Hegel, Democracy, and the Kingdom of God

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Plato, in common with all his thinking contemporaries, perceived [the] demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle; he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state, but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjectivity, which still escaped his intelligence. The state is therefore, on its own showing, wanting in subjective liberty [...]. It was not vouchsafed to Plato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold sway in political life, so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality [...]. In the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of the ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to see itself in its reasonableness and truth. In the Protestant state, the constitution and the code, as well as their several applications, embody the principle and the development of the moral life, which proceeds and can only proceed from the truth of religion.

(Hegel, Philosophy of Mind § 552)

Theologians, like philosophers, are not noted for their in-house agreements. But one area of considerable and long-standing consensus among both Catholic and Protestant theologians concerns the pivotal importance of the concept of a »kingdom of God« in Christianity. There are over a hundred references to the »kingdom of God« or the »kingdom of heaven« in the Gospels; and it seems clear that the historical Jesus understood his mission primarily in terms of announcing -- or possibly bringing about -- this »kingdom.«

I have to hedge and use disjunctions like »or« or qualifiers like »possibly« at this point, because concerning the precise nature of the »kingdom of God« there is now and always has been considerable and heated controversy among Christian interpreters. Was the Kingdom meant to come during the generation during which Christ lived? The early Christians began to abandon that interpretation a few centuries after Christ died. Was the Kingdom purely spiritual, or was it meant to free men from social and political oppression and establish justice on earth? Was the Kingdom to be identified with the Church or with some community of believers transcending all established Churches? Is the inauguration of the Kingdom something that depends on human initiative and control, or something completely dependent on the intervention of God in human history?

These are not theoretical questions purely of interest to academicians. The interpretation of the meaning of the »kingdom of God« in Western Christian (or »post-Christian«) civilization is of the utmost importance for politics. It makes a great deal of difference, after all, whether we interpret the kingdom as a world empire, as did Constantine’s court-theologian, Eusebius, as well as Adolph Hitler when he in effect continued the Germanic »Holy Roman Empire« by inaugurating the Third Reich, although he eschewed the theological connotations; or as a world-wide Christian republic, as did Dante; or as the establishment of a purified community separate from the world, as did various monastic orders and as do the Mennonites and Amish in our day; or as an apocalyptic event which will finally rescue the faithful from the ineluctable injustice of secular governments, as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Seventh-Day Adventists in our time interpret the Kingdom.

In the post-World-War-II era, some of the most recent political-theological interpretations of the Kingdom of God have been reflected in the now-disbanded »Moral Majority« movement in the U.S. and the
still-continuing commitment to a social Kingdom of God encapsulated in the *Sojourner* periodical; in the continuing drive towards a final acquisition of the promised land which characterizes many contemporary Zionists, including not only Jews but some conservative Christian theologians; in the passionate revolutionary struggle for the establishment of the final reign of justice, advocated by Latin American liberation theologians and implemented in an inchoate way in »base communities« in many Latin American countries; and in secularized but still recognizable form in Marxist movements, now in disarray and trying to reconstitute after having striven against considerable odds to establish, not in some future world, but on this earth, a reign of peace and justice beyond capitalism made possible by the emergence of a new, socialized species of man.

If there are any political ramifications related to one’s theological interpretation of the Kingdom of God, these ramifications will of course be of the utmost importance for democracy. One who is committed to the idea of the Kingdom may want to know whether his theological ideal is consistent with, and possibly even conducive towards, democracy; one who is committed to democracy, on the other hand, should be interested in determining whether his political ideal is compatible with a long-standing and deeply-rooted theological tradition, or must in some way distance itself from that tradition.

One initial obstacle in addressing such problems is the current and growing ambiguity of the term, »democracy«, itself. In recent times almost every kind of government, with the exception of an out-and-out dictatorship, has been self-styled as a »democracy«. Karl Marx in 1843 hailed communism as the harbinger of true democracy; and in recent decades various »people’s democracies«, »democratic republics«, etc., have sprung up which are a long way from what we in the »Western world« consider to be the essential standards for democracy. The fact that some of these systems have now implemented »democratization« processes to counteract the Marxist version of democracy only sends us back to the »drawing board« regarding the meaning of »democratization«: Does it require a free market? Are free elections the necessary and sufficient condition for democracy? Are constitutional »checks and balances« prerequisites for stable democracies? And so forth. Jacques Barzun observes that the common-denominator meaning of »democracy« seems to be that »the people should be sovereign, and [that] this popular sovereignty implies political and social equality.« But this is perhaps too general. For in actual practice there is of course perpetual conflict even in »democratic« systems between equality and freedom, and the »people« means something different now, in the aftermath of 19th century industrial revolutions and 20th century social revolutions than it did in former eras. Even in the 18th century there was considerable diffidence among political theorists concerning the value of democracy. Rousseau came to the conclusion that democratic full-participation after the model of the ancient Athenian polity was simply impossible in a large nation; and the fathers of the American constitution were so diffident about the term, »democracy«, that they insisted on more precisely characterizing the government they were founding as a »democratic republic«, not as a »democracy.« In our own world of nation-states, what is left over from the classical democracy of the Greek polis is that minimal residue of meaning which Jacques Barzun adumbrates: a very general and overly vague notion concerning the sovereignty of the people.

Hegel agreed substantially with Madison and Jefferson, as well as with Rousseau, Kant, and others: »Democracy« was an unwieldy and impractical notion in the modern world. But instead of leaning, like the others, towards a replacement and sublimation of democracy with the traditional ideal of a »republic«, Hegel advocated a more radical restructuring of the political ideal in terms of the essential notion of a free modern society, derived from the metaphysical basis of the speculative »Idea« (the idea of the reconciliation of opposites) developed in his *Logic*, and receiving fuller elaboration in his political philosophy. Ancient Greek democracy, according to Hegel, was the political zenith of an era of objective spirit in which it so happened that the wills of individual citizens were intrinsically intertwined with the objective will manifested in the polity. The citizens had no conscience or »morality« in our modern sense; but they had virtue and *Sittlichkeit*, which prevented disharmony. The injection of subjectivity – as exemplified by the anti-establishment comedies of Aristophanes and the iconoclastic philosophizing of Socrates – destroyed the Greek spirit, and likewise makes their kind of democracy impossible in our own times, which are characterized and keynoted by subjectivity.

Christianity, according to Hegel, renewed and intensified the question concerning subjectivity, with its emphasis on the worth of the individual and on the right of subjectivity to be satisfied and fulfilled. But Christianity also pointed the way to a solution, through its doctrine of the Incarnation. The Incarnation,
beyond the literal meaning of the advent of a man-God, was the symbol of the union of divine and human, subjective will and objective reality, freedom and nature, individual and community.5 The reconciliation of these opposites, and ultimately the reconciliation of God with himself, became, in Hegel’s estimation, the leading idea of the Christian community which perpetuated and perpetuates a communal reenactment of the death and resurrection of the man-god throughout history. Although the Christian church was not always or even generally a worthy instrument for the accomplishment of this ideal, it did serve as a pre-philosophical custodian of the synthesizing Absolute Idea, down through the centuries.

It is true, says Hegel, that under Roman Catholicism, the Church quickly began to appropriate for itself political power, as soon as it escaped from its second-class status under the Roman Empire. Then it began to build up a quasi-empire of its own, an »ecclesiastical Kingdom of God« which lorded it over secular authorities and secular existence, intermittently attempting to control the state either by force, or by inculcating a division into church-related and non-church-related political parties.6 Nevertheless, he points out, such political excesses were simply the manifestation of the imperfect development within Catholicism of the Christian idea, which instead of arising to freedom kept mankind in a kind of spiritual slavery, oriented towards the mere externals of spirituality under a pseudo-spiritual leadership imbued more with the secular spirit than with the spirit of God.7

But finally, Hegel tells us, with the advent of Protestantism, the Church awoke to its truly spiritual but essentially private calling. The vocation of the Church is, after all, something quite private — not »private« in the pejorative sense, i.e., in the way that Catholicism had been able to stand aloofly indifferent to countless abuses in the secular sphere;8 but private in the sense that the Church is a hidden source and divine springboard in the world for all authentic moral activity in the public sphere.9 For the inner kingdom of God, as conceived by Hegel, is a direct »vertical« relationship to the divine, the »horizontal« correlate to which is the state — that ultimate community, the ethical and juridical arena where alone divine freedom and truth can be fully realized and guaranteed.10

It is unfortunate that Charles Taylor, Emil Fackenheim and many other commentators on Hegel ignore the important function of religion in Hegel’s concept of the state. Hegel, like Kant, viewed politics as a derivation from, and extension of, the moral order; but Hegel went beyond Kant in basing the moral order in religion, and specifically, in the modern world, in Protestant Christianity.

In the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of the ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to see itself in its reasonableness and truth. In the Protestant state, the constitution and the code, as well as their several applications, embody the principle and the development of the moral life, which proceeds and can only proceed from the truth of religion.11

Protestantism was not only the foundation for moral and just interpersonal relations, but the indispensable means for building up the entire edifice of secular relations encapsulated in the state.12 Under Protestantism, according to Hegel, there was no longer any need for the cyclical but incessant alienated conflict between »church and state«: for Protestantism itself was the realization — albeit an abstract realization — of the final reconciliation of the political and the religious.13

One would think offhand that democracy would fare very well under the criterion of Hegel’s Absolute Idea. Does not democracy, even in Jacques Barzun’s common-denominator meaning, incorporate subjectivity to a high degree, and take steps to insure the representation of grassroots personhood in a fair manner at the highest levels of government? Yes, of course. But in Hegel’s mind democracy is only an imperfect step in the right direction. Hegel, no doubt thinking of Rousseau’s political philosophy, castigates democracy for offering just one more quantitative solution to the problem of the representation of subjectivity (in other words, instead of just one or a few subjectivities being represented, the majority of personhood-units being »represented« in democracy); and he disapproves of democracy also for inculcating a simplistic, mathematical idea of human equality — in contemporary terms, »one man, one vote.«14 But such a »solution«, in Hegel’s view, is incapable of dealing with the truly qualitative problems presented by subjectivity in the modern world. Democratic constitutions are in the final analysis overly cerebral constructions of spirit, depending on artificial devices like the »separation of powers« and »checks and balances« to stave off the self-destructiveness of what is essentially an unhealthy adversary relationship. And they aim at a utopian equality, which can only be reached in the spiritual realm, in the Kingdom of God, the inception of which is to be found on this earth in (Protestant) Christianity.15 In short, democracy is simply incapable of dealing
with the complexities of modern subjectivity, of guaranteeing the maximum qualitative representation of individuals who may be spiritually equal but manifest all manner of natural and material differences in any empirical society.

The solution in Hegel’s philosophy is the development of political relations in conformity to the speculative-dialectical «Idea» of the unity of opposites, which in politics translates into an intrinsic reconciliation of objective order and subjective aspiration, necessity and freedom, nature and spirit. In conformity to this Idea, the state should correspondingly be based and built up upon the various «natural» divisions of the subjectivities which compose it -- classes, «estates», unions and associations, as well as majorities, so that freedom can be shored up and perpetuated by being rooted in what is natural and inevitable. In accord with the same principles, Hegel, as is well-known, opted for a constitutional monarchy, in which the natural individuality and familial succession to the throne of the monarch would be coordinated with the spiritual excogitations of parliamentary government, as the final unifying device in a free society.

We should not be too hasty in dismissing Hegel’s royalist critique of democracy as reactionary and outdated. Although we may view the problem of the «coordination of nature and spirit» as a problem that only an adamant German idealist could think up and try to solve, there are situations frequently arising in the world’s democracies, in which we might wish for something very much like the bolstering of nature itself to prop up the institutions and policies excogitated by the rational spirits of incumbent governments. A believing Hegelian might want to compare the astounding stability and security through thick and thin of a constitutional monarchy like that in England with the instability and chaotic periodic successes of the parliamentary democracy in Italy; he might point with disdain at the frequent neglect of the business of governments like the U.S. for extended periods of time preceding elections in which the incumbent president is a candidate; and finally, he might top off his critique with smug comments about the quality of president that often results (no names, please) from all the interminable electoral processes. But one does not have to be a hypercritical monarchist to ask: would it not be a boon to any free, democratic society to bring in nature as an ever-present support of spirit through natural groupings and what Hegel designated as «corporations» -- municipalities, economic associations, professional groups, labor organizations, religious congregations, etc.? And might not Hegel be right at least in his general observation that the Protestant Church (and perhaps even a suitably protestantized Catholicism!) can and perhaps must be a spiritual ally of the state in fostering the concepts of individual freedom, personal morality and responsibility, and freedom of thought, which are important for building up a government based more on initiative from below than coercion from above?

On the other hand, Hegel’s position has important structural defects which even a critic of democracy should be aware of: For one thing, monarchy is a rather arbitrary way of uniting nature with freedom in political administration; and, as Theunissen points out, the monarch whose mission is to unite nature and spirit is playing the part of a Christ-figure in Hegel’s schema, a role which most monarchs even in Hegel’s time would presumably not consciously aspire to, let alone be capable of. It is also quite conceivable that other more satisfactory ways of «uniting nature and spirit» than monarchy could be devised with some minimal effort and ingenuity. For example, would not a meritocracy, requiring tests for aptitude, intelligence and experience as a prerequisite for being elected to the highest government offices, be a logical, albeit complicated, way of coordinating natural ability with the determinations of «spirit»? Or one could reasonably maintain, along with Alexis de Toqueville, that the perennial division in politics into conservative and liberal camps is not just an accident of history, but something natural and intrinsic to political systems -- a «natural» division whose recognition and institutionalization is a prerequisite for modern enlightened politics. But in a more fundamental sense can we not argue forcibly that democracy itself is precisely the sort of union of nature and spirit that someone like Hegel might be looking for, insofar as democracy joins the organizational forces of government with the sine qua non of voluntary initiative and participation by the governed (the sort of thing that erstwhile communist governments have belatedly been trying to inculcate by their «democratization» programs)? In a somewhat similar vein Hartmann suggests that Hegel could have elaborated a similarly sound idealistic political theory based on a republican rather than monarchical constitution. The real philosophical problem for Hegel and Hegelians, Hartmann points out, is to bring about a synthesis of the rational-speculative «Category» in Hegel’s system with anthropology. Such a synthesis would be neces-
sary in order to demonstrate just how the existential »communion« of the citizens can be conjoined with the reason and organicity emphasized in Hegel's system.20

But let us put aside for the moment questions about whether or not a democratic or republican government might be the best way, pacé Hegel, to bring about the ideal of a free society. Granted that a free society and a free state is an ideal that we share in common with Hegel, what is to be said about Hegel’s proposal for overcoming the counterproductive adversary relationship between religion and government which had characterized Catholic eras, with a new cooperative and complementary relationship? Should the relation of church and state be, in the aftermath of the benefits that have been derived from the separation of churches from each other,21 an »inseparable union«22 in the context of the Absolute Idea? We of course have considerable benefit from hindsight in answering that question. We know, for example, that the Protestantism whose spirit of freedom Hegel prized was no bulwark of individual freedom in Germany during the era of National Socialism. And Catholics can scarcely feel superior in this respect, since Catholics by and large also kept silence -- a German bishop achieving a last-minute »success« in preventing Pope Pius XI from nearly issuing a public warning against Hitler’s anti-semitism. But this is just one example. We in the latter part of the twentieth century have a sufficiently broad outlook on the history of close unions between politics and religion (whether Protestant, Catholic or non-Christian) to know that too close a relationship can be at least as deleterious, if not more so, than the opposite. In any case, it is obviously in the area of church-state relations that Hegel’s interpretation of the »Kingdom of God« becomes most crucial and foundational. And this is the subject on which our final attention should be focused.

In Protestantism for rather obvious reasons there has been a reluctance to accept the position of Augustine that the visible Church is the »present kingdom of God« preparing the way for the »end times«. To the Augustinian monk, Martin Luther, as well as to his religious successors, it was obvious that to associate the »kingdom of God« with the visible church would be to forfeit the possibility of reform and to compromise with the prevailing virulent abuses of religion and religious authority. Hegel as a convinced Lutheran was likewise unwilling to designate the locus of spiritual freedom in any visible organization, and in particular in the Catholic Church, which, Hegel observes, although experiencing a thrust toward democracy in the traditional processes of electing the Pope, had become by and large a bastion of aristocratic conservatism through the power of priestly consecration. A church with a spiritual elite standing far above the secular world could never be an appropriate vehicle for, or perpetuator of, »infinite« freedom, i.e. concrete rather than abstract self-determination in the world and in secular society. Hegel did, however, agree with Augustine in the now extremely controversial opinion (among theologians) that the Church is the present Kingdom of God.23 And for Hegel this presence is, so to speak, at the center of social and public life:

The church is the kingdom of God, the achieved presence, life, preservation, and enjoyment of the Spirit [...]. Family, property, temporal concerns arise of themselves, [and in turn give rise to] laws and governance; and all that is needed is that out of the womb of the church there be formed a free life, <a civil and political life, stemming from eternal principles, <a rational, worldly kingdom in accord with the idea of freedom and the absolute character of rights. With what is legal, rational, and universal belonging in this way to the worldly sphere, there remains to the church the salvation of individual souls -- [the sphere of] particular subjectivity; the worldly universal becomes its own affair.>24

Hegel’s position has elicited considerable criticism for its overly facile identification of present and eschaton, secular and sacred.25 Ironically, it is now the German theologians who seem to argue most forcibly against any neo-Hegelian attempt to locate the Gospel idea of the »Kingdom of God« -- which seems to them to refer textually to some future event -- in the temporally extant Church or in any present institution or phenomenon in the world. But Hegel also poses a problem for theologians and practitioners of political theology: If the Kingdom of God is present but not to be identified with any visible church, then in what sense is it indeed present? And where? Hegel answers this question quite straightforwardly in the passage just cited: It is located in the inner sanctum of subjectivity, a reservoir of spiritual resources springing up from private depths and quietly transforming public life and political relationships. How does it do this? Not by church activity or liturgy, not by lobbying for religious causes or attempts at conversion, but simply by producing an everyday reconciliation of the spiritual and the secular in ordinary life by means of individuals
who have already brought about a foundational reconciliation of the spiritual and the secular within their own personality. All in all, we find in Hegel a decisive and concerted effort to counterbalance what he considered to be the rampant alienations found in the history of the relationship of the Christian religion to the world. But does he not go too far in the other direction?

It should be remembered that Hegel was not only a product of his time, but also thought a philosopher had no choice but to be a product of his time; and presumably was also quite satisfied with this limitation on one's philosophizing. But if philosophers are indeed products of their own time, we in our time at least have the benefit of an extra century-and-a-half of history -- a history which includes the phenomena of compliant Christians under Nazism, a largely cooperative Orthodox Church under Bolshevism, nationalistic Protestantism and Catholicism in Ireland, militant politicized Islam in Iran, etc. The unavoidable conclusion for one objectively surveying the empirical past since Hegel's era would simply have to be that too great a unity (even non-institutional) between church and state is as great a mistake as institutionalized conflict or jockeying for power between churchmen and statesmen.

European theologians, perhaps influenced by the flawed history of attempts to erect the Kingdom of God, and its corresponding «Reichs», on earth, have by and large adopted an eschatological interpretation of the Kingdom. European commentators, following the lead of Albert Schweitzer and others, tend towards «consistent eschatology» -- the idea that all Gospel references to the »kingdom« have to be understood as references to a future coming. The Kingdom is something to be attained at the »end time«, through the intervention of God, certainly not something to be produced in neo-Pelagian fashion by initiatives and organization on the part of the church. American theologians in contrast have until recently tended towards »realized eschatology« -- the notion that the Kingdom of God came with the coming of Christ, with the spiritual power that Christ in his life manifested over the forces of evil. Some theologians have tried to combine both positions -- future and present eschatology -- without contradiction. But the general picture we are presented with in theology is one of continuing controversy.

The problem of defining the appropriate relationship of church and state may be most formidable for Protestant theologians. For, on the one hand, scandals in the visible church were the springboard for Protestantism in the first place; on the other, a strictly invisible, strictly private church, if it has anything to do with the inauguration of a Kingdom of God on earth, must, it would seem, have to do so, by default as it were, in and through the most formidable earthly power, the state. If the church is construed as in some sense a visible organization, and not just as a plurality of sects and denominations all of which may be true or false propagators of Christianity, then there still is, of course, the problem of distancing and clearly differentiating it (the »one true reformed church«) from that ancient and clearly visible organization whose perceived abuses gave rise to Protestantism in the first place.

Since it is just possible that Hegel may have been right in his contention that philosophers can say nothing reliable about the future, I will abstain from prophecy and simply conclude here by cautiously pointing to two current developments, one in religion and the other in politics, that, in a sense -- which I will adumbrate at the end -- receive clarification and perhaps justification from past history:

1) In religion, the ecumenical movement: This movement over the last few decades has been primarily concerned with reuniting Catholics, Protestant and orthodox Christians, although its ultimate objective may be to unite all major world religions. If this movement is indeed successful in bridging the differences between Christians, a corollary result would seem to be that it will help obviate that nagging traditional problem, just alluded to above, about whether the Kingdom of God can be connected with any present and visible church or not. For the »visible« church would be the single, reunited consortium of Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox churches, no longer needing to appeal to some »invisible« church over and above some formidable visible ecclesial organization deemed no longer worthy of the title of »Christian.«

2) In politics, international federative movements: It would seem that the main movements of interest in this respect are the current movement towards European federation, supported by François Mitterand and Helmut Kohl and other European leaders; but also the ongoing development of the movement towards confederation in the United Nations, which we tend to take for granted. This latter process, which is becoming more and more pluralistic with the access to representation of various third-world countries, not only runs parallel to the ecumenical movement but seems to be complementary, although manifesting and eliciting still unresolved clashes of opinion regarding political ideology and the nature of »democracy«.
It goes without saying that both of these contemporary developments would jar Hegel, who could never envision or countenance any rapprochement between Catholics and Protestants, let alone Orthodox; and who, pace Kant, could find nothing admirable or even rational in the idea of some international federation transcending the nation-state. But, as I will now show, such developments would in a sense seem to be higher or »sublated« developments of a past stage -- the sort of development that Hegel characteristically extolled.

A recent book by William Everett, God's Federal Republic, advocates a change of political-theological symbolism from »kingdom« to »republican federation«, in the interests of both Christianity and of democracy. Everett's thesis seems at first blush to be of a rather utilitarian stripe (»what sort of combination of political and theological interpretations would be most useful?«). But there is more than utilitarian appeal in Everett's thesis. We must take into consideration the fact that the earliest interpretation of the idea of the Kingdom of God was the ancient Hebrew confederation of twelve tribes under the leadership of God alone, a political structuring which was primordially democratic, since it included elections, processes for dismissal of incompetent or irresponsible leaders, guarantees of individual rights, and other features which we in our day consider to be intrinsic to democratic constitutions. In view of the practices of the ancient Hebrews, Everett was possibly wrong in arguing so strenuously that we must change the dominant religious-political symbol from kingdom to federation. If indeed the »Kingdom of God« for Moses and Joshua and Gideon meant unambiguously a confederation under God as king, rather than the theocratic Hebrew kingdom which was later inaugurated over the protests of the judge-and-prophet Samuel, Everett should opt more consistently for a return to the original idea of the Kingdom.

The reason why the ancient Hebrews felt impelled to abandon confederation for kingdom was that they concluded that confederative unity was not strong enough to offer defense against threats from foreign forces. If they had been able to forge a stronger union for consolidation and defense by moving from confederation to federation, as did the American colonies in the 18th century, this would perhaps have alleviated some of the endemic problems in succeeding centuries regarding the proper interpretation of the »Kingdom of God«. But such a solution was not available or even conceivable at that time.

Hegel's vision of a quasi-organic quasi-liberal state as the ultimate citadel of freedom prevented him from giving serious consideration to the excessively Kantian idea of international federation; and his interpretation of Lutheran Christianity as involving a strictly spiritual, private, individual presence of the »kingdom of God« made it unnecessary for him to attach great importance to a visible organizational unity of Christians. But if the vision of past history that we now have were available to him, and if he had taken into account the earliest developments of the idea of a »kingdom of God«, perhaps his much-celebrated »Owl of Minerva«, whose wisdom beams forth only at the end of the long day, would have led him to a different conclusion.

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NOTES

1 My thanks to the Bradley Institute for Democracy and Public Values for a grant which made possible the writing of this paper.
4 Werke, 7:233.
5 Werke 19:509-10.
7 Werke, 10:356-7; 17:331.
8 Werke, 16:241-4.
9 Werke, 10:365.
16 See Klaus HARTMANN Die Marxscbe Theorie: Eine Philosophische Untersuchung zu den Hauptschrif-
17 Werke, 7:417.
18 See THEUNISSEN, Hegels Lehre..., p. 447.
20 Ibid., pp. 577-8.
21 Werke, 7:428.
22 Werke, 10:356.
25 See e.g. THEUNISSEN, Hegels Lehre..., p. 441.
27 Werke, 7:500.