Kant, Neo-Kantianism, and Phenomenology

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Abstract and Keywords

This chapter offers a reassessment of the relationship between Kant, the Kantian tradition, and phenomenology, here focusing mainly on Husserl and Heidegger. Part of this reassessment concerns those philosophers who, during the lives of Husserl and Heidegger, sought to defend an updated version of Kant’s philosophy, the neo-Kantians. The chapter shows where the phenomenologists were able to benefit from some of the insights on the part of Kant and the neo-Kantians, but also clearly points to the differences. The aim of this chapter is to offer a fair evaluation of the relation of the main phenomenologists to Kant and to what was at the time the most powerful philosophical movement in Europe.

Keywords: Immanuel Kant, neo-Kantianism, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Marburg School of neo-Kantianism

3.1 Introduction

The relation between phenomenology, Kant, and Kantian philosophizing broadly construed (historically and systematically), has been a mainstay in phenomenological research.¹ This mutual testing of both philosophies is hardly surprising given phenomenology’s promise to provide a wholly novel type of philosophy. In the first decades of the twentieth century, if there was one “classical” form of philosophy to play off against, it was the philosophy inaugurated by Kant. Kant was the main philosopher anybody writing in German had to contend with, and since the movement promoting Kant, neo-Kantianism, was the most dominant philosophical movement at the time, this was the main sounding board for the proponents of phenomenology. If one had to choose an enemy for one’s own “liberation narrative,” it would have to be Kant and his successors.

A few words are in order regarding with whom exactly phenomenology is to be contrasted. At the time phenomenology surged, Kant was represented by neo-Kantianism, which was anything but a unified movement. Part of the methodological challenge in assessing
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the relation between phenomenology and Kant is to keep Kant and his representatives separated as much as possible, for the latter were innovative thinkers with original agendas. But since Kant cannot be properly assessed without a look at his self-proclaimed representatives, the neo-Kantians, too, need to be included in this account.

This standoff that took place in the first decades of the twentieth century was not a wholesale rejection of the other’s standpoint. Most phenomenologists admitted that they were able to benefit from Kant and his successors and sought contact with them. In turn, some neo-Kantians appreciated aspects of the phenomenologists’ writings. This rapprochement can partly be explained by phenomenology originally stemming from the Austrian tradition associated with Brentano, an outright critic of philosophy in a Kantian register. Brentano remained an important inspiratory source; but when the Movement broadened, the ties to Brentano weakened. Husserl struggled to free himself from these empiricist confines, and once he did, was surprised to see the similarities and overlaps with Kant and the neo-Kantians. Heidegger was closer to the neo-Kantians from his beginnings (being a student of Rickert). But he, too, had a knee-jerk reaction to the “idealistic” elements of Kantianism. In later years, his appreciation of Kant increased. “His” Kant is both an ingenious interpretation of Kant and an attempt at “assassinating” the neo-Kantian Kant.

Looking over into the other “camp,” something like “Kant scholarship” was just developing, and would establish the main lines of interpretation the phenomenologists challenged. The influential Kant interpretations beginning in the 1870s would, by the beginning of the twentieth century, become “canonical.” These readings that seem to be part of Kant’s “DNA” were in fact the result of some eighty years of Kant scholarship, reaching back to the debates in the nineteenth century waged by Trendelenburg, Fischer, and Cohen. As a result, the brand “neo-Kantianism” took on its own character, divorced from some of Kant’s claims. This makes it even harder to assess the relationship between Kant, neo-Kantianism, and phenomenology, hardly a homogenous category itself.

As a result of this historical situation in which phenomenology evolved, many phenomenological interpretations of Kant were attempts to go back to the “true” Kant that the neo-Kantian “scholastics” had obfuscated. While some phenomenologists were attempting to establish an openly anti-Kantian philosophy in the name of phenomenology, others wanted to turn to the allegedly “real” Kant and were anti-neo-Kantian. In some cases, the presumed debates with Kant were really debates with the neo-Kantians, over issues that Kant would have found incomprehensible. All of these considerations make it clear that an assessment of the Kantian and neo-Kantian influence on phenomenology is tricky.

For this reason a systematic confrontation between phenomenology and Kant/Kantianism is impossible. Neither is the Phenomenological Movement a unified movement such that its claims could be clearly identified and neatly compared, one to one, to its “enemies.” Nor is it possible to separate Kant from his interpretation in the hands of the neo-Kantians, who provided the first access to Kant for all contemporaries at the time. While a confrontation between both traditions along the lines of main themes may be de-
sirable, separating each phenomenologist’s and Kant’s and neo-Kantian’s views on them would be an all-too arduous task. Instead, I have opted to present the two main phenomenologists’, Husserl’s and Heidegger’s, reactions to Kant and the neo-Kantians, restricting myself to the main discussions between them. I will spend more time on Husserl than Heidegger, since I believe that Kant and the neo-Kantians were more important to Husserl than to Heidegger; though Kant was a constant companion on the latter’s path of thought. Heidegger’s reading of Kant is rather a matter of setting straight the record about who Kant “really” was. I believe this is the most fruitful approach for an entry path into this jungle. Other phenomenologists have dealt with Kant and the neo-Kantians, for instance Max Scheler and Eugen Fink; as well Jean-Paul Sartre, Paul Ricœur, and others in the French tradition. In confining myself to the “classical” phenomenologists, their views are representative for a first overview and apply cum grano salis to most phenomenologists.

3.2 Husserl

Husserl’s relation to Kant as well as to neo-Kantianism can be summed up in his own words in a letter to Cassirer of 1925:

In my own development, originally hostile towards Kant . . . I first started out from Descartes and from there moved to the pre-Kantian philosophy of the eighteenth century . . . However, when I, driven by the basic problem in theory of science most dear to me as a mathematician to ever new problems in a necessary consequence, made a breakthrough to the method of eidetic analysis of consciousness . . . when, with the phenomenological reduction, the realm of the fundamental sources of all cognition opened up before me, at that point I had to acknowledge that this science developing before my eyes, although in an entirely different method, encompassed the total Kantian problematic (a problematic which only now received a deeper and clearer sense), and that it confirmed Kant’s main results in rigorous scientific grounding . . . After having learned to see Kant from my own perspective, I can now also—and especially in the most recent years—receive rich instructions from Kant and the true Kantians.

(Husserl 1994: 4)\(^7\)

What is, “the total Kantian problematic” which, in Husserl’s hands, has taken on a “deeper and clearer sense”? This main problematic can be divided into a few key aspects that will be considered separately. Let us turn to Kant first.

3.2.1 Kant

As Husserl mentions, he was inimical towards Kant in his early phase, but once he had established the main lines of his phenomenological “system,” he sought contact with Kant and discovered that he moved, in general, in the same framework, but with some significant improvements. There are, I think, three main substantial moves:\(^8\) from formal to ma-
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ter al a priori; from sensible to categorial intuition; from deduction to reduction. I take these to be the crucial elements of Kant’s philosophy, where Husserl made positive improvements over Kant. All aspects taken together result in Husserl’s notion of transcendental idealism, which is not a separate topic, but the total consequence of these points.

But all of these may be prefaced by an important methodological difference between Kant and Husserl.

**Philosophy as science:** In the above quoted passage a methodological difference is hinted at, but can be missed easily: Husserl says that Kant’s results had been confirmed by himself, but in a “rigorous scientific grounding.” Put differently, Husserl accuses Kant of not being rigorous enough, and this is quite a reproach to someone who insists on bringing metaphysics on the path “to a science” (see Kant 2004) for the very first time. The contrast between both here may be an instructive start.

What Kant means by science in the famous formulation from *Prolegomena* is to bring philosophy on the same path to science that natural science had already undergone in modernity through Newton’s canonization of physics under the method of mathematics. In Kant’s narrative, the transition to modern science is marked by the fact that in natural science, mathematics, and not empirical induction, could be used to reach synthetic a priori results, when applying pure mathematics to empirically experienced nature. Not all of natural science is a priori, but it can be a priori to the extent that it applies a priori laws to nature: “Now we are nevertheless actually in possession of a pure natural science, which, a priori and with all of the necessity required for apodictic propositions, pronounces laws to which nature is subject” (Kant 2004: 47). Hence, what Kant celebrated about modern science is that it, too (besides pure mathematics), could achieve synthetic a priori truths with respect to objects of experience (and not just imagined objects in geometrical space). Thus, what characterizes “science” for Kant is the possible attainment of synthetic a priori judgments.

For Kant, the upshot of this understanding of “scientific” is that philosophy, too, should be made fit to attain these kinds of truths (cf. CPR, B xviiiif.). But this hopefulness has to be taken restrictively. For, metaphysics’ traditional claim to provide secure truth with respect to “absolute” objects, such as God, has been forever thwarted by Kant’s transcendental idealism. According to the latter, we can only speak meaningfully about, and have cognition with respect to, objects of experience. Philosophy has no privilege over the sciences in its ability to forge a special access to things in themselves. Hence, the notion that philosophy could provide judgments with respect to “metaphysical” objects in the way that other scientific disciplines cannot, is rejected. The only thing philosophy, as metaphysics, can do is to show how any talk about absolute objects is meaningless, although their transformation into ideas of reason guiding our actions is a crucial part of Kant’s critique of traditional metaphysics. Philosophy cannot reach synthetic judgments a priori about its own domain (as a realm of possible experience), because there exists no such domain; instead, it secures the judgments made in the sciences insofar as they uti-
Husserl’s notion of scientific as a predicate for philosophy differs vastly. Already from his 1911 essay “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” it is clear what Husserl means by “scientific,” by contrast with those attempts that betray the very notion of scientificity: psychologism in logic and historicism in the human sciences. Both reduce ideal truth to either occurrences in an individual mind or to historical events. They misconstrue the notion of truth as being ideal and true-in-itself, no matter what kind of consciousness grasps it. For Husserl, philosophy can be a science, a rigorous (a priori) one, since it can reach truths about its own, peculiar subject matter: ideal entities that are not part of the domain of logic or mathematics.

While Kant would have rejected the very notion that philosophy has its own subject domain, a proper realm of experience, this is exactly what Husserl claims. If philosophy understands its task correctly, to clarify the epistemological grounds for all sciences (“first philosophy”), it must see that it can do so, or only do so, while maintaining that philosophy has its own subject domain where this can be achieved: this is the realm of experience on the part of the cognizing subject. Hence, epistemology must become an investigation of that subject which has cognition (and besides cognition, also feelings, willings, judgments, memories, and so forth). If all scientific disciplines are by definition worldly disciplines—they investigate a realm in the world—then philosophy, as phenomenology, is an investigation into that realm which has the world as the correlate of its experience. Moreover, its investigation is scientific, rigorously scientific, when it understands that the truths it can furnish with respect to its subject matter, consciousness, are ideal as well. Hence we glean the notion of phenomenology as an ideal science of a subject domain wholly its own: consciousness in its having of the world.

From formal to material a priori: Kant claims to have redefined how cognition comes about through the two stems of cognition, sensibility and understanding. Through the understanding, the active part of the subject, the human mind is able to connect what is given in sensibility with forms of thought, categories, to make cognition possible. Hence Kant’s famous statement, “thoughts without content are dumb, intuitions without concepts are blind” (Kant 1965: 94/B 75). Both need to work together to yield the conditions of the possibility for experience and hence cognition. Sensibility and concepts are the conditions of the possibility for cognition, and both function as forms, that, once filled with content, make possible their execution. Sensibility is the form of (possible) sensible content, while reason is the place where (possible) concepts reside that can be connected to what is given in sensibility. Both are the conditions of the possibility of any experience, hence a priori, and both are by necessity formal. They are the forms for possible sensible experience and forms of possible conceptual thought. Hence, to Kant, the status of a priori is necessarily bound up with its formality. This can also be seen in the moral law, which is the formal law of the categorical imperative.
Husserl agrees that our access to the world must contain elements that are necessarily and universally the case for conscious agents experiencing the world. He would, however, broaden Kant’s claims in two directions: these a priori elements are in place not only in the case of cognition of objects in the world (in the question, what makes synthetic judgments a priori possible?), but in all possible forms of experience of the world (hence asking, instead, what makes experience of the world in all aspects possible?). Moreover, these a priori elements pertain not only to formal aspects of experience, but also contain “material” aspects. Material elements may not be found in all regions of experience (for instance, time), but for Husserl the identification of a priori and formal is restrictive. A priori status must also be granted to non-formal, yet necessary elements in certain regions of experience. Let us take two examples.

First, take the case of external experience, which to Kant involves space and time as forms of intuition. Husserl would expand here; external experience of a spatiotemporal object necessarily involves a consciousness experiencing it, but a consciousness that is not merely a thinking subject but one that is, necessarily, embodied, with the capacity to walk around it, touch it, have corresponding eye movements. The body, accordingly, is more than just a physical body, but is the locus for subjectivity. The subject functions in her body, it is the organ of experience and willful actions. No external perception is possible without a body as an integral part of the experience of the physical, external world. But a body is necessarily material, it is flesh. Hence, the body—not in the sense of a physical body, a Körper, but as a lived-body, a Leib—is the necessary, but material condition of the possibility for external experience. The eidetic proof of this claim can be demonstrated in that it is also present in a phantasized permutation of experience, for instance, when I imagine myself as an animal in a jungle. Thus, even in eidetic variation of external experience, the body might be modified, but cannot be thought away, hence it is necessary.11

Second, in his ethical reflections, Husserl insists that there is also a material a priori element in moral contexts. Indeed, there are a priori elements in ethical situations, such that a situation I find myself in, harbors a priori the right means for action. Hence, his categorical imperative, inspired by Brentano, “do the best among the attainable in a given situation” (Husserl 1988: 129, italics added), implies that there is such a best course of action given the situation one finds oneself in. This is not a priori in the sense of a universalizable maxim, but in the situation itself, which demands a certain action, indeed the “best action” for a given agent. Since every situation supposedly has its options for what can be done contained in it, the situation is governed by material a priori laws. While the categorical imperative Husserl formulates is formal in the sense that it demands the choice of the best option among the attainable ones, its choice by necessity implies material elements that the situation itself provides, which are necessary for the individual in it. Hence, everybody has her individual categorical imperative necessary for her exclusively.

Thus, if phenomenology is an ideal science, its claims are a priori, but many of its findings are material of the sort indicated; they are necessary elements of the intentional act, but they cannot be merely formal; or put differently, what Kant specifies as a priori for-
malities, can be materially “filled in” with content, as in the case of spatial experience indicated.

**From sensible to categorial intuition:** One of the main claims of Kant’s epistemology is the classical distinction between sensibility and the understanding. Both might stem “from a common root, which is, however, unknown to us” (CPR: B 29), but despite this “crypticism” the distinction is a firm part of Kant’s epistemology. The resistance to this distinction is nearly as old as Kant’s philosophy, beginning with Fichte. The notion that intuition only pertains to the senses and, conversely, that conceptuality pertains to thought alone, has been found to be critique-worthy by different thinkers in different ways, but Husserl’s rejection of this distinction is germane to his idea of phenomenology. For phenomenology’s impetus to get to the “things themselves” implies a wide concept of “things.” Things, to phenomenology, are phenomena insofar as they give themselves to a subject with the capacity to receive them. Thus, “things” can be a visual or auditive (sensible in the broadest sense) object, but also an object of memory, a presentified object, but also a wished-for action or a loved or hated object. Thus, phenomenology’s basic claim, formulated in the “principle of all principles,” teaches “that each intuition affording [something] in an originary way is a legitimate source of knowledge, that whatever presents itself to us in ‘Intuition’ in an originary way . . . is to be taken simply as what it affords itself as, but only within the limitation in which it affords itself there” (Husserl 2014: 43).

Thus, intuition (Anschauung) is utilized by phenomenology in the broadest sense, as anything that manifests itself in consciousness in different forms of intuition, thereby making itself evident in different forms. The notion that “non-sensible” things are not evident in the same form of “in the flesh” (leibhaftig) as sensible phenomena is an artificial privileging of objects “given to the senses.” The contents of a wish or a will or the evidence of a mathematical proof have their own form of evidence that can be equally vivid. But Husserl goes even further than that. He claims that intuition pertains to categories, which, for Kant, can never be intuited but rather make all intuition possible. Hence, we find here one of Husserl’s most controversial claims—that there can be such a thing as categorial intuition.

Rather than using the terminology of objects of “sensible” and “super-sensible” perception (Husserl 2001a: 673), Husserl prefers to call them “real” and “ideal” (Husserl 2001a: 674). “Ideal” intuitions are founded upon real ones, such that Husserl can say, “we can characterize the sensible or real objects as objects of the lower levels of possible intuition, the categorial or ideal ones as the objects of higher levels” (Husserl 2001a: 674). In these higher acts, the categorial character of the intuition becomes grasped. “In such founded acts lies the categorial character of intuition and cognition, in them the judging thinking (where it functions as expression) receives its fulfillment: the possibility of perfect adequation to such acts determines the truth of the expression as its correctness” (Husserl 2001a: 675). Thus, while the lower-level act sees a book as red, the categorial act has as its content the expression, “the book is red.” They stand in a foundational relationship. “For Husserl, categorial acts are founded on the sensory acts of per-
cepting, but are not reducible to them” (Moran and Cohen 2012: 60). Thus, categories have their own manner of givenness in the form of categorical intuition. It is not important for the present context to explain what role categorial intuition plays in Husserl’s theory of cognition. Suffice it to say that the very notion of an intuition of categories is a contradictio in adiecto to any Kantian. As a reaction to his critics, Husserl later clarified that the intuition of ideal objects and eidetic lawfulnesses—those that phenomenology develops as a science—is not a “simple” intuition like a visual perception but involves an activity he calls “eidetic variation” (cf. Husserl 1964: 410–20). This clarification only corroborates his basic idea that these ideal entities, no matter how we arrive at an experience of them (since cognition is a type of experience as well), are in some form given to consciousness, manifest in the latter, and for that reason one can say that they, too, are “intuited.”

From deduction to reduction: With respect to Husserl’s method of entry into transcendental phenomenology, one question that may be asked is why he uses the curious term reduction. While it is clear that the main meaning of the term is re-ducere, leading back to transcendental subjectivity, the term is still somewhat puzzling. The verbal analogy to Kant’s central term deduction cannot be dismissed. When it comes to the method of transcendental philosophy, reduction and deduction, respectively, can be used to term their methods. “Deduction” is Kant’s crucial term for the task of justifying the knowledge claims on the part of the sciences, when intuitions are connected with concepts to bring knowledge about. The term is not meant as a deduction from highest principles, but as a justification as to why this procedure is appropriate. The term “deduction” stems from the legal language of his day, denoting a “justification” of accusations made in the courtroom. This becomes clear in the courtroom metaphor Kant uses, when he speaks of modern science putting nature on the witness stand. “Deduction” is, thus, the philosophical justification of existing and putatively true claims to knowledge, which the philosophical critique does not challenge; instead, the justification clarifies how these knowledge claims are possible.

To Husserl, justifying knowledge claims is a worthy enterprise, but recall that Husserl rejects the two-stem doctrine, hence justification (a term abounding in his writings) takes on a different meaning. What the phenomenologist needs to do is justify the fact of experience in general, to explain how experience becomes possible. This explanation must ensue constitutively, i.e., by showing how the objects of experience are constituted in transcendental (inter)subjectivity. Thus, if we practice the “reduction,” we reduce to the world-constituting transcendental subjectivity in all of its forms of experience, beginning with the most primitive, up to the highest, and in its intersubjective dimensions (the world is never constituted by a single subject). From this viewpoint, a justification of knowledge claims is not wrongheaded; it comes rather late in the process of justifying subjective deeds. Thus, both methods do not form a contradiction; it is rather Husserl’s claim that the task of justifying knowledge claims in the scientific register accounts only for cognition, a very small portion of our engagement with the world, although the most dignified one. An account of the world as it is experienced as a life-world must begin from the lowest and most primitive levels until it can connect with the Kantian question. The
highest form of justification reaches beyond Kant’s scope; indeed, the highest level of justifica­tion is to justify oneself and one’s actions as a person and ultimately as a philosophizing subject.

**Phenomenology as transcendental idealism:** The sum total of what has been said can be summed up in Husserl’s version of transcendental idealism. As in Kant, transcendental idealism is compatible with empirical realism insofar as the idealist is not skeptical with respect to the empirical reality of the world, but understands the latter in terms of the world as given in the natural attitude, where the world is taken to exist independently of experiencing subjectivity. But the reduction to transcendental subjectivity reveals the natural attitude as constitutively dependent on this subjectivity. If the reduction is the true way to subjectivity in its world-constitutive activity, then “it is the royal road [Marschroute] to transcendental idealism” (Husserl 1959: 181). This claim can be connected to Kant’s Copernican Turn. The turn from objects in themselves to the experience of objects (as phenomena) means that we cannot get beyond phenomena, but that we must account for them and our experience and cognition of them. Husserl would agree with this, but add that this account must begin with pre-predicative levels of experience all the way up to highest experience, manifest in judgments of cognition. Thus, when phenomenology, through the reduction, lays bare the correlational a priori between our experience of the world and that which gives itself therein, Husserl claims to have carried through with the Copernican Turn in its universality. For this reason he calls Kant’s thing-in-itself a “mythical” remnant. Husserl follows the move Hegel made from transcendental to absolute idealism in that the very notion of a thing-in-itself (a thing not of possible experience) is counter-sensical. Any object that can be an object at all (for us), must be an object of actual or possible experience. Husserl never called his position “absolute idealism,” he prefers the notion “transcendental” idealism, which he “proves” (cf. Husserl 2003). This “proof” lies not so much in a series of arguments, but rather in the execution of the intentional analyses themselves, which demonstrate that the world constitutes itself as a world of experience, as the life-world.14

### 3.2.2 Neo-Kantianism

Neo-Kantianism was present in two different schools in Germany, the Marburg School and in Southwest Germany, at Freiburg and Heidelberg (the “Baden School”). Husserl was philosophically closer to Marburg. While Husserl had a considerable appreciation for the Marburgers, his assessment of the Southwesterners was for the most part critical. In the interest of space, I will confine myself to his relation to Marburg.

The Marburg School consisted, essentially, of Cohen and Natorp. Though they worked in unison to keep their school formation alive, they were not as close as one may have assumed. Indeed, Cohen had forged his method in his reading of Kant, the “transcendental method,” which Natorp publicly endorsed. However, Natorp (secretively) promoted his own idea of a philosophical psychology, which was critical of Cohen’s position, though he took pains to present both as compatible. Husserl had things to say to both of them.
The “true” transcendental method: For Cohen, Kant’s crucial insight following the Copernican Turn had to be turned into a method, the “transcendental method.” This method is closely tied to the defining factum of our times: mathematical, natural science. This is the factum Kant meant, Cohen argued, when he devised his transcendental turn from the objects to the cognition of objects. After this turn, the objects meant can only be the objects that science constructs:

Not the stars in the heavens are the objects that this method teaches us to contemplate, but the astronomical calculations; those facts of scientific reality are, as it were, the real that is to be accounted for, as that at which the transcendental gaze is directed. What is the basis of this reality that is given in such facts? Which are the conditions of this certitude from which visible reality derives its reality? Those facts of laws are the objects, not the star-objects.

(Cohen 1877: 20f.)

Thus the transcendental method had to start its regressive path from the factum of the sciences and reconstruct the logical conditions that make this factum possible. This is a scientific restatement of Kant’s question regarding the conditions of the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition. This method had to be implemented in all “directions” of culture, besides science, morality, and aesthetics. The net accomplishment of this investigation is a thorough critique of culture that was to supplant Kant’s narrower critique of reason’s capacities. This expansion of the critique was the defining idea of the Marburg School.

Husserl’s critique of this method is not that it is altogether wrong, but that it rests on unclarified presuppositions:

All regressive “transcendental” methodology in the specific sense of the term—much-used by Kant and preferred in neo-Kantianism—operates with presuppositions, which are never systematically sought for, never scientifically ascertained, and, especially, not ascertained on the purely transcendental ground. . . . All regressive methods obviously hang suspended in mid-air, as long as this ground is not given and prepared and as long as progressive methods of cognition have not been attained, of which the regressive method is in need of as positive presuppositions.

(Husserl 1956: 370)

Phenomenology purports to provide this “positive” method, since it makes the ground upon which the sciences stand into a theme of research. Thus, “it is clear, accordingly, that the presupposition of the fact of science . . . has an entirely different meaning than the presupposition of a fact that is presupposed in the realm of the natural attitude and any natural science” (Husserl 1956: 371). Every science stands on the ground of the natural attitude. Phenomenology, on the other hand, begins by questioning the presupposition of the natural attitude and delves, from there, into the depths of the subjectivity constituting
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it. It thereby does not render the transcendental method wrong, but relegates it to a higher-level problem that presupposes the foundational investigation that phenomenology provides: to study the constitution of that which makes possible all activities on the ground of the natural attitude, including science. While Kant (on this neo-Kantian reading) clarifies the conditions of the possibility of cognition, Husserl clarifies the conditions of the possibility of every possible world-experience. It is the true foundational discipline and in this capacity “first philosophy.”

Natorp: Transcendental psychology can only be transcendental phenomenology: In the shadow of Cohen, Natorp developed transcendental psychology. This psychology should have the inverse direction of the transcendental method and offer an investigation into the psychological laws involved in producing culture. This project is motivated by the methodological problem all psychology faces, that to describe the mental, one interrupts the normal course of psychic life and thereby “kills” it. As Brentano says, when I am angry, I cannot describe my anger; and when I do, I am no longer angry (see Brentano 2015: 30). Hence, there lies a falsifying effect in the very notion of a self-description of the psychic. The regressive method Natorp devises in reconstructing the psychic from its normal state of affairs, its factum, is meant to solve this problem. Yet, as his contemporaries already noticed, reconstruction does not avoid being constructive and thereby falsifying. Husserl knew of these issues raised by Brentano and Natorp, and his solution is his claim that a just description of psychic states are possible through a change of attitude or a splitting of the ego into a “patent” and a “latent” ego (cf. Husserl 1959: 86–92). When I reflect on myself, what happens, in effect, is a splitting of the ego into an ego that reflects on a latent ego, while the reflecting ego is patent. This could occur ad infinitum in the natural attitude; but if I break with the natural attitude and establish a new attitude, that of phenomenology, I can gain a view of the life of the ego in its totality that does not distort it. Hence Husserl’s name for the phenomenologist, “unparticipating observer,” who is not uninterested in her own life, but does not participate in the constitution of the world in the natural attitude.

Husserl, however, appropriates from Natorp the idea of a reconstruction of depth structures of subjectivity that are lower layers upon which current acts rest. For instance, the current seeing of an object (described in “static” phenomenology) rests on a “thick” structure of cultural habituation, sedimented meaning structures. The latter is described by “genetic” phenomenology, and it can only fully execute its task after the break with the natural attitude. What was Natorp’s “great premonition” (Husserl 2002: 3) of a transcendental-reconstructive science of the psyche becomes possible only through genetic phenomenology. But one must not overlook Natorp’s formative role in the development of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology.

3.3 Heidegger

Heidegger’s view on Kant is most prominently presented in his book of 1929; it is equally a critique of the neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant. While it is tempting to read Kant and
the Problem of Metaphysics as Heidegger’s definitive statement on Kant, it must not be overlooked that Heidegger dealt, prior to 1929, critically with the neo-Kantians, especially in his early Freiburg and Marburg periods (1923–8). I will mention this early treatment of the neo-Kantians before turning to the 1929 debate with Cassirer, and Heidegger’s subsequent Kant interpretation in his 1929 book. The book contains Heidegger’s presentation of his Kant vis-à-vis the alleged distortion of the neo-Kantians. I present the main disagreement between Heidegger and Cassirer in Davos before turning to Heidegger’s treatment of Kant, which was written as a direct consequence of that debate.

3.3.1 Heidegger and the Neo-Kantians

Categories of life: As of Heidegger’s earliest lectures in Freiburg (1919–23) and Marburg (1923–8), he deals critically with his contemporaries, mainly the neo-Kantians, and their predecessors in the nineteenth century. It has already been mentioned that Heidegger stemmed from the lineage of Southwest neo-Kantianism, as a protégé of Rickert’s. But the Marburgers fare no better in his invectives. In his earliest years, the philosopher Heidegger is, arguably, closest to is Dilthey. It is from Dilthey that he takes his main cues in developing his early position that becomes published, as a torso, in Being and Time. The main strategy of his critique of the neo-Kantians is that their philosophy obfuscates what he considers (with Dilthey) the main topic of philosophy, the phenomenon of life.

Indeed, this phenomenon that Dilthey forcefully brought to the forefront of the debate in the last decade of the nineteenth century is something that goes missing in biological or psychological accounts. Though biology deals with life, bios, biology treats it only as a natural phenomenon, an organic feature of living creatures. Psychology, the discipline treating the soul, as it was developed in the nineteenth century, also misses the originary phenomenon of life because it treats the psyche like every other science treats its subject matter: in an objectifying way. This is exactly where Heidegger latches on to the problem of Natorp’s psychology; as Heidegger acknowledges, Natorp does recognize the problem. For Natorp sees the problem that to thematize the psychic means to miss its original life beat, that all thematization is one step removed from the original experience of life, and hence that every psychology “kills” its very phenomenon. But although Natorp sees the problem, he is unable to solve it; his method of “reconstruction” does not evade the fact that it is a form of construction; Heidegger comments:

Does the method of reconstruction achieve what it sets out to achieve? No. For one thing, it, too, is objectification. One must reject the notion that Natorp has made it intelligible that the meaning of method is different from that of objectivation [the method of the natural sciences]. . . . And it is not evident how through such a mediating thematization . . . the immediate is ever to be gained and achieved.

(Heidegger 1987: 107)
Yet Husserl’s method of using the individual experience from the first-person perspective as a springboard for an eidetic analysis of the individual consciousness is no way out either. For this method, too, no longer lives in the original experience. The solution can only be a method that lets life itself speak, without “killing” it through any scientific or philosophical method. The project of letting life speak is, in this light, an anti-philosophy. Heidegger calls it hermeneutics of facticity, which aims at a self-interpretation of life in its quotidian lifestyle, in “taking care of business” (Sorge) before any “idealizing” interpretation from above. Such an interpretation does not press this life in the Procrustean bed of artificial distinctions, such as subject–object, theory–practice, etc. (cf. Heidegger 1995: 101–4).

Heidegger unfolds this program in Being and Time. It is a hermeneutic laying-out of the categories of life as it is lived, as it lives itself in the creature who has an awareness of it: factical Dasein, the human being in her “thereness,” thrown into the world without a choice of whence, where, and whereto. This project is the result of Heidegger’s critical rejection of the neo-Kantian “logification” of everything into a systematizing account. For this reason Heidegger rejected philosophical systems and canonic distinctions within doctrinal philosophy such as epistemology and ethics.17

3.3.2 Heidegger and Cassirer, and Kant

The finitude of the subject: Heidegger and Cassirer were invited to the Swiss town Davos in the spring of 1929 to present their views on Kant. From the outside, this may seem like a fairly academic affair; however, within academia this event bore significance as Cassirer was considered the eminence grise of neo-Kantianism and Heidegger the young renegade of the new “existentialist” movement. The fact that Heidegger, only three years later, became one of the foremost thinkers of the Nazi movement and that the Jew Cassirer was forced to leave Germany, made the event auspicious in hindsight.18 Though the discussion seems cordial and both afterwards did not attach too much weight to this meeting,19 it was perceived as a watershed event. “All” that happened was that both presented “their” Kant and used this interpretation to highlight the main lines of their philosophies. While neither Heidegger nor Cassirer articulated any novelties, the discussion brought their positions into clear relief. The event was important enough for Heidegger to pen his Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik so quickly that it appeared in the fall of that year.20 It has become one of the most influential, though controversial, Kant interpretations. Hence, I will work my way backward from Heidegger’s discussion with Cassirer, then turn to Heidegger’s treatment of Kant.21

The dispute quickly turns to the question of what neo-Kantianism really amounts to. Heidegger criticizes the neo-Kantian reading of Kant for reducing Kant to the “theoretician of mathematico-physical theory of natural science” (Luft 2015a: 479). Cassirer rejects this reading to be paradigmatic of neo-Kantianism: “The positioning of the mathematical sciences of nature is for me only a paradigm, not the whole of the problem” (Luft 2015a: 479). To both, there is more at stake in Kant. What is it? Cassirer suggests—ever conciliatorily—that it is the problem of freedom and its possibility (Luft 2015a: 479), but Heideg-
ger puts the difference in a dialectical fashion: the different starting and end points of both ventures: “One could say that the terminus ad quem is [for Cassirer] a complete philosophy of culture in the sense of clarification of the wholeness of the form of a structure-creating consciousness. The terminus a quo in Cassirer is completely problematical. My position is the opposite: the terminus a quo is my central problematic” (Luft 2015a: 482). This starting point for Heidegger is finite Dasein in its thrownness, but this is also his terminus ad quem. Heidegger even asserts that “what I designate with the term Dasein cannot be translated by one of Cassirer’s concepts” (Luft 2015a: 483), an interpretation with which Cassirer agrees. To Cassirer, this Dasein and its life would be philosophically trivial, were one to remain at the level of this radical individuation and not see that individual Dasein is capable of partaking in a common world of culture, something which “always already” happens (which Heidegger presupposes when committing his thoughts to paper). “The essential of the transcendental method lies in this, that it begins with a given. Thus I inquire into the possibility of the given called [e.g.] ‘language.’ How is it possible that we as one Dasein to another can understand each other in this medium” (Luft 2015a: 484).

For Cassirer, the Kantian problematic of inquiring into the conditions of the possibility of the given (the transcendental method) comes into its own when it is applied to all regions of culture. Accordingly, his project is a rightful extension of the critique of reason into the critique of culture. Heidegger, in turn, interprets the Kantian problematic as raising, precisely, the issue of the individual Dasein, such that “it is the essence of philosophy, as a finite affair, that it is limited within the finitude of man” (Luft 2015a: 484). Heidegger adds, God does not need philosophy; it is we humans who do. Kant as the philosopher of finitude? This is the thesis of Heidegger’s “instructively idiosyncratic and challenging” (Dahlstrom 2013: 110) interpretation of Kant, to which I turn now.

Heidegger’s provocative title is “Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.” What is this problem? As he writes in 1965: “The problem for metaphysics, namely, the question concerning beings as such in their totality, is what allows Metaphysics as Metaphysics to become a problem” (Heidegger 1997: xxi). “Metaphysics” is, thus, not a philosophical doctrine, but a title for the problem, to which metaphysics is the answer. Accordingly, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is interpreted “as laying of the ground and thus of placing the problem of metaphysics before us as a fundamental ontology” (Heidegger 1997: 1). Kant’s project is presented as Heidegger’s avant la lettre. Heidegger interprets Kant’s central question as to the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments as inquiring into the possibility of knowledge regarding the being of beings, of “ontological (and not merely ontic) knowledge.” The latter “is hence a judging according to grounds (principles) which are not brought forth experientially” (Heidegger 1997: 9). These principles are supplied by “our faculty of knowing a priori” (Heidegger 1997: 9), pure reason. Thus, “laying the ground for metaphysics as unveiling the essence of ontology is ‘Critique of Pure Reason’” (Heidegger 1997: 10). The question regarding the possibility of synthetic cognition a priori is a “derivative” problem that becomes possible once the fundamental one is clarified.22
What Kant achieves is an ontology that is “modeled” on the ontological makeup of the being that does ontology, and that is Dasein. Citing the traditional interpretation of Kant, Heidegger asserts that “the Critique of Reason has nothing to do with a ‘theory of knowledge’” (Heidegger 1997: 11), since it is not about the possibility of “ontic knowledge (experience)” (Heidegger 1997: 11), but ontological knowledge; in Kantian terms, not about synthetic judgments a priori, but their possibility for finite Dasein. The fascination, allegedly for Kant, lies in the fact that finite Dasein can have access to infinity (ideality), transcending its finitude. This says nothing about infinite entities, such as mathematical axioms, but everything about Dasein. Thus, Heidegger shifts the viewpoint from the goal achieved (synthetic judgments a priori) back to the human being in its finitude. What does this say about this finitude? This is, to Heidegger, Kant’s central, though concealed, question. Kant must have had an answer to it, since without one, the very project would collapse. Kant does not seem to have understood that he had such an answer. Only a “violent interpretation” can wrest this answer from Kant. Heidegger attempts to retrieve this question at the heart of Kant’s enterprise by a “going back [needed] for carrying out the laying of the ground of metaphysics” (Heidegger 1997: 13).

This finitude is firstly to be located in our sensibility, in “finite intuition” (Heidegger 1997: 24), seen in our access merely to appearances, not “things in themselves.” Moreover, the duality of sensibility and understanding characterizes us as finite, in that we need the “detour” through sensibility to then append categories of the understanding to the given. Ours is an intellectus ectypus, not archetypus, as is God’s, who has access to things in themselves (see B 723). Heidegger interprets Kant’s two-stem doctrine as yet another “proof” for our finitude. Heidegger takes Kant’s famous allusion to the “common root” of sensibility and understanding as “go[ing] into and point[ing] consciously toward the unknown” (Heidegger 1997: 26). Heidegger takes the reader on a Holzweg into this “unknown region."

The Transcendental Deduction becomes central to Heidegger’s interpretation; to him, it is the “elucidation of finite reason as [its] basic intention” (Heidegger 1997: 50). Heidegger is among those (following Schopenhauer) expressing sympathy for the first edition of the Critique, since Kant is less guarded regarding his “true” intentions, which Heidegger intends to uncover. Kant’s express purpose of the Deduction—which caused him “the most effort” (A xvi)—was to give a justification for the rightful production of synthetic a priori knowledge through “pure synthesis” on the part of the understanding. Thus, “I call the explanation of the manner in which concepts a priori can refer to objects the transcendental deduction” (B 117). What justifies this synthesis that achieves this reference?

It is finite understanding which allows things to appear, to let them stand against . . . (Gegen-Stand, ob-jectum, cf. Heidegger 1997: 50–3). “For a finite creature, beings are accessible only on the grounds of a preliminary letting-stand-against” (Heidegger 1997: 54). This is achieved by a “unifying unity” (Heidegger 1997: 54), “which has already been comprehensively grasped in advance through the horizon of time, which is set forth in pure intuition” (Heidegger 1997: 54). Here, the theme of “time” is introduced, and it will become pivotal for Heidegger’s interpretation. Kant is “the first and only one” (Heidegger
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1996: 23) to have seen the connection between temporality and being, witnessed in Kant’s observation that “all modifications of the mind . . . are subject to time . . . as that in which they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relation with one another” (A 99, cf. Heidegger 1997: 57). What enables these modifications to “be brought in relation” is the transcendental power of imagination; Heidegger cites Kant: “We thus have a pure power of imagination as a fundamental faculty of the human soul which serves as a basis for all knowledge a priori” (A 124, cf. Heidegger 1997: 59). Thus, “the pure synthesis of the transcendental power of imagination . . . is relative to time” (Heidegger 1997: 59). How, then, does the power of imagination function?

Imagination is finite creatures’ power “to make something intuitable, i.e., . . . to create a look (image) from something” (Heidegger 1997: 65). Kant discusses how this is possible in the Schematism-chapter. To produce a schema is to make an appearance of something general, it is the visualization of a universal. It is this capacity on the part of the human being, which lets us gain access to ideal entities through an intuition by creating a rule under which they appear: “If the concept in general is that which is in (p. 62) service to the rule, then conceptual representing means the giving of the rule for the possible attainment of a look in advance in the manner of its regulation” (Heidegger 1997: 67). And “such making-sensible occurs primarily in the power of the imagination” (Heidegger 1997: 68). The schema, thus, is the “possible presentation of the rule of presentation represented in the schema” (Heidegger 1997: 69), such that Kant can say that the concept “always refers immediately to the schema” (Heidegger 1997: from A 141/B 180). But how does this lead to time?

The transcendental power of imagination, as the “faculty of binding together (synthesis)” (Heidegger 1997: 91), is “productive,” but not in the sense of an intuitus originarius, but as bringing to presence: “The productive power of imagination forms only the look of an object which is possible and which, under certain conditions, is perhaps also producible, i.e., one which can be brought to presence” (Heidegger 1997: 92). It brings into view “constant presence” (Heidegger 1997: 93). Hence, “the pure productive power of imagination . . . makes experience possible for the first time” (Heidegger 1997: 93). Thus, the transcendental power of imagination accounts for the fact that both sensibility and the understanding “necessarily hang together” (A 124). From this assessment arises Heidegger’s most original interpretation of Kant, namely that it is nothing other than this transcendental power, which constitutes the root of the two stems of cognition (cf. Heidegger 1997: 97–9). It is a “ground in such a way that it lets the stems grow out of itself, lending them support and stability” (Heidegger 1997: 97). To have unveiled this ground is Kant’s great achievement, and this ground is the ground of metaphysics itself. Thus, “pure thinking” is “essentially intuitive” (cf. Heidegger 1997: 108), again pointing to Dasein’s main “defect”: the fact that we cannot intuit originarily, which is proven in the very root of our mind, the Gemüt, where the transcendental power of imagination resides. This “highest principle . . . speaks of the essential constitution of the human essence in general, to the extent that it is determined as finite, pure reason” (Heidegger 1997: 112).
Heidegger's interpretation is not without drama; having glimpsed into this abyss, “Kant shrank back from [it]” (Heidegger 1997: 112); it is “thrust aside” in the second edition of the Critique. Kant suffered from “metaphysical anxiety” in the crucial moment of his thinking. Heidegger concludes, “the specific finitude of human nature is decisive for the laying of the ground for metaphysics” (Heidegger 1997: 120). But pure sensibility, as the trait of the human being, is time (see Heidegger 1997: 121), time “as the original, threefold-unifying forming of future, past, and present in general” (Heidegger 1997: 137); this is the basic thesis of Heidegger's philosophy. Only Kant’s “horror metaphysicus” kept him from going down the path Heidegger took. Heidegger’s own achievement is a “retrieval” of laying the ground for metaphysics, which leads him to term his own project a “metaphysics of Dasein” (Heidegger 1997: 153).

Heidegger's Kant has nothing to do with the philosopher of science who ponders on the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments in modern physics; he also has no relation to the “all-crusher” of traditional metaphysics as rendering questions regarding “transcendent” things unanswerable. Heidegger does not even mention the part of the Critique, which aroused most attention in Kant's day: the Transcendental Dialectics. Nor does he ponder Kant’s very purpose of the critique of reason: to make freedom possible. In this “existential” interpretation, Kant is decidedly brought into the twentieth century and its concerns with individual existence. That this “twentieth-century Kant” has, perhaps, little to do with the “eighteenth-century Kant” or the Kant of the nineteenth century, is at best collateral damage for Heidegger. However, in this, Heidegger has achieved the most controversial interpretation of Kant to date, where the question of whether or not Heidegger discovered the “real Kant” has become obsolete and even naïve.

3.4 Conclusion: Mapping the Terrain—Then and Now

Looking back upon the discussion, one may open up three categories to characterize the relationship between the Kantian and phenomenological traditions. These reflect the way in which scholarship has dealt with these figures and their mutual relations. Taken separately, none of them is entirely correct; the truth lies in the whole.

1. First there are those, mostly from the phenomenological camp, who believe that the Phenomenological Movement represents a major departure from Kant and the Kantians, in various aspects: in method, substance, main claims, and interests. They criticize the Kantian deductive method “from above,” and reject many of the canonical Kantian claims, such as the fundamental distinction between sensibility and the understanding, transcendental idealism, the identification of a priori with formality. Instead, they see phenomenology’s descriptive program as opening up vast arrays of investigation that were never acknowledged by the Kantians. Some Kantians, to this day, think the same of phenomenology; that its representatives never fully understood the main intentions of
Kant and his followers; that there lies enough potential in Kant’s philosophy to render phenomenology and its interests obsolete.

As this discussion has shown, such a reading neglects the catalytic effect Kant and the neo-Kantians have had on the development of phenomenology. Even in its most critical aspects, the main phenomenological import cannot be fully appreciated without a clear understanding that it was a rejection or transformation of key tenets of Kantianism. For instance, to claim that “dumb experience” is not dumb and needs to be brought to speak through an analysis of consciousness’s passivity, indeed the term “passive synthesis,” could only be appreciated in its pushback against Kantianism. Also, the way in which the main phenomenologists disagreed with Kantianism is instructive, since phenomenology’s counter-claims only come into relief against the backdrop they reject. Thus, whether or not the development of phenomenology is motivated by Kantianism, the way in which phenomenology did things differently from Kant and his followers tells us a great deal about phenomenology.

2. A more radical position is that phenomenology has nothing to do with Kantianism. Representatives of this claim believe that the main concerns that guided Husserl, Heidegger, and others, lay so far apart from all of what concerned Kant that to even venture into a comparison between them, misses the innovative parts of phenomenology; that the guiding intentions of phenomenology are fundamentally un-Kantian, stemming from an entirely different philosophical tradition—Brentano and his empirical psychology and his realism. Indeed, the “German” and the “Austrian” traditions lay light years apart.

This represents a questionable historical assessment, as if German and Austrian philosophies were as far apart as the Prussian and Austro-Hungarian Empires were politically. In certain philosophical decisions, both traditions might be fundamentally inimical to each other; but this should not cause us to overlook the commonalities they shared which are too important to be cast aside, such as the belief in philosophy as a science, the rejection of psychologism, and the rejection of skepticism or skeptical relativism in epistemology and ethics. Husserl’s version of transcendental idealism is similar to Kant’s more than just in name. Heidegger’s claim that Kant discovered finite Dasein, if plausible, would also lend credibility to the commonality thesis.

3. Third, there are some who think that Kantianism and phenomenology are siblings from a common father, Kant. They believe that Husserl merely re-did, and perhaps did better, what Kant and his predecessors attempted to achieve; that Heidegger got Kant right with his insistence on the subject as a finite Dasein, that this was what Kant had attempted but was unable to do given the limitations of his philosophical vocabulary. This also goes for the neo-Kantians; the Marburg School reading of the a priori as dynamic is the only way to react, as a Kantian, to paradigm shifts in the sciences; this is what Kant would have said had he witnessed the paradigm shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics.

Yet such a reading sells their respective genuine achievements short. Phenomenology does depart significantly from many Kantian claims, justifying itself as a philosophical movement in its own right. It cannot be neatly integrated into Kantianism; nor does it
simply present an *Aufhebung* of Kant. It can also not be said that phenomenology makes Kantian claims obsolete. The Kantian notion of a deductive justification of the claims of knowledge from a factum is originally Kantian and has no equivalent in phenomenology. The same goes for the neo-Kantian contributions to the theory of science, as questionable as they were from the standpoint of phenomenology. Some newer research takes the stance that the mutual relationship is constructive, that these traditions can be seen as working out (differently, but constructively) solutions to common problems, such as the nature of transcendental philosophy, the threat of skepticism, and the role of philosophy in contemporary culture. Newer scholars, in the spirit of overcoming the Continental-analytic split, are thankfully no longer concerned with keeping the traditions separate, but see phenomenology and Kantianism as working on common problems that still occupy us today.

Thus, all of these interpretive standpoints have their merits and must be seen as contributing their part to a fair assessment of the relation between phenomenology and Kantianism in its various guises. Acknowledging the Kantian influence on phenomenology does not sell the latter’s achievements short. On the other hand, insisting on the originality of phenomenology does not necessitate the killing of one of its fathers, nor does phenomenology render all aspects of Kantianism moot. A fair and circumspect assessment of phenomenology in all of its forms and figures finds a good touchstone and starting point in Kant as well as any of the major representatives of the neo-Kantian tradition. This way of assessing the relation between Kant and his followers to phenomenology is, I would argue, true to this day.

References


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Notes:

(1) See the first newer work assessing this relation, Kern’s classical Husserl und Kant (1964), which is an excellent place to start.

(2) The same goes the other way, too, as can be seen by Natorp’s ringing endorsement of Husserl’s Logical Investigations (see Natorp 2013: 257f.).

(3) Cf. Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, where Kant is a “whipping boy” for numerous wrongdoings.

(4) Brentano died in 1917 and had cut his ties with the “Phenomenological Movement.” Brentano disagreed with the project of phenomenology the moment it moved from its descriptive-psychological into its philosophical register. For Husserl and his followers, leaving phenomenology at the stage of descriptive psychology rendered its main intentions moot.

(5) For a history of neo-Kantianism, see Willey 1978 and Köhnke 1991; for newer reconstructions see the recent work by Beiser 2014 and 2015.

(6) A collected works of Kant did not exist until the Akademieausgabe was begun in 1900 (with Dilthey as general editor). Later, Cassirer began his own edition of Kant’s collected works.

(7) All translations from the German, unless otherwise noted, are by the author.

(8) These differences to Kant pertain to phenomenology as a theoretical discipline; hence, what is missing here are the differences between Kant and Husserl regarding practical philosophy. On these differences see Peucker 2007. Other differences extend to the role of
the imagination (see Jansen 2010); the role of aesthetics; the importance of religion, and other aspects. Thus the above account is very restrictive.


(10) Husserl is critical of the formality of the categorical imperative. In turn, he claims to have found the formal laws of feeling and willing in formal axiology and formal practology corresponding to material a priori structures in the world; see Husserl 1988: 42f.

(11) Nuzzo (2008) has argued that there is a certain sense of embodiment in Kant as well.

(12) In this context, Husserl also rejects Brentano’s distinction between “outer” and “inner” intuition (see Husserl 2001a: 760–2). They are both “of the same epistemological character given the normal conception of the terms” (Husserl 2001a: 760–2).

(13) As I have argued elsewhere (see Luft 2009).

(14) See Husserl 1959: 181: “Phenomenology in its entirety is nothing other than the first rigorous form of this idealism.” Husserl also develops a “proof” for transcendental idealism around 1913 (see Husserl 2003).

(15) For a summary of this discussion, see Zahavi 2003.

(16) For the reconstruction of Husserl’s development of genetic phenomenology, also through the influence of Natorp, see Welton (2000, esp. ch. 9: 221–56).

(17) Another figure who, unfortunately, has to be passed over here and who had a significant impact on Heidegger was Emil Lask, a pupil of Windelband and Rickert, who prematurely died in the Great War. For a demonstration of this influence, see Crowell 2001.

(18) A detailed account of Davos 1929, its prehistory and aftermath, is to be found in Gordon (2008). It reports the whole event from all angles with impressive detail.

(19) The protocol of this dispute had already been circulated by then. One reason to quickly write the Kant book was this “uncontrolled circulation,” see the letter to Jaspers quoted in the following footnote. Since the protocol continued to be circulated after the publication of the Kant book, Heidegger decided to publish it as an appendix to the edition of 1973. See Heidegger’s immediate reaction to the dispute in the letter to Blochmann, from April 12, 1929: “Substantially-philosophically, I gained nothing . . . Cassirer was extremely polite in the discussion, almost too obliging. Thus I found too little resistance, which made it impossible to give the problems their proper acuity. Essentially, the questions were far too difficult for a public debate” (Heidegger/Blochmann 1989: 29f.).

(20) The Davos Dispute took place in March 1929. Heidegger writes to Jaspers on April 14, 1929, “I must finish the manuscript of my Kant interpretation by the end of the
month” (Heidegger/Jaspers 1990: 120). Heidegger penned the manuscript in roughly six weeks.

(21) It is written mainly against the Marburg neo-Kantians, whereas it arguably has some resonance with Rickert’s interpretation of Kant, see Rickert’s letter to Heidegger (Heidegger/Rickert 2002: 61), where Rickert points to a passage of his book on Kant of 1921, where he writes (Rickert 1924: 153) that the “main emphasis . . . of the Critique of Pure Reason . . . lay not in the Transcendental Aesthetic or Analytic, but in the Dialectic, and this means: the main problem of this work is not a theory of the experiential sciences, but it is about the old, ever-recurring problems of metaphysics.” Rickert refers Heidegger to this passage, because he feels unfairly treated in the Davos debate, since Heidegger also mentions Rickert as someone who put forward the “epistemology of science thesis.” In his reply to Rickert, Heidegger does not take back his words, but expresses dissatisfaction that the protocol had been leaked, since it was in many ways “insufficient.”

(22) In this point—that Kant is essentially correct but starts “too high up”—Heidegger is close to Husserl’s interpretation of Kant, only that the thrust of Heidegger’s interpretation targets less Kant himself than the neo-Kantian interpretation of him.

(23) There are indications that Husserl, too, favored the first edition, see Kern 1964: 19 n. 5.


(25) Thanks to two anonymous readers of an earlier version of this chapter, whose suggestions I sought to include.

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