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Creation and Causality in Chasidic Kabbalism

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An important strain of medieval Jewish thought, kabbala, finds its most explicit and rationalistic exposition within the Chasidic philosophical tradition. A key work is the *Tanya* of R. Schneur Zalman of Liadi ("the Alter Rebbe," 1745–1812) the founder of the Lubavitch or Chabad movement. Kabbalistic interpretation, speculation, and practice had been traditionally understood to be too dangerous for all but those who had reached the highest levels of spiritual and intellectual achievement. For R. Schneur Zalman, on the other hand, all people share the intellectual faculties by which the metaphysical structure of the cosmos can to some extent be grasped. A straightforward, philosophical exposition of these teachings could allow all who study it to understand as much as they are able, which, he thought, could only be to the good.¹

The second book of the *Tanya*, *Shaar HaYichud VeHaEmunah* (*The Gate to [the Understanding of] G-d’s Unity and the Faith*) deals with the relation between the existence of God and that of other things, most importantly, that of human beings. R. Schneur Zalman argues that, if God is the truly first cause, He must be self-sufficient, which in turn means that He lacks nothing

required for the exercise of His causal power. Monism is the logical consequence,\(^2\) for if there were anything other than God, in regard to which He exercises His power, such exercise would depend on this external thing, and for this reason God would no longer be self-sufficient and all-powerful.\(^3\) Nonetheless, there appears to be a multiplicity of objects; this multiplicity is consigned to how things seem to us, in a manner that is reminiscent of the Parmenidean distinction between being and doxa (appearance). Given that this multiplicity is, in reality (that is, from the perspective of God) merely the one God, God is responsible for every detail within the phenomenal world.\(^4\) This is not to say that the regularities that the phenomenal world exhibits have no ground at all other than their divine origin. R. Schneur Zalman dovetails an essentialist account of things within his occasionalistic monistic

\(^2\) The view that R. Schneur Zalman takes things other than God to be illusions is argued by R. Elior, The Paradoxical Ascent to God: The Kabbalistic Theosophy of Habad Hasidism, tr. J. M. Green (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 49–57; see also R. Foxbrunner, Habad: The Chasidism of R. Schneur Zalman of Lyady (Northvale, N.J.: J. Aronson, 1992), pp. 110–11. N. Gurary, Chasidism: It Development, Theology, and Practice (Northvale, N.J.: J. Aronson, 1997), pp. 120–21, 134–37, points to the importance of creation to argue that R. Schneur Zalman’s meaning is not that the world is an illusion. Rather, he argues, his teaching is merely that the world is contingent. He does not explain why an illusion cannot be something of importance arising through the divine will.

\(^3\) Tanya 1.20–22.

\(^4\) See Tanya 2.7. This view derives from the Ba’al Shem Tov, the founder of Chasidism. See Gurary, 139–142, who compares this teaching to that of Maimonides.
metaphysics. The regularities within the world can be rendered intelligible by showing how as a matter of logical necessity they are entailed by these essences. But the existence of a thing with a certain essence, and the set of the essences that there are, are contingent, at every moment brought about through an act of divine causation. (The essences of things are understood as resultant from the combination and arrangement of the letters that make up their Hebrew names.)

R. Schneur Zalman acknowledges that the existence of the world cannot be really explained; the nature of divine causality is far beyond the grasp of the human mind. Nonetheless, he presents an account of it, by developing the metaphors of light and speech. The positive account developed within the Tanya can be best understood in contrast to the classical notions of causality that would have been familiar to R. Schneur Zalman through his extensive reading in medieval Jewish philosophy.

What sort of causal link between one event and another is it that we can immediately understand? Consider what occurs when someone, call him Michael, hands a letter to someone else, call him Sam. What is the cause of Sam’s having the letter? Clearly it is the fact that Michael handed over the letter. This event explains Sam’s possession of the letter, and renders this fact intelligible. There is a necessary link between being given a letter and possessing a

Thus in Tanya 2.2, accidental change (yesh miyesh) is distinguished from the coming into existence of a new substance (yesh me ’ayin). See the exposition of Y. Wineberg in Lessons in Tanya, vol. 3 (Brooklyn: Kehot, 1989), pp. 846–47. As in Aristotelian physics, these two varieties of change are distinguished depending on whether there is persistence of an essential attribute. But for R. Schneur Zalman substantial and accidental change, as Aristotle understands them, would both fall under the class of yesh miyesh, for even substantial generation involves the actualization of a potentiality inherent within already existing matter. So even here some substrate with some essential attribute persists through the change.
letter. Consider another case: fire warms the metal which is placed near it. On a naive understanding of heat and physical objects, here too something is being given over from one thing to another. The heat of the fire is transmitted, as it were, to the metal. A third case is that of the sun, and its light. The sun radiates its light, which allows it to be seen, in such a way that it allows other things to be seen. In all of these cases, the fact that B is C is explained by showing how this is necessitated by the fact that C is given to B by A.\(^6\)

\(^6\)If the effect does not necessarily result from the cause, the whole cause has not been identified, and the effect has not been thoroughly explained. One could still ask why the effect that did not have to come about did in fact occur. These considerations lie behind the great appeal of a foundationalist account of scientific explanation, like that of Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* and its descendants. Insofar as one rejects the view that explanations rest on principles or facts that do not demand explanation, what one accepts as an explanation will depart from the ideal of rendering the world intelligible.

\(^7\)The accounts of heat and light that are given by contemporary science greatly complicate our understanding of the true sequence of events involved in such cases. At the atomic level, the transfers of energy involved are astonishingly complex, and again, at the subatomic level, there are apparently gaps between cause and effect, so that it is not immediately evident why a certain cause must result in a certain effect. This is because, according to recent theories in physics, neither heat nor light turn out to be a kind of stuff or thing, handed over from one place to another. (Indeed, on one interpretation, the theory of general relativity calls into question the extent to which we are ultimately justified in considering Michael, Sam, and the letter as substantial realities.) But I bring up heat and light only as examples. If there really were cases in which one thing is handed over from one place to another, we would have a case of an intelligible, necessary causal connection.
Such explanations rely on what A. C. Lloyd has called “The Transmission Model of Causality,” pervasive in Western philosophical thought. Its most comprehensive and systematic use was in the natural philosophy of Aristotle, to which R. Schneur Zalman would have been exposed, in his reading of Maimonides. Although within Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics little is said of explanation through the identification of the efficient cause, in his physical and biological treatises, Aristotle identifies a great number of links between efficient cause and effect which conform to the transmission model. Just as the fire imparts its own heat to the object sitting near it, so an animal is thought to transmit its own species-form to its offspring. The series of regular natural events is to be understood as a series of basic stuffs or beings in the process of being transmitted from source to recipient. In each case, given appropriate contact, a thing which is actually $x$ must transmit $x$ to that which is only potentially $x$. God’s activity too, was


9Aristotle’s conception of efficient causation is to be understood along the lines of the transmission model. Formal causation follows this model only insofar as one is explaining the efficient cause for the form’s inherence of matter (although perhaps the attribution of a formal cause to a state of affairs understood synchronically would follow this model, insofar as the form is understood as something different from the composite substances whose basic attributes and abilities are inherited from the form, imparting to them its structure and attributes). In the case of final causation we can hardly have a case of a future, planned event, transmit something back to the present. Nonetheless the purpose in the mind of the agent can be transmitted through action. That is to say, that which the agent has in mind, first exists in the mind, and thereby is imparted to that which has the potentiality for
understood in this way, especially among the Greek neoplatonists and the Arab Aristotelians. God is thought to be the cause of the being of things by virtue of imparting the being that He has in Himself. The analogy is often made to the sun, which illuminates all things by imparting its own light.

being its substrate. Similarly, the final cause of the developing organism is found in the form of that organism which is transmitted through the seed (Phys. 2.7 198a22–27, Meta. Z 7). The case of material causation may be hardest to subsume under the transmission model. One can say, however, that pre-existent matter is responsible for certain attributes of a composite substance since it conveys some of its (lower-level) formal attributes to the composite of which is the substrate. (For example, the bottle is brittle because it is made of glass, and glass is a brittle stuff.)

This is also how Maimonides understands Aristotle's account of God's activity. See the discussion in Guide of the Perplexed 2.12 of God's activity as an “overflow,” a neoplatonic notion absent from the writings of Aristotle, for whom God, as object of desire, is responsible for the motion of things, not their existence (Meta. 12.7). Maimonides accepts the neoplatonic version of Aristotelian metaphysics put forward by the Arabic Aristotelians, especially al-Farabi. See his praise of al-Farabi's works as “faultlessly excellent” in the letter to Samuel Ibn Tibbon, quoted in the S. Pines, “Translator’s Introduction” in Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

See Plato, Republic 6 508b–509c, Plotinus, Enneads 5.3.12.39–44 and 5.1.6.26–30 (on which see J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus: A Commentary on Selected Texts [Leiden and New York : E. J. Brill, 1988], pp. 134–35), from which derives the pseudo-Aristotelian Theology of Aristotle 8, by which the metaphor was conveyed to Arabic Aristotelians and to Jewish philosophers, including Jewish mystical thought; cf. G.
But it would seem as though causality as transmission is incompatible with monism. Must not that which is imparted, and that which receives it, be truly different from that which is doing the imparting?

Perhaps multiplicity itself is that which is being imparted to the world. But, in accordance with the Transmission Model, the source of the multiplicity would already have multiplicity within it. But this is incompatible with monotheism and, \textit{a fortiori}, with the monism which R. Schneur Zalman takes to be fundamental to Judaism.

If, as \textit{Tanya} 2.1 declares, love of God is to rest on knowledge of God, the transmission model of causality, accepted as furnishing a complete understanding of what it is to cause either something to exist or an event to occur, would be dangerous to Jewish life. But within the second book of \textit{Tanya} an alternative account of causation is put forward, to the end of rendering partially intelligible God's activity upon and in the world.

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In Chapter 2 of the second book of the \textit{Tanya}, R. Schneur Zalman addresses the objection of those who question the philosophical possibility of the miracle by which the Red Sea was parted. The heretics object that such an irruption in the natural course of events is unacceptable to reason. In response, the R. Schneur Zalman suggests that they are focusing on the sort of creation that occurs when one created being (such as an artisan) works on another (such as an artifact). But God's activity involves bringing about the very being of a thing, a mode of causation both higher and more fundamental than that involved in the miracle of the parting of the

Red Sea. In the latter case, an existing substance was simply given a new characteristic. R. Schneur Zalman calls it “[making] one existing thing out of [another, already] existing thing (yesh miyes). The greater miracle lies in the fact that a thing exists at all: the fact that God has created a thing out of nothing (yesh me’ayin).” In providing this answer to the heretic, R. Schneur Zalman makes clear that the point he is making is not merely conceptual; it is ethical. He asks the reader to consider the ethical consequences of the heretic’s objection. If indeed it were impossible for the Red Seas to part, if indeed this would be beyond the capacity of God, or would constitute a compromise in God’s unity, Torah would be a compilation of falsehoods, and there would be no obligation to perform or keep from performing any action, simply on account of the fact that it is commanded by Torah.

The model of causation that is presented to account for yesh m’ayin is the tzimtzum (alternatively translated as “contraction” or “concealment.”) The basic idea, which R. Schneur Zalman adopts from Lurianic kabbala, is that creation does not involve adding anything to reality that was not already in the source. For saying this imputes a deficiency to the source. If, in the beginning, all there is is the source, and this source is lacking in nothing, how could anything possibly be added to it? Yet creation occurs. Since it is a causal activity, it would seem that creation somehow involves transmission of what is in the source. Transmission to what? To something new? But if there is something new, then in the process of creation something new has been added to the source, and we have seen that, from the monistic standpoint that R. Schneur Zalman adopts, this is impossible.

So how can creation be a process by which something new comes about? Creation must be a kind of subtraction from the

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13The following remarks are confined to the first tzimtzum, the tzimtzum harishon, by which creation ex nihilo is effected.
source. Nothing is present in the created that is not in the creator, but there is much in the creator that is not in the created. Creation is to be understood as a process by which God conceals and restricts His own being. Given the monistic assumptions that underlie the account of creation, this concealment and restriction cannot constitute a real withdrawal of God away from the world, a point on which R. Schneur Zalman and his successors insisted, in opposition to those who interpreted the Lurianic teaching as asserting that God is not present within the phenomenal world. The tzimtzum furnishes the conditions under which such an appearance can arise. The withdrawal of God is the means by which there comes about the limited perspective by which reality is perceived in a manner different from how it is perceived by God. God’s causality, then, is jointly found in transmission and withdrawal.

Although the true nature of the tzimtzum is wholly impenetrable to human reason, two metaphors shed some light on this. The first is that of the relation between the sun and its


15See Tanya 2.7, On the controversy, see Elior, pp. 80–91, Gurary, pp. 102–16.

16See, for example, Tanya 2.4, 299: “And it is not within the scope of the intellect of any creature to comprehend the essential nature of the tzimtzum and concealment [of the life-force] and that nonetheless the body of the creature itself be created ex nihilo—just as it is not within the capacity of any creature’s intellect to comprehend the essential nature of the creation of being out of nothing.”
light. We have noted that, among the Greeks, this served as a prototypical example of a causal relationship of transmission. Thus, according to Republic 6 the sun transmits both warmth, by which physical things exist, as well as light, by which other physical beings are aware of them (through sight). Likewise, the Form of the Good transmits being to the Forms (which in turn are responsible for whatever intelligible characteristics physical things possess), and also imparts that which is required if they are to be known. The Good performs this function by its own intelligibility and being to the things for which it is responsible.17

Neoplatonic thinkers found a new way to exploit Plato’s metaphorical description of the Form of the Good as a kind of sun. The ultimate cause of all things, the Good or the One, causes the Forms to be through a kind of flowing out, or imparting of what is already within it. Like the outpouring of the sun’s radiance, this is a kind of transmission of inner content that does not diminish that which is present in the source, by which the source is never exhausted. The model of emanation is likewise extended to other, derivative causal processes. Divine causation is thus understood as a kind of transmission of characteristics that God already possesses.

The metaphor of the sun shining on the created world maintains a real distinction between cause and caused, the agent and the recipient of the transmission. This is incompatible with the monistic metaphysics of the Tanya. R. Schneur Zalman deals with this issue by finding a third way to exploit the metaphorical likening of God to the sun.

According to the neoplatonic metaphor, the rays of the sun represent Intellect, the second hypostasis, which is multiform and different from the One, its source, which radiates as it remains

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unchanged. As such it is an antecedent for R. Schneur Zalman’s use of the metaphor. But R. Schneur Zalman alters the force of the metaphor by taking it in a new direction. He considers the status of the unity and independence of the sun’s rays, as regarded from the vantage point of the sun itself. The sun is likened to God, that which has the true perspective of the unity of all things, the sun’s rays to the things that God creates (which, from the outside, are aware of a plurality). When considered in relation to the sun itself, the rays have no separate existence, they are simply an aspect of the sun’s activity, an aspect which, if properly understood, is not to be distinguished from the central activity of the core. However, from a perspective distanced from the sun, a perspective from which one is blind to the inner workings of the sun’s radiance, each ray spreads itself out independently from the sun, and appears to have an existence unto itself.

There in its own place, this radiance is considered naught and complete nothingness, for it is absolutely nonexistent in relation to the body of the sun-globe which is the source of this light and radiance, inasmuch as this radiance and light is merely the illumination which shines from the body of the sun-globe itself. It is only in the space of the universe, under the heavens and on the earth, where the body of the sun-globe is not present, that this light and radiance appears to the eye to have actual existence . . . In the same manner the term YESH (“existence” can be applied to all created things only [as they appear] to our corporeal eyes, for we do not see nor comprehend at all the source, which is the spirit of G-d, that brings them into existence.

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18 See the Plotinus references in n. 11.

19 Tanya 2.3, 293–95.
R. Schneur Zalman must accept a kind of idealism, in order to grant some limited reality to the phenomenal world. In reality, there is only God, but there are many appearances of many other things. Creation is, in effect, the generation of a multiplicity of perspectives. Only that perspective that comprehends the unity of all things is true. Yet other perspectives exist. They themselves are caused by a kind of transmission: they exist by virtue of that which possesses the true perspective. In this way, R. Schneur Zalman suggests that one can understand how it can be the case that all objects other than God depend on God for their very being, and yet show themselves to us as having an independent existence of their own. From the point of view of God there is only God; yet, from our point of view, distant from God and His workings, the results of the divine activity (including ourselves) seem to have the status of independent beings.

We see that the Tanya employs a Transmission Model of Causality, with a difference. It is not only the being of the attribute itself that is being transmitted. Rather, what is being transmitted is primarily consciousness, by virtue of which there is a unique perspective by which there can be awareness of such an attribute. For such consciousness is the precondition of the phenomenal existence of attributes. But is not the generation of even a new perspective the adding of something new, which was not present in the divine source? R. Schneur Zalman denies this. The generation of a new perspective is merely a subtraction, by virtue of the tzimtzum. What is subtracted is the awareness of God as the ultimate source and the ultimate reality. It is this that makes possible a separate consciousness, able to see itself and other objects as independent beings.20 The sun metaphor is intended to

20 In reality, they [heaven and earth] are completely nullified in relation to the ‘Word of God’ and the ‘Breath of His mouth,’ may He be blessed, which are unified with His Essence and Being, may He be blessed . . . just as the light of the sun is nullified in the sun. Yet these are his Restraining Powers, to hide
provide some limited comprehension of how created beings are mistakenly seen by themselves as separate, independent beings.

But all of the rays of the sun are qualitatively alike. The metaphor fails to account for how it can be the case that there is the appearance of different things, from those perspectives that are generated. We have already noted that such appearance could arise only through the tzimtzum. Two things appear different only because that which they have in common is somehow suppressed or canceled. But the metaphor of the sun and its rays, which lends itself so well to the transmission model, and can be exploited to illustrate how an effect can be substantially one with its cause, is unsuited for illustrating this aspect of Creation, as R. Schneur Zalman conceives it. For in the tzimtzum, the cause withholds itself from its effect. But what could be a negative transmission, or a taking of the effect back into the cause? This cannot be illuminated by appealing to how things are with the sun, for the sun’s radiance does not involve subtraction or taking anything away.

There is need of another, complementary metaphor, which illustrates how it is possible for something “new” to come to be, by virtue of a withholding or constriction of the cause. Such a metaphor is provided by the Scriptural account of Creation. The Zohar (I 15b) teaches that the divine utterances related at the beginning of Genesis are the actions by which God creates the world.21 R. Schneur Zalman exploits this to develop the metaphor of creation as speech, which complements the metaphor of creation as radiance.

Even from a naive point of view, not attending to the intricate cognitive processes that underlie communication, speech

and conceal, through the attribute of Gevurah [restraint] and Tzimtzum, the life-force which flows into them, so that heaven and earth and all their host should appear as if they were independently existing entities” (Tanya 2.6, 305–7).

cannot be adequately understood within the framework of the Transmission Model of Causality. To be sure, any sort of communication might be regarded as a transmission of meaning, from one mind to another. But (even if one were to grant the possibility of the sort of communication that telepathy or prophecy might involve) what is internal to the cause of the communication is far different from what is expressed. To say something is to select what is expressed from the practically unlimited number of things that might be expressed. Other thought is held back. Contrast the sun, as R. Schneur Zalman understands it. What is within the sun, heat and light, is radiated. There is no kind or characteristic within the sun that is held back, and that which is radiated is all of a kind.

Thus, R. Schneur Zalman understands the speech metaphor as conveying the teaching that creation is a kind of communication, whereby only what is spoken is not concealed. But even as he explains this point, he hastens to remind his readers of what the sun metaphor makes clear, that, even following Creation, what is created is not something different from what creates it:

However, “The nature of the Divine order is not like that of a creature of flesh and blood” [Berachot 40a]. When a man utters a word, the breath emitted in speaking is something that can be sensed and perceived as a thing apart, separated from its source, namely, the ten faculties of the soul itself. But with the Holy One, blessed be He, His speech is not, Heaven forfend, separated from His blessed Self, for there is nothing outside of Him, and there is no place devoid of Him. Therefore His blessed speech is not like our speech, G-d forbid, (just as His thought is not like our thought . . . His blessed speech is called “speech” only by way of an

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22This is a reference to the ten sephirot, aspects of divine activity which have their analogues in human psychology.
anthropomorphic illustration, in the sense that, as in the case of man below, whose speech reveals to his audience what was hidden and concealed in his thoughts, so, too, is it on high with the blessed En Sof. Whose emitted light and life-force—as it emerges from Him, from concealment into revelation—is called “speech.”

Just as a sage can only express his wisdom by means of the expression of words, which are vastly more limited that the things that remain unsaid, so God expresses His being only by means of the tzimtzum, understood along the model of speech.

Now, with terrestrial man, for example, when one who is so great a sage as to comprehend the wonders of wisdom contracts his intellect and thought to a single letter of his speech, this is an immense tzimtzum and a great descent for his wondrous wisdom. Metaphorically speaking, precisely so, and infinitely more so, there was an immensely great and mighty tzimtzum when during the six days of creation “The heavens were made by the word of the Lord, and all their hosts by the breath of their mouth.”

23 This refers to God as the infinite, prior to any revelation.

24 Tanya 1.21, 87.

25 Tanya 4.5, 415. Here R. Schneur Zalman seems to have in mind the contraction of a conceptual account into the physical form of articulate speech; in other works (Ma’amre Admor ha-Zaken 5562 [Brooklyn: Kehot, 1964], p. 35; Ma’amre Admor ha-Zaken 5568 [Brooklyn: Kehot, 1982], pp. 484, 548) he makes clear that the expression of an abstruse concept in simple terms commensurate with the student’s level of understanding is similarly an
Only by virtue of such "speech" is the wisdom of the sage articulated into discreet elements. Likewise, only through the divine "speech" does there arise the phenomenal multiplicity, by virtue of which each thing that appears to be an independent entity manifests distinct characteristics. These characteristics are all present in the source; as such the metaphysics of R. Schneur Zalman follows the Transmission Model. But the tzimtzum, especially as illustrated by the metaphor of voice, points to a crucial respect in which effect does not simply flow from the source. The characteristics of things that are derived from God reveal themselves to us as limited, and they do not immediately reveal to us their ultimate source within the divine unity. These limitations do not themselves exist in the effect by virtue of being transmitted by the source. Rather they exist because what has been transmitted is itself limited.

The great virtue of the Transmission Model of Causality is that it renders intelligible the relation between cause and effect. A Humean theory of causation, on the other hand, denies that the world presents such intelligible connections; for Hume there are only regular sequences of like perceptions. Neither the Transmission Model nor the Humean theory, however, serves to illuminate the relationship between God as cause and Creation, as required by a religious monism. The tzimtzum, as illustrated by the dual metaphor of sun and voice, goes a long way to fill the gap.

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equation of the contraction found in speech.