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A Reconstruction of Bernard Lonergan's 1947-48 Course On Grace, Part 2

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A RECONSTRUCTION OF
BERNARD LONERGAN'S
1947-48 COURSE ON GRACE, PART 2

*Reconstruction by Robert M. Doran,
working from notes taken by
Frederick Crowe and William Stewart**

Editor's Introduction: As noted at the end of part 1 of this reconstruction, Lonergan moved on quite early in the course from commenting on Charles Boyer's text *Tractatus de Gratia Divina*. Boyer had moved next to a treatment of the necessity of grace. Lonergan indicated that it is better to treat first the question, Just what precisely is grace? He answers this question in the form of nineteen propositions consisting almost entirely of a presentation of biblical doctrine on the point, with abundant references and quotations and attempts to respond to Reformation positions. Other propositions follow these nineteen, with the total eventually coming to fifty-four, but these further propositions represent efforts at a systematic understanding of the biblical doctrine. These systematic propositions are preceded by a lengthy treatment in English of "primitive notions." The treatment of these notions, lengthy as it is, culminates in the methodological principle of contingent predication, which seems to be the principal purpose of this interruption. This is perhaps Lonergan's most extensive treatment of the reasoning behind his understanding of the position on contingent predication or extrinsic denomination.

*The main body of the text is Lonergan's as reported on by Crowe and Stewart. The latter two are remarkably in agreement on almost everything. If there is a difference, I made the decision as to which one to accept and have indicated why. Commentary on my part is relegated to the footnotes and to comments in the body prefaced by "Editor." There is no commentary by the note takers, and there is no other commentary by me in the main body of the text.

The notes of William Stewart and Frederick Crowe, on which we are relying for this reconstruction, indicate that Lonergan changed the order of the propositions from that found in 16000DTL040, putting what there were propositions 12, 13, and 14 at the very beginning of the revised list. These first three propositions have to do with the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

The numbering of our sections begins with 10, since we ended the first part of the reconstruction with section 9.

10. The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit

10.1 Proposition 1: *The Holy Spirit, not just his created gift, is really given.*¹

Lonergan's first proposition is put in the form of a question, but then the question is answered affirmatively. The question is "*Utrum ipse Spiritus Sanctus datur et non tantum donum eius creatum,*" "Whether the Holy Spirit himself is given and not just his created gift." It is *de fide divina* (from scripture) *et catholica* (from tradition) that the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit is given to us. Appeal is made to Romans 5:5, where, Lonergan insists, *pneuma* refers to the Holy Spirit, not to a principle internal to us. Something of God is poured forth in us.

Scriptural references are given to support the proposition.²

Romans 8:9-11: "But you are not in the flesh; you are in the Spirit, since the Spirit of God really dwells in you. Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him. But if Christ is in you, although the body is dead because of sin, the spirit is life because of righteousness. If the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Jesus from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also through his Spirit which dwells in you." See verses 15-16: "When we cry, 'Abba! Father!' it is that very Spirit bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God."

1 Corinthians 6:19: "Do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, which you have from God?"

1 Corinthians 3:16: "Do you not know that you are God's temple and that God's Spirit dwells in you?"

Galatians 4:6: "And because you are children, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, 'Abba! Father!'"

¹In 16000DTL040 this is proposition 12.

²Scripture quotations are taken from the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV).

Ephesians 1:13: "In him you also, when you had heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation, and had believed in him, were marked with the seal of the promised Holy Spirit.:

Ephesians 4:30: "And do not grieve the Holy Spirit of God, with which you were marked with a seal for the day of redemption."

Ephesians 5:18: "... but be filled with the Spirit ..."

1 Thessalonians 4:8: "Therefore whoever rejects this rejects not human authority but God, who also gives his Holy Spirit to you."

John 14:16-17: "And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Advocate, to be with you forever. This is the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it neither sees him nor knows him. You know him, because he abides with you, and he will be in you."

Lonergan indicates patristic references by referring to M. J. Rouët de Journel, *Enchiridion patristicum* (Friburgi Brisgoviae, B. Herder, 1922) series 357.

10.2 Proposition 2: *The Holy Spirit is given in every instance of justification.*³

This proposition is also put in the form of a question that then is given an affirmative answer: "Utrum Spiritus Sanctus datur in omni iustificatione," "Whether the Holy Spirit is given in all instances of justification." Lonergan takes issue with those (Ostwald, Karl Adam) who would say that the Holy Spirit is given only *dynamice* in baptism and *substantialiter* in confirmation, and with those (Petavius and others) who would say the uncreated gift is not given in the Old Testament. Romans 8:9 and 5:5 (see above) are again appealed to. The earlier Fathers are ambiguous on the question, but not the later Fathers.

As for Romans 8:9, "Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him": Whoever does not belong to Christ is not justified. But whoever does not have the Holy Spirit does not belong to Christ. Therefore, whoever does not have the Holy Spirit is not justified. *Ad maiorem*: All justification is through Christ, and whoever is justified through Christ belongs to Christ. *Ad minorem*: from the text of Romans 8:9.

As for Romans 5:5: All the just and only the just have charity. But from the text charity is had through the gift of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, all the just and only the just have the gift of the Holy Spirit.

³In 16000DTL040 this is proposition 13.

10.3 Proposition 3: *The Father and the Son come when the Holy Spirit is given.*⁴

Proposition 3 reads: "Utrum Pater et Filius veniunt ubi datur Spiritus Sanctus," "Whether the Father and the Son come when the Holy Spirit is given." John 14:23, "We will come to them." Where there is charity, there is justification. Where there is charity, there the Father and Son are. 2 Corinthians 6:19, "We are the temple of the living God." The living God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Commonly theologians have said the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is by appropriation, with no real distinction from the indwelling of Father and Son.⁵

11. Faith and Justification

The next four propositions have to do with the relation between faith and justification, all in the context of disputes with Reformation positions.

11.1 Proposition 4: *We are not justified by faith alone.*⁶

This is *de fide definita*, against Protestant doctrine. Scriptural passages are offered in support.

James 2:14-26, where it is said twice (Stewart says "ter," three times) that "faith without works is dead."

⁴In 16000DTL040 this is proposition 14.

⁵Lonergan does not take this up further here. At this point in the 1947-48 course he had not worked out just how the Holy Spirit is given, that is, as the term of a relation. That solution came to him while he was teaching this course, as we will see below. If the Holy Spirit is given as the term of a relation, then the Father and the Son can also 'come' as terms of an opposed relation. The network of the created relations is a created analogue of the network of divine uncreated relations: a position Lonergan approaches in this course but does not quite reach. Hanging over this entire discussion is Pius XII's stricture that all things must be held to be common to the three divine persons inasmuch as they relate to God as their efficient cause. Later in this treatise Lonergan will write, 'This statement perhaps leaves a certain latitude when God is not considered as an efficient principle but as a constitutive principle.' But as we will see, it was only in the course of teaching this material that he came to grasp this, changing one of his own propositions as a result. Furthermore, he is more prepared to speak of distinct relations to each of the divine persons when he takes up these questions again in 1951-52. For the reference, see below, note 17. For further comments, see Robert M. Doran, *The Trinity in History: A Theology of the Divine Missions*, vol. 1: *Missions and Processions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 26-27. And for the question of whether the gift of the Holy Spirit is by appropriation, see below, page 56. The position there presented seems to be something that Lonergan worked out as he taught the course.

⁶In 16000DTL040 this is proposition 1.

Galatians 5:6: "For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision counts for anything; the only thing that counts is faith working through love." 1 Corinthians 13:2: "... and if I have all faith, so as to remove mountains, but have not love, I am nothing."

11.2 Proposition 5: We are disposed to justification through faith and the acts of the other virtues.⁷

The entire argument consists simply of references to scripture.

Romans 3:28-30: "For we hold that a person is justified by faith apart from works prescribed by the law. Or is God the God of Jews only? Is he not the God of Gentiles also? Yes, of Gentiles also, since God is one; and he will justify the circumcised on the ground of their faith and the uncircumcised through that same faith."

Romans 5:2: "Through [him] we have obtained access [by faith] to this grace in which we stand ..." [Editor's note: "by faith" is not in all manuscripts].

Galatians 3:8: "And the scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the Gentiles by faith, declared the gospel beforehand to Abraham ..."

Galatians 3:24: "Therefore the law was our disciplinarian until Christ came, that we might be justified by faith."

Philippians 3:9: "... and be found in him, not having a righteousness of my own that comes from the law, but one that comes through faith in Christ ..."

Luke 7:47 and 13:3 speak of love and of repentance, which signifies an interior change.

11.3 Proposition 6: Holy Scripture both praises trust [Lutheran "fiducia," confidence] and yet steers us away from vain trust.⁸

Laudat (praises): the parable of the prodigal son, Luke 15:11-32.

Matthew 9:2: "... when Jesus saw their faith he said to the paralytic, "Take heart, son; your sins are forgiven.'" See also Mark 2:5.

But Philippians 2: "... work out your own salvation with fear and trembling."

⁷In 16000DTL040 this is proposition 2.

⁸In 16000DTL040 this is proposition 3.

2 Peter 1:10: "Therefore, brothers and sisters, be all the more eager to confirm your call and election, for if you do this, you will never stumble."

*11.4 Proposition 7: The faith that disposes us to justification is dogmatic faith.*⁹

Dogmatic faith is that of which we hear in Vatican I: "qua credimus vera esse revelata," "by which we believe that what has been revealed is true." Appeal is made to DB 798, 802, 822-24, and to the following scriptural passages.

Romans 1:16: "For I am not ashamed of the gospel; it is the power of God for salvation to everyone who has faith . . ."

Romans 10: ". . . and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead . . ."

Hebrews 11:6: "And without faith it is impossible to please God, for whoever would approach him must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him."

Mark 16:15-16: "Go into all the world and proclaim the good news to the whole creation. The one who believes and is baptized will be saved . . ."

John 20:31: ". . . so that you may come to believe that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God, and that through believing you may have life in his name." Scripture nowhere teaches *fides fiducialis* in the Lutheran sense of being justified because you believe you are justified.

12. What Is Justification?

A new section begins: *De Iustificatione, Quid Sit*. It comprises the next seven propositions (8-14).

*12.1 Proposition 8: God is just, beyond the measure of human judgment.*¹⁰

Isaiah 55:8-9: "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, nor are your ways my ways, says the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts."

Romans 11:30-36, esp. 33-35: "O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how

⁹In 16000DTL040 this is proposition 4.

¹⁰In 16000DTL040 this is proposition 5.

inscrutable his ways! "O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! For who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been his counselor? Or who has given a gift to him, to receive a gift in return?"

Romans 9:14-15: "What then are we to say? Is there injustice on God's part? By no means! For he says to Moses, "I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion." So it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God who shows mercy.'

12.2 Proposition 9: True justice and holiness are according to divine norms revealed to us through Christ.¹¹

Matthew 5:48: "Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect."

Ephesians 4:30-5:2: "And do not grieve the Holy Spirit of God, with which you were marked with a seal for the day of redemption. Put away from you all bitterness and wrath and anger and wrangling and slander, together with all malice, and be kind to one another, tenderhearted, forgiving one another, as God in Christ has forgiven you. Therefore be imitators of God, as beloved children, and live in love, as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us, a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God."

John 15:12: "This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you."

John 13:15: "For I have set you an example, that you also should do as I have done to you."

1 Peter 2:20-25: "If you endure when you are beaten for doing wrong, what credit is that? But if you endure when you do right and suffer for it, you have God's approval. For to this you have been called, because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, so that you should follow in his steps. He committed no sin, and no deceit was found in his mouth. When he was abused, he did not return abuse; when he suffered, he did not threaten; but he entrusted himself to the one who judges justly. He himself bore our sins in his body on the tree, so that, free from sins, we might live for righteousness; by his wounds you have been healed. For you were going astray like sheep, but now you have returned to the shepherd and guardian of your souls.'

Philippians 2:5, special emphasis on "that was in Christ Jesus."

¹¹In 16000DTL040 this is proposition 6.

Hebrews 12:1-5ff., with emphasis on "looking to Jesus the pioneer and perfecter of our faith, who for the sake of the joy that was set before him endured the cross, disregarding its shame, and has taken his seat at the right hand of the throne of God.'

1 Corinthians 11:1: "Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ."

1 Corinthians 4:16: "I appeal to you, then, be imitators of me."

Philippians 3:17: "Brothers and sisters, join in imitating me, and observe those who live according to the example you have in us."

1 Thessalonians 1:6: "And you became imitators of us and of the Lord, for in spite of persecution you received the word with joy inspired by the Holy Spirit."

1 Corinthians 1:18-31: "For the message about the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God. For it is written, 'I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the discernment of the discerning I will thwart.' Where is the one who is wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For since, in the wisdom of God, the world did not know God through wisdom, God decided, through the foolishness of our proclamation, to save those who believe. For Jews demand signs and Greeks seek wisdom, but we proclaim Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, but to those who are the called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. For God's foolishness is wiser than human wisdom, and God's weakness is stronger than human strength.

"Consider your own call, brothers and sisters; not many of you were wise by human standards, not many were powerful, not many were of noble birth. But God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise; God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong; God chose what is low and despised in the world, things that are not, to reduce to nothing things that are, so that no one might boast in the presence of God. He is the source of your life in Christ Jesus, who became for us wisdom from God, and righteousness and sanctification and redemption, in order that, as it is written, 'Let the one who boasts, boast in the Lord.'"

1 Corinthians 2:9-16: "But, as it is written, 'What no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived, what God has prepared for those who love him' – these things God has revealed to us through the Spirit; for the Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God. For what human

being knows what is truly human except the human spirit that is within? So also no one comprehends what is truly God's except the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit that is from God, so that we might understand the gifts bestowed on us by God. And we speak of these things in words not taught by human wisdom but taught by the Spirit, interpreting spiritual things to those who are spiritual.

"Those who are unspiritual do not receive the gifts of God's Spirit, for they are foolishness to them, and they are unable to understand them because they are spiritually discerned. Those who are spiritual discern all things, and they are themselves subject to no one else's scrutiny. 'For who has known the mind of the Lord so as to instruct him?' But we have the mind of Christ."

Colossians 3 in its entirety: on the imitation of Christ.

Colossians 1:28: "It is he whom we proclaim, warning everyone and teaching everyone in all wisdom, so that we may present everyone mature in Christ."

Colossians 2:6: "As you, therefore, have received Christ Jesus the Lord, continue to live your lives in him."

Colossians 2:20: "If with Christ you died to the elemental spirits of the universe, why do you live as if you still belonged to the world?"

Ephesians 2:10: "For we are what he has made us, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand to be our way of life."

Ephesians 3:6: "... the Gentiles have become fellow heirs, members of the same body, and sharers in the promise in Christ Jesus through the gospel."

Ephesians 3:19-21: "... and to know the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge, so that you may be filled with all the fullness of God.

"Now to him who by the power at work within us is able to accomplish abundantly far more than all that we can ask or imagine, to him be glory in the church and in Christ Jesus to all generations, forever and ever. Amen."

Ephesians 4:16: "... from whom the whole body, joined and knit together by every ligament with which it is supplied, as each part is working properly, promotes the body's growth in building itself up in love."

Ephesians 4:20-24: "That is not the way you learned Christ! For surely you have heard about him and were taught in him, as truth is in Jesus. You were taught to put away your former way of life, your old self, corrupt and deluded by its lusts, and to be renewed in the spirit of your minds, and

clothe yourselves with the new self, created according to the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness."

Ephesians 5:1: "Therefore be imitators of God, as beloved children."

Galatians 2:19-20: "For through the law I died to the law, so that I might live to God. I have been crucified with Christ; and it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me. And the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me."

Galatians 3:25-29: "But now that faith has come, we are no longer subject to a disciplinarian, for in Christ Jesus you are all children of God through faith. As many of you as were baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ. There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus. And if you belong to Christ, then you are Abraham's offspring, heirs according to the promise."

Galatians 4:19: "My little children, for whom I am again in the pain of childbirth until Christ is formed in you . . ."

Romans 6:3-4: "Do you not know that all of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death? Therefore we have been buried with him by baptism into death, so that, just as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, we too might walk in newness of life."

Romans 8:17: "and if children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ – if, in fact, we suffer with him so that we may also be glorified with him."

Romans 14:7-8: "We do not live to ourselves, and we do not die to ourselves. If we live, we live to the Lord, and if we die, we die to the Lord; so then, whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's."

Philippians 3:7: "Yet whatever gains I had, these I have come to regard as loss because of Christ. More than that, I regard everything as loss because of the surpassing value of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord."

*12.3 Proposition 10: True justice and holiness belong to the new man, who is created according to God; thus this justice before God is not from the law or from the works of the law or from human testimony whether external or internal, but through the gospel and faith.*¹²

Ephesians 4:24: "created according to the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness."

¹²In 16000DTL040 this is proposition 7.

Galatians 2: "... if justification comes through the law, then Christ died for nothing."

Romans 3:20: "For 'no human being will be justified in his sight' by deeds prescribed by the law, for through the law comes the knowledge of sin."

Romans 3:28: "For we hold that a person is justified by faith apart from works prescribed by the law."

Romans 10:3: "For, being ignorant of the righteousness that comes from God, and seeking to establish their own, they have not submitted to God's righteousness."

1 Corinthians 4:3-4: "But with me it is a very small thing that I should be judged by you or by any human court. I do not even judge myself. I am not aware of anything against myself, but I am not thereby acquitted. It is the Lord who judges me."

Romans 1:16-17: "For I am not ashamed of the gospel; it is the power of God for salvation to everyone who has faith, to the Jew first and also to the Greek. For in it the righteousness of God is revealed through faith for faith; as it is written, 'The one who is righteous will live by faith.'"

Romans 3:21-22: "But now, apart from law, the righteousness of God has been disclosed, and is attested by the law and the prophets, the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ for all who believe."

Romans 9:30-31: "What then are we to say? Gentiles, who did not strive for righteousness, have attained it, that is, righteousness through faith; but Israel, who strove for the righteousness that is based on the law, did not succeed in fulfilling that law."

*12.4 Proposition 11: This justice before God is also from God, and grace for the sake of redemption in Jesus Christ is conferred on those who believe and are baptized.*¹³

Philippians 3:4-12: a distinction between justification from the law and another justification from God.

Titus 3:4ff.: not from works but in virtue of his own mercy.

Romans 3:24ff.: justified by grace as a gift, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus . . . for him who has faith in Jesus.

Romans 5:12-21: "much more . . . by one man's obedience."

¹³In 16000DTL040 this is proposition 8.

12.5 Proposition 12: *This justice and holiness before God (1) can be lost and indeed (2) by every mortal sin and (3) by mortal sin alone.*¹⁴

The first part is against Calvin, for whom justice once had can never be lost. The second is against Luther, for whom fiducial faith gives justice, so that it is lost only if one loses trust in God, but by no other sin, however terrible.

- (1) That it can be lost is *De fide*, DB 805-807, 833. See also 839. Romans 11:22: "severity toward those who have fallen . . . otherwise you also will be cut off."

1 Corinthians 9:27: "I punish my body and enslave it, so that after proclaiming to others I myself should not be disqualified."

1 Corinthians 10:12: "So if you think you are standing, watch out that you do not fall."

Revelation 3:11: ". . . hold fast to what you have, so that no one may seize your crown."

Fathers: *Enchiridion patristicum*, series 365 – 2.

- (2) That it is lost with every mortal sin is *De fide*, DB 808. See also 837, 862.

1 Corinthians 6:9: "Do you not know that wrongdoers will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived!"

Galatians 5:19-21: the works of the flesh.

Ephesians 5:5: ". . . no fornicator or impure person, or one who is greedy (that is, an idolater) has any inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God."

Revelation 21:8: A list – "their place will be in the lake that burns with fire and sulfur, which is the second death."

Romans 2:13: "For it is not the hearers of the law but the doers of the law who are righteous in God's sight."

Romans 2:5: "by your hard and impenitent heart you are storing up wrath for yourself on the day of wrath . . ."

James 1: "then, when that desire has conceived, it gives birth to sin, and sin, when it is fully grown, gives birth to death."

James 1:22: "But be doers of the word, and not merely hearers who deceive themselves."

Fathers: *Enchiridion patristicum*, series 364.

¹⁴In 16000DTL040 this is proposition 9.

(3) Only by mortal sin – Trent DB 804. See also 899.

Matthew 6:12: "Forgive us our trespasses" is said by all, even the just. Thus the just have sins.

12.6 Proposition 13: This justice and holiness before God can grow and should, through observance of the commandments and conformity with Christ Jesus, nor are they perfectly grasped before we arrive at the resurrection and receive the crown from the just judge.¹⁵

(1) They can and should grow. Trent: DB 803, with texts of scripture. Justice is greater in some than in others. See DB 799 toward the end.

(2) through observance of the commandments: DB 804. Texts of scripture found there. Romans 2:13 – Be doers, not just hearers. James 1:22, same.

(3) through conformity with Christ Jesus. See everything in proposition 2 above. Romans 8:28-30: to be conformed to the image of his Son.

(4) not perfectly grasped before . . . Philippians 3:9-14: pressing on, et cetera. Romans 8:35: shows Paul's great charity, but not yet accomplished.

1 Corinthians 9:24-27: Run that you may obtain the prize.

2 Corinthians 6:4-10: still laboring.

Romans 8:23: groaning inwardly.

(5) from the just judge. 2 Corinthians 5:10: we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ.

Romans 2:6: he will render to everyone according to their works.

Matthew 25:31-64, clear.

12.7 Proposition 14: In justification our sins are wiped away.¹⁶

Sin is (1) offense against God; (2) transgression of the divine law; (3) aversion from God, conversion to creatures.

act: the transgression itself, the offense itself actually existing here and now, the act of turning away from God . . . ;

¹⁵In 16000DTL040 this is proposition 10.

¹⁶In 16000DTL040 this is proposition 11.

guilt: subsequent status, by which one is guilty of the act already performed. Guilt of fault: the state of one who is already turned away from God. Guilt of fault is the state itself; it is liable to punishment, the evil that is deserved.

In the thesis, we are dealing with guilt of fault.

The thesis is posited against the Protestants, especially Lutherans, who said that sins were not wiped away but only not imputed to us.

The thesis is *de fide*, defined at Trent – DB 792, 799.

Romans 5:19. One man's disobedience; by one man's obedience many constituted just, not imputed.

Acts 3:19: sins blotted out. Many metaphors are used for sins being taken away, washed, cleansed. John 1:29, 1 Corinthians 6:11, Romans 6:4-11.

Fathers – *Enchiridion patristicum*, series 355, 75.

13. The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit

The next set of propositions turns again to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. And now the numbering matches that found in 16000DTL040.

13.1 Proposition 15: Through the Holy Spirit we are made in justification living members of Christ.

The justified person is a living member of Christ. DB 809, 842. "De corpore Christi mystico," Pius XII, AAS, vol. 35, 1943, 193ff.

- (1) New life in Christ. John 15:1ff., vine and branches.
- (2) The Mystical Body of Christ. 1 Corinthians 12:12-29 (one body with many members).

Romans 12:2-4: "For as in one body we have many members, and not all the members have the same function, so we, who are many, are one body in Christ, and individually we are members one of another."

1 Corinthians 6:15, 19: "Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? . . . Or do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, which you have from God, and that you are not your own?"

Galatians 3:27-28: "As many of you as were baptized into Christ

have clothed yourselves with Christ. There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus."

Romans 6 passim.

(3) The relation between the Holy Spirit and the Body of Christ.

Romans 8:8-11: "... those who are in the flesh cannot please God. But you are not in the flesh; you are in the Spirit, since the Spirit of God dwells in you. Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him. But if Christ is in you, though the body is dead because of sin, the Spirit is life because of righteousness. If the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also through his Spirit that dwells in you." And verse 14: "For all who are led by the Spirit of God are children of God."

Galatians 5:16-25: "Live by the Spirit, I say, and do not gratify the desires of the flesh. For what the flesh desires is opposed to the Spirit and what the Spirit desires is opposed to the flesh; for these are opposed to each other, to prevent you from doing what you want. But if you are led by the Spirit, you are not subject to the law. Now the works of the flesh are obvious (then lists them and by contrast, the fruit of the Spirit).

(4) The Holy Spirit is the common principle of all the members.

2 Corinthians 13:13: "... and the communion of the Holy Spirit be with all of you." Koinōnia = sharing, fellowship, common possession of Holy Spirit.

Almost the entire letter to the Ephesians, to chapter 5, and especially chapter 2 (and chapter 4).

Also, Colossians 1:9-23, 2:6 – 3:17.

Cf. Prat, "Theol. de S. Paul," note M at the end of vol. 2 (479).

Fathers: Tromp: in the series "Textus et Documenta."¹⁷

¹⁷See Bernard Lonergan, "Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace," in *Early Latin Theology*, vol. 19 of the *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*, trans. Michael G. Shields and ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011) 605: "Prat, *La théologie de saint Paul*, deuxième partie, note m, 479-80 [*The Theology of Saint Paul*, vol. 2, note m, 394-95]: 'in Christ, in the Spirit,' when are they equivalent? Sebastian Tromp, *De Spiritu Sancto anima corporis mystici: Testimonia selecta e patribus Graecis. Textus et documenta, Series theologica 1* (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1932). *De Spiritu Sancto anima corporis mystici: Testimonia selecta e partibus Latinis. Textus et documenta, Series theologica 7* (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1932)."

13.2 Proposition 16: In justification we are spiritually reborn of God into a new person, a new creation, to walk in newness of life.

Theological note: De fide definita (from scripture) et catholica (DB 799-800.)

Part 1: On rebirth

John 1:13: "who were born, not of blood or of the will of the flesh or of the will of man, but of God."

John 3: "... no one can enter the kingdom of God without being born of water and Spirit. What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the Spirit is spirit."

1 John 2:29: "... everyone who does right has been born of him."

1 John 3:9: "Those who have been born of God do not sin, because God's seed abides in them; they cannot sin, because they have been born of God."

1 John 4:7: "everyone who loves is born of God and knows God."

1 John 5:1: "Everyone who believes that Jesus is the Christ has been born of God ..."

1 John 5:4: "whatever is born of God conquers the world."

1 John 5:18: "We know that those who are born of God do not sin, but the one who was born of God protects them, and the evil one does not touch them."

1 Peter 1:3: "By his great mercy he has given us a new birth into a living hope through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead."

1 Peter 1:23: "You have been born anew, not of perishable but of imperishable seed, through the living and enduring word of God."

Part 2: Into a new person, a new creation, to walk in newness of life

1 John 3:9: see above.

1 John 5:18: see above.

Romans 6:4: "... so that, just as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we too might walk in newness of life."

Romans 6:6: "We know that our old self was crucified with him so that the body of sin might be destroyed, and we might no longer be enslaved to sin."

Romans 6:10: "The death he died, he died to sin, once for all; but the life he lives, he lives to God."

Romans 6:11-14: "So you also must consider yourselves dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus."

Romans 6:16-23: from slaves of sin to slaves of righteousness,

Ephesians 4:17 to end of chapter, see verse 24: "and to clothe yourselves with the new self, created according to the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness."

Colossians 3:1-17, see 9-11: "Do not lie to one another, seeing that you have stripped off the old self with its practices and have clothed yourselves with the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge according to the image of its creator. In that renewal there is no longer Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave and free; but Christ is all and in all!"

Galatians 3:27: "As many of you as were baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ."

Galatians 6:15: "For neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is anything; but a new creation is everything!"

2 Corinthians 5:17: "So if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; see, everything has become new!"

James 1:18: "he gave us birth by the word of truth, so that we would Fathers: *Enchiridion patristicum*, series 356.

13.3 Proposition 17: *In justification we are brought into the state of filiation by adoption.*

The issue has to do with adoption in the proper sense, with which there is connected the right of inheritance. (But see Romans 9:14, where adoption does not include the right of inheritance.)

Theological note: at least *de fide*. DB 796: definition of justification by the Council of Trent. DB 799.

Argument: from the preceding proposition it is clear that we are in some sense children – we are born of God.

τέκνα θεοῦ: John 1:12: "But to all who received him, who believed in his name, he gave power to become children of God."

1 John 3:1-2: "See what love the Father has given us, that we should be called children of God . . . Beloved, we are God's children now . . ."

1 John 5:1-2: "Everyone who believes that Jesus is the Christ has been born of God, and everyone who loves the parent loves the child. By this we

know that we love the children of God, when we love God and obey his commandments."

Romans 8:16, 17, 21: "It is that very Spirit bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God, and if children, then heirs . . . the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to decay and will obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God."

Other passages appear in parentheses in Stewart: Galatians 3:26, 4:6-7, 4:28.

Ephesians 5:1: "Be imitators of God, as beloved children . . ."

Romans 8:29: ". . . the firstborn of many children."

And indeed strict adoption: Romans 8:17: "and if children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ . . ."

Galatians 4:5-7: ". . . so that we might receive adoption as children. And because you are children . . . So you are no longer a slave but a child, and if a child then also an heir, through God."

Romans 8:15-16: "For you did not receive a spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have received a spirit of adoption. When we cry, 'Abba! Father!' it is that very Spirit bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God . . ."

But our heredity is conditioned:

Romans 8:17: "if, in fact, we suffer with him so that we may also be glorified with him."

We await complete adoption:

Romans 8:23: "while we wait for adoption, the redemption of our bodies."

Fathers: *Enchiridion patristicum*, 359.

13.4 Proposition 18: In justification there begins participation in the divine nature, which will be perfected in heaven.

De fide – from scripture and tradition. See DB 1042.

2 Peter 1:4: the text asserts some participation in the divine nature. In the Greek text, γένησθε is aorist subjunctive, and so we do not know from the text alone whether it is a matter of participation in this life or in the future life. But from the rest of scripture we know that there is a rebirth from God, filiation from God, conflation with Christ, we know that we are children of God, and so on. Therefore, from the context of the whole New Testament we know that this new life begins in this life.

Fathers: *Enchiridion patristicum*, 358.

13.5 Proposition 19: *In justification there are infused faith, hope, and charity, which inhere in the soul as habits.*

More is said about this in the treatment of infused virtues.

Theological note: part 1 is at least Catholic doctrine (DB 800); that charity inheres is *de fide definita* 800, 821; that all three remain is *de fide*, from scripture; and that they are physically permanent is theologically certain from the intention of the Council.

- (1) Preliminary note: that the justified believe, hope, and love is clearly found in scripture and tradition.

Hebrews 10:38: "My righteous one will live by faith."

Romans 1:17: "The one who is righteous will live by faith."

Galatians 3:11: "The one who is righteous will live by faith."

Hebrews 11:1: "Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen."

Romans 8:24: "For in hope we were saved."

1 Peter 1:3: "... he has given us a new birth into a living hope."

1 Corinthians 13:1-13.

- (2) In those who have been justified, faith, hope, charity are not only transient acts but also permanent qualities.

1 Corinthians 13:13: "And now faith, hope, and love abide ..."

John 15:9: "abide in my love."

They are qualities. Things are either qualities or quantities or substances or relations. These are not quantities or substances or relations. Therefore, they are qualities. Thus is resolved the question about baptized infants: they have permanent qualities.

- (3) These permanent qualities are operative principles in the manner of a nature (therefore, habits). *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 110, a. 2. And so we argue as he did: God provides for the living members of Christ as for other living things. But other living things are equipped with permanent principles from which, by a certain natural force and spontaneity, proper acts are performed. Therefore, the living members of Christ are likewise equipped with permanent principles from which, by a certain force and spontaneously, they proceed to

their proper acts, namely, acts of faith, hope, and charity.

The major seems per se evident. It is confirmed in Matthew 11:30: "My yoke is easy and my burden light."

Fathers, *Enchiridion patristicum*, 237-81.

The minor is clear from philosophy.

14. Primitive Notions

Editor's note: At this point Lonergan broke from the theses or propositions and spent a great deal of time on the following treatment of "primitive notions." The material appears in English, for the most part, in the notes of both Stewart and Crowe. The "primitive notions" are required for understanding the remaining propositions, because these propositions are systematic in nature and rely on the methodological doctrine regarding contingent predication if they are to be understood. The section on primitive notions culminates in a statement on contingent predication. This material is not found as such in either set of Lonergan's notes for this course, nor for that matter anywhere else in his archival papers.

14.1 Introduction

- (1) Not all notions are primitive, as some can be reduced to others. For example, man. But primitive notions cannot be reduced to anything else.
- (2) Primitive notions have to be determined "a simultaneo." They cannot be determined "a priori," because they have no previous notions. Nor can they be determined "a posteriori" because, it is presumed, they are primitive. Therefore, they must be determined by their mutual relations. For example, act in relation to potency, substance in relation to accidents, et cetera.

Now, a relation supposes two terms. But it is not enough to have all notions set up in pairs. The pairs themselves must be related to one another. Otherwise each would be a system unto itself and instead of avoiding a system you would multiply systems.

A *system* consists of a set of members each of which is related to all the others (Stewart: . . . in which each part is determined *in its relations* to all the

others, for example, a machine). The material element lies in the members. The formal element is found in the network of relations between members.

Material (scdm ¹⁸ members)	Closed system: admitting a definite number of members and not others (for example, a machine) Open system: admitting an indefinite number of members (for example, system of integers)
Formal (scdm relations)	Direct system: relation of one member to other is direct – for example, drive shaft to clutch Analogous system: for example, in systems of numbers, the relations within one member are only <i>similar</i> to those within another.

$N_1 : O_1 :: N_2 : O_2$ (N = number, O = operation). Members have relations within *themselves*. In an open analogous system, the members need not be members of the same system in relation to one another.

14.2 Universal System

Realities that are inadequately distinct have a reality in common. Peter is not his body, but his body is part of Peter.

Realities that are adequately distinct have no reality in common: for example, Peter and Paul. What is common between them is the concept "real." Peter is real, and Paul is real. But "real" does not denote things adequately distinct. Therefore, the analogy of *ens* [being] is the answer to what is common. $Ens_1 : Esse_1 :: Ens_2 : Esse_2$.

The proportions are related.

Ens is an open analogous universal system.

Is there one concept of *ens* or many? Obviously, there is not a concept of *ens* as there is one of *man*. But there are not many concepts of *ens* as there are many concepts of equivocal terms. There is one concept of *ens* in as far as *ens* is an open analogous system, and there are as many *entia* as there are members of that system.

Ens and other concepts: other concepts connote some aspects of a thing and prescind from all the others. Other concepts, however, include the concept of *ens*, and in virtue of this fact they have "this aspect of the thing."

¹⁸Scdm = secundum = according to, with regard to.

Ens in one sense thus includes all the aspects of all things, because all the aspects of all things are members of the universal system that *ens* is.

Ens in one sense also prescind from all aspects because it does not specify which aspects, but merely treats them as members of the universal system. *Ens*, therefore, does not consider one aspect of the thing and prescind from others.

The concept of *ens* in relation to the other concepts in sciences stands as metaphysics does to other sciences.

Do the other sciences deal with reality?

Distinguish: (1) science as such, using its own evidence and recognizing only this, has nothing to say about reality; (2) science insofar as it presupposes metaphysics and gives evidence in view of the metaphysics it presupposes deals with reality, that is, gives aspects of *the thing*. Proof: if there were just phenomena and nothing else, then the other sciences would stay the course, but metaphysics and epistemology would have to change. Only metaphysics deals with the real as real, and therefore is the science and the only science of reality. If the other sciences do not presuppose metaphysics, they should always substitute *seems* for *is*.

14.3 *Sciences of Universal Import*

- (1) Metaphysics – *ens secundum se*, universal reality.
- (2) Gnoseology – part of psychology, treats of a department of reality, viz. knowledge; knowledge as a knowing, as part of *ens*.
- (3) Epistemology – treats of knowledge not as a department of reality but inasmuch as through knowledge one reaches out to reality.
- (4) Logic – treats *ens qua cognitum*, the object of thought, not entities of the mind but any entities whatever not in themselves but as known. Thus, logic is valid in any science.

(1) and (3) and (4) are sciences of universal import, but not (2). Gnoseology treats of the department through which we get hold of reality. Therefore, it is closely related to logic and epistemology.

Truth (*Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 16, a. 5, ad 2) presupposes two entities, some real distinction, with a comparison, relation, whether the thing be in the mind or outside.

Definition: *adaequatio intellectus cum re*, the correspondence of the mind with the thing. But this is not the criterion of truth. [Two entities – one in the mind, the other in or out.]

Don't confuse the definition of truth with the criterion of truth. Ontological: absolute and relative. Logical – materially in the concepts, formally only in the judgments. *Falsum est in intellectu per accidens*, not *simpliciter* [the false is in the intellect *per accidens*, not unqualifiedly].

Reality: It may mean

- (1) a number of things, *all entia completa* [complete beings]
- (2) one *ens completum* – the totality of any of the analogates
- (3) the predominant part in any member, that is, substance, that which exists
- (4) any part at all of a member, for example, matter, form; potency, accidental acts; relations.

Remarks:

- (1) Corresponding to any meaning of the term "reality" we can form a true judgment – that is, we can predicate reality of any one of the four above meanings.
- (2) The necessary and sufficient condition of the truth of a judgment is precisely the reality of what the judgment asserts.
- (3) Inversely, the necessary and sufficient condition of our knowing reality is that in a true judgment we affirm it. The condition is necessary because *veritas formalis* is in the intellect. Up to the time we affirm we have only *veritas materialis*.
- (4) The necessary and sufficient criterion of the real is our true judgment.
- (5) Catholic dogma is in perfect accord with our philosophic definition of the real, for example, the propositions established by the church.

Mistaken criteria of the real:

- (1) Common sense: "it is real if common sense says so!" Common sense defined: people with common sense do make true judgments without being able to reduce them to a philosophic system. But often they do not know precisely what they mean. (For example, it was

common sense 500 years ago to say the world was flat . . .) Science today has made a fool out of common sense. Common sense is a criterion, therefore, only insofar as its judgments are true judgments.

- (2) Natural science is a satisfactory criterion of the real insofar as its conclusions are true judgments, but natural science is not the study of the real.
- (3) Empiricism: "man of experience" – "practical man" – without knowing any why's! Knowing "that" without knowing "why." (Compare with *Metaphysics*, book 1, lecture 1). Empiricism as a system says that all you know by intellect are the relations between things built up from sensation, memory, experience . . . The real thus becomes the "imaginable." A real distinction is had, therefore, only when things can be separated. The distinction must be imaginable.

One: "unum est indivisum in se et divisum a quolibet alio," "undivided in itself and divided from everything else." *Indivisum in se*: undivided not excluding divisibility (= a principle of identity), *divisum a quolibet alio*, principle of non-contradiction. Hence, "unum et ens convertuntur," "one and being are convertible."

Distinction: "distincta sunt quorum unum non est aliud," "things are distinct when one is not the other."

Real:

adequate
inadequate
metaphysical
physical

Logical:

adequate
inadequate
rationis ratiocinantis
rationis ratiocinatae
perfect
imperfect

Realiter distincta – quorum realitas unius non est realitas alterius

adequate – quorum realitas unius neque est tota neque pars realitatis alterius

inadequate – quorum realitas unius non est tota sed est pars alterius
metaphysica – inter entia incompleta, for example, matter and form
physica – inter entia completa

Logice distincta – quorum conceptus unius non est conceptus alterius
adequate – quorum rationes sunt simpliciter aliae – man and angel
inadequate – quorum rationes non sunt simpliciter aliae
rationis ratiocinantis – between a notion and same notion
analyzed
rationis ratiocinatae –
perfect: as genus is distinct from its species
imperfect: as a species is distinct from genus (also vg, ens,
unum, verum or ens & entia).¹⁹

14.4 Relations

We now have to examine the kinds of relations holding our system together. See the definition of a system: "... in its *relations* ..." What are they?

- (1) Empirical – if knowing them is mainly a matter of experience (glued, bolted, side by side, color, et cetera), by taking a look at them.
- (2) Intelligible – when you know *why* = expressed by "because," "therefore," "if-then."

Thus, we can distinguish between merely empirical systems and intelligible systems. For example, merely empirical system: contents of wastebasket, city dump (although intelligible relations here too). Intelligible system – the why of the above. Two types: artificial and natural.

In both there is an intelligible relation between one part and another, and so on round the whole circuit. But there is this difference. In the artefact the intelligible relation of the part determines the use but not the nature, that is, what it can do, not what it is. In the natural system the function of

¹⁹Really distinct – the reality of one is not the reality of another;

adequate – the reality of one is neither the whole nor a part of the reality of another;

inadequate – the reality of one is not the whole but a part of the other;

metaphysical – between incomplete beings, for example, matter and form;

physical – between complete beings;

Logically distinct – the concept of one is not the concept of another;

adequate – the formalities are simply different – man and angel

inadequate – the formalities are not simply different –

on the part of reason reasoning – between a notion and same notion analyzed

on the part of what reason has reasoned –

perfect: as genus is distinct from its species

imperfect: as a species is distinct from genus (also, for example, being, one, true or being and beings).

a part in the whole defines not only the use of the part but also the nature of the part, so that to separate a part out of its natural system is to change its nature. For example, an eye – function and nature in the whole coincide. Remove the eye and it cannot see. Culmination of Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, compare with book 7, chapter 17.

The natural system, as any system, must have primitive notions. Art and nature are analogously related: raw materials, finished product, its use.

- (1) Raw materials may be called the subjective potency of the finished product. They become part of the car, say, but the factory does not. The factory enters into the production but is not a part of the product. Raw materials are also the essential potency of the finished product. Essential potency is potency to an essence. The transition from raw materials to finished product is a process, and it requires a series of operations to go from raw materials to finished product.
- (2) Finished product – the finished car is the subjective potency of its use. But this is an accidental potency. Whether you use the car or not the essence is already there. Further, the transition from accidental potency to use is not a process. In general, accidental potency is of this type – a releasing.

Raw materials (essential potency) → (in process [incomplete act]) → finished product (first act) → in accidental potency to second act (its use).

Art imitates nature. In the natural arts, the habit of science stands to understanding as finished product to use, accidental potency to second act. Virtue stands to acts of willing as finished product to use. So too eye to seeing, appetites to objects. All are as finished product to use.

On the other hand, process is required. Essential potency must be trained, for example, by acquisition of virtue, habit of science.

Our system holds universally. This transition from accidental potency to second act is verified whenever the laws of nature are in force. But where laws of nature are not yet in force but will be later, you have the transition from essential potency to first act, that is, whenever there is an emergence of a law not verified before.

First act is the key point – it is the *formal cause*. It is the cause which makes the difference between essence and accidental potency, therefore called the *causa essendi*. It is the intrinsic and constituent element in the thing. It makes the reality the reality that it is.

It differs from the material cause.

It differs from the final cause, except in one case, where the final cause and the formal coincide.

The efficient and final causes may be partly empirical, but the formal cause can be known only by understanding. The formal cause is that which makes you understand that which it is. It brings you from the sensitive to the real.

Aristotle went about the question simply: there are four possible types of question (see the first chapter in *Verbum*, vol. 2 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan). (1) Is it? (2) What is it? (3) Is it that, Is A, B? (4) Why is A, B? Aristotle pointed out that (1) is related to (3). (2) and (4) really ask for a cause. And "what is it?" really means, "why are the sensible data the thing?"

For the empiricist, formal cause is only a matter of words. For formal cause cannot be known by the senses and what cannot be known by the senses is unreal. Though properly there is only one type of formal cause, we may name improperly four.

- (1) Physical – when corresponding to the act of understanding there is a concrete reality. Thus, what makes an eye an eye is the power to see, but the power to see can be known only by understanding. This is the only true formal cause.
- (2) Artificial – forms are constituent of the thing *as conceived*, but *a parte rei* [on the side of the thing] they are simply a pattern of efficient and final relations, for example, all that the mind knows in a machine is a pattern of efficient and final relations.
- (3) Conceptual – intrinsic and constitutive of the thing *as conceived*, but do not require *anything a parte rei*. For example, the positive integers 1, 2, 3, 4 . . . Each one is a specifically different concept. But the mind knows the *law* of the series ($T_{n-1} + 1 = T_n$). And in the series 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 . . . the law again, after thought, is seen to be: ($T_{n-1} + 2 = T_n$; $2T_{n-1} = T_n$). Et cetera, et cetera But the law is formulated only after observation of the sensible data. Actual data → act of understanding → concepts → laws = expression of the understanding which knows formal cause. The law simply prescind from the empirical (in its expression). Thus the conceptual formal cause as above is subjective but not in the reality extrinsically. The concept corresponds to matter and form (understanding to form, sensible perceptions to matter). The concept

thus is the law of the series but not the formal cause of the series. The act of understanding is formal cause and not the reflex concept which is its product. The reflex concept corresponds to formal cause but is not the formal cause. It expresses the act of understanding. In the act of understanding we know the formal cause.

- (4) Methodological: you know the object is a unity, but you don't understand it. For example, classifying flowers according to similarities. You know there is a formal cause, but you don't know what it is, and so you work as if there were one and say, "All similars will have the cause," et cetera. All the concepts obtained in botany help toward understanding but still you do not know what it is. This is the method of the natural sciences.

Now to the third part of our discussion of system. We have seen that in any system there are relations involved. According as these are known we can divide systems into methodological, conceptual, artificial, and physical. But first more about Formal Cause. It is the key to the Thomistic theory of knowledge. Plato did not know it. To him anything intelligible was real. The intellect's objects were real, sensible objects unreal, no formal cause. Plato went from abstract concepts to separate substances. Aristotle discovered the formal cause. You cannot grasp a thing without understanding. Aristotle went from the act of understanding.

In things without matter, one and the same thing is what understands and what is understood. Few people grasped Aristotle. They did not get far with the notion of formal cause. Avicenna and Scotus did not get hold of this. They wished to follow Aristotle and posit his concepts on sensible things, somehow, anyhow. They did not eliminate [the] act of understanding. This became a seeing of nexus between concepts. But it is from sensible data that you get your concepts. But the nexus cannot be seen in sensible data. Thus, if one has not made an act of understanding on the sensible data, one will not see the nexus between the concepts, and he will not find it in the abstract concepts which are the products of the act of understanding. Scotus was a reactionary, holding onto Avicennist influences in Scholasticism. It leads to skepticism, and the skepticism became parasitical to the writings of St Thomas and Aristotle.

This grasp of the act of understanding is the key note in the whole system. And the trouble with materialism, Kantianism, mere conceptualism lies in the failure to grasp this key note.

- (1) Thus, the failure to admit the formal physical cause reduces a thing to the status of mere phenomenon, and materialism. Elimination of the physical cause eliminates the thing. Things are merely matter and phenomena. Materialist. This is natural to us, because the animal in us develops fully long before the rational develops fully, if the latter ever does.

Variations of materialism: sensism, the real is the "solid out there"; empiricism – includes internal senses, imagination, memory, et cetera. Even Catholics spontaneously think and talk as if the really real were the "out there." But the really real is God, who is not solid, hard, soft, et cetera. For the materialists, then, the observable phenomena give you the real. Doctors operate, find no soul, so there is no soul. Thus, spontaneous materialism – there is much of it still today. Positivism goes further, knows there is such a thing as the intellect, but says "keep away from it, as it ends in difficulties. Therefore, stick to crucial experiments, the science of phenomena." Pragmatism says you do not really know something when you understand, but it is useful. Therefore, use intellect insofar as it is useful towards material values.

- (2) But some philosophers discover that elimination of the formal cause also eliminates the thing. They admit it and talk then about phenomena, say the notion of "real" is nonsensical, which the materialists never admitted. Hence the idealist prizes intellect in itself. Thus, Hegel, who held that what was of value was intellectual process. The "real" of the materialists is of no value because all they had was phenomena.
- (3) Between the two is Kantian transcendentalism, the transcendental empiricists, chiefly Kant. In his transcendental analysis, you start with the object as object, with an opposition between knower and known. What are the conditions of the known? Kant says mere sensitive impressions won't give you an object. You have to construct the object in terms of rules, for example, time and space, substance, cause, et cetera, which must be added to sensible data to give you an object. As long as you did this, the procedure was valid. But when you get outside the field of constructing objects out of phenomena, and go into that of constructing the abstract, the process was invalid. For

you were using the same process on two different objects. Hence metaphysics is invalid. Kant differs from idealists, in that he admits things in themselves. You can't know them in themselves but only by adding the a priori categories. He admits the existence of God. There can be no speculative proof of this, but practical reason postulates it. He was not a materialist, for he admitted concepts and judgments. Nor was he a pure idealist, for he admitted the existence of the real in itself. What has no speculative proof can be supplied by the practical reason. It is quite all right, natural, acceptable for God to exist, and so he may exist.

Division of physical formal cause:

The physical formal cause is (1) substantial and (2) accidental. Common to both: (1) they are intelligible in themselves, known by acts of understanding; not known by external sense, or by internal acts of consciousness, simple awareness, which is not an act of understanding. Common to both (2), insofar as they are forms of material things known by us in this life, is that both are known by acts of understanding of empirical data (that is, by insight into phantasm). They are forms of material things known by us in material things in this life by acts of understanding with respect to empirical data, by insight into phantasm, sensible data, whether organized in the phantasm or seen direct in the sensible data.

Difference: (1) the accidental form is grasped by considering data as of a kind, no matter what the subject. For example, internal or external? et cetera hardness, softness, color . . . (2) the substantial form is known by understanding a concrete and permanent unity in dissimilar data, for example, a cat. All data can be considered in either of these two ways.

Note two different senses of accident: (1) *in alio*, as opposed to *in se* and (2) *per accidens* as opposed to *per se*.

Essences: Essence is closely related to form: *id quo aliquid est* [that by which *something* is] – if you understand the *aliquid* to mean matter you have the form – that is, all the data combine to make object what it is. If you understand the *aliquid* to be the subject, you have an essence – the essential notes which make it this and not something else. Essence includes, form does not include, common matter. This common matter is opposed to particular matter. You can understand a circle; any circle, not this particular circle, is necessary.

Material: abstract essence prescind from the subject – for example, whiteness; concrete essence includes the subject – for example, man and white.

Both abstract and concrete are divided into common and particular according as they include or prescind from a reference to a particular matter. We can speak of humanity or of Socrates. Abstract and common essence – humanity, whiteness. Concrete and particular essence – that to which essential potency is in potency. That is accidental potency to second act. From one point of view it is the common and abstract essence (*id quo*) that is basic, and from another point of view it is the concrete and particular essence that is basic. For it is the concrete and particular essence that is in potency. Also, it is in second act.

The empirical residue: When you understand, you get hold of something. But when you get hold of a physical form, is there anything left? The something necessarily left over we call the empirical residue.

The importance of this notion can be put in various ways. We wish to show there are limits to the transformations science may make in explaining phenomena. The effects of future acts of understanding may change a notion – for example, Aristotle thought fire was a substance (one of four); then later it was thought to be phlogiston; then an activity. Thus, to avoid changes in the system we must establish the empirical residue. If we can show that even when a scientist understands all the phenomena (data) there is still something left which will not be included within but will stand outside the scientific system – that there are elements that cannot be included in essences – we will have established the idea of empirical residue. The chief instances of empirical residue are the following:

First, the existence of material things. The divine existence is intelligible in itself, purely so, necessary, identical with the divine essence. No other existence is intelligible in itself, for we can understand it only extrinsically, in terms of efficient or final causality. We know the existence of material things, not the way we know form, by an act of understanding; not the way we know an essence, by a definition expressing an act of understanding; but in two steps: materially, by external senses vis-à-vis empirical data and internal awareness of consciousness vis-à-vis data of consciousness (cf. *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 87, a. 1, et circa); here you don't know it *as* existence; it's given, it's there; it is known *formally* by the act of judgment which affirms an essence to be verified in the data of sense or consciousness.

The concept of existence is only analogical: that is, essence : existence ::

accidental potency : second act. Existence is not internal to any existing or possible scientific system or scientific theory. If the scientific system contained its own existence of its own subject, it would not have to be verified. The system itself is on the level of essence and needs verification. It is the essence of science that it has to be verified. And in this verification, in the judgment saying it is true, you know existence.

Moreover, existence does not mean the same thing as reality. All existence is a reality, but not all reality is an existence. For example, prime matter and accidents are real, but they are not an existence.

Essence and contingent existence are really distinct, if they have contradictory predicates: A cannot be B. But they have contradictory predicates: Essence is what is intelligible in itself. Contingent existence is not intelligible in itself.

The intelligibility of a reality is a real predicate. It must be identical with the reality, if you are to know the reality, for you know intelligibility.

The *second* instance of the empirical residue is *material particularity*. $1 + 1 = 2$. The second 1 has the same intelligibility as the first but differs from it materially. It has the same essence and properties, but it is another instance of the same essence and properties. Material particularity will not be overcome when the series has reached its goal. Science has a different theory of water now from what it had 8,000 years ago, but it is no closer to knowledge of each particular instance of water. No matter what theory the series constructs about water, that theory will apply equally to all instances.

Material particularity is not intelligible in itself. If it were, each instance would be definable in itself, would have its own essence and properties different from others. Material particularity is intelligible only in its form. The essence is intelligible only in its universality. Otherwise, we would know material particularity. Material particularity is known by external sense and by the internal awareness of consciousness, but not by understanding. Material particularity is really distinct from form, on the argument regarding contradictory predicates: material particularity is not intelligible, form is. Material particularity is really distinct from existence, for material particularity is intelligible in form, whereas contingent existence is understood only by an extrinsic relation to God.

The *third* instance of the empirical residue is *space-time*. This we know by observation, not by an act of understanding. Space is a continuous manifold of merely empirical differences. The difference between two points is not

understood, it is *seen*. If you try to explain it by different distances, you will have to explain different distances by different points. and the same is true of time. Time – *est secundum prius et posterius* – that is, is according to the before and after in *experience*.

The *fourth* instance of the empirical residue is *accidental conjunction*. Intelligible conjunction, the opposite to accidental conjunction, is the organization of members in a system, for example, of muscles in a body.

- (1) The accidental conjunction is the mere juxtaposition of some things to others, the mere happening to be together.
- (2) Suppose you had an initial disposition of all particles and deduce from it to the whole history of universe. Such a disposition would not make accidental conjunction into intelligible conjunction. Necessary laws would govern the development, but the final result would just be another *happening to be together*. To make any present conjunction intelligible, you must show that the *initial* disposition was intelligible, of its nature.
- (3) *But* inversely since we don't know the initial disposition but only *present* conjunctions, unless *they* are intelligible in themselves, there is no possibility of demonstrating that the *initial* disposition was.
- (4) You can't show that any present disposition *in itself* is intelligible and not merely happening. You know it the same way you know material particularity, the space-time manifold, et cetera. *It happens to be so*. The dog happens to be there when the car comes along. There is nothing in the nature of each by which you can show they had to be there simultaneously.
- (5) Another weakness – you can't demonstrate there ever was an initial disposition without appealing to faith.
- (6) Final weakness – you would have to suppose the world is a closed system, that other causes can't intervene, that God can't create new ones, providing new dispositions.

Thus, just as material particularity is not intelligible in itself, and also the manifold variety of space-time, so the infinite variety of juxtapositions are accidental conjunctions. Accidental conjunction is intelligible only in relation to God, *quoad Deum*, not *quoad se*. The precise way in which different things are related to one another within space-time is not intelligible in itself.

The *fifth* instance of the empirical residue is *the contingency of operation*. In a primary sense, all operations of material things are contingent because the existence of the things themselves is contingent. But over and above that, there is a further contingency proper to operation. For every operation occurs at a given time, not sooner not later: not sooner, because previously the totality of conditions was not fulfilled; not later, because at that time all the conditions are fulfilled, not later. The conditions are the absence of anything that hinders, prevents, and the presence of anything that helps or is necessary. Non-fulfilment is due to the absence of necessary conditions, or to the presence of interference. Fulfilment is due to the presence of everything necessary, and the absence of everything that might interfere. Therefore, the fulfilment of the necessary conditions is an accidental conjunction. It pertains to the empirical residue, and is unintelligible in itself.

Connected with the foregoing is probability. Probability is the ratio of an actual number of occurrences at a given time to the number of possible occurrences. When the number of possible occurrences is indefinitely great, the limit of probable occurrences is indefinitely great. So defined, probability is not something *subjective*, not a rule for thinking, but something *objective* both *formally* and *materially*. *Formally*: the actual occurrences are objective, and also their number, and the possibilities are objective, and so is their number; *materially*, (a) negatively, probability is objective materially if determinism is false; but determinism is false, for the universe is not a closed system, and even if it were, operation has a contingent existence, and men have free will; (b) positively, probability is objective materially if all its elements are objective; but possible occurrences are objective in potency, and actual occurrences are objective in act.

Objective probability squares with fundamental thinking in modern science. For example, theories of the subatomic, genetic evolution. And it squares with fundamental elements in the thought of Aristotle and St Thomas: for example, act, potency, indeterminacy (that is, "per accidens"). Objective probability is not in conflict with the "necessary" laws of nature, for these are abstract. The conditions, for example, for acceleration = $32/\text{ft}/\text{sec}^2$ are never verified in the concrete. Aristotle was talking about events (e.g., gravity in given circumstances). Modern science in speaking of necessary law does so under a set of ideal circumstances. St Thomas takes into account secondary contingency, as does probability.

Next, Relations and Relativity:

- (1) "Relativa sunt quorum esse sunt ad aliud se habere," "relatives are those whose existence is to be to another." (The "sunt" does not mean existence, but the *einai* of Aristotle, the "notion." Their very notion is to have *se ad aliud*, themselves to another.) Thus, a creature is from God and for God. A creature from God is not a relation, but the *from God* is. The concept of a relation is the "ad aliud" – the dependence, the "for-ness."
- (2) The relation is the *ad aliud*. It presupposes (a) a subject that is related, (b) the foundation or ground, (c) the *ad aliud*, and (d) the term. Remove any of them, and you have neither real nor notional relations.

Crowe: You can't prove a relation is really distinct from its foundation (and BL seems to think it is not distinct anyway) because to do so you would have to take the relation as relation and as real (just as in considering real distinction between essence and existence, you have to think of essence as essence and as real), but the relation *as relation* is not real; otherwise there would be no notional relations.

- (3) There is a reality corresponding *somehow* to the relation. Otherwise, the order of the universe would be purely subjective.
- (4) There are relations that are *merely notional*: that is, valid as concepts but involving no reality that is possible. There are four classes: (a) relation of a thing to itself; (b) relation of something to a non-ens; (c) relation having a foundation only in the term – for example, God to creatures; (d) relation *of a relation*, or *to a relation*.
- (5) Because some relations are notional, *relatio ut relatio* is not real.
- (6) Because relation as relation is not real, you cannot argue from the notion of a relation to a real distinction between a relation and its foundation.

Relativity is distinct from the notion of relation.

Definition: the capacity, exigence, necessity of the absolute (substance, quantity, quality) to be related. It is something (intrinsic property) prior to relation Hence, relativity does not presuppose a term, (though it may

postulate it). It is an intrinsic property of the absolute and pertains to the intelligibility of the absolute, and so must be identical with the absolute. (By absolute here, we mean not-relation.) Relativity = substance or absolute accident (quantity or quality).

There are different kinds of relativity.

- (a) Relativity connected with *quantity*. For example, if someone is 6 feet tall, there is an intrinsic exigence for him to be equal in height to anyone else who is 6 feet tall, whether or not there actually is anyone else like that. The exigence is prior to his actually being equal to the other, that is, it is prior to relation. The same holds for "smaller than," "greater than," et cetera.
- (b) Any material thing having a *form* of a given kind has an exigence to be similar to anything else with a similar form materially multiplied, whether or not there is any such thing actually existing.
- (c) Relativity connected with *operation*: the finality of a natural cause to producing an effect; the finality of the recipient to receiving the effect; the finality of the effect to be received; the dependence of the effect on the agent, et cetera.
- (d) The relativity of the constituent elements of things: of potency to act, matter to form, essence to existence, and so on.

There cannot be a real relation without there being relativity. Relation adds to relativity an extrinsic denomination from the term. Relativity includes something more than foundation: it includes relative aspects without going as far as relation itself. Hence, relations come and go without any real addition or subtraction from their subjects. If there are two similar things and one is annihilated, there is no change in the other, even though all relations disappear. Thomas: *Nihil advenit*.

This brings us to the issue of the order of the universe. The order of the universe is real, because subject, relations, and terms are real. It is real because relativity is real and terms are real. Relation is a distinct category from substance, *quantum*, et *quale*. They are categories of intrinsic denomination, but relation is a category of extrinsic denomination. Substance: "ens cui competit esse per se." Accident: "ens cui competit esse in alio."

But there are two senses of "per se": negation of *in alio*, or opposed to *per accidens*. Thus, another point of departure is necessary if we are to talk about

substance and accidents. We must go deeper, to "essence." The common genus of substance and accident is essence. They are analogously essence.

An essence is what is known in essential definition. Essential definition is definition proceeding from and expressing what is grasped in an act of understanding. There are two classes of essence: *simpliciter* and *secundum quid*. *Simpliciter* – its own intelligibility doesn't include a reference to another essence. Its definition contains nothing that the defined is not, nothing that cannot be predicated of defined. *Secundum quid* - its own intelligibility does include a reference to another essence. Its definition contains something that the defined is not. For example, snubness is curvature *in a nose*, not just any curvature, but curvature in a nose. By substance we mean an essence *simpliciter*, and by accident we mean an essence *secundum quid*.

Substance and accidents are really distinct, for they have contradictory predicates. They are ultimate categories, for they will survive the process of scientific development. Science is always a matter of understanding data and setting up system. Any set of data admits two types of consideration – (1) data as of a kind, such as light, heat, sound, biological theories, et cetera, hence laws of nature and probability of occurrences; (2) *these* data, *not* as similar, but as united, *unum per se*: a cat, a concrete unity, not something that can be referred to something else.

Next, potency and act in relation to essence: the fundamental point is that one and the same act of understanding, one and the same essence, one and the same definition have to do for different realities. For example, sight: even with closed eyes, I have sight; with open eyes, I have seeing. *Is a new essence added* when I open my eyes? No, because you can't get a new definition. One and the same definition has to do for both. What sight is in potency, seeing is in act. And the "one and the same definition" that works for both is the definition named above as the definition of accidental potency and second act. There are realities that can be understood only by anticipation: sight can be understood only in relation to the future act of seeing. Sight is an essence, and seeing is over and above essence. And you can go below the scale of essence: an adult *is able* to see; an embryo *will be able* to see. This is not a mere statement about the future but about the embryo *as it is*. You cannot understand the embryo *as it is* without understanding what it is going to be. It has not the essence now, but the potency to the essence. The fetus too, in relation to the embryo, has not sight, but does have the organ, and so is much more developed than the embryo. The essence (sight)

hasn't arrived but it is on the way, it isn't merely potency. In the fetus you have incomplete act, act "on the way."

The same distinction as can be made for accidental essences can be made for substantial essence (except possibly for the element of process). Thus, prime matter is essential potency to substantial form; substance is in potency to its accidents; an essence is in potency to existence. Composition (essence) is in accidental potency to existence; substance is in potency to its accidents but in a different sense from that in which a composition is in accidental potency to existence.

Next, *the real and the intelligible*. Where do we get the concept "real," "ens"? Reality is connected with intelligibility, for intelligibility is the criterion of the possible, and possibility is possibility of being, or what is, can be, *ens*. Essence by definition is that which is intelligible in itself, what proceeds from an act of understanding. Substantial essence is essence *simpliciter*, and so it has potency to be *simpliciter*, whereas accidental essence is essence *secundum quid*, and so it has potency to be *secundum quid*. Essential potency (to either substantial or accidental essence) is intelligible in the other, viz., in the essence to which it is in potency. Existence and operation are intelligible in the other, existence in the first cause, operation in the universality of causes. All the elements in the system are intelligible either in themselves or in another. They are all possible, all are related to being.

14.5 The Concept of Ens

- (1) The concept of *ens* is natural: it is natural for intellect to understand and to judge. Insofar as it understands, it apprehends the intelligible; insofar as it judges, it posits, affirms the intelligible. The intelligible is the possible, the possible is what can be (*id cui suo modo competit esse*). Thus the proportion: *Understanding : judgment :: the intelligible : the affirmed :: the possible : being*.
- (2) The concept of *ens* is analogous: everything conceived is somehow intelligible, somehow possible, somehow *ens*, somehow related to understanding and to judgment, and so to being. Each different individual conception will differ from all the others, but there will be a proportion, and they will be related: *this affirmation : this concept :: this ens : this possibility*.

- (3) The sensible is potentially intelligible, potentially a possible, potentially *ens*. The sensible as apprehended by sense is not known *sub ratione entis*; it enters *sub ratione entis* insofar as it is understood. If it is understood in itself, it is essence, substantial or accidental. If it is understood in the other, and if the other is essence, it is essential potency; if the other is an extrinsic cause, then it is existence or operation.

14.6 System and Knowledge

The system we have been outlining is the system of proportionate objects of human intellect. That is, there is a parallel between the structure of our knowledge and the structure of the things around us. God made our knowledge to correspond to the structure of things. We couldn't know them unless their structure was that of our knowledge.

The real is what is known in true judgment. And what is known in true judgment is what is apprehended by external sense or by the internal awareness of consciousness, and as understood and conceived is affirmed to be. Thus, where you have understanding and conception, you have essences, and where you have sense, you have the empirical residue around the essences. Thus, you have to accept judgment; you must accept it. Judgment to be judgment is rational. To accept judgment, you must accept understanding. To accept understanding, you must accept *something* understood. But *something* is understood only through sensible data. And sensible data are given. They are "just there."

This process is what you can't help doing. We say nothing about *why* it is so, or whether the judgment is true and why so. These are other questions. Our concern here is with the "compulsion." And thus the parallel appears between the intellectual process and the system.

14.7 The Use of the System

The real is what is known by true judgment.

The system provides a complete and ultimate analysis of any reality proportionate to our knowledge.

Put the two together and one has the use of the system. Hence by use of the system one can state the realities involved in any true judgment. These

concepts state the whole reality, not just part.

A true judgment may be true in either of two ways: by intrinsic denomination or by extrinsic denomination.

Truth is an equation between the field of mind and the field of reality. Hence, propositions are true by intrinsic denomination when the real condition of their truth is substance or accident as divided by potency and act, and whether considered absolutely or relatively. God's knowledge is infinite.

Propositions are true by extrinsic denomination when the real condition of their truth is not some constituent, some *ens quo* constitutive of the subject, but the related reality of some other subject. 'God knows the finite world exists.'

Hence the system is a system of primitive concepts defined by their mutual relations.

14.8 *Extensions of the System*

As outlined, the system regards realities as *proportionate* to our knowledge. However, it is an open system, and so we can extend it to realities beyond the proportion of our knowledge but not beyond the universal system of *ens*. Such extensions are twofold: the theory of the separate or immaterial substances, for example, angels – see *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 54, aa. 1-3; and the theory of supernatural truths known by faith alone, that is, the theological extension of the system. The theological extension of the system is also twofold:

on the analogy of the system: for example, as soul is to its faculties, so sanctifying grace is to the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity;
or: faith is to acts of faith as accidental potency is to operations;

and beyond the analogy of the system: for example, the second person of the Blessed Trinity is this man Jesus Christ. The root point in the extension beyond the analogy of the system is that one can predicate about God by extrinsic denomination much more than one can about finite beings by extrinsic denomination. Those cases in which the proposition is true by extrinsic denomination: (1) true about God and creatures; (2) true about God but not about creatures, and known from philosophy; (3) true about God but not about creatures, and known only from revelation.

- (1) Creation: God is intrinsically the same whether he creates or does not. That God creates cannot be true by intrinsic denomination for that would posit a contingent operation in God, and there is no potency in God. So creation must be applied to God by extrinsic denomination. Only in this sense is it true that God creates. Thus the terms *entitative* (God creates – N [nego, No]) and *terminative* (God creates – C [concedo, Yes]).

That God creates, then, is true *by extrinsic denomination from the creature*. This instance of extrinsic denomination is *per se* true also of creatures. Whenever you have a cause, that the cause is producing an effect is true by extrinsic denomination – *per se*. It is true necessarily about every cause.

- (2) If God creates, God's knowledge and willing is different from what it is on the assumption that God does not create. These differences aren't true of God by intrinsic denomination. They don't involve any entitative difference in God. But this is not true of us. Our intellects and wills are in potency, and are perfected by acts. But God is infinite knowledge and will. Generalizing these 2 points: universally, "quidquid praedicatur de Deo contingente praedicatur per denominationem extrinsecam," "whatever is predicated contingently of God is predicated through extrinsic denomination." The proof: it is either by intrinsic or by extrinsic denomination. But it is not by intrinsic. Therefore . . . Major: a complete enumeration; minor: not by intrinsic, for then there would be posited in God a contingent reality, and there would be posited composition in God; God's simplicity would be taken away.
- (3) There are three cases in theology of extrinsic denomination about God that go beyond the preceding.

The Word *is* this man Jesus Christ (incarnation).

The divine essence actuates the intellects of the blessed (beatific vision).

The Holy Spirit inhabits the souls of the just (inhabitation).

These statements about God are contingent. Hence, they are true by extrinsic denomination. The first is in the category of substance, "this man," and also contingent – "He might not have been." The second is in the category of accident, but the divine essence is playing the role of a form. The third deals with a conjunction between two substances: the divine essence

inhabits a human person. The truths are supernatural, and therefore nothing in nature can provide the extrinsic denomination. Consequently, there must be a set of extrinsic denominators that are supernatural. There are finite beings which are supernatural realities by which propositions about certain mysteries are true, *supernaturalia quibus verae sunt propositiones circa aliqua mysteria*. They are *entia quibus* outside the system. No ordinary sense of form, act, second act, potency, et cetera applies, in any sense of these words. De la Taille invented the phrase "Actuation finie par l'acte infinie," but there is a tendency to assimilate this phrase with our existing notions in the system, in this case "form." It is better, therefore, to consider them as being outside the system, not outside the universal system of *ens* but outside the proportionate object of our intellects.

15. Further Propositions

At this point Lonergan returns to his propositions, beginning with proposition 20.

15.1 Proposition 20: The Holy Spirit is not given without a finite effect being produced in the just.

The argument proceeds from what we have just seen. What is predicated contingently of God is predicated through extrinsic denomination. Extrinsic denomination is not true unless there is given an extrinsic denominator. But there is not given an extrinsic denominator unless a finite effect is produced in the just.

The conclusion is related to several other views. Thus, for Peter Lombard, the Holy Spirit is the principle of acts of charity. Gregory of Rimini and the nominalists say that inhabitation or indwelling truly so called can be had only through an extrinsic acceptance. It consists solely in God's benevolence. Lessius, Petavius, Thomassinus, and in some sense Scheeben say that inhabitation is something of a gift that is independent of created grace.²⁰

²⁰As we will see shortly, the nature of this independence became a question that led Lonergan to revise his position in mid-stream during this course.

15.2 Proposition 21: *This finite effect is not the uncreated gift itself, nor is it the uncreated gift in us, but it is that by which there is an uncreated gift in us.*

This finite effect is not the uncreated gift itself, for the contingent finite effect is created. It is not the uncreated gift in us, for the uncreated gift does not cease to be uncreated because it is in us. That it is that by which the uncreated gift can truly be said to be in us is argued in two ways.

First, the other two possibilities are excluded, and this is the only possibility left. Second, the mode of proving the existence of this finite effect establishes the proposition that it is that by which there is an uncreated gift in us. For the finite effect is posited in order that the assertion that the Holy Spirit dwells in us be true. And that which is posited for some assertion to be true is an *ens quo*.

15.3 Proposition 22, original version: *Not only the indwelling of the Holy Spirit but also the vivification of the just by the same Holy Spirit are constituted by one and the same finite effect.*

Editor's note: This is the proposition that Lonergan changed. We will present his argument for the rejected proposition first, and then will show how he changed it.

- (1) From the first of our propositions it is clear that the Spirit inhabits, that through the Holy Spirit we are made living members of Christ, that through the Holy Spirit there is infused in our hearts the gift of charity.
- (2) Therefore, there exists something *by which* the Holy Spirit vivifies, diffuses, et cetera.
- (3) Beings are not to be multiplied without necessity. *There suffices one reality by which* the Holy Spirit inhabits and seals, vivifies, diffuses charity. For through one *ens quo* the same finite effect can be both the extrinsic denominator and the vital principle in us.
- (4) This vital principle is sanctifying. This is proven from the notion of "holiness." "Holy" is said *simpliciter* – of God – or in a qualified fashion, *secundum quid* (a) if one is united with God or (b) if one is assimilated to God. But this vital principle is sanctifying in either

way. It is the principle by which we are *united* to God. And it is the *assimilating* principle, the principle of a new supernatural life supernaturally assimilated to the life of God.

- (5) There is a difference between this vital principle and the soul. The soul is a vital principle, but it is a *substantial* form. This vital principle is an *accidental* form. Moreover, the soul is that remote, ultimate principle of our human life; but this vital principle is not the ultimate principle, for "it is the *Spirit* who gives life" to the members of Christ. Therefore, this vital principle is that by which the Spirit gives life.
- (6) This vital principle exceeds the analogy of nature. For it makes the Holy Spirit by extrinsic denomination the principle of life *in another*, not just the *efficient* cause of life in another, as God is in relation to all living things; and not as *formal* cause, for the Holy Spirit is not a part of us – what is predicated of one is not predicated of the other; and not as the simple instrument by which the Holy Spirit dynamically produces operations in us, for then *we* would not live with that new life. It is beyond any analogy of nature.
- (7) This vital principle is our inchoate participation in the divine nature. This is not a matter of participation as the participation of Son and Holy Spirit in the divine nature, nor as Jesus Christ's participation in the divine nature, nor as all possible participations in the divine nature. Therefore, not as in the Trinity nor in the hypostatic union, and not as in mere imitation *ad extra*. But it is *such* that the Holy Spirit vivifies us, and from this vivification we are able to elicit acts of the divine order, to love God as he is in himself, to know God as he is in himself. (Lonergan refers to some of the earliest material in *De ente supernaturali*.)

15.4 *The Revised Proposition 22: (1) The uncreated gift, precisely as uncreated, is constituted by God alone. (2) Therefore, God stands with respect to the state or condition of the justified person not only as an efficient principle but also as a constitutive principle. (3) But this constitutive principle dwells in the justified person, not in the mode of an inherent form, but in the mode of the term of a relation.*

Editor's note: Frederick Crowe revisited his notes in 1960 and added here in pencil: "I think it was at this point that BL was forced to go away for a couple of weeks' rest. When he returned, it was to tackle the problem anew – rejecting this last proposition [that is, the original proposition 22]."

A major question, I believe, is whether Lonergan had by this time read Karl Rahner's 1946 essay, now available in *Theological Investigations* 1 as "Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace." His original proposition 22 reflects the mistake Rahner had noted in the usual Scholastic treatment of the relation between created and uncreated grace: the inhabitation of the Holy Spirit is constituted by a finite effect. But he proposes a quite different solution from that offered by Rahner, and in the words "not in the mode of an inherent form" rejects what in fact was Rahner's solution. However, to date no evidence has surfaced that Lonergan had yet read Rahner's essay. The source of Lonergan's rethinking of the issue is probably found below, page 54, where the problem is located in other works.

In the first proposition 22, then, the uncreated gift is constituted by the created finite effect. In the revised proposition 22 the uncreated gift is constituted by God alone. But the manner in which the Holy Spirit, the uncreated gift, stands as a constitutive principle is not that of a quasi-formal cause (Rahner's solution) but that of the uncreated term of a created relation (Lonergan's solution).

At any rate, the notes of Crowe and Stewart proceed as follows in explicating the new proposition 22.

Terms:

Principle: what is first in some order

Efficient: principle by which

Constitutive: principle *that* by which

Inherent form: form received in a potency and limited by the potency

Term of a relation: that to which the subject of the relation is related

State of the justified: includes not only all that is intrinsic to the justified person but also everything that is included in the formality of being justified.

Part 1: The uncreated gift, precisely as uncreated, is constituted by God alone. Note: This is evident from the words themselves. The uncreated as uncreated is constituted by the uncreated alone. But only God is uncreated. Therefore, the uncreated gift as uncreated is constituted by God alone.

Part 2: Therefore, God stands with respect to the state or condition of the justified person not only as an efficient principle but also as a constitutive principle.

This is a conclusion from part 1, as is proved in two ways.

- (1) What not only gives but also is given is not only an efficient principle but also a constitutive principle. But in justification God not only gives but also is given. Therefore . . .
- (2) That by which something is constituted stands with respect to that something as a constitutive principle. But God himself is that by which the uncreated gift as uncreated is constituted. Therefore, God himself pertains to the state or condition of the justified person as a constitutive principle.

Part 3: But this constitutive principle dwells in the justified person not in the mode of an inherent form, but in the mode of the term of a relation.

- (1) The negative element of this proposition is evident from philosophy.
- (2) The positive element contains something of a minimum affirmation that is common among all theologians.
- (3) Argument for the negative part: The infinite God cannot be received and limited by a finite potency.
- (4) Argument for the positive part: Unless God is present to the justified person *at least* as the term of a relation, God is not present to the justified person in any way, and this is contrary to revelation.

An objection is then raised and treated. The objection treats a "fundamental difficulty": either God is intrinsically received, or God is not a constitutive principle. But God cannot be intrinsically received. Therefore, God is not a constitutive principle.

Major: "constitutive" means what is intrinsic to something: form, potency, act, existence, et cetera.

Minor: that God cannot be intrinsically received is stated in part 3 of the assertion: God is not present in the mode of an inherent form.

Response: The presupposition of the major, that the constitutive is intrinsically received, is to be denied. It is true of substance. As for accidents, it is valid only insofar as accidents are considered absolutely, but not insofar as "accidents" includes relations. Relation is not constituted without a term. There is no wife without a husband, no father without a child.

We return now to the question of the finite effect.

15.5 Proposition 23: *The finite effect is (1) physical and (2) per se permanent.*

Terms:

Physical: not metaphorical, not moral (through extrinsic denomination, by a juridical act). The term is not used in opposition to "supernatural."

Permanent: what per se remains but can be removed by another cause.

Part 1: It is a physical effect if it is truly said of the justified person from intrinsic denomination.

But it is truly said from intrinsic denomination.

Therefore, it is a physical effect.

Major: "truly said" excludes metaphor, and intrinsic denomination excludes moral effects.

Minor: "truly said" is clear from the preceding theses. "From intrinsic denomination" means that some objective reality must correspond to the truth being affirmed. The affirmation of the indwelling of the Holy spirit posits nothing objectively about God, who is immutable; it posits nothing in the Holy Spirit, because nothing contingent can be said of the immutable and infinite Holy Spirit. Therefore, it posits something in the creature. That something must be intrinsic, because if were extrinsic to the creature it would have to be intrinsic to God.

Part 2: The effect is per se permanent if the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is per se permanent.

But the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is per se permanent.

Therefore, the effect is per se permanent.

The major is per se evident, for the created effect is that by which the Holy Spirit indwells.

The minor: indwelling is found in all the justified, and the justified remain justified until their just status is removed by mortal sin.

15.6 *Proposition 24: This finite effect is absolutely supernatural.*

Terms:

Absolutely supernatural: Negatively, that which exceeds the proportion of any finite substance. Positively, an accident that is defined through God as God is in himself, or whose definition includes God as he is in himself.

Argument:

That is absolutely supernatural that is a definite accident with a relation to God as he is in himself.

But that by which the Holy Spirit indwells is a definite accident with a relation to God as he is in himself.

Therefore, it is absolutely supernatural.

15.7 *Proposition 25: The same finite effect is the first intrinsic principle of that new life according to which we become just and holy persons before God.*

Terms:

The same created effect: see propositions 20, 21.

That new life: see propositions 15-19.

Opinions:

Theologians commonly place the foundation of divine indwelling in that sanctifying grace which they hold to be the intrinsic principle of a higher life. But they can go astray in different ways when they try to explain how sanctifying grace makes the Holy Spirit indwell. This will be taken up later.

Argument:

The finite effect by which the Holy Spirit indwells either is (1) an intrinsic principle of the new life or (2) some sort of consequence flowing from that principle or (3) some thing independent of this new life. But (2) and (3) are impossible. Therefore (1) is the case.

Major: the enumeration seems complete.

Minor: (a) (2) cannot be, for a consequence either adds something to the grace of perfection of the first intrinsic principle or not. If it does, then it does not flow from the first principle nor is it a consequence of it. If it does not, it is not clear why the first principle itself does not suffice to be that by which

the Holy Spirit indwells.

(b) (3) cannot be, and there are two reasons. (i) This does not agree with the doctrine of the Fathers about the Holy Spirit as the principle of our sanctification. See *Enchiridion patristicum* 357. (2) It involves a methodological error, for according to the [first] Vatican Council (DB 1796) there exists a connection of the mysteries among themselves. Therefore, there exists a connection between the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and our sanctification.

15.8 Proposition 26: *This first intrinsic principle (1) is not some infused virtue, (2) nor is it charity, (3) but it is a physical accident (4) in the genus of quality (5) reducible to the species of a habit, and (6) the essence of the soul is its subject.* (Boyer thesis 15). See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 110, aa. 1 to 4; regarding "habit," et cetera, see 1-2, q. 49, a. 3, and q. 50, a. 2.

Adversaries include the Scotists, for whom sanctifying grace and the habit of charity are not really distinct.

Note: communior et probabilior, as far as the whole thesis is concerned. That it is a physical accident is theologically certain from DB 821, 800.

Argument:

(1) It is not an infused virtue. This is argued from the very notion of a virtue. A virtue is a habit that perfects a potency for the sake of an act in accord with a nature. In this case, that would be an already elevated nature. We know acts from their objects, potencies from their acts, the essence from the potencies. An infused virtue cannot be the first intrinsic principle if it supposes something prior. For human potencies to be perfected for the sake of a supernatural act, human nature itself must be already elevated.

Another argument against its being an infused virtue: It is not another virtue besides charity. For we can lose the status of justice before God but still retain the other virtues. The first intrinsic principle cannot be another virtue besides charity if we can lose charity while retaining the other virtues. But this is possible, for charity can be lost while faith remains (DB 838).

(2) And it is not charity. This can be argued from the general argument from the definition of a virtue but also from a special argument.

Charity is not the first intrinsic principle if it supposes another. But it supposes another. Therefore . . .

The major is evident.

The minor: charity is the love of friendship. Friendship supposes some equality, in this case some equality between man and God. Therefore, before charity can be had, there is required some participation in the divine nature.

- (3) It is a physical accident. It is either an accident or a substance. But it is not a substance.

Major: evident.

Minor: It is not a substance because man is not substantially changed by justification, and a substance cannot be absolutely supernatural. It is a physical accident, argued from proposition 23.

- (4) It is in the genus of quality. *Positively*, what makes a subject such as it is is quality; but this first intrinsic principle makes a subject such as it is. Minor: it makes the subject just and holy. *Negatively*, by excluding other possibilities. It is not quantity, for it is not sensible; it is not relation, for it is the first principle, something absolute. It is not some other predicament, for it entails intrinsic denomination while they entail extrinsic denomination.
- (5) It is in the species of habit. Aristotle divides quality into (a) habit or disposition, (b) potency and impotence, (c) possible qualities, (d) form and figure. But this principle is not potency or impotence because these immediately regard act. Nor is it a passible quality, for these are sensible: potencies for change in weight or color, et cetera. Nor is it form and figure, for these are quantitative. It remains that it is a matter of habit or disposition. But it is not disposition, which is easily changeable. Therefore, it is *habit*.
- (6) The essence of the soul is its subject. It is either in the essence or in a potency. But it is not in a potency. Minor: if it were in a potency that would be its subject, it would be a virtue. But it is not a virtue. Therefore . . .

See 1-2, q. 49, a. 3; q. 50, a. 2. There is supposed the analysis given there of habit: habit either perfects the nature itself or it perfects a potency for the sake of operation. If it perfects a potency, it is received in the potency. If it perfects the nature itself, it is received in the nature itself, that is, in the essence.

15.9 Proposition 27: *This first intrinsic principle somehow stands to the infused virtues and their acts as the essence of the soul stands to the potencies and their operations.*

See 1-2, q. 110, a. 4, ad 1.

Somehow (*quodammodo*): not a perfect analogy.

Argument:

- (1) As the essence of the soul is the principle from which there flow the potencies of the soul, so this first principle is like an essence from which there flow the potencies of the supernatural virtues.
- (2) As the essence of the soul is the principle through which there is determined the formal object *quod* for the potencies, so this first principle is the principle through which there is determined the formal object *quod* for the virtues.

15.10 Proposition 28: *This first principle is sanctifying grace.*

Terms:

Grace: a gift not owed to nature, perfecting us for the sake of eternal life.

Sanctifying: in the order of efficient causality, that from which someone is holy; in the constitutive order, that by which someone is holy.

Holy: absolutely, God himself as he is in himself ("Holy, Holy, Holy"); in a qualified sense, unitively that person is holy who is united with God; and by assimilation that person is holy who is capable of operations in accord with divine norms.

Argument:

It is grace, for it is unowed to nature, gratuitous, simply supernatural, and ordered to eternal life. It is sanctifying as unitive since it is the reality by which the Holy Spirit is given, indwelling, sealing, filling the souls of justified persons; it is sanctifying as assimilating, for it is the first intrinsic principle of all supernatural life.

Scholion:

Whether this notion of sanctifying grace is grounded in (1) scripture and (2) tradition.

- (1) *Scripture*: See 1 Corinthians 3:16ff.: "You are the temple of God, and the temple of God that you are is *holy*."
- (2) *Tradition*: The Fathers (*Enchiridion patristicum* 251, 607, 780) conclude from this text that the holiness of man depends on the Holy Spirit. Basil distinguishes between the holiness of the angels and the holiness of human beings (941). 950, 900: the angels are made holy by the present communion of the Holy Spirit; 944, 948; application of the same doctrine to human beings.

The same doctrine is found in other Fathers: 36, 40, 158, 159: coincidence of the gift of the Spirit and holiness.

Irenaeus: 219, 151, 253; the connection is clear.

Origen: 449; Cyprian 548; Methodius 613; Chrysostom 1282; Augustine 1701; Cyril of Alexandria 2063, 2080, 2099.

Now to the central question: the formal effects of sanctifying grace: regeneration, adoption, et cetera.²¹

- (1) Regeneration. See Titus 3:5: "he saved us, not because of any works of righteousness that we had done, but according to his mercy, through the water of rebirth and renewal by the Holy Spirit"; John 3:5: "Very truly, I tell you, no one can enter the kingdom of God without being born of water and Spirit." *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 27, a. 4: the notion of regeneration commonly, properly, and more properly. Commonly: the origin of one from another; properly: the origin of a living thing from a conjoined living principle; more properly: the origin of a living thing from a conjoined living principle in accord with a likeness in nature. See propositions 18 and 19 above, and 47 and 48 below.

- (2) Adoptive filiation.

Filiation: the same as generation more properly.

Adoption: the acceptance of one who is not son or daughter into the rights of son and daughter, and especially into the right of inheritance. See Romans 8:16-17: "if children, then heirs . . ."

Adoption (1) is a juridical or moral reality; (2) denies natural filiation; (3) supposes a likeness of nature.

²¹At this point Lonergan referred to Boyer 185: "Corollarium: De effectibus formalibus gratiae habitualis."

Lonergan's note as recorded by Crowe and Stewart: adoptive filiation as adoptive is called a secondary effect of sanctifying grace insofar as some condition enters in between grace and this effect.

Christ had grace and yet is not a son by adoption.

- (3) Participation in the divine nature. There is relevant here a threefold distinction: consortium, communication, and participation. Consortium refers to that concerning which something is found in the sources of revelation; 2 Peter 14, "consortium divine naturae." By "communication of the divine nature" we understand the uncreated gift. By "participation in the divine nature" we understand the created gift.

Communication is a fourfold reality. (1) Through the processions, the divine nature is communicated by the Father to the Son, and by the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit. (2) By the hypostatic union, the divine nature is communicated to the humanity of Our Lord Jesus Christ, since the same person is both God and man. (3) Through sanctifying grace, the divine nature is communicated to the souls of the justified, insofar as the uncreated gift is given to them and is had by them. (4) Through the light of glory, the divine nature is communicated to the intellects of the blessed, so that it becomes for them something of an intelligible species.

Participation is threefold. (1) There is participation in a mode common to all creatures, where the essence of God is the foundation of the possibles. Every created being is an analogical imitation and therefore a participation of the divine nature. (2) There is participation in a mode restricted to supernatural beings, which are participations of the divine nature absolutely: first, insofar as they are participations of the divine nature analogically, for they are finite beings; second, insofar as they have a special relation to God as he is in himself. (3) There is participation in a mode that is restricted to sanctifying grace itself. That is, sanctifying grace adds something special, for it is the intrinsic first principle from which operations flow; it is "ad modum naturae" in this sense.

Sanctifying grace is a participation in the divine nature in three ways: terminatively, formally, and by way of principle: (1) terminatively, insofar as it is that by which the uncreated gift is given; (2) formally, insofar as it is a certain analogical imitation of the divine nature and indeed in an absolutely supernatural degree; (3) by way of principle, both proximately

and remotely; proximately, insofar as from it there flows supernatural life on this earth; remotely, insofar as by the mediation of meritorious acts it is the seed of life eternal.

Now to the problem:

- (1) Van der Mersch, "Grace," DTC, VI, col. 1614 [1610-1615] contains a brief overview. Van der Mersch says that in the Scholastics the uncreated gift receives secondary consideration.²² Primary attention is paid to the creature named grace. Lennerz, 105, says this is a very difficult and obscure question. Pius XII in the encyclical about the mystical body of Christ praises serious inquiry about the issue (AAS, vol. 35, 1943, 193-243, at 231).
- (2) The roots of the problem are twofold: (a) Neo-Platonism, where assimilation and union are identical; and (b) an illegitimate abstraction (conceptualism). See Arnou, "Platonisme des Pères," DTC, XII, cols. 2258-2391. Also Arnou, "Textes et documenta," on this topic.
 - (a) Neo-Platonism confuses the logical and ontological orders. It elaborates a universal metaphysical system, and indeed is the first to do so. Aristotle really did not construct a metaphysical system. According to neo-Platonists, the metaphysical system grounded moral truths. The confusion of the logical and ontological orders consists not only in an affirmation of the existence of universals *a parte rei*, but also in the *identification of assimilation with union*. When we are good, we are joined to God through a likeness, and we are separated from God through diversity. Basil: union with the Holy Spirit is not local proximity but separation from the passions. Augustine: the more one is like to God, the nearer one draws to him. There is a threefold problem here: in the enunciation of the doctrine, in the understanding of the doctrine, and in the interpretation of the teachers.

In the enunciation of the doctrine: it would be superfluous for a neo-Platonist to say, "is united to God," when he has already said, "is assimilated to God." In the understanding of the doctrine: our twofold problem regarding assimilation to

²²This is where Lonergan discloses how he came to awareness of the problem that is represented in the first version of his proposition 22 above. See the Editor's note, page 45. above. Fill in bibliographical information on van der Mersch.

God and indwelling of the Holy Spirit would be *one* problem if we accept the neo-Platonic notions. In the interpretation of the teachers: let's suppose that some authors spoke in a neo-Platonic mode, while others later interpreted them *not knowing* that they had spoken in a neo-Platonic mode. Thus, an Aristotelian theologian, wishing to explain the doctrine as he finds it in the Fathers, and not finding there the doctrine concerning unity (which for these Fathers superfluous), now explains everything through *assimilation* alone.

- (b) An illegitimate abstraction. A foot cannot be understood without an animal, or a father without a child. Distinction and abstraction are not the same thing (*In Boet. de Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 3 c.). Application: as a foot is not understood apart from an animal, so a living member of Christ is not understood in abstraction from the mystical body of Christ. But in an illegitimate abstraction a foot is understood in abstraction from an animal, and a living member of Christ is understood in abstraction from the mystical body of Christ.

A justified person has a share in the divine nature insofar as one has sanctifying grace. One who has the intrinsic principle for the proper acts of a particular nature participates in that nature. But a justified person has the intrinsic principle for the proper acts of the divine nature: to love God as he is in himself, so see God as he is in himself, et cetera.

All of this is true, but is it all that can be said?

A justified person has adoptive filiation insofar as one is a creature participating in the divine nature. Adoptive filiation thus involves two things: imitation of God; creaturely existence, whereby one cannot be a natural child and so is a child by adoption.

There are two theories about the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

- (a) A justified person has the Holy Spirit indwelling insofar as one has the intrinsic principles of operations of knowing and willing whose object is God as he is in himself. This theory is found in Aquinas. Thomists indicate a connection with mystical experience. Suárez insists more on the nature of lover in the demands of friendship. The difficulty is that the object of knowledge and love can be present, but it can also be absent. Knowledge and love do not make an object

present. A possible response is that God is everywhere, so that with the addition of knowledge and love there are sufficient grounds for the indwelling. But another objection is that the Holy Spirit is sent many times in the scriptures, a fact that does not cohere with the doctrine. In addition, in the encyclical on the mystical body, Pius XII first posits presence and then speaks of knowing and willing.

- (b) The justified person has the Holy Spirit indwelling insofar as God, present in all his works through knowledge, presence, and omnipotence, is present in a *special* way where there is a participation in the divine nature. Thus Vasquez, Galtier, Lennerz. The difficulty is that the superior effect thus produced is not the uncreated gift, and that the presence itself, while it is uncreated, is not given. But Romans 5:5 does say that the Holy Spirit is *given*. Nor are they both (the effect and the presence) together.

Opinion (a) is by far the more common opinion. Everything is explained through sanctifying grace. Some other views are mentioned. Then directive principles are given from the documents of the church:

- (1) There does exist a real share in the divine nature and adoptive filiation. It is not explicitly defined but clearly enough found in scripture and tradition to say that it is *de fide*.
- (2) There does not exist an identification with God. We do not become God.
- (3) We must speak cautiously about the relation of the justified person to the distinct divine persons. Insofar as a creature has God as *efficient* cause there is no distinction between the persons. There remains, perhaps, a place for the distinction when God is considered as a *constitutive* cause.²³
- (4) There cannot be excluded the charity which is poured out in the hearts of the justified by the Holy Spirit.
- (5) The one unique formal cause of our justification is sanctifying grace. The Holy Spirit is not a formal cause.

The solution is proposed, then, in a methodological proposition: Although a legitimate distinction can be made between sanctifying grace

²³See above, note 4.

and its relations and their terms, still the abstraction is illegitimate whereby sanctifying grace is understood prescinding from the relations which in the actual order of salvation belong to its nature (*ratio*).

Terms: it is one thing to understand, another to conceive, which the one who understands does when expressing one's understanding; and it is still another thing to judge, which the one who understands does when measuring one's conceptions against their principle. Thus, we have three operations here: understanding, conceiving, and judging.

Therefore, it is one thing to abstract, which one does when one understands one thing while omitting others, and it is another thing to distinguish, which one does when one presents diverse concepts as diverse; and it is yet one more thing to separate, which one does when one judges that this is not that. "Legitimate distinction" thus pertains to conceiving.

We distinguish all these. But it is not a legitimate abstraction when one wishes to abstract from a concept all its relations. For example, in the definition of the soul, the soul is referred to the body and to the faculties of knowing and willing, and so on.

The sense of the assertion is methodological. It asks about distinctions and abstractions. It says abstraction is not legitimate, and distinction is legitimate. The end of the assertion is to make a judgment about the realities that underlie the opinions and disputations of the theologians.

The argument:

- (1) From Aquinas, *In Boet. de Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 3 c.: (a) there Thomas distinguishes a foot and an animal, an accident and a subject, a father and a child; therefore he makes a distinction; (b) he denies that a foot can be understood apart from the animal, an accident apart from its subject, a father apart from a child. And he states the general rule: when that by which the formality of a nature is constituted, and through which the nature itself is understood, is ordained to and dependent on something else, then the nature itself cannot be understood without that other reality. So too, sanctifying grace cannot be understood without the mystical body of Christ.
- (2) By analogy: the soul is defined in two ways: the first act of an organic body, and that by which we live, et cetera. Both definitions are in terms of relations. All we know of the soul is based on these relations. Hence we can understand nothing about the soul except through relations.

- (3) From the nature of theology: theology is a kind of wisdom, and it is the function of the wise person to order things, but order is through relations, and so there is no ordination except through relations.
- (4) From the Vatican Council, DB 1796, regarding the connection of the mysteries among themselves and the analogy of nature. Connection is a relation. Analogy: as the soul is understood through relations, so too is the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

15.11 Proposition 29: *By imperfect analogy, we may say that the Holy Spirit is the soul of the whole mystical body of Christ in such a way that created grace received in the just person is the one and only formal cause of justification.*

Terms:

Holy Spirit: the third person of the Blessed Trinity

Soul: the first act of an organic body

Analogy: a proportion ($a : b :: c : d$)

Perfect: in which the analogical formality is properly said of each term (God *is* and a human being *is*)

Metaphorical: in which the analogate is properly said of one term and metaphorically of the other (for example, George VI *is king*; the lion *is king*).

Imperfect: in which the analogical formality is said properly of one term and in part properly and in part improperly of the other (for example, "soul" is said properly of the human soul and partly properly and partly improperly of the Holy Spirit; properly, the soul : an organic body :: sight : the eye; imperfectly, the Holy Spirit : the mystical body :: created grace : a member of the mystical body).

The mystical body: that body of which St Paul and St John wrote. See the propositions about the living members of Christ, proposition 15. See Pius XII, AAS, 35, 1943, 193-248; Leo XIII, "Divinum illud," AAS, 29, 1897, 65. Lennerz, 106ff. DTC, sub Église, vol. IV, col. 2150-2155, under "Jesus Christ," vol. VIII, col. 1349 sq. *Theological Studies* (reference not given in either set of notes), where there is a bibliography.

Created grace: this does not exclude the virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. It is the grace spoken of by the Council of Trent at DB 799. What is excluded is uncreated grace.

Formal cause: intrinsic, determining, constitutive principle

Note:

- (1) That the Holy Spirit is the soul of the mystical body of Christ: this is clear in the magisterium of the church (the encyclical of Pius XII 60-61).
- (2) That it is not by a perfect analogy: this is theologically certain; otherwise, the mystical body of Christ would be an *unum per se*.
- (3) That it is not by mere metaphor is very probable, perhaps certain in view of the Encyclical.
- (4) That created grace is the one and only formal cause is defined in Trent, DB 799, 809 at the end.

Part 1: That the Holy Spirit is the soul of the entire mystical body: (a) Ephesians 4:4: one body and one spirit; (b) by comparison with many texts previously collated (proposition 15); one body, one spirit – the juxtaposition suggests one soul. The one Spirit is the Holy Spirit.

Also the Fathers understand things this way: Tromp, 2 fascicles in a series put out at the Gregorian.

LEO XII, AAS, 29, p. 650; Pius XII, AAS, 35, 220.

Part 2: It is by imperfect analogy: not perfect analogy, not metaphor, but imperfect analogy.

Not perfect analogy: (1) Pius XII, AAS, 35, 221-22. In the human body, the members do not have their own proper subsistence, but in the mystical body they do. Furthermore, the hand is for the sake of the person, but the mystical body is for the sake of the member (and the member for the sake of Christ, and Christ for the sake of God). (2) From reason: if the hand sins, it is not the hand but the person that sins. But if Peter or Paul sins, or believes, it is not the mystical body that sins or believes, but the person.

Not a merely metaphorical analogy: Pius XII, AAS, 35. In a moral body (society), the principle of unity is the end and the authority directing to the end, but in the mystical body of Christ there is another principle of unity that directs toward the end, namely, the Holy Spirit. And it is a more perfect principle than the principle of unity in society or the principle of unity found in the soul of a natural body.

But an imperfect analogy: it is an imperfect analogy if the Holy Spirit is present and operative in the members, joining them, as the soul is present

and operative and joining the elements. *Atqui, Ergo*. The minor: Pius XII, AAS, 35, 219-20. The Holy Spirit is present in the Head of the body. Luke 4:18-19. In the members, from the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the living members. It acts to join, is a principle of union: it is whole in the head, whole in the body, in each member, and so it is the principle of union among all of these. It is operative: Pius XII: (a) a principle of some vital and salutary action (that is, it causes actual grace and the habits); (b) it always gives birth to new members; (c) it is present and assisting in each member in accord with their function and office and in accord with the measure of grace that they have.

Part 3: Created grace received in the just is the one and only formal cause of justification. This is proven from the Council of Trent. The major is DB 799: "The justice of God by which he makes us just is the one and only formal cause of justification." The minor is DB 809: "But created grace received in the justified is the justification of God by which he makes us just." Therefore, the one and only formal cause of our justification is created grace received in the justified person.

Part 4: There is a problem. The Holy Spirit is the form of the body but not the form of the member. But the soul is the form of the body, and therefore the form of the members, and so too if the Holy Spirit is the form of the body, the Holy Spirit should be the form of the members.

There is a solution. For the Council of Trent did not exclude but rather presupposed and taught the doctrine of the mystical body of Christ, as is clear from DB 843: the just person is a living member of Christ; from DB 809 (in the middle), where Christ is described as having a vital influence on his members; from DB 795: "unless we are reborn in Christ, we are never justified"; from DB 798, where it is asserted that the status of the son of adoption is transference to the reign of Christ, which equals the church, the mystical body of Christ.

How is the soul related to the members of a natural body? See *Summa theologiae*, 1, 1. 76, a. 8. The soul is related to the individual organs: the soul, the form, communicates one act of existence to the body; therefore, also to the organs. It gives *esse* to the organs. It also gives to the organ to be an organ in act, for example, sight in the eye; the accidental forms flow from the soul. The eye and the eye in act are really distinct. A blind person has an eye but does not have an eye in act. And to all organs: insofar as it gives *esse* to the

organs, it also gives *material* unity. Even in the case of a blind, deaf, mute person, there is a material unity between eye, ears, and tongue. Also, insofar as from the same soul there flow the accidental forms into the organs – sight in the eye, et cetera – there is given a vital conjunction.

How is the Holy Spirit related to the members of the mystical body?

Prenote: the form is the intrinsic constitutive determining principle. But the Holy Spirit cannot be the intrinsic determining principle, for otherwise there would be two forms. Created grace would not be the one and only form. Nor can the Holy Spirit be said to be the principle, omitting “constitutive,” for the Holy Spirit should be constitutive in some way. If the Holy Spirit were in no way a constitutive principle, the Holy Spirit would not be any more the soul of the mystical body than God is the soul of the world. But God is not the soul of the world, even though he is totally present and operative throughout the universe.

Also, here are the differences and similarities between the Holy Spirit and the soul. The soul communicates its act of existence to the body in order that the body be one substantial composite; the Spirit gives its act of existence to the mystical body not in the mode of a form but in the mode of a gift. There does not result one substantial composite but an accidental union among diverse substances. Also, the members are first united to the Holy Spirit and through the Holy Spirit are united to the body, whereas in a human body there is first the soul and then the members. Furthermore, the perfection and operation of the organs is the perfection and operation of the composite; but the operation and perfection of the members of the mystical body is not the operation or perfection of the Holy Spirit.

From the soul the accidental forms naturally result in the organs. Similarly, from the gift of the Holy Spirit there naturally results created grace in the members: natural resultance, an objective consequence from that which is ontologically first. And the soul is the principle from which the accidental forms flow. But the soul is intrinsic, and the Holy Spirit extrinsic. That is, in our constitution the movement is from within, from the soul to the accidental forms, while in the mystical body the movement is from without, from the Holy Spirit to the members.

As the soul is the constitutive principle of vital union among the informed organs, so the Holy Spirit is the constitutive principle of vital union among the members. But this is not verified in precisely the same way in each case. The difference results from the different suppositis. The soul as

form gives *esse*. This is not the case with the Holy Spirit. Here is an instance of the imperfect analogy of which Pius XII spoke.

Now to our problem. The Holy Spirit is the soul of the mystical body insofar as it is a gift to each individual member.

Objection: The soul is the form of the body and therefore the soul of the organs. But the Holy Spirit is the soul or form of the mystical body. And therefore, the Holy Spirit is the form of the members.

Response: With regard to the major, the soul is the form of the body, yes; as to whether it is the form of the organs, a distinction must be made. It is not a form received in the organ itself, because the form received in the organ itself is an accidental form. But the soul is the form of the composite in which the organs reside.

And with regard to the minor: as to whether the Holy Spirit is the soul or form of the mystical body, a distinction has to be made. Directly, no. Is it so indirectly, through the mediation of the members, insofar as it is first a gift to the individual members? Another distinction is needed: by perfect analogy, no; by imperfect analogy, yes.

16. The Connection of the Mysteries among Themselves and with Our Last End

16.1 *Proposition 30: Grace is the gift of God in love, ordered to the gift of God in vision. And God gives in two ways. Summa theologiae, 2-2, q. 23, a. 1. The love of friendship is the mutual love of benevolence by which we will good to another and the other wills good to us; and this love is grounded in the communication of some good. The good can be extrinsic or intrinsic. God gives in two ways: in creation, and in the gift of himself in the supernatural order (1-2, q. 110, a. 1).*

16.2 *Proposition 31: And God gives himself in two ways: in beatific vision, and in love. God loves the just and in some infinite way, namely, as ordered to the beatific vision. One who loves in an order to the gift of himself already loves; and love itself has the formality of being the first gift. To those to whom God gives his love, to them he gives himself because his love is God himself. 1, q. 38, a. 2.*

16.3 *Proposition 32: The gift of God in love can be considered in two ways: (1) insofar as there is a relation of the lover to the person or the thing loved; this is essential love; and (2) as a rational act proceeding from the act of understanding and*

judging in the practical order These are not two loves but one and the same under diverse aspects. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 37, a. 1.

As considered in the first way, divine love is the divine essence. The divine essence is common to the three persons, and so this love is common to the three persons. The Father loves, the Son loves, the Holy Spirit loves. They love themselves, and they love all creatures.

The second way is what we call notional love. Divine love is the Holy Spirit, the divine essence as proceeding from the Father as act of understanding and from the Son as act of judging.²⁴ In this second way, it is better to say not that the Holy Spirit loves, but that the Holy Spirit *is* love. Again, in accord with this love, the Father and the Son love, and they love by the Holy Spirit. They love the Father and the Son and all creatures. See 1, q. 37, a. 2.

According to essential love, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit love, give their love, give themselves, for they are God, who is love. That is, they both give and are given. But according to love considered notionally, the Father and the Son give, but they are not given, for they are not the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is given, but does not give. *Summa theologiae, 1, q. 38, a. 1.*

16.4 Proposition 33: The Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit. 1, q. 37, a. 2. The Father is the first person, and the Son is one and the same person in two natures, divine and human. That the Father loves the Son as God in the Holy Spirit has already been determined, in the preceding proposition. Therefore, he also loves the Son as human by the Holy Spirit. For the human being is the same person as the Word, and love terminates at the person. The love of the Father towards the Son as human is clear in the gospel, where John baptizes Jesus at the Jordan. The Holy Spirit descends on the Son, "in whom I am well pleased."

16.5 Proposition 34: The Father likewise loves by the Holy Spirit those whom he joins to the Son. (1) He loves by the Holy Spirit, for he gives them his uncreated gift, the indwelling Holy Spirit. (2) The Father joins them to the Son: no one can come to me unless my Father has drawn him (John 6:42). (3) The Father joins them to the Son

²⁴Later, if not already here, this act of judging is for Lonergan a judgment of value. See Bernard Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, vol. 12 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 181.

as human because of the merits of the Son as human; see the treatise on redemption. (4) The Father joins them to the Son as human through the instrumentality of the Son, for the Son as human founds the church and institutes the sacraments. Through the church and the sacraments, we are incorporated into the Son. (5) Finally, the Father joins them to the Son through the Holy Spirit; through the gift of the Holy Spirit we are made living members of Christ. The Spirit is the intrinsic constitutive principle of vital union between the head and the members.

16.6 Proposition 35: Those whom the Father loves, he does not find pleasing; he makes them pleasing (1-2, q. 110, a. 1). We ourselves do not produce goodness in another whom we love. We love others because of the goodness in them. But God, the cause of all goodness, does not love us because he finds us good, but because he loves us he makes us good. First there is the love of God, then our loveability.

Therefore, God loves us in two ways: giving of his goods, and so in the natural order; and giving himself, and so in the supernatural order: giving created loveability that is both natural and supernatural, the latter being through the gift of himself.

16.7 Proposition 36: The Father makes those he loves pleasing by the grace of the Son.

- (1) What kind of grace is in the Son? In the Son as human, our Lord Jesus Christ, there is the grace of hypostatic union, that grace by which it is true that this man is God. This is the first grace. Further, as God the Father loves the Son as God by the Holy Spirit, it is also true that the Father loves the Son as human by the Holy Spirit. Similarly, the Son himself as God loves himself as human by the Holy Spirit, by the uncreated gift, the second grace. The third grace is that from the uncreated gift there results in the soul of this human being sanctifying grace. From sanctifying grace there results charity, from which flow the infused virtues. From charity in him who cannot sin, there results the beatific vision. All these graces are proper to the Son, consequent upon the grace of union. The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of union, the Spirit of Christ. Similarly, charity is the charity of Christ, and the vision is Christ's vision. Operating follows upon being.

- (2) This grace that is proper to the Son is extended to others, not in its root, which is the grace of union, but according to its consequences, that is, the gift of the Holy Spirit, sanctifying grace, charity, and also to those who persevere the beatific vision. To put this into a syllogism: The Father makes them pleasing by the grace of the Son, if the grace they receive consists of the consequences of the grace of hypostatic union. Atqui. Ergo.

16.8 Proposition 37: He makes them pleasing on account of the Son. This can be spelled out in a fourfold manner.

- (1) On account of the Son, according to the law of love, that a friend of one's friend is a friend to the one who loves one's friend: because the Father loves the Son, he loves those whom the Son loves, and the Son loves us.
- (2) According to the law of merit: as we are able to merit eternal life because of Christ, the beatific vision is consequent upon this.
- (3) According to the law of impetration.
- (4) According to the law of satisfaction.²⁵

16.9 Proposition 38: He makes them pleasing through the Son.

- (1) The Son as human institutes the church and the sacraments. Through the church and the sacraments, we receive grace. Therefore, we receive grace through the Son.
- (2) More intimately, it is not only the Father who gives us the Holy Spirit but also the Son. The Son also loves us by the Holy Spirit. The Son also sends the Holy Spirit into us. John 15:26, 14:16, Romans 8:8ff.

16.10 Proposition 39: He makes us pleasing in the Son, and this in two ways: through union and through assimilation.

- (1) Through union: "remains in me and I in him." John 6:54ff., 15:11ff. The just remain in him, in the mystical body of Christ, whose life is a

²⁵These last two ways are not spelled out in any detail in the notes.

participation of the life proper to the Son, communicated on account of the Son (proposition 37) and through the Son (proposition 38). And he remains in the just, for not only does he send the Holy Spirit but also he comes with his gift. John 14:23. Therefore, the Eucharist is the great symbol, and also the realization of the mystical body of Christ – “to remain in me and I in him.” Galatians 2:20: “it is now not I who live.”

(2) Through assimilation:

- (a) The grace of Christ received in us tends to take effect as in Christ (proposition 36: the just are made pleasing by the grace of Christ). Therefore, there is an assimilation, because there is the same principle of operation.
- (b) Romans 8:29: “those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, so that he might be the firstborn of many children.
- (c) From the precepts: “I have given you an example” (John 13:15); “Learn of me, for I am humble . . .” (Matthew 11:29).
- (d) From Christian tradition: the imitation of Christ (thus the book *The Imitation of Christ*, the *Spiritual Exercises* of St Ignatius, John 14:26 and 16:13: the Holy Spirit will teach you.

16.11 Proposition 40: *For this reason, supernatural life is called Life.*²⁶

On the notion of life, see *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 18, aa. 1-3. Living things are those things that move themselves in accord with some kind of movement. It does not suffice that someone move oneself, but one ought to move oneself in accord with one’s nature, by a connatural movement. A living thing is a substance to whom it pertains to move itself in accord with its nature. To live is to be in such a nature.

Two things, therefore, pertain to something living: (1) that it move itself in some way; (2) that it do this in accord with its nature.

²⁶Stewart has: “Qua ratione (Spiritus Sanctus) dicatur ista vita supernaturalis.” “For this reason, the Holy Spirit is called this supernatural life, or, For this reason this supernatural life is called the Holy Spirit.” Crowe has: “Qua ratione vita supernaturalis dicatur Vita: For this reason, supernatural life is called Life.” The latter seems better.

This definition cannot be applied univocally to supernatural life. For supernatural life is not the life of the whole, but of a member. The just are branches, not the vine. John 15, and see Romans 11:17ff. But if not univocally, then how is it applied? There are two considerations.

- (1) With respect to operations: The operations of the just are vital, acts of faith, hope, et cetera. These operations are absolutely proper to the just. That is, these acts are elicited in the just, not in Christ. The just person believes, hopes, et cetera, not Christ. The just loves with an imperfect love, sins venially; Christ does not love with an imperfect love, sin, et cetera. These operations are attributed to the members alone. But they are produced by Christ as the first principle, insofar as they are good and supernatural, and by the members insofar as they are free.
- (2) With respect to connaturality: the connaturality of operations pertains to the member, not to the substance. For example, the proper principle of vision is present in the eye, but there are also present the muscles, et cetera, in accord with which the eye performs its operation in accord with its nature for the good of the whole body. So too, the irascible appetite is present in a person so that he may act, that is, do his proper work, but the moral virtues perfect those appetites so that they operate in accord with the dictate of reason.

Similarly, there are present in the just sanctifying grace and the infused virtues, whence one connaturally does the works of Christ; whence connaturally one lives in accord with the supernatural life of Christ. And since these gifts do not suffice, there are present also the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit by which it happens connaturally that people are easily moved, directed, by the instinct of the Holy Spirit.

On these gifts see 1-2, q. 68, aa. 1-3; Lange, *De gratia* 458-61 (34ff.). Whence it is said in Romans 8:14, "all who are led by the Spirit of God are children of God." Also, so that we might be the best "instruments" of God. Therefore, we require special help to persevere, which comes from the gift of the Holy Spirit. And so, he makes us pleasing not according to assimilation alone but also in accord with union.

16.12 Proposition 41: For this reason, the Holy Spirit is said to be given and to indwell.²⁷

Intimate personal love is more easily begged for than expressed.

- (1) To love someone is to will good to that person. Because one *wills* good, one also *does* good, and indeed gratuitously. Still, to do good is not love itself but the effect of love.
- (2) The different grades of love are more easily perceived in the effects than in love itself.
- (3) Thus we distinguish between love in general and intimate love.
 - (a) Love in general is the love by which one either in act or habitually does good to another; for example, in giving to the poor.
 - (b) Intimate love is the love by which one makes a radical gift to another, the gift of oneself, so that all the good things that one will ever be able to do are already done in one act.

In order to understand the nature of intimate love, we consider two effects. There is an effect that is more external. Friends have all things in common. The greater intimate love is, the less it distinguishes between mine and thine, and the more it brings it about that one's own goods become common, so that we choose to pursue those goods which friends can enjoy in common.

And there is an effect that is more internal. A friend is another self. Before one loves another intimately, one thinks especially about oneself. One considers especially what is good for oneself, what is able to hurt oneself. One desires and pursues the former, and fears and shuns the latter. One is an egoist. But after one has been affected by intimate love, egoism vanishes.

Therefore, the definition of intimate love must contain something about its quasi-object, the act with respect to the object, and the effect.

- (i) The quasi-object: the object of love, certainly, is the good. But special love has a special quasi-object. *Primarily* it is the transformation of the way in which one relates to the pursuit and enjoyment of the

²⁷Stewart has: "Qua ratione Spiritus Sanctus inhabitare, amare dicitur," "For this reason the Holy Spirit is said to indwell, to love." Crowe has: "Qua ratione Spiritus Sanctus dari et inhabitare dicitur" "For this reason the Holy Spirit is said to be given and to indwell." The latter seems correct. It is easy to understand how Stewart might have heard Lonergan's "dari" as "amare." What might support Stewart's rendition is the prevalence of love in what follows.

end, and *secondarily* it is a change in the end itself and/or in the pursuit of the end and/or in the enjoyment of the end.

The relation to the end is threefold: to will, to pursue, and to enjoy. The mode of the relation to the end is the *finis cui*, the end to which: to will for oneself, to pursue for oneself, to enjoy for oneself, or to will for the other, to pursue for the other, to enjoy with the other, et cetera. Therefore, the primary quasi-object is the transformation in the *finis cui*, the end to which. And the secondary quasi-object is the conditioned transmutation in accord with what the transformation of the mode demands.

- (ii) The act or habit with respect to the object is to *will* this quasi-object.
- (iii) The effect: The primary effect of intimate love is the transmutation of the *mode* by which one relates to the end. Note here that the primary effect is immediately had through the very act of loving or willing itself. The secondary effect is the consequent change either in the end itself or in the pursuit of the end or in the enjoyment of the end. And the secondary effect is partly brought about immediately and partly by operating: immediately, there is that which is effected by willing; by operating, something is produced that is not produced by willing.

16.13 Proposition 42: *Whether in God there is intimate personal love of this kind. The answer is yes, in two ways.*

- (1) Ad intra, the Father communicates infinite good to the Son, and the Father and the Son communicate infinite good to the Holy Spirit, where the infinite good is to be God, with all that follows from this.
- (2) Ad extra: (i) through the hypostatic union there is communicated the divine act of existence to the humanity of our Lord Jesus Christ; (ii) through sanctifying grace there is communicated the uncreated gift to the just; (iii) through the light of glory God himself is communicated to the blessed as to be known intuitively, to be loved, and to be enjoyed.

16.14 *Proposition 43: Whether the primary effect of divine intimate love for the just is the gift of the Holy Spirit and the foundation of indwelling.*

Recall that the primary effect is the transformation of the mode by which one relates to the pursuit and enjoyment of the end, namely, the radical gift of Oneself and the assumption of the other into one's intimate life through loving care.

To those whom God intimately loves he makes the radical gift of himself and assumes them into his own intimate life by some loving care. Moreover, in keeping with the first radical gift of himself is the gift of the Holy Spirit, the uncreated gift.

And in accord with the second there is had the foundation of indwelling. In the scriptures:

Romans 8:9-11, 8:14-16, 8:26-27: "But you are not in the flesh; you are in the Spirit, since the spirit of God dwells in you. Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him. But if Christ is in you, though the body is dead because of sin, the Spirit is life because of righteousness. If the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also through his Spirit that dwells in you . . . For all who are led by the Spirit of God are children of God. For you did not receive a spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have received a spirit of adoption. When we cry, 'Abba! Father!' it is that very Spirit bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God . . . Likewise the Spirit helps us in our weakness; for we do not know how to pray as we ought, but that very Spirit intercedes with sighs too deep for words. And God, who searches the heart, knows what the mind of the Spirit is, because the Spirit intercedes for the saints according to the will of God."

Galatians 4:6: "And because you are children, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, 'Abba! Father!'"

Ephesians 4:30: "And do not grieve the Holy Spirit of God, with which you were marked with a seal for the day of redemption."

John 14:16-18: "And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Advocate, to be with you forever. This is the Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it neither sees him nor knows him. You know him, because he abides in you, and he will be in you."

John 14:26: "But the Advocate, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, will teach you everything, and remind you of all that I have said to you."

John 15:26: "When the Advocate comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth who comes from the Father, he will testify on my behalf."

John 16:7-15: "Nevertheless I tell you the truth: it is to your advantage that I go away, for if I do not go away, the Advocate will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him to you. And when he comes, he will prove the world wrong about sin and righteousness and judgment: about sin, because they do not believe in me; about righteousness, because I am going to the Father and you will see me no longer; about judgment, because the ruler of this world has been condemned. I still have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth; for he will not speak on his own, but will speak whatever he hears, and he will declare to you the things that are to come. He will glorify me, because he will take what is mine and declare it to you. All that the Father has is mine. For this reason I said that he will take what is mine and declare it to you."

Why is it said to be only the foundation of indwelling? See *Summa theologiae*, 1, q. 43, a. 3, where Thomas explains indwelling through the fact that *we* have the Holy Spirit, perfectly in heaven, imperfectly on earth. Enjoyment is knowledge and intimate love. The gift itself is God with the relation of indwelling. To the gift on God's part there corresponds "to have" on our part, that is, sanctifying grace. Therefore, we say "foundation," not "indwelling" itself, in order to be in harmony with the mind of Thomas.

16.15 Proposition 44: Whether the secondary effect that is immediately produced by indwelling is grace making one pleasing, that is, sanctifying grace.

Certainly it is immediately produced, because it is an effect, by extrinsic denomination. And it makes a change in the end by which (the external glory of God, the mode of attaining the end which, that is, God) so that it be supernatural, not natural. We have intrinsic principles, proportioned to a supernatural end.

16.16 Proposition 45: Whether the uncreated gift and the created gift can be separated. Clearly not. For God gives himself through intimate love, and created grace is the term ad extra by which it is true that God gives himself. What gives and the terminus that is given cannot be separated. Therefore, a metaphysical separation

of the created gift from the uncreated gift is not possible. Here we stand against Lessius and Scheeben.

16.17 *Proposition 46: Whether the Holy Spirit is given by appropriation or properly. The Holy Spirit would be given properly if only the Holy Spirit were given and not the Father and the Son. The Holy Spirit would be given by appropriation if the Father and the Son are also given with the Holy Spirit. This is similar to saying of the Father that the Father creates.*

The gift of the Holy Spirit is said to be according to intimate love. This love can be considered in two ways: essentially and notionally. As considered essentially, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit equally give and are given. As considered according to notional love, the Father and the Son love, and therefore give, while the Holy Spirit does not love but is the love, and therefore the

Gift of love. Thus "gift" is a proper name of the Holy Spirit (1, q. 38, aa. 1 and 2). Thus in accord with notional love, the Father and the Son give, they come with their love, but they are not given. The Spirit is sent, given, and does not give.

Thus, the response to the question is that in one way the Holy Spirit is given by appropriation and in another way the Holy Spirit is given properly. God is not only an effective principle but also a constitutive principle. Insofar as God is said to give, God is an effective principle. Insofar as God is given, God is constitutive, that is, an extrinsic constitutive. Or again, insofar as God is said to give, God is an effective principle, and insofar as God is said to be given, God is an affective principle.

16.18 *Proposition 47: Whether the uncreated gift was explained well above.*

- (1) There are deficiencies in other theories. Some say that God is present by essence, power, and presence, and present in a special way through supernatural effects. But the *uncreated* gift does not seem to be explained, for someone can be present and still not indwell. And we are able to love that which is not given. Others say that supernatural love and knowledge suffice. But in this way greater attention is given to the gift, not to the indwelling. We can know and love what is absent.

- (2) Thomas says everything that we say. 1, 38, 1 and 2, concerning the gift; 43, 3, about indwelling. The connection between the two is not explicitly given, namely, that the gift is the foundation of the indwelling. *1 Sent.*, d. 14, qq. 1 and 2; *1 Sent.*, d. 18, aa. 1 and 2. *Contra Gentiles*, 4, c. 21. Still, elsewhere Thomas seems to explain this more along the lines of presence.

From the defects of the other theories and from what Thomas does say, we have enough. Pius XII first posits presence and then knowledge and love. And so what is lacking in Thomas can be found in Pius XII. And Pius XII cites Thomas as well.

Objections:

- (1) This theory offers only a moral union, a union according to volition: all will and love the same thing. Response: I deny that it is any old union according to volition and what is willed. It is a union consequent upon intimate love and indeed intimate divine love, which is really identical with the divine substance and which makes pleasing what it loves. That this is merely moral, we let pass (*transeat*).
- (2) It is simply by appropriation. This is the more common view among theologians. Insofar as they strongly reject the view of Petavius and Scheeben, I concur. Insofar as they reject the view of St Thomas, that "gift" is a proper name of the Holy Spirit, I disagree. Perhaps not sufficient attention has been given to those articles.
- (3) Again, some say "gift" is a proper name of the Holy Spirit *ab aeterno*, but the gift of the Spirit through grace is in time. Therefore, it is false to bring in the view of Thomas.

Response: The Spirit is properly said to be given in accord with the divine processions without any real term *ad extra ab aeterno*. The Spirit is properly said to be given *to us* in accord with the same processions but with a real *terminus ad extra*, and therefore in time. *1 Sent.* d. 14, qq. 1 and 2; d. 18, aa. 1 and 2.

16.19 Proposition 48: Through sanctifying grace there is given a share (consortium) in the divine nature. (1) According to the more common opinion,

through sanctifying grace there is given a remote intrinsic proportionate principle for supernatural operations proper to God. To have such a principle is to have a share in the divine nature. (2) According to some of the Fathers (Enchiridion patristicum 766, 770, 780, 1071, 2010, also Thomas, 1, q. 38, a. 1), through sanctifying grace there is given the uncreated gift, the divine nature itself communicated to us in the manner of a gift.

16.20 Proposition 49: Through sanctifying grace there is given adoptive filiation. (1) In the more common opinion, there is filiation insofar as there is a share in the divine nature, and there is adoptive filiation insofar as that share is had by a created person. (2) According to some of the Fathers (Enchiridion patristicum 407, 766, 788, 813, 2106), there is adoptive filiation insofar as the Spirit of Christ is given to us and dwells in us and assimilates us to the Son through the grace of the Son. Romans 8:15 and Galatians 4:6 are explained in this way. (Romans 8:15: "For you did not receive a spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have received a spirit of adoption. When we cry, 'Abba! Father!' it is that very Spirit bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God." Galatians 4:6: "And because you are children, God has sent the spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, 'Abba! Father!'")

But there are difficulties. (a) There is not given adoptive filiation through sanctifying grace but only a hope for it. See Romans 8:23: "... groan inwardly while we wait for adoption ..." Response: It is true that it is not had perfectly. It is not true that it is not given even imperfectly. (b) Adoptive filiation is had without sanctifying grace. Romans 9:4: "they are Israelites, and to them belong the adoption ..." Response: Adoptive filiation pertains to the Hebrews *in figura*, yes. Does it belong in reality? No. But *per accidens*, insofar as Israelites have grace individually; not *per se*.

16.21 Proposition 50: A living member of Christ is a friend of God. DB 799. Definition of friendship: friendship is the mutual love of benevolence in the communication of some good. It requires love, mutuality, and communication or common seeking or enjoyment. God loves us through sanctifying grace. We love God in act and habit. There is the communication of a good: the uncreated gift, the Holy Spirit, here on earth; in heaven, the uncreated gift is given through intuitive vision.

16.22 *Proposition 51: A living member of Christ is just before God (coram Deo). Justice (1-2, q. 113, a. 1) is twofold: (1) according to the ordination of the act; the act is ordered through commutative, distributive, legal justice; (2) interior ordering of the person is also called justice: reason subordinated to God and inferior powers to reason. The latter is what the proposition is referring to. It is had when sanctifying grace is present. For this ordering is produced in accord with the infused virtues, both theological and moral. Through charity we are subordinated to God. Through faith and hope charity is nourished. Through the virtues all else is subordinated to charity. And such justice is coram Deo. For grace assimilates us to Christ, and Christ shows in his life the norms of divine justice.*

Lonergan's note as reported by Crowe and Stewart: there is a twofold restitution of the interior person, an imperfect one in this life and a perfect one in heaven. In this life, a just person can avoid all mortal sins. But without a privilege one cannot avoid all venial sins and remains concupiscent. In heaven not only venial sins but also positive imperfections are avoided, and there is no concupiscence.

16.23 *Proposition 52: A living member of Christ has remission of one's sins. Sin is either enmity with God (personal aspect) or disorder in the person. According to either aspect sin is removed through sanctifying grace insofar as the person is a living member of Christ. Enmity is removed through friendship. Disorder is removed through interior ordering. The remission of sins necessarily flows from sanctifying grace in such a way that one cannot be both friend and enemy – thus by metaphysical necessity.*

16.24 *Proposition 53: In the actual order of things remission of sins does not occur except by being a living member of Christ: (1) de facto, (2) de iure, (3) by metaphysical necessity. (1) The fact: DB 795: "Unless one is reborn in Christ": rebirth in Christ is a necessary condition of remission. (2) From the nature of things, rebirth is required for remission. Without grace we are not ordered to a supernatural end, and so we are disordered. (3) Absolutely it is required. Otherwise there would be a contradiction. The same person would be ordered and at the same time disordered.*

16.25 *Proposition 54: Not only before justification but per se in justification itself there are had free acts, namely, faith and the detestation of sins. As for "before," see DB 798. In justification itself (though not in infants): see 1-2, q. 113, aa. 3-5, 7, 8. Why are there free acts in justification itself? Because there are already present*

second acts and the infusion of the virtues as a kind of pre-motion to those acts so that they be free.

Editor's note: At this point the propositions end. Lonergan goes on to discuss the natural desire to see God, and perhaps for the first time in public remarks discusses (very briefly) Henri de Lubac's *Surnaturel*. The next installment in this reconstruction of the course will begin with that material.