d’état was a constitutional imposition on the “monarch-as-embodiment of sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{773} In the territorial state, reason of state shifted to the “monarch as minister of sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{774} There “Staatsraison is the rationale given on behalf of the State, an imperative that compels its strategic designs (such as the seizure of a proximate province for geostrategic designs). It identifies the state with the country, the land.”\textsuperscript{775}

I wholeheartedly affirm Bobbitt’s attention to historical details, but there are problems in his account. He grants a general fluidity and progressive accumulation in history that his Hegelian historical classification is too rigid to accommodate. Nonetheless, and counter to Hauerwas’s project, Bobbitt’s categories and historical

\textsuperscript{770} Ibid., 136.
\textsuperscript{771} Ibid., 108.
\textsuperscript{772} Ibid., 136.
\textsuperscript{773} Ibid., 143.
\textsuperscript{774} Ibid. See also Poggi, The Development of the Modern State, 68-77.
\textsuperscript{775} Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 135-136. For an historical account of reason of state in the Anglo-British tradition, see Poole, Reason of State.
narrative lend an implicit affirmation of liberalism’s *raison d’être-raison d’état* narrative through two steps that actually break historical continuity.  

First, Bobbitt’s strict emphasis on the discontinuities among the Italian, French, and German versions of reason of state underplays an important overlap between *raison d’état* and *Staats raison*. Bobbitt clearly notes that both are constitutional and deeply ambitious. However, less clear, and at best only partially noted, is that both *raison d’état* and *Staats raison* are imposed upon the monarch/minister by the “constitutional orders”; both are the ground for realpolitik domestic and foreign policies; and both are justified by the state’s *raison d’être* of “special responsibilities.” This basic continuity is crucial. It covers the historic period when, for example, the French state was developed through war and justified by *raison d’état*. By that manner of development, the state in turn established and partially secured essential characteristics that formed the modern French nation. The state’s role as such is in continuity with Hauerwas’s claim, through Bobbitt, that war formed the state preceding the nation. However, Bobbitt’s nuanced emphasis on distinguishing *raison d’état* and *Staats raison* is a form of classification that breaks important continuity. This downplays the importance of reason of state, and in turn serves a historical supersessionism in the next point.  

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776 Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles*, 827. One import of Bobbitt’s attention to historical details confirms that reason of state is closely aligned with absolutism, but still separable from it (Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 134). As for the break against *raison d’état*, Bates argues for that too in terms of natural law (*States of War*, 215-216). However, even in Bates’ own narrative the autonomy and autonomous reason of the state, of the political, and of natural law are interrelated (ibid., 44-45, 91-92, 105, 221). In fact, it is the concurrent and later development of natural law with reason of state that justifies the autonomy of reason of state (ibid., 48, 50-51, 221). Poole acknowledges Bobbitt’s historical framework (*Reason of State*, 3, 97-99, 168); however, without addressing Bobbitt’s break, Poole attempts to show the continuity (ibid., 128-130, 254-262). But whereas Poole starts with Hobbes, Kantorowicz has shown that “natural reason” and what would become “reason of state” are tied together even in the medieval period as the monarchy began to replace the church (*The King’s Two Bodies*, 255, 257).  


778 Hauerwas once noted that he was “impressed…by Anthony Giddens’s account of the discontinuity in the change from the absolutist to the modern nation-state” (*WW*, 94 n. 7. See also Hauerwas, *AC*, 33-34; Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, chp. 4, esp. p. 121.). I do not aim to conflate historical differences, but to show amidst them a line of continuity concerning state power. There
Second, Bobbitt creates an oversimplified break between *raison d’État* and today.

With reason of state fragmented, he gives an historical description of the kingly state and the territorial state replaced by the *state-nation* without an account of reason of state. This formula, on the one hand, serves a careful historical account that distances the territorial state from both the state-nation and nation-state. On the other hand, the formula and distance also serve Bobbitt’s normative understanding of the *nation-state*. It is one without an account of reason of state, even though some have noted that *raison d’État* undergirds modern “executive prerogative.”

And in a somewhat similar fashion, Bobbitt’s Hegelian historiography allows that the princely state’s “balance of power” and the kingly state’s “ideological hegemony” were maintained in later state iterations. But that continuity is precisely what he pays lip service to concerning *raison d’être*. Instead, his account, for both the state-nation (historical account) and for the nation-state (normative account) above, replaces *raison d’État-Staatsraison* with history identifying and shaping the state’s *raison d’être*. With the distance provided by changes over time, is warrant for that much even in Giddens since he writes: “France expanded in a relative stable way across the centuries from the Île de France, and it [is] surely not accidental that the most powerful and centralized absolutist state is also the one which the lineages of modern nationalism can most easily be discerned” (ibid., 119). Giddens’ example is the French state’s endeavor, particularly Richelieu’s, to make Parisian French the language of the country (ibid.). This is a crucial point. While the Treaty of Verdun in 843 established the kingdom of France (*Francia Occidentalis*) in the Île-de-France dutchy (the province today surrounding Paris), Richelieu and Louis XIV sought to solidify and expand that once a small, relativized kingdom among other ‘French provinces’ into what was effectively a nation for the state’s interests (Richelieu) and the glory called the *grand siècle* (Louis XIV). In order to solidify the monarch’s control, they built on Francis I’s 1539 Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts declared *langue d’oil*—specifically the dialect of Paris and the Loire River valley, which eventually became modern French—to be the official language. That development was not only later heavily promoted by Richelieu, but was also vital for Louis XIV’s attempt to solidify early modern France under his bureaucracy and to support France’s colonial endeavors across the globe. For the development of the French language, see R. Anthony Lodge, *French: From Dialect to Standard* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 63, 71-78, 95-104, 120-135, esp. 135 and the following: 159-160, 169-173, 178-185, 190, 192-195, 211. But contra Bobbitt’s emphasis on the originality of the state-nation, it is worth noting that Richelieu appropriates an *already* existing French nation for asserting the state’s autonomy. That appropriation for autonomy parallel previous French endeavors by Philip VI (1293-1350) and Philip IV (1268-1314), which Richelieu and Kantorowicz raise respectively. The difference is that Richelieu’s was more successful and long-lasting. See *The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu*, 123 or *Testament Politique D’Armand du Plessis, Cardinal Duc de Richelieu* (Amsterdam: Henri Desbordes..., 1688) Seconde Partie, Chapitre IX, Section VIII, pp. 187-188; Kantorowicz, *The King’s Two Bodies*, 66 n. 52, 195, 229, 235-237 (esp. 237), 247-262.

Engster, *Divine Sovereignty*, 82. See also ibid., 83-84.

the state’s reason for being is informed by the wisdom of hindsight and by the need to protect the present from recurring problems, rather than the state ideologically driven by justified self-interest. History, then at least indirectly, gives the state its mission. That is, unfortunately, another way of construing liberalism’s narrative of \textit{raison d’être} leading to \textit{raison d’état}.\footnote{\textcite{Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 5-6, 173-175. For Bobbitt, “the State exists by virtue of its purposes, and among these are a drive for survival and freedom of action, which is strategy; for authority and legitimacy, which is law; for identity, which is history” (ibid., 6. See also ibid., 204, 206-208, 216, 280, 334-336.). The irony here is palpable. Privileging history could be helpful considering Bobbitt’s argument that war formed the modern state. It is that formational account which Hauerwas employs most. However, Bobbitt’s emphasis on history supplants \textit{raison d’état} in both Bobbitt’s historical account and his normative understanding of the state. This supplanting exemplifies his larger break between the failures of the past and the potential of today. That runs against Hauerwas’s project. But continuity between the nation-state and kingly state’s power dynamics is, I believe, helpful for illuminating Hauerwas (AE, 120-136). Recovering the historical connection is vital not only for maintaining Bobbitt’s insights, but also for that connection establishing an alternative, a robust historical account about the world’s aeon from then to now. Without that alternative, Hauerwas opts to segue from critiquing Bobbitt to critiquing Kant on the basis that war just is (AE, 123-125). If Hauerwas bought into critiquing them on their terms, he would have implicitly bought into R. Niebuhr’s ahistorical existentialist account of human sin that Hauerwas connects to Kant (ibid., 134). But Hauerwas rejects their ahistorical terms, opting to critique them in light of the wars of religion and the category of religion followed by a Yoderian eschatology (ibid., 130-131, 135-136).}

One of the nation-state’s chief responsibilities includes controlling the use of force for the “survival” of the state and its citizens, as Bobbitt asserts.\footnote{\textcite{Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 6. This is continued in his account of the market-state (ibid., 235-328).} Essential to this understanding of the state’s own sovereign power is its “monopoly” over legitimate violence and a policing of illegitimate violence.\footnote{\textcite{Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 206.} The question is not if one should see that \textit{raison d’être} and \textit{raison d’état} are still linked today. Rather, the question for contemporary liberals is whether to privilege state/national interest outright, like R. Niebuhr and Hegel, or to maintain the Kantian legacy by stressing the modification of the reason of state for universal human rights through the UN, like Dorrien. These differences notwithstanding, the basic ground is still the same. The liberal narrative treats the nation-state’s \textit{raison d’être} as a security service to the nation that precedes, and

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\footnote{\textcite{Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 5-6, 173-175. For Bobbitt, “the State exists by virtue of its purposes, and among these are a drive for survival and freedom of action, which is strategy; for authority and legitimacy, which is law; for identity, which is history” (ibid., 6. See also ibid., 204, 206-208, 216, 280, 334-336.). The irony here is palpable. Privileging history could be helpful considering Bobbitt’s argument that war formed the modern state. It is that formational account which Hauerwas employs most. However, Bobbitt’s emphasis on history supplants \textit{raison d’état} in both Bobbitt’s historical account and his normative understanding of the state. This supplanting exemplifies his larger break between the failures of the past and the potential of today. That runs against Hauerwas’s project. But continuity between the nation-state and kingly state’s power dynamics is, I believe, helpful for illuminating Hauerwas (AE, 120-136). Recovering the historical connection is vital not only for maintaining Bobbitt’s insights, but also for that connection establishing an alternative, a robust historical account about the world’s aeon from then to now. Without that alternative, Hauerwas opts to segue from critiquing Bobbitt to critiquing Kant on the basis that war just is (AE, 123-125). If Hauerwas bought into critiquing them on their terms, he would have implicitly bought into R. Niebuhr’s ahistorical existentialist account of human sin that Hauerwas connects to Kant (ibid., 134). But Hauerwas rejects their ahistorical terms, opting to critique them in light of the wars of religion and the category of religion followed by a Yoderian eschatology (ibid., 130-131, 135-136).}
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thereby justifies, the state securing its own self-interested power through coercion and violence.\textsuperscript{784}

\textit{Developing Hauerwas’s Position through Autonomy, Exception, Raison d’être, and Raison d’état}

One might then grant that \textit{raison d’être} and \textit{raison d’état} are at most mutually informing. Yet, the logic of \textit{raison d’état} is more fundamental to political liberalism than it admits. Carl Schmitt, Giorgio Agamben, Hauerwas, and others have exposed political liberalism’s failure to realize that law is not self-grounded on its own autonomous reason. Instead, liberal law stands upon a secularized theology of the sovereign who decides exceptions to law in light of necessities and interests. To add to their critiques of political liberalism, the continued presence of exceptions to the law shows that \textit{raison d’état} is still crucial for the nation-state’s sovereignty and its biopolitics even in an international world with a UN.\textsuperscript{785}


\textsuperscript{785} Patrick O. Gudridge, “Emergency, Legality, Sovereignty: Birmingham, 1963,” in \textit{Sovereignty, Emergency, Legality}, ed. Austin Sarat (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 86. I am deeply wary of Schmitt because his work against the Weimar Republic is intellectually connected to his Nazi conversion and his support for Adolf Hitler’s despotism. However, I do take from him, in a very limited capacity, his insight about political liberalism hiding the fact that it requires a secularized sovereign, either as an individual or as a small number of individuals.
The very nature of raison d’État is about making the state itself and its interests an exception to not only the rule of law, but also to other facets of life. Reason of state is the claim that the state has its own autonomous sphere and concomitant morality because the state’s basic interests are their own form of public rationality. Less recognized is that the state’s act of making itself an exception undergirds autonomy inherent in the reason of state. Richelieu’s raison d’État asserted a separation between the monarch’s personal morality and his public role. He did so to demand, as the monarch’s chief minister and confessor, that the monarch set aside his personal morality of Christian charity in order to act according to the morality of raison d’État. The latter can require personally immoral acts in order to secure justice and peace, but for the monarch to not act accordingly is actually to act immorally in the position of monarch. Richelieu and others argued as much under the guise of, broadly, the monarch’s God-given duty to secure the public

Schmitt is most famous for that insight, which is largely why I mention him. But he need not be the only one or the primary frame of reference. For instance, I will prepare soon the ground for noting later that reason of state was initially a quasi-religious and quasi-secular version of the divine right of kings.


Foucault could be included in the list above, but sufficiently delineating the reason why would take too long here. So I will simply note the following. Despite Agamben’s criticism of Foucault for overlooking exception, Foucault could be read as showing how exception becomes the norm—a permanent state of exception—through sovereign power wielding the law for exception. That much is precisely what Schmitt and Benjamin contend. For just such an argument, see Mika Ojakangas, “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-Power: Agamben and Foucault,” Foucault Studies 2 (2005): 17-18. Hauerwas also makes his own Schmitt-Foucault connection through Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz, which illuminates the normalization of war (AÉ, 123-124, esp. 124 n. 15; WAD, 47-48).
interest and, narrowly, the monarch’s political responsibilities to his lords’ interests. The Cardinal’s Constantinian salve accordingly minimized theological interference by reducing Christian salvation to “attrition” instead of “contrition.” So Richelieu may appear to situate the monarch as simply responding to realities and necessities of ruling. But in truth Richelieu’s arguments were about exempting the French monarch’s violent domestic and foreign pursuits from the prevailing social morality, ecclesiastical influence, and political arrangements that obstructed the autonomy of state interests.

Richelieu’s project is far from antiquated. The separation of private and public morality and its use to legitimate the state’s self-interested power are fundamental assumptions undergirding R. Niebuhr’s project. The private-public morality separation parallels his distinction between moral man’s selflessness and immoral society’s selfishness. The latter’s selfishness restricting reason may countermand Richelieu’s emphasis on ruling through reason. But in more significant continuity with Richelieu, Niebuhr’s account of the nation’s selfishness is its distinctive rationality not only inherent to the nation but also necessary for its unity and survival. In that society, for Niebuhr, only justice can be obtained. So Niebuhr’s realist solution accordingly privatized Jesus’s love ethic and accommodated US’s violent pursuit of national interests. Thus, even though Hauerwas attributes the separation of an ‘external’ “morality”…from economics

786 Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, 90, 403.
787 Isaiah Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays, ed. Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer (London: Chatto & Windus, 1997), 310-311; Bates, States of War, 45-51; Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, 85-98, 475-513; Engelmann, Imagining Interest in Political Thought, 87; Engster, Divine Sovereignty, chp. 3; Meinecke, Machiavellism, 167-168; The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, pp. 3-5, and part 2, chps. 1-3, 9-10. For Richelieu’s project worked out in the conflict between Louis XIV and the Companie due Saint Sacrement, see Stremski, Contesting Sacrifice, 23-25.
[and] politics” to Kant’s legacy, Hauerwas has been implicitly working against the logic of *raison d’état* for most of his career.  

Political liberalism assumes war would be an exception, an “aberration,” if the state is sovereign over violence, but Hauerwas has recently argued the reverse. In terms of *raison d’état*, the exceptional status of the state’s autonomous interests secured in violence makes war normal. With the state and war as such, they precede and override law. The early modern state’s rise was predicated on making it an exception in order to make war for self-interests. So, the formalization of war went hand in hand with the formation of the state. Ironically, that actually ensures war. War, the power to wage war, and the power over war are inherent in the politics of the modern nation-state, Hauerwas contends, is not an aberration.

Initially, then, Hauerwas appears to undercut issue of exception and to limit himself to concerns only about war. But Hauerwas also employs Paul Kahn’s contention that war is fundamentally sacrificial, and thereby a form of sacred violence. Kahn asserts that in war “sovereignty shows itself as an end in itself,” and that a war, like the US ‘war on terror,’ cannot be bound by law. Law and humanitarian police actions follow the logic of sacrificial honor that intensifies violence, and the sacrificial character of war

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789 Of course the private-public distinction in terms of morality can be traced back to earlier figures than I have or Hauerwas develops, like to Machiavelli and Michel de Montaigne (Hauerwas, *WAD*, 8; Berlin, *The Proper Study of Mankind*, 310-311; Engelmann, *Imagining Interest in Political Thought*, 86-87). Hauerwas, applying Barth, notes a similar politics to Richelieu found in an English contemporary: Oliver “Cromwell’s...delusion Karl Barth calls ‘the syndrome of the two kingdoms’; Cromwell seems to suppose he can lead a decent life in private which in public follows ‘chance or laws of its own.’” Hauerwas, *CET*, 209; Karl Barth, *Evangelical Theology: An Introduction*, trans. Grover Foley (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1979), 129-130.

790 Hauerwas, *AE*, 121.

791 Ibid., 121-124; Hauerwas, *WAD*, pp. xvi, 47-51, chp. 5.

cannot but keep making exceptions to law. “Kahn suggests,” Hauerwas concludes, “that war is the way states sanctify their existence—an ironic result, given the widespread presumption that creation of the modern nation-state system was necessary to stop” the wars of religion.792 For Hauerwas, it is “war that makes clear that there is no higher value than the continued existence of the state,” or as Hauerwas employs Kahn, “war is about the existence of ‘the sovereign as an imagined transcendental value.’”793

An alternative expression of this irony is that the state’s raison d’état, as its own end, precedes the modern state’s raison d’être and its laws. From the early modern state born from war up through the contemporary nation-state, the modern state exists first as self-grounding power for realizing its own self-interests through war and others’ sacrifices in war. The irony of this is that the state created itself through exception, and therefore the state is ultimately beholden to its own exception and violence before it is bound by law. The state will always make exceptions for war and self-interested power that override law because the state’s violent autonomy precedes it mission of peacemaking by lawful ordering. That, for liberalism, construes war and raison d’état as the tail wagging the dog. But political liberalism’s attempts to enshrine the fundamental primacy of law misunderstands exception.794

The responsibilities, interests, and ultimately the sovereignty of raison d’état are undergirded by the state’s power as an exception to the mechanisms for peace that it

793 For the quotes, see “Hauerwas on ‘Hauerwas and the Law,’” 249; Hauerwas, AE, 128-129; Kahn, Sacred Violence, 150. Also see “Hauerwas on ‘Hauerwas and the Law,’” 250 for Hauerwas’s comment that Kahn and him are “quite similar.” For the rest of the paragraph, see Hauerwas, AE, 34-36, 69-71, 123-129, esp. 128-129 (for Hauerwas’s earlier work on war as sacrifice, see AN, 183-185); Kahn, Sacred Violence, 148-149, 151-152; Hauerwas, WAD, p. 48, chp. 5.
ensures. The state can then declare an exception to mechanisms like law. Fundamental state interests, like policing power and a monopoly over violence in particular, are synonymous with what is necessary for the state to exist in light of its responsibilities (e.g., securing national interests and safety). Yet the sovereignty of the state makes the state an exception from what the state oversees—a non-democratic sovereignty to secure a democracy—despite appeals to rule by the people. In raison d’état “the sovereign power of the state could only be truly effective if it was separated from the form of government that enacted it.”

One particularly clear instance of this separation, and in terms of efficiency, is found in the 1994 Supreme Court Case Waters v. Churchill. The case was about a former employee of a public hospital who was fired for criticizing her superior in a private conversation with another employee while taking a break at work. The Court vacated an earlier ruling in her favor because the court rejected that she could claim her First Amendment right of free speech. In continuity with precedent set by earlier Supreme Court decisions and with the majority of the other judges on the bench, Sandra Day O’Connor’s plurality opinion distinguished between the state as sovereign and state as employer. She asserted that, on the one hand, the state as sovereign does not limit First Amendment rights. But on the other hand, the state as employer “may under certain circumstances violate” public employees’ First Amendment rights for “the interest of the State… in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its

795 Bates, States of War, 46. Emphasis original. See also ibid., 47.
employees. 796 I expect Schmitt, Kahn, and others would note that the sovereign-employer separation is an ironic exception instituted by jurisprudence. But more to the point, this exception is the raison d’État logic in two ways. 797

First, the Supreme Court separates state power (employer) from the form of governance (democratic free speech) in order to secure the state’s effectiveness in terms of efficiency. Waters and others can be fired on the basis of their superior’s reasonable judgment without the due process of law in a liberal democracy. Thus jurisprudence hands itself over to bureaucracy for efficiency, which Hauerwas has critiqued. 798

Second, while this separation of power and governance is shot through with exception, undergirding the separation itself is, ironically, an act of sovereignty masked by the category of employment. Under the guise of efficiency (raison d’État) to achieve the state’s mission (raison d’être), the state as employer can make an exceptional

796 Waters v. Churchill, 511 US 661, 668-669. Emphasis is mine, not O’Connor’s. See also ibid., 674-75; Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140, 142 (1983). As for other judges on the bench, David Souter notes that “though Justice O’Connor’s opinion speaks for just four Members of the Court, the reasonableness test it sets out is clearly the one that lower courts should apply” (Waters v. Churchill, p. 685, concurring opinion). Indeed, the precedent set and secured by Pickering v. Board of Education, Connick v. Myers, and Waters v. Churchill was employed in Horstkoetter v. Department of Public Safety, 159 F.3d 1265, 1271-1274 (1998). For the precedent and latter’s decision shaping other cases, see the examples of Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 985, 998-999 (1999); Greene v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136, 1142 (1999); Bass v. Richards, 308 F. 3d 1081, 1088-1089 (2002); Arndt v. Koby, 309 F.3d 1247, 1251-1252 (2002). And in case one understandably assumes my connection to Horstkoetter v. Department of Public Safety, I do not know that branch of the Horstkoetter family. I simply stumbled onto the case.

797 Schmitt, Dictatorship, 9-10, 13-14. By Kahn’s estimation, even the votes by the justices are individual decisions that amount to a decision that is itself an exception (Political Theology, 90). Feldman, by partial contrast, may call such an exception a norm because of the Court’s affirmation of the executive branch (Leonard C. Feldman, “The Banality of Emergency: On the Time and Space of ‘Political Necessity,’” in Sovereignty. Emergency. Legality, esp. pp. 159-160). I affirm both views if they are framed in terms of action and ideology normalized respectively. That distinguishing in order to unify is far from unusual by critics of the state of emergency. They see not only that the appeal to emergency in dire situations exposes a sovereign rather than the law as the ultimate. They also see through the initial shock of emergency situations as legitimating a continual endeavor (or norm) to avoid the law. Both are deep, intertwined ironies in political liberalism. The latter irony, such as the Court affirming exception, confirms the former irony in the executive branch. But what is particularly interesting about Kahn’s contention is in the implied reversal of how the branches work together, so often perceived of as legislation first, executive enforcement second, and judicial confirmation third. The reverse, structurally speaking, is that the action of the Court’s sovereign decisions is affirmed by the other two branches. So with the Court first, the distinction of action and ideology are perhaps not distinguishable. The Court’s action is a sovereign exception instituted as a norm. That reversal illuminates similar but obscured action-norms of other branches. For instance, the president has normalized prerogative to launch nuclear weapons at the push of a button (Kahn, Political Theology, 2).

798 Waters v. Churchill, 669; Hauerwas, AC, 33-34, 64-66; Hauerwas, BH, 226 n. 31. Justice Antonin Scalia was the only one to reject skirting procedure (Waters v. Churchill, 686-694), but O’Connor replied that procedure does not ensure free speech (ibid., 669-671), citing the court’s ruling in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
sovereign decision (*raison d’état*) to limit the mission of state sovereignty (*raison d’être*) in order to ensure self-serving power in the interests of the state (*raison d’état*).

Both making the exception and limiting free speech for *raison d’être* are deep illiberal incoherencies within political liberalism, due to jurisprudence recognizing that power and decision-making-an-exception are the ultimate ground, not the law.

Liberalism’s nation-state cites its mission of creating peace by ensuring rights in order for the state to appear as ordered (*ordinata*), legitimate power (*potestas*). However, when the mission for peace conflicts with the state’s *raison d’état*, then *raison d’être* is overruled for the state’s actual grounding in sheer, autonomous might (*potentia absoluta*), and its desire for more power. Thus, political liberalism’s narrative of *raison d’être* requiring *raison d’état* is actually the reverse. *Raison d’état* is a tautology that, to justify itself, employs a *raison d’être.*

Up to now I have contended that, in French political terms, Hauerwas’s more recent work argues that *raison d’état* is legitimated by *raison d’être*. Despite the modern nation-state putting on airs of neutral objectivity for war, state warfare is instead ideologically driven by a pathological securing of its own self-interested power. This project is achieved further under the guise of protecting ‘public’ self-interests from “the fear of death,” and protecting the status quo for the greed and banal illusions of autonomy in capitalism. Such a project is nothing short of rejecting the politics of friendship and its source, the gifts of God’s sovereign agency, as outlined in chapter three. I have

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799 Hauerwas finds US law “interesting” precisely because it does not have a “bottom,” but then follows with the next sentence “that is, it is a law without a bottom unless you think the Supreme Court is the bottom.” For Hauerwas, US law appears to be a tradition dependent form of practical reasoning, but he “worr[ies] that one of the dangers of liberalism as an ideology is how it can work to undermine the common law tradition.” What I have argued about concerning reason of state, I believe, gets to the heart of Hauerwas’s worry. For the quotes, see “Hauerwas on ‘Hauerwas and the Law,’” 236, 247. See also ibid., 239, 244-245.
developed Hauerwas’s work by establishing his early engagement with *raison d’état*, by teasing out how he continued to reject *raison d’état*, and then by combining my constructive work on *raison d’état* with aspects of his criticisms of privatization, war, and efficiency. But for Hauerwas there is one more element to, broadly, the state’s hegemonic sovereignty and, narrowly, the wars of religion narrative. The state ‘created’ the category of religion in order for the state’s sovereignty to replace divine sovereignty. 801

The Category of Religion and State Sovereignty as Sacred

The rise of the modern nation-state through self-interested war is predicated on the concomitant creation of the decidedly non-neutral category of religion. Hauerwas, using Cavanaugh, describes the modern characterization of religion as some kind of “trans-historical” and “trans-cultural” private belief or spirituality “essentially distinct from public, secular rationality.” 802 Construing ‘religion’ as such is deeply problematic. The category of religion is an abstract universal that separates faith from its particular language, content, and/or social existence. That separation, in turn, creates a broken definition of religion no matter how it is construed. When religion is defined by its substance in doctrines or practices, religion is too narrow to incorporate all faiths. The alternative is defining religion by its “function,” but doing so is too expansive because issues like “nationalism” could fit as well. 803 These definitional problems indicate that an

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802 Hauerwas, *AE* 129; Cavanaugh, *The Myth of Religious Violence*, 9. See also ibid., 19, 25, 28, 45, 50, 58-59; Hauerwas, *WwW*, 90. Perhaps this marks a change for Hauerwas since he once wrote: “The church is one political entity in our culture that is global, transnational, transcultural” (*RA*, 42). Recently Hauerwas has argued against the term “global Christianity” as studied by the academic anthropologists, but for the church catholic as witness and as mission in diaspora (*WwW*, 39-60; *WwW*, chps. 10, 12).
alien framework is at play, rather than the category simply collecting together different
faiths describing themselves.\textsuperscript{804}

The religion category, Hauerwas and Cavanaugh contend, is determined by
distorting liberal mechanisms that marginalize ecclesial influence in order to serve state
power. Political liberalism’s social contract means that “the only entity with political
standing is the individual,” and so the citizen-state relation precludes room for other
socio-political entities.\textsuperscript{805} That policing already excludes faith from being recognized as a
source of politics, but this strategic goal also goes hand in hand with disenfranchising
faith communities. The issue is, then, what to do with faith. Since the wars of religion
characterized faith as irrational, chaotic, and violent, faith cannot be allowed in public
without restrictions. The generic category of religion is just such a fundamental
restriction. ‘Religion’ re-defines faith as a belief relegated to one’s private life in order to
keep faith away from significant discussions and actions in society. The privatization of
faith and a strong state enforcement of an autonomous moral-political order, by liberal
accounts, should keep the religious conflict at bay. But considering the actual histories of
the category of ‘religion’ and of the ‘wars of religion,’ Hauerwas maintains not only “that
any attempt to isolate ‘religion’ from any social, economic, and political realities cannot
be sustained.”\textsuperscript{806} Those two ways of understanding ‘religion’ are instead part of an
“attempt to legitimate state control of the church.”\textsuperscript{807} There is warrant for such a striking

\textsuperscript{805} Hauerwas, \textit{CC}, 219. See also ibid., 83-84, 127, 130-131, 148-150, 158-162, 171.
\textsuperscript{806} Hauerwas, \textit{AE}, 131. Hauerwas’s point is left implicit in reference to Kant (\textit{AE}, 124-128, 132, 134-135), but he has account of just
such an attempt by Kant elsewhere, although towards a different end and without reference to the wars of religion or the category of
religion (\textit{STT}, 148-151).
\textsuperscript{807} Hauerwas, \textit{AE}, 131.
claim even when the state appears to take seriously the separation of church and state. Since religion is construed as nothing more than an individual’s private interest in the contemporary US, salvation has become accordingly “individualistic.” This reduction, Hauerwas argues, enables and supports coherence with market-values and “modern democratic presuppositions” of autonomy. The reduction and coherence have the effect of replacing discipleship as learning the “craft” of following Jesus from tradition and a masterful community. Consequently, liberalism’s abstract politics of the autonomous citizen-consumer supplants Christian particularity, formation by an ecclesial community, the supreme Good, and the theological and moral virtues that belong to Christianity’s distinctiveness and mission.

State control through privatizing ‘religion’ not only exposes liberalism’s hegemonic attempt to police Christianity. The privatization of faith also creates a public gap for the state to fill with its own attempt to be divinely sovereign. To make matters worse, liberal theology is complicit in that endeavor. But how can that be? After all,
Hauerwas notes that R. Niebuhr places state sovereignty in a subordinated position to divine sovereignty, even though both Niebuhr and John Courtney Murray argue that the state’s attempt to be neutral, that is secular, means there is room for divine sovereignty. However, through a rare appreciative use of Murray, Dorrien appears to agree with Hauerwas at least on concluding to a superficial plurality in a liberal society and on liberalism policing faith. Yet then Dorrien and Hauerwas differ.812

Dorrien finds liberative promise in the liberal emphasis on equality. So he argues, in terms of justice, for developing religious freedom to overcome superficial pluralism that ignores or suppresses real differences. Hauerwas eschews the nation-state’s categories of religion and religious freedom that demand privatization and translation. Those categories and demands distort the substance of Christian faith by shearing it from its socio-political constitution crucial to social salvation. The all too often result is that Christianity “becomes” tantamount to “a court religion held captive to the interests of a nation-state” and no longer “capable of calling into question ‘the public.’”813

Dorrien’s valuing of truth and giving up success for a prophetic stand, as noted in chapter one, are aimed at keeping Christianity from becoming a court religion. Yet Rauschenbusch’s role for the state in his tripartite structure and Dorrien’s qualification of that—the state’s involvement in redemption limited to justice—correlate with the sphere-making of raison d’état. The monarch in the early modern state claimed access to God not limited to the confines of papal power precisely because raison d’état was initially a

812 Hauerwas, CC, 72, 246 n. 4; Hauerwas, WW, 55-56; Dorrien, EDE, 364.
813 For the quotes, see Hauerwas, AC, 74; Hauerwas, WW, 116. For the rest of the paragraph, see Dorrien, EDE, 359-364; Hauerwas, IGC, chp. 13.
quasi-religious and quasi-secular development of the divine right of kings. The historical
development of political liberalism, even some liberals admit, accordingly furthered the
secularization of the divine right rather than “break decisively from” it.814 This continuity
explains why, in contrast to Dorrien, Hauerwas undercuts the presupposition that the
modern nation-state makes room for divine sovereignty. The state claims ownership over
the keys to death since the state asserts “a monopoly on legitimate violence to save us
from the violence of religion.”815 In effect, the state creates a sacral order “supplanting”
alternative, authoritative sources like Jesus and the church.816 The state’s most significant
raison d’être as sacred, neutrally objective peace-maker is a trumped up charge to justify
the state’s raison d’état, the state as the ultimate authority, as the exception determining
life and death through death. That emphasis on death is, Achille Mbembe argues, not so
much a biopolitics but a “necropolitics.”817 In accepting this new sacred order, Christian
loyalty is exchanged for what is tantamount to another, perverse kind of sacred, the
necropolitics of the state that seeks to regulate and transcend death through unity in
violence and rules. Thereby the gifts of God’s sovereignty, the gifts of creaturehood, true
peace, and Christian witness, have been rejected and supplanted to support a self-
interested rival, human autonomy.818

814 Engster, Divine Sovereignty, 199. See also Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, 508; Meinecke, Machiavellism, pp. 135, 355,
and chp. 17; Strenski, Contesting Sacrifice, 116-117, 123, 147.
815 Hauerwas, AE, 132. See also ibid., 131.
816 Cavanaugh, Myth of Religious Violence, 113. See also ibid., 114-118, 120-121; Hauerwas, AC, 66; Hauerwas, AE, 131-132;
Hauerwas, CET, 189 n. 30; Hauerwas, WAD, chp. 5; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 9-12.
818 Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, 472-504; Engster, Divine Sovereignty, 83-84, 198-199; Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious
Violence, 4-5; Engster, Divine Sovereignty, 83-84, 196-199; Hauerwas, AC, 142-144; Hauerwas, Dfª, 150-151, 194-195 n. 22;
Hauerwas, WAD, 8-11; Hauerwas, WW, 57-58; Poggi, The Development of the Modern State, 99-100; Strenski, Contesting Sacrifice,
117, 123; Philip Windsor, “The Justification of the State,” in The Reason of States: A Study in International Political Theory, ed.
Michael Donelan (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 176; Hauerwas, AC, 66-68, 71; Hauerwas, AE, 131; Hauerwas, CET, 182-
183; Hauerwas, WAD, p. 5, chp. 5; Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence, 9-10, 113-114, 120-121, 123, 210, 226; Cavanaugh,
**Dorrien’s Presumable Suspicion**

Hauerwas’s critique of state sovereignty is problematic on Dorrien’s terms, which value liberalism’s liberative potential because of its ideals and its historical success in realizing the ideals. His pragmatic streak further strengthens his objection to the isolation of the church and faith from liberal democracy. On those terms, Hauerwas’s rejection of an activist church is as overblown now as it was when Hauerwas first made the argument. It would be inconsistent for Dorrien not to judge that Hauerwas’s claim of a new agency still has yet to fully make good on relating to aspects of society that aim at fulfilling the liberative commands in the Bible. As much as solidarity is about living-with, even suffering with, solidarity is part of making sure all needs are met for liberation.\(^{819}\)

In some respects, the above is an update of the church-world difference that Dorrien saw at the heart of their disagreement. But simply interpreting the issue of hegemonic sovereignty as such would be too simplistic. It is addressing human intra-relations and thereby reality that underlies their disagreements over the church-world relation as Dorrien saw it. Hauerwas’s later work, then, *seems* even further isolated from a society where “politics is finally an arena of limited options.”\(^{820}\) Dorrien may grant that one could not work with a state so diametrically opposed to Christianity, but he does not hold to the same description of the state as Hauerwas. Dorrien appears to assume the wars of religion narrative, and he repeatedly claims that “the way beyond modernity is through it.”\(^{821}\) So I assume Dorrien would extend the same criticism to Hauerwas as Dorrien

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\(^{820}\) Hauerwas, *DF*, 10.

levels at Barth. He did not give enough credence “to the apologetic aspects of theology done as ‘faith seeking understanding.’” A sufficient enough commonality and some measure of translation are necessary for intelligible communication and the mutual endeavor of seeking the truth.

But earlier in Resident Aliens, Hauerwas and Willimon’s advocacy for a radical break, a “revolutionary ethics,” was already about a revolution from liberalism rather than a revolution within liberalism. Six years later, Hauerwas went further in an excoriating critique of Rauschenbusch and R. Niebuhr’s embrace of liberal democracy as justification for Constantinian power. Hauerwas still holds to rejecting procedural democracy, despite Stout’s 2004 critique of Hauerwas “as decidedly anti-democratic.” Dorrien pre-empted Stout here too, criticizing Hauerwas and Yoder’s “Christian anarcho-pacifism” and its support from Yoder’s account of Jesus’s Lordship. Dorrien still maintains that Resident Aliens was “unintended aid” to injustice and oppression. I note, then, that my work on raison d’être and raison d’état only creates further distance between Dorrien and Hauerwas at the most basic level. That is if the discussion were simply left here.

III. Conclusion: Fracture and Hope

Divine and political sovereignty and human subjectivity and agency are at the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement. Their different understandings of the

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822 Dorrien, WTM, 236.
823 Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 62-63.
824 Hauerwas, DF, 93-104.
826 Dorrien, review of Dispatches from the Front, 580. Hauerwas has since granted that his understanding of “authority stands as a challenge, a challenge that may appear to threaten anarchy, in a liberal social order in which common goods by design are reduced to common interest” (WT, 189). But as I will raise soon, Hauerwas is not for anarchy. Rather, the charge of anarchy is a self-legitimating charge: “hegemonic narratives, when confronted by their hegemony, always attempt to claim that ‘peace’ is being threatened” (Hauerwas, WW, 194).
827 Dorrien, “Unintended Aid.”
two sovereignties at work exemplifies a deep fracture in the political voices of Christians in the US. Granted there are other facets of Christianity’s political voice, like the Evangelicals and Catholics that Dorrien and Hauerwas have addressed in varying degrees. But I agree with Dorrien’s assertion in 1995 that he and Hauerwas represent the two most promising, albeit divergent, options for a post-Christendom, Protestant Christianity in the US.  

For Dorrien, divine sovereignty and spiritual subjectivity work with and in the world to transform the world. But from Dorrien’s perspective, Hauerwas’s accounts of divine sovereignty, of humanity as creature-friends, and of liberal democracy set him in an isolating direction that is still potentially unbiblical. For Hauerwas, his understanding of divine sovereignty and human subjectivity fundamentally question the modern nation-state’s sovereignty because Jesus is the truth of the triune God who is sovereign by gift-giving. From Hauerwas’s perspective, Dorrien’s divine sovereignty and human subjectivity fundamentally integrate with state sovereignty. Hauerwas has not explicitly accused Dorrien of Constantinianism, but the social gospelers’ and R. Niebuhr’s forms of integration with state sovereignty is a major hallmark of Constantinianism. From Hauerwas’s position, then, it is difficult to see how Dorrien sufficiently avoids Constantinianism, even considering Dorrien’s arguments for a counter-cultural witness from the margins and a recovery of the evangelical heritage. This articulation of their differences stresses the theological vector of the two sovereignties at work covered in chapter three.

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828 In fact, aspects of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s projects seem to be about recovering the evangelical—in the sense of *evangelion*—aspects of Christianity without being formally Evangelical (Dorrien, *RET*, 11; Hauerwas, *STT*, 77). For Dorrien’s claim, see Dorrien, *SS*, 360.
In the Hauerwas section of this chapter, I raised the other vector: liberalism as a whole, and the liberal nation-state specifically, operating on them also contributes to their different responses to political sovereignty. Dorrien’s divine sovereignty fits with state sovereignty, but as a sometimes critical voice for the internal development of liberalism. This critical continuity occurs because liberal theology is part of the larger liberal project. Hauerwas’s project is not part of the liberal project. He questions the state’s mission of peacemaking and its reasons for doing so based on his better hope in Jesus’s sovereignty and in turn humanity’s new agency. As a result, Hauerwas illuminates the modern state’s sovereignty as intrinsically hegemonic, rather than hegemony as a symptomatic expression of US imperialism.

Hauerwas and Dorrien’s friendship and their generosity toward each other’s work are helpful. But how is the next generation of theological discussion not fated to repeat their categorical impasse? Is development beyond that impasse possible? Answering these questions is vital since Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s divergent trajectories seem to be moving further apart. As I have argued elsewhere, the theological roots of liberation theology have slowly given way to simply social solidarity and moral praxis. Hauerwas’s worry about the separation of theology and ethics is being further realized; and while Dorrien’s historical work has been recognized, his call for a spiritual center is largely overlooked. If this situation continues unabated, soon enough the faithfulness versus social justice narrative will become self-fulfilling as a solidified conflict forcing a false decision for US Christians.829

829 For Hauerwas and Dorrien’s friendship, see some their correspondence in box 4, accession 2008-0123, Stanley Hauerwas Papers, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University. For the rest of the paragraph, see Horstkoetter, “Getting Back to Idolatry Critique,” 90 n. 17; Hauerwas, STT, chp. 1.
Yet hope is still present. Hauerwas and Dorrien both maintain a vision of human relations more expansive than the state’s conceptions of politics. That political surplus is found in both of their arguments about achieving the common good through a decentralized politics of subsidiarity, localism, and radical democracy. Despite Hauerwas’s rejection of liberalism’s “procedural” democracy, he advocates for “deliberative democracy” in local communities so people with significant differences can discover the common good together. Hauerwas’s work on friendship, hospitality, and disability not only reflects the heart of l’Arche; he also raises them as exemplars in his discussion on radical democracy. Dorrien’s advocacy for breaking up the banks among other regulatory mechanisms constitute a socio-economic policy to be lobbied for in Washington D.C. But the larger issue of economic democracy is about a grass roots movement to “suit particular social and cultural contexts” in the expanding pluralism of US society. Additionally, while Dorrien’s vision is about co-operatives and worker-owned enterprises, he also critically appreciates the Occupy movement and supports the churches’ involvement in it. Those two ‘prongs,’ of vision and activism, can be construed as forms of radical democracy in the framework of subsidiarity.

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831 Dorrien, *EDE*, 141. See also ibid., 283-286; Dorrien, “Economic Democracy and the Possibility of Real, Healthy Change,” 144  
Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s political surplus is intelligible in their rejection of the self as self-constituted or self-determined. They maintain a positive understanding of multiple sources that determine the self. So there are multiple communities and narratives at work, although some may be more authoritative than others. Yet as much as their surplus countermands the sphere-making of *raison d’état*, their surplus is obscured by the terms of the discussion beholden to political sovereignty as it is, and more superficially, social justice versus faithfulness. So how can they be freed for complex space? How can communities be recognized as authoritative in a political sphere where the power of state sovereignty is predicated on the individualism of the social contract? The answer lies in Rowan Williams’s work on multi-layered, decentralized politics.
CHAPTER 4
Williams’s Political Horizon: With and Beyond Hauerwas and Dorrien

Rowan Williams advocates for state sovereignty, constituted by securing *raison d’état* hidden under the guise of procedural policing, to be transformed into supporting a decentralized, co-operative, and discussion-oriented politics. In his vision, the identity forming power of social groups and their concomitant traditions are recognized to be authoritative for the subject’s identity and to play an essential role in public life, including politics and the common good.

The transformation of the state’s hegemonic sovereignty is a tall order; however, there is significant warrant for doing so. Williams’s concerns are partly about recognizing the plurality of society that is suppressed by England’s monopolistic jurisprudence. I have similar concerns about the US context. The US government’s hegemonic sovereignty forms our imagination in a way that leaves us incapable of receiving and responding to the plurality of US society in an adequate and healthy manner. Consider the plight of the Native Americans, the chattel slavery of Africans, and the historical effects of those oppressions that are still real today for both groups. We are encountering similar problems today with other social groups. In particular, the xenophobic trumped-up ‘specter’ of Islam and Shari’a law has stimulated unsuccessful and successful attempts to establish laws excluding the possibility of Shari’a in state jurisprudence.833

For those who scoff at the idea of the transformation of state sovereignty, it as a current reality has been well recognized by political scientists beginning in the middle of the 1990s and has since produced a massive amount of discussion. The issue is primarily whether or not the state should go along with its ongoing transformation pushed by global capitalism, and less primarily its greater reception towards multiculturalism. For select examples, see Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Kanishka Jayasuriya, “Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law: From Political to Economic Constitutionalism,” *Constellations: An International Journal of Critical & Democratic Theory* 8, no. 4 (2001);
As much as there is warrant to transform the fundamental nature of state sovereignty for the common good, the central concern of my argument here is that Williams’s work provides a new horizon for the theological discussion. Specifically, I argue that his political horizon opens up the Hauerwas-Dorrien discussion, on the one hand, by meeting much of the political criticisms and surplus in their thought, and on the other hand, by going beyond them toward transforming state sovereignty without Constantinian presumptions.

Like Dorrien, I am wary of “giganticist analyses that sound radical but which strangle political agency.” I emphasize, therefore, the practical aspects of realizing Williams’s transformative vision. But in this chapter the most significant value of his thought is that it opens up our imagination. The situation of Hauerwas and Dorrien’s argument, not just the argument, is crucial. Williams illuminates the division over political sovereignty, and he shows how it need not be that way. He sketches a vision of state sovereignty that frees Hauerwas and Dorrien from the pressure of the state’s

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834 Dorrien, “Economic Democracy and the Possibility of Real, Healthy Change,” 141. But at the same time, an audacious vision is essential. I am also wary that the critique of state sovereignty in chapter three and the transformative vision of it in this chapter can be co-opted. As Bartelson writes, “those of us who had spent so much intellectual labor deconstructing and historicizing sovereignty—sometimes in the vain hope of escaping its hold over our political imagination—had there by inadvertently provided the rhetorical resources necessary for its governmentalization and restoration.” My difference from Bartelson is that an ‘escape’—his word, not mine—is possible precisely because it has already occurred. The triune God’s ordering of Christianity’s social ‘imagination’ is a concrete reality in faithful churches. That ecclesial embodiment’s concern for the cosmos, through instances like inter-faith dialogue, shows an alternative to the state’s homogenized sovereignty and provides the external pressure necessary to call for a state’s decentralized sovereignty. For the quote, see Jens Bartelson, Sovereignty as Symbolic Form (New York: Routledge, 2014), vi.
hegemonic sovereignty. The hegemonic issues of privatization and translation disappear in Williams’s decentralized, discussion-oriented politics, in which the social groups and their particular languages matter. This transformation alleviates the pressure state sovereignty contributes to the impasse and fracture in US Christianity. Indeed, Williams’s vision of transforming state sovereignty frees Hauerwas and Dorrien from their different responses to the constraints of a common assumption: the permanence of state sovereignty. By permanence of state sovereignty, I do not mean that state sovereignty does not shift. It seems to be transforming from a nation-state to a market-state, as I will address. I also do not ignore the fact that Hauerwas and Dorrien critically engage the state, even opting for alternatives to it. Those critical shifts object to but do not unravel the state’s own pathological compulsion to secure its self-serving power through mechanisms like privatization and translation. What I mean by permanence is assuming rather than transforming the state’s own self-understanding and its mechanisms. The assumption of permanence is a weed that strangles their political surplus. But if we are freed from this presumption, we can act—as I believe Hauerwas and Dorrien want—in a relational way to each other that is not beholden to hegemonic sovereignty, no matter if the state initially wants to co-operate or not. In such “ad hominem” practical reasoning we can realize where and how we can know one another differently.835 Hauerwas and Dorrien could be brought together in a fresh way through advocating for the transformation of state sovereignty in the process of proleptically realizing its new form.

In short, we can live in “complex space,” and thereby call the state to catch up. So my interpretation of Williams’s new horizon has implications that can change the internal discussion of Christianity in the US and the nature of Christian work for the common good.

Williams opens, then, the possibility that the Dorrien-Hauerwas discussion can be freed from disagreements over political sovereignty’s status quo. But Williams’s work is not simply a pragmatic bridge through ethics. Ethics and theology are united. So the final conclusion not only shows that his political vision issues from his theological horizon, but also suggests that his theopolitical horizon critically develops crucial aspects of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s theopolitics. By addressing Williams’s challenge, the Dorrien-Hauerwas discussion can be re-freshed for beginning to move beyond fracture.

I. Williams’s Programmatic and Procedural Secularisms

In 2008, then Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams gave a lecture on civil and religious jurisprudence at the Royal Courts of Justice in London. He primarily argued that monopolistic state jurisprudence ignores but should accommodate Shari’a law in a way similar to what the Jewish court system (Beth Din) already enjoys. The dominating response was a public uproar displaying anti-Islamic and anti-immigrant sentiment with woefully uniformed opinions about Shari’a law and what Williams actually meant, much less why. The ‘Shari’a lecture’ continued his long standing engagement with secular political liberalism in England, by building on his knowledge of the English state

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836 John Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997), 271. It is Milbank’s term “complex space” that I appreciate, in the same manner as Long: “Liberalism will close down any ‘complex space’ that exists outside of the ‘simple space’ liberalism creates” (The Goodness of God, 102). But I am reticent about other aspects of Milbank’s work, even in his chapter on complex space. For instance, I am not convinced by his analysis of liberation theology because it has always been more diverse than the Latin American Catholic theologians (The Word Made Strange, 270).
pluralists John Neville Figgis (1866-1919) in particular, as well as G. D. H. Cole (1889-1959) and Harold J. Laski (1893-1950). The heart of Williams’s political thought lies in this engagement, not in the popular, mass media misunderstandings of his claims that were reported to the public. 837


In a more recent publication that mostly consists of lectures prior to the ‘Shari’a lecture,’ Williams defines secularism as “a functional, instrumentalist perspective, suspicious and uncomfortable about inaccessible dimensions.” Williams might then appear to reject political liberalism. But he is for it if framed as “the idea that political life can and should be a realm of creative engagement” for the common good. This definition of liberalism is aimed against reductive political accounts. The realm of creative engagement cannot be reduced to “a principle simply of democratic rights, nor of individual liberties.” The liberal state is secular in the sense that “loyalty to the state is not the same thing as religious belonging.” From this framework, Williams distinguishes two forms of secular political liberalism: “programmatic” and “procedural.” He rejects the programmatic understanding of liberalism, but he embraces the procedural. Programmatic liberalism follows after French secularism, which is characterized by sheer “functionality” and by the requirement of “clear public loyalty to the state.” Programmatic secularism, in a Kantian-like fashion, also reduces religious faith to “private convictions” or “choices,” construing the sacred as about more than what we might see and thus out of bounds. Faith can affect private morality, but if

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Williams, FPS, 15. Chapters one through six, eight, eleven, fourteen, nineteen through twenty-one, and twenty-three through twenty-six all predate the ‘Shari’a lecture.’

Ibid., 78. See also ibid., 3-4, 21, 80-83, 120-123.

Ibid., 78.

Ibid.

Ibid., 2, 27.

Ibid., 3. See also ibid., 27, 38.

Ibid., 3. See also ibid., 19-20, 26-27.
faith ever enters the public square, faith’s content must first be translated into secular concepts to divest faith of religious markers. In contrast, procedural secularism focuses on plurality. The state cannot give “advantage or preference to any one religious body over others,” nor may the state “requir[e] any specific public confessional allegiance from its servants.” Social bodies, not just individuals, are also emphasized in procedural secularism’s plurality. Social communities and their particular corporate nature are recognized as authoritatively constituting the individual subject and the local community. Such corporate plurality welcomes difference without privatization or translation. This is because the local communities are in direct discussion in public; they are not policed into the private sphere by a state that enforces a ‘neutral’ public language.

Williams’s differentiation between programmatic and procedural secularisms is crucial to his work for the transformation of sovereignty. I argue next that Williams’s critical analysis of programmatic secularism complements both Hauerwas’s critique of political liberalism as hegemonic and my development of that critique. Then I focus on Williams’s procedural secularism in order to show his transforming vision of the state. Only then can I show later how that vision offers a new horizon that parallels and opens the promise of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s political surplus without the limits of their impasse.

845 Ibid., 2. See also ibid., 20-21, 33.
Programmatic Secularism’s Monopolistic Sovereignty

Williams’s account of programmatic secularism broadly corresponds to Hauerwas’s contention that political liberalism is hegemonic. Programmatic secularism’s aim is the “almost value-free atmosphere of public neutrality” in order to secure individual autonomy and peace. To achieve this end, programmatic secularism privileges the autonomous freedom and reason over and against external authorities like religion. However, Williams rejects not only just such an account of autonomy, but also the veracity of individual and state neutrality. Programmatic secularism creates a ‘neutral’ public space under the auspices of a desire to create peace. Yet to do so requires the state to marginalize all rival authorities. The state does so through monopolizing public space, citizenship, and juridical mechanisms. This form of state-sovereignty demands that citizens “detach their perspectives and policies in social or political discussion from fundamental convictions that are not allowed to be mentioned or manifested in public.” However, this detachment is situated instead of neutral, and the state’s monopolization of public space and language is constraining rather than liberating.

There is more to Williams’s description of programmatic secularism, which has more points of congruity between Hauerwas’s and Williams’s critiques of hegemony. For instance, Williams critiques the wars of religion narrative, the category of religion, and the use of them to legitimate procedural secularism for the same reasons as Hauerwas and Cavanaugh. But it is worth emphasizing how Williams’s view is distinct from

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847 Ibid., 27. See also ibid., 38-39.
848 Ibid., 27.
849 Ibid., 27, 38, 63-65, 68, 74, 88-89.
Hauerwas’s within their similar critiques of hegemony. I focus on first the influence of Roman sovereignty in relation to raison d’être and raison d’état. Then I highlight the importance of jurisprudence before concluding with the issue of pluralism.\textsuperscript{850}

In order to illuminate the imperial nature of the modern state’s sovereignty, Williams raises the connection between Roman sovereignty and the modern state’s. The latter emerged through its own additions and subtractions to Roman sovereignty in order to support the state’s claim of autonomy under the auspices of serving its subjects autonomy.\textsuperscript{851}

Following Figgis, Williams characterizes Rome’s imperial sovereignty as “intensely centralized” and as “systematically suspicious of private societies.”\textsuperscript{852} To achieve this Rome “imposed upon all nationalities an absolutely uniform culture, reinforced by a formidably organized army.”\textsuperscript{853} Rome’s aim of universal rule was achieved on the basis of “a higher law” than “local jurisdictions.”\textsuperscript{854} That “centralized system” was recovered shortly preceding and during the sixteenth century by monarchs seeking to become the “single source of all legality and jurisdiction” in order to be

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Williams, FPS, 23-24, 28-32, 51-53, 64, 76-78; Williams, OCT, 268-269. If I were to give a historical genealogy of reason of state in chapter three, I would have also contended that the recovery of Roman law in the late medieval age was a crucial development for the later independence of state sovereignty in the rise of the early modern state.
\item Williams, FPS, 51.
\item Ibid., 51.
\item Ibid., 77. This page and its surrounding pages are an important nuancing of Williams’s sympathetic critique of his own summary of Figgis’s “broad sweep of argument” (ibid., 52).
\end{enumerate}
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“inviolable, beyond challenge” or “appeal.” 855 This form of sovereignty is the heritage upon which programmatic secularism is built.

State concerns about unification and an underlying fear indicate a fundamental acceptance of Rome-style sovereignty. Political unification is achieved by a supposedly universal, “timeless,” and “instrumental” autonomous rationality. 856 By contrast, loyalties that tie citizens to alternative, historical communities are deemed sources of violent, irrational passions that create political chaos. So like the Roman Empire, programmatic secularism fears external loyalties and communities. Constructively, programmatic secularism also employs a monopolistic sovereignty like that of imperial Rome. The state’s mission, it claims, is to ensure an autonomous public order of autonomous individuals. But since external loyalties threaten social cohesion, programmatic secularism asserts that monopolistic sovereignty is necessary for peace. The wars of religion narrative exemplifies that irrational, violent, and competitive religion overthrew public order until the modern state made peace through claiming sole jurisdiction over its geographic boundaries. 857

Williams puts questions to the narrative sequence that state’s mission requiring its autonomous power. The state’s reason for being is a justification for its self-serving “monopoly” on violence and for the demand “exclusive loyalty” over-against the communal bonds in other corporate groups. 858 Specifically concerning faith, it is privatized. Historically rooted faith communities in particular contribute distinctive

855 Ibid., 51, 55, 77. See also ibid., 38, 52; Rowan Williams, “Liberation Theology and the Anglican Tradition,” in Politics and Theological Identity: Two Anglican Essays, by Rowan Williams and David Nicholls (London: Jubilee, 1984), 21-22.
856 Williams, FPS, 27, 43. See also ibid., 37-39, 42, 44, 113, 294-295.
858 Ibid., 41, 43. See also ibid., 3, 37-40, 46, 55, 80, 302.
differences to the identities of persons and society, but programmatic secularism sequesters the communities from politics, economics, and society in order to make room for autonomous self-creation. By securing the private-public distinction over and against “alternative citizenship’... [like] the Christian community,” political liberalism “turns itself into a fixed and absolute thing, another pseudo-religion.”

This ironic transformation into the state as “the sole source of legitimate common life” reflects Rome’s “absolute and universal” sacred sovereignty transcending any “local tradition” or governance. Programmatic secularism’s form of sovereignty excludes rivals in order to privilege the autonomous, self-interested subject. That pattern reflects the imperial and monopolistic designs of Roman sovereignty.

Chapter three argued that the state’s ambition for hegemonic sovereignty undergirds its sacral order in relation to raison d’être and raison d’état. Williams, like Hauerwas, effectively over-turns liberalism’s narrative of reason for being requiring reason of state, but without noting doing so in such terms. Above highlighted issues in Williams’s work that are specific, constitutive elements of the overturning. Programmatic secularism holds a pseudo-sacred sovereignty, enforces it through privatization, and justifies it by the wars of religion. Although those issues on their own are not sufficient to show the overturning, other parts of Williams’s work complete the overturning of the narrative of autonomous political reason grounding reason of state. He exposes the state’s use of exception and rejects its claims to autonomy, which are key characteristics of

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859 Ibid., 79. See also ibid., 37.
860 Ibid., 52, 77, 80. See also Williams, LI, 84.
861 Ibid., 23, 26, 32-33, 38, 53, 74, 78-80, 84, 298-299; Rowan Williams, Lost Icons: Reflections on Cultural Bereavement (Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse, 2000), 84-86 (hereafter LI).
raison d’état in the modern nation-state. Williams notes that the state “claims the right to assess and on occasion overrule individual liberties” so the state can fulfill its mission against threats like terrorism. Yet in doing so the liberal state actually violates its mission of ensuring rights in order to secure its own sovereignty. Raison d’état undergirds exception with the state’s autonomy in its uniquely ‘natural’ reason. But Williams opposes that autonomy when he rejects its “ungrounded authority.”

Williams objects in two ways that when joined undercut the logic of raison d’état. First, Williams rejects a state metaphysics (“Staatsmetaphysik”) because it makes “the state…a thing in itself.” Second, he disputes the state’s claim that its power is—as he and Karl Barth use the term—“potentia” as “pure might, defining its own ends.” This kind of power is illuminated when Williams makes his own connection of it to nuclear weapons. “The nuclear state…identifies its own Recht with eternal value and legitimacy, and regards itself as having in principle the authority to exterminate what threatens it—not to resist, control, or discipline, but to exterminate.” The key words here are “state metaphysics,” “potentia,” and “own.” At the core of reason of state is the state’s own self-grounding, metaphysical rationality for the “eternal value and legitimacy” of the state’s potentia absoluta.

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862 Williams, FPS, 149. See also ibid., 32.
863 For the quote, see ibid., 121. See also ibid., 31, 158. For the rest of the paragraph, see Williams, FPS, 60; Rowan Williams, Writing in the Dust: After September 11 (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2002), 34 (hereafter WD); Williams, FPS, 32, 37-38.
864 Rowan Williams, Wrestling with Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology, ed. Mike Higton (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2007), 164, 166 (hereafter WA).
865 Ibid., 161. Emphasis original. My use of potentia and potestas here is in continuity with Williams’s own position (ibid., 166) articulated first in his description of Barth. The latter differentiates between “potentia” and “potestas” as respectively “pure might, defining its own ends” and “the purposive capacity to serve and effect law so as to realize harmony” (ibid., 161. Emphasis original.). For Barth, see Karl Barth, “The Christian Community and the Civil Community,” trans. Stanley Godman, in Against the Stream: Shorter Post-War Writings 1946-52, ed. R. Gregor Smith (London: SCM, 1954).
866 Williams, WA, 165. Emphasis original. See also Williams, FPS, 80.
867 Williams, WA, 165.
Williams further countermands reason of state’s autonomy and all-encompassing nature with his alternative proposal to programmatic sovereignty. For him, “procedural secularism is the acceptance by state authority of something prior to it and irreducibly other to it” and “a theology of the state in functional terms” is “essential.”868 This rejection of a state metaphysics and assertion of state function supplies the ground for a “theological critique of a positivist view of sovereignty.”869 Williams asserts the sovereignty of Jesus, which relativizes any claims by reason of state.870 The state’s “sovereignty is not a claim to be the source of law,” but rather the state’s sovereign power ought to be “potestas…power defined in terms of the purposive capacity to serve and effect law.”871

The second issue of the state’s sovereignty is found in its jurisprudence as part of the state’s larger project. Williams argues that the modern state enforces a legal monopoly through the mechanisms of citizenship and jurisprudence in order to secure privatization and its sovereignty. Citizenship is how the programmatic state universally enforces its minimalistic, autonomous anthropology and private-public distinction. For the sake of political unity, everyone is primarily determined by the minimal identity of the social contract. The social contract, in turn, resists the substantive recognition of

870 Williams, FPS, 57, 60-61; Williams, WA, 166.
871 Williams, FPS, 60; Williams, WA, 161. See also Williams, FPS, 57, 61.
“additional level[s] of social belonging” that constitute the subject’s public life. Privatizing other communities undermines their claims to public authority. Put more negatively, programmatic secularism’s form of “citizenship” creates a social space in which the state polices expression of any other social loyalties. That state’s sovereignty, much like Rome’s, at best becomes “in some sense a source of legitimacy for other social groups.” That is, they have no political legitimacy on their own.

Although Williams’s emphasis on citizenship is similar to Hauerwas, Williams’s focus on jurisprudence is largely a different avenue than Hauerwas’s critique. At the intersection of citizenship, conflict, and a “monopoly of legitimate force” is the state’s jurisprudence as the single and definitive authority. Monopolizing jurisprudence may help bring order, but it also tends toward monopolizing the resolving social relationships in a juridical frame. The latter, making the state’s juridical justice the adjudication of the conflicting freedoms of individuals, undermines the social resources for reconciliation and peace-making outside the state. This monopolistic reduction to individual, juridical subjects involves the state in policing both relations within the internal life of corporate bodies and relations among communities. Ironically, this involvement occurs in spite of the state’s claims of neutrality and self-distancing from the private sphere.

872 Williams, FPS, 39, 64.
873 Ibid., 61. See also ibid., 79-80.
874 Ibid., 51.
875 Ibid., 38-39, 80, 119-120.
876 Ibid., 45. See also ibid., 51, 61.
877 Williams, “Civil and Religious Law in England,” ¶ 6; Williams, FPS, 18-19, 23-27, 61, 120-125, 132-133. Williams’s focus on jurisprudence touches on a central issue in legitimating state sovereignty (Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations, 13). Hauerwas has critiqued a juridical decision by the US Supreme Court, and Hauerwas has exhibited appreciation of lawyers and juridical work in terms of the common law tradition as non-foundational practical reasoning (IGC, 199-202; “Hauerwas on Hauerwas and the Law,” 247). But those are not in the stated focus of, respectively, his critical broadsides at political liberalism and his constructive position.
Consider for instance Williams’s (in)famous ‘Shari’a lecture.’ As a speech-act it was an intercessory attempt, in his capacity as the most senior Archbishop of the English state church, to raise the importance of Shari’a law for Muslim life in England to English state jurists. He argued that the state’s monopoly on jurisprudence and its imposition of the public-private distinction excluded Muslims’ own communal resources in Shari’a law for mediating internal disputes from being legally recognized or accommodated. Lord Chief Justice Nicholas Phillips, “the most senior judge in England and Wales,” affirmed the use and legal acknowledgment of Shari’a as Williams suggested. However, constructive conversation after Williams’s infamous ‘Shari’a lecture’ was conducted in the state’s ideological categories. Interfaith discussion, even when calling for change, was oriented by the state’s terms. There could be public, legal accommodations in accordance with the state’s external pressure of privatization on the internal politics and public visibility of the Muslim community. Actual accommodations made to Muslims, from the state’s point of view even as argued by Phillips, are to individual citizens in pursuit of personal freedom. Accommodations are thereby directed to individual citizens of the realm. In turn, accommodations are granted indirectly at best to juridical bodies for arbitration such as the various Jewish law courts or various Muslim “councils.” But accommodations are not made directly to the alternative communities themselves as


social bodies. Doing so would require the state to legally recognize alternative authorities outside of the state’s scope.880

The third issue of state sovereignty is its negative relation to pluralism. In parallel with Hauerwas and partially with Dorrien, for Williams the regime of programmatic secularism leads to a superficial and ultimately harmful pluralism. Pluralism in general, and multiculturalism in particular, are at odds with liberalism’s secularized sacred sovereignty. The state’s boundaries do not determine the boundaries of politics, Williams contends. However, the “‘totalizing’ spirit” of programmatic secularism’s state sovereignty falls into the “danger of behaving and speaking as if it is the only kind of human solidarity that really matters is that of the state.”881 Such hegemonic homogeneity “silenc[es] the other” and, ironically, fragments the subject and society as a whole.882 The state’s timeless (ahistorical) monopoly is a claim to its own autonomy realized in autonomous individuals pursuing arbitrary desire and in privatizing social relationships. These ideals and mechanism suppress difference by hiding the sources of identity. Corporate forms of life, like faith, are reduced to social clubs centered on individuals’ inconsequential, private opinions. Faith is thereby rendered “invisible” and/or

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Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens contends that even Williams’s own argument follows an “individualist framework” in order to recognize multiple jurisprudences. John Milbank makes a similar argument. To a degree they correct. But I will show at the end of this chapter how Williams goes beyond such a framework by transformative expansion, by deep accommodation to the social bodies themselves, which Gaudreault-DesBiens kind of see elsewhere (Williams, FPS, 102, 106). The development of expansion was crucial to Williams’s lecture. Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, “Religious Courts’ Recognition Claims: Two Qualitatively Distinct Narratives,” in Shari’a in the West, 63; John Milbank, “Shari’a and the True Basis of Group Rights,” in Shari’a in the West, 137; Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, “Religious Courts, Personal Federalism, and Legal Transplants,” in Shari’a in the West, 160.

881 Williams, FPS, 32. See also ibid., 31, 33. Simultaneously overlooking Williams’s account of Islam (FPS, 33-34, 40-41, 81-83) and fulfilling precisely his concern about monopolistic sovereignty, one critical response to him called for the rejection of Shari’a courts for arbitration in part because “elements in Islamic law …are seriously out of step with trends in Western legislation that derive from the values of the Enlightenment and are inherent in modern codes of human rights that are in force throughout Europe and in democratic countries elsewhere.” Denis McEoin, Shari’a Law or One Law for All (London, Civitas, 2009), 11.

882 Williams, FPS, 33. See also ibid., 31-32, 102; Williams, LI, 86; Williams, OCT, 268.
“decorative” without significant meaning. 883 Although this strategy of political liberalism has produced gains in equality, the strategy also “isolate[s] us further from each other” and frames relations in terms of competition. 884 The US fixation on abstract rights makes “the fragmentation…even more acute.” 885 The reduction not only harms citizens, it also eliminates the ground and sources crucial for robust discussions necessary to discover the common good among differences. The modern state thereby works against a broader, substantive vision of politics for the common good. 886

The similarity between Williams and Hauerwas is clear. But Williams’s thought on procedural secularism does not so easily cohere with Hauerwas’s critique of the modern liberal state. Williams’s account of procedural secularism allows him to argue that “loyalty to the state is not the same thing as religious belonging: not that the state has no claims, but that it is a mistake to see those claims as beyond challenge in any imaginable circumstance.” 887 That position for now, on Dorrien’s terms, seems more similar to Dorrien’s understanding of liberative, agapic Spirit working in the world than to Hauerwas’s accounts of the church-world distinction and the state’s sacral endeavor. So what kind of state does Williams have in mind? How can it be open to other loyalties rather than be monopolistic?

*Interactive Pluralism, Procedural Secularism, and Cooperative State Sovereignty*

The state’s hegemonic sovereignty compromises other traditions by displacing the role of tradition in public discourse. As immigration and Islam rise in social prominence,
the nation-state is at a crossroads that affects its future shape. It can entrench its sovereignty by expanding its ‘war on terror.’ The state can develop into a market-state in the service of global capitalism. Or the state can change by listening to and by providing space for distinctive traditions in public on their terms. Williams opts for a robust version of the third, where change is achieved by and pluralism is realized in listening to distinctive traditions in their particular languages. This discursive politics can transform state sovereignty into serving a cooperative and truly pluralist society. Williams calls this form of society “interactive pluralism.” For him, “the sphere of public and political negotiation flourishes only in the context of larger commitments and visions” rather than by privatizing and rejecting them. In that vision of interactive pluralism, political life hinges on the interrelatedness in an Hegelian account of “mutual recognition,” beginning with the “acknowledgement that someone else’s welfare is actually constitutive of my own.” So on the one hand, mutual recognition illuminates differences and grounds a pluralistic politics of discussion for Williams. On the other hand, his position is distinguished by a “loosening of monopoly” that shifts loyalty from to “a sovereign authority” to loyalty for discussion-in-difference, especially among the neighbors and among the corporate communities that both constitute one’s identity. Thus, operating

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888 Ibid., 61, 81. See also ibid., 71-72, 80, 104-108, 128. Williams’s normative account of interactive pluralism is informed by his own interaction with Ayelet Shachar, Maleha Malik, and Tariq Ramadan (Williams, “Civil and Religious Law in England,” ¶¶ 2-3, 6, 13, 20-21; Williams, FPS, 33-35, 40-41, 47, 82-84, 106, 145).
889 Williams FPS, 35. See also ibid., 53, 301.
890 Ibid., 161-163; Williams, LI, 77; Williams, WA, 70. Emphasis original. See also Williams, FPS, 90, 117, 122-123, 157-159, 167-171, 222-224, 252-253, 271; Williams, LI, 81-83, 93-94; Williams, WA, 68-69, 71-72. As noted in those Wrestling with Angels pages, this version of Hegel is Williams’s development of Gillian Rose’s interpretation of Hegel.
in this short summary are two different but connected relations of mutual recognition, interactive pluralism itself and its relation to state sovereignty, that I will develop now.  

For Williams, mutual recognition requires fundamentally acknowledging crucial, substantial differences. Corporate bodies authoritatively determine the person and participate in shaping society. These communities are not only different than one another; they also exist prior to and alongside liberalism’s political apparatus. But difference and mutual recognition are undercut by the hegemonic mechanisms of political liberalism in the name of overcoming potentially fragmenting difference. The distinction between Williams’s “more-than-liberal” option and political liberalism then becomes quite sharp. Interactive pluralism recovers the possibility of acknowledging different corporate communities and their role of authoritative role crucial for the common good. In contrast, the common good is subverted by a thin pluralism or blasé multiculturalism constituted by the primacy of individual self-interest, the state’s superficial accommodations to plurality, and the global capitalism’s commodification of plurality.

While listening to other traditions on their terms constructively emphasizes their corporate nature, together they also have a critical edge. They break open the pseudo-sacredness and autonomy of state sovereignty. Williams maintains theological arguments about the necessity of Christianity reclaiming its corporate nature for itself. But that Christian end also serves a common good. Corporate “religious identity” is “one of the  

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893 Williams, *LI*, 86-87. See also Williams, *FPS*, 253 for “liberal-plus.”

most potent allies possible for genuine pluralism.” In the face of an ahistorical and universal rationality, an emphasis on religious communities de-sacralizes the state and opens room for true pluralism. The corporate nature of Christianity shows that there are other “source[s] of legitimate common life,” like “intermediate institutions, guilds, unions, churches, ethnic groups, all sorts of civil associations.” In effect, Williams maps a vision of local to global relations intersecting through the subject and thereby determining it. This subjectivity does not reduce to individuality; it merely emphasizes the irreducible social constitution of subjects in a broader political frame. Williams’s vision of interactive pluralism requires a politics with more flexibility and permeable boundaries than “any specific state.”

Interactive pluralism provokes, then, a tricky question suppressed by the liberalism’s autonomous anthropology and the state’s monopolization of sovereignty. How should society be united and the state be organized if we recognize other authoritative communities besides the state? Williams’s answer is twofold. The first develops a politics of interactive discussion in mutual recognition. The second forms the state in accordance to that politics. 

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895 Williams, FPS, 95.
896 Ibid., 80. See also ibid., 50.
897 For the quote, see ibid., 30, 54. See also ibid., 53. For the rest of the paragraph, see Williams, FPS, 61, 79-84; Williams, OCT, 237-238; Williams, FPS, 92-93; Williams, OCT, 172-173, 214, 236, 284-285; Williams, FPS, 39, 78-79, 84, 95-96, 114-125, 134, 294, 298-299.
Difference-in-relation, for Williams, can only be negotiated in concrete, interactive discussion, which is absolutely necessary to determine the common good. In contrast to political liberalism, interactive pluralism’s mutual recognition does not assume a substantive conception of rationality (“apodictic” reasoning) in order to enter into conversation.\(^{899}\) That would render impossible any recognition between incommensurable positions only overcome by “the priority of force.”\(^{900}\) Instead, Williams opts for, in all but name, Charles Taylor’s “ad hominem” practical reasoning.\(^{901}\) Though some might maintain the need for a common culture or heritage, the “conversation” between people is already held “in common” despite vastly different cultural or historical differences.\(^{902}\) Not just plurality, but also social intimacy, hospitality, and cooperation make possible discussion for discovering and working towards the common good. In the conversation among distinctive difference can occur “the breakthrough into a recognition of common goods, things we can only value or enjoy together.”\(^{903}\)

Mutual recognition also presupposes that each person and each group possess “the freedom to be themselves” with each group holding a concomitant vision of the common good.\(^{904}\) Williams stresses accordingly that individual and corporate equality, with attention to the interests of particular corporate bodies, is vital for mutual recognition and negotiation. He calls “covenantal mutuality” these mutually interactive relations taking place inside a co-operative agreement.\(^{905}\) In this agreement, all parties “promise that no-

\(^{899}\) Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments*, 36.
\(^{900}\) Williams, *FPS*, 295. See also ibid., 75, 88.
\(^{902}\) Williams, *LI*, 81. See also ibid., 58; Williams, *OCT*, 240-241.
\(^{903}\) For the quote, see Williams, *LI*, 76. Emphasis original. See also ibid., 83; Williams, *FPS*, 271. For the rest of the paragraph, see Williams, *FPS*, 47, 58-59, 78, 80-84, 105-106, 108, 111-112, 117, 119, 121, 128, 147, 273-274, 301; Williams, *LI*, 58-59, 80-81.
\(^{904}\) Williams, *FPS*, 81. See also ibid., 50, 128.
\(^{905}\) Ibid., 117. See also ibid., 56-59, 118, 121, 300.
one’s interest is written out of the social script and—crucially—that a long-term perspective on social needs is being taken for granted. This mutual relation makes critical discourse possible. Williams’s framework allows for more than individual interests to play a significant role in shaping society. But corporate or individual interests cannot be recognized or negotiated without discussion.

The importance of maintaining communal discussion is, for Williams, “a kind of moral interest” constitutive to the state. So does he recapitulate reason of state? No. In his words, the state “cannot in any simple sense have goals of its own, goals that are potentially in competition with those of its constituent communities.” Or in terms of reason of state, the state’s self-interested assertion of self-grounded autonomy, its demand of singular loyalty, and its pursuit of centralized power are eliminated because the state’s role in procedural secularism is formed by Williams’s account of mutual recognition. That is, corporate bodies can be in direct discussion with one another because “state authority” recognizes “something prior to it and irreducibly other to it.” Following the English state pluralists, Williams distinguishes two levels in the complex space of society’s political arrangement. “‘First-level’ associations” are “self-regulating” and “relatively unreconstructed forms of belonging” that appear in everyday life, such as faith communities, “trade unions, …co-operative societies, professional guilds,” “ethnic groups,” etc. But individually they do not “occup[y] the whole political and social

906 Ibid., 117.
907 Ibid., 121, 169-171, 297-297, 300.
908 Ibid., 58-59.
909 Ibid., 58.
910 Ibid., 33. See also ibid., 81, 83, 135.
911 Ibid., 50, 53, 60. See also ibid., 51, 55, 80.
territory.”

Neither does the second-level, the state. It is “a particular cluster of” the first-level associations “agreed on a legal structure” that “provides the stable climate for all first-level communities to flourish and the means for settling, and enforcing, ‘boundary disputes’ between them.”

Rather than providing a rival source of identity or demanding loyalty to itself, the pluralist state is an “ideologically neutral,” or “disinterested,” “broker” who maintains discussions among the first-level communities so they can be “partner[s] in the negotiations of public life” for the common good. Accordingly, the secular part of procedural secularism here means the refusal to “privilege” a “confessional group” over others, not the absence of faith. On this vision of the state’s new mission “to harmonize and, to some degree, regulate this social variety,” the state as broker fundamentally assumes the previous histories of diverse first-level associations, accepts the commitments of subject to them, and values the complexity of their interactive “co-existence.”

That new recognition of alternative, complex loyalties not only transforms state sovereignty by shaping the state’s new mission. The state’s recognition also limits its sovereignty by its openness to “scrutiny” and criticism from first-level communities in order to keep the state faithful to its new mission for the common good. State sovereignty, then, is not “inviolable” nor self-grounding. Rather, the state is a de-centered, cooperative service for the procedural

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912 Ibid., 50.
913 Ibid., 31, 50. See also ibid., 53.
914 Ibid., 59, 80, 126. See also ibid., 50, 53, 56-57, 61, 81, 83.
915 Ibid., 20, 28. See also ibid., 2-3, 27, 32-33, 127.
916 Ibid., 80, 135. See also ibid., 30, 39, 53, 60, 81, 126-128, 134.
917 Ibid., 39. See also ibid., 30-31, 60.
918 Ibid., 55. See also ibid., 52.
facilitation of and generated by public, interactive discussion among a plurality of first-
level associations.  

II. Situating Williams in Relation to Hauerwas and Dorrien

There is much more to say about Williams’s project, but I will do so below in
relation to Hauerwas and Dorrien. It is tempting to employ Williams for mediating
between Hauerwas and Dorrien, since there is so much warrant for doing just that.
Williams has worked for dialogue in politics, and he has attempted to broker discussion
in the same global denomination to which Dorrien (priest) and Hauerwas (layman)
belong. Williams also moves in-between seemingly incommensurate positions such as
Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s. Hauerwas and Dorrien can appreciate Williams’s positive
description of “the central conviction of political liberalism”: “the idea that political life
can and should be a realm of creative engagement” between valued, diverse peoples.

More complex is how Williams meets the divergent positions of Hauerwas and Dorrien.
On the one hand, with Hauerwas, Williams emphasizes the particularity of individuals
and of corporate bodies; in effect, he opts for radical democracy in the political sphere.
On the other hand, with Dorrien, Williams works through liberalism to get beyond it
through Hegelian mutual recognition, equality, and universal human dignity. But
Williams configures equality and human dignity differently.
I will develop those points of continuity, but I do not use Williams primarily to mediate between Hauerwas and Dorrien. Williams as mediator would miss distinctiveness and promise of his work about and for discussion. That work is not only revolutionary in regard to the modern nation-state’s sovereignty, and so his work deserves a hearing in its own right. Williams also provides more than a mediating position for Dorrien and Hauerwas.

For two reasons I focus on Williams in relation to Hauerwas and then Williams in relation to Dorrien in the next sections. First, I support my contention that Williams maintains much of the political surplus in each of Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s thought. Second, I develop the roots upon which Williams draws in going beyond them to open up a new political horizon. I begin setting up the latter argument here by contending that Williams’s work is about transforming state sovereignty. This contrasts with Hauerwas and Dorrien who assume the permanence of state sovereignty, albeit in complex, different ways. Then I can detail further how Williams goes beyond them in order to bring them together informed by the promise of Williams’s work.

III. Williams and Hauerwas on Radical Democracy, and the Roots of Williams Going Beyond Hauerwas

Hauerwas has praised, defended, and incorporated Williams’s thought with increasing regularity. Over the last fifteen years their positions have further converged on important points. They construct democracy similarly, for instance. Both emphasize democracy as decentralized, local, and ad hominem discussion between individuals and

groups in their traditioned particularities. In contrast to liberal democracy’s suppression of difference and of conflict, Williams and Hauerwas emphasize the possibility of nonviolent conflict and resolution among particularists in discussion. Both emphasize deliberation between particularities as a form of practical reasoning. This interactive discussion with others in immediate proximity is fundamental for discovering the common good. Both reject theocracy, even though Hauerwas calls himself a “theocrat,” and Williams affirms the primacy of God’s sovereignty over the state.922 They also approach interfaith dialogue similarly. Although Williams argues that Christianity plays an important role in England’s political recognition of a deeper pluralism, nevertheless he and Hauerwas refuse to accept—and Dorrien too—the position that Christianity ought to play a special role over other faiths in interfaith relations. For all three, interfaith dialogue operates best through practices like the scriptural reasoning project, in which people of different faiths interpret their texts for one another and reason practically together.923


923 See below for Hauerwas’s affinity for Williams; Hauerwas, DT, 211-212; Hauerwas, SU, 104 n. 31, 156-157; Hauerwas, WAD, 143; Hauerwas, WT, 184-185; “Hauerwas on ‘Hauerwas and the Law,’” 247, 249; Williams, FPS, 133-134, 147, 296-297, 301; Hauerwas, DT, 192-195; Hauerwas, STT, 184-185; Hauerwas, WT, 76; Hauerwas, WAD, 140-144; Williams, OCT, 174, 177; Hauerwas, SU, 69, 71-75; Dorrien, EDE, 364-366; see below for interfaith dialogue.


The final conclusion to my project will explicitly deal with Williams’s theopolitics in relation to Hauerwas’s own. As for Hauerwas’s participation in and accounts of the practical reasoning of scriptural reasoning, see Stanley Hauerwas, “Pharaoh’s Hardened Heart: Some Christian Readings,” Journal of Scriptural Reasoning 2, no. 2 (2002); Stanley Hauerwas, “Postscript: A Conversation with Stanley Hauerwas on Peace and War after Scripture,” by Jacob Goodson, Journal of Scriptural Reasoning 8, no. 1 (2009); Hauerwas, WwW, 112 n. 43. For Dorrien, he raises the “Gamaliel model” in the question and answer session following his lecture “Social Ethics for Social Justice: The Idea of Economic Democracy,” Collins Lectures, Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon, “God’s Economy,” Trinity Episcopal Cathedral, Portland, OR, Nov. 29, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IFE97XxOL0, see one hour and twenty-four through twenty-five minutes. For Williams, besides instances like FPS, 133-134, 301 and OCT, 174 on
The tensions between Williams and Hauerwas emerge in Williams’s constructive understanding of state sovereignty, his transforming of state sovereignty, and his presuppositions undergirding both. Given Hauerwas’s critiques of political liberalism and liberal theology, there is at least tension specifically over the general layout of Williams’s pluralist state, its neutral role, and its monopoly on legal force. Then there is the issue of Williams actually working to transform state sovereignty itself from hegemonic to pluralist. I focus on the four points of tension in order. Some of the tensions can be resolved in ways that show how Williams is congruent with Hauerwas’s political surplus. Other issues remain tendentious. The most important of these places concerns the transformation of the state’s structure. It is the site for both fruitful overlap between Hauerwas and Williams, and for Williams going beyond Hauerwas.

Agreement over Pluralist, Deliberative Democracy in Practical Reason


\(^{924}\) Williams, FPS, 3, 126; Rowan Williams, The Truce of God, updated ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2005), 128 (hereafter TG).
to reject Martin Marty’s construal of “association of associations,” because it demands “distance” rather than “personal intimacy.”

925 The emphasis on argument in such a framework, Hauerwas argued, is ultimately a call “to be ‘civil’ to one another.”

926 But the reasons undergirding Hauerwas’s criticisms are not easily applicable to Williams. He assumes social intimacy rather than social distance, as I noted earlier. In fact, Williams claims that distance is the source of violence. Yet, the tension on civility and argument is more complicated since Williams assumes both.

927 For Hauerwas, civility is a “bourgeois project” that suppresses pluralism by privatizing “affect,” conflict, truth, and the good for the illusion of peaceful “public demeanor.”

928 When civility as such frames association of associations, Hauerwas argues, a notion of peace is achieved by an overarching morality of civil relations without “any theological justification.”

929 Marty, consequently, interprets US Christianity in light of the US but not the converse. In contrast, Williams rejects an account of civility or tolerance that re-enforces the privatization of religious belief, for his account of politics is in search of the truth.

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928 Stanley Hauerwas, “The Importance of Being Catholic: A Protestant View,” *First Things*, Mar. 1990, 28. The quoted text is largely about John Murray Cuddihy, *The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Lévi-Strauss and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987). But this is not all about Cuddihy. Soon after the quotes above, Hauerwas addresses the issue of pluralism and Christianity’s public voice vis-à-vis the Catholic church, abortion, and “justice as participation” (29). Being present—on the one hand in order to shape the moral order, and on the other hand to be one voice among many—is precisely part of what Hauerwas takes issue with concerning Marty’s project on association of associations (*BH*, 29).


Lending Williams further credibility here for Hauerwas’s position is that more recently Hauerwas cites Williams on “truth-telling” and Jesus as the truth right after Hauerwas rejects civility.\(^3\) This raises the fact that Williams provides theological support for his vision of interactive pluralism. He asserts that mutual argumentation directed toward the truth can replace the state’s hegemonic sovereignty “because…the theological roots of modernity” are “a Christian-inspired culture of argument and what a theologian would call ‘eschatological reserve’ about excessive political claims.”\(^2\) This entire framework, from mutual argumentation to eschatological reserve, is supported by his trinitarian theopolitics that I will raise in the final conclusion to this project. But suffice it to say for now, these theological points shape Williams vision of argument and the limitations of the state. Williams meets Hauerwas’s concerns about association of associations by endorsing social intimacy and truth and by providing a theological justification for his approach.\(^3\)

The second point of tension is the issue of neutrality. Hauerwas has long rejected the notion of political liberalism’s neutrality. But in Williams’s pluralist account, the “state apparatus” “must be ideologically neutral” in order to be “a reliable and creative broker” among first-level associations.\(^4\) Williams may, at first glance, appear to re-institute aspects of political liberalism that he and Hauerwas reject, but the truth is more complex.

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\(^1\) Hauerwas, *PF*, 67; Williams, *OCT*, 82.
\(^2\) Williams, *FPS*, 83.
\(^3\) For an instance of Williams meeting Hauerwas’s concerns, Cavanaugh affirms not only Williams’s positive response to Cavanaugh’s work on the category of religion, but also Williams working against monopolistic sovereignty, his emphasizing of complex space in society, and his maintaining of the eschatological reserve. William T. Cavanaugh, “Spaces of Recognition: A Reply to My Interlocutors,” in “Symposium on William Cavanaugh’s *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict*,” 361-362.
\(^4\) Williams, *FPS*, 80, 126.
Earlier I noted Williams’s agreement with Hauerwas that the neutrality of the liberal order, undergirded by autonomous rationality, is far from neutral. Accordingly, Williams’s pluralist state need not claim the neutral objectivity in autonomy provided by autonomous reason. Any sense of the state itself is not autonomous, and the state’s neutrality is ordered by the common good. These are seen in Williams’s alternative to programmatic secularism’s reduction of the individual to rational self-interest. Williams privileges instead the particularity of individuals and of corporate bodies. Each particularity determines its understanding of the good, and through mutual relation to one another they realize the common good. The state, then, “cannot in any simple sense have goals of its own, goals that are potentially in competition with those of its constituent communities.”

Rather, the state’s mission and laws are oriented by the first-level associations finding the common good in discussion. So the state’s immediate goal is “to create the conditions, within a complex social environment, that allow each group to pursue what it sees as good. If any group’s notion of what is good veers towards undermining the good of other groups, the law’s task is restraint and control of any such tendency, as well as the defense of the whole network against destabilizing from outside.”

Hauerwas affirms such practical reasoning between social bodies in order to determine and pursue the common good. Yet, Williams’s qualified account of pluralistic neutrality may still be too much for Hauerwas. He observes that “attempts to create a stable human community, to ensure we can communicate, have ended in failure.” This

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935 Ibid., 58.
936 Ibid., 50.
937 Hauerwas, WAD, 127.
is because, for Hauerwas, “our ability to communicate depends on being a member of a particular community,” and “the more concrete our discussion…the more we become isolated from one another.” Hauerwas argues that “negotiate diversity” without liberalism’s transcendental endeavor to oversee diversity that actually suppresses diversity. Instead, with MacIntyre and against Hegel, Hauerwas argues that “traditions…resolve conflicts” within themselves and “between traditions.”

So Williams’s pluralist state might appear to fly in the face of Hauerwas’s tradition-dependent view. But in fact Williams is giving a partial account of how to negotiate diverse particularities without liberal hegemony. The reason why Williams’s account is both constructive and partial is because he forms an account of the state in light of discursive practical reason between particularities. For him, “the law of the state is what provides the stable climate for all first-level communities to flourish and the means for settling, and enforcing, ‘boundary disputes’ between them.” Williams’s view of a multi-layered society and the broker state has a Hegelian background, since he argues “it is a great mistake to think of Hegel as some kind of an apologist for monolithic centralism.” But Williams also distances himself from the abstract universalism of

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938 Ibid. For an earlier, parallel argument, see Hauerwas, CC, 93. But elsewhere Hauerwas has also expressed appreciation for “unity that ‘emerges from dialogue’” rather than a third language, and that dialogue can allow for a real pluralism which does not trivialize or suppress diversity (BH, 27). This option dialogue without suppression I will develop later as the fruit of Williams’s political vision.
939 “Hauerwas on ‘Hauerwas and the Law,’” 248. Hauerwas also does not give an account of how to negotiate diversity because he is “trying to help Christian recognize that we are part of the ‘diverse’” (ibid., 248). Elsewhere he finds even the word pluralism to be an “abstraction capable of ideological perversion.” See Stanley Hauerwas, “The Church in a Divided World: The Interpretative Power of the Christian Story,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 8, no. 1 (1980): 80 n. 18 which does not appear in the re-print of the essay (CC, 110).
940 For the quote, see Hauerwas, STT, 185. See also Hauerwas, AE, 114-116. For the rest of the paragraph, see Hauerwas, WAD, 141-144, 146.
941 Williams, FPS, 50.
942 Ibid., 51.
Hegel. Williams rejects the notion that one can have “a position outside or beyond diverse faith traditions from which to broker a union between them in which their convictions can be reconciled.” This rejection of an objective, outside position means for Williams that no rationality or state violence can create unity by the state resolving diverse “transcendent values.” Healthy peace cannot be achieved nor truth realized through the homogenized suppression of diverse particularities. Rather, all that is left, and is absolutely necessary, is “negotiation and the struggle for mutual understanding” among particularities. The state’s raison d’être is to serve traditioned dialogue and to “facilitate…co-operation” between individuals and corporate bodies “through [the state’s] own sponsorship and partnership” in order to achieve the common good.

As chapter one noted, Hauerwas’s critique of neutrality relies on rejecting liberalism’s procedural system of rules that enforce and frame the morality of self-interest. How then is Williams’s pluralist state not reproducing a similar procedural morality? Are ‘procedure’ and ‘discussion’ the new morality for illuminating an abstract “common moral ‘property’” between faiths? No. Similar to Dorrien’s position, Williams uses terms like “common moral ‘property’” and “universal horizon” in political life to denote unity through interrelated difference for the common good. Yet,

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943 Ibid., 296.
944 Ibid. See also ibid., 113-115, 124.
945 Ibid., 297.
946 For the quote, see ibid., 58. For the rest of the paragraph, see Williams, FPS, 298; Williams, WA, 64. This paragraph, in light of others on the mutual discovery of the common good (above) and the neutrality of the state (more below), shows one of many ways that Williams does not fit into an account of the liberal-communitarian divide as described by Hauerwas: “Liberals want government to remain neutral between rival conceptions of the human good. Communitarians want government to give expression to some shared vision of the human good that will define some type of community” (IGC, 25). Williams here is driving between the liberal-communitarian divide, with his political vision employing elements of both while being wholly either (FPS, 259-260). So as he writes elsewhere the divide “is not actually very much help” concerning his “more-than-liberal” political vision (LI, 86-87).
947 Williams, FPS, 298.
948 Ibid., 121, 298. See also ibid., 307; Dorrien, review of The American Spiritual Culture, 120.
Williams qualifies such unification in a way that overlaps with Hauerwas’s concerns. Unity, from start to finish, describes “corporate…discernment” among distinctive particularities in equality and “mutual generosity” rather than abstract, universal rationalism.\(^949\) Williams’s position can be understood as corporate discussion discovering a universal horizon like human dignity, but always in particularity. Any “common moral ‘property’” is about the particular common good discovered in particular discussions between particularities. The procedure, then, is practical reasoning between particularities that are historical, corporate, and public instead of “timeless,” individual, and private communities.\(^950\) In this case, Williams’s notions of neutrality and procedure lack the key hallmarks of programmatic secularism that Hauerwas rejects, and Williams promotes much of what Hauerwas embraces.

_Tension over Legal Force and Transforming the State_  

The third point of tension is the issue of legal force. Earlier I raised Williams’s sympathy for Hauerwas’s and Cavanaugh’s argument against the wars of religion narrative, which illuminates that the state’s sovereignty is through its monopoly on violence. However, nuanced as always, for Williams the pluralist state’s sovereignty is “the agreed monopoly of legal force and a recognition of where the ultimate court of appeal is to be located for virtually all practical and routine purposes.”\(^951\) Phrases like “the ultimate court of appeal” should not be separated from Williams’s reliance on practical reason, his argument for multiple jurisprudences, and his emphasis on corporate

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\(^{949}\) Williams, _FPS_, 121. See also ibid., 124, 306-307; Hauerwas, _DT_, 211-212; Hauerwas, _SU_, 156-157.  
\(^{950}\) Williams, _FPS_, 299. See also ibid., 121, 298, 300.  
\(^{951}\) Ibid., 60.
particularity. Hauerwas has made similar arguments about such matters. The phrase “monopoly on legal force” is the sticking point, and not just between Williams and Hauerwas. William’s theology and politics, as Hauerwas rightly argues, are effectively pacifist witness. Williams understands the major world religions as inherently nonviolent, despite his “brush with death” on September 11 in lower Manhattan. He has consistently been deeply critical of war, of state violence, and of their isolating roots in fear, security, and hubris. Hauerwas, in his arguments on just war and nuclear proliferation, appreciatively cited Williams’s work on peace. In an activist move that would hearten Dorrien, Williams with others performed an act of civil disobedience on Ash Wednesday 1985 at Alconbury airbase. They were arrested “at gun point” and briefly jailed for “scaling the fence” and occupying a runway—by holding a service of

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952 Ibid., 60-61.
“sitting and singing psalms” and “scattering ashes”—in protest against nuclear weapons. 954 How then should legal force be understood? 955

On one level the “monopoly of legitimate coercion” is not the same as legal force. 956 In Williams’s thought, coercion has a consistently negative connotation, and it is

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954 Andrew Goddard, Rowan Williams: His Legacy (Oxford: Lion Hudson, 2013), 26; Rowan Williams, “Dr. Rowan Williams,” by Gay Byrne, The Meaning of Life with Gay Byrne, episode 5, series 10, aired Mar. 1, 2015 (Dublin: RTE). The arrest was part of Williams’s Anglo-Catholic socialism, his criticism of Margaret Thatcher, and his involvement in the Jubilee Group, of which he was a leading member. For all that he was labeled a subversive by the MI5 in secret. The only publicly available source available about MI5 seems to be the well-timed, indirect hit-piece by Jason Lewis and Jonathan Wynne-Jones, “MI5 Labelled the Archbishop of Canterbury a Subversive over Anti-Thatcher Campaigns,” Telegraph, Jun. 18, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/8584157/MI5-labelled-the-Archbishop-of-Canterbury-a-subversive-over-anti-Thatcher-campaigns.html.

To briefly describe Williams’s civil disobedience and arrest above, I have used the historiographic principle of interpretation that looks for agreement rather than disagreement in order to determine what can be said to have happened. That principle is necessary because the actual location, administration of the location, and the date of Williams’s civil disobedience are, oddly, points of confusion. Williams’s short biography on Magdalen College’s website (“The Master,” http://www.magr.cam.ac.uk/dr-rowan-williams/) notes Lakenheath air base, as does a couple other newspaper and magazine articles. However, Williams himself says and others write that his civil disobedience was at Alconbury air base in Cambridgeshire, which is at least a two-hour drive from Lakenheath. Those others are: Rupert Shortt; Rowan Williams: An Introduction (Harrissburg, PA: Morehouse, 2003), 47; Tom Frame, “Rowan Williams on War and Peace,” in On Rowan Williams: Critical Essays, ed. Matheson Russell (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2009), 174. All of them state that the Williams’s arrest occurred in 1985, and all but Williams designate Alconbury as RAF Alconbury. The latter could lead one to assume that it was administered primarily by the Royal Air Force. By contrast, both Williams and Oliver O’Donovan describe the base as an American military base (O’Donovan, “Archbishop Rowan Williams,” in “Rowan Williams: The New Archbishop of Canterbury: A Symposium,” Pro Ecclesia 12, no. 1 (2003): 5). While O’Donovan’s 1984 rather than 1985 dating of the arrest may have been a simple typographical error, the administration of the air base can be easily reconciled. The RAF designation is about air bases being located in Britain and once having been under RAF control but now primarily a site of USAF operations or a site of joint cooperation. Both RAF Alconbury and RAF Lakenheath have been under the US’s Air Force in Europe (USAFE) or Strategic Air Command (SAC) since the early 1950’s. For brief histories of RAF Alconbury and RAF Lakenheath, see Harry R. Fletcher, Air Force Bases, vol. 2, Air Bases Outside the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1993), 97-99, 121-123.


Some may balk at claiming that Williams’s work is effectively pacifist capable of negotiation. Shortt, for instance, judges Williams’s Truce of God a failure on Niebuhrian terms while ignoring the book’s constructive source for the “community of communities” (Shortt, Rowan’s Rule, 174-183, 348-349; Williams, TG, 128). But for Williams, “Figgis is a far more sophisticated and resourceful thinker than Niebuhr and his work is very relevant to the time we live in. The work of David Nicholls did something to recover his reputation but it is extraordinary that for decades he has been ignored. He is not only a political thinker but a theologian who was trying to hang on to a Catholic identity that was plural and dispersed and yet was also profoundly orthodox” (Williams, “A Higher Responsibility”). So for someone who, like Dorrien, holds to a progressive realism in debt to Niebuhr, this chapter makes an appeal for a different vision of negotiation and powers in the political arena. Undergirding that alternative is, as next chapter will develop, a different account of reality. One that is marked by the triune God. Considering my engagement with Dorrien to come, I believe his response would be a yes and no, but the no would be grounded in more so from other influences than Niebuhr.

960 Williams, FPS, 39. Emphasis is mine. When Williams uses “monopoly of coercion” (ibid.) and coercion in a similar sense but without “monopoly” (ibid., 4, 95, 295, 298, 309): they are wholly negative save for one pragmatic instance in which Williams argues for the theological voice limiting “the accepted methods of coercion” (ibid., 56). But there are three grades to Williams’s use of “monopoly of legitimate force,” “monopoly of legal force,” and it truncated to “monopoly of force.” First, once he uses negatively “monopoly of force” when it is strictly legal positivism, which correlates with him negatively using the term “monopoly of power” (ibid., 300). The latter is used to name the same sort of impulse in Williams’s use of “monopoly of coercion”: hegemonic sovereignty rooted in violence as found in the birth of the nation-state. Second, he uses “monopoly of legitimate force” as only descriptive as still part of the emerging market-state (ibid., 45), but soon after positively affirms the “monopoly of force” in terms of
constitutive of the state’s hegemonic sovereignty. Legal force allows for armed services and police to protect human dignity: “the state provides protection against homicide.”\textsuperscript{957} But how can legal force be affirmed if the state’s violence is intrinsic to the state’s sovereignty? Williams is not beholden, in theory or practice, to the legacy of the modern state’s formation by war and coercion. His understanding of legal force issue located instead in other historical roots and in the notion of the pluralist state’s different sovereignty. Christianity’s legacy of attentiveness to Jesus’s sovereignty and of providing a culture of deliberative argument changes the state’s raison d’être. This change allows for defense or enforcement of values while mitigating state violence more thoroughly than just war principles designed to limit coercive state sovereignty. How? The issue is sovereignty.\textsuperscript{958}

Just war principles are applied over the regnant understandings of sovereignty. In this frame, Williams grants that state violence may sometimes seem to be “the only available option” for some, like “police action” under “international law” and working with “non-national moral communities.”\textsuperscript{959} But killing involves a “total mutual rejection” that closes any discussion with finality.\textsuperscript{960} In this way, the state’s violence “denies the deepest purpose of the state.”\textsuperscript{961} Williams can make this qualification because he endorses an ordained potestas, not an absolute potentia, in a specific way. Discussion is

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under law rather than “pure legal positivism” (ibid., 46, 47). Third, in the frame of the pluralist state, he positively uses “monopoly of legitimate force” (with force qualified as “restraint”) and “monopoly of legal force” (ibid., 50, 60). While the second and third uses of monopoly are under law, Williams only grants the market-state, the second, on his terms strikingly similar to the pluralist state, the third. I am unsure if these delineations of coercion and force illuminate or cast doubt on Frame’s claim that “Williams does not draw any systematic distinction between force and violence in any of his writings” (“Rowan Williams on War and Peace,” 184). But what is certain is that Williams can be too vague.\\textsuperscript{957} Williams, FPS, 46.\\textsuperscript{958} Ibid., 83.\\textsuperscript{959} Williams, TG, 33, 121; Williams, WD, 46.\\textsuperscript{960} Williams, TG, 34.\\textsuperscript{961} Mike Higton, Difficult Gospel: The Theology of Rowan Williams (New York: Church Publishing, 2004), 131. Although Higton does not give a citation for Williams for the sentence from which I quote, Higton seems to be summarizing Williams, WA, 164-165. This is one instance of why Higton is one of Williams’s best interpreters.
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the state’s *raison d’être*, not violence, since it has in a different kind of sovereignty. His pluralist, second-level state does not have the autonomous exercise of *raison d’état* because that exercise is *limited* by first-level associations. This means two things concerning violence. First, the church, a corporate body with responsibility to be a faithful witness to Jesus’s gracious and loving alternative, is vital both for “challeng[ing]…all war-oriented policy” and for recovering truth, health, hope, and repentance for true peace. Second, transforming the state’s sovereignty and its reason for being in line with the common good should structurally and practically change the state’s orientation to violence. This change reduces actual violence.

Hauerwas is quite critical of international police-like intervention. On his terms, it seems that Williams’s witness makes warfare more sober and self-critical. It may then appear that there is no way to reconcile Williams and Hauerwas on the state’s use of violence. However, Williams’s appeals to the role of discussion and to the use of legal force raise the related issues of domestic policing and punishment. Here there is not only the potential of merging Hauerwas and Williams, but also the possibility of their convergence concerning the state more broadly. Hauerwas’s rhetoric against warfare and violence appears to preclude policing *tout court*. But he affirms domestic policing in order “that the innocent be protected from homicidal maniacs.” Hauerwas can do so because he makes a nuanced distinction, a qualitative difference between policing and war. He “assumes[s] most of what police officers do is nonviolent response to violence.”

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962 Williams, *TG*, 33. See also ibid., 20-24, 26-39, 49, 51, 57-87, 119-123.
964 Hauerwas, *WAD*, 80. See also Hauerwas, *PF*, 27.
and as a pacifist, he would like to see police “not [be]…required as part of their task to use lethal weapons.” 965 It seems then that the police have to think on their feet, ask questions, and address concerns in order to resolve conflict. Williams’s category of potestas—at least in publication—surprisingly lacks such a distinction, or even much mention of the police. However, Williams offers a judicial mirror to Hauerwas’s policing framework. Williams’s vision for reforming the UK system of punishment privileges mutual recognition and dialogue to protect the victim, to care for the perpetrator, and to a restorative end for all affected parties. That specific domestic account is in continuity with his larger vision of the state. He does allow for the state to defend the politics of discussion. But the most basic ground for the state’s reason for being is to serve discussion, not engage in violence or forms of self-serving power such as President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. So Williams opens the door to Hauerwas’s hope, “the possibility that a state could exist for which war is not a possibility.” 966 But how does that come about? 967

The fourth point of tension is transformation. Williams seeks to transform state sovereignty through a politics of recognition, while at most Hauerwas favors altering specific state practices in light of Christian witness. The heart of Williams’s proposal is the transformation of the meaning of state sovereignty from the hegemonic monopoly

965 Hauerwas, BH, 280 n. 19. See also Hauerwas, DF, 128-129; Hauerwas, PF, 27; Hauerwas, WAD, 80. In fact, he actually finds public services like the police are unduly burdened by the community’s privileging of self-interest rather than the services oriented by the common good (Hauerwas, WAD, 141). There is further possibility of convergence between Hauerwas and Williams concerning prison. But Hauerwas’s constructive proposal, the transformation of punishment practices, is too brief. So I will raise it soon towards another end.

966 Hauerwas, AN, 196.

over the public sphere into support for interactive pluralism. Hauerwas agrees with the attempts to recognize diversity, but he has long rejected the idea of transforming the state. For him, the church’s job is witness, not “control.”

Against Constantinianism, Hauerwas likens the church to a “peasant” that “does not seek to become the master, but rather she wants to know how to survive under the power of the master.” In this light, Williams’s work to transform the state could appear similar to liberal Protestantism’s Constantinian impulse to control history to make it come out right. Williams’s project could also seem parallel to what undergirded liberal Protestantism’s work, specifically a theology of the state and Christianity’s mission to be a handmaiden to the state. After all, from a theological ground Williams gives a theory of the state, and he was the highest ranking archbishop of the English state church that is caesaropapist by definition.

If these congruities are true all the way down, they would place Williams more on the side of transforming culture than on Hauerwas’s emphasis on the primacy of ecclesial embodiment being witness. However, Williams is more in continuity with Hauerwas than it may seem because Hauerwas’s position and Williams’s proposal are more complex than what I have already delineated. Their difference is not over the idea of social transformation, but rather the kinds of engagement through which that transformation can be achieved.

Transformation is a word Hauerwas avoids because it evokes H. R. Niebuhr’s account of transforming culture. But despite Hauerwas’s rhetoric, his critiques and

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969 Hauerwas, *DF*, 105.
positive witness acknowledge a different kind of transformation. In his rejection of state and society’s autonomy on the basis of Christian witness, he implicitly allows some sort of transformation of the state “by Christ.”

Constructively, Hauerwas’s account of ecclesial agency and witness assumes his infrequent but explicit acknowledgement that the world can, and he hopes it will, respond positively to Christian witness. This distinguishes Hauerwas’s understanding of transformation from H. R. Niebuhr’s. The process of transformation further distinguishes Hauerwas. Transformation is achieved through practical reasoning between particular individuals and groups. Rather than supply “a better theory,” Hauerwas points to “a practice of” Christian justice and “punishment that can be imitated” for ending capital punishment and reforming prisons.

Hauerwas focuses on practice instead of theory, in part, because of his concern for particularity over and against an abstraction like the term “state.” The issue for Hauerwas is the faithful witness of Christian particularity to society, especially the specific individuals in government offices.

Hauerwas limits engaging power dynamics to thoroughgoing, ad hoc practical reasoning in particular, immediate contexts. He employs this methodological “tactic” to create a critical response to liberal hegemony alongside a constructive understanding of transformation through the witnessing practice of faithful Christian embodiment.

Hauerwas’s account of the church is in order for it to challenge the world to be more like

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971 Hauerwas, PF, 196. I am citing the body of the text for support, rather than footnote 23 where Hauerwas writes—in a potentially confusing way—that he does “share Dulles’s view of the transformation of the state in modernity.” This statement appears to be both historical description concerning the change in justice, but also normative in light of what Hauerwas contends next about changing capitol punishment, and his argument about justice in the body of the text.

972 Hauerwas, PF, 200. See also ibid., 195-199.

973 Ibid., 196. See also ibid., 195, 197.

974 In a conversation Hauerwas told me about his reticence to use the word transformation. I have not found a published note about that reticence; however, it can be seen in Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 39-48. For the rest of the paragraph, see Hauerwas, AE, 63; Hauerwas, WAD, xii; Hauerwas, WW, 59 n. 3.

975 Hauerwas, AC, 17-18.
the church. His political thought could then be construed as a call to transform state sovereignty to allow for the particularity of Christian witness. That call, however, is generally subtext at best. Most of Hauerwas’s work concerns asserting Jesus’s sovereignty, maintaining faithful witness to it in community, and critiquing the dangers and failures of liberalism in light of Christian faith. Without faithful witness, which has been lacking, the world would not know what or how state sovereignty should be.\footnote{Hauerwas, \textit{PF}, 22-23; Hauerwas, \textit{WT}, chp. 1; Ryan, \textit{The Politics of Practical Reason}, chp. 3; Hauerwas, \textit{PK}, chps. 5 and 6; Hauerwas, \textit{AE}, 37-38, 43-63; Hauerwas, \textit{PF}, 200; Hauerwas, \textit{WGU}, 207.}

Though vital, this project maintains an \textit{implicit} assumption of state \textit{sovereignty} as \textit{permanent} in a \textit{specific} way. Hauerwas’s longstanding claim that the church as an alternative political order appears to preclude tearing down the state’s mechanisms \textit{and} replacing them in terms of the state’s \textit{self}-understanding. His emphases on practical reasoning in opposition to hegemonic mechanisms and to overriding theory mitigate transforming the undergirding state sovereignty in line with a different ‘theoretical’ vision. Though Hauerwas \textit{opposes} liberal hegemony and would like to see it transformed, he lacks the conceptual resources to, or simply declines to, \textit{reach in} and \textit{transform} the underlying \textit{structure}—or to give an account in Hauerwas’s parlance—of state \textit{sovereignty}. Well of course, one might say, if he tried to do that he would be succumbing to Constantinianism! That is not the case with Williams’s vision, as I will address below. But to the point here, a Constantinian charge hides the implicit assumption of permanence. Hauerwas’s political alternative of radical democracy exposes the poverty of the state because cultivating an alternative is just as much resistance as embodying an alternative. But both resistance and embodiment can be problematic here in terms of
assuming permanence. Resistance presupposes something to reject. But rejection need not be permanent if the constructive alternative takes over, or at least if radical democracy is practiced locally. However, while Hauerwas is trying to help develop a complex space, he is not constructively addressing the state’s account of itself that reduces the complexity of social space. There could be complications to such a claim in view of Hauerwas’s recent publications. But any thought about substantive, constructive change of state sovereignty is marginal.  

Although often subtext, Hauerwas understands that “as Christians we will best serve God and our neighbor by seeking to form a common life in the world as we see it.” So Hauerwas notes that this “may well mean we must attempt to develop institutions, like the university,” that are “necessary for the development of practical reason.” Yet, it is unclear whether or not the state could be included in “institutions” because the next sentences emphasize Christian witness and reject liberalism’s political order.

Further, like Williams, MacIntyre, and Benedict XVI, Hauerwas supports the notion of subsidiarity that is heavily weighted towards the local community. He does so, like Williams, in light of a diasporic Christianity and an encroaching, leveling global

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978 Hauerwas, WAD, 146.
979 Ibid.
980 Ibid. For the liberal order: “What we cannot fear or try to repress in the name of peace is conflict…” (ibid.).
capitalism. But on the issue of subsidiarity, Hauerwas gives scant attention to the modern state.981

Hauerwas also claims that “an alternative imaginary needs to be constructed” to “the logic of war and the imperatives of the war system,” within the context his argument that state sovereignty depends on war and sacrifice, and vice versa.982 This claim appears to be the closest Hauerwas has come recently to calling for the transformation of state sovereignty, but the call is indirect. His “Appeal to Abolish War” was primarily aimed at the church, even though Hauerwas also saw the appeal as contravening the “barrier” between “church and world.”983 Despite Hauerwas’s sympathies for Williams’s political vision, Hauerwas lacks both a constructive vision about the state as detailed as Williams’s pluralist state and an execution of its implication—that it requires constructively transforming state sovereignty itself.984

I will return to later the assumption of permanence in terms of complex space because both raise an issue worth addressing now. One might argue that Williams replaces hegemonic sovereignty with a ‘better theory,’ the English state pluralists’ social vision of interactive pluralism and of the pluralist state. Such an argument would assume an overriding distinction between practice and theory in Hauerwas and William. That separation might explain why Williams ends up calling for the transformation of state sovereignty and Hauerwas does not in explicit terms. However, the practice-theory

981 Hauerwas, AE, 112; Hauerwas, WAD, 142-148, 157-158, 161; Williams, FPS, 55, 276; Williams, TG, 129. I will deal with Williams’s sympathy for subsidiarity in more detail later.
982 Hauerwas, WAD, 51. See also ibid., 48; Hauerwas, AE, 35-36, 120-136, esp. 124.
983 Hauerwas, WAD, 39. See also ibid., 45-46.
984 Typifying Hauerwas’s desire and reticence is his line: “I am more than happy to work to make the kind of modest state…[as] a reality” (PF, 237 n. 46). The question that Hauerwas puts to Stout is that he "needs to tell us a good deal more about what he means by a 'civic nation'...and how that 'nation' is or is not related to the modern nation-state" (ibid.). Williams works for the vision of a "modest state" that at least gives some answers to Hauerwas's question.
distinction does not need to determine Hauerwas and does not do justice to Williams. Hauerwas’s aversion to “a better theory” has not kept him from using descriptive categories that are currently more theoretical than a reality.\textsuperscript{985} He explicitly frames his argument for the Christian transformation of policing within Williams’s rejection of the “market-state” because the market-state undercuts the common good.\textsuperscript{986} Williams’s expansion of politics might lead one to see him as working from a ‘better theological theory’ of culture or society to order a theology of the state. However, such a conclusion would only be true if construed too broadly. Not only, as I will note in the final conclusion to this project that his account of the \textit{imago trinitatis} is a trinitarian formed ecclesial account of creation—not a theology of the state in the \textit{Staatsmetaphysik} sense. But also four important details show that his ‘theory’ of the state is not simply a theory, and is built on much that Hauerwas embraces. The latter significantly qualifies any similarity with US liberal Protestantism.

First, Williams is not attempting to give a full or universal account of culture precisely because it is always dynamic. Rather, it is more accurate to say, that like Hauerwas, Williams broadens politics beyond the boundaries of citizenship and the state by emphasizing mutual practical reasoning and authoritative corporate bodies other than the autonomous state. Constructively similar to Hauerwas, recall that Williams puts forward a theology of politics constituted by particularity, corporate bodies, mutuality, discussion, practical reason, and the common good.\textsuperscript{987}

\textsuperscript{985} Hauerwas, \textit{PF}, 200.

\textsuperscript{986} The market-state’s reason for being, as I will address later is the “maximiz[ing] the opportunity of its citizens” (Bobbitt, \textit{Shield of Achilles}, 347). See also Hauerwas, \textit{PF}, 27-29.

Second, Williams’s practical theory parallels Hauerwas’s arguments that emphasize political virtue, construe the state in terms of function, and privilege the common good. Williams’s argument about “a theology of the state in functional terms” is for “a theology of ‘political virtue’ rather than a Staatsmetaphysik.”988 His understanding of “covenantal mutuality” includes, for deepening relations, both “carefully crafted compromises” and “formation of political character” in “virtues like prudence…justice,” and “mutual” or “social trust.”989 Within this functional approach, not only is state power limited by the critical and co-operative participation of first-level associations, but also both levels are in accord with the teleological direction of discovering and working for the common good.990

Third, Williams’s concrete work to transform state sovereignty began with him, in his then pastoral office, in the mode of practical reasoning. In this, he argued for expanding the state’s practice of accommodations to faith to include corporate faith. In following sections, I will focus on Williams’s concrete work of expansion, and how that transforms state sovereignty. But the point here is that Williams calls for the transformation of the state through Christian witness for the common good.

Fourth, one might argue that the reason Williams’s voice was heard nationally is indebted to modern Constantinianism: his pastoral work is inseparable from his highest ecclesial office in a caesaropapist church. This critique misses that the substance of his vision, which runs against modern Constantinianism. Williams’s political ecclesiology is effectively pacifist. The church as a particular, corporate body challenges the state to

988 Williams, WA, 166. Emphasis original.
989 Williams, FPS, 117-119. See also ibid. 121, 300.
990 Ibid., 30, 61, 121, 126-129; Williams, TG, 126-129.
change its understanding of its mission from primarily monopolizing violence to adjudicating discussion. So discursive, practical reasoning for interactive pluralism marks both Williams’s political vision and his attempt to realize it. This vision and his work for it does not privilege Christianity in a way that it controls the situation or becomes a handmaiden to state hegemony. Christianity is to be one of the diverse communities in a society where all faiths have an equal voice in procedural secularism.

So does Williams give into the idea that Hauerwas avoids that the “social order…must be destroyed for the church to be the church”? Is Williams at once Constantinian and tribalist? He is neither precisely because he does not opt to destroy but to call the state’s sovereignty to cohere with complex space. Hauerwas objects to Constantinian “control” because it is predicated on the delusion of autonomy. He continues, “we lose the necessities that create imaginative alternatives that make it possible for us to live without denying the difficult task of acknowledging our humanity and that of our neighbors.” That objection, however, does not apply to Williams. His understanding of “covenantal mutuality” and procedural secularism are precisely an imaginative alternative that countermands autonomy and makes space for corporate Christian discipleship. In recent work Hauerwas shows sympathy for the work on difference by Jonathan Sacks, who Williams draws upon for “covenantal mutuality.” In earlier work, Hauerwas appreciatively evaluated Williams’s “work [as] an invaluable

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992 Hauerwas, AE, 151.
993 Ibid.
994 Williams, FPS, 117. See also ibid., 442-44, 57-58, 121, 300.
995 Ibid., 117. See also ibid., 121; Hauerwas, WAD, 117-119, 123, 133. Here Hauerwas is addressing Jonathan Sacks’s The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations, rev. ed. (New York: Continuum, 2003) rather than his The Home We Build Together: Recreating Society (New York: Continuum, 2007). Williams draws upon both for “covenantal mutuality” (FPS, 228, 300), and Hauerwas ends up implying the need for mutuality in the work to forgive one another by drawing on Sacks (WAD, 133).
resource for helping the church ‘to be where we are.’” 996 Hauerwas emphasizes Williams’s sense of God’s open time and love for dialogue and redemption both inside the church and between the church and the world. The issue of time is particularly important since the two aeons framework is fundamental to rejecting Constantinianism and constructing an alternative. 997

What marks the difference between Williams and Hauerwas is not whether to transform political practices. Instead, Williams calls for the *wholesale* transformation of state *sovereignty*, while Hauerwas does not. Hauerwas’s critical position is simultaneously rich and limited due to his concerns about theory’s relation to practice, particularity and witness, liberalism’s hegemony, and Constantinianism. In light of similar concerns, however, Williams still calls for the transformation of state sovereignty. Therefore, something else is in play. It is, in short, divine sovereignty. A chapter five would have argued that the issue is ultimately rooted in a seemingly ‘small’ trinitarian, soteriological point concerning command and obedience which reverberates into Hauerwas’s church-world distinction. Divine gift is turned into command to Jesus and thereby to humanity, and their proper response is turned into obedience. But for the sake of space, in the final conclusion I will describe Williams’s account of divine sovereignty. Then in reference to Hauerwas, I will simply take up a significant implication of his trinitarian, soteriological point: his distinction between obedient creation (church as faithful witness) and disobedient creation (world). That is, Williams answers a question that Hauerwas has not fully accounted for: on what *theological* basis does the church have

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a developing argument with the world? Before I can develop this claim and further engage Hauerwas’s solution of practical reason, I need to develop further how Williams’s interactive pluralism is predicated on his understanding of discussion and mutual recognition. 998

IV. Williams and Dorrien Going through Liberalism to Go Beyond It, and the Roots of Williams Going Beyond Dorrien

In contradistinction to Hauerwas, Dorrien has almost never engaged Williams’s work. Dorrien’s only published note about Williams is indirect and less than positive. Dorrien briefly summarizes Theo Hobson’s 2005 characterization of Williams’s “ecclesiology…as standard Anglo-Catholicism sandwiched by an unwieldy Radical Orthodox compound of anarchy and utopia.”999 In Dorrien’s own nuanced way, he affirms Hobson’s assertion “that the best context for speaking and living the gospel is the liberal state,” over and against positions held by Hauerwas and John Milbank.1000 Dorrien does so, in part, because “the way beyond liberalism is through it.”1001 His positive valuation of the state and liberalism, set in contrast to Williams’s “unwieldy…anarchy,” gives the appearance that Williams is on some ‘other side.’ However, the truth is far more complicated.1002 Williams effectively opts for going through liberalism to go “beyond it”

in a way somewhat similar to Dorrien and for some of the same reasons as Dorrien. However, Williams wants structural transformation of the state because he is less beholden to aspects of liberalism that Dorrien maintains. Here I will focus on the congruities and incongruities of their politics, which are predicated on Hegel and the English state pluralists. From that complex overlapping and distinguishing of Williams work with Dorrien’s political surplus, I conclude that Williams goes beyond Dorrien.

_Similarity and Difference in Human Rights and Mutual Recognition_

Williams and Dorrien largely follow a Hegelian mode of reasoning to go, as even Williams puts it, “beyond liberalism.” Drawing from his and Gillian Roses’s interpretation of Hegel’s conception of “concrete freedom,” Williams constructs a politics of kenotic “mutual recognition.” That politics opens up secularism to focus on the common good beyond programmatic secularism’s minimal self-interests of individual autonomy. So in the positive Williams parallels Dorrien’s insistence on the _social_ aspect of intellectual intuition that involves mutual recognition within the whole. There is also a

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1003 Hobson, _Anarchy, Church, and Utopia_, 2. While I agree to this limited extent with Hobson here and I have a few reservations about how John Hughes groups Williams with Milbank and Oliver O'Donovan, the point of Williams going through liberalism while still remaining Anglo-Catholic coheres better with Hughes’s construal of Williams as a new William Temple. That characterization is in terms of not only interpreting Williams in general, but also arguing in relation to Dorrien. Temple is not simply one of Dorrien’s heroes (KRHS, 415; RCG, 7-8; SS, 292, 375-376). Dorrien “was originally led into the Anglican communion, and later ordained into its priesthood, through [his] study of” Temple (DSF, 3). But where Dorrien appeals frequently to Temple for democratizing the economy (DSF, 3-4, 45; EDE, 135-136, 182; RCG, 173; SS, 11, 283-284, 292-293, 295; “Beyond State and Market,” 188-189, 191), Williams does the same to politics. The latter is still in line with Dorrien’s account of Temple, even though Dorrien has largely glossed over explicitly noting Temple’s “decentralized government authority” since 1986 (DSF, 44-45. See also EDE, 141; SS, 288, 292, 295.). There is still warrant for following Williams, for, to use Dorrien’s terms and to turn his critique of liberation theology back on him, Dorrien’s vision of social democracy sees the “need…to appropriate communitarian critiques of liberal democracy” (RCG, vii). By doing so, one can begin to move towards Williams’s more than liberal option. Unfortunately, I do not have the space to address later how Williams might be seen as a new Temple on more theologically focused issues. Such an argument would require accounting for Dorrien’s attraction to Temple’s flirtation but not consummation with process theology, as well as arguing for a complicated similar and different reading of Temple in relation to Williams. John Hughes, “After Temple? The Recent Renewal of Anglican Social Thought,” in _Anglican Social Theology Today_, ed. Malcolm Brown (London: Church House Publishing, 2014), 87-90.


1005 Williams, _WA_, 44, 70. See also ibid., 48-49, 71-73.
parallel in the negative. Williams argues against ecclesial “tribalism” by asserting “a prohibition against imagining any individual or group interest in isolation from the good of all, and a procedural insistence upon self-questioning, in the wake of this prohibition.”\textsuperscript{1006} Similarly Dorrien maintains the common good in an open perspectivism and emphasizes the negative in Hegel’s dialectic.\textsuperscript{1007}

The difference between Williams and Dorrien arises in who else they include besides Hegel. Williams takes a philosophically realist turn by adding Ludwig Wittgenstein. Since Hauerwas’s qualified realism also employs Wittgenstein, one might then expect that Williams would reject the language of human rights in the manner that Hauerwas does. Williams argues that “too much is at stake” not only for secularism to ignore the critiques of rights as “excessively abstract.”\textsuperscript{1008} But also, somewhat paralleling Dorrien’s criticism of Hauerwas, Williams criticizes those who use “anxieties about their freedom to make religiously based ethical judgments an excuse for denying the unconditionality—and the self-critical imperatives—of the language of rights.”\textsuperscript{1009} Instead, one must “salvage” and support “something from…the language of rights” because it “is…the only intelligible way of expressing how the state is itself under law.”\textsuperscript{1010} In that philosophically realist frame, Williams has critically accepted rights for some time and has recently advanced a constructive argument for human dignity as well.\textsuperscript{1011}

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\textsuperscript{1006} Williams, “Beyond Liberalism,” 72.
\textsuperscript{1007} Ibid., 71-72.
\textsuperscript{1008} Williams, FPS, 172.
\textsuperscript{1009} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1010} Ibid., 150.
\textsuperscript{1011} Williams, WA, 47, 57, 77-78, 223; Hauerwas, PF, 122-125. For Williams’s critique of rights is multi-faceted. They are a “means” for conversation “rather than ends” in themselves (LI, 104). They should not be “divorced from a proper conception of the human good”; they are problematic if turned into an abstraction which they often are (OCT, 263). They should not be “purely aspirational,”
Instead of the minimalism of the social contract and autonomous freedom in which rights are their own ends, Williams re-grounds human dignity and rights in a cluster of ideas in order to serve negotiation for the common good. All persons are created in the *imago Dei*. The Christian mission is one of universal proclamation.

Historical and communicative embodiment is inseparable from the mutual recognition of another as gift. These points attend to how both the relation between God and humanity and the relation between human beings constitute not only human dignity directly and indirectly, but also in turn human rights. Williams grounds his support for human rights in “an attitude of receptivity towards” the whole of humanity because all humanity is related under God’s sovereign “invitation” in the gospel.1012 Williams’s advocacy for “mutual personal recognition” shapes rights “language” such that it must be “grounded in a clear sense of the dignity of the other, not simply of the claims of the self.”1013 Failure to recognize human rights is not only unloving and inhospitable, but also rejects recognizing equal belonging crucial for “civil discourse.”1014

There is much for Dorrien to agree with here, especially the issues of mutual recognition, equality, and rights. In fact, like Dorrien, Williams could be understood as framing religious pluralism partly as a justice issue. But Dorrien’s primary emphasis on Hegel does not preclude Dorrien relying on the Kantian construal of equality in terms of human autonomy and choice. In contrast, Williams argues for liberalism’s creative

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1012 Williams, *FPS*, 156. See also ibid., 170-171.
1013 Ibid., 268. See also ibid., 156-157.
1014 For the quote, see ibid., 169. See also ibid., 164-165, 168, 170-172. For the rest of the paragraph, see ibid., 152-156, 159, 161-166, 169-171; Williams, “Faith & Politics.”
engagement as reducible neither to “a principle simply of democratic rights, nor individual liberties.” Williams’s understanding of human dignity and rights relies not on Kant, but on Williams’s assumptions about the nature of bodies and language. His account of equality rests on his framework of discourse among particularities in mutual recognition rather than on abstractions like choice. Ironically, this difference between Dorrien and Williams now marks a place of agreement for rights language between Hauerwas and Williams. In recent work Hauerwas shows appreciation for Williams’s framing of rights as attentive to the communicative nature of human bodies in concrete particularities and traditions.1016

Recall that, for Dorrien, equal autonomy is an end in itself as much as it is necessary for flourishing. In attention to such ends, he allows his broader theological, social vision to be reconfigured in light of liberation. However, also remember Dorrien’s position that liberation theologies need to be grounded in a broader vision like the social gospel and economic democracy. So questions remain as to whether or to what extent Dorrien will let an even broader social vision transform his understanding of liberalism. Williams’s vision offers an alternative of how to work through liberalism to go beyond it. This can be seen in their similar and different visions of radical democracy.1017

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1015 Williams, FPS, 78.
1016 Dorrien, EDE, 360; Williams, FPS, 96, 152-159, 168-172, 298, 301; Hauerwas, WT, 203-206; Hauerwas, “Review of Rowan Williams’s Faith in the Public Square,” 121; Hauerwas, WAD, 124-128.
1017 Dorrien, RCG, 112, 161.
Williams was never for anarchy. Instead, he has long been for what is tantamount to radical democracy in the same vein as Dorrien’s radical democracy: “pluralistic, contextual, and pragmatic.” In particular, they both draw from the English state pluralist tradition for their normative visions of radical democracy. Hobson missed Williams’s consistent reliance on the English state pluralists informed by Hegel’s positive valuation of “intermediate civil associations.” Dorrien’s arguments for a “decentralized economic democracy” not only similarly rely on deep sympathy for guild socialism. But also that guild socialism he connects directly and indirectly to some of the same figures in the English state pluralist tradition which Williams draws upon. In fact, Williams and Dorrien see an overlap between, and argue for, integrating the English state pluralists and liberation theology. Williams’s and Dorrien’s appeals to the English state pluralists also indicate their affirmation of subsidiarity, which they do for similar reasons. Hobson’s charge of anarchy misperceived Williams’s emphasis that the church’s “focus is necessarily local and mobile.” In the same vein, Williams emphasizes local associations like “microcredit institutions in alliance with civil society bodies.”

1018 Dorrien, EDE, 141. See also ibid., chp. 9 and p. 281.
1019 Williams, FPS, 51. For early reliance on the Figgis, see Williams, “Mankind, Nation, State,” 121-122.
1020 Dorrien, EDE, 141. See also ibid., 168, 308-309; Dorrien, RCG, 12, 164-166.
1021 Williams, “Beyond Liberalism,” 72.
Dorrien also understands that “the building of healthy communities [is] best dealt with on a community and regional basis.”

Williams gives an important role to the state at national and international levels, in part, to promote ecological justice against the capitalist abuse of a finite world. Dorrien also resists negating the importance of international and federal levels of governance for ensuring universal human rights and healthcare, enforcing economic regulation of the big banks, and negotiating ecological issues that invariably affect multiple communities. At the same time, Williams broadens his interactive pluralism in mutuality to the international level. He argues that a kind of ecclesial “advocacy” for “non-national,” non-governmental organizations are essential to help resolve international conflict.

Similarly, Dorrien has worked with the World Council of Churches and social justice organizations. Williams also, like Dorrien, engages the ecological crisis from a view about the interrelatedness of the person within the whole.

Their difference here in terms of state sovereignty is that Williams opts for transforming it through recognizing corporate equality. This is where the anarchism charge may come from today, since Williams’s vision is an alternative to the nation-state’s sovereignty and to its ongoing transformation into the market-state. By contrast, Dorrien’s privileging of equal choice is secured by the state. These differences can be

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1023 For the quote, see Dorrien, “Economic Democracy and the Possibility of Real, Healthy Change,” 144. For the paragraph, see Dorrien, DSV, 43, 113, 150; Dorrien, RCG, 164; Dorrien, SS, 287, 307; Dorrien, “Beyond State and Market,” 200; Williams, “Liberation Theology and the Anglican Tradition,” 15-16, 21-24; Dorrien, EDE, 309; Dorrien, RCG, 161-164; Williams, FPS, 53-55, 275-278; Dorrien, “Economic Democracy and the Possibility of Real, Healthy Change,” 144-145.

1024 Williams, TG, 121. See also Williams, “War & Statecraft,” 17.

seen in how Williams works for transformation, and how Dorrien works with the nation-state and key aspects of the market-state.\footnote{1026}

To claim that Williams’s transformation of state sovereignty is anarchic and/or an impossible ideal overlooks the process of transformation that he proposes. It is ‘practical’ in Hauerwas’s terms and ‘pragmatic’ in Dorrien’s. The reconfiguration of state sovereignty for cooperative, interactive pluralism begins by expanding the state’s recognition of other corporate bodies through its legal accommodations to their individual members becoming accommodations of the corporate bodies. In this legal frame rather than public relations, Williams’s ‘Shari’a lecture’ was a practical and successful \textit{first} step in expanding the state’s juridical accommodations according to the corporate nature of faith. Granted the state may not have realized yet the social bodies themselves as legal authorities in any full sense, but the pragmatic first step occurs in corporate bodies such as English Muslim communities receiving accommodations indirectly.\footnote{1027}

Williams then gives the corporate bodies a critical voice. He emphasizes that pushing the state to re-conceive “religious belonging” in a corporate mode expands state accommodation for intermediate communities so that they can be “critical participa[nts]” \textit{inside} “the institutions of the secular state.”\footnote{1028} For Williams, “communities of faith have a stake in the decisions of the state and its moral direction.”\footnote{1029} The state can be held to

\footnotetext{1026}{Williams, \textit{FPS}, 44-45, 52-55, 269-278.}
\footnotetext{1028}{Ibid., 41. See also ibid., 40, 82-83.}
\footnotetext{1029}{Ibid., 298.}
ideals of protecting human dignity and of co-operation without losing the state’s role as “a proactive transnational sovereign power.” The immediate aim here is a state “that can be held to account” rather than one that conceives of itself as sacred. And that aim is for a broader account of politics: the fullness of minority voices is crucial for understanding the common good. They are accordingly raised up more robustly in Williams’s framework than one that privileging the choices of autonomous individuals. Thus, the first step in Williams’s proposal for transforming the state is built on situating individuality and equality with and within authoritative corporate bodies other than the state, but still working with the state.

Williams’s category of corporate critic is significant for understanding his agreement and disagreement with Dorrien. When they are looked at from a distance, they have significant parallels. Dorrien emphasizes minority voices and human dignity. In order to achieve those ends, his project is about Christianity’s critical participation in democratic process without giving up on gospel truth that makes Christianity Christian. He also stresses the importance of “religious pluralism” in particular. He critiques, accordingly, theological resistance to it such as the social gospers’ Christianizing and the various forms of Christian supersessionism.

However, crucial points of disagreement between Dorrien and Williams concern corporate bodies, equality, and state sovereignty. I assume Dorrien wants to hold up the corporate nature of Christianity since he affirms that the church is a social ethic, since he

1030 Ibid., 60.
1031 Ibid. See also ibid., 82.
1032 Ibid., 106.
1033 Dorrien, EDE, 364.
1034 Ibid., 358-359, 365-366.
is an Episcopal priest, and since he travels an ecclesial lecture circuit. But his published work does not develop a corporate account of the church. Nor does Dorrien seek to expand the state’s juridical accommodation to religious faiths for the individual or the corporate body. Instead, he aims to publicly realize “the claim of the gospel to religious truth” in a way that is beholden to the US liberal order’s ideals and its structure. Dorrien’s argument for securing religious pluralism is about it as a “justice issue” that he frames with the duty of “respect” in the First Amendment. For him, developing the First Amendment’s protection of respect grounds his resistance to the privatizing dissolution of Christianity’s corporate nature. But simply asserting freedom of speech plays into the individualism inherent to the social contract. There is a better way, despite its limits. The US courts have the category of arbitration to make accommodations to religious bodies and their laws. This is how law courts in Texas have acknowledged the importance of Islamic law courts for a Muslim divorce. So Dorrien construes respect only in the negative. Further, despite being an Episcopal priest, his published work lacks a robust, constructive, and normative account in his own voice concerning corporate bodies of faith. That lacuna presumably comes partly from his debt to state sovereignty. He seeks to secure equality for choice on the basis of the state’s sovereign status quo in two ways.

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1035 Ibid., 366.
1036 Ibid., 360, 364.
First, Dorrien shores up the contemporary nation-state through ensuring equality in politics and in economics without violating the individualism of political liberalism. Dorrien’s normative relation between politics and economics is an ethos of democratic equality. Because of this similarity, they can be mutually informing. On the one hand, he upholds liberalism’s social contract in order to secure individual equality and to fight “turbo-capitalism.” On the other hand, economic democracy’s emphasis on equality helps secure equality in the social contract. However, economic democracy does not realize intermediate civil associations in the political sphere, just in the economic sphere. Equality is between individual citizens in democratic politics, while equality is found in communal forms like unions and co-operatives in democratic economics. So Dorrien wants to change economics, but he does not extend the communitarianism of his economics into the structure of democratic politics.

Second, although Dorrien does not engage the state qua market-state, he partially embraces it insofar as he works to secure economic choice for all through and alongside the state. Under the influence of global capitalism, the nation-state, which exists for “the welfare of the nation,” is currently transforming into the market-state, whose reason for


Dorrien, EDE, 145. See also ibid., xii, 146-149.

sup 1038 Ibid., 148-149, 167-168. The closest Dorrien appears to come is in his claim that “better government and the struggles of a profusion of social movements are indispensable to solving these problems” of turbo capitalism (ibid., 184). Better government with those social movements may mean, since Dorrien holds to subsidiarity, a limited state as with G. D. H. Cole (Dorrien, RCG, 164) and in terms of popular sovereignty (ibid., 112). But even Dorrien’s arguments “for an updated guild socialism” were in terms of economic democracy and, as I will address below, a “welfare state” and social democracy (EDE, 308-309). Then I will note how the latter two still do not democratize state sovereignty, but Williams’s updated guild socialism does.
being is “maximiz[ing] the opportunity of its citizens.” In terms of equality and choice, Dorrien also seeks to secure just such maximization of opportunities in politics and economics. To these ends, he critiques global capitalism running roughshod over the local and global capacities of unions and the state’s regulatory power. One instance is the major banks lobbying for economic autonomy.

These constructive and critical arguments put Dorrien against and with the market-state. On the one hand, he requires aspects of the nation-state’s welfare. He assumes it in his persuasive argument for the public option of single-payer, universal health care. Thereby Dorrien also shows his resistance to privatization of the public commons that occurs in the market-state. On the other hand, Dorrien’s economic democracy coheres with the state’s acknowledgement of “other institutions” that rise while the state increasingly centralizes its power in a more narrow way than before. He emphasizes a decentralized, local, and grass-roots movement for establishing economic democracy, “a third way between the systems of the competitive market and the state.” But some federal centralization is still important for Dorrien. It not only secures “environmental protection” and public, universal health care. Economic democracy also requires social democracy. That is, the state provides some measure of both “social ownership” and investment in the economy in order to help democratize the

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1041 Dorrien, SS, 304-307; Dorrien, “Beyond State and Market,” 190, 200; Dorrien, *EDE*, chp. 8-9; Dorrien, *OQ*, chps. 4, 7; Dorrien, “Economic Democracy and the Possibility of Real, Healthy Change” 139-144.
1042 Bobbitt, *Shield of Achilles*, 234.
1043 Dorrien, SS, 305; Dorrien, “Beyond State and Market,” 201. See also Dorrien, SS, 305-307; Dorrien, “Beyond State and Market,” 188, 200.
1044 Bobbitt, *Shield of Achilles*, 234. Although the quote is Bobbitt’s, for Dorrien on both issues, see *EDE*, 165, 184, 388-391; “Economic Democracy and the Possibility of Real, Healthy Change,” 144.
economy and to ensure choice.\textsuperscript{1045} Dorrien, then, seeks to maintain much of the welfare state, but he works critically with key hallmarks of the burgeoning market-state.\textsuperscript{1046}

Both Williams and Dorrien argue for broadening a sense of the “political” beyond the state.\textsuperscript{1047} In fact, I understand Williams’s political horizon as the ground for fulfilling Dorrien’s proclamation, that “we need new forms of community that arise out of but transcend religious affiliation, culture, and nation.”\textsuperscript{1048} However, they differ as to how much they embrace political liberalism. Dorrien is a communitarian through and through with regard to his \textit{economics} for equal choice. But in his \textit{politics} for equal choice, he implicitly assumes a social contract between equal individuals when he holds that their equal and individual dignity, “rights,” and “opportunity” are absolutely necessary.\textsuperscript{1049} This political frame situates a welfare state in which operates the updated social gospelers’ social creed for the proleptic but partial transforming the soul of society. Even his emphasis on equal choice in economics, like the social gospelers, indirectly reinforces

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\textsuperscript{1045} Dorrien, \textit{SEM}, 687. See also ibid., 686, 688; Dorrien, \textit{EDE}, 183-184, 283-285, 387-388; Dorrien, “Economic Democracy and the Possibility of Real, Healthy Change,” 143-144. I emphasize some because Dorrien is wary of old-style socialism (\textit{EDE}, 169). The problem for him is not centralization itself, but a “a high degree of centralized government bureaucracy” (“Beyond the State and Market,” 188).
\textsuperscript{1046} Dorrien, \textit{DSV}, 140; Dorrien, \textit{SS}, 305; Dorrien, \textit{OQ}, chp. 5, esp. pp. 114-121; Bobbitt, \textit{Shield of Achilles}, 241-242; Dorrien, \textit{SS}, 305-308. I describe the market-state as burgeoning, rather than already here as Bobbitt does, because there are forms of the nation-state’s sovereignty that the US federal government still holds to. For instance, the state continues to pressure technology companies to make their encryption \textit{weaker} in order for the state to intercept digital communications without the companies’ assistance. At least publicly some major companies, like Apple and Google, still resist such pressure. So the state has increasingly, but still occasionally, appeal to stopping terrorism and prosecuting crimes in order to justify the state’s panoptical desire. For example, see FBI Director James Comey’s testimony at the Senate Judiciary Committee Oversight hearing, “Federal Bureau of Investigation Oversight,” \textit{C-SPAN}, Dec. 9, 2015, \url{http://www.c-span.org/video/?401606-1/fbi-director-james-comey-oversight-hearing-testimony}; Dan Froomkin and Jenna McLaughlin, “Comey Calls on Tech Companies Offering End-to-End Encryption to Reconsider ‘Their Business Model,’” \textit{Intercept}, Dec. 9, 2015, \url{https://theintercept.com/2015/12/09/comey-calls-on-tech-companies-offering-end-to-end-encryption-to-reconsider-their-business-model/}.
\textsuperscript{1047} Rowan Williams, “The Archbishop of Canterbury’s Response to the Presence and Engagement Study Day.” The Archbishop of Canterbury Archived Website, Jun. 1, 2009, \url{http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/974/the-archbishops-response-to-the-presence-and-engagement-study-day-with-qas}. Williams, and I, use the term political to denote human relations broader than a narrow account of politics as “the electoral arena (as in liberalism)” (Dorrien, \textit{SEM}, 688). I do so because Dorrien does differentiate between social, economic, and political democracy (ibid.). Those distinctions may seem initially to conflict with the use of political, a broader aspect than the social contract and the state’s adjudication of it. But how I use the term seems to correlate with Dorrien’s use of the word democracy.
\textsuperscript{1049} Dorrien, \textit{EDE}, xii.
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political equality over against those privatizing the commons. Because of his assumption and project, Dorrien presupposes the permanence of the state’s sovereignty. He calls for additions to it, but he cannot call for the transformation of it to the same degree that Williams does. Yet, Dorrien’s communitarianism opens the door for him, in the future, to follow Williams. Williams emphasizes that a corporate sense of equality should be a primary component of a “broader vision of what political humanity looks like.”

So what truly differentiates Dorrien and Williams is not so much if one should go through liberalism in theory and the liberal state in practice. Instead, Williams embraces a broader sense of the political on the wide terms of society’s complex constitution rather than on the narrow terms of the state. Williams, then, is less beholden to certain aspects of liberalism than Dorrien. Thereby Williams is more structurally transformative of the state than Dorrien is. But Dorrien could move in Williams’s direction if Dorrien’s social concern for democratic transformation will include state sovereignty itself entirely.1051

V. Williams’s Political Horizon Going Beyond Dorrien and Hauerwas

Hauerwas, Dorrien, and Williams have different answers on how to transform political life. Hauerwas argues that the truthful, faithful witness of the church proleptically embodies the eschatological kingdom. That embodied witness is how the world comes to know itself as the world. Only then can the world be transformed in the light of Jesus, the truth. Dorrien argues that Christianity’s truthful, faithful work is about the liberative and spiritual transformation of society’s soul. Christianity is grounded in a

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1050 Williams, FPS, 25.
spiritual center that is deeply concerned about justice for flourishing. Williams argues for discussion in society in a way that coheres with aspects of both Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s positions. So Williams’s position could mediate between Hauerwas and Dorrien.

Yet there is potential for much more in Williams’s project. His focus on pluralist, interactive discussion opens our imaginations to a new horizon for state sovereignty. That is also a new horizon for Hauerwas and Dorrien, which can release their projects from a dead-end impasse. Williams’s work helps move beyond an impasse about survival within a political structure to changing the structure’s fundamental nature. So here I further develop the horizon of Williams’s political vision in relation to Dorrien and Hauerwas. The implications of Williams’s political work releases the pressure of the state’s current understanding of its sovereignty that divides and limits both Dorrien and Hauerwas.

I have described some of the horizon’s aspects, but there are more implications in his pluralist state that round out his vision and establish the new horizon’s potential. Williams argues for reforming the state’s hegemonic sovereignty that demands private faith be translated into secular categories in order for it to have a public voice. When his work is extended to the US theological discussion, he illuminates how it is unnecessarily fractured by a conflicted response to both the hegemonic sovereignty of the modern nation-state and the categories of programmatic secularism.

Transformation: Cut Out the Permanence of Privatization and Translation

Chapter one raised Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s complex agreement and disagreement about the privatization of Christianity and the translation of it into secular idioms. This is worth returning to now since I have identified the heart of their disagreement and since it serves as a foil to Williams. Dorrien thinks Hauerwas’s position
leads to isolation from society; Hauerwas turned the charge back to Dorrien, questioning Dorrien’s position as leading to isolation from the church. They have since effectively responded to one another’s positions, although not in direct reference to one another. To answer Stout’s criticism of isolation, Hauerwas has given accounts of radical democracy that rest upon practical reasoning and the work of Yoder, Williams, and Sheldon Wolin. Dorrien, for his part, has called for recovering truth and liberal theology’s spiritual center in the form of a personalist gospel that once preached well in churches.  

Yet Hauerwas and Dorrien are still beholden to privatization and translation, their differences notwithstanding. Hauerwas still focuses on particularity, especially the particularity of Christianity’s corporate nature, to provide an alternative to the dead-end of liberalism’s political order. He looks to some like an isolated antagonist withdrawn into his tribe because the liberal order’s ‘neutral’ public sphere and social contract undercuts the particularity of Christianity’s corporate embodiment. But in truth, his refusal to save the liberal order stems from the way he is un-willfully bounded by the perverting illusions of privatization and translation that he resists wisely on the church’s terms.

Dorrien is, however, willfully bounded by privatization and translation because of his pragmatic streak and his sympathy for liberalism. But he also astutely maintains a critical reserve while he works within the liberal order. He attempts to avoid the pitfalls of privatization and translation. So he privileges idealism and intellectual intuition. He emphasizes liberation and social gospel morality. He stresses the importance of love for

1052 Dorrien, SS, 359; Hauerwas, review of Soul in Society, 420; Hauerwas, SU, chp. 10 and pp. 209-213, which allows for a richer interpretation of p. 175.
social transformation. He recovers Christianity’s spiritual truth of loving, personal Spirit. Yet, his own constructive solution for recovering liberal theology’s spiritual center is only briefly mapped, in part, because of the 2012 presidential election. That kairotic moment appeared to ‘necessitate’ a conventional response by social ethics: privatized faith translated as morality into the public sphere. That was the method for Dorrien’s The *Obama Question*, although in other ways it was an analytical and explanatory tour de force. So Hauerwas and Dorrien are prevented from realizing their political surplus by the categorical boundaries of privatization and translation that they assume are permanent aspects of the liberal state.1053

In contrast to both Hauerwas and Dorrien, Williams cuts the Gordian knot of privatization and translation. They are not simply absent in interactive pluralism. They are replaced with precisely what they repress: the acceptance of authoritative corporate bodies in public life. Privatization is no longer a tool for an uneasy ‘peace,’ since corporate groups are recognized as legitimate authorities for members as political subjects and for public life on the whole. Life together in an interactive pluralist society depends on mutual recognition by such groups in direct communication with each other so that their language does not need to be translated into a ‘neutral’ public sphere. Mutual recognition raises up the fullness of political life in both its complex diversity and mutual commonality. This fullness allows for multi-faceted co-operation in discussion for the

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1053 Dorrien, *OQ*, 2, 116, 167, 216-228; Dorrien, *EDE*, 164; Dorrien, *RCG*, 161. For Dorrien articulating his realistic-pragmatic take on the kairotic moment, which he says also required putting briefly putting aside *Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit*, see the question and answer session following his lecture “Social Ethics for Social Justice: The Idea of Economic Democracy,” [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IFE97XsOlO](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IFE97XsOlO), hour one and minutes fifteen through twenty and fifty-six through fifty-nine. For other places where Dorrien writes explicitly about seizing the moment, see *EDE*, 184; Dorrien, *OQ*, 204.
common good, instead of orientation to the common good undercut by suppressing plurality justified on the grounds of Hobbes’s state of nature.\textsuperscript{1054}

Hauerwas finds such a vision attractive, and Dorrien may also at least in part. Nevertheless, they are still bound to their disagreement over privatization and translation because of their division over the issue of sovereignty. Dorrien critically appreciates the triumphs and promise of liberalism’s political order, but Hauerwas sees a thoroughgoing hegemony. I have shown how Williams holds to both. Like Dorrien, Williams appreciates and constructively builds upon liberalism, albeit in somewhat different ways than Dorrien. Like Hauerwas, Williams rejects state hegemony and its mechanisms of privatization and translation.

Both Dorrien and Hauerwas’s appeals to subsidiarity counter increasing federal power, but they lack a robust vision or argument for a new political structure to transform the state’s account of \textit{itself}. Williams is not so beholden to the immutability of hegemonic sovereignty and its mechanisms (Dorrien). Nor does Williams’s critical response focus strictly on constructing an alternative qua ecclesial polis (Hauerwas). Because Williams’s political imagination does not assume the \textit{permanence} of the modern state’s hegemonic sovereignty, he is able to re-conceive it as procedural secularism for interactive pluralism. Williams opts to transform state sovereignty by subjecting its \textit{potestas} to a new political


Williams’s emphasis on practical reasoning directly between communities does not require natural law as a foundationalist form of reason to create unity in politics. Nor does Williams require “secular reason” for public discussion as more friendly positions to his vision hold. This is how Williams meets the potential and avoids the failure that Long has seen in Stout’s unification of pragmatism and democracy. J. Budziszewski, “Natural Law, Democracy, and Sharia,” in \textit{Sharia in the West}, 188-193; Robert Audi, \textit{Religious Commitment and Secular Reason} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 112; Long, \textit{Speaking of God}, 270-272.
horizon in which corporate bodies, their particularity, and their authority are essential to the primacy of mutual recognition and discussion in public life.

This is not impossible idealism as those with Niebuhrian concerns might object. Very practical means, most visibly through jurisprudence, undergird the realization of mutual recognition in Williams’s vision of interactive pluralism and the pluralist state. He shrewdly but without deceit engages in practical reasoning to expand the state’s most important self-referential categories. Expansion is to such a degree that the state’s understanding of its mission, categories, and sovereignty are transformed. Such transformation is in light of other corporate bodies and their authority in order to approximate more closely to Williams’s pluralist state. In effect, Williams’s practical theory expands the state’s categories and practices like over-inflating a balloon to the point that it explodes. But here the analogy breaks down, for explosion might seem like anarchy. However, the expansion transfigures rather than destroys, because what Williams focuses on is not confined to the limits of liberal categories.1055

For example, Williams’s argument for expanding the state’s juridical accommodations to corporate bodies recognizes that faiths, like Islam, have their own juridical methods of reconciliation, like Shari’a, that are authoritative for their members. Williams employs the Jewish scholar Ayelet Shachar’s notion of “transformative accommodation” to describe “a scheme in which individuals retain the liberty to choose the jurisdiction under which they will seek to [resolve] certain carefully specified

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1055 Expansion is a possibility since “the liberal state has repeatedly had to make accommodation with minority communities, not simply with individuals—ethnic minorities who identities have been damaged by state centralism, religious groups, even those making a specific choice of lifestyle” (FPS, 40). Williams has perceived a pragmatic opening in the equally pragmatic “concessions” to multicultural accommodations, even though they are at odds with the ideological primacy of the individual (ibid.).
matters.”1056 While this is called accommodation, what distinguishes it from the accommodations by the state today is a process of “mutual” transformation through relation “without compromising the distinctiveness of the essential elements of… communal loyalties.”1057 In this new framework, jurisdictions of the state and the corporate faiths transform each other through “overlapping,” “supplementary” jurisdictions and work to keep from falling back into a monopolistic system of jurisprudence. 1058 Jurisdictions undergo at least a partial leveling, where religious authorities do not merely fit into a simple category delineated by the state. In the latter is the tired category of the state policing relationships themselves. But rather than through the filter of the state and its language, multiple jurisdictions reflect a web of powers with each distinctive node in direct dialogue with others.1059

There is an important feminist critique put to Williams here. He acknowledges that such a system will not be without tension or even conflict, and so he attempts to be

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1057 Williams, “Civil and Religious Law in England,” ¶ 21. See also ibid., ¶ 20.
1058 Ibid., ¶¶ 10-11, 13-14, 20-21; Bernard Jackson, “‘Transformative Accommodation’ and Religious Law,” Ecclesiastical Law Journal 11, no. 2 (2009): 132. Jackson also rightly notes that the term “‘parallel’ jurisdictions” is a distortion of Williams’s argument (ibid.).
1059 Some have called into question that Williams used Shachar’s account of transformative accommodation because it is, critics claim, competitive rather than consensual governing. But such criticism is too narrow. It misses the fact that right now the state’s sovereignty is hegemonic and its jurisprudence is monopolistic. That antagonistic governing needs to change in order to realize Williams’s pluralist and ‘consensual-like’ account of first and second-level communities. Further, in Williams’s vision of the pluralist state, transformation is fundamentally about maturation, not antagonism; and how he gets there is through supplemental jurisdictions. For the critique of Shachar, see Russell Sandberg, Gillian Douglas, Norman Doe, Sophie Gilliat-Ray, and Asma Khan, “Britain’s Religious Tribunals: Joint Governance in Practice,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33, no. 2 (2013): 2-3, 21-22. For a defense of Williams’s position that meets the narrow critique, see Robin Griffith-Jones, “Religious Rights and the Public Interest,” in Islam and English Law, 193-194. Sandberg and company study on the Family Division of Beth Din and Shari’a councils also overlooks a practical example of the state’s accommodation to supplemental jurisdiction. A Canadian-English Jewish divorce under the Jewish court Beth Din of America was recognized by Justice Baker’s 2013 ruling in England’s High Court (Family Division), one of the most senior courts overseeing England and Wales. The case not only exemplifies the kind of permeable boundaries that Williams calls for. The case also, in the judge’s own words, “illustrates the principle propounded by Archbishop Rowan Williams in his 2008 lecture ‘Civil and Religious Law in England: a Religious Perspectiv[e] . . . that ‘citizenship in a secular society should not necessitate the abandoning of religious discipline, any more than religious discipline should deprive one of access to liberties secured by the law of the land, to the common benefits of secular citizenship’” (AI v. MT, [2013] EWHC (Fam) 100, [1], [35], [2013] 2 FLR 371). For an insightful connecting and developing of Williams’s work on transformative accommodation to the divorce case, see Tarama Tolley, “When Binding is Not Binding and when not Binding, Binds,” 493-500.
particularly sensitive to the plight of women. However, some see conflict as indicating failure and Williams’s vision as regression. More sympathetic critics, such as the Muslim scholar Samia Bano, ask why Williams’s vision is any better or necessary in terms of opening space for Shari’a courts. Bano raised important issues concerning women that need to be further addressed. But she also answered her own question. In the fearful, ignorant, and arrogant responses to Williams’s ‘Shari’a lecture,’ Bano notes the continued ghettoization and marginalization of Muslim women as unenlightened Muslims. So very necessary is Williams’s fundamental point which Bano admires: to open complex space in order to negotiate, rather than suppress, the conflict between diverse peoples in their communities for the common good. In doing so, as Shachar notes, jurisprudence is transformed, and accordingly the state’s sovereignty. In Williams’s terms, the state begins to open the door to first-level associations when the state opens up to the corporate reality of faith. This shift changes the state from overriding the associations with the social contract’s individualism that creates ghettoization and marginalization.

Situating Dorrien and Hauerwas in Williams’s Complex Space

Williams’s horizon goes beyond Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s in a way that calls Dorrien and Hauerwas to greater attention to aspects of the other’s project while eliminating some of the major reservations they have about each other.

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Hauerwas’s emphasis on particularity and witness need not be understood as isolation if political equality is reconfigured in light of corporate bodies. Williams’s understanding of mutual recognition and in particular communal language actually expands the category of equality to include corporate bodies in the political ‘sphere.’ This expansion-inclusion opens the potential of liberalism’s stress on creative discussion to allow for all aspects of life, including first-level associations, to participate in public life.

Williams’s incorporation of corporate bodies in politics also opens up new paths for contemporary liberal theology. Liberal theology conceived anew would not cease to exist for Dorrien as a mediating theology. In fact, mediation is all the more important in Williams’s pluralist state. However, contemporary liberal theology would undergo significant change in its basic assumptions of privatization and translation, which are present even in Dorrien’s emphasis on morality. For Williams, mediation is about discussion directly between particularities (e.g., scriptural reasoning) occurring in the political ‘sphere,’ rather than mediation including translation into an abstract, third language qua morality. The challenge for liberal theology’s hybridity is the need to reckon better with conflicting distinctiveness and incommensurable truth/revelation claims between communities. In doing so, liberal theology could then reclaim the distinctiveness of the Christian truth that Dorrien affirms and that Hauerwas emphasizes. Williams’s stress on living as participating in multiple communities might even invigorate Dorrien’s hybridity and dialectical recognition of truth in liberal theology.

Once the first-level associations are recognized as important voices for the common good of society, they can then be critical and co-operative participants in politics without the trappings of Constantinianism. Williams argues for the recognition of
first-level associations for three reasons. First, “politics is too important to leave to politicians.” Second, the converse, “politicians are too important to leave to politics.” Third, the recognition of corporate bodies is a necessary step for the particularity of Christianity’s corporate witness to get a receptive hearing as a participant. Hauerwas assumes the corporate nature of Christian witness and its importance for politics. But there were problems even in his explicit but brief flirtation with Christian witness aimed at transforming the practical aspects of the state’s disciplinary justice. He does not sufficiently indicate how he thinks Christianity’s corporate body can be recognized by state authorities. Nor does he develop how the church’s specific practices can be “imitated” by the state authorities.

By contrast, Williams’s emphasis on corporate bodies could be quite helpful in, as Hauerwas desires, reforming prisons away from their practices that create “social alienation” and steer them toward communion. That transformative vision is not unlike Dorrien’s social gospel sense of transformation. But leveraging Williams towards such ends cannot be set in the same frame as the social gospelers and R. Niebuhr. Unlike them, Williams’s work is in the context of transforming the state in a democratic but non-Constantinian fashion.

I argued above that Williams’s transformative vision not only lacks the hallmarks of Constantinianism, but it also emphasizes Christianity’s distinctive particularity that modern, liberal Constantinianism suppresses. Christianity’s corporate nature is important

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1062 Williams, “Faith & Politics.”
1063 Ibid.
for both its nonviolent politics of reconciliation and its role as critical witness to the state rather than its handmaiden. Williams can maintain these while working towards political transformation because his theopolitics are about having a developing argument with the world. I will develop this ground in the final conclusion within a constructive criticism of Hauerwas.

VI. Conclusion

Williams goes beyond Dorrien and Hauerwas because he establishes a new political horizon, the transformation of the hegemonic state into a pluralist state for supporting a robust, interactive pluralism. I argued that Williams maintains much of the political surplus in Dorrien and Hauerwas. But I also contrasted William’s vision with elements in Dorrien and Hauerwas in order to show that Williams opens up a new understanding of political sovereignty, in a way that resists the contemporary framework which both divides and limits Dorrien and Hauerwas. What results is a space for fresh discussion in US theology and social ethics. By virtue of Williams’s horizon going beyond Dorrien and Hauerwas, they can be freed from a conflictual discussion driven by the categories of privatization and translation. Williams’s new vision, and his work to realize it, can re-invigorate the discussion. Dorrien and Hauerwas can see each other’s projects in a new light, specifically by re-thinking transformation and the distinctive particularity of Christianity’s corporate body. But to do so requires considering how Williams’s trinitarian theopolitics can stimulate development in Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s projects.
CONCLUSION

Chapter four loosened the grip of problematic political assumptions and began to chart a direction away from the social justice-faithfulness discontent. Support for these changes and continuing development requires an engagement with deeper theological issues. So by way of conclusion, I suggest that Williams’s trinitarian theopolitics of love and gift in mutuality and plenitude provides a way to reconsider aspects of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s projects. I will briefly address the issue of Trinity and plenitude in Dorrien’s project, but I will focus on the church-world issue in Hauerwas’s project. Such reconsideration is not a closure, as if Dorrien or Hauerwas should simply adopt Williams’s position. Instead, reconsideration is about an encounter with Williams that makes possible a fresh discussion between Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s positions, or at least those indebted to them.

I. The Ground of a Different Theopolitical Horizon: Trinitarian Gift and Love

Political liberalism’s attempt to create peace by autonomy, Williams argues, ironically assumed a logic of violence. Self-determining became self-ownership in need of security, which is tantamount to anti-gift. Supporting ownership and security gave rise to a Hobbesian “law and lawlessness” dichotomy instead of a gift-economy and the common good. So Williams rejects holding tightly to oneself. Rather, God unites human freedom with human dependence by, in Jesus and his church, calling one to receive the difference of the other as a gift and to reciprocate in kind with gift. Out of this

1066 Williams, OCT, 268. See also ibid., 269-270, 273-274; Williams, LI, 58-59; Williams, TG, 111-115.
dynamic not only “emerge[s]…selfhood.”\textsuperscript{1067} Not only constitutive to the subject, maturation, and peace are recognition, gift, and reciprocity mediated through a storied, traditioned community. But also, for Williams, human flourishing implies a “deeper level of agency or liberty.”\textsuperscript{1068}

Later I will address Williams’s understanding of human agency. Here the issue is how divine sovereignty \textit{itself} is “a deeper level of agency or liberty.” Since divine sovereignty is rooted in “the nature of God” who is triune, Williams maintains that the Trinity is “of cardinal importance.”\textsuperscript{1069} Williams’s political vision is grounded in divine sovereignty in terms of the triune economy of love, gift, mutuality, dispossession, and freedom. But here I will only explicitly focus on divine sovereignty as trinitarian difference-in-mutuality in terms of love \textit{and} gift.\textsuperscript{1070}

The Hegelianism of Williams’s account of mutual recognition is critically appropriated in light of a more significant, theological truth: the Trinity is the root of mutual recognition. Hegel circumvents his own account of difference-in-relation because, according to Williams, Hegel does not abide difference in the end. By contrast, the Trinity is a unity that spans all gaps of its internal differences while still maintaining

\textsuperscript{1067} Williams, \textit{OCT}, 243.


\textsuperscript{1069} Williams, \textit{WA}, 142.

\textsuperscript{1070} Williams, \textit{FPS}, 171, 177-179, 222-223; Williams, \textit{LI}, 71-72; Williams, \textit{OCT}, pp. 77-78, 144-146, 158-161, and chp. 11; Williams, \textit{WA}, pp. 15, chp. 4, pp. 81-83. The preceding paragraph above should indicate that the \textit{ordo cognoscendi} matters, and I do not intend to undercet it even though my argument will go in reverse (Williams, \textit{OCT}, 161). To thoroughly show all the dynamics at work in human flourishing leading up to economic Trinity, one would need to work through creation and incarnation to the Trinity since Williams assumes, like Barth, Donald MacKinnon, and Hauerwas, that “the structure of revelation itself…correspond[s] to God’s own being”—although Williams does frame such revelatory correspondence in a non-foundationalist way by using Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of horizon (Williams, \textit{OCT}, 142. See also ibid., 143-145, 160-161; Williams, \textit{WA}, 108, 142.). However, for the sake of space, I will begin with Trinity.
difference. With Hans Urs von Balthasar, Williams describes the “positive otherness” of the triune persons as relating in the “mutual sharing” of dispossessive “self-giving.”\textsuperscript{1071} One important implication of this relation is that “differences matter.”\textsuperscript{1072} But difference is not sheer difference, but “unity-in-difference.”\textsuperscript{1073} Differences can be maintained in unity because difference-in-relation is ordered by the fusion of love and gift.\textsuperscript{1074}

For Williams, constitutive to difference is an open orientation toward the other, much like Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s descriptions of love. Because this orientation of love is in effect mutual recognition—or “mutually constitutive presence” in Williams’s words to emphasize analogy more strongly—love constitutes triune difference and its “positive distance.”\textsuperscript{1075} But love is more than orientation. From the orientation to another, Williams articulates an outward going and relational understanding of love that is common to Aquinas, Hegel, and Eastern Orthodoxy. Love is ecstatic affection (“\textit{ecstasis}”), which drives one to reach out to the other for a mutual indwelling (\textit{mutua inhaesio} or “reciprocal inhaesio”).\textsuperscript{1076} But ecstasy and mutual indwelling is also another way of expressing kenotic, mutual “self-giving” in the Trinity that “grow[s]” in


I do not intend to imply here or later that Williams is a social trinitarian in any formal sense, but I do not have the space to directly engage such misinterpretation. So the stress on \textit{agency} later in reference to the \textit{imago trinitatis} will have to suffice for indirectly distancing Williams from any formal social trinitarianism.

\textsuperscript{1074} Williams, \textit{WA}, 30-31, 72-73, 77-79, 81.

\textsuperscript{1075} Williams, \textit{OCT}, 158; Williams, “Balthasar and the Trinity,” 48. See also Williams, \textit{OCT}, 74; Williams, \textit{WA}, 130-131; Williams, “What does Love Know?”, 264-266.

plenitude.\textsuperscript{1077} The Trinity’s internal kenotic self-giving is gift-giving that establishes and affirms difference. This may appear to create a dueling articulation of God’s work as love or gift. Or it may suggest that one precedes the other in the trinitarian life and God’s interaction with humanity “because our speech is temporal.”\textsuperscript{1078} Either way, Dorrien emphasizes love and Hauerwas privileges gift. But Williams simultaneously upholds love and gift to the point that they converge like “a Moebius strip” in the intra-trinitarian life because of its relational economy.\textsuperscript{1079} The openness of God’s love is a gift, and God’s openness makes difference a gift. Similarly, the mutual indwelling of the triune persons is achieved in ecstatic affection and self-gift.\textsuperscript{1080}

On an initial glance, this convergence of love and gift may appear less than helpful for engaging Dorrien and Hauerwas. After all, I went to lengths in chapter two to show that Dorrien and Hauerwas are more complex than only love or grace respectively. The issue is which one is privileged. This may simply reflect that, as Williams notes, human analogy fails to fully grasp, in any concrete sense, this love-gift convergence in

\textsuperscript{1077} Williams, “The Deflections of Desire,” 118; Williams, “What does Love Know?,” 271. See also Williams, “The Deflections of Desire,” 122-125; Williams, \textit{FPS}, 178; Rowan Williams, \textit{A Margin of Silence: The Holy Spirit in Russian Orthodox Theology} (Québec, Canada: Éditions du Lys Vert, 2008), 22-23 (hereafter MS); Williams, \textit{WA}, 72, 81.

\textsuperscript{1078} Williams, \textit{WA}, 82.


the intra-trinitarian life. So Williams’s convergence of love and gift may simply appear to one as more of a rhetorical than substantive contrast to either Dorrien or Hauerwas.1081

But rhetoric matters; in Hauerwas’s parlance, “words matter.”1082 For Dorrien’s idealism, words signify, no matter how incompletely, what truth undergirds and thereby orients one’s thought within the Whole. So he privileges love’s openness in humanity’s existence of interrelation, but he largely lacks gift and its *dynamism* in his normative accounts. For Hauerwas’s Wittgensteinian position, words shape the person. So Hauerwas subsumes love under gift: humanity’s existence is contingent on receiving and responding to one another and to divine gift. Dorrien and Hauerwas disagree, then, about what determines reality. This disagreement undergirds their difference on church and world. In contrast, Williams’s convergence of love and gift in the trinitarian life is maintained throughout his work. Of utmost importance for Williams is that the triune establishment of and openness to difference are ecstatic self-gifts to humanity for continually opening humanity to “flourishing” in God’s ever expanding economy.1083 Dorrien and Hauerwas would affirm much of that statement in different ways, but Williams can simultaneously overlap with both of their respective emphases on love and gift. The triune relations of love-gift in the mutuality of “positive otherness” characterize both the difference between God and humanity and therein how God relates to humanity.1084 As Williams writes: “God desires us [creatures], *as if we were God*, as if we were that unconditional response to God’s giving that God’s self makes in the life of

1082 Hauerwas, *WwW*, 100.
1083 Williams, *OCT*, 73. See also ibid., 74.
the Trinity. We are created so that we may be caught up in this, so that we may grow into the whole hearted love of God by learning that God loves us as God loves God.” In other words, from the particularity of God pro nobis, Williams focuses on the relations of God in se in such a way that the internal relations in mutuality are God’s sovereignty. This account of divine sovereignty marks Williams’s difference from Dorrien and, to a lesser extent, Hauerwas. With Williams, the Trinity’s fruitful, loving, and giving internal relations are God’s sovereignty.

For instance, recall from chapter two that Dorrien’s apophaticism has difficulty giving a trinitarian account of God in se, which has been supplanted with an account of personal Spirit. Yet for Williams, the triune relations are the source of plenitude and, thereby, the source of not only creation’s existence but also William’s apophaticism. Humanity cannot full plumb the depth of the triune life. However, humanity comes to know both this and its dependence by God’s pro nobis invitation to and humanity’s responsive, developmental participation in the triune economy. The reason why dependence and development are linked is partly because, for Williams, humanity is the image of God’s “divine liberty…always exercised in mutual love and creative self- bestowal” (love-gift). In other words, following Eastern Orthodox theologians, Williams maintains that the imago Dei is the imago trinitatis. The imago trinitatis is, for him, a cataphatic emphasis on relations within a larger apophatic turn. Human relations are predicated on and analogous in terms of agency to the intra-trinitarian life of creative

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plentitude and “unity-in-difference,” not correlations between God and humanity like the
analogia entis or the incarnation as the model for human relations. 1087 The imago
trinitatis effectively establishes the trinitarian economy as the ground for human agency
from which stems human development in human history within God’s plentitude. 1088

Such a framework can critically develop, among other issues, Dorrien’s
personalist assumptions about human freedom, his concerns for interfaith dialogue, and
his advancements in economic democracy. For instance, although Dorrien has a far more
detailed account of a political economy than Williams, Williams’s account is shaped by
divine plentitude and gift whereas Dorrien does not. But I will leave such critical
development for another time. Instead, I will show here how Williams’s framework can
critically develop Hauerwas’s position on one specific issue in the disagreement between
him and Dorrien. 1089

1087 Williams, ToT, 136. See also Williams, DOS, 184; Williams, FPS, 178-179; Williams, OCT, 140-141, 156-159, 225-238, 287-288;
Williams, Res, 88; Williams, WA, 4, 19, 26, 79-83; Rowan Williams, Why Study the Past?: The Quest for the Historical Church
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2005), 99 (hereafter WSP); Rowan Williams, “Creation, Creativity and Creatureliness: The
and Transformation: A Conversation with Rowan Williams,” by Todd Breyfogle, Cross Currents, Fall 1995, 307-308; Williams, “The
Deflections of Desire,” 131; Andrew Moody, “The Hidden Center: Trinity and Incarnation in the Negative (and Positive) Theology of
Rowan Williams,” in On Rowan Williams, 30. For a very early version of Williams employing the imago trinitatis, see Shortt,
Rowan’s Rule, 84. Williams’s rejection of analogia entis might be qualified since he seems to appreciate how Balthasar employs it in
terms of gender (WA, 79-83). However, surprisingly Williams does not address feminist concerns or a critical retrieval of Balthasar in
light of those concerns. For both, see Aristotle Papanikolau, “Person, Kenosis and Abuse: Hans Urs von Balthasar and Feminist

1088 Williams, “Deflections of Desire,” 117-128, 133-135 (esp. 133); Williams, “What does Love Know?,” 266-268; Williams, Res,
83-90; Williams, OCT, 70-72, 140-141, 288. For the Orthodox theologians, mostly Lossky and Bulgakov but also Paul Evdokimov,
Pavel Florensky, Georges Florovsky, and Antony (Alexei) Khrapovitsky, see Rowan Williams, A Silent Action: Engagements with
Thomas Merton (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2011), 31 (hereafter AS4); Williams, MS, 31-32, 36-37; Williams, WA, 19; Williams,
WSP, 99; Williams, “Creation, Creativity, and Creatureliness,” 26-31; Williams, “Eastern Orthodox Theology,” 582; Williams, “The
Spirit of the Age to Come,” 622; Rowan Williams, “The Theology of Vladimir Nikolaievich Lossky: An Exposition and Critique,”
(PhD thesis, University of Oxford, 1975), 261-285, http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:15b86a5d-21f4-44a3-95bb-b8543d326658. For the
last sentence in the paragraph in the body of the text, see Williams, OCT, 285-289; Williams, Res, 88; Williams, WA, 72-73. These
sources can be linked to the imago trinitatis partly because, as I will note later, it is developed in an ecclesial frame.

1089 If given the space, I would place and continue the Dorrien-Williams engagement after engaging Hauerwas, beginning with how
the latter’s accounts of the Trinity and the God-human relation are related in terms of command and obedience. But here, for the sake
of space, I will simply pick up the second half of the argument engaging Hauerwas.
II. Toward a Theological Account for a Developing Relation between Church and World

Recall from chapter one that Hauerwas applies the term “the world” to Christians in terms of disobedience (agency), but he also separates the church and world in terms of their traditioned communities. Sometimes he even equivocates between world and creation: the “world” can refer to the planet Earth, one’s social context as it is and as deceptive, etc.\(^ {1090}\) Despite these problems with clarity and consistency, I established that Hauerwas’s work is primarily concerned about ecclesial witness to the human creatures and their traditioned communities who do not know or who reject God. So my use of the term “world” below reflects that emphasis in light of Hauerwas’s equivocation. The test is how the church’s reciprocity with the rest of creation can turn enemy-creatures into friend-creatures. Here I am concerned with part of that change, the turning of enemies into neighbors. How can the church, as made up of God’s human creatures attempting to be faithful to God’s invitation, on the church’s terms understand and enter into a developing argument with the world, as made up of God’s human creatures who do not know or who reject God?

I am not convinced by Dorrien’s 2009 description of his 1995 claim: that the problem here is Hauerwas’s “sharp dichotomy” between the church and world.\(^ {1091}\) Difference matters, especially on the issue of human violence and Christian pacifism. Rather, Hauerwas has not given a sufficient theological account for a maturing relationship, through response back and forth, between church and world after the world

\(^{1090}\) Hauerwas, CC, 15, 18, 232 n. 15; Hauerwas, TT, 82, 86, 96.
\(^{1091}\) Dorrien, SEM, 486.
responds positively but partially to ecclesial witness. Hauerwas’s difficulty here, I will argue, results from a two-tiered problem that undergirds Christian and non-Christian difference and, in turn, that governs their relation. The first tier is Hauerwas’s accounts of witness and friendship are categorically separated. Hauerwas attempts to overcome that separation through practical reasoning, but it alone is insufficient for a theological account of a developing relation between the church and world. The second tier regards Hauerwas’s account of gift, that produces the obedient and not-obedient dichotomy undergirding the categorical separation of witness and friendship. However, there is no theological support for practical reasoning that can address the obedient and not-obedient dichotomy. The sectarian withdrawal critiques levied at Hauerwas are not only wrong, they are superficial misdiagnoses. They do not account for the tiers and the problems therein. Nor do the criticisms, even Dorrien’s isolationist charge, offer a sufficiently trinitarian solution for human beings as relational creatures. However, Williams’s theological framework does through reciprocal trinitarian love-gift in abundance. The imago trinitatis in creation supplies the necessary ground for how the church can be appropriately open to the world and, in turn, how the church can have a developing argument with the world.

*Tier One: Friendship, Witness, and Practical Reasoning*

For Hauerwas, ecclesial witness is revelation to the world. Witness makes Christian truth intelligible by the particular embodiment of it in relations and in practical reasoning, not by translating truth into claims of autonomous, abstract rationality. Witness as such is the gift of representing God to the world, as according to Hauerwas’s co-creator and representation dichotomy. Christian witness on Christian terms is the
grounds for discussion rather than closes discussion, since Hauerwas grants “that the world can respond to the distinctive character of Christian witness.” However, the proclamation of truth in word and deed has a narrow understanding of reciprocity for those inside and outside the church. Witness is primarily about ecclesial faithfulness, not for the sake of discussion with the world alone. Perhaps Hauerwas’s most explicit note about the world’s reciprocity and its affect on the church is in Resident Aliens: “Now, one of the problems with witness is that people hear it. Then they tell it back to you, and you think, is that what I said? But the gospel is not the Gospel until it’s been received. That often times works as a judgment on our lives.” So Hauerwas understands the good news as gift, and reciprocity is constitutive of it. But his articulation of ecclesial witness is largely unidirectional and critical: to “identify the world as the world” exposes the falsity of the world’s claim to autonomy. In a rare occurrence, Hauerwas briefly acknowledges that the world’s response to ecclesial witness can “create an epistemological crisis within Christianity.” But even granting that acknowledgment, a question still remains. If representative witness is revelatory, then what about a reciprocity that allows for development in the world that is not immediately conversion?

Friendship is the gift of mutual care (love) that enables virtuous development. So intra-human friendship might be the answer since witness and friendship are intertwined for Hauerwas. Witness constitutes patient friendship, and witness is the result of

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1092 Hauerwas, WW, 59 n. 3. See also Hauerwas, WAD, xiii; Hauerwas, WGU, 207.
1093 Hauerwas and Willimon, R4, 93.
1094 Hauerwas, HR, 533. See also Hauerwas, AE, 59, 62; Hauerwas, STT, 73-74, 164; Hauerwas, WAD, 170; Hauerwas, WT, 29.
1095 Hauerwas, STT, 189.
friendship. But the church can only witness for friendship, because witness from friendship only makes sense in the church. So witness and friendship are categorically separated: witness is how the church relates to the world; friendship is how the church relates internally. This separation stems from Hauerwas’s normative privileging of ecclesial friendship as obedient response to a given, particular Christological command. That account places friendship within loyalty to an ecclesiological frame. So in the context of communities with different historical traditions, Hauerwas holds that “the church is never a friend to the world,” which is “an enemy.” Conversely, to be “friends with the world” makes Christians “enemies of God and one another.” But such polemical frankness should not obscure that Hauerwas qualifies his rejection of ecclesial friendship with the world in two ways.

First, he qualifies ‘the world.’ He notes that often “what we are wont to call ‘the world’ [are] strangers who speak to us as friends.” Elsewhere Hauerwas asserts that “our commitment to the church finds expression through the necessity of friendship beyond the church.” While these qualifications show that the world as a concept is more fluid than his rhetoric indicates, the qualifications are perhaps further equivocation. Hauerwas leaves “the world” rather vague as a concept. Nor does he explain how Christians can have friendship with strangers in relation to their different loyalties, even

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1097 Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 82, 84. Emphasis original. See also Hauerwas, STT, 196.
1098 Hauerwas, US, 114. For the implicit bifurcation between the world and church as traditioned communities, see ibid., 115 for the reference to the church as “a community of peace.”
1100 Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 85.
1101 Hauerwas, DT, 174. See also Hauerwas, CC, 93; Hauerwas, WAD, 125.
though the most important distinction between both Christians and strangers for Hauerwas is their different loyalties.\textsuperscript{1102}

Second, answers to both criticisms are found in the performance of Hauerwas’s actual friendship with ‘worldly strangers.’ The irony of Hauerwas’s \textit{explicit} development on radical democracy is that it was stimulated not by the criticisms of Christians—like those of, as Dorrien narrates, his and Albrecht’s—that “rolled off Hauerwas for years.”\textsuperscript{1103} Rather, it was the similar critique by Jeffrey Stout, the non-Christian and friend of Hauerwas. Part of Hauerwas’s response was \textit{Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary}, a co-written book of correspondence with his friend and former colleague at Duke, Romand Coles, who is not a Christian. How can these friendships with non-Christians be explained?

On the one hand, Hauerwas’s relating to the ‘secular world’ indicates a more constructive understanding of the world than I have used the term for Hauerwas. Insomuch as the term ‘the world’ simply names that in which human beings live, the world as a concept is vague. The vagueness is because the world as such depends on humanity existing in local, particular relations through which one reasons to act. The world-as-particular-relations indicates that practical reasoning in discussion is operative for Christian friendship with the ‘secular world,’ which has a different agency than the church. On the other hand, Hauerwas is a friend through his “constancy”—similar to patience and courage—embodying Jesus “across and through…many different loyalties and actions.”\textsuperscript{1104} “Constancy” implies that witness is a perennial undercurrent at the very

\textsuperscript{1102} Hauerwas and Pinches, \textit{CAV}, 85, 160-162; Hauerwas, \textit{PK}, 133.
\textsuperscript{1103} Dorrien, \textit{SEM}, 487.
\textsuperscript{1104} Hauerwas, \textit{STT}, 126. See also Hauerwas and Pinches, \textit{CAV}, 41.
least. Therefore, to the question “How to have a developing argument with the world?,” Hauerwas answers by eschewing abstract theory while upholding practical reason and witness.\textsuperscript{1105} Christian worship, for Hauerwas, shows Christians their contingency as creatures and ultimately their vulnerability to all in the manner of Jesus’s nonviolence. Hauerwas performs this sort of vulnerability in his dialogue with Stout and Coles. To give Hauerwas’s performance more weight, his discussions with Stout and Coles are doing what Williams understands as negotiation for the common good.\textsuperscript{1106}

So Hauerwas complicates an easy separation of witness and friendship through his account of practical reason. Yet the latter is insufficient for a full theological account of a developing relation between the church and world, for practical reason does not give a developed account to answer the question, what about dynamic growth in the church-world relation? I value performance as describing growth in friendship with a worldly stranger; however, such performance still requires an interpretative account. Hauerwas has given illuminating interpretation before in his narrative work. But a similar interpretation of friendship with worldly ‘strangers’ is also necessary for the church-world relation. Too often appeals to practical reason over against ‘theory’ give the appearance of an alchemic bridge between points A and C, as unclear as C may be. That is a pyrrhic victory since we are left with little imaginative vision about what to do next in the mutual development (maturation) of friendship with ‘worldly strangers.’ Towards a next step, Hauerwas raises resources like the university for practical reasoning, and he employs Williams and Alasdair MacIntyre for support on the university and practical

reasoning, respectively. As important as cultivating a place for discussion is, this is in continuity with Hauerwas’s normal tendencies. He focuses on witness for setting the ground of discussion. Yet, he largely eschews giving a robust account of how to develop the discussion other than his own aporetic practice of engaging the world. The latter is still often in the primary frame of witness.  

Practical reason alone is also theologically insufficient to link friendship and witness. If there is no theological account, the door has been implicitly opened to liberal theology’s primacy of experience and reason. Hauerwas’s response, witness and practical reasoning (or practical “wisdom”), both guards against liberalism and repeats the witness-friend problem. But the framework of friendship within witness encourages the appearance that Hauerwas holds to what Williams rejects: a theology that opts out of “nature by treating ‘God’ as a successful rival for our attention.” That is not true of Hauerwas at his best, but there is some resonance since there is a deeper, theological lacuna. Hauerwas lacks specific aspects necessary for a robust theological account of how the church can have a developing argument with the world when it responds positively but partially.

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1107 Hauerwas, CC, chp. 1; Hauerwas, CET, chp. 9; Hauerwas, SU, 106-107; Hauerwas, WAD, 140-144, 146; Hauerwas, SU, 31-32; Hauerwas, WGU, 207. Intellectual affinities and even witness can be seen in the performance of Hauerwas’s engagement with ‘strangers’ (AE, 144, 155-157). But that is only the tip of friendship. One might suggest Hauerwas’s memoir, Hannah’s Child, to show more about friendship. Indeed it does, but not so much with ‘strangers.’ The same goes elsewhere (WT, 31). Perhaps the difficulty in describing friendship with strangers is, as Williams observes about describing the Holy Spirit, the “impossibility of seeing one’s own face” (OCT, 126). After all, Dorrien notes that Hauerwas has “a gift for friendship” (SEM, 486). Since Hauerwas and Coles’s conversation at the end of Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary is already published, maybe it is an opportunity for an interpretive account.

1108 Hauerwas, WT, 16. In that chapter Hauerwas argues for the importance of “ad hominem” practical reasoning because it emphasizes particularity in “the concrete,” human contingency within narrated communities, and “connections” among people, their commitments, their friendships, etc. (WT, 14-15, 18-19, 21, 23. Emphasis original.). The link between practical reason and theology might appear to overcome the friend-witness dichotomy since practical reason allows Hauerwas to give an account of engagement. Yet it is that dichotomy which marks the conclusion of Hauerwas’s chapter (ibid., 29-31). On “ad hominem” practical reasoning, Hauerwas is quoting Taylor, but Hauerwas uses a different source than I have cited already. See Charles Taylor, “Explanation and Practical Reason,” in The Quality of Life, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

1109 Williams, OCT, 73. See also ibid., 69.

1110 My claim about the theological insufficiency of practical reason may be contrary to Hauerwas for the same reason that I may be correct: “Aristotle,” not Christianity, “thinks deliberation between friends to be the paradigm of practical reason” (Hauerwas, WGU, 249). For the liberal theology, see Dorrien, MALT, 2:555.
The deeper, second tier is that Hauerwas’s position needs a better *theological* account to relate friendship and witness within the church-world relation. Gift might be the way to address the link between friendship and witness since gift undergirds both. As chapter two also showed, Hauerwas has, with some debt to Williams, a theology of particular grace that plays a significant role in holding together Hauerwas’s constructive work from God’s sovereignty to human creaturehood to human agency (friendship). Further, within the context of reflecting on the elderly, the poor, the disabled, and *L’Arche*, Hauerwas maintains that gift undergirds mutual recognition, love, and friendship. But to the detriment of his understanding of grace and his categories of friendship and witness, he has not sufficiently taken account of Williams’s *full sense of mutual recognition in theological terms.*

Gift is the ground for humanity’s contingency, both in the asymmetry of the God-human relation and in the mutuality of intra-human relations. Yet Hauerwas extends the command-obedience framework from the asymmetry of the God-human relation to negatively impact the mutuality of intra-human relationships. The creator-creation relation in non-mutuality frames humanity’s positive response as obedient, representative witness. When that account is applied to ecclesiology and other traditioned communities, the church’s obedient witness is set over-against the world’s disobedience to given command. But that framework overlooks too much the extent of *relational* mutuality, on

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a theological basis, between human creatures as applied to the church and world relation. Recall the categories of friendship and witness. Openness and mutuality are vital to Hauerwas’s understanding of friendship. However, openness and mutuality are also theologically underdeveloped in his account of the church-world relation because obedience to gift undergirds ecclesial witness and creaturely existence.1112

Hauerwas’s concept of stranger, if derived from Mosaic law and so a theological category, is not so helpful here as it might seem. His description of it is more underdeveloped and equivocated than his account of the world. What is a human stranger if she or he is a creature but not defined as either obedient to covenant-loyalty to God or disobedient to their creaturely status ordained by God? Hauerwas’s answer employs the ancient Greeks: “Strangers were those people who did not necessarily share your stories, but who seemed capable of hearing your stories and appreciating them with understanding.”1113 That answer shows an openness to mutual recognition; however, the framework is nothing but sheer openness to potentiality. Strangers can be Christians and non-Christians. The reason why someone is a stranger is simply that she or he is not close relationally speaking and/or that she or he is not part of the immediate community (assuming something in common). But that account of stranger is not truly a third category between the dichotomy of obedient and not-obedient human creatures. Rather, the concept of stranger is a product of practical reason that qualifies the dichotomy. Strangers can be those who have yet to be recognized as obedient and not-obedient.


1113 Hauerwas, PS, 5. See also Hauerwas, PK, 133.
Strangers can be those who are already recognized to exist but are either relationally unknown Christians or not-obedient (non-covenantal loyalty) people who can be allies with Christians. That description of strangers is too expansive to be the same as the stranger as a theological category when transposed to Jews as covenanted and non-Jews as strangers to each other in the covenant of the Mosaic law. Even when Hauerwas’s focus on the non-Christian stranger parallels that Mosaic dichotomy, he employs practical reason to solve a categorical, theological bind concerning reciprocity.\(^{1114}\)

Coles also sees the problem of mutual reciprocity. He challenges Hauerwas to take further account of gift and reciprocity between church and world, because doing so would more positively develop Hauerwas’s understanding of witness. What gives weight to Coles’s point is that he makes it in light of not only Jean Vanier and \(L’Arche\), but also Williams, who “calls Christians to the experience of being foot-washed by ‘unbelievers.’”\(^{1115}\) The need for further development is, I think, correct. At the same time that D. Stephen Long defends Hauerwas, Long also echoes Nigel Biggar’s now partially dated challenge to Hauerwas. He assumes God but actually writes little about God in published work. A result of that was little theological exploration to ground theopolitical avenues in addition to what Hauerwas has developed. For all of Hauerwas’s reliance on gift and his narrowing of it for the church-world relation, Hauerwas’s account of a

\(^{1114}\) Exodus 22:21; Leviticus 19:34; Deuteronomy 10:19, 23; Hauerwas, \(PS\), 4-6, 65; Hauerwas, \(WAD\), 146-147. For other instances of stranger in Hauerwas’s work, see Hauerwas, \(CC\), 2, 10, 26, 51, 106; Hauerwas, \(PK\), 108-109, 133; Hauerwas, \(RA\), 68, 83, 91, 138; Stanley Hauerwas, “The Church and the Mentally Handicapped: A Continuing Challenge to the Imagination,” in \textit{Critical Reflections on Stanley Hauerwas’ Theology of Disability: Disabling Society, Enabling Theology}, ed. John Swinton (Binghamton, NY: Haworth Press, 2004; repr. New York: Routledge, 2008), 58, Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells, “How the Church Managed before there was Ethics,” in \textit{The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics}, 42. Hauerwas’s category of stranger is even larger: God is also a “stranger” (\(PK\), 144).

Hauerwas’s use of practical reason to solve a categorical bind should not be surprising since he understands theology itself as a form of practical reasoning (\(WT\), chp. 1). I am not against that in general, for theology is faith seeking understanding in relation to one another and to God. My concern is that Hauerwas’s reliance on practical reasoning allows him to maintain his privileging of the command-obedience framework rather than re-work it in light of a larger frame.

\(^{1115}\) Coles, \(CDRO\), 213. See also ibid., 214-216. Coles is citing Rowan Williams, afterward to \textit{The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics}, 498.
theology of gift itself is ironically underdeveloped. The point of his work is more about developing the theopolitical implication of gift rather than, he once admitted, developing a theology of gift itself. In Hauerwas’s terms, he refuses to separate theology and practice. But despite even Hauerwas’s practice of dialogue, he has not articulated a theological way of thinking about friendship and the economy of grace to sufficiently account for his own practice of developing reciprocity between church and world. Consequently, Hauerwas lacks crucial elements necessary for his and Williams’s accounts of deliberative democracy.\textsuperscript{1116}

So the issue here is the development of certain unfulfilled theopolitical trajectories in light of a more robust trinitarian account begun with Hauerwas’s work on the Holy Spirit. But the development of gift cannot be achieved by supercharging it on its own. This would either fail to extricate the primacy of the command-obedience framework or would expand grace such that it becomes little more than the sheer openness of generalized love, eliminating particularity and difference. Coles overlooks crucial theological similarities between Williams and Hauerwas because, as Cavanaugh points out, Coles questionably construes Williams’s apophatic openness in order to

\textsuperscript{1116} Coles, \textit{CDRO}, 211, 215-216; Long, “Capitalizing and Fetishizing the Particular,” 52-55, 58. For Hauerwas’s admission, see \textit{WW}, 169 n. 21 which appeals to John Milbank, “Can a Gift be Given? Prolegomena to a Future Trinitarian Metaphysic,” \textit{Modern Theology} 11, no. 1 (1995). Hauerwas presumably does not raise his earlier chapter “The Politics of Charity” (\textit{TT}, chp. 9) partly because it had a Christological focus rather than a trinitarian one. The latter Hauerwas developed via Milbank out right and then extended it by attention to Williams (\textit{WW}, chp. 12; \textit{PF}, chp. 3). For gift playing an important but largely assumed role in more recent work, simply see Hauerwas, \textit{CDRO}. For Hauerwas on gift therein explicitly, see 107-110, 204-206, 310, 314. For Hauerwas lacking a sufficient theological account of his own practice of developing reciprocity, see Hauerwas, \textit{WAD}, 146.

I characterize above Hauerwas’s development as partial for a number of reasons. His answer to Biggar was the Decalogue, as Long rightly notes, and that issue of command-obedience was framed by Barth (Long, “Capitalizing and Fetishizing the Particular,” 57; Hauerwas, \textit{STT}, 37-38). But Hauerwas has since clarified that his critique of humanism does not mean a rejection of humanism on his own terms (\textit{STT}, 145; \textit{AE}, xv-xvi, 58-59, 142-143, 156-157). Stemming from that humanism, Hauerwas continues to clarify that his earlier work on the difference between the agencies of the church and world is not born out of hatred for the world, a “Manichean dualism” wherein “the world is evil and the church is not” (\textit{WT}, 49). Rather, “because Christians believe we are what the world can be, we can act in the hope that the world can and will positively respond to a witness of peace” (\textit{WAD}, xiii). That framework has been behind even Hauerwas’s seemingly most critical book title, \textit{Against the Nations} (Long, \textit{Goodness of God}, 102). So my concern about the theological basis for recognizing the world’s positive but partial response is a question about how Hauerwas’s project can be extended in a more positive mode. Of course, that does not mean ignoring critique, a sharp no to sin—to violence.
challenge Hauerwas. Coles also glosses over: Williams’s stress on the importance of the church as a corporate body built on the particularity of Jesus; Williams’s emphasis on the necessity of Christian faithfulness in order to be witnesses; and Williams’s affirmation of, like Hauerwas, the church-world distinction rooted in divine sovereignty. Further, to follow Coles here would ask Hauerwas to simply be more like Dorrien since Coles privileges the solidarity of love to construe receptivity but underplays gift like Dorrien. So I am not repeating Dorrien’s critique of Hauerwas on the church-world distinction.  

Rather, Hauerwas needs a theologically developed account of the church-world relation in light of a more coherent trinitarian framework that connects love-gift in abundance and mutuality to intra-human relations. Even though he does not explicitly connect the *imago Dei* to the *imago trinitatis*, he has linked the *imago Dei* to “*imago Christi*” within an implied trinitarian frame. A couple years later he noted not only the importance of that trinitarian account, but also that he had insufficiently developed it. The latter is still the case, especially concerning the church-world relation. More recently Hauerwas has written that “what is required is a theological account of language in which

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1117 Hauerwas, *WT*, chp. 2; Hauerwas and Willimon, *HS*; Cavanaugh, “A Politics of Vulnerability,” 109-110; Coles, *CDRO*, 180-181; Williams, *FPS*, 66-74, 92-93, 305-306; Williams, *OCR*, 24-25, 143, 170-177, 212, 202-206, 229-234, 284-285; Williams, *TG*, 75-87; Williams, “Being a People,” 209-210, 214-222; Rowan Williams, “Christian Identity and Religious Plurality,” *Ecumenical Review* 58, no. 1 (2006): 69-75. For Coles on love and solidarity, including the beloved community, see *CDRO*, 38, 42, 59, 63, 67, 81, 185, 220-221, 224-227, 251, 336-338, 340. Coles does positively raise gift or grace from time to time, see *CDRO*, 173, 182, 188, 225, 246. But Coles’s emphasis on love-solidarity and his lack of gift seem to stem his worries about the church as a gift. That framework, he argues, sets boundaries and insulates the church from encounters while mirroring Constantinianism (ibid., 210-212). It is worth noting that Coles distinguishes insulation from sectarianism and acknowledges that his conversation with Hauerwas qualifies the insulation critique (ibid., 211). I am not convinced about the mirroring of Constantinianism. As for Coles’s insulation critique, it is not fatal even if one grants it as a true possibility. He finds a community of gift as articulated by Jean Vanier so “very difficult” to receive precisely because one has to actually see L’Arche (ibid., 245). If such an embodied social imagination is such a dramatic alternative, the solution to Hauerwas’s problem cannot be Cole’s rejection of the church as “constituted prior to its encounter with the world” (Cavanaugh, “A Politics of Vulnerability,” 107). That rejection not only overlooks Christianity’s historical beginnings and continuation in the world and in God’s kingdom that is part of Christianity’s distinctiveness but without it being “purely ‘sect-like’” (Williams, *OCR*, 285). But also Coles’s rejection can implicitly eliminate the difference necessary for interactive discussion and then mutual development of both parties in light of each other’s words to the other (Williams, *FPS*, 170). Since I have already emphasized difference in chapter four, below I will focus on Williams’s account of mutual development.

1118 Hauerwas, *IGC*, 194. Emphasis original. See also ibid., 193.
the human being as a linguistic creature participates in the very life of the Logos, the Word, that is, Trinity.”\textsuperscript{1119} Indeed, the trinitarian frame needs further development, even if Hauerwas may not be initially interested in doing so in terms of the imago trinitatis. Williams has achieved just such a development and extended it to the church-world relation. His trinitarian fusion of love and gift in mutuality and abundance undergirds mutual recognition and negotiation. This unified love-gift expands grace based on theological particularity, the Trinity’s kenotic mutuality in love-gift. That particularity frames humanity’s and Jesus’s obedience not as command-obedience but as open (or attentive) and ecstatic self-gift in the mutual sharing of and the mutual dwelling within one another. Through this account of reality, Williams gives a more adequately robust account of creation to sustain Hauerwas’s practice.\textsuperscript{1120}

\textbf{Williams’s Theopolitics of Gift-Negotiation in Openness and Mutuality}

Williams argues that, in intra-human relations, the gift economy by itself “fails to be a politics at all.”\textsuperscript{1121} Instead, politics is constituted by gift combined with negotiation. The church’s joining of gift and negotiation marks its internal relations and, in turn, its relation to the world. Out of divine freedom, the church and creation on the whole are given the “liberty” and the time for the “negotiation’ of needs, the patterns of giving and receiving, speaking and hearing—stripped of violence-inducing anxiety.”\textsuperscript{1122} Accordingly Williams goes beyond Hauerwas’s positive construal of the world’s response almost

\textsuperscript{1119} Hauerwas, \textit{WAD}, 149. See also Hauerwas, \textit{AE}, 112.

\textsuperscript{1120} Hauerwas, “Failure of Communication or a Case for Uncomprehending Feminism,” 237; Long, “Capitalizing and Fetishizing the Particular,” 53; Williams, “The Deflections of Desire,” 121-122 (that seems to be his best and fullest summary of the issues from humanity’s and Jesus’s ‘obedience’ and Gethsemane to without command and fissure that can be found elsewhere in varying degrees of development and often not entirely connected to one another: Williams, \textit{Dost}, 152-153, 176-177; Williams, \textit{OCT}, 121-122, 140-142; Williams, \textit{OF}, 17, 40-41, 68-71, 98, 130-131, 165-167, 198, 245, 250, 257, 274-277—see esp. 198, 250). If I had more space, I would show how Williams here is different than how Hauerwas appropriates him in \textit{PF}, chp. 3, esp. p. 100.

\textsuperscript{1121} Williams, \textit{LI}, 70. See also ibid., 71

\textsuperscript{1122} Williams, \textit{OCT}, 73, 145. See also ibid., 249, 268-275, 284-287.
always in terms of clarifying the church’s witness. Williams stresses that the Holy Spirit pushes the church into asking questions of both the church and the world for continuous dialogue within the church and between the church and world. This question-driven dialogue is how the Holy Spirit keeps the church open for creative growth internal and external to itself. 1123

Williams’s openness to externality and negotiation is undergirded by his trinitarian account. The mutual trinitarian relations, the “necessary and irreducible reciprocity between Logos and Spirit,” ground the “model of relation between Christ and his body.” 1124 That model, in turn, is the ground for a critical mutuality between church and world. Williams argues that Christianity’s “commitment undertaken in baptism” is to proclaim “that the Word of God is sovereign,” and to identify with that through embodying Jesus’s life in the body of Christ. 1125 This account of Christianity’s distinctiveness in a Christological and trinitarian frame grounds “resistance” to what Williams would come to call programmatic secularism. 1126 Yet the church’s “Christological and trinitarian focus” means that “the purpose of [baptismal] commitment is” not only the self-gift of witness, but also the gift of love that emphasizes the other’s voice and receives it in active listening. 1127 This Christian subjectivity makes possible “the free identification of the believer with the world.” 1128 The political form of witness, dialogue, and identification is Williams’s political vision of interactive pluralism and a pluralist state. That vision works to create openness to mutuality in order to allow for the

1123 Williams, LI, 70-71; Williams, OCT, 73; Williams, OCT, 123-124, 144-145, 173-180.
1124 Williams, OCT, 174. See also ibid., 288; Williams, “Creation, Creativity and Creatureliness,” 28.
1125 Williams, “Being a People,” 214, 216. See also ibid., 209-210; Williams, OCT, 230-233.
1126 Williams, OCT, 174. See also ibid., 233.
1127 Williams, “Being a People,” 216, 221. See also ibid, 210-211.
1128 Ibid., 217.
mutuality in interfaith dialogue to be constitutive to public life. The openness to mutuality in politics and in interfaith dialogue is an important first step for the church to have a developing relation, even friendship, with the world. All these are based theologically on the inherent openness in the triune relations for embracing the other.\(^{1129}\)

Williams’s construal of mutuality also indicates presuppositions about the world. It is open to the church, the world develops in negotiation, and the world’s openness and negotiation are grounded in the triune relations, even though the world may reject the triune God. The world’s openness can be described as “commitments need imaginative testing” through negotiation, or “responsive testing,” since that is a method applicable to atheist and Christian alike.\(^ {1130}\) This method is, for Williams, about human development in mutuality, not either side developing in itself where mutual interaction has only been construed in terms of witness to the other. Development in mutuality, for goals like the common good, marks a partial maturation of the world before any strict conversion moment.\(^ {1131}\)

The maturing relation between the church and world is grounded by the answer to a question, what is the theological basis for mutual development on the part of the world? Like Hauerwas, Williams affirms Jesus’s particularity and the church-world distinction in terms of identity and agency. But at the same time, Williams’s triune fusion of gift and love in abundance marking all of creation allows for a partial overlap of the church and


\(^ {1130}\) Williams, \textit{Dost}, 242; Rowan Williams, \textit{The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language} (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 42 (hereafter \textit{EW}). See also ibid., 44-45.

world in terms of agency. So in contrast to Hauerwas, Williams can maintain the
similarity and distinction between the church’s and world’s agencies. How Williams can
do so is critical. He holds that human agency is in the image of the triune relations.

Hauerwas need not fear this ‘natural theology’ about human agency. Eastern Orthodoxy
and Williams develop the imago trinitatis in an ecclesial-liturgical frame, rather than
focus mostly on mental faculties or appealed to some generalized abstract content.

However, here I will focus on the imago trinitatis as a theology of creation itself for
discussion.1132

1132 Williams, “Being a People,” 216-219; Williams, FPS, 178-179; Williams, WA, 225-226. For the imago trinitatis developed in an
ecclesial-liturgical frame, FPS, 177-179; Williams, OA, 257-258; Williams, Tot, 136; Williams, WA, 19; Rowan
from the East, there is also Williams’s reading of Augustine for the imago trinitatis through triune relations rather than mental
eucharisticus,” which further places the imago trinitatis in an ecclesial frame. Rowan Williams, Anglican Identities (Lanham, MD:
Cowley, 2003), 109; Williams, FPS, 96, 183; Williams, “Being a People,” 215-219, 221; Rowan Williams, “Liturgical Humanism:
Orthodoxy and the Transformation of Culture,” Orthodoxy in America Lecture Series (New York: Fordham University, Orthodox
eucharisticus” is a summary of Gregory Dix, The Shape of Liturgy, new ed. (London: Continuum, 2005), xxxviii-xxxix. For “homo
liturgicus,” which is functionally the same as homo eucharisticus but this time in a merging of Thomas Merton and Evdokimov, see
Williams, AS, 33, 36.

Homo eucharisticus raises a solution to an initial tension between Hauerwas and Williams over the imago Dei. Hauerwas’s
characterization of the imago Dei as sharing Jesus’s mission, the imago Christi, may appear to not meet or perhaps even to reject the
imago trinitatis as relational (IGC, 188). Williams affirms the sharing of the mission and the imago Christi, but also emphasizes
“representing and bearing of the world to the Father…the vocation of the human being to become a priest within creation” (“Being a
People,” 219; Dost, 207). This framework follows the pattern of the economic Trinity in terms of missio (“Being a People,” 210-211,
220-221). When that pattern is joined with the body of Christ—“where persons…exist only in communion, in mutuality, in an utter
being there for each other,” in a phrase the homo eucharisticus—following Jesus’s mission to God’s creation implies an analogical
reflection of the immanent Trinity’s processio (Williams, OJ, 257-258; Williams, “Creation, Creativity, and Creatureliness,” 32. See
also ibid., 25, 28.). So there is a way for Hauerwas to move to the imago trinitatis.

As for the Eastern voices in their own right on the imago trinitatis, see Georges Florovsky, The Collected Works of
Georges Florovsky, vol. 1, Bible, Church, Tradition: An Eastern Orthodox View (Belmont, MA: Nordland, 1972), 39, 67; Georges
189; Vladimir Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God, ed. John H. Erickson and Thomas E. Bird (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s
Seminary Press, 1974), 175-181, 190-194; Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood, NY: St
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1976), chps. 6, 9; Kallistos (Ware) of Diokleia, “The Human Person as Icon of the Trinity,” Sobornost 8,
East, ed. Graham Speake and Kallistos Ware (New York: Peter Lang, 2011), 188-195 (the way that Ware writes about the Orthodox
monastic communities on Mount Athos can be read as realizing the imago trinitatis within and between ecclesial communities of
prayer, which Hauerwas’s position would appreciate); Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church, rev. ed. (Baltimore, MD: Penguin,
1964), 244-245; John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s
Paul McPartlan (New York: T&T Clark, 2009), chp. 6, esp. p. 249. There are, of course, caveats. One could argue that Sergius
Bulgakov’s triune account of creation and humanity’s divinization is abstract. Additionally, Williams is sympathetic to Bulgakov.
However, Bulgakov still privileges the ecclesial frame and Williams’s own position is always fleshy. Sergius Bulgakov, The Lamb of
Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), 318-319; Sergius Bulgakov, The Orthodox Church, trans. Lydia Kesich
(Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1998), chp. 1.
Creation is constituted by its *internal* mutual relations reflecting the Trinity’s creative economy of love-gift. Although the creator’s love is a vital theological ground for human value, Williams maintains that everyone should be recognized as “not merely bound to a common divine Master.” Analogically similar to the triune economy of God *in se*, every human being is “bound in a relation of mutuality according to which each becomes the bearer of necessary gifts to the other.” This “universal,” “mutual recognition” and reciprocity is the way love’s openness to the other’s difference is manifested socially. Love’s mutual indwelling produces “a shared social world” for the common good. From this framework follows a political implication. Mutual recognition and reciprocity of love-gift recognize “non-negotiable[s],” like human dignity and equality, which are necessary to negotiate liberating discussion even with those who may not seem “naturally loveable persons.” Oppressive master-slave relations are undercut by the notions that all human beings are “unique and irreplaceable” and that their inherent value is shared in the other. Human creatures are in this together and “responsible” for one another, even if one affirms a church-world distinction. It is a sin not to receive the whole of humanity as a gift.

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1133 Williams, *FPS*, 156.
1134 Ibid.
1135 Ibid., 123, 162. See also ibid., 122, 170.
1136 Ibid., 169. See also ibid., 163, 168.
1137 Williams, *Dost*, 182; Williams, *FPS*, 158. See also ibid., 121-122, 156-157.
1139 Williams, *Dost*, 157, 159. See also ibid., 110, 150.
Human creatures’ participation in the openness and mutuality of trinitarian self-giving includes receiving concretese human bodies. Williams’s arguments for mutual recognition and human rights is rooted in the fact that material bodies are “a system of communication” that “will always be carrying meanings or messages that are inalienably [their] own.”\textsuperscript{1141} Communication is not reducible to speech or even “self-awareness” since it does disservice to children or those with “mental disabilities.”\textsuperscript{1142} Rather, human bodies are communicative simply by existing, and that is “realize[d]” through the reception of another’s bodily communication.\textsuperscript{1143} Accordingly, attentiveness to embodiment as communicating with the other is vital for humanity to develop together and to resist silencing by physical abuse, even murder, by dominating institutions such as slavery. In other words, giving oneself is always an act of vulnerability, and it calls for similar vulnerability in the one who receives and returns it. That mutual vulnerability is made possible because Williams frames the other’s body as ultimately a divine gift to be received.\textsuperscript{1144}

\textsuperscript{1141} Williams, FPS, 153, 156.
\textsuperscript{1142} Ibid., 153-154.
\textsuperscript{1143} Ibid., 156.
\textsuperscript{1144} Ibid., 152, 154, 156, 170-171; Williams, OCT, 241; Williams, FPS, 159. For his earlier, community oriented argument for rights connected to “conversation” see LI, 93 and OCT, 263.

Hauerwas finds Williams’s “account of rights…grounded in our recognition of our bodily character” to be “persuasive,” but “the bodily character of language might have been developed more fully” (Hauerwas, “Review of Rowan Williams’s Faith in the Public Square,” 121). The same could be said for Williams’s work on sexuality. He largely assumes bodily communication framed in open (love) grace instead of developing the actual concrete embodiment as communication itself through open self-gift (Williams, “The Body’s Grace,” 310-317). So it is worth noting a few concrete examples, of concrete embodiment as communication itself through open self-gift, not restricted to an ecclesial context. Bodies, vulnerability, ecstatic self-giving, and mutual indwelling (love) call to mind the initial act of procreation, the fetus developing in the mother’s womb, and the parent(s) nursing an infant with the mother’s milk. Vulnerability and love-gift can also be seen in the open gift of a naked embrace that is literally a life-sustaining act of heat exchange for someone in hypothermia. More metaphorically but still very real, self-giving occurs in other bodily communicative acts. Body posture subconsciously indicates a state of mind: Dance gives one’s self over to music and other(s). The labor of creating art employs, as Williams notes, a skilled body to pour a vision larger than their own into an object for others to interact with ("Creation, Creativity, Creatureliness," 29-31). One could even include the act of foot washing, as Coles does, or the less sacramentally explicit bathing of the infirm out of ecstatic care for them (CDRO, 216-217).
Humanity can continue to dialogue together in love-gift because the inexhaustibility of triune plentitude is the ground for dialogical exploration, and in turn, for maturation. For one “to enter into conversation is always to be…at risk” of being “misheard or consciously distorted.” Feminist theology has rightly raised critical concerns about self-gift used to justify coercing women into a vulnerable position of passive and one-sided self-sacrifice. Williams implicitly addresses such concerns by specifically noting that in self-giving there is a “capacity for confrontation,” which he later repeats as “mutual answerability” in the context of Sophia. Williams can allow for vulnerable and confrontational self-gift because of plentitude. It includes not only the gift of the other. Plenitude is also the “time and space” necessary to recognize the “misrecognition” and overcome it in dialogue for development. So triune superabundance does not close history or suffocate human agency. Rather, “human liberty posits a space for an ‘excess of being’…a background of depth and surplus in reality itself which holds and makes sense of all these dialogical processes.” As with the triune relations, human relations have some measure of creativity in reciprocal speech

1145 Williams, Dost, 132.
1146 Ibid., 153, 208-210. I note Sophia here because of feminist emphasis on Sophia, even though Williams is working with male Eastern Orthodox theologians. For two examples, see Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam’s Child, Sophia’s Prophet: Critical Issues in Feminist Christology, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015), chps. 5-6; Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse, tenth anniversary ed. (New York: Crossroad, 2002), chps. 7-9. Williams further sympathizes with other concerns in feminist theology. He joins the feminist rejection of patriarchy (LI, 44), and he affirms feminist insight “that the making of my body into a distant and dangerous object that can either be subdued or placated with quick gratification is the root of sexual oppression” (“The Body’s Grace,” 316). For a frank discussion on Teresa of Avila and patriarchy—including sexual repression and receptivity, with the latter applied also to male mystics as “queering the discourse in the sixteenth century”—see “An Interview with Rowan Williams,” 164-165, 167-168, partly in light of Rowan Williams, Teresa of Avila (London: Continuum, 1991), 213-214. See as well his argument setting the ground for the ordination of women, Rowan Williams, “Women and the Ministry: A Case for Theological Seriousness,” in Feminine in the Church, ed. Monica Furlong (London: SPCK, 1984).
1147 Williams, Dost, 135, 139. See also ibid., 133-134, 136-138, 141, 236-237.
1148 Ibid., 134. See also Williams, EW, 32-33.
to other human beings. That creativity is dependent on the mutually contingent recognition of the other and intelligible dialogue with each other.\textsuperscript{1149}

The \textit{imago trinitatis}, then, underwrites Williams’s account of dialogue between traditions for discovering the common good within one’s community. Human beings develop \textit{through} dialogue, the mutual and continual exploration of each other within abundance. The theopolitics of relation-in-plenitude reflects the pattern of the triune economy because the theopolitics stems from the triune God’s \textit{pro nobis} universal invitation—or open gift/given openness—and \textit{in se} relations.

Since Hauerwas lacks a developed \textit{theological} account like the \textit{imago trinitatis} that supports Christians’ dialogue with the world, his overly narrow \textit{theological} understanding of human agency in response to divine sovereignty privileges obedient witness in a way that hinders a \textit{developing} reciprocity between the church and world. Williams’s better, internally coherent \textit{theological} account of dialogue with the world serves Hauerwas’s aims in a context responds partially but positively to witness. Witness is indeed crucial for Christian participation in deliberative democracy. However, we need a larger account of negotiation in a deliberative democracy than witness in practical circumstances. Williams helps supply the ground for just such an account from

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Hauerwas presumably affirms dialogue in plenitude when described in terms of time since he uses Williams’s work to write: “we must learn to engage in everyday tasks as common as learning to speak the truth and, perhaps even more demanding, to hear the truth through the time-consuming work of conversation” (SU, 210). Admittedly, Hauerwas is addressing the church in this specific instance. But earlier in the book he uses Williams on discussion in the university (106). So there is a promising possibility for Hauerwas to affirm much of this section above if one makes a composite from his uses of Williams.
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Christianity’s particular understanding rather than from an appeal to an abstractly theoretical or ideological external standard.

However, the value of Williams’s horizon, the *imago trinitatis* and dialogue rooted in the mutuality and plenitude of triune love-gift is not nor should be reducible to shoring up deliberative democracy. His theological horizon goes beyond both Hauerwas’s faithful witness in gift and Dorrien’s mediating dialectic in love. But rather than sublate and unify them in Williams’s horizon, I have argued that his horizon offers critical help for developing aspects of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s positions. These developments take a step towards my larger hope, to constructively begin moving beyond the fracture in US Christianity. Those who hold to the positions of Dorrien and Hauerwas can enter into a fresh theopolitical discussion after they take into account Williams’s horizon for their respective projects.

**III. Conclusion**

The faithfulness versus social justice binary is far too simplistic and superficial to sufficiently account for the differences between Hauerwas and Dorrien. One should not miss that Hauerwas is concerned about justice and Dorrien is equally concerned about faithful, counter-cultural witness. However, even the church-world distinction, in terms of Hauerwas denouncing but Dorrien critically affirming liberalism and liberal theology, overlooks too much. Their different responses to liberalism and their similar critiques of liberal theology are not simply undergirded by rival constructive projects. Those responses, critiques, and projects are dependent on sharply divergent accounts of relational truth and the nature of reality.
But even the relations that determine human existence are created and shaped by some-'thing' more. At the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s theologies and their differences are divergent accounts of divine sovereignty, which determines human subjectivity, human agency, and intra-human relations. Dorrien’s apophatic embrace of panentheistic monism emphasizes the sovereignty of love. This framework involves the universality of Spirit, the similarity of spirit, and the autonomy-in-relation of human spirit for free flourishing. Hauerwas’s cataphatic proclamation of Jesus’s universal particularity stresses the sovereignty of gift. This framework involves the universal particularity of the triune creator, the creaturehood of humanity, and the friendship of human creatures with each other and God.

These divergent positions give dramatically different responses to the state’s sovereignty and its mechanisms. For Dorrien’s position, the state’s limited sphere is part of how the Spirit’s transformative love is realized. For Hauerwas’s position, the state’s hegemony makes it a negative force that demands a shift in divine sovereignty, as seen in Dorrien’s account where Christianity may be critical but is fundamentally integrated into the state’s project. So at work in the fracture between Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s positions are two vectors: political sovereignty acting on divine sovereignty, and divine sovereignty acting on political sovereignty.

Because of political sovereignty acting on divine sovereignty, Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s positions are put in irreconcilable contradiction. But they can be seen as contrary, in a place of creative and interactive tension, if they are freed from the specter of state hegemony. Williams’s work on transforming state sovereignty provides that release. Williams’s horizon of trinitarian mutuality and plenitude in love-gift, which
frames his theopolitics, offers critical help for the development of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s projects. That re-framing and developing, in turn, can support a fresh discussion between Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s contrary positions. Through such a discussion, then steps can be taken to address the fracture at the heart of their disagreement.1150

1150 For the difference between contradiction and contrary, see Robert Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1990), p. 10, chp. 3, esp. p. 71. What differentiates Doran’s account of contradiction-contrary from mine is that I have not aimed or tried to resolve the Dorrien-Hauerwas tension with Williams, a third.
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