

Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette

Dissertations (2009 -)

Dissertations, Theses, and Professional
Projects

Transforming the Foundation: Lonergan's Transposition of Aquinas' Notion of Wisdom

Juliana Vazquez Krivsky
Marquette University

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu



Part of the [Religion Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Vazquez Krivsky, Juliana, "Transforming the Foundation: Lonergan's Transposition of Aquinas' Notion of Wisdom" (2019). *Dissertations (2009 -)*. 888.

https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/888

TRANSFORMING THE FOUNDATION: LONERGAN'S TRANSPOSITION OF
AQUINAS' NOTION OF WISDOM

by

Juliana Vazquez Krivsky, B.A., M.A.

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School,
Marquette University,
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

December 2019

ABSTRACT
TRANSFORMING THE FOUNDATION: LONERGAN'S TRANSPOSITION OF
AQUINAS' NOTION OF WISDOM

Juliana Vazquez Krivsky, B.A., M.A.

Marquette University, 2019

Medieval philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas developed a multifaceted account of wisdom by integrating Aristotelian and Platonic lines of thought with the truths of Christianity. Bernard J.F. Lonergan, SJ (1904-1984), one of the leading Catholic systematic theologians of the twentieth century, transplanted the metaphysical insights of Aquinas into a contemporary philosophy and theology of conscious intentionality constructed around human experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, and loving.

This dissertation reiterates the deceptively simple question first posed by Frederick Crowe: Did Lonergan achieve a deliberate, thoroughgoing transposition of the Thomist metaphysical category of wisdom into a more cognitive-existential context? Through a chronological and detailed interpretation of primary texts, I conclude that wisdom, for Lonergan, is the development of fuller authenticity in the subject. This subjective development is sown in self-appropriation and reaches full bloom only in the radical shift in horizon that is conversion, especially in the transformation from isolation to transcendent being-in-love that constitutes religious conversion. Intrinsically connected to transcendental method, which already implies within its unfolding the operative (and potentially fourfold) conversion of the subject, the most sapiential components of Lonergan's anthropology are self-appropriation and, ultimately, the self-surrender of completely unqualified love. Self-appropriation and self-surrender serve the

same foundational, consummate, normative, and unifying roles ascribed to wisdom by Aquinas while also retaining the sapiential tasks of ordering and judging so important to the Angelic Doctor.

In terms of methodology, I characterize my overall approach as interpretation, the second step in the process from data to results that is transcendental method. In Chapter One, I aim to discern exactly what Aquinas means by wisdom; in Chapters Two through Five, I ascertain what Lonergan means by wisdom in his early work and what his silence around wisdom means in his later work. And in the Conclusion, I submit a preliminary position on how the later Lonergan's notion of wisdom as self-appropriation and self-surrender helps us imitate and love divine wisdom. This idea is worked out within the functional specialty of systematics and builds on Lonergan's and Doran's own systematic theology of the Trinity, which seeks further understanding of our share in the inner-Trinitarian relations, a central mystery of the Christian faith.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Juliana Vazquez Krivsky, B.A., M.A.

Writing this dissertation has been a long and sometimes difficult journey, but there have been many oases along the way. When I began my master's degree here at Marquette I was unsure of the direction my studies would take and was blessed to find an excellent and, in fact, life-changing introduction to Lonergan through Fr. Robert Doran, SJ. While much of my coursework has furthered both my faith and my intellectual development, my classes with Fr. Doran have perhaps most brightly reflected the joy and promise of what critical theological thought can discover about our world and its amazing Trinitarian God. As have others, I have found in Fr. Doran's teaching and research a striking model of *fides quaerens intellectum* in a guild not always characterized by authenticity. His patience, understanding, and good counsel have been invaluable and appreciated beyond what words can communicate.

Likewise, I would like to thank Dr. Wanda Zemler-Cizewski, Dr. Mark Johnson, and Dr. John Dadosky for serving on my board. In addition to their obvious expertise and scholarly contributions, I greatly respect and admire their theological wisdom and humility. It is an honor to learn from scholars of their caliber and an even greater privilege to witness their commitment to theology as a religious and spiritual practice. I am very grateful for Dr. Dadosky's enlightening insight into the writing process and for Dr. Johnson's and Dr. Zemler-Cizewski's aid in expanding my knowledge of Aquinas, especially his historical context.

I have been fortunate to receive the guidance of other professors as well. I would like to thank Dr. Susan Wood for her kind concern for my growth as a student and for providing me with diverse learning opportunities as her teaching assistant. I have benefited enormously from exploring ethics with Dr. M. Therese Lysaught and will always remember the intellectual hospitality and gracious collaboration she extended to her students. Finally, I want to acknowledge in a special way Dr. Danielle Nussberger, master pedagogue and mentor extraordinaire, who consistently shares her knowledge in a spirit of self-sacrificial charity and genuine *cura personalis*. Her constant encouragement, wisdom, and advice have helped me beyond measure and transparently revealed what it means to be a theologian truly in love with God.

I have been equally happy to find at Marquette a supportive community of fellow students that have enlarged my vision of God, others, and myself no less than my academic interests. Karen Keen, Kirsten Guidero, Anne Carpenter, Chris Samuel, Paul Monson, Eric Vanden Eykel, Katy Leamy, Christine Wood, and Joseph Flipper have happily shared their knowledge and fellowship throughout the years, and I am a much better theologian and person for it. Jeremy Blackwood and Matthew Peters deserve particular mention for their generosity in conversation, especially for helping me during the “early days” as I grappled with Lonergan’s terminology and struggled to figure out what in God’s name he might mean by this mysterious “self-appropriation.” I have also learned much from the many scholars of the Lonergan community and am especially thankful for the friends I have gained through the Lonergan on the Edge conference. And for the precious gift of long-suffering friendship and the countless ways they have enriched my life outside of the academy, I am deeply grateful for the following dear

individuals: Mary Stanton, Erin Stisser, Jen Husz, Daniel Towne, Susan Koehne, Katy Leamy, Christine Wood, and Joseph Flipper.

My family has been extremely gregarious in helping me finish this degree; above all, I could never repay their faith in me. My mother's love for books, my father's belief in the transformative power of education, and their shared conviction on the value of hard work have shaped my love for learning. I am indebted to my brothers for their care and reassurance throughout the years, and my in-laws deserve special recognition for their consistent support of and sincere interest in my theological career.

There could never be an adequate expression of gratitude for my husband Mike, whose love for the universe (or multiverse, as it may be) is a sure sign of wisdom and a profound source of inspiration for me and my work. His good humor, balanced perspective, and loving companionship have lightened my burdens. And his undying confidence in me and fervent support of all my endeavors have been shining stars along a sometimes uncertain path. I will never forget the sacrifices he made to help carry me one step closer to health and to finishing this project.

Last but not least, I praise God for placing all of these wonderful people in my life and for teaching me how to begin new adventures, theological and otherwise, with greater hope and love. Thank You for being a God of seventy-seven chances, of unfathomable mercy, of unconditional love. Thank You for being a God that lifts up the weak, favors the poor, and heals the broken. Thank You for being a God that resurrects a new creation all around us and never ceases to illuminate all our dark nights. Thank You for giving all of us a share in your wisdom and for unveiling the beauty of the cross.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.....	1
1 The Secondary Conversation	2
2 Wisdom as Conversion and Love	5
3 A Note on Method	5
4 A Note on Transposition.....	7
 Chapter One: Aquinas on <i>Sapientia</i>	10
1 Wisdom as Speculative Intellectual Virtue.....	10
1.1 <i>Intellectus, Scientia, et Sapientia</i> : Some Preliminary Notions	11
1.2 Wisdom and First Principles: The Heart of the Sapiential Habit.....	14
1.3 Functions of Wisdom.....	17
2 Wisdom as Metaphysics	21
3 Wisdom as Prudence.....	26
4 Wisdom as <i>Sacra Doctrina</i>	30
5 Wisdom as Gift of the Spirit	35
6 Divine Wisdom	42
7 Summary: Wisdom in Aquinas as Foundational, Consummate, Normative, and Unitive.....	47
 Chapter Two: <i>Sapientia</i> in the Quest for Cognitional Foundations: Epistemological and Metaphysical Dimensions of Wisdom in <i>Verbum</i> and <i>Insight</i> (1940-1957)	49
1 <i>Verbum</i>	51
1.1 Wisdom as Metaphysics	52

1.2 Wisdom as Epistemology	53
1.3 Wisdom as Psychological Introspection	58
1.4 Wisdom as Normative Self-Knowledge	61
1.5 Wisdom as Unity: The Whole of Being.....	64
1.6 Wisdom as Unity-in-Duality: Subject and Object	67
1.7 Wisdom as Unity-in-Duality: Knowledge of Self and Knowledge of God	71
2 <i>Insight</i>	74
2.1 Wisdom and the Universe of Being	75
2.2 The Intellectual Habit of Wisdom and the Self-Affirmation of the Knower	78
2.3 The Self-Affirmation of the Knower as Epistemological Wisdom	80
2.4 Epistemological Wisdom as Prior to Metaphysics	84
2.4.1 Epistemological Wisdom and the Notion of Being	90
2.5 Metaphysical Wisdom as the Integral Heuristic Structure of Proportionate Being	91
2.6 Wisdom as the Highest Viewpoint (and a Note on the Universal Viewpoint)	96
3 Summary: Metaphysical and Epistemological Dimensions of Wisdom.....	99
Chapter Three: <i>Sapientia</i> in the Quest for Theological Foundations: The Emergence of Method and the Ascension of Conversion in the Gregorian Courses (1957-1964).....	102
1 <i>De intellectu et methodo</i> (1959): Wisdom as Method's Companion.....	102
1.1 Wisdom as a Foundational Bridge in Historical Development	104
1.2 Wisdom as Parallel to Modern Science	109
1.3 Wisdom and Theological Method.....	110
1.4 Wisdom and General Method	111

2 <i>Topics in Education: The Role of Science and Education in Developing Wisdom</i>	114
3 <i>De systemate et historia: Wisdom as the Master Operatory Habit</i>	117
3.1 The Circle of Operations.....	119
3.1.1 Wisdom as the Master Operatory Habit.....	122
3.2 A New Definition of “Primitive Terms”	125
3.3 Horizon and Wisdom as a Circle of Operations	126
3.4 A Note on Order.....	128
4 <i>De intellectu et methodo</i> (1961) and a 1961 Lecture at Moraga: Wisdom Understood “Methodically”	131
5 <i>De methodo theologiae</i> (Spring 1962) and the Regis College Institute “On the Method of Theology” (Summer 1962): Wisdom and Method Closer Still	133
5.1 “A Wisdom that Regards <i>All</i> Things”: Wisdom as the Integration of Differentiated Worlds	135
5.2 Wisdom as Self-Appropriation: A Reprise	139
5.3 Wisdom as Method’s Younger Sister	141
5.3.1 Functions of Wisdom and Method.....	141
5.3.1a The Ordering Functions of Wisdom and Method	142
5.3.1b The Judging Functions of Wisdom and Method.....	144
5.3.1c The Unifying Functions of Wisdom and Method	146
5.3.2 Characteristics of Transcendental Method and Wisdom	148
5.3.3 Wisdom as Interiority and Method as Interiority.....	150
5.3.4 Wisdom and Conversion.....	152
5.4 Theology as Wisdom in <i>De methodo theologiae</i> (Spring 1962) and the Regis College Institute “On the Method of Theology” (Summer 1962)	154

6 <i>De methodo theologiae</i> (Spring 1963 and Fall-Winter 1963-1964): Wisdom of the Concrete as Part and Parcel of Transcendental Method	157
6.1 Wisdom and Transcendental Method	158
6.1.1 Wisdom and the Dialectical Function of Method	162
6.1.2 Theological Wisdom and Transcendental Theological Wisdom	166
7 Summary: Wisdom in the <i>De methodo theologiae</i> courses and the Regis College Institute on Theological Method	169

Chapter Four: <i>Sapientia</i> in the Third Stage of Meaning: Wisdom as Transcendental Method and Conversion in <i>Method in Theology</i> (1964-1972).....	172
1 The Fourth Level of Consciousness.....	173
2 General Resemblances Between Transcendental Method and Wisdom.....	175
2.1 Operations as Patterned, Related, and Recurrent.....	176
2.2 Operations as Transcendental	179
2.3 Operations as Normative.....	182
2.4 Cumulative and Progressive Results.....	183
3 Functions of Transcendental Method and Objectives of Thomist Wisdom	189
3.1 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Unitive	190
3.2 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Systematic	190
3.3 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Heuristic	191
3.4 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Foundational	192
3.5 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Normative	193
3.6 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Critical	193
3.7 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Dialectical.....	195
4 Functional Specialization.....	196

5 Wisdom as Functional Specialty: Dialectic	199
5.1 Dialectic in <i>Method in Theology</i>	201
5.1.1 Dialectic and Conversion.....	203
5.1.2 The Urgency of Dialectic for the First Phase of Theology	204
5.1.3 The Structure of Dialectic	205
5.2 Evidence of a Transposition.....	206
5.3 Dialectic as Epistemological Wisdom	207
5.4 A Further Verification: Dialectic and the Universal Viewpoint.....	209
6 Wisdom as Functional Specialty: Foundations.....	210
6.1 Foundations and Conversion.....	210
6.2 Foundations and General Categories	212
6.3 Foundations and Special Categories	213
6.4 Evidence of a Transposition.....	216
6.5 Foundations as Metaphysical Wisdom	218
7 Caveat to a Transposition.....	219
8 Wisdom as Conversion	221
9 Summary: Wisdom as Transcendental Method	224
 Chapter Five: <i>Sapientia</i> in the Fourth Stage of Meaning: Wisdom as the Self-Surrender of Love in Post- <i>Method</i> Works (1972-1982)	 226
1 Conversion and Self-Transcendence.....	228
1.1 The Converted Self as the Transcending Self.....	230
1.2 Conversion as from Lovelessness to Being-in-Love	233
2 Successive Degrees of Self-Transcendence.....	235

2.1 Horizontal Processes and Horizontal Finality.....	236
2.2 Vertical Processes and Vertical Finality	238
2.3 Wisdom as Successive Self-Transcendence Sublated by Love	242
3 Love as Ultimate Self-Transcendence	244
3.1 Love as a Fifth Level	245
3.2 Love as a Way of Being Conscious	246
3.3 Love and the Relationship Between Person and Community.....	247
4 The Sapiential Nature of All Love.....	248
4.1 Love as Foundational.....	249
4.1.1 Love as Foundational for Value Recognition	250
4.1.2 Love as Foundational for Individual Development	251
4.1.3 Love as Foundational for Psychic and Spiritual Wholeness.....	252
4.2 Love as Consummate.....	254
4.2.1 Love as Actuation	255
4.2.2 Love as the Fulfillment of Conscious Intentionality.....	257
4.2.3 Love as Affective Fulfillment.....	261
4.2.4 Love and Community as a Higher Horizon	263
4.3 Love as Normative.....	264
4.4 Love as Unitive.....	265
5 Religious Love as the Ultimate Form of Wisdom	268
5.1 Religious Love as Foundational.....	269
5.1.1 Religious Love as the First Principle of Conversion	270
5.1.2 Religious Love as Foundational for Other Loves	272

5.2 Religious Love as Consummate.....	273
5.2.1 Religious Love as Actuation.....	273
5.2.2 Religious Love as the Fulfillment of Conscious Intentionality	274
5.2.3 Religious Love as Affective Fulfillment.....	276
5.2.4 Religious Love as Higher Horizon and Kingdom of God	277
5.3 Religious Love as Normative.....	278
5.3.1 Religious Love and the Scale of Values	279
5.4 Religious Love as Unitive.....	280
6 Summary: Wisdom as the Self-Surrender of Love	281
Conclusion	283
1 An Avenue for Further Research: Love of Divine Wisdom as Participation in the Inner-Trinitarian Life of God.....	285
1.1 The Invisible Mission of the Son.....	285
1.2 Reading <i>De redemptione</i> (1958) through the Lens of <i>The Trinity in History</i> ...	287
1.2.1 Current World Order.....	288
1.2.2 The Exterior and Interior Orders and the Order of the Universe.....	289
1.2.3 Cultural Value and Wisdom.....	290
1.2.4 Cultural Value and the Wisdom of the Word	292
2 Our Relationship to the Divine Word through “Love of Wisdom”: A Few Questions.....	292
2.1 The Spirit of Love and the Word of Wisdom	293
2.2 Love for God and Love for the Universe.....	294
3 Final Thoughts: Wisdom as the Humility, Patience, and Autonomy of Love.....	296
Bibliography	300

Introduction

In an essay originally published in 1984, Frederick Crowe notes that the Thomist notion of wisdom played a major role in many of Lonergan's works prior to 1959, but wisdom as an explicit theme seems to drop off around this time.¹ Inquiring into what becomes of Aquinas' notion of wisdom in the later Lonergan, Crowe looks backward through the chronology of Lonergan's works and observes that the idea of the "universal viewpoint" in *Insight* (1957) serves some of the same functions explicitly attributed to the Thomist conception of wisdom in Lonergan's early works. Crowe also stresses that wisdom is considered precisely in the context of Lonergan's search for foundations in his early Latin theology courses. Indeed, although in both the 1959 course *De intellectu et methodo* and the 1962 course *De methodo theologiae* Lonergan still stressed the traditional Thomist account of wisdom as an intellectual virtue, he also brings in the dynamic nature of wisdom as a sort of "moving foundation."

More specifically, Crowe submits that the Thomist notion of wisdom as a habit of right judgment residing in the intellect of an individual, preserved in Lonergan's early works, gives way to "a collective wisdom gained through dialectic and foundations,"² which are, in the language of the 1972 *Method in Theology*, two (of eight total) interdependent groups of operations, the two that bring existential decision to bear on the

¹ Frederick E. Crowe, "Lonergan's Search for Foundations: The Early Years, 1940-1959," in *Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes*, ed. Michael Vertin (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 164-193, especially 178-179, 190, and 190 n. 144; "The Spectrum of 'Communication' in Lonergan" (ibid.), 53-77, especially 68; "Rhyme and Reason: On Lonergan's Foundations for Works of the Spirit" (ibid.), 314-331, especially 317; and "The Task of Interpreting Lonergan," in *Appropriating the Lonergan Idea*, ed. Michael Vertin (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1989), 145-160, especially 148.

² Crowe, "Lonergan's Search for Foundations," 68.

cumulative process from data to results that is transcendental method. And so if Crowe were to offer a final answer to the question that he himself posed, it seems that he would conclude that transcendental method takes the place of the traditional Thomist doctrine on wisdom in Lonergan's later works; however, he draws no final conclusions.

1 The Secondary Conversation

Other Lonergan scholars have also shaped discussion on this topic. Agreeing with Crowe that certain "sapiential functions" are taken over by the idea of the universal viewpoint in *Insight*, Ivo Coelho traces Lonergan's thoughts on wisdom as a middle term to provide an amazingly thorough account of the development and transmutation of the universal viewpoint in Lonergan's corpus. Although his principal task is to render an interpretation of the universal viewpoint in Lonergan's work, not to provide an interpretation of Lonergan on wisdom, Coelho believes that the traditional Thomist doctrine of wisdom falls out of extensive use in Lonergan's corpus from 1963 forward because Lonergan transposes it into the terms of conscious intentionality as transcendental method.³

Likewise, in an editorial footnote to *The Triune God: Systematics*, based on the systematic portion of Lonergan's 1964 *De Deo Trino*, Robert M. Doran, SJ, and H. Daniel Monsour elaborate on Lonergan's conception of theology as possessing a "sapiential function." Monsour and Doran suggest that this "sapiential function," although not explicitly called that or even discussed under the term "wisdom" in the 1972

³ Ivo Coelho, *Hermeneutics and Method: The 'Universal Viewpoint' in Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2001), 203.

Method, is connected with the normative, critical, dialectical, heuristic, foundational, and unifying functions of transcendental method discussed in that work.⁴

In his 2014 article “Lonergan on Wisdom,” John Dadosky takes as his starting points Crowe’s observation on the pivotal importance of 1959 and both Crowe’s and Coelho’s theory that transcendental method ultimately takes over the functions of Thomist wisdom in Lonergan’s later work. Dadosky shows that wisdom is the foundation and goal of the methodological precepts of 1959 and, later, of the greatly expanded version of these precepts in the transcendental method of 1972; therefore, the transposition is fundamentally effected in 1959. While largely congruent with that of Crowe and Coelho, Dadosky’s interpretation of Lonergan on wisdom is still distinct.

He notes, correctly in my view, that Crowe’s preliminary placement of wisdom in the functional specialties of dialectic and foundations does not adequately frame the full picture of Lonergan’s transposition. Dadosky does, however, silhouette the sapiential capacity for order and integration among different disciplines that is seen in transcendental method. He argues that the five methodological precepts outlined in *De intellectu et methodo* effectively transpose the intellectual facets of Thomist wisdom, but adds that this transposition is not complete until Lonergan discovers the eightfold order of functional specialization guiding different theological tasks into a cohesive unity. From this perspective, then, the date at which Lonergan’s relative “silence” around wisdom truly goes into effect is after 1965, which archival work has pinpointed as the time of Lonergan’s breakthrough to functional specialization.

⁴ Bernard J.F. Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and Daniel Monsour, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 12 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2007), 103, ed. n. 59. Cf. CWL 14: 22-27. Hereafter *The Triune God: Systematics* is cited as CWL 12.

Equally crucial is Dadosky's commentary on divine wisdom, spoken of the most extensively in Lonergan's 1958 *De redemptione* as God's plan to re-order the universe through the law of the cross—the divine invitation to return good for evil. By restoring order within human beings, who through grace are empowered to image the inner-Trinitarian order, divine wisdom ultimately heals the disordered cultural values that bring foolishness and destruction to entire societies in a vicious historical cycle of decline. Dadosky also analyzes supernatural wisdom by observing the implicit connection in *Method* between the dynamic state of being in love, which breaks into our consciousness when the gift of sanctifying grace is given and received, with the gift of wisdom from the Holy Spirit, which flows from the Holy Spirit as given (that is, from sanctifying grace).⁵

More recently, in his 2018 *Before Truth: Lonergan, Aquinas, and the Problem of Wisdom*, Jeremy Wilkins characterizes Lonergan's entire project as the development of wisdom in the sense of authentic subjectivity, a difficult and largely ignored but still necessary and viable solution to the Western crisis of normativity. All of Lonergan's work is contoured by a grammar of wisdom: "order in the knower (self-appropriation, conversion, self-surrender in love), order in the known (metaphysics, theology), and order in the coming to know (method)."⁶ Taking the place of classical first principles is the more radically foundational first principle, the subject as she or he is measured by the transcendental norms of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, and love.

⁵ John D. Dadosky, "Lonergan on Wisdom," *Irish Theological Journal* 79:1 (2014): 51-57 and 61-66..

⁶ *Before Truth: Lonergan, Aquinas, and the Problem of Wisdom* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 2018), 10, 61-95, with quote on 10.

2 Wisdom as Conversion and Love

In this dissertation, I will present my own answer to Crowe's question, an answer that is in basic continuity with the insights of Crowe, Doran, Monsour, Coelho, and Dadosky, while giving them greater precision and greater breadth by incorporating conversion more deeply into the interpretation of Lonergan's later "silence" around wisdom. My conclusions are, in fact, extremely similar to Wilkins', but garnered from an inductive, chronological, comparative survey of Lonergan's individual texts rather than the overall thrust and contemporary implications of his life's work. I attempt to perform all of the textual work and extensive argumentation required to definitively demonstrate not only that Thomist wisdom becomes transcendental method but also, more fundamentally, the conversion of the subject, especially the subject-in-love.⁷ Since it is love as existential orientation that ultimately undergirds the authenticity of method, I uphold the acute relevance of Lonergan's post-*Method* works for a study of wisdom, complementing the work of Dadosky, who analyzes wisdom in Lonergan through *Method*.

3 A Note on Method

The transition from Aquinas' metaphysical account to Lonergan's cognitional account of wisdom travels down numerous twists and turns, which I will here attempt to

⁷ At one point Crowe seems to point in this direction as well, speculating that "the 1959 position on wisdom is sublated in the role of authentic subjectivity" ("On Lonergan's Foundations for Works of the Spirit," 318). Dadosky also identifies religious authenticity, understood as conformity to the wisdom of the cross, as the ultimate wisdom ("Lonergan on Wisdom," 57 and 61).

simplify with a couple methodological assumptions. First, I intend as the formal object of my study the common core of meaning that consolidates Lonergan's various approaches to wisdom seen over time, and so the genetic elements of Lonergan's eventual identification of wisdom with self-appropriation command my attention the most. Accordingly, special importance is given to Lonergan's own intertextual references to his thoughts on wisdom, which often shine a light on this genetic aspect.⁸ Second, each genetic "moment" in Lonergan's transposition is set against a specific chronological-and-thematic stage of development in Lonergan's overall growth as a thinker.⁹

And so Lonergan's conception of wisdom during the first stage of his development (1940-1957) will be analyzed through the lens of the interplay among cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics in Chapter Two, especially as these pertain to the relationship between the knower and the known; through the lens of the emergence of method and the ascension of conversion in the second stage in Chapter Three (1957-1964) and Chapter Four (1964-1972); and through the lens of love as self-surrender in the third stage and the healing work of love as inverse to the work of understanding in the fourth stage in Chapter Five (1972-1982).

⁸ In addition, I lend more significance to shifts between texts rather than variations within a given text, although the latter will certainly be highlighted if proven relevant. It should also be noted that all of Lonergan's substantive references to wisdom will be analyzed according to date of completion rather than date of publication, to emphasize shifts in his thought more clearly than the latter might allow.

⁹ I take these stages from Doran's *Theology and the Dialectics of History* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1990), 19-33. In Chapter Five I have chosen to merge the last two stages described by Doran ("increasing centrality of love" and "healing and creating") into only one phase, which I will simply refer to by the broader title of Lonergan's position on love, while still retaining Doran's helpful distinction of two connected themes on love.

4 A Note on Transposition

Lonergan's fundamental stance toward such theological giants of the past as Augustine and Aquinas can best be characterized as transposition rather than negation or even a simple "moving beyond."¹⁰ Lonergan himself defines transposition as a restatement of an earlier position in a new and broader context.¹¹ The context of a statement is the remainder of factors that must be considered if that statement is to be understood.¹² And so in moving an author's position forward into a different context, an effort at transposition must discern the insights and judgments constitutive of the new context. The fundamental meaning of the author stays the same, although it is enriched and empowered to speak to the contemporary theological situation.

Different realms of meaning and different horizons are the two types of contexts that Lonergan mentions the most in regard to the work of transposition. When Lonergan transposed insights from Aquinas' psychology and metaphysics into the terms and relations of conscious intentionality, he was migrating from the realm of theory to the realm of interiority. Lonergan insists that the intersection of our conscious and intentional operations with historical circumstances produces four major exigencies—systematic, critical, methodical, and transcendent—that, in turn, eventually give rise to different realms of meaning (common sense, theory, interiority, and transcendence). In turn, the

¹⁰ See Matthew Lamb, "Lonergan's Transposition of Augustine and Aquinas: Exploratory Suggestions," in *The Importance of Insight: Essays in Honour of Michael Vertin*, ed. John J. Liptay, Jr., and David S. Liptay (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2007), 3-21, especially 5.

¹¹ "Horizons and Transpositions," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 410. Hereafter *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980* is cited as CWL 17.

¹² See the "Regis College Institute 'On the Method of Theology,' 9-20 July 1962," in *Early Works on Theological Method I*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 22 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2010), 20. Hereafter *Early Works on Theological Method I* is cited as CWL 22.

emergence of a novel stage of meaning in history necessitates the transposition of judgments of fact and judgments of value that have achieved the status of permanent truth in a prior stage of meaning. And the transposition of a judgment of fact or value from one realm of meaning to another is a move from one horizon to another genetically related horizon—a shift from one range of knowledge and interests to another.¹³

But how does one go about assuring that a given truth is not lost or distorted in the process of historical development and ultimately of complete transposition, and what does the latter process involve? A genuine change of horizon cannot be demonstrated from a previous horizon in the way of deductive logic.¹⁴ The genuineness of a transposition, like that of any other product of human subjectivity on Lonergan's analysis, proceeds from the self-transcendence of the subject.

If transposition is a genuine change of horizon that critically navigates the passage from one stage of meaning to another, then it demands a sufficiently differentiated consciousness to distinguish among the different cognitional processes characteristic of each realm of meaning and to consciously shift from one realm to another by shifting one's own thought patterns. Moreover, the success of a transposition is effectively verified when the transposed terms and relations produce a fuller or more explanatory account than the original terms and relations, perhaps answering questions that arise in the older context but cannot be answered on the basis of that context, allowing for more creative possibilities.¹⁵ The success of any transposition also stems from the accuracy

¹³ Bernard J.F. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 14 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017), 143-144. Hereafter *Method in Theology* is cited as CWL 14.

¹⁴ CWL 17: 410.

¹⁵ For instance, Jeremy Wilkins uses the terms and relations afforded by Lonergan's intentionality analysis to conceive of the Scholastic category of habitual grace as the role played by being-in-love in the

with which the original meaning is grasped. And so an investigation into Lonergan's transposition of Aquinas' notion of wisdom vitally relies on the prior task of interpreting Aquinas' doctrine on wisdom, the task to which I now turn.

development, orientation, and transformation of skills, and contends that doing so yields distinct advantages over faculty psychology. See Jeremy D. Wilkins, "Grace and Growth: Aquinas, Lonergan, and the Problematic of Habitual Grace," *Theological Studies* 72 (2011): 723-749, especially 748-749.

Chapter One: Aquinas on *Sapientia*

Wisdom is not only an acquired speculative virtue aimed at contemplation of the Divine, with a concomitant coalescence as metaphysics. It is also prudence, the guiding light of ethical discernment. The highest manifestations of wisdom, in the infused virtue of prudence, the gift of the Spirit, and all of the theological practices implied by *sacra doctrina*, circle as closely as humanly possible around divine mystery. In what follows, each type of wisdom will be described, with special emphasis on its functions, local context in Aquinas, and relation to other terms.¹⁶

1 Wisdom as Speculative Intellectual Virtue

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of wisdom as a category in Aquinas' thought. It is an idea almost as fundamental as that of being, since it validates the veracity of what is meant by that most fundamental term; the category of wisdom carries an ultimate significance. Not surprisingly, Thomas' notion of wisdom shines with a multifaceted brilliance, shifting with varied conceptual fields while conserving a unity throughout.

¹⁶ In what follows I emphasize the *Summa theologiae* as the most detailed, paradigmatic, and chronologically final of Aquinas' central texts addressing wisdom. Other important texts, however, include (in chronological order) Aquinas' first treatment of the prologue of *In I Sententiarum*, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, *Summa contra gentiles*, and his second treatment of the prologue of *In I Sententiarum* (called "the Roman commentary"). He also discusses wisdom in *In Meta. pro.*, *In VI Ethicorum*, and other more secondary sources. For a summary of the texts and ideas of Aristotle that Aquinas draws upon the most for his doctrine on wisdom, see Mark F. Johnson, "The Sapiential Character of *Sacra Doctrina* in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas: The Appropriation of Aristotle's Intellectual Virtue of Wisdom," PhD dissertation (University of Toronto, 1990), 76-106.

1.1 *Intellectus, Scientia, et Sapientia*: Some Preliminary Notions

Acquired wisdom, both speculative and practical, is a perfection of intellect or reason, which is the power of a human being to know things by understanding and judging. The object of the human intellect in general and in this life is universal being; in this life, the being and the truth we are properly oriented to is being and truth as discoverable in material things. The good of the intellect is truth.¹⁷

The speculative and practical intellect are not two distinct powers but the same power of reason directed to different ends, either to contemplation alone (speculative intellect) or to operation (practical intellect). The practical intellect apprehends the true under the aspect of goodness or desirability, while the speculative intellect prescind from this aspect. Speculative knowledge is knowledge sought for its own sake, not for the further end of action, as in practical reason; it is a good of the knower.¹⁸

The subject of all speculative intellectual virtues, including wisdom, is the speculative intellect in relation to the agent intellect, because all three speculative virtues revolve in one way or another around the first principles given in the agent intellect. Aquinas describes the agent intellect as a participation in God's own understanding, since it reduces from potency to act the natures of the sensible things we seek to understand, reflecting participation in the pure act who is God. Speculative knowledge of first principles is a natural, not acquired, participation of divine wisdom; we naturally and

¹⁷ I-II, 9, 1, reply to 2; I-II, 57, 2, reply to 3; I-II, 60, 1, reply to 1.

¹⁸ I, 79, 11, response; I-II, 9, 1, reply to 2; I-II, 64, 3, response; II-II, 47, reply to 3; I-II, 1, 6, reply to 2; *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, 5.1

habitually know certain common principles of being. These most fundamental principles belong to a distinct habit of the intellect called understanding, or *intellectus*.¹⁹

First principles are indemonstrable insofar as they are *per se notum*, known by the intellect at once and without mediation of any other truths. By definition, it is not just the meaning but also the truth of a first principle that is immediately known to the mind once the meaning of each term is known. As examples, Aquinas gives two self-evident principles having to do with quantity: the whole is greater than the part, and things equal to one and the same are equal to one another. More significantly, St. Thomas remarks that the very first indemonstrable principle from which all others flow, in agreement with Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, is that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time. As the most fundamental principle, the principle of non-contradiction is based on the notion of being and not-being, but there exist "other notions consequent upon being," such as unity, plurality, potency, act, substance and accident, which also function as first terms. The self-evidence of some first principles, such as the whole is greater than the part, comes from the fact that the very definition of the predicate is included in the very essence of the subject.²⁰

But a much vaster array of our knowledge consists in truths known through other truths (*per aliud notum*), acquired by means of reasonable inquiry rather than bestowed by nature. Such mediated truths are not indemonstrable principles but are rather "like a limit" (*se habet in ratione termini*). If they are the limits of a certain genus, they are known through the habit of *scientia*, which draws conclusions from principles that are ultimate only in that genus. But if they are truths that either stand outside or encapsulate

¹⁹ I-II, 56, 3, response; I-II, 65, 1, response; I, 79, 3 and 4; I-II, 91, 3, reply to 1.

²⁰ *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, 5.1; I, 2, 1, response; I-II, 66, 5, reply to 4; I-II, 65, 2, response; I, 94, 2, response.

the limits of all human knowledge, then they are studied by *sapientia*, the habit that studies things that are first in intelligibility but last in our process of coming to know.²¹

The proper procedure of science is from knowledge of causes to knowledge of their effects. In contrast, wisdom reasons about eternal, necessary things by proceeding from a consideration of the highest causes to judgments about the principles and conclusions of all other sciences, as well as the validity of terms composing first principles. In the sense that wisdom draws conclusions both from first causes, which are the first principles of all of being, and from the first principles of knowledge (indemonstrable propositions), wisdom is also a science.²²

But it is a more perfect virtue than science simply called, since wisdom's object, God as first principle and ultimate end, is more excellent than even the necessary and eternal things studied by some sciences. In fact, some truths about God lie entirely outside of the limits of human nature, as God transcends all genera and humanity is completely and utterly disproportionate to divinity. And yet wisdom's knowledge of God as first cause—the existence and essence of the necessary, universal, and eternal First Principle—allows it to judge the conclusions and principles of other sciences. All scientific truths, whether they be principles of a given genus or science, or conclusions of the scientific reasoning process, stand as effects to the first cause known by wisdom. We judge lower effects by higher causes. Whether cause or effect in its own genus, all principles and all conclusions—even indemonstrable principles of knowledge—are, indeed, lower effects in relation to God, who is the highest cause of all creatures, the first

²¹ I-II, 57, 2, response.

²² I, 79, 9, reply to 3. The primary object of wisdom, like that of understanding and science, is the nature of necessary things, since in the Thomist thought-world, only necessary things are worth knowing for their own sake. See I-II, 57, 1, *sed contra*.

cause of our power of knowledge, and the proper object of wisdom. In this way *sapientia* exercises judgement over the activities and objects of *intellectus* and *scientia*.²³

Because the acts associated with prudence are beneath humanity, while speculative wisdom aims at eternal and necessary realities far exceeding all human concerns, theoretical wisdom is objectively superior to practical wisdom.²⁴ Moreover, speculative wisdom comes closer to complete happiness than prudence, since God is the very object of happiness, while prudence considers the means toward obtaining that happiness. As knowledge of God, the object of wisdom far surpasses the objects of all other knowledge, and so wisdom surpasses any science.

1.2 Wisdom and First Principles: The Heart of the Sapiential Habit

But wisdom judges principles as well as conclusions. On the surface level, Aquinas tells us that the meaning of some terms is known only to the wise, so the wise have more self-evident propositions at their disposal than most. So the proposition “angels are not circumscribed in place” is only a self-evident principle to the wise, since only the wise know that immateriality is included in the very essence of what it means to be an angel. At a deeper level, wisdom is also the driving force behind the selection of the primitive terms composing first principles. Just as the divine first cause is the first principle of all of being, knowledge of the first cause is fundamental knowledge.²⁵ The implication is that all primitive terms deal either directly with being or with what follows

²³ I, 4, 3, reply to 2; 88, 2, reply to 1 and reply to 4; I, 3, 5, response; I-II, 57, 2, reply to 1; I, 79, 9, reply to 3; I-II, 66, 5, response; I, 88, 3, reply to 2; I-II, 66, 5, response.

²⁴ I-II, q. 66, 6, reply to 1.

²⁵ I, 2, 1, response; I, 4, 3, response.

essentially from being, and the wise person's knowledge of God makes them privy, by analogy, to the notion of being which all beings participate in—*ens commune*.²⁶

Wisdom's relationship toward indemonstrable principles is threefold, as evidenced in a passage from the *Summa theologiae* that Lonergan will rely on heavily: *Et ideo sapientia non solum utitur principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum est intellectus, concludendo ex eis, sicut aliae scientiae; sed etiam iudicando de eis, et disputando contra negantes*.²⁷ Perhaps most importantly, wisdom passes judgment on first principles by resolving them into their component terms and justifying these terms against the most fundamental term of all, the meaning of being, which it is up to wisdom to validate. *Sapientia* grounds ultimate terms by what Aquinas calls the way of resolution.

Wisdom uses knowledge of temporal things to eventually ascend to a knowledge of the absolutely ultimate and unchanging things. In the way of resolution, wisdom grounds ultimate terms by testing them against both experience and reason in the reverse-inductive process essential to judgment, by way of resolution to the senses and to the intellectual light that makes *intellectus* possible. The truths stemming from wisdom form the basis upon which we can judge all things rightly, the principles grasped by understanding as well as the conclusions reached by science.²⁸

²⁶ Lonergan helpfully explains this same connection between knowledge of God and metaphysics: "God alone is being by essence, and it is only on a being that exists by its very essence that the science of all being, considered in itself, is founded." See Bernard J.F. Lonergan, *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 7 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2002), 39.

²⁷ I-II, 66, 5, reply to 4.

²⁸ I, 88, 2; I-II, 3, 6. Primary terms and the indemonstrable propositions (or principles) composed of them are also determined by sensory knowledge. It seems that it would be wisdom that guides the way of resolution in which reason validates the meaning of being (an essentially analogous concept) by resolving it to sensation and (more importantly in this context) to intellectual light. See I-II, 3, 6, response; I-II, 51, 1, response.

Next, in the way of synthesis, wisdom draws conclusions from the first principles of being grasped by *intellectus* in a manner parallel to the way the other sciences draw conclusions from their more particular principles. In its relationship to principles, wisdom can be thought of as the “understanding (intellect) of eternal and divine things”; insofar as it draws conclusions from such principles, it can be thought of as the “science of eternal and divine things.” Finally, although it cannot prove its principles, since then they would not be ultimate, it can dispute with those who would deny them by showing their objections to be false.

As profound as wisdom’s relationship to first principles may be, it is worth noting that it hinges upon the more original understanding of indemonstrable principles given in *intellectus*, and *intellectus* is present in us by nature only by way of a beginning that stands in need of further development. It is on account of the very nature of the intellectual soul that once we grasp the definition of a whole and the definition of a part, we immediately grasp that the whole is greater than the part. But the natural habit of understanding is not sufficient, in and of itself, to know what the correct definition of a whole is, and what the correct definition of a part is; such definitions stem from the intelligible species abstracted from phantasms and thus partly from sensation. And so Aristotle remarks in his *Metaphysics* and *Posterior Analytics* that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses, through induction.²⁹

Having reviewed wisdom’s threefold intersection with first principles, we can now cast the interconnections among *sapientia*, *intellectus*, and *scientia* in a new light. Aquinas depicts *sapientia*’s relationship to *intellectus* and *scientia* in at least two ways,

²⁹ I-II, 3, 6, response; I-II, 51, 1, response.

all of which closely follow upon its critical relationship with first principles and the notion of being. First, wisdom exercises judgment over *intellectus* and *scientia* inasmuch as it grounds the veracity of first terms composing first principles, on which *intellectus* and *scientia* intimately depend (albeit in two different ways).

Next, *sapientia* directs *intellectus* and *scientia* inasmuch as the latter two intellectual virtues are ordered to the right judgment of wisdom. *Intellectus* is only the remote and derivative source of principles for *scientia* but is the proximate and primary source of first principles for *sapientia*. *Scientia* gives us knowledge of causes that are ultimate in a particular genus, and since all particular causes are ordered to the most universal, divine cause, the wise are led on by the sciences to know the ultimate Being who transcends all genera, the Being who is being essentially.³⁰

1.3 Functions of Wisdom

If the proper object of wisdom is divine truth, then Aquinas identifies at least three central functions of wisdom, and all center around divine truth: wisdom considers, judges, and orders.³¹ We find these highlighted in the *Summa*: *ad sapientem pertinet considerare causam altissimam, per quam de aliis certissime iudicatur, et secundum quam omnia ordinari oportet.*³² The highest truths are those regarding the highest object:

³⁰ I-II, 9, 1, response; I, 4, 3, reply to 2; 88, 2, reply to 1 and reply to 4; I, 3, 5, response; *SCG*, ch. 1, no. 1.

³¹ For commentary on this triad, see Eric Mabry, “*Officium Sapientis*: Sapiential Moorings of Lonergan’s Notion of Method and Interiority in Thomas Aquinas,” paper presented at the West Coast Methods Institute at the Lonergan Center, Loyola Marymount University, April 2013.

³² II-II, 45, 1, response.

that God is, and that God is characterized by such and such an attribute.³³ Wisdom considers, or contemplates, God. Put simply, to reason to a truth about God, to understand a truth about God, and to consider a truth about God are all proper acts of wisdom.

Just as all particular causes are ordered to the universal cause, *intellectus* and *scientia* are ordered to *sapientia*. God is both ultimate end and first principle of being, and so the principles that are understood without mediation by the habit of understanding and that are taken as starting points by the habit of science, are intimately dependent on wisdom, the habit that strives to know God. In the Aristotelian-Thomist anthropology, humanity's highest power is our speculative intellect, and happiness resides in an activity of our highest power with respect to our highest object, and so our greatest happiness consists in contemplation of God. Because its action is the contemplation of God, wisdom is a beginning or foretaste of the saints' beatitude in eternity; in this life, however, wisdom knows God only imperfectly.³⁴

Reasoning about God does not consist merely in ideas about God but in actual interior assents and dissents of judgment. Wisdom's consideration or contemplation of God comes after and is a direct result of right judgment about divine truths.³⁵ Judgment is the act of reason whereby truth and falsity first enter into the mind; it is an interior act of the intellect putting things together, as in composition, or separating them, as in division.

³³ Of course it is Aquinas' position that God's essence can never be comprehended by us—neither on earth nor in heaven. I, 12, 7.

³⁴ I-II, 66, 5, response; I-II, 2, 5, reply to 3; I-II, 66, 5, replies to 2, 3, and 4; I-II, 66, 3, reply to 1; I-II, 3, 6 and 7. Cf. *SCG* ch. 2, no. 1

³⁵ "After" need not be taken here in a temporal sense, as it seems possible to me that the act of judgment affirming a divine truth may be practically simultaneous with the contemplative insight that rests in the truth of the reality assented to in judgment. Cf. the mention of contemplative insight in the notes taken by Martin O'Hara on Lonergan's 1945-1946 course at the Thomas More Institute entitled "Thought and Reality," Archive Entry 10034DTE040, 4. See <https://www.bernardlonergan.com/pdf/10034DTE040.pdf>. Accessed on November 7, 2018.

Judgment is always made in light of principles, in a process of resolving one's initial understanding (concept or definition) back to its dual sources in sense and in first principles, all in order to affirm or deny that initial understanding.

In Boethius' schema of the sciences, which Aquinas investigates in his unfinished commentary on the former's *De Trinitate*, the sciences are distinguished not only according to the degree of abstraction but also according to their resolution (or non-resolution) of judgment back to sensory knowledge. The primary and proximate kind of judgment about God that has wisdom as its habitual source can be described as a negative judgment, in the sense that judgments about God's existence and God's attributes do not terminate in sensory knowledge, as other judgments do.³⁶

While wisdom is first and foremost right judgment about divine truths, it is also right judgment about everything else in light of divine truth. Because all particular causes are ordered to the universal, divine cause, and are, in fact, effects of the highest cause, consideration of the highest cause empowers us to judge rightly about all other causes. The relationship between right judgment of divine truths and right judgment of everything else pivots around causation: the order of judgment follows the order of causation.³⁷

Order to a right end and to the divine law is common to all the virtues, but speculative wisdom has a special connection to order, as one of its central functions is the very act of ordering all things. As is true for much of Aquinas' claims about wisdom, one of his most treasured sources is Aristotle, who describes the "wise man" as one who orders because he "knows that for the sake of which each thing must be done, and this is

³⁶ The same can be said about knowledge of angels, who, like God, not only do not exist in matter and motion but can in no way exist in matter and motion.

³⁷ SCG, ch. 1, no. 2.

the good in each case, and, in general, the highest good in the whole of nature.”³⁸ The notion of order is connected with that of relation or proportion; to grasp the order of something is to understand its relation to the whole of which it is a part, or to its causes, or, as Aristotle and Aquinas stress, to its end (final cause).³⁹ In the *Summa contra Gentiles*, Aquinas threads together God’s intellectual nature, the nature of our end, and the good of the universe. It is fitting that wisdom, which is knowledge of the highest cause, is a perfection of intellect, because the first author and mover of the universe is an intellect. Therefore the ultimate end of the universe is truth, which is the good of the intellect. The purpose of the universe is to realize the very goodness of God as Truth; the highest goodness of our intellect is conformity with the Truth through the pursuit of wisdom.⁴⁰

The ability of wisdom to order all things would seem to depend on and follow directly from its ability to rightly judge of divine truth. Speaking of the gift of wisdom’s twofold types of activity, which we can reasonably apply to its virtuous counterpart, Aquinas explains that “A thing is considered in itself before being compared with something else.”⁴¹ Similar to the first activity of the gift of wisdom, wisdom understood as a virtue aims at contemplation of God for the sake of that contemplation itself, but flowing from that contemplation is the activity of ordering, of relating all things to God. To understand the order of many things among themselves is to grasp their relation to one another and, more importantly, to something higher, since the interrelations of diverse things are characterized by a telos to a common end. In the case of wisdom’s object, one

³⁸ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1.2, 982a17-20 and 982b5-7.

³⁹ I-II, 55, 4, reply to 4. In *I Eth.*, Lect. 1. Aquinas emphasizes that the order to the end is the more primary order in things, since often the order of parts to their whole relies on the order of the whole to its end.

⁴⁰ SCG, book 1, ch. 1., no. 2.

⁴¹ II-II, 45, 3, reply to 3.

and the same Deity is both first cause and final end (final cause), and so wisdom orders all things to God as principle and end. To judge rightly about creatures is to understand their true relation to God: not only to judge rightly about their due order to God as principle and end, but to understand the details of that order, including the hierarchy of beings.

2 Wisdom as Metaphysics

While we are not capable of receiving the divine essence as an inhering form in our intellect in this life, we are capable of a natural and imperfect union with God, as the known in the knower, through the virtue of wisdom, which considers the highest causes, and through its extension into the science of metaphysics. When wisdom draws conclusions from the principles that pertain to natural knowledge of God, to other primary causes besides God, and to being as such, it is practicing the science of metaphysics. The wise are believed by all to have knowledge of first causes and principles, and God is the highest and absolute first cause and principle of all other beings, so the primary object of metaphysics is the Divine Being. But as metaphysics treats all that is free from both motion and matter, it also studies angels. As secondary objects after separate substances, metaphysics studies the four primary causes, being qua being (*ens inquantum ens*, or *ens commune*), and the essential properties of being qua being.⁴²

⁴² Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1.1-1.2, especially 981b-982a982b10; *Super Boetium De Trinitate* 5.4, reply to 3 and reply to 4; *ST*, I, 50, 3; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 12.8, 1073a32ff; *In Post. Anal.*, Book 1, Lectio 5, Caput 2, 72a8-24.

The meaning of “being qua being,” which is, admittedly, an extremely abstract and elusive turn of phrase, is clarified by Aquinas in terms of principles: all beings, inasmuch as they share in being, have certain principles in common. Such principles are universal either by predication or causality. *Esse* is not predicated of God in the same way that it is predicated of creatures, but God is the cause of all creatures, so God is the principle of all things and also has a complete nature in and of God’s self. While God’s essence cannot be comprehended in this life or the next, it can be known through a relationship of non-univocal (but not entirely equivocal) predication with creatures.

Inasmuch as the effects of God and the angels can be traced back to their divine causes, and these divine causes are the common principles of all things,⁴³ they are investigated by the science studied by philosophers, who call it divine science, theology, first philosophy, or metaphysics. But a different type of divine science, the theology that studies sacred scripture, considers the nature of divine beings in and of themselves, and as they are revealed to humanity.⁴⁴ The divine science of the philosophers and the *sacra doctrina* of the *magister in sacra pagina* approach the study of being in dramatically different ways. Their subject-matter may be the same in a general kind of way, but it is their subject (*subiectum*)—the formal *ratio* under which it knows its subject-matter—that differs substantially. The subject-matter is that which the science concerns; from this perspective, faith-based theology, for instance, understands God as revealed. But the subject of a science is that whose causes and properties we hope to examine, while knowledge of the causes themselves is the terminus achieved by that scientist’s efforts.

⁴³ Aquinas was of the view that angels moved the heavenly bodies. See *ST*, 1, 70, 3; *SCG* 2.70, 3.23, 3.24.

⁴⁴ Theology studies God in God’s self—*ens divinum*—as its primary subject, while metaphysics studies God insofar as God is the cause of *ens commune*. See Johnson, “The Sapiential Character of *Sacra Doctrina* in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,” 76-79.

The subject-matter of all of metaphysics is the separate substances, that which is separate from matter and motion both in existence and in thought—God and the angels. In contrast, *ens commune*, substance, potency, and act are sometimes found existing in matter and motion, although according to their nature they do not exist in matter and motion. Faith-based theology has separated substances themselves as its subject, since it considers everything under the formality of being related to the God of revelation, while philosophical theology has *ens commune* (“being-in-general”) and its affiliated terms as its subject.⁴⁵ Another way of stating this distinction is to say that although both concern divine things as their subject-matter, faith-based theology seeks to know divine things for the sake of this knowledge itself, while philosophical theology seeks to know divine things insofar as they are the principles of other beings.

Most importantly, the foregoing distinction is the basis of Aquinas’ threefold distinction in the objects of metaphysics, the various monikers used for metaphysics, and the crucial way that he protects divine transcendence, even at the level of natural metaphysics. In his commentary on Aristotle’s *Ethics*, Aquinas lays out the three objects of metaphysics as the first and universal causes of being (as in the four causes from Aristotle’s *Physics*), being-in-general and its attendant properties (like unity), and the separate substances (especially God). Because God completely transcends all other being, God is not the subject of metaphysics in the same way that being-in-general, primary causes and principles, or even the angels are. In fact, in the metaphysics that is philosophical theology, only being-in-general is the subject, since everything in philosophical theology is apprehended under the formality of being and its attendant

⁴⁵ *Super Boetium De Trinitate* 5.1, reply to 9, and 5.4; 6.1, reply to the third question.

properties.⁴⁶ Knowledge of God is the term of philosophical theology, and is acquired through the ways of causation, negation, and eminence.

Metaphysics is called first philosophy because the principles of all other sciences can all be resolved into metaphysical principles and causes, and it studies those things that are first in being by their very nature, although our knowledge of them is last. It is called divine science or theology because it treats separate substances, which are the most excellent things we can ever hope to know. And, last but not least, it is properly called metaphysics because its objects—being and the essential traits of being—go beyond what is known in physics, since the more universal concepts of being and its attributes, which are not sensible in and of themselves, are learned after the more particular concepts of natural principles, which are closer to our sensory powers.⁴⁷

Aquinas claims that metaphysics should be learned after physics, since in the tripartite division of the speculative sciences into physics-mathematics-metaphysics, the type of thinking characteristic of the natural sciences in the way of analysis—discursive or “rational thinking”—comes before “intellectual thinking.” “Intellectual thinking” is the type of thinking most proper to the separate substances, especially God, who in one act of understanding understands all that there is to be understood, including God’s self.

But humans also share in this type of cognition, analogously, in the direct grasp of simple unity that rests in its knowledge as in an end. Unlike the intellects of the separate substances, the human intellect always moves from a consideration of many things to a comprehension of unity (the movement of rational thought), and from a consideration of unity to a comprehension of many things in that unity (the movement of intellectual

⁴⁶ More specifically, the formality in question here seems to be independence from matter and motion, although things included under this subject are, sometimes, found in matter and motion.

⁴⁷ *In Meta.*, prooemium; *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, 5.1, reply to 7, and 5.4.

thought). It is this type of thinking, similar to the habit of *intellectus* that grasps first principles but that here represents the term of a science instead, that metaphysics approaches more closely than mathematics or physics.⁴⁸ The understanding that is the term of metaphysics holds priority over the understanding that is the term not only of mathematics and physics but of all the sciences, since in the way of analysis the most universal causes ultimately reached in these sciences can be traced back even further, beyond the bounds of those sciences themselves, to the most universal and first cause, which is the object of metaphysics.⁴⁹

Moreover, at the term of its inquiry, metaphysics understands principles in conclusions, just as any other science does in the way of synthesis. But it reflects the divine unity more powerfully because its conclusions about divine being are closer to its principles, which also pertain to being, although not in the exact same way, since being is an analogous concept. And so in both regards—method and terminus—divine science beautifully imitates its sacred objects: as with theology, metaphysics strives for a unity of knowledge that mirrors the unity of God.⁵⁰

In the way of analysis, by rationally and discursively tracing multiple effects back to causes in the order of things and the more particular to the more universal in the order

⁴⁸ Of course, divine science or metaphysics depends on *intellectus* just as much if not more so than any other science, since its principles are the first principles of all being.

⁴⁹ Aquinas clarifies that this relationship between metaphysics and other sciences applies regardless of whether we are speaking about the order of reality, which proceeds by analysis from effects to causes, or about things in the intentional order, which we know by analysis from the more particular to the more universal. The terminus of analysis in divine science in the order of reality is knowledge of the separate substances, God and the angels. *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, 6.1, reply to the third question. For Aquinas, reason and intellect (understanding) are distinct acts of one and the same power, and their interrelationship is one of movement to rest. Reason starts from a more certain understanding of something and advances to a knowledge of something that was grasped, in the beginning, with less certainty. Intellect apprehends absolutely; it is the possession of intelligible truth. I, 79, 8, response; *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, 6.1, reply to the first question and reply to the third question.

⁵⁰ *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, 6.1.

of intention, we come to metaphysics, knowledge of the highest cause. At the term of metaphysical knowledge, our intellect contemplates many different truths about the divine attributes, which are in reality one and undivided in God. And then we proceed by way of synthesis to rationally and discursively come to an understanding of the multitude of creatures, understood, as much as is humanly possible, in the simple light of divine truth. The knowledge procured by wisdom is more certain than any other naturally proportionate knowledge, since what is simple and unchangeable is more certain than what is changing and multiple, and the act who is God is eternally one and eternally the same.⁵¹

3 Wisdom as Prudence

Prudence is right reasoning about things to be done, the ethical powerhouse of Thomist virtue theory. Right reason concerning things to be done requires due inclination of the will to a due end. Despite its nobility, the possession of wisdom or any other speculative virtue does not make its possessor good, since it does not prompt a person to use it well (that requires virtues informing the will, as charity and justice) or even to use it at all (that requires a motion of the will). The principles of speculative truth given by the natural light of the agent intellect are present and operative regardless of the will's disposition. And so the wisdom discussed above merely gives the possessor the capacity to consider truths about God. In contrast, the goodness of the practical intellect, which

⁵¹ *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, 6.1, reply to the third question.

prudence perfects, is a truth that is in conformity with right appetite, and so prudence presupposes rectitude of will.

Prudence has a special relationship to the moral virtues as well as its speculative counterpart. In itself prudence is a perfection of the practical intellect, but is located in close affinity to moral virtue because of its relation to the will. Moral virtue functions to moderate either our operations (as in the case of justice) or our passions (as in the case of all the other moral virtues) in conformity with a proper mean, but that mean is determined by right reasoning, which is prudence. The end of each moral virtue is to attain the mean—the good that is in conformity with reason in the matter that particular virtue regards⁵²—but it is prudence that determines what exactly that concrete good is in the particular situation at hand, and which means should be taken to achieve that concrete good. It is in this vein that Aquinas references Aristotle’s definition of moral virtue as *quod est habitus electivus in medietate consistens determinata ratione, prout sapiens determinabit*.⁵³ Prudence speaks to the “how” of an action, as well as to its where, when, with whom, and so on.

For reaching the end of human life that is proportionate to our nature, the moral virtue and practical wisdom that are acquired through repeated actions suffice. But for the purpose of ultimately reaching perfect union with the Divine, charity and infused prudence work together hand-in-hand: the theological virtue of charity conforms us to God as the object of supernatural happiness, and infused prudence discerns the best means to cling to and deepen this human-divine union. Thus in the life of grace, charity disposes and directs us to God as ultimate end; the infused moral virtues dispose and

⁵² I-II, 56, 3, response; I-II, 57, 1, response; I-II, 19, 3, reply to 2; I-II, 57, 5, reply to 3; I-II, 61, 2, response.

⁵³ I-II, 59, 1, response.

direct us to all other ends, but in relation to God; and infused prudence disposes us to choose, in the concrete situations of our lives, the best means for attaining the ends of the other infused virtues, and for ordering all these ends to the ultimate end.⁵⁴

Theoretical and practical wisdom share a similarity of proportion. Reason and will, in their raw power and in their formation by various virtues, are the twin sources of human morality. The subject of all speculative intellectual virtues, including wisdom, is the speculative intellect in relation to the agent intellect. The subject of prudence is the practical intellect in relation to righteous will, since to have right reasoning concerning things to be done requires proper inclination of the will to a good end. Or, in starker terms, right judgment of a moral action depends on the will. And because a righteous will orders all particular goods to the universal good, and prudence is right reason regarding the due proportion of a particular good and the ordering of all particular goods to the universal good, prudence wisely directs the other virtues insofar as it is informed by a good will.⁵⁵

Through correct choice of the means, prudence helps direct all of our powers and their perfections to the attainment of their proper ends as well as to the ultimate end, happiness in God. In this way practical wisdom, which discerns the best means to accomplish a given end and orders various ends to our ultimate end, helps us determine

⁵⁴ Attention to the concrete, practical, particular conditions of virtuous decision and action is a hallmark of Aquinas' *prudentia* (which draws heavily on Aristotle's *phronesis*) as well as Lonergan's commonsense judgments and judgments of value. For a fascinating sketch of how Lonergan's account of commonsense judgments (and their relation to judgments of value) might help clarify Aristotle's *phronesis*, see Patrick H. Byrne, "Phronesis and Commonsense Judgment: Aristotle and Lonergan on Moral Wisdom," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 71 (Supp. 1997): 163-177.

⁵⁵ I-II, 65, 2, response; I-II, 63, 3, reply to 2; I-II, 3, 5, response; I-II, 9, 1 response; I-II, 59, 4, response.

the best way to acquire speculative wisdom in our particular circumstances. Prudence is the servant of speculative wisdom, which contemplates our ultimate divine end.⁵⁶

The discernment of prudence, however, begins at a point further removed from the first means chosen. As actions are contingent, singular events, the exercise of prudence demands both particular principles in addition to universal ones. Parallel to the natural habit of *intellectus* that furnishes us with the first principles used by reason in speculative matters, the natural habit of intellect called *synderesis* is presupposed by prudence and consists in universal principles of practical action.

As the first thing apprehended by speculative reason is being, the first thing apprehended by practical reason is the good. And so the core of *synderesis* is the very first, and remarkably simple, universal principle in ethical reasoning: do good and avoid evil.⁵⁷ We have already seen that in speculative reason first principles are naturally known and naturally given. But in the practical reason, principles are ends. The ends of the moral virtues are naturally known and naturally given as the first principles of practical reason in *synderesis*, analogous to the habit of *intellectus*. Just as science draws conclusions from the first principles of the speculative intellect (*intellectus*), prudence draws conclusions about the proper means from the first principles of the practical reason, which are the ends of the moral virtues as appointed by the habit of *synderesis*. Just as *scientia* is presupposed by *intellectus*, prudence presupposes *synderesis*, and *synderesis* moves prudence. As a perfection of practical reason, prudence applies the

⁵⁶ I-II, 66, 5, reply to 1; I-II, 57, 4, reply to 3.

⁵⁷ Equally fundamental and practical is the particular principle of prudence, which is whatever particular end is desired by the will at a given time.

universal principles furnished by *synderesis* to practical matters, forming conclusions about the best means to enact, here and now, toward the end willed.⁵⁸

Insofar as prudence guides the human self-governance that images God's own self and God commands the order of all things to God's self, Aquinas thinks of human prudence as providential and divine providence as (analogously) prudential. In God, providence is the *ratio* of the good of order that is foreordained (and executed in God's wise governance) to obtain among created things. Because it is the function of prudence to order things toward their proper ends and the *ratio* of this order is, in God, providence, both prudence and providence can be appropriately said of God, as long as what is uniquely human is stripped away from the divine predication.⁵⁹

4 Wisdom as *Sacra Doctrina*

Put simply, *sacra doctrina* treats the truths of revelation. Its subject-matter is first and foremost God, but also includes creatures insofar as they are ordered to God as to their original beginning and final end. The formal aspect or subject under which sacred doctrine studies God is the divine light of revelation. So sacred doctrine covers not only those truths that can in no manner be learned by human reason but also those proportionate to natural inquiries. All are known in this science under the *ratio* of having been revealed by God.

⁵⁸ I-II, 58, 4, response; II-II, 47, 6, response, reply to 1 and reply to 3; I, 79, 12; II-II, 47, 6, response.

⁵⁹ I, 22, 1 and I-II, 91, 2. For an interesting and perhaps urgent application of the Thomist notion of prudence as providential, see Mary L. Hirschfeld, *Aquinas on the Market: Toward a Humane Economy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2018), 113-117.

Sacred doctrine also diverges from other sciences insofar as its principles, while not against reason, do not spring from reason as an ultimate source, as they do in all other sciences. As there are many truths about God that God has revealed that are not susceptible to proofs from reason, and the divine intervention of revelation casts a different, transcendent light over even those truths that we can also know by reason, the foundation of theology belongs to faith, the habit by which we assent to what transcends our comprehension. Its principles are the articles of faith—distinct truths about God that fit together into a whole. Some articles of faith, such as the mystery of the Trinity and the Incarnation, are primary objects of faith, since they order us to eternal life directly. Secondary objects of faith, which do not congeal into distinct articles, exist for the sake of manifesting the primary objects.⁶⁰

The habit of science comes to be in us insofar as we draw true conclusions from principles, and for Aquinas theology still does this.⁶¹ Although believers do not see or know the articles of faith in themselves in the way one knows that the whole is greater than the part, they truly know them through an intellectual act of choice that assents to them through the light of faith, which makes them “see” that they ought to believe them. Thus Aquinas insists that whatever is based on these principles is as well-proved in the

⁶⁰ II-II, 1, 5 and 6.

⁶¹ Aquinas’ classification of theology as *scientia* has, of course, been considerably amplified by Chenu’s *La Théologie comme science au XIII siècle*, although the sixth chapter of the third edition does discuss theology as wisdom (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957, 93-100). More recent discussions of *sacra doctrina* have also shed brighter light on theology as *sapientia*. As examples, see Kieran Conley, *A Theology of Wisdom* (Dubuque, IA: The Priory Press, 1963), 59-104; Matthew Levering, *Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 27-34, 239-241, 139-140; and Gilles Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom: The Summa theologiae as Spiritual Pedagogy* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2015); and Tomáš Machula, “Theology as Wisdom: Renaissance and Modern Scholastic Commentaries on Aquinas,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 93:2 (2019): 211-225. This recognition of wisdom as a trademark of Aquinas’ theological framework seems to be one moment within the larger movement of scholarship to reframe Aquinas as a theologian, a Dominican, a saint rather than simply a philosophical genius: to read his vision of theology as an exercise of faith accompanied by the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the infused moral virtues, for instance.

eyes of the faithful as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in the eyes of all.

A subalternated science borrows principles from a higher science but is ignorant of their justification; it merely accepts these principles as facts, while the higher science knows the reasons behind its principles. Sacred doctrine is a subalternated science par excellence, since its principles are properly and fully known only in the light of the science (knowledge) that God has of God's self, and of the angels and saints, who see God in God's essence.⁶²

Among knowledge that can be gained through human effort, sacred doctrine is the highest form of wisdom and wonderfully satisfies the three sapiential functions outlined above: contemplate, judge, and order. From its contemplation of divinely revealed truth, sacred doctrine judges and orders all other truths. As the First Truth is the cause of all other truths, theology's contemplation of God grounds judgments of all lesser truths.⁶³ Included in these lesser truths are the principles of the other sciences, which theology judges but does not prove. As wisdom, *sacra doctrina* perceives the relation of all beings of the universe to the Perfect Cause, and it sets everything in order to God as beginning and end, especially the internal order of the articles of faith themselves (recall Thomas' lament in the *Prologue* about the current disarray of theological teaching).⁶⁴

⁶² II-II, 1, 5, reply to 2; also see I, 1, 7, response; *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, 5.1, reply to 5.I, 1, article 2 and article 5, reply to 2; I, 1, 6, reply to 2.

⁶³ For the way that the contemplation of *sacra doctrina* differs from the contemplation of infused wisdom, see

⁶⁴ I, 1, 6; II-II, 1, 3, response; *In 1 Sent.*, prol., 3.1 For more on the way theology orders its own principles, see Mark F. Johnson, "The Sapiential Character of the First Article of the *Summa theologiae*," in *Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl, OP*, Papers in Mediaeval Studies 12 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1991), 85-98, especially 92-96.

In *sacra doctrina* we contemplate the interconnections of revelation through the lens of an “ordered simplicity,”⁶⁵ although we begin from the multiplicity of our senses and only progressively grasp this unity. Like metaphysics, theological knowledge strives to imitate the profound unity of its subject. But theology strives for a unified vision more ardently, as it is, in us, *quaedam impressio* of the seamlessly one and ultimately simple divine science, the self-knowledge of a deity whose knowledge is absolutely identical to his self.⁶⁶

Teaching is also an indispensable dimension of theology understood as wisdom. In the prologue to the *Prima Pars*, emblematic of the entire program of the *Summa theologiae*, the Angelic Doctor sets his aim as the “instruction of beginners,” which requires that truths about God be set in the order called for by divine truth itself.⁶⁷ And so in the *Summa*’s schema, the consideration of God comes first, before the procession of creatures from God; the divine processions are spoken of before the divine missions; the discussion of who man is comes before the discussion of all the ways God reconciles us to Himself.

Last but not last, rather than referring defense of its truth to a higher science, as do the other sciences in relation to metaphysics, sacred doctrine directly fulfills the defensive function of wisdom. Against those who would deny its principles, the theologian does not demonstrate their truth as through a proof. But if the disputer admits any truth in revelation, the sacred scientist can offer a persuasive argument in its defense

⁶⁵ Kieran Conley, *A Theology of Wisdom*, 97.

⁶⁶ I, 1, 3, reply to 2; SCG, book 2, ch. 4, no. 5.

⁶⁷ Recall that to proclaim the truth and to refute error constitute the dual mission of the “wise man” in the *Summa contra Gentiles* (book 1, ch. 1, no. 4; book 1, ch. 2, no. 2), a mission appropriated to *sacra doctrina* in the *Summa theologiae*. In his *Saint Thomas d’Aquin, Somme contre les Gentils: Introduction*, René-Antoine Gauthier, OP, traces back this twofold office to Aristotle’s *Sophistical Refutations* (Paris: Éditions Universitaires, 1993), 148.

by arguing from scripture or from an article of faith that is accepted. If the disputer does not accept revelation, then the theologian can at least show that the objection is false.⁶⁸

One who contemplates the order of the universe and its ultimate end is in a privileged position to lead others to God. It is incumbent upon the “wise man” to teach these ultimate truths and to defend them against errors,⁶⁹ since the very reality of world order—in which we must labor for the salvation of our neighbors—calls for our contemplation to overflow into action. Christ himself gave to us, through teaching and preaching, the fruits of his contemplation. While wisdom’s act of contemplation may be superior to the corporality of more active gestures, a whole life lived in imitation of Christ and out of love for others reshapes the office of *sapientia* to include teaching, preaching, and correcting.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ I, 1, 8. Again, as Aquinas makes clear in his assertion of the superiority of *sapientia* vis-à-vis *intellectus* and *scientia*, it is precisely wisdom’s relationship to principles that makes it almost intrinsically transcendent, even in its “natural” form. This unique relationship is doubly so in the case of *sacra doctrina*. In an article exploring the similarity between wisdom and God’s own knowledge, Mark F. Johnson lists the “special prerogatives” of wisdom as the contemplation of God, an explanation and ordering of the first principles of the discipline (actually, both metaphysics and theology do this), and a defense of those principles. While theology’s account of its own first principles—the articles of the faith—is clearly not equivalent to their intelligibility within God’s knowledge, theology approximates this divine knowledge by striving to grasp the unity of the articles and their interconnections, especially in relation to the doctrines of God’s existence and God’s providence. Here Johnson’s read of *sacra doctrina* as “penetration into the intelligibility of the revealed truths, their order, and defense” seems quite similar to Vatican I’s encouragement that theologians concern themselves with the relations among the mysteries, a goal that Lonergan aligns with systematics in *Method* (and some earlier works) and Doran further rehabilitates in *What Is Systematic Theology?*. See Johnson, “God’s Knowledge in Our Frail Mind: The Thomistic Model of Theology,” *Angelicum* 76 (1999): 25-46, with quote on 43, as well as *De ente supernaturali*, Lonergan’s original work on grace written in the fall of 1946 (*Early Latin Theology*, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and Daniel Monsour, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 19 [Toronto: University of Toronto, 2011], 79.) Hereafter *Early Latin Theology* is cited as CWL 19.

⁶⁹ Note that, as *sapientia*, *sacra doctrina* does something beyond and above what other sciences do, as sciences: it explains and defends its own principles. For commentary on how exactly theology does this on Aquinas’ view (and how the first article of the *Prima pars* exemplifies this capacity), see Mark F. Johnson, “The Sapiential Character of the First Article of the *Summa theologiae*,” 85-98.

⁷⁰ See *SCG*, ch. 1, no. 3 and no. 4 and III, 40, 1, reply to 2. For clarification on Aquinas’ thought on the best life as well as a summary of different types of contemplation in Aquinas, see Mary Catherine Sommers, “Contemplation and Action in Aristotle and Aquinas,” from *Aristotle in Aquinas’ Theology*, ed. Gilles Emery, OP, and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 167-185. Also see Conley, *A Theology of Wisdom*, on contemplation as the primary act of metaphysics as wisdom, theology as wisdom,

5 Wisdom as Gift of the Spirit

Theoretically, in terms of human nature itself, we can approach naturally proportionate happiness through the natural virtues. But we need grace, infused virtues, the theological virtues, and the gifts of the Spirit in this life to approach the disproportionate end of supernatural beatitude, even if it will be realized fully only in the next life.

To be moved by God requires that we be in union with God, just as the movement of an instrument by an artist requires some sort of contact with that instrument. We are created for the sake of perfect union with God but cannot attain it without the healing and elevating action of sanctifying grace. Consequent upon grace are the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, which achieve this primal union of humanity and God, and out of this union spring the gifts.

Aquinas holds that all human action, whether internal or external, flow from two principles: human reason and divine goodness. The moral virtues perfect our appetites in such a way that they become obediently receptive to the motions of our reason, but we stand in need of a completely distinct and independent habit to perfect all of our powers in obediential receptivity to the motions of the Spirit. If we are to become receptive, sensitive, and responsive to God, natural virtues do not suffice, since a more perfect mover requires a more perfect disposition to connect divine agent and human patient.

Surprisingly, even reason informed by the theological virtues—which have God in God’s self as their end—is insufficient for the perfection of the life of grace. For the

and infused wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit, and their similarities and differences (38-47; 81-89-121-128, respectively).

full abundance of salvation, the acts of the theological virtues must be supported by the gifts of the Spirit, which are dispositions that correspond to direct, perfect, unique “promptings” of God. These dispositions are called “divine virtues” not because they direct us to our supernatural end, since the theological virtues achieve this as well, but because they direct us to our supernatural end in a perfect and divine manner.⁷¹

In the life of grace, our faculties are not merely or solely passive, even if the connaturality induced by charity and joined to judgment in the gift of wisdom empowers us to suffer divine things.⁷² The gifts are habits within us, disposing us to divine motion from without. While bearing a direct telos to divine inspiration, they are still our own dispositions, just as through the theological virtue of charity the will is moved by the Spirit to an act of love in such a way that the will remains the efficient cause of the act. And just as the infused virtues regard the same general matters as their natural counterpart, the gifts of the Spirit perfect our faculties in all the same spheres of being and action in which the virtues perfect us, but according to a supernatural end and (more critically) according to a supernatural motion—“the divine instinct” (*instinctus Spiritus Sancti*).⁷³

Aquinas holds that these same spheres of being and action, focused around the various faculties, lend proper material to the various gifts as they are laid out in Isaiah 11: 2-3. The two activities of reason are understanding and judgment, and each pertains to both speculative and practical reason. The speculative gift of understanding penetrates into the hidden heart of divine things in accord with a supernatural light (“the light of

⁷¹ I-II, 68, 1 and 2. For the meaning of the “divine virtues” that Aquinas references here, see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 8, 1, 1145a 20.

⁷² II-II, 45, 2, response.

⁷³ I-II, 68, 3, response and reply to 3; II-II, 23, 2, response; I-II, 68, 2, reply to 1; I-II, 68, 4, response; I-II, 68, 7, response.

grace”), just as the natural light of the agent intellect grounds the habit of *intellectus*.

Faith assents to the divine truth while the gift of understanding grasps the meaning of divine truth, through being enlightened by a motion of the Spirit. The gifts of wisdom and science (knowledge) complete the intellectual trifecta of speculative gifts of the Spirit, because the gift of science helps us judge human things under direct inspiration of the Spirit, and wisdom helps us judge divine things not just by direct inspiration of the Spirit but also by connaturality with divine things.⁷⁴

As with all other gifts, the gift of wisdom emanates from the union with God made possible by grace and solidified by the theological virtues. But Aquinas describes the gift of wisdom in unique terms, contending that it exercises judgment according to connaturality with divine things. From a union of connaturality it reaches speculative aims—a contemplation of the truth of God’s being and right judgment about divine things—as well as practical aims—the application of “divine rules” to temporal matters, a reference to the ordering function of wisdom. Taken as a whole, the gift of wisdom empowers us to judge rightly about divine things by connaturality with the divine, and to judge rightly about other things by ordering them to the knowledge born of this union. If wisdom judges rightly about divine things by connaturality, it only achieves this connaturality through the theological virtue of charity. Faith is belief in what is not seen and hope is desire for that which is not yet fully possessed. In contrast, the very presence of God is given to us in the gift of charity: *caritas autem semper habet praesentem Deum, quem amat*.⁷⁵ By informing our will with a supernatural alignment to God’s own will, the

⁷⁴ II-II, 45, 2, reply to 3; I-II, 68, 4, response; I-II, 68, 6, reply to 1.

⁷⁵ I-II, 70, 3, response (quoted); II-II, 23, 2.

habit of charity is the formal principle of a supernatural act of love that clings to God for God's sake.⁷⁶

While charity is an effect of the Triune God as united, charity can be appropriated to the Third Person of the Trinity, since the Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son as Love. In addition to Love, the Third Person of the Trinity is given the personal and proper name of Gift. The Spirit is the absolute first love, through which all other gifts are given; "Gift" denotes the Spirit's relation to the Father and the Son as to an origin.

Appropriately, the Gift of the Spirit overflows, into us, as the gifts of the Spirit. And so whoever has charity, by which the Holy Spirit dwells in us, has all of the gifts.⁷⁷

Since connaturality with divine things comes from charity, which is in the will, the gift of wisdom has its cause in the will but its essence in the intellect, which is made sympathetic to the mind of God through this "divine virtue" of judgment.⁷⁸ For all of these reasons, Aquinas chooses to align the gift of wisdom with the theological virtue of charity: *scire autem ipsas res creditas secundum seipsas per quendam unionem ad ipsas pertinet ad donum sapientiae, so that donum sapientiae magis respondet caritati, quae unit mentem hominis Deo.*⁷⁹

While speculative wisdom and the gift of wisdom both enable judgment about divine things, one is acquired through human effort, while the other is received as a gift from God. But speculative wisdom and charity are alike in their preeminence respective to other virtues in the same genus: wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues, and

⁷⁶ I, 1, 6, reply to 3; II-II, 45, 4, response; II-II, 23, 2.

⁷⁷ I, 37, 1, response; II-II, 1, 8, reply to 5; II-II, 23, 3, reply to 3; I, 38, 1; I-II, 68, 5, reply. Here, as in other places in which he discusses the gifts, Aquinas quotes Romans 5:5, a passage that will become equally important in Lonergan's theology of grace: "And hope does not disappoint us, because God's love has been poured out into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who was given to us."

⁷⁸ II-II, 45, 2, response.

⁷⁹ II-II, 9, 2, reply to 1.

charity is the greatest of the theological virtues. As knowledge of the highest causes, wisdom directs the other intellectual virtues and is superior to all of the other natural virtues in its object. Likewise, charity directs all the other virtues to its own end, which is union with the divine. Because the form of an act is taken from its end, and charity moves all virtuous activity to a friendship-communion of love between the soul and God, charity is the form of all virtuous acts.

Aquinas links the gift of wisdom not only with charity but also with the virtue of faith, the fruit of faith, the seventh beatitude, and the gift of fear. All four of these connections are forged through either the considering, judging, or ordering functions of the sapiential gift. Faith assents to the divine truth while the gift of wisdom judges according to divine truth.⁸⁰ Since certitude belongs to the perfection of the intellect, and wisdom is the utmost perfection of the intellect, he designates the certitude of faith as the fruit of the Spirit's gift of wisdom. Aquinas defines a "fruit of the Spirit" as an ultimate and delightful virtuous deed which the Divine Gift kindles within us, and whatever is ultimate and delightful has the character of an end. The practical task of the gift of wisdom—direction of human life according to "divine reasons"—exists for the sake of its speculative task, the contemplation of God as Eternal Law and the judgment of divine things according to the connaturality born of charity. Thus the fruit of wisdom, which is the certitude of the divine things known through this sapiential gift, aligns with its own end as a perfection of the intellect. The virtue of faith precedes the gift of wisdom, but the

⁸⁰ II-II, 45, 1, reply to 2.

gift of wisdom, in turn, germinates in the intellect a heightened sense of certitude (the fruit of faith) about the articles of faith grasped by the theological virtue.⁸¹

According to Aquinas, “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called children of God” is a perfect fulfillment of the gift of wisdom. The first part of the beatitude depends on the ordering function of wisdom—peace is the result of due order. And since it pertains to the treatment of ourselves and others, it epitomizes the blessing of the active life. Because the wise live their relationship with themselves and with others in a rightly ordered way, and peace is “the tranquility of order” according to Augustine, the wise create peace and are made happy by it, since peace is inevitably coupled with joy.⁸² To make peace in oneself or among others manifests our divine calling, since the Father is a God of unity and peace.

Such a Father promises us, as a reward, the glory of becoming children of God, because divine filiation consists in the perfect union with God that is the charity-enflamed gift of “consummate wisdom,”⁸³ because we become more and more like children of God by participating in the likeness of the only-begotten and natural Son of God, who is Wisdom Begotten. This likeness reaches all the way back to creation and is recapitulated by grace.⁸⁴ As the Word expresses the Father’s knowledge not only of God’s self but of all creatures, this Wisdom that is conceived from the Father is

⁸¹ II-II, 112, 5, reply to 2; II-II, 8, 8, reply to 3; I-II, 70, 1, 2, and 3; II-II, 8, 8, response; II-II, 8, 8, reply to 3; I-II, 70, 3, reply to 3.

⁸² I-II, 70, 3, response; II-II, 45, 6, response.

⁸³ I-II, 69, 4, response.

⁸⁴ III, 3, 8, response. This same relationship between God’s wisdom and creatures is expressed by the notion of *ars* as well as *lex*. God’s wisdom is the art from which creatures proceed and by which creatures are ordered to God and to one another; eternal law is Divine Wisdom’s governance of all created things, and the Son is eternal law by appropriation. See I, 22, 2 and 3; I-II, 91, 1; I-II, 93, 1; I-II, 93, 4, reply to 2. For more on how the Word as God’s Wisdom Incarnate is the structuring principle of the content of *sacra doctrina* and the pedagogical program of the *Summa*, see Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*, 116-117, 132-133, and 141-143.

similitudo exemplaris totius creaturae.⁸⁵ And it by this Word's union with humanity in the Incarnation that the rational creature is re-ordered toward its participation in divine perfection, for the Word is *conceptus aeternae sapientiae* from whom human wisdom (the perfection of the rational creature) is derived.

It is Uncreated Wisdom that reaches out to us in gift, first uniting us with itself in the gift of charity and then revealing to us divine mysteries in the gift of wisdom. The gift of wisdom places us at the very center, beautiful and magnificent, of the relationship between Son and Spirit. The gift of wisdom is initiated in charity, which makes us share in the likeness of the Spirit, but this is the Spirit of Christ and the Spirit of our adoption, who gives us the likeness of Begotten Wisdom, the natural Son.⁸⁶ This likeness goes beyond the invisible missions of the Son and Spirit to encompass the visible mission of the Son as well, for in revealing to us what he has known from the Father (John 15:15), Jesus shares his wisdom with us and thereby makes us his friends.⁸⁷

And so the Spirit's gift of wisdom, while a motion from the Spirit within us, is appropriated to the Son. Again, by sharing in the divine filiation of the Son, we become sons and daughters of God and thereby approach to a glorious likeness of God. Because it moves us closer to the "consummation by glory," the gift of wisdom is associated more closely with the contemplative life, although its guidance of human actions by the divine

⁸⁵ Notice the reference in III, 3, 8 to 1 Cor. 1:18-25 and see *Super Epistolas Sancti Pauli Lectura*, 243.

⁸⁶ Aquinas even goes so far as to describe the virtue of charity as a created likeness of the Holy Spirit and the gift of wisdom as a created likeness of the Son, whose is naturally Begotten Wisdom. But because we share in the Spirit in a special way by charity, and charity gives rise to the gift of wisdom, it is from the Spirit that we receive the likeness of Begotten Wisdom. See II-II, 23, 3, reply to three; II-II, 24, 5, reply to three; and II-II, 45, 6 reply to 1.

⁸⁷ *Lectura super Ioannem*, ch. 15, lect. 3 (no. 2016). Cf. SCG book 1, ch. 2, no. 1, where Aquinas says that wisdom makes us more like God, drawing us closer to God in friendship.

motions of the Spirit, who helps us refer all of our actions to Divine Wisdom, can still be considered a practical aim.⁸⁸

Perhaps because the gift of wisdom has its cause in the union of lover and beloved effected by charity, and love is the harbinger of joy, peace, and delight, the gift of wisdom has an intrinsic relation to the will, the emotions, and the senses, unlike the intellectual virtue. Aquinas affirms the etymological Latin tradition around *sapientia* as being connected with *sapor*, sweetness, because wisdom is caused by charity and thus imbued with the sweetness of love. The saturation of wisdom with love makes all of our labors on behalf of Divine Wisdom sweet.⁸⁹

6 Divine Wisdom

The way sacred doctrine goes about naming God is inseparable from its knowledge of God, since our ability to name only goes so far as our ability to understand. Aquinas insists that we cannot know the essence of God in this life, but that ignorance does not exclude any positive knowledge at all. Although what God is not is clearer to us than what God is, we can still know some things concerning what God is, both through natural reason and through revelation. Aquinas is altogether clear on the fact that we know God in at least three ways (*triplex via*): from causation, which signifies the relation of creature as effects to God; from negation, which signifies creatures' distance from God

⁸⁸ II-II, 1, 8, reply to 5; I-II, 69, 3; II-II, 45, 6, response, reply to 1 and reply to 2.

⁸⁹ II-II, 45, 6, reply to 2; II-II, 45, 8, reply to 3; II-II, 45, 2, reply to 1 and reply to 2; II-II, 45, 3, reply to 3. For commentary on the uniquely affective elements of infused wisdom, see Conley, *A Theology of Wisdom*, 124-126; Francis Cunningham, *The Indwelling of the Trinity* (Dubuque, IA: Priory Press, 1955), 202, 352-354; and Jacques Maritain, *Distinguer pour unir ou Les degrés du savoir* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1932), 24-25, 484, 512, 517, 521, 863.

and God's transcendence above the order of creation; and from excellence, which signifies the higher way that creaturely perfections preexist in God.⁹⁰

Since God is absolutely and universally perfect, God prepossesses all creaturely perfections in God's self. In the act of creation, God communicates divinely infinite perfections to creation, but each being receives the effect of this communication according to its own imperfect mode and capacity. Each creature represents God through its perfections, which are like God in some way, but are inadequate to anything remotely approaching a complete or perfect representation.⁹¹ Predication by preeminence truly signifies the divine substance, but does so imperfectly because of the imperfect way creatures participate the perfections of the Deity.

We know from scripture that God is wise, but we can interpret this proposition in different ways. The way of causation would tell us that God causes wisdom in his rational creatures; while this is true, it does not tell us much about God's own wisdom. And since nothing is predicated of God and creatures univocally, our own wisdom may not adequately reflect God's. In turn, the way of negation might instruct us that God is not wise in the way that we are wise, or that no foolishness exists in God. While these things are true, they do not solidify into much of a starting point for further discursive reasoning on God's attributes. But the way of excellence tells us that God's wisdom is absolutely perfect; all creaturely wisdom is a participated wisdom. The way of eminence opens up

⁹⁰ I, 13, 1, reply to 2; I, 13, 3; I, 1, 9, reply to 3. Aquinas argues that the third way of naming God, from the excellence of things, most closely aligns with substantial predication, since it tells us most about what God is like, although with an element of unlikeness as well.

⁹¹ I, 4, 3; I, 6, 1, reply to 2.

further discussion, inviting us to ask in what ways exactly God's wisdom exceeds creatures', and in what ways we fall short of divine wisdom.⁹²

With these different kinds of predication in mind, we can better understand why Aquinas holds that wisdom is an essential attribute in God rather than a notional one, whereby we predicate something of one Person of the Trinity in oppositional-relational distinction from another Person. Absolute properties or essential attributes pertain to the essence of God. But because the Persons of the Holy Trinity are distinguished only by opposed relations of origin, and the relations are truly identical with the divine essence, only those attributes which do not pertain to a relation of origin are absolute properties in distinction from proper attributes or personal notions.⁹³ Essential attributes express absolutely the divine essence, the one nature in which all three Persons share. A proper attribute (also called a personal notion) belongs only to one Person.

Everything that does not denote a relation in God is said absolutely of the divine essence. Wisdom is not one of the relations in God; it is an essential attribute. Since in God essence and existence and attributes are all one and the same divine act, the divine essence itself is preeminent wisdom, and the wisdom which makes us formally wise is a share in God's own wisdom.⁹⁴

⁹² I, 13, 2, response; I, 13, 5. In all of its forms, including divine, wisdom is a perfection of the intellect, but intellect is not in us and in God univocally (I, 32, 1, reply to 2). Additionally, any predication involving wisdom is liable to the same imperfection that Aquinas admits for divine predication at large: what we are seeking to understand surpasses our language (*excedentem nominis significationem*). As Rudi Te Velde writes, "The name 'wise', when applied to God, leaves the thing signified (that is, God's wisdom) uncomprehended." See *Aquinas on God: The 'Divine Science' of the Summa Theologiae* (Hants, England: Ashgate, 2006), 105.

⁹³ Of course, since the divine essence is really the same as the divine relations, it is perfectly acceptable (and necessary, for the sake of our knowledge) to predicate essential attributes of the three Persons, as mentioned below (I, 39, 3, 4 and 5).

⁹⁴ II-II, 23, 2, reply to 1.

While wisdom is an essential attribute of God, it can also be appropriated, without any contradiction or confusion, to each of the Persons of the Holy Trinity.⁹⁵

Appropriation is the manifestation of the divine persons by the use of the essential attributes. Thus moving from knowledge of essential attributes to a knowledge of personal properties is made possible by revelation, which initially discloses Triune mystery.

In addition, we also look to the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures for knowledge of the three Persons.⁹⁶ Predicated as a concrete name, the Father, Son, and Spirit are each said to be wise; predicated as an abstract name, the Father is wisdom, the Son is wisdom, and the Spirit is wisdom. We can even say that the Son, who is essence and wisdom, is from the Father, who is essence and wisdom.⁹⁷

But Aquinas must account for St. Paul's declaration that "Christ is the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24), as well as for various other authorities in Christian tradition that appropriate wisdom to the Son in a special way. Aquinas explicates this traditional appropriation thus: *sapientia vero similitudinem habet cum filio caelesti, inquantum est verbum, quod nihil aliud est quam conceptus sapientiae*.⁹⁸ The distinction of Three Persons is grounded in only two processions: one by way of the intellect, which is the procession of the Word or Son, and another by way of the will, which is the procession of

⁹⁵ I, 32, 1, reply to 1. This is not the same, however, as something being both an essential and a notional attribute in God, which does obtain in the case of "to love," which is said of God both essentially and notionally. Wisdom is said of each of the Persons of the Trinity, and especially of the Son, through appropriation, not by notional attribution.

⁹⁶ I, 39, 8, response.

⁹⁷ The statement that the Son proceeds as "wisdom from wisdom," however, could potentially be misleading, since the wisdom of God is God's essence, and it is false to say that "Essence begot essence." For this reason, Aquinas suggests that in cases of confusion, abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or preferably even by personal names (I, 39, 5, response and reply to 1). Interestingly, Lonergan indirectly comments on the possibility of *sapientia genita* existing in the Godhead but quickly qualifies this expression for the same reasons just mentioned. See CWL 2: 99 and n. 201.

⁹⁸ I, 39, 8, response.

Love or Spirit. In the intelligible emanation of the word, from an act of understanding a conception of the thing understood proceeds, and this conception is called a word.⁹⁹

In the Father's speaking of the Word, there is the relation of the principle of the Word to the Word Himself. So "to speak" is a notional term as to speak is to produce a Word, but to understand is an essential attribute in God, because it does not signify relation to the Word that proceeds. By the Word, or the Son, the Father speaks Himself and all God's creatures. The personal notion of the Word is to be spoken by the Father. Inherent also in the Word is the relation of the Word to the thing expressed by the Word, which is the Father and all that the Father understands, including the Word. In one simple act God understands all things, including God's self; all that is understood by God is expressed in the begotten Word.¹⁰⁰

If the essence of wisdom is knowledge of the highest cause, and there can be no cause higher than God's own self, then God's knowledge of God's self, which is spoken by the Father as a Word, is wisdom in a preeminent way. In this way the Son can be called "wisdom begotten."¹⁰¹ This special appropriation of divine wisdom to the Son carries over into His invisible mission in those who come to know and love Him. Both the Son and the Spirit are sent in and by the gift of grace, which both kindles our love and illuminates our intellect. As an effect of grace, we are assimilated to the Spirit by the ardor of charity and participate in this property of the Spirit. In yet another effect of

⁹⁹ I, 27, 1, response; I, 37, 1, response; I, 27, I, 3 and 5.

¹⁰⁰ I, 37, 1, response; I, 37, 1, reply to 2; I, 14, 7, response.

¹⁰¹ I, 37, 1, response. Cf. the prologue of *Super Boetium De Trinitate*.

grace, we are assimilated to the Son by the illumination of wisdom and participate in this property of the Son.¹⁰²

Despite the appropriation of divine wisdom to the Son, “to be wise” is still taken essentially, not notionally, for wisdom in itself does not necessarily imply either begetting or speaking, or even being begotten or being spoken. Wisdom is not an essential act of God. And because “to be wise” is not said notionally, it is not true that the Father is wise by the Son.¹⁰³

7 Summary: Wisdom in Aquinas as Foundational, Consummate, Normative, and Unitive

When all variations of Thomist wisdom are taken into account, a common core of meaning surfaces: in each instance, *sapientia* seems to bear foundational, consummate, normative, and unifying roles in Thomas’ account of knowledge. Without repeating details about each type of wisdom, the common core of meaning that belongs to each can be outlined in broad form as follows. In its foundational objective, Thomist wisdom considers God as the ontological principle of all reality and selects the meaning of the basic terms that compose the first principles of knowledge. Wisdom is consummate, since its grasp of highest causes is the highest actuation of human knowledge and union with its divine object is the final end of humanity. In its normative objective, the wisdom of the philosopher defends first principles against objections and judges the conclusions of

¹⁰² See I, 43, 5, replies to 1 and 2; I, 93, 7 and 8; and For commentary on this “assimilation” in relation to the Father as well, see Gilles Emery’s *Trinity in Aquinas* (Ypsilanti, MI: Sapientia Press, 2003), 161-163.

¹⁰³ In contrast, we can say that the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit, because in God “to love” is taken both essentially and notionally. Taken essentially, we say that the Father and the Son love each other by their divine essence (I, 37, 2, response).

all other sciences as lower effects of the highest cause; the wisdom of the theologian judges the authenticity of other truth claims against the truths of the faith which it contemplates. In its unifying objective, wisdom orders all beings and truths within a cogent universe where the Highest Cause (in the case of metaphysics) and the loving and merciful Triune God (in the case of theology) is regarded as principle and end of all things.

As will be seen in Chapter Two, the early transposition of Thomist wisdom into Lonergan's cognitional anthropology is relatively straightforward, as he makes explicit mention of wisdom in both *Verbum* and *Insight*. In later works, however, it is more difficult to substantiate further transposition, as prolonged reflection on wisdom begins to subside. But by searching out the fourfold rubric of Aquinas' original "sapiential functionality" explained above, the basic contours of Thomist wisdom can still be clearly detected in *Method* (Chapter Four) as well as post-*Method* works (Chapter Five).

Chapter Two: *Sapientia* in the Quest for Cognitional Foundations: Epistemological and Metaphysical Dimensions of Wisdom in *Verbum* and *Insight* (1940-1957)

It is an understatement to say that the first stage of Lonergan's intellectual development, which Doran sets from 1940 (the completion of Lonergan's dissertation, *Gratia operans*)¹⁰⁴ to 1957 (the date of publication of *Insight*), is more straightforward to identify than to master. The one major theme tying all of Lonergan's publications together during this period is the formation and clarification of his position on "the subject as knower." Yet this subject wears quite different colors in 1940 than even in 1953, when *Insight* for all practical purposes was finished. The first portion of this period is dominated by what Lonergan himself describes as his eleven-year apprenticeship to Aquinas, and the two major works of the 1940s, *Gratia operans* (1940) and the *Verbum* articles (1946-1949), have him producing deeply theological primary interpretations of Aquinas. But in the very last sentence of the Epilogue of *Insight*, Lonergan gives a startling piece of advice for anyone hoping to accurately interpret the Angelic Doctor:

¹⁰⁴ The relatively straightforward Aristotelian metaphysics and correspondent faculty psychology surrounding wisdom in this early text are clearly lifted straight from Aquinas' integration of Aristotle. Emphasized throughout is the role of divine wisdom as the rule of human righteousness. Here Lonergan raises the question of how we can live up to this measure without an externally violent and, because only external, ultimately superficial intervention by God. The metaphysical notion of habit comes to the rescue. The potency in us most in need of determination and perfection by divine wisdom is the will, and with grace received in this faculty as habit, the external rule of rectitude that is divine wisdom becomes the "inherent form" empowering the will's right operation. In Lonergan's estimation, later development in Aquinas' theory of operative grace sees the need "to add divine motions to infused grace," for our highest perfection cannot be immanent habits like moral virtues or even infused grace (CWL 1: 46). Rather, ultimate righteousness consists in connaturality with such divine motions, a connaturality endowed through the gifts of the Holy Spirit that elevate us to the level of the Spirit's own wisdom. Interestingly, there is no hint in 1940 that the traditional Thomist conception of wisdom is about to undergo a radical revision as it keeps pace with Lonergan's quickening steps toward interiority.

“...I would say that it is only through a personal appropriation of one’s own rational self-consciousness that one can hope to reach the mind of Aquinas.”¹⁰⁵

In the 1940 texts Lonergan seems like a metaphysical fish in medieval waters, completely immersed in the metaphysical technicalities of object, potency, habit, act, essence, and so on. Not surprisingly then, in these two early works wisdom is predominantly spoken of as a perfection of the speculative intellect, enabling us to judge rightly the order of the whole universe by reducing all truths to their ultimate cause and through this cause, to know universal reality.¹⁰⁶

By the completion of *Insight* in 1953, however, Lonergan’s account of knowledge expressly begins with knowing considered as a rationally conscious activity whose phenomenon, at least in the beginning, can be bracketed from metaphysical positions and whose validity, from beginning to end, is ultimately anchored in self-appropriation. When objectified, self-appropriation yields a cognitional theory, and in later chapters of *Insight* cognitional theory is opened further to reveal a metaphysics of proportionate being.

But exactly how does wisdom emerge in a more cognitional light in 1953 compared to its more traditional metaphysical account in the 1940s? This particular question cannot be answered sufficiently apart from the more general question of Lonergan’s position on the subject as a knower. As the representative culmination of Lonergan’s quest to know “the subject as knower” and to invite his readers to know themselves as knowers, it is *Insight*’s vision of the subject as an experiencing,

¹⁰⁵ See *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1992), 770. Hereafter *Insight* is cited as CWL 3.

¹⁰⁶ See *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1997), 78-82. Hereafter *Verbum* is cited as CWL 2.

understanding, judging seeker of truth that serves as the retrospective keystone by which we must judge the developmental thrust of earlier works.¹⁰⁷

1 *Verbum*

The *Verbum* articles, composed from 1946 through 1949, marks the formal initiation of Lonergan's ongoing transposition of Thomist wisdom as self-appropriation. In keeping with the metaphysical framework,¹⁰⁸ Lonergan analyzes the habit of wisdom by studying its act—the act of judgment (also called *compositio vel divisio*, or assent) proceeding from the act of reflective understanding. Accordingly, Lonergan understands the habit of wisdom, the act of reflective understanding, and the act of judgment as the relationship among habit (first act), second act, and the act that proceeds from act.¹⁰⁹ Henceforth everything that Lonergan says about wisdom in *Verbum* dovetails with

¹⁰⁷ Considered from the opposite direction, then, we read Lonergan's pre-1953 philosophical and theological positions as all bearing a certain *telos* toward a more comprehensive and nuanced treatment in *Insight*. And so because *Insight* does contain an explicitly acknowledged and developed cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics, we read the earlier texts with an eye toward these interrelations to better understand how Lonergan's thought developed on these topics in relation to wisdom, not necessarily because those exact distinctions among the three can be found in earlier texts like *Verbum*. As the analysis proceeds, it will become more and more clear why these three categories are so important in any discussion of Lonergan's conception of wisdom.

¹⁰⁸ It bears noting that Lonergan insists that what Aquinas really meant by *intelligere* and the *verbum* that proceeds from it can only be properly understood by adverting to our own acts of understanding and judgment, and so he starts his study of word in Aquinas "not from the metaphysical framework, but from the psychological content of Thomist theory of intellect" (59), which would seem to contradict my contention. However, the fact that Lonergan begins with "introspective psychological data" (60)—represented here by two specific types of cognitional acts, the act of definition from direct act of understanding (Chapter One) and the act of judgment from reflective act of understanding (Chapter Two)—does not mean that he prioritizes cognitional theory over metaphysics in *Verbum* in the way that he does in later works, such as *Insight*, or even that his analysis of these two types of inner word in *Verbum* is primarily cognitional rather than metaphysical. The relationship between cognitional theory and metaphysics in *Verbum* is one of tight interdependence (see CWL 2: 105).

¹⁰⁹ CWL 2: 78.

judgment, beginning with a close analysis of the link between wisdom and judgment in Aquinas.

1.1 Wisdom as Metaphysics

As already witnessed, Aquinas' notion of wisdom primarily regards the objective order of reality, for wisdom is the virtue of right judgment, and it is only through accurate judgments that we properly know reality. Aquinas' very definition of wisdom links it with metaphysics, since it belongs to the speculative science of metaphysics to study the real as real, and it is through judgment that we reach the real. First principles and ultimate causes are the object of wisdom; as metaphysics, wisdom studies "something of which the reality is most real and the truth most true."¹¹⁰

It also belongs to the habit of wisdom to choose and validate the correct concept of *ens*—the foundational concept of metaphysics. The habit of understanding grasps the first principles of demonstrations.¹¹¹ But these first principles of demonstrations are only as valid as their component terms.¹¹² In turn, these component terms are, in fact, the first principles of reality—the concept of being and directly related concepts—and as such are

¹¹⁰ CWL 2: 82. Taken together, all of the characteristics of wisdom mentioned in this paragraph are what Coelho calls the "metaphysical aspect of wisdom" or simply "metaphysical wisdom,"¹¹⁰ and in the summary of *Verbum* that follows I use his shorthand.

¹¹¹ CWL 2: 80: "Where Aquinas spoke of the habits of intellect, science, and wisdom, we were led to distinguish between direct understanding, the development of direct understanding, and reflective understanding."

¹¹² Remember that in Aquinas' triadic scheme of the speculative intellectual virtues (understanding-science-wisdom), which Lonergan follows closely throughout *Verbum*, it is by the habit of science that we are able to properly draw conclusions from premises and thus generate knowledge. But demonstrations cannot be traced back in infinite regress. Thus there exist two habits that deal with first principles: intellect (understanding), which grasps the first principles of demonstrations, and wisdom, which grasps the first principles of reality (CWL 2: 78-80 and 82).

chosen and validated by the habit of wisdom.¹¹³ Wisdom as a science is first and foremost metaphysical, identical with what Aristotle called first philosophy: “the wise man contemplates the universal scheme of things and sees each in the perspective of its causes right up to the ultimate cause.”¹¹⁴

1.2 Wisdom as Epistemology

Sapientia also passes judgment on the validity of the connections between principles and conclusions drawn in demonstrations by the development of direct understanding in science (*scientia*). In this way, reflective understanding (*sapientia*) also regards the transition from the order of thought to the order of reality, and so Lonergan argues that wisdom is not solely metaphysical; it also possesses “some of the characteristics of an epistemology.”¹¹⁵ It will soon be clear that Lonergan’s discovery of the epistemological moment within wisdom marks a shift in *Verbum* from the metaphysical Thomist account of wisdom as habit of right judgment to a more psychological¹¹⁶ account of wisdom as a method of psychological introspection that culminates in normative self-knowledge (what Lonergan summarizes as “wisdom through self-knowledge”¹¹⁷).

¹¹³ Lonergan gives the concepts of not-being and whole and part as examples of the “other concepts that flow from the concept of being.” CWL 2: 97; also 82, n. 113.

¹¹⁴ CWL 2: 79. Also 78 n. 81, 80-81, 83, 99.

¹¹⁵ CWL 2: 79. Taken together, these characteristics are what Coelho calls the “epistemological aspect” of wisdom or simply “epistemological wisdom,”¹¹⁵ and in the summary of *Verbum* that follows I will use his shorthand. See *Hermeneutics and Method*, 21, 23, 26-28, 40-43, 47, 74, 77, 95, 132, 203, 208, 212.

¹¹⁶ In the context of *Verbum*, Lonergan defines “psychological” as being “derived from the character of acts of understanding” (CWL 2: 56).

¹¹⁷ CWL 2: 101.

The epistemological aspect of wisdom, which Lonergan finds embedded underneath the metaphysical aspect in both Aristotle's and Aquinas' accounts, comes to light in his identification of judgment (and thus wisdom) as rationally reflective understanding. "Rational" and "reflective" might be read as trademarks of Lonergan's conception of both understanding and judgment—the twin hearts of his cognitional foundations in *Verbum* and all subsequent works. Lonergan's exploration of the rational and reflective nature of judgment will become the linchpin of his eventual identification of wisdom with self-appropriation. The reflective and rational nature of judgment is seen most clearly in relation to the act of direct understanding.

It is the act of direct understanding that generates the inner word of definition, grasping and expressing the *quod quid est* of which the spirit wonders and inquires. Pulling from its external source in sensitive impressions and its internal source in intellectual light, the act of insight effects a synthesis of intelligibilities, a mental unity that may or may not correspond to a real unity. We need judgment to know whether the mental composition effected by insight corresponds to real composition in the thing. Reflective understanding asks critical questions about these compositions, leading to the *resolutio in principia*, the process by which the mind returns—that is, reflects—from mental syntheses to their sources in sense and in intellectual light.¹¹⁸ This resolution is the reflective and critical act of understanding (*intelligere*) from which proceeds the speaking of the inner word (*dicere verbum*) of *compositio vel divisio* (judgment).¹¹⁹

Inasmuch as the inner word of assent proceeds from sufficient grounds precisely because they are known to be sufficient, the *verbum* of judgment is an act of rational

¹¹⁸ CWL 2: 76-77 and 79-87.

¹¹⁹ CWL 2: 60. Interestingly, both direct understanding (the act of insight) and reflective understanding (the act of judgment) are characterized by Lonergan as reflective.

consciousness. Lonergan tells us that “the reflective act generates in judgment the expression of consciously possessed truth through which reality is both known and known to be known.”¹²⁰

If judgment is both reflective and rational, acting as the “gate” through which we know reality, then wisdom as the greatest perfection of judgment constitutes the highest point of rational reflection.¹²¹ By extension, wisdom can be considered as identical to what Lonergan calls “epistemological reflection.”¹²² At this juncture a tangle of questions regarding Thomist epistemology suddenly enters the scene. We might summarize this epistemological conundrum in the form of three questions: what exactly is the basis of judgment’s awareness of its own sufficiency; how exactly does this awareness of sufficiency come about; how is it that judgment effectively makes the transition from knowledge as a perfection to knowledge as of the other and from the order of thought to the order of reality?¹²³ Lonergan’s answer, as interpreted from a variety of Aquinas’ texts but especially *De veritate*, solves all of these problems in terms of intellectual light. Intellectual light is a crucial category that serves ontological, psychological, and epistemological roles all in service to Lonergan’s emerging foundations. Intellectual light is interpreted from an ontological angle to answer the first question; from a psychological angle to answer the second question; and from an epistemological angle to answer the third question.

¹²⁰ CWL 2: 61.

¹²¹ CWL 2: 47, 86, and 198, n. 28.

¹²² See CWL 2: 96. Cf. Coelho: “Epistemological reflection is merely wisdom in its epistemological role, and so the highest point in psychological introspection seems to coincide with epistemological wisdom” (*Hermeneutics and Method*, 26).

¹²³ CWL 2: 79 and 85. These questions are my own, but I believe they will aid us in understanding Lonergan’s complex argumentation on this point.

First, what exactly is the basis of judgment's awareness of its own sufficiency? In Lonergan's reading of Aquinas on judgment, it is intellectual light—interpreted here as an ontological category—that underlies the reflectively rational nature of judgment. If it is intellectual light that provides the evidence and motive by which *intellectus* grasps first principles and by which all knowledge unfolding from *scientia* is already ours in seminal form, then even more so does intellectual light shine forth in *sapientia*, whose most fundamental function is to know being from not-being.¹²⁴ In his reading of Aquinas' *De malo*, Lonergan finds that intelligible species brings to perfection our power of direct understanding, by which we come to possess "apprehensions of things"¹²⁵ (insights). But our power of reflective understanding (judgment) is brought to perfection by intellectual light itself, by which we resolve insights into first principles and then pass judgment upon such insights.¹²⁶

But for Lonergan, judgment is also a rational act of consciousness inasmuch as it proceeds from and in virtue of intellectual light. As rational, it is "the self-expression of the self-possessed act of [reflective] understanding"¹²⁷ that grasps its own conditions as judgment. The inner word of judgment proceeds not just as a proportionate effect from a sufficient cause (a reflective act of understanding) but also from sufficient grounds of evidence known to be sufficient. In other words, judgment includes knowledge of truth within itself.

¹²⁴ In fact, naturally known first principles themselves are a direct effect of intellectual light (CWL 2: 77). Also see CWL 2: 76 and 76 n. 74 citing Aquinas' *De veritate*; 91-92; 97.

¹²⁵ CWL 2: 94.

¹²⁶ Indeed, it is intellectual light that makes essence intelligible to us. See CWL 2: 92-93: "The object of understanding is supplied and offered to us, as it were materially, by the imagination; formally, as object of understanding, it is completed by intellectual light."

¹²⁷ CWL 2: 94. Also see 63.

Staying true to Aquinas, however, Lonergan concedes that not every judgment returns upon itself so completely as to understand its own nature as rooted in intellectual light. But he does find in *De veritate* the position that our knowledge of truth as truth, reached through judgment, is in some way operative in and through our knowledge of ourselves.¹²⁸ Knowledge of ourselves, however, is gained simply through reflecting on our own acts of understanding. It is wisdom, as the very highest perfection of judgment, that empowers this uniquely penetrating type of rational reflection (“epistemological reflection”) in which the intellect comes to understand itself. In turn, wisdom considered as epistemological reflection is the rationally reflective “act by which intellectual light reflects by intellectual light upon intellectual light” in order to “grasp its own nature and the commensuration of that nature to the universe of reality.”¹²⁹

Can we further specify this unique act of judgment, this actuation of wisdom as epistemological reflection? On this point Lonergan is interestingly (and perhaps uncharacteristically) short-winded. He says that the precise content of this act is a grasp of the native infinity of intellect, which then leads to a further grasp of its capacity to know reality. Moreover, this type of act can be called epistemological reflection inasmuch as it explains not only how we know but how we know that we know: “We know by what we are; we know we know by knowing what we are.”¹³⁰ Just as this short anthem can be considered a summation of Lonergan’s epistemology in *Verbum*,¹³¹ the act

¹²⁸ CWL 2: 86-88; 91. Lonergan makes this particular interpretation of Aquinas quite carefully, with a variety of complex qualifications. Among them is the fact that intellectual light is not known as an object but as that through which objects are known (91), and that the activity of intellectual light reflecting on its own activity, its own nature, and its native commensuration to reality is not the same as the soul knowing its own essence by its own essence, which is impossible for creatures.

¹²⁹ CWL 2: 98.

¹³⁰ CWL 2: 99.

¹³¹ For further on this, see Crowe, “Lonergan’s Search for Foundations,” 170.

of judgment that reflects upon its nature and its proportion to reality can aptly be called epistemological wisdom. As the first step in Lonergan's ongoing reconception of Thomist wisdom in *Verbum*, we might say that epistemological wisdom is the "act by which intellectual light reflects by intellectual light upon intellectual light to understand itself and pronounce its universal validity."¹³²

Lonergan tracks back the ontological validation of epistemological wisdom by sketching what he sees as an ontology of knowledge within Thomist thought. The ultimate ground of our knowing is God; although we know by the light within us, this created light which reflects by itself and on itself to know truth as truth, is in itself a participation of Uncreated Light.¹³³ When linked to its ontological validation, epistemological wisdom can be described as follows:

Inasmuch as the act of understanding grasps its own transcendence-in-immanence, its quality of intellectual light as a participation of the divine and uncreated Light, it expresses itself in judgment, in a positing of truth, in the affirmation or negation of reality.¹³⁴

As a metaphysical and Thomist construal of judgment, Lonergan says this position satisfies; as an epistemology, however, "it is null and void," since it assumes that we already validly know both ourselves and God.¹³⁵

1.3 Wisdom as Psychological Introspection

The knotty problem of how to validate epistemological wisdom apart from a preconceived metaphysics will not be fully untangled until *Insight*, but in *Verbum*

¹³² CWL 2: 98.

¹³³ CWL 2: 85, 92, 95, 98.

¹³⁴ CWL 2: 94.

¹³⁵ CWL 2: 86.

Lonergan gives a partial solution. As abbreviated as the solution may be, it adequately addresses our second question—how does epistemological wisdom’s awareness of its own sufficiency come about? In other words, can judgment’s own powers of validation be validated apart from its ontological specification as a share in Uncreated Light? The answer is that wisdom in its epistemological aspect, as it connects thought with reality, can only be validated through the process of psychological introspection.

Lonergan proposes that the method of psychological introspection is a certain “development of understanding by which we come to grasp just how it is that our minds are proportionate to knowledge of reality.”¹³⁶ In fact, wisdom in its epistemological aspect—the act by which intellectual light reflects by intellectual light upon intellectual light to understand its own nature and the commensuration of that nature to the universe of reality—is just such a cognitional process,¹³⁷ precisely because there exist certain “experienced effects” of intellectual light that break into our “range of introspective observation.”¹³⁸ Here intellectual light also operates as a psychological category inasmuch as its implications can be discerned in our own experience of coming to know.

Yet Lonergan warns us that the exact procedure of psychological introspection is “somewhat hazardous” to try to identify in Aquinas.¹³⁹ Although Lonergan contends that Aquinas practiced psychological introspection and that such a practice was essential in forming his profound Trinitarian theory, he insists that Aquinas did not objectify and

¹³⁶ CWL 2: 96.

¹³⁷ CWL 2: 98. As Coelho puts it, “But perhaps epistemological wisdom is to be identified not merely with a part of psychological introspection but with the whole of it. Such an interpretation finds support in the distinction between empirical, scientific, and normative self-knowledge” (*Hermeneutics and Method*, 26).

¹³⁸ CWL 2: 92 and 91, respectively.

¹³⁹ CWL 2: 96.

translate such a practice into a descriptive psychology.¹⁴⁰ Lonergan goes on to warn us that any greater specification of the introspective process from Aquinas can only be patched together roughly, and the final result may even run the danger of being more Thomistic than Thomist.¹⁴¹

And yet Lonergan still comes through with an impressive list of cognitional elements that we can locate in our experience of our own acts of understanding, both direct (insights) and reflective (judgments). These include evidence of first principles; the rational motive of our assent to such principles; immanent ground of certitude; the exigence of critical reflection to leave aside probability and only assent in judgment if the possibility of the contradictory proposition is excluded; the entire dynamism behind our spiritual wonder, inquiry, critical reflection, and natural desire for God, all of which incessantly drive us to discover the causes of things, ceasing only with its final rest in a supernatural vision of and union with God.¹⁴² Insofar as all of these different elements of rational consciousness fall within our awareness, they can be considered the foremost fruits of Lonergan's first foray into what he calls "psychological introspection" here in *Verbum* but will later call interiority analysis.

¹⁴⁰ CWL 2: 58 and 104.

¹⁴¹ CWL 2: 96. (Later in *Verbum*, Lonergan pointedly clarifies that by "Thomist" he means to denote a position that can be shown to be authentically "of St. Thomas," while by "Thomistic" he means to denote a position that often distorts Thomas' true meaning, even though it is considered "of his [Thomas'] school." CWL 2: 153, n. 5.)

¹⁴² CWL 2: 77, 92, 97-98, 100.

1.4 Wisdom as Normative Self-Knowledge

There remains a third and final step in Lonergan's reconception of Thomist wisdom in *Verbum*, which ultimately rewrites Thomist wisdom as introspective, normative self-knowledge. It comes, as might be expected, in Lonergan's reading of *De veritate*, in which Aquinas distinguishes among three types of self-knowledge. At the most basic level, at which we need not assume more than the existence of the soul itself, we find that the soul is habitually present to itself. The soul's presence to itself constitutes "the habitual possession of empirical self-knowledge."¹⁴³ Similarly, the soul in its very presence to itself generates acts which are also empirically aware; thus, empirical self-knowledge can also be considered as actual, not merely habitual. When considered as actual, empirical self-knowledge consists in the simple fact that we know ourselves as in act by our acts. But Lonergan contends that empirical self-knowledge is in fact the basis of a second type of self-knowledge—the scientific self-knowledge of objects, acts, potencies, and essence that we find in Aristotle and, in a more refined form, in Aquinas.¹⁴⁴

But wisdom cannot be completely coincident with either of these two types of self-knowledge. Habitual or actual, empirical self-knowledge appears to be closer to experience or perhaps consciousness itself than to science. And if we take seriously what Lonergan says about the necessary basis of scientific self-knowledge in empirical self-knowledge, then it belongs to judgment to say whether or not the Aristotelian-Thomist conception of the soul corresponds to the reality of the soul's empirical self-knowledge.

¹⁴³ CWL 2: 89.

¹⁴⁴ CWL 2: 88-89; 101. Of course, what Lonergan identifies as the habit of empirical self-knowledge is not the only habit necessary to produce a given act.

For this task there is a third type of self-knowledge, what Lonergan designates as merely “the act of judgment which passes from the conception of essence to the affirmation of reality.”¹⁴⁵ For this final type of self-knowledge to be normative, however, its object must be the “dynamic norm” of what any soul ought to be, not just “sorry achievement.”¹⁴⁶

But only the created participation of Uncreated Light can envision the reality of soul considered as norm. And we have already witnessed that Lonergan follows Aquinas in identifying this participation of Uncreated Light as the intellectual light within us, “the flash of understanding” that is capable not just of understanding a thing’s essence but also of reflectively penetrating its own essence.¹⁴⁷ And in such reflective penetration, intellectual light operates as epistemological wisdom, forging the vital link between thought and reality. Thus, normative self-knowledge—what Lonergan crystallizes into the summary phrase “wisdom through self-knowledge”¹⁴⁸—is finally identical with epistemological wisdom.

But we have already witnessed that epistemological wisdom can only be validated through the process of psychological introspection. We experience this process of introspection when we “almost catch” ourselves intellectually reaching forward to grasp a thing’s essence as we exult in a new idea, and then reaching back in judgment to ground that new idea in the concrete knowledge that yes, the essence that was merely imagined or supposed does indeed exist. And so, at the very end of a very long day spent contemplating the wisdom of the Angelic Doctor, Lonergan concludes that the Thomist

¹⁴⁵ CWL 2: 101.

¹⁴⁶ CWL 2: 101.

¹⁴⁷ CWL 2: 85; 87; 90-91.

¹⁴⁸ CWL 2: 101.

notion of wisdom itself can be reconceived as the normative, introspective self-knowledge that comes from reflecting on ourselves as knowers.

But how exactly does this “epistemological reflection” construct a bridge from knowledge as a perfection to knowledge of the other and from the order of thought to the order of reality? In the faculty psychology adopted by Aquinas, the basic account of knowledge by identity posits that there is always at least an imaginative identity between thought and reality, since the faculty (understanding) and the thing (the object being understood) are identical in act; from such identity there results knowledge as a perfection, as the potency of our intellect is perfected in its actuation. Knowledge as a perfection is constituted by an act of insight, in which an idea (the definition) of the thing’s essence proceeds from a direct act of understanding. The intellectual grasp of a thing’s essence prescind from its existence, with knowledge of the thing as other not yet emergent.¹⁴⁹ It is only in a reflective act of judgment that we affirm the thing’s essence as actually existing, leaving the order of “mere thought” to penetrate into the very reality of the thing.

Knowledge of the other goes beyond the knowledge of essence, which is the knowledge by identity through which sensible or intelligible forms are known. Knowledge of the other as other is “the act of judgment which passes from the conception of essence to the affirmation of reality.”¹⁵⁰ In the same way that we affirm or deny the nature of any other object as actually existent, we also can judge the nature of the active principle of our intellect to be an intellectual light whose native infinity reaches

¹⁴⁹ CWL 2: 80; 83-84.

¹⁵⁰ CWL 2: 101. The reason that Lonergan gives for this is fascinating: knowledge of the other as other only occurs in a reflective act of judgment, because it is only by the reflective act of judgment that we can reflect on identity of act and thus know the difference of potency (CWL 2: 84). Cf. 83, 85, and 196-197 on the limitations of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge by identity for our own finite intellects.

out to all of being. In turn, from the nature of intellectual light we can judge that yes, our intellect is indeed capable of knowing reality; in this specific judgment, intellectual light takes on an explicitly epistemological role.¹⁵¹ More importantly, this specific judgment constitutes what Lonergan previously identified as the normative, introspective self-knowledge that comes from reflecting on ourselves as knowers—in a word, wisdom. Ultimately it is wisdom, reconceived by Lonergan as the psychological process of introspection yielding normative self-knowledge, that constructs the bridge between the order of reality and the order of thought.¹⁵² As such, wisdom holds the key to knowledge of the other as other and knowledge of the order underlying all of reality.

1.5 Wisdom as Unity: The Whole of Being

Moreover, wisdom undergirds the intrinsic relationship between the order underlying all of reality and the unity of being: without an initial (even if extremely primitive) grasp of unity, nothing could ever be ordered. The “universal scheme of things” grasped by wisdom is the order of the universe, where “universe” denotes the whole of being in the most inexhaustible sense of that word: “the universe in the multiplicity of its members, in the totality and individuality of each, and in the interrelations of all.”¹⁵³ When our reflective understanding assents in judgment, uttering “yes” to the existence of any individual thing, it is the unity or whole of that thing that is

¹⁵¹ CWL 2: 95-96.

¹⁵² Lonergan states that “Rational reflection has to bear the weight of the transition from knowledge as perfection to knowledge as of the other” (CWL 2: 85). But as shown above, on Lonergan’s analysis rational reflection is the same thing as epistemological reflection, and epistemological reflection is the same thing as wisdom in its epistemological aspect.

¹⁵³ CWL 2: 79 and 98, with quote on 98.

posited as existent, not simply a quality or aspect. The whole of each thing is real; since wisdom regards the real as real, its premier object is the unity of all being. And as the highest perfection of judgment, wisdom aims to order nothing less than the universe in its grand entirety, seeking to know the existence and interconnections of all things in and through ultimate causes and first principles. To posit the place of any X or Y in universal order is to know its role as a part in the larger whole as well as its relation to other parts in this same whole.¹⁵⁴

Driven by a spirit of critical reflection that never stops asking “why?”, our intellect is *potens omnia fieri*. Our growth in knowledge is an ever-repeating actuation of such potential. It consists in a differentiation of unity X from unity Y, and a categorization of the relationship between unity X and unity Y and between unity X and the absolutely “largest” unity Z—the entire universe of being. But the emergence of such synthetic knowledge erects the specter of the infinite regress. How can we hazard to posit the role of unity X in the grand scheme of things if we are ignorant of the scheme itself?¹⁵⁵

Lonergan submits that it is the light of reason within us, immanently caused by agent intellect, that provides us with an innate grasp of the unity underlying all reality.¹⁵⁶ In effect, we possess a latent but surely anchored map of universal order from the start—what Coelho calls a rudimentary, inchoate, undifferentiated view of the whole, a

¹⁵⁴ CWL 2: 78; 98 and cf. 237: “the intelligible is always a unity.”

¹⁵⁵ CWL 2: 98.

¹⁵⁶ CWL 2: 91; 98. What I am calling an “innate grasp of the whole” is not included in Lonergan’s list of explicitly identified effects of intellectual light, but is strongly implied in the overall shape of the argument in CWL 2: 98-99. Coelho finds a robust parallel between this implicit argument in *Verbum* and a more explicit expansion of this same point in the 1959 *De intellectu et methodo* course taught by Lonergan at the Gregorian University, in which he explicitly claims that a rudimentary view of the whole is an effect of intellectual light, constituting what Coelho frames as the “original upper blade that is wisdom [itself]” (*Hermeneutics and Method*, 25, 27-28).

permanent and universal anticipation of the unity of being. It is precisely because we do possess an innate (although undifferentiated) grasp of the whole of being that we are able to accurately situate and rightly order any further determination of being within this whole.

In the context of *Verbum*, Coelho describes this anticipation, perpetually given in intellectual light, as “inchoate wisdom.” When read retrospectively from the perspective of *Insight*, Coelho construes this inchoate wisdom as the most primordial heuristic, the “original upper blade of human knowing,”¹⁵⁷ where the term “upper blade” refers to a merely heuristic and formal set of generalities in need of further specific, material determination (denoted by the term “lower blade”).¹⁵⁸ The most general set of generalities possible is the anticipation of the as-yet-undifferentiated whole of being.

Since it is impossible to order any one thing and make judgments about it in the absence of a more inclusive intellectual context, the traditional Thomist locution of *Sapientis est ordinare et iudicare*—often referenced by Lonergan—mandates that wisdom is knowledge of the whole of the universe, even though that knowledge is always imperfect and in development. In its most foundational instance, wisdom is the mind’s reflection on its own nature as infinite anticipation of the unity underlying universal order. In more ontological terms, wisdom is the intellect’s reflection on its infinite potency to come to know any and all intelligibility—that is, to grasp the unity of the *quod quid est* of a thing, the unity denoted by the metaphysical notion of form, and to affirm its existence, its *esse* or *actus essendi*, the unity denoted by the metaphysical notion of

¹⁵⁷ Coelho, *Hermeneutics and Method*, 27-28.

¹⁵⁸ CWL 3: 600.

act.¹⁵⁹ As an inchoate grasp of unity, wisdom is a primitive, inborn anticipation that the whole of the universe is intelligible.¹⁶⁰ In turn, as wisdom continues to develop throughout our lives, it apprehends more and more of the grand scheme of the universe by ordering intelligibilities in their relations to one another.

1.6 Wisdom as Unity-in-Duality: Subject and Object

Chapter Two of *Verbum* opens with Lonergan restating Aquinas' claim that wisdom refers first and foremost to knowledge of the objective order of the universe, clearly emphasizing what Coelho terms the "object pole" of wisdom. However, after identifying wisdom's epistemological aspect as epistemological reflection—thereby opening the way for Lonergan's innovative interpretation of wisdom as self-knowledge—the "subject pole" of wisdom comes into stark view.¹⁶¹ Epistemological wisdom grasps the commensuration between knowing and being.

Likewise, Lonergan finds this same tension between being and knowledge intrinsic even to Aristotle's and Aquinas' understanding of the object of wisdom: "Wisdom, as first philosophy, deals at once with the real as real and with the first principles of demonstrations. It is, in the very definition of its object, a duality."¹⁶²

Lonergan depicts this duality as fruitful tension rather than division or opposition. Long before reflection on *sapientia* ever reached the theoretical level—and far in advance of

¹⁵⁹ CWL 2: 59. Also see 57: "Hence, the first operation of intellect regards quiddities, but the second, judgment, regards *esse*, the *actus essendi*."

¹⁶⁰ As Lonergan points out, the metaphysical ground of this anticipation by wisdom is simply the principle of the excluded middle: X either is or is not, and what is not cannot be understood (CWL 2: 98).

¹⁶¹ CWL 2: 78-96; Coelho, *Hermeneutics and Method*, 95.

¹⁶² CWL 2: 99.

the more modern separation of metaphysics from epistemology—the all-important “psychological fact” remained the same. We know by what we are, and we know that we know by reflecting on what we are.¹⁶³ Epistemological wisdom merely thematizes the intrinsic connection between being and knowing that Lonergan insists always applies in the concrete practice of coming to know.

And yet such objectification is of the utmost relevance to philosophical foray, especially in regard to the subject-object relationship and, ultimately, to the critical problem. On Lonergan’s count, naïve realism does more than blindly posit the subject as what is “in here” and the object as what is “out there.” Naïve realism also drapes the critical problem with the façade of insolubility, since its basic gnoseology is one of confrontation between two essences that are inherently out-of-sync with one another (if not flatly opposed) and must somehow be brought into harmony with each other through another essence. And so a false concept of the real operates as an “outside standard,” a “true essence” that can somehow validate the truth of our knowledge of the object.¹⁶⁴

In contrast, the very strength of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge by identity is that it posits *ens* as the per se and naturally known object of the intellect. The identity in act between knower and known necessarily defines intelligibility as the act of the intellect. Such a theory is relatively straightforward to apply to the case of knowing form, whether sensible or intelligible. The act of the thing as sensible is the act of sensation, the act of the thing as intelligible is the act of the intellect. In either case, the faculty and the object are different only in potency.¹⁶⁵ Far from being opposed or divided, subject and

¹⁶³ CWL 2: 99.

¹⁶⁴ CWL 2: 57; 71-72; 98-99.

¹⁶⁵ CWL 2: 58; 83-85; 96. Cf. CWL 3: 539: “As has been seen, intelligibility is intrinsic to being.”

object are meant for one another. Drawn together by a deep, abiding, and ultimate compatibility, they become identical in act.

The same intimate compatibility between faculty and object can be extended to the subjective and objective dimensions of wisdom, revealing further the broader meaning of the “universe of being” and our place in it and so eventually broaching the critical problem. Normative self-knowledge (wisdom’s subjective pole) not only grows in us a grasp of our intellect’s *telos*—we long to know all of being—but tells us that our capacity to know is attainable. In short, epistemological wisdom teaches us, slowly but surely, that our mind is made for reality, and reality for our mind. In addition, our “subjective” growth in wisdom also cultivates our mind’s capacity to reach the objective pole of wisdom—actual knowledge of the universe of being, the real as real, the object of metaphysics.

To know essence as essence and existence as existence—to know being as being—requires judgment, which reflects on the active unity of faculty and object according to an immanent standard. Hence Aquinas’ definition of wisdom as a perfection of judgment—and thus rationally reflective and critical, by Lonergan’s reading—means that as we grow in wisdom, our knowledge of universal order grows, particularly our knowledge of being as such. Wisdom selects the concept of all concepts—*ens*. As any student of scholastic theology will tell you, the concept of *ens* is an analogous one. Rather than the lowest (or highest) common denominator among all other concepts or just another, most general concept, the concept of *ens* is any concept when considered in relation to its *actus essendi*, which is known in judgment:

Hence in his direct acts of understanding man enters into identity with the intelligibility of only this or that material nature; it is in an act of reflective

understanding, in which the nature of understanding is itself understood as *potens omnia facere et fieri*, that man becomes capable of grasping the analogous concept of *ens*.¹⁶⁶

It is the function of epistemological wisdom to reflect on the intellect's capacity to know being by reflecting on the nature of any act of understanding, and such reflection unearths metaphysical gold. In an enriching feedback circle between the subject and object poles of wisdom, self-knowledge (epistemological wisdom) and knowledge of the universe (metaphysical wisdom) are necessarily, intrinsically, and proportionately connected. Since we know the universe through knowing ourselves, and we know ourselves by reflecting on our knowledge of the universe, each "pole" of wisdom grows in proportion to the other.¹⁶⁷

Rather than casting subject and object as opposing actors, as does the conventional formulation of the critical problem, Lonergan characterizes knowledge as a teleological movement from the infinite potentiality of our intellect to know all being toward more finite actuations. The distinction between subject and object can be grasped in the same exact way that any distinction is truly known—through judgment. The relationship between subject and object is merely one among many specifications of the innate grasp of undifferentiated being supplied by wisdom. We reach the real in concrete judgments long before we make the distinction between subject and object, only one important distinction in an entire universe of them. And in Lonergan's estimation, the most essential judgment about the subject-to-object relationship is that made by

¹⁶⁶ CWL 2: 97.

¹⁶⁷ CWL 2: 88; 97; 99.

epistemological wisdom, the rationally reflective and critical act by which the intellect knows itself as commensurate to reality.¹⁶⁸

1.7 Wisdom as Unity-in-Duality: Knowledge of Self and Knowledge of God

Lonergan contends that our intellectual light holds within itself an “inner nisus towards the infinite,”¹⁶⁹ manifested as a natural desire for God that cannot attain the supernatural on its own. It is one and the same act of epistemological wisdom by which our intellect grasps that it is, as intellect, infinite and, as infinite, inevitably drawn into union with Uncreated Infinity. Our self-knowledge is a grasp not solely of the commensuration of our intellect’s nature to all of being but also of the transcendence within our immanent intellectual light and the origin of that light in divine Light. Human wisdom is a participation in and likeness of divine wisdom.¹⁷⁰

Just as there operates an enriching feedback loop between subject and object whenever we come to know, and a fruitfully tense unity-in-duality between the subject

¹⁶⁸ CWL 2: 98-99. Cf. CWL 3: 539.

¹⁶⁹ CWL 2: 100.

¹⁷⁰ CWL 2: 94 and 98. The nature of divine wisdom is less clear in *Verbum*, but it certainly has something to do, by appropriation, with the intellectual generation of the Son from the Father. If we extend the notion of wisdom as self-knowledge to God, then God’s knowledge of God’s self is God’s wisdom. God’s act of understanding, by which God understands God’s self and all things in God’s self, speaks in God the Word of God’s self-knowledge. God’s self-knowledge is divine wisdom, and, by appropriation, God’s own Son, the Second Person of the Trinity, is divine wisdom. Lonergan indirectly describes God’s wisdom in this vein when he explains that the procession of an infinite Word from an infinite Understanding is an intellectual generation characterized by consubstantiality, since the principle and term of intellectual generation in God are identical in substance and in fact differ only in relation (98-99). In contrast, the analogy to the procession of the Word in us involves a duality between principle and term, since our self-knowledge (wisdom) is not exactly the same as our very self, as is God’s self-knowledge; our self-knowledge does not come about through our essence, as does God’s self-knowledge; our self-knowledge (wisdom) as act of judgment is not identical to our existence, as is God’s self-knowledge, and so on (CWL 2: 13; 99-100; 199-208, esp. 206-208). Interestingly, Lonergan hints that there still exists some slight shadow of duality in God’s wisdom, as suggested by Aquinas’ discussion of the difficult and perplexing phrase *sapientia genita* (CWL 2: 99 and n. 201).

pole and the object pole as our wisdom grows, there also exists a “dialectical oscillation”¹⁷¹ between knowledge of self and knowledge of God. As our self-knowledge develops, it enlightens our path toward God, clarifies what we already know of the divine and asks further questions. In turn, greater knowledge of God enlightens, clarifies, and demands further expansions of self-knowledge.

The dialectical movement between knowledge of self and knowledge of God unfolds one way according to the natural light of reason in so-called natural theology, a natural type of wisdom that helps us grasp first principles and judge all things in light of the Very First Principle. The same dialectical movement unfolds two additional ways according to the supernatural light of faith, with Lonergan following Aquinas in delineating two types of supernatural wisdom. The supernatural science of theology aims to understand divinely revealed truths and judge all other sciences according to the truths of revelation, while the supernatural wisdom that is a gift of the Holy Spirit puts us into direct contact with the divine and makes us docile to God’s action in our spirits.

In regard to the latter type of wisdom, Lonergan seems to raise a fascinating question. If we understand the Spirit’s gift of wisdom as self-knowledge transposed into a spiritual key, might this spiritual awareness of self, gifted by the Spirit, connect us to a deeper awareness of God, perhaps even providing us with an additional analogy for understanding the Trinity, one based in religious or even mystical experience? In ferreting out the *vetera* of Aquinas’ position on the psychological analogy, Lonergan is naturally limited to what Aquinas says and means, and it is clear to Lonergan that

¹⁷¹ CWL 2: 100-101.

Thomas' theory of the Trinitarian processions is psychological, not mystical, at its root.¹⁷²

Although Lonergan discerns an Augustinian influence early in Aquinas' commentary on the *Sentences* that seems to posit the existence of "some simple and continuous intuition in virtue of presence by which the soul knows and loves both itself and God in some indeterminate manner,"¹⁷³ he concedes that the leap from the soul's presence to itself to the presence of God to the soul is a large one. And so Lonergan merely suggests that the soul's presence to itself in a state of graced rational self-consciousness—what we might call spiritual wisdom in distinction from the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of wisdom—might just extend into an awareness of God, perhaps embedded in what mystical writers describe as the habitual felt presence of God.

Lonergan further hints, from a brief interpretation of a question in Aquinas, that we might fruitfully understand God's presence to the soul as a *memoria* in the mind, a habitual knowledge of God that is actuated by an inner experience of God's love for oneself. In turn, God's presence to the mind in *memoria*, when in act, generates an inner word of judgment affirming God's goodness, from which proceeds an ineffable act of love for the divine.¹⁷⁴ But for Lonergan, Thomas' description of mystical experience only serves to underline what is essential versus what is accidental: the "special graces" bestowed in the gifts of the Holy Spirit "have to do with the development of wisdom and of love in man and not with the essence of what develops."¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² CWL 2: 104 and 226.

¹⁷³ CWL 2: 102.

¹⁷⁴ CWL 2: 102-103 and n. 210.

¹⁷⁵ CWL 2: 104.

Most significantly, *Verbum* marks the first time in Lonergan's corpus in which he connects wisdom with self-knowledge. Wisdom understood as normative self-knowledge is the beginning point of an ever-widening spiral of thought on self-appropriation that will become the central thread of Lonergan's philosophical and theological work. Above all, we notice that *Verbum* operates, for the most part, in metaphysical rather than cognitional terms, and Lonergan's reconception of Thomist wisdom is no exception: it revolves around the metaphysical categories of essence, potency, act, and object. Metaphysical wisdom is the speculative science whose object is ultimate causes and principles. Epistemological wisdom is the rationally reflective act by which intellect reflects upon itself, grasping its own nature as well as the relationship between its infinite potency and its natural object—all of being.

And yet every *dicere verbum* and every *intelligere* from which it proceeds is a cognitional act—an act of the human mind that is experienced psychologically, in a way analogous to the manner in which acts of seeing, hearing, and moving are experienced in our bodies, and this experience can be adverted to, explored, studied.¹⁷⁶ The discrepancy embedded in *Verbum*'s primarily metaphysical treatment of cognitional process opens a wide door through which *Insight* can march, carrying interiority analysis in its bulky arms. As Lonergan's foundations inch closer toward intentionality analysis and further away from faculty psychology, we can anticipate a corresponding shift in *Insight* toward a more cognitional account of Thomist wisdom.

2 *Insight*

¹⁷⁶ CWL 2: 89, citing Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book IX, 9, 1170a 29-34.

Chapter Ten of *Insight* details reflective insight as what grasps the sufficiency of the evidence for a prospective judgment, which is the link between the conditioned content of the proposed judgment and the fulfillment of the conditions. By the end of Chapter Ten, *Insight*'s cognitional theory—what Lonergan also calls introspective analysis—is complete, with judgment as the keystone.¹⁷⁷ It should be no surprise then that the first substantial reference to wisdom in *Insight* occurs here in Chapter Ten, in the first extensive discussion of judgment in the book.¹⁷⁸ However much *Insight* represents a shift away from faculty psychology and toward intentionality analysis, the fact that Lonergan references wisdom in substantial association with judgment rather than understanding and experience shows that the traditional Thomist conception of wisdom as right judgment is not far from his mind.

2.1 Wisdom and the Universe of Being

Wisdom enters the scene in Lonergan's examination of analytic propositions as a case of virtually unconditioned judgment that, like all other virtually unconditioned judgments, flows from an act of reflective insight. Lonergan defines analytic propositions as propositions whose suppositions ("formal terms of meaning") provide the conditioned

¹⁷⁷ Interestingly enough, "introspective analysis" seems to regard the general form of cognitional process that is immanent and operative in the three levels of experience, understanding, and judgment; Lonergan pointedly remarks that introspective analysis does not generally make us better thinkers or operators (CWL 3: 307). So I am left to conclude that introspective analysis refers to cognitional theory, whereas self-appropriation refers to one's taking cognitive and existential possession of one's rationality as it unfolds on these three levels—a "heightening of consciousness" (345).

¹⁷⁸ While Chapter Nine helps us form a general notion of judgment, Lonergan saves the proper explanation of what makes an insight a judgment, as well as a specification of different cases of judgment, for Chapter Ten.

and whose “partial terms” (what is meant by a word or phrase) provide the fulfilling conditions in their very definitions. A link between the supposition and the definitions of the terms is provided by “rules of meaning”—syntactical rules that dictate how words are combined into a complete proposition.¹⁷⁹

But what dictates the terms themselves? Without the fulfillment of the conditions of other judgments that contain the same partial terms with the same meaning as they are given in the analytic proposition, such a proposition fails to add to our knowledge and in fact approaches tautology. In the Thomist schema of intellectual habits, wisdom is what selects the terms that determine principles, and the principles are the basis of conclusions.

In his discussion of analytic propositions, Lonergan comments on this Thomist schema, saying that by wisdom Aquinas meant “an accumulation of insights that stands to the universe as common sense stands to the domain of the particular, incidental, relative, and imaginable.”¹⁸⁰ There are two significant elements to this latent definition of wisdom: its object as the universe of being in its explanatory (rather than common sense) relations, and its emergence as the result of an accumulation of insights, which will be treated later.

Earlier in *Insight* Lonergan argued for the nature of common sense as a specialization of intellectual development, a set of habitual and appropriately incomplete insights that have the particular, concrete, immediate, and practical as their object—that is, the relations of things to us, especially as they pertain to making, doing, and organizing in community. Just as things in themselves and things for us constitute two distinct but complementary fields of objects, common sense and empirical science are

¹⁷⁹ CWL 3: 330-331 and 338.

¹⁸⁰ CWL 3: 331.

two distinct but complementary “universes of discourse” within our overall knowledge of being as a whole, or the entire “universe of being.” The ordinary descriptions afforded by common sense cover only a “section” of the universe of being.¹⁸¹ In his exposition of reflective insights in which we reach the virtually unconditioned, common sense judgments are only one type of virtually unconditioned, alongside concrete judgments of fact; insights into concrete situations; concrete analogies and generalization; probable judgments; and mathematical judgments.¹⁸²

In fact, in Lonergan’s account all of these different types of judgment can serve as validation for the defined sense of the terms appearing in analytic propositions. As already noted, in Aquinas’ account wisdom is the selector of terms. And so if we follow the analogy to completion, then any (or all) of these other types of judgments, apart from common sense ones, might take the place of traditional Thomist wisdom in providing validation for terms. We recall Lonergan’s rather cryptic statement that “an account of critical reflection and the possibility of judgment will reveal unavoidable judgments.”¹⁸³ These unavoidable judgments, Lonergan tell us, will ultimately validate his cognitional theory as truth rather than empty speculation.

All that is clear from Part One of *Insight*—Lonergan’s account of insight as an activity—is that wisdom has as its object the universe of being comprised by things in relation to each other and, by extension, that wisdom must speak in the discourse of explanation rather than mere description. It is not until Part Two, which considers insight

¹⁸¹ CWL 3: 196-204; 314-324; 317-319, with quotes on 319.

¹⁸² See CWL 3: 339-340 for a summary of the kinds of reflective insights that Lonergan analyzes to show that grasping the sufficiency of evidence for a prospective judgment is the same as grasping the prospective judgment as virtually unconditioned.

¹⁸³ CWL 3: 295.

as knowledge, that we learn which type of judgment is to take over the function of selecting terms.

2.2 The Intellectual Habit of Wisdom and the Self-Affirmation of the Knower

Part One on insight as activity comes to a close with the reader having gained a basic familiarity with himself as a knower. But familiarity with cognitional theory—what Lonergan calls “introspective analysis”—is one thing, while affirming it to be constitutive of one’s own interior world—what Lonergan calls “self-appropriation”—is quite another.¹⁸⁴ And so Part Two of *Insight* opens with a formal invitation to the reader to take possession of the immanently and recurrently operative structure of experiencing-understanding-judging as the core of his identity as a rational knower.¹⁸⁵

If the invitation is embraced by the reader and applied to her own cognitional identity, the proceeding judgment is called “the self-affirmation of the knower.” The conditioned content of the self-affirmation of the knower is simply the content of the proposition “I am a knower inasmuch as I am a unity-identity-whole characterized by experiencing, understanding, and judging.”¹⁸⁶ The very judgment of rational self-affirmation affirms the existence of certain concrete intelligibilities and thereby establishes crucial cognitional terms. These terms are not the content of cognitional acts but the acts as acts.

¹⁸⁴ One of the more interesting implications of the difference between the two is the fact that introspective analysis rarely improves the performance of one’s rational activities, while self-appropriation does. See CWL 3: 304; 307.

¹⁸⁵ CWL 3: 13; Chapter Eleven, 343-371.

¹⁸⁶ CWL 3: 343-344.

But the implications of the self-affirmation of the knower stretch further to include the outlines of all intelligible contents: “Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further development of understanding.”¹⁸⁷ The self-affirmation of the knower lays out in clear terms and relations what is meant by knowledge (correct understanding) and the “broad lines of all there is to be understood” references the metaphysical elements that are drawn from cognitional analysis, as discussed below.

Finally, the self-affirmation of the knower opens upon all further development of understanding insofar as all further developments in knowledge are the content of further acts of experiencing, understanding, and judging. Therefore, what is said about the relations of the interlocking acts of basic cognitional structure in the self-affirmation of the knower applies also to what is said about the relations of the contents of experiencing, understanding, and judging constituting any particular department of knowledge. As the primarily cognitional and derivatively metaphysical basis of all development of knowledge, the self-affirmation of the knower would seem to be a transposition of Thomas’ intellectual habit of wisdom, the selector of the terms that make up the universal principles of knowledge.

Importantly, the self-affirmation of the knower stands in functional parallel to the intellectual habit of wisdom which it transposes. Thomas’ account of wisdom as an intellectual habit that is the ultimate (if remote) source of all our knowledge is an account of an unavoidable and permanently valid metaphysical foundation for the development of

¹⁸⁷ CWL 3: 22.

scientia, in the sense of both knowledge in general and knowledge of a particular science. Lonergan's account of the self-affirmation of the knower operates as an ultimate, unavoidable, and permanently valid cognitional foundation for the expansion of all knowledge. Although primarily cognitional, it is a foundation with profound metaphysical implications.

Essentially, the function of the intellectual habit of wisdom as an ultimate and unavoidable metaphysical category is transposed into the function of the self-affirmation of the knower as an unavoidable and ultimate cognitional category, exempt from radical revision, and with metaphysical implications. The self-affirmation of the judgment is unavoidable insofar as it follows with "rational compulsion" from a grasp of the possibility of judgment, a possibility grounded in a grasp of the account of critical reflection. Further, the self-affirmation of the knower is an ultimate judgment in the sense that it represents a pragmatic, concrete, operative engagement of the subject that cannot be reduced to a more foundational judgment. To seek a deeper foundation than intellectual self-affirmation provokes a vicious circle, because the very search for a more ultimate ground involves the cognitional process asserted in the self-affirmation of the knower.

2.3 The Self-Affirmation of the Knower as Epistemological Wisdom

And yet the self-affirmation of the knower, in and of itself, only takes us so far along the road to knowledge of the universe of being:

Even in unfolding the process that ends in self-affirmation, we were unprepared to say whether affirming the self was knowing the self. Affirming the self became knowing

the self inasmuch as knowing being was judged to be affirming it; and knowing being became objective knowing through a grasp of the nature of experiential, normative, absolute, and the consequent objectivity.¹⁸⁸

But Lonergan's epistemological reflections are not an after-the-fact justification that externally or accidentally transforms self-appropriation into self-knowledge. The self-affirmation of the knower itself bears epistemological ramifications, linking the structure of knowledge with the structure of reality. In and through these epistemological ramifications, the self-affirmation of the knower can be conceived as the next genetic moment in Lonergan's transposition of epistemological wisdom, a transposition begun in *Verbum*.

We witnessed in *Verbum* that wisdom's epistemological function revolved around the self-reflective judgment affirming the commensuration of the intellect to being and thus connecting the order of thought with the order of reality. *Insight's* vision of epistemological wisdom as the self-affirmation of the knower connects knowledge to being by presenting second-order definitions of being and objectivity that determine the meanings of these notions in relation to the fundamental operations of the empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious subject. If being is defined as the objective of the pure desire to know, then knowledge is, by definition, knowledge of being.¹⁸⁹ And if objectivity is defined as emergent from a patterned set of judgments that posit the existence of multiple beings, the distinction of one being from another, the identity of my own self as a knower, and the distinction of myself from other beings, then what is known through any patterned context of judgments that fit the determinate pattern just mentioned is, by definition, objectivity. Being and objectivity each make contact with the

¹⁸⁸ CWL 3: 411.

¹⁸⁹ CWL 3: 374.

self-affirmation of the knower, with certain elements of their definitions operative in this all-important judgment.¹⁹⁰

The principal notion of objectivity¹⁹¹ emerges from a patterned context of judgments that implicitly define the terms “object” and “subject.” On Lonergan’s account, objectivity is surprisingly simple. Objectivity is attained when judgments are reached in the following pattern:

A is; B is; C is; D is (etc.);
 A is neither B nor C nor D (etc.);
 B is neither C nor D, etc. (and so on for D...)

The patterned context of judgments given above implicitly defines what we mean by an object, but the principal notion of objectivity is not fully intelligible without the addition of two more judgments: the self-affirmation of the knower and the affirmation of the knower’s existence as distinct from the existence of other beings. The subject is defined as any object, say A, where A represents myself as understood and affirmed as an empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious knower. If the judgment A (I exist as a rational knower) is correct as well as the judgments affirming the distinction between me

¹⁹⁰ However, it is still reasonable to make a distinction, as does Dadosky, between the self-affirmation of the knower itself (a paramount “moment” in the ongoing process of rational self-appropriation) and the epistemological wisdom that transitions from the order of thought to the order of reality. In Dadosky’s estimation, epistemological wisdom in *Insight* encompasses everything that answers the question of why Lonergan’s cognitional theory is knowing. Here I choose to highlight the epistemological ramifications of the self-affirmation of the knower insofar as it inextricably connects to objectivity; hence I maintain that such self-affirmation is, in a sense, already epistemological wisdom. In agreement with Dadosky, it is clear that self-appropriation is the source of Lonergan’s epistemology. Intellectual self-appropriation is the “third type” of wisdom, facilitated by *Insight*, that grounds both epistemology and metaphysics.

¹⁹¹ To this principal notion of objectivity Lonergan adds three partial aspects of objectivity, discoverable with equal certainty in cognitional process: experiential, normative, and absolute. See CWL 3: 399 for a summary of each.

and other beings, then it is correct that there exist objects and a subject in the sense just given.¹⁹²

And so the necessity of the self-affirmation of the knower for the very possibility of both the principal notion of objectivity and the distinction between subject and object is transparent. The affirmation of subjectivity actually presupposes the affirmation of objectivity, since I must know that I exist and that my existence is distinct from the existence of other beings to know myself as a knower. The self-affirmation of the knower is in fact the judgment that I exist as a rational knower, and once that is affirmed, subjectivity is affirmed. Once the distinction of my existence as a rational knower from other existents is drawn, not only do I implicitly know myself as being but I also know myself as an object who is simultaneously a subject.¹⁹³ Therefore the self-affirmation of the knower is a crucial constituent of the notion of objectivity, and through the notion of objectivity it also enters into the constitution of the notion of subjectivity.

In summary, the self-affirmation of the knower appears to be a transposition of the epistemological aspect of wisdom first mentioned in *Verbum*. The self-affirmation of the knower in *Insight* is continuous with the sense of epistemological wisdom espoused in the *Verbum* articles—that is, the self-reflective judgment affirming the commensuration of the intellect to being—in several ways. Both accounts of epistemological wisdom ultimately affirm an implicit teleology of knowledge for being and of the subject's correct judgments for objectivity.¹⁹⁴ And they both ultimately affirm being as a more fundamental unity-identity-whole than knowledge, for the distinction of

¹⁹² CWL 3: 399-400. Of course all that would be needed to know the existence of other subjects would be to “intelligently grasp and reasonably affirm the existence of other knowers beside oneself” (CWL 3: 400).

¹⁹³ CWL 3: 400-402.

¹⁹⁴ CWL 3: 374; 381; 400-401; 408.

knowledge from being is a distinction made within being. Likewise, the difference between object and subject is a positive difference within being, not outside of it, as in the case of the naïve realism that tends to posit the existence of a subject who stands outside being and looks at it.¹⁹⁵ In addition, both affirm the subject's correct judgments as a more fundamental unity-identity-whole than objectivity, for prior to judgment we can only think being, not know it. And so the subject cannot know himself until he makes the correct judgment "I am," which, when added to other judgments, results in knowledge of herself as both being and object.¹⁹⁶

Finally, the epistemological wisdom embodied in the self-affirmation of the knower in *Insight* naturally transitions us into considerations of being and objectivity. Perhaps most importantly, the epistemological wisdom of the self-affirmation of the knower, when mediated through the notions of being and objectivity, organically culminates in a set of directives—in other words, a method—for the derivation of a metaphysics. This metaphysics preserves the permanent achievements of the Aristotelian-Thomist schema while incorporating insights from cognitional theory, mathematics, the natural sciences, modern history, and hermeneutics.¹⁹⁷

2.4 Epistemological Wisdom as Prior to Metaphysics

However, the unfolding of metaphysics from a basis in cognitional theory, and through a prior expansion of cognitional theory into epistemology, is anything but straightforward. Standing in the way is what Lonergan calls the polymorphism of

¹⁹⁵ CWL 3: 401.

¹⁹⁶ CWL 3: 401-402.

¹⁹⁷ CWL 3: 423-425.

consciousness—the fact that concrete human consciousness is multiform, with different patterns of experience competing for priority, blending together indiscriminatingly, sometimes heading for breakdown, and at other times competing directly with each other.¹⁹⁸

To overcome the possible confusion presented by the polymorphism of consciousness for the metaphysical task, Lonergan intentionally accounts for it: he considers metaphysics as springing from the polymorphic reality of people as they are, which he describes collectively as “the polymorphic subject in his native disorientation and bewilderment.”¹⁹⁹ At this stage metaphysics is latent and has no method; the very possibility of metaphysic lies hidden in the inevitably recurrent and conscious operations of experiencing, understanding, and judging.

To take up method in relation to metaphysics, the movement to an explicit metaphysics must begin, and the first step is an acquaintance with the existence and characteristics of insight in various fields of knowledge, with the self-affirmation of the knower and the notions of being and objectivity following. The path to explicit metaphysics is a journey to self-knowledge, and the directives of metaphysical method are issued by the self-affirming subject to herself. Lonergan examines a dialectic of metaphysical methods to show that only one is an authentic unfolding of the intellectual

¹⁹⁸ CWL 3: 410-413. For example, the intellectual pattern of experience in which the rational knower can grasp her identity with the clarity and precision exemplified in Chapter Eleven may very well issue into the series of accurate basic positions on being and objectivity in Chapters Twelve and Thirteen, respectively. And yet it is equally possible that the biological pattern of experience, with its focus on vital anticipation, extroversion, and satisfaction, may surreptitiously influence philosophical reflection with precisely these tendencies, declaring the real to be the already out there now.

¹⁹⁹ CWL 3: 422.

pattern of experiencing-understanding-judging that is affirmed as constitutive of rational knowing in the self-affirmation of the knower.²⁰⁰

The transition from latent to explicit metaphysics is a concrete deduction. To help us locate the role of epistemological wisdom in the transformation of latent metaphysics to explicit metaphysics, it is helpful to outline the deduction as follows:

The major premise posits the similarity in form (“isomorphism”) between the structure of knowing and the structure of the known. If knowing is defined as a composite of a related set of acts and the known is defined as the related set of contents of these acts,

then the pattern of the relations between the acts is isomorphic with the pattern of the relations between the contents of the acts. The premise is analytic because knowing is defined by a similarity to the known, and the known is defined by a similarity to knowing, and in this bare statement of implicit definition there is not yet any actual validation of either definition.

The set of primary minor premises contains several assertions that are direct consequences of the isomorphism of knowing and known. The most fundamental of these implications is the concrete, recurring structure of unity on the side of the known, corresponding to the unity of knowing. Because every composite of experiencing, understanding, and judging is one single knowing, every instance of known proportionate being is a unity of a content of experience, a content of understanding, and a content of judgment.²⁰¹

Finally, the set of secondary minor premises consists in material provided by reoriented science and common sense, material that will be integrated into a metaphysical account of what is known and of what is to be known of the universe of proportionate being—that is, what can be known by human experiencing, understanding, and judging. But the entire edifice of Lonergan’s proposal for metaphysics lies in the first major premise—the isomorphism between the structure of knowing and the known—and so the validity of this concrete deduction as metaphysical method stands or falls on the validity of the major premise.

²⁰⁰ CWL 3: 426-455. Among the possibilities sifted by Lonergan are abstract deduction, universal doubt, empiricism, commonsense eclecticism, Hegelian dialectic, and scientific method and philosophy.

²⁰¹ CWL 3: 424-425.

And so whether the isomorphism between knowing and known is an analytic proposition or an analytic principle is of the utmost importance. If it is an analytic proposition, with knowing defined in relation to the known and the known defined in relation to knowing in isolation from any verification, then it possesses the two benefits that accrue to a metaphysical method of abstract deduction: necessity and universality. On this reading of the major premise, such isomorphism would obtain in any possible world (because necessary) and would be perfectly abstract (universal), refraining from asserting the existence of any object. But an abstract deduction like this is ultimately empty of meaning and riddled with inane internal contradictions, as tempting as its appeal to self-evident principles might be.²⁰²

Lonergan does not abandon entirely the notion of self-evident principles, but transforms it. His reading of Aquinas on this point underlines a crucial qualification made by Aquinas himself: the self-justifying gravitas of self-evident principles does not come primarily from the logical force of syntax or even the intelligibility and reasonableness of implicit definition, but from the habit of wisdom, which selects and validates the terms in the first place. But at this juncture Lonergan faces a quandary, since the judicial virtue of wisdom is laden with Thomas' own metaphysics. That much is fine and to be expected, but Lonergan is searching for a form of wisdom that supposes neither a metaphysics (for how does one know that Aristotle's or Aquinas' metaphysics is correct?) nor a religious tradition (for the moment, we set aside wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit). The question

²⁰² CWL 3: 427-428.

of metaphysical method asks for the “genesis of a wisdom that is prior to metaphysics,”²⁰³ a genesis that he believes Aquinas never treated explicitly.

Astonishingly, what Aquinas did not treat explicitly, Lonergan discovers embedded in the Angelic Doctor all along—the epistemological wisdom that generates a metaphysics, a “third type of wisdom.” In a sidelong reference to his own work in *Verbum*, he insists that a cognitional account of a wisdom prior to metaphysics—in a word, epistemological wisdom—can be discerned in Aquinas’ work. In *Insight*, epistemological wisdom is transposed as the self-affirmation of the knower.

In contrast to an empty, deductive approach to metaphysics, Lonergan espouses an alternative, concrete deduction that relies on epistemological wisdom to determine the meaning of the partial term “knowing,” which is one of two terms making up the major premise of isomorphism between knowing and known. Epistemological wisdom, understood here as the self-affirmation of the knower that transposes Aquinas’ intellectual habit of wisdom, asserts that knowing is experiencing-understanding-judging and that such a cognitional pattern actually occurs and is precisely what characterizes myself as a rational knower. The self-affirmation of the knower is a concrete judgment of fact and an analytic principle that is universal and necessary with a different kind of universality and necessity than that of a merely analytic proposition. Thus the self-affirmation of the knower, which defines the term “knowing” of the major premise of Lonergan’s concrete deduction, lends metaphysical method a concretely existent referential—the subject as he or she really is—and a contingent necessity, since I may be

²⁰³ CWL 3: 446.

otherwise than I am. But insofar as I am, I am a rational knower whose knowing consists in experiencing, understanding, and judging.²⁰⁴

In summary, for Lonergan the twofold problem of metaphysical method is solved by epistemological wisdom on each count. First, the detached and disinterested desire to know often goes unrecognized by the subject. Thus while the patterned context of cognitional acts flowing from the pure desire to know does indeed provide the general relations of the unknown contents of these acts, this fact often goes unnoticed and thus remains latent.²⁰⁵ The self-affirmation of the knower remedies this deficiency, beginning the transition from latent to explicit metaphysics. Such self-knowledge issues the two directives constituting metaphysical method: a reorientation of one's scientific opinions and common sense, and an integration of what one knows and can know of the universe of proportionate being through the known structure of one's cognitional process.

But standing in the way of attaining both directives is the second problem facing metaphysical method: polymorphism of consciousness. When undifferentiated, polymorphism of consciousness often taints science with extrascientific opinions and common sense with common nonsense. Against this distortion the self-affirmation of the knower works to assert the basic positions on being and objectivity that invite further development and act as a dialectic sifter to weed out counterpositions, which invite reversal. Finally, the most constructive of directives of metaphysical method—to integrate the known and to-be-known of proportionate being under one unifying, heuristic structure—is the metaphysical task toward which epistemological wisdom most blatantly contributes.

²⁰⁴ CWL 3: 333; 343; 364.

²⁰⁵ CWL 3: 420; 422.

The epistemological wisdom encapsulated in the self-affirmation of the knower replaces the Aristotelian-Thomist notion of self-evident principles with the very source of the meaning of the terms that compose self-evident principles: the unfolding of the pure desire to know in the affirmation of the empirically, intellectually, and rationally aware self. The isomorphism between the knower and the known is the keystone to Lonergan's concrete deduction of metaphysics, with epistemological wisdom as the self-affirmation of the knower providing the meaning of the term "knowing."²⁰⁶

2.4.1 Epistemological Wisdom and the Notion of Being

For Lonergan the notion of being is a spontaneously operative, pre-conceptual, all-pervasive, and all-inclusive notion of the to-be-known. And so being itself is the "anything and everything" that is the objective of the unrestricted, detached, pure desire to know; the concrete universe of being is what is affirmed in the totality of all correct judgments. But as prior to any cognitional content, the notion of being given in the pure desire to know is supremely heuristic, open to determination by anything and everything that intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation will come to judge as true. Lonergan notes that since the pure desire to know is a "constituent element" of both the affirming and of the self that is affirmed in the self-affirmation of the knower, the discussion of self-affirmation must come before the discussion of the notion of being.²⁰⁷

Further, for Lonergan the self-affirmation of the knower is sapiential insofar as it selects the correct notion of being, fulfilling the classic Thomist conception of wisdom

²⁰⁶ CWL 3: 412-415 and 424-426.

²⁰⁷ CWL 3: 373-381; 387; 396; 398.

that Lonergan refers to so often.²⁰⁸ The self-affirmation of the knower is an affirmation of the naturally given, spontaneous, unrestricted, and all-encompassing drive of intelligence for correct understanding—an affirmation of the pure desire to know—as a permanent and essential mark of my rational consciousness, indeed as the defining feature of what it means to be rationally conscious. This affirmation of the pure desire to know is a selection of the correct notion of being, which is precisely this drive of intelligence for knowledge.²⁰⁹

2.5 Metaphysical Wisdom as the Integral Heuristic Structure of Proportionate Being

Verbum conceived epistemological wisdom as the self-reflective judgment affirming the commensuration of the intellect to being and thus connecting the order of thought with the order of reality. In *Insight*, epistemological wisdom is transposed as the self-affirmation of the knower, which supplies the principles from which an explicit metaphysics is generated. Lonergan's conception of metaphysical wisdom in *Verbum*

²⁰⁸ That Lonergan regards the self-affirmation of the knower as inherently sapiential is a major point made by Christopher Friel in his illuminating article on "Lonergan's Notion of Being," *Heythrop Journal* 57 (2016): 511-531. Just as in *Insight*, Lonergan himself states this rather directly in the 1957 Boston College lectures on mathematical logic and existentialism: "And it is by *sapientia* that you effect the transition from analytic propositions to analytic principles. *Summa theologiae*, 1-2, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4m: he doesn't put it that way, but he's showing that *sapientia* is superior to *intellectus*" (CWL 18: 346). As Coelho underlines, the self-affirmation of the knower does not become fully adequate and objective knowledge until correct positions on basic issues in philosophy have been developed, which does not happen in *Insight* until the dialectic of Chapter Fourteen is complete. So although Coelho identifies self-appropriation through generalized method as coincident with epistemological wisdom, he emphasizes that this represents only the preliminary phase of metaphysical method. In turn, metaphysical method only becomes metaphysical wisdom when it is fully dialectical, since dialectic is necessary for the correct interpretation of basic terms. For the similarities and differences between Coelho's position and my own, see n. 434 below.

²⁰⁹ Additional judgments of fact are necessary if one is to advance from the correct notion of being—correctly selected in and from the knower's sapiential self-affirmation—to the correct definition of being as the object of the pure desire to know. For example, the reader must still discover that knowing being is identical with affirming it in a reasonable judgment, and knowledge of being is objective.

followed Aquinas closely; it is the speculative science whose object is ultimate causes and principles. *Insight's* definition of metaphysics as the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being remains to be investigated, as does the derivation of metaphysical elements and the unique manner in which Lonergan's metaphysics acts as the first principles of all knowledge.

The structure of the known revealed by self-appropriation is the object of Lonergan's metaphysics. Because the structure of knowing brings to light the structure of the known, correct metaphysical positions stem from accurate self-knowledge, while inaccurate or deficient metaphysical affirmations stem from inaccurate or deficient self-knowledge. As the self-affirmation of the knower is a shift from the contents of cognition to its acts and its actor, the notion of metaphysics unfolded from such a judgment must be heuristic. And so explicit metaphysics determines the definitions not of the known contents of any cognitive act, but of the unknown contents of any cognitive act insofar as they are heuristically related to the structure of knowledge.

In anticipating the type of act through which the unknown content would become known, metaphysics must employ heuristic notions. But Lonergan's explicit metaphysics is a heuristic structure, laying out the entire ordered set of heuristic notions. And because it does so exhaustively, metaphysics is an integral heuristic structure; as integral, it supplies the ordered set of all heuristic notions and melds them into one unity-identity-whole. Lonergan defines proportionate being as whatever is to be known by human experience, understanding, and judgment, and defines explicit metaphysics as the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being.²¹⁰

²¹⁰ CWL 3: 22-23; 558-559; 416-417.

If the Thomist notion of wisdom as metaphysics found in Aristotle and Aquinas and expounded by Lonergan in *Verbum* is to be affirmed by our author once again, then metaphysical wisdom is coincident with *Insight*'s vision of metaphysics as the explicit, integral, heuristic structure of proportionate being. Like that of Aristotle and Aquinas, Lonergan's metaphysics studies being as subsisting in potency, form, and act, but it defines each of these elements heuristically.²¹¹ Potency refers to that from which understanding abstracts, and thus can only be understood in the proper sense of fully explanatory knowledge by an intellectually patterned experience of the empirical residue. Form refers to that which is known by the direct insight that grasps unities-identities-wholes in their relation to one another; form is the content of the act of understanding. Act refers to that which is affirmed as virtually unconditioned in the "yes" of reflective insight; act is the content of the act of judgment. Since concrete things are known by understanding, they are forms. Central form is what is grasped insofar as the unity of a concrete unity-identity-whole is understood. This concrete unity-identity-whole is what exists, and what is grasped as the existence of intelligible unity is central act. Insofar as a concrete unity-identity-whole is an intelligible unit grasped in data as individual, central potency is defined as the individuality of the empirical residue.²¹²

The next group of terms comprising the elements of Lonergan's metaphysics are conjugate potency, form, and act. As there is a distinct type of understanding that grasps concrete things, there are general structures and abstract laws that grasp the properties of

²¹¹ CWL 3: 456. Lonergan contends that what he means by each of the terms denoting components of proportionate being would be easily recognizable by Aristotle as his own. However, he is also quick to point out that there are substantial differences between them, stemming from instances in Aristotle's physics in which he fails to distinguish descriptive from explanatory knowledge, a distinction made much more sharply by modern science (458; 507; 511).

²¹² CWL 3: 457 and 510.

things and the occurrence of events, which are known by understanding and thus are as much forms as the unities-identities-wholes of things themselves. And so to central forms is added an account of conjugate forms—the intelligible mutual relations between sensible similarities once these sensible similarities are verified and explained in relation to one another. In turn, conjugate act is the occurrence of the property or event, and conjugate potency refers to the spatiotemporal details in which properties or events (conjugate forms) are verified.²¹³

Other tenets of Lonergan's metaphysics are included based on their outgrowth from aspects of his cognitional theory. We recall from the deductive form of latent to explicit metaphysics that the primary minor premises consist in concrete and recurring structures ultimately capable of being reduced to the self-affirmation of the knower. Lonergan clarifies major instances of these structures as classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical methods. The conjunction of classical and statistical method reveals the immanent intelligibility of the order of events to be an emergent probability. Likewise, the notion of successive higher viewpoints by which the same things have different properties studied by different sciences expands our conception of the immanent order of the universe as a generalized emergent probability for both things and events.

Corresponding to the unrestricted objective of the pure desire to know is an upwardly directed dynamism, the finality of being itself. Again, the notion that lower levels of otherwise coincidental sets of occurrences can be systematized by higher forms, when applied to the categories of genus and species, unveils the existence of successive, explanatory genera. In turn, the existence of explanatory genera makes sense of the

²¹³ CWL 3: 460-462; 509-510.

existence of a succession of distinct and autonomous sciences with no logical process from one to another.²¹⁴

All in all, within the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being that is Lonergan's scientific metaphysics, the following fundamental topoi are explored and articulated in line with his three basic positions on knowing, being, and objectivity: the six metaphysical elements of central form, central act, central potency, conjugate form, conjugate act, and conjugate potency; generalized emergent probability; development; explanatory genera and species; distinctions, relations, and unity.²¹⁵ All of these components comprise the content of Lonergan's metaphysics, and all are considered in their relations to one another, thereby approaching the universe of being from an explanatory angle. Since the metaphysics of *Insight* is the transposition of the metaphysical wisdom described in *Verbum*—metaphysics as a science, following the Thomist-Aristotelian notion—all of the above form the content of a new metaphysical wisdom that takes its stand on the structure of human knowing.

The open, dynamic character and foundational nature of Lonergan's metaphysics result not merely from its heuristic nature but also from its relation to the other sciences. As heuristic, it underlies all other sciences insofar as its dual principles—the desire to know and its ongoing unfolding in empirical, intellectual, and rational self-consciousness—is the impetus for all questions, insights, and judgments constituting other departments of knowledge. In striking similarity to the role of Aquinas' *sapientia* vis-à-vis the other sciences, Lonergan's metaphysical wisdom asks the total, foundational question to which other sciences give partial answers and so penetrates all other sciences.

²¹⁴ CWL 3: 463-467; 475; 509-510.

²¹⁵ CWL 3: 410-552.

Furthermore, its principles constitute the common source of all other knowledge and make possible a common compatibility and coherence among the different sciences. As dialectical, metaphysical wisdom transforms the other sciences by encouraging their positions to fuller development and manifesting the waywardness of counterpositions. As integral, it joins the partial answers provided by other sciences into a single intelligible unity. Although not the whole of knowledge in the sense of the achievement of all concrete knowns, metaphysics is the “whole in knowledge.”²¹⁶

2.6 Wisdom as the Highest Viewpoint (and a Note on the Universal Viewpoint)

Earlier we noted Lonergan’s remark that by wisdom Aquinas meant “an accumulation of insights that stands to the universe as common sense stands to the domain of the particular, incidental, relative, and imaginable.”²¹⁷ A higher viewpoint is a habitual accumulation of insights that emerges from a particular set of images, definitions, judgments, and so on, but goes beyond all of these cognitional elements to ground a larger and broader field of further images, definitions, judgments, and so on that are capable of placing the original set of cognitional elements in a larger and broader field of meaning. What is merely coincidental on the level of a lower viewpoint (or lower science) is understood as systematized at the level of a higher viewpoint (or higher science).²¹⁸ Lonergan’s conception of metaphysics as a science consisting in the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being can be fruitfully illustrated as a viewpoint from

²¹⁶ CWL 3: 415-417.

²¹⁷ CWL 3: 331.

²¹⁸ CWL 3: 37-43; 506.

two angles: as actually being the highest viewpoint naturally possible, and as containing within itself something Lonergan calls “the universal viewpoint.”

Like the self-affirmation of the knower from which it flows, Lonergan’s explicit metaphysics is exempt from radical revision. The primitive terms and relations of any given science may shift once a higher viewpoint emerges in that science, but the achievement of a higher viewpoint is made possible by the intelligence that wonders and inquires and the critical reasonableness that refuses assent to mere opinion. The primitive terms of metaphysics are these dynamic tendencies of intelligence itself, which admit no revision; thus human knowledge of proportionate being knows no higher viewpoint than explicit metaphysics, although such a viewpoint progresses in expansion and specification as the sciences discover new methods.²¹⁹

Lonergan’s metaphysics is critical insofar as it distinguishes between positions and counterpositions. It is scientific insofar as it possesses a clear and distinct objective, operates within razor-sharp boundaries, and has a method that serves as a criterion to avoid the dreaded “mere disputations” of metaphysical past. But Lonergan’s metaphysics is also dialectical, giving us a basis from which to evaluate any philosophy according to whether or not (and to what extent) it aligns with fundamental cognitional truths. Thus metaphysics as dialectical issues in a definition of truth, two criteria of truth, and the ontological foundation of truth as the intrinsic intelligibility of being.²²⁰

²¹⁹ Metaphysics integrates the sciences’ discoveries of new methods into its account of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being (418), just as it works the conclusions of the sciences and common sense into a unity by grasping in them the concrete extensions of its own anticipations of understanding (418); provides the different conclusions of the different sciences with compatibility and coherence (415); and spurs on the positions within sciences to further development while reversing their counterpositions (415).

²²⁰ CWL 3: 546-547; 572-576.

Meaning occurs within being, and so the truth of interpretation—that is, the truth of the expression of the meaning of another expression—will also be treated under the dialectic of metaphysics. The issue of the truth of interpretation calls for the dialectical aspect of metaphysics to combat what Lonergan describes as the basic problem of interpretation, the influence of several different kinds of bias in the interpreter’s habitual accumulation of insights (viewpoints); biases in the viewpoints of the original author of the original expression to be interpreted; biases in the viewpoints of the original audience; biases in the viewpoints of the current audience.²²¹

Insofar as an accurate interpretation presupposes knowledge of the development of types of meaning in history, in which the original expression must be put into context to be fully understood, it demands a genetic tool. Insofar as an accurate interpretation presupposes an understanding of the development of positions and counterpositions in history, and an understanding of how the polymorphism of human consciousness introduces elements of confusion into both the original author’s and the interpreter’s possible meanings, it demands a dialectical tool. Lonergan finds such a genetic and dialectical hermeneutical tool in the universal viewpoint, which he defines as a potential totality of genetically and dialectically ordered viewpoints.

Lonergan contends that “the universe of meanings” that emerges from cognitional theory falls under metaphysical dialectic, and grounds the universal viewpoint possesses

²²¹ CWL 3: 586-587. Further, the expression of the original author as well as the expression of the interpreter may be adequate or inadequate to the original truth he knew or the truth of interpretation she knows now, respectively (576-581). Therefore, there exists a need for a genetic account of the potential totality of modes of expression as they progress toward “specialization and differentiation on sharply distinguishable levels” (601). Together with the genetic and dialectic account of the potential totality of meanings that is the universal viewpoint, the genetic account of the potential totality of modes of expression composes the upper blade of Lonergan’s methodical hermeneutics, with the lower blade provided by the different scholarly techniques of interpretation (600-601).

four dimensions: experiences and lack of experience; insights and lack of insights; judgments and failures to judge; various patterns of experiencing making up the polymorphism of human consciousness. The universal viewpoint is simply the potential, full range of possible combinations of the aforesaid dimensions of meaning, ordered genetically and dialectically. Situating any given, particular interpretation within the universal viewpoint empowers the interpreter with a full range of possible alternatives in which the original author's meaning may be recreated. Since the universal viewpoint has its basis in the adequate, explicit self-knowledge of the interpreter and the explicit metaphysics that follows from such self-knowledge, the universal viewpoint is implied and contained within the science of metaphysical wisdom.²²²

3 Summary: Metaphysical and Epistemological Dimensions of Wisdom

On one hand we recall the Thomist identification of wisdom with metaphysics (first philosophy) and of the wise man as the one who knows the real. On the other hand, we have Lonergan's notion of rational self-appropriation—especially its initiation and crystallization in the self-affirmation of the knower—as the foundation of metaphysics and, in fact, of all expansions of knowledge. In this sense, the basic notion of self-appropriation at large would seem to take on the role of wisdom in *Insight*.

And yet Lonergan clearly, albeit indirectly, transposes Thomist wisdom from its base in Aristotelian theory to a more multidimensional unfolding in interiority with greater specification than a mere equivalence of Thomist wisdom with “Lonerganian”

²²² CWL 3: 588-591.

self-affirmation. In *Insight*, that greater specification consists in a differently (and more clearly) ordered relationship between epistemology and metaphysics than found in *Verbum*. While *Verbum* explicitly distinguished metaphysical wisdom from epistemological wisdom, it only implicitly hinted that wisdom's epistemological function may be the basis of its metaphysical function. It was Lonergan's contention that the commensuration between intellect and intelligible known by epistemological wisdom is a distinction within being that can be known through a development of understanding and affirmed as real in a self-reflective judgment.

We noticed that issues of ontology (metaphysics), psychology (cognition), and epistemology are clearly distinguished in *Verbum*, with the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of wisdom differentiated and the intrinsic tension between them held in unity by the cognitional reframing of wisdom as self-knowledge. However, distinctions among metaphysics, psychology, and epistemology are not fully concretized or systematized in *Verbum* in the form of a full-fledged method, as in the case of generalized empirical method in *Insight*. In *Insight* Lonergan consistently upholds and in fact performs a clear and distinct order among these three, with cognitional theory coming before epistemology and metaphysics, not only chronologically but also in principle and order of derivation.

In *Insight* the connection between epistemological wisdom and metaphysical wisdom is clearly and explicitly derivative, since the reflective insight of the self-affirmation of the knower is precisely what grounds our knowledge of the metaphysical elements of potency, form, and act. And so it is only after the self-affirmation of the knower has been made in Chapter Eleven that the two epistemological chapters on the

notion of being and the notion of objectivity can emerge, and the next four chapters on metaphysics can be properly grounded.²²³

The path laid out in *Insight*'s "slogan"—from thoroughly understanding what it is to understand to the broad lines of all there is to be understood, and to all further developments of understanding—is not a simplistic, abstract deduction or an execution of a merely analytic syllogism. Instead, the path from the self-affirmation of the knower to an explicit metaphysics is the cluster of ever-growing and consolidating insights gradually rising to the universal viewpoint that is an ordered totality of viewpoints.²²⁴

²²³ See CWL 3: 398 for Lonergan's synopsis on the relationship between the self-affirmation of the knower in Chapter Eleven and the notion of being in Chapter Twelve.

²²⁴ CWL 3: 22 and 588. Coelho discusses the universal viewpoint in *Insight* as being a "type of wisdom insofar as it is a grasp of order in the universe of meanings." It is, at the same time, the dialectical aspect of the explicit metaphysics of *Insight*, because this metaphysics incorporates the universe of meanings into the universe of being. Because it integrates all particular heuristic structures, metaphysics is analogous to the habit of wisdom's grasp of universal order (*Hermeneutics and Method*, 74, 85, and 96, with quote on 74).

Chapter Three: *Sapientia* in the Quest for Theological Foundations: The Emergence of Method and the Ascension of Conversion in the Gregorian Courses (1957-1964)

In the late 1950s and early to mid-1960s, many of Lonergan's ideas on the subject underwent development in dialogue with the hermeneutical and historical discoveries of nineteenth-century German philosophy. Lonergan himself mentions three specific courses that he taught at the Gregorian University—*De intellectu et methodo*, *De systemate et historia*, and *De methodo theologiae*—as his attempt to grapple with the issues of this *Geisteswissenschaften*.²²⁵ The “eventual outcome” of such an encounter was *Method in Theology*, but what becomes of wisdom in the middling years between the two epic bookends of *Insight* and *Method*?²²⁶

1 *De intellectu et methodo* (1959): Wisdom as Method's Companion

The answer resides in the various ways that Lonergan approaches and solves the questions posed by the development of knowledge in history. Put most generally, this problem is the question of method, or how to go about the process of coming to know. In the *De intellectu et methodo* course he taught at the Gregorian in the spring of 1959, Lonergan highlights the historical emergence of method as a crucial philosophical and theological problematic from two different angles: the challenge raised by the trifold

²²⁵ CWL 13: 232-233.

²²⁶ Between the publication of *Insight* in 1957 and the *De intellectu et methodo* course in 1959 there lies *De redemptione*, a text of paramount importance in Lonergan's account of divine wisdom. Research by Crowe indicates that the date of completion was most likely around 1958. See *The Redemption*, tr. Michael G. Shields and ed. Robert M. Doran, H. Daniel Monsour, and Jeremy D. Wilkins, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 9 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2018), xv-xvi. Hereafter *The Redemption* is cited as CWL 9. Because its focus on divine wisdom represents a unique instance in Lonergan's thought on *sapientia*, *De redemptione* will be analyzed in the Conclusion in its connection to further avenues of research.

dilemma of foundations, chasm, and historicity in the development of knowledge, and the challenge posed by the development of the notion of science. As will be seen shortly, the solution to both challenges hinges upon wisdom understood as an intellectual habit.

Wisdom selects the terms forming the foundation of a science, makes judgments about their actual existence, and properly orders the relations among terms—a solidly Thomist account reminiscent of *Verbum*—and yet develops dramatically over time, mirroring the concrete cognitive context already established by *Insight*.²²⁷

Granting what *Insight* says about the act of questioning as the most fundamental manifestation of the pure desire to know,²²⁸ knowledge can be seen as an ordering of serial arrangements of answers to a serial arrangement of questions. The process of ordering answers to any one serial arrangement of questions is a relatively simple manner: the principle of order is the technique of logical derivation, the process of distinguishing primitive terms (definitions) and propositions from derived terms and propositions.²²⁹

System is defined as a virtual totality of propositions established from primitive terms and propositions by means of a technique of derivation alone. But what is the principle of order among different systems? The application of a technique of derivation

²²⁷ *Insight*, which was covered in the last chapter, was published in 1957. In the summer of 1958, Lonergan gave a series of lectures on *Insight* at St. Mary's University in Halifax, which later came to be edited and titled as *Understanding and Being* (CWL 5). Since it repeats much of the same material as *Insight* but also incorporates more extensively the existential language and theme of "horizon," a notion that becomes increasingly important to Lonergan's thought, I save my commentary on *Understanding and Being* until the fifth chapter.

²²⁸ CWL 3: 33-34.

²²⁹ Bernard J.F. Lonergan, "Understanding and Method [*De intellectu et methodo*]," in *Early Works on Theological Method 2*, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and Daniel Monsour, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 23 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013), 17. Hereafter *Early Works on Theological Method 2* is cited as CWL 23. By primitive terms Lonergan means to indicate not necessarily self-evident or necessary ones, but definitions that are not derived from other definitions according to some deductive technique. CWL 23: 18-19.

within the same system does not always yield the solution to a new problem; a new system is necessary, but this also is not always borne out of any logical technique.

At the heart of this dilemma is the distinction between a closed, complete system and an open, incomplete one. In a closed system the sum of questions equals the sum of answers. As the system is complete, no more answers can be derived in response to new questions. In contrast, an open system is incomplete; the sum of questions is greater than the sum of available answers.²³⁰ For these new questions to find an adequate response,²³¹ there must be a transition from one ordering, which raises a set of questions it cannot answer, to another ordering.

1.1 Wisdom as a Foundational Bridge in Historical Development

Lonergan explores three instances of this problematic scenario posited by the growth of knowledge, what he describes as “three logically distinct aspects of one real problem, that of method.”²³² There is the problem of the transition from an old ordering to a new one, which he calls the problem of foundations; the problem of maintaining and accounting for continuity from one ordering to another, or the problem of historicity; and

²³⁰ CWL 23: 19 and 30-39.

²³¹ The conception of system in terms of questions vis-à-vis answers is a significant one; as Lonergan will communicate it in the *De methodo theologiae* course from the spring of 1962, “All method begins from questions to which an answer is to be found” (CWL 23: 387). The moment in which the need for a new ordering is brought to conscious reflection is an intellectually pregnant one, but one that is often delayed in intellectual history. As an example, Lonergan explains that if the technique of symbolic logic were to be applied to Scholastic method, the urgent need for a new ordering would become immediately obvious, since the existence of eternally controversial questions—questions that are unsolvable a priori—manifests the problem of method (CWL 23: 35; cf. CWL 18:110). In his later writings, Lonergan will interpret the occurrence of more questions than answers as the sign of an open mind, and the explicit acknowledgment of this discrepancy as the motivation and accommodation of transcendental method. See CWL 14: 17-18 and “Method: Trend and Variations,” in *A Third Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadasosky, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 16 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017), 15. Hereafter *A Third Collection* is cited as CWL 16.

²³² CWL 23: 49.

the problem of an ever-greater number and ever-greater systematization of orderings, which become more and more conceptually distant from their sources, or the problem of the chasm. In each of these conundrums, a new totality of propositions requires a new ordering and thus new primitive propositions and a new technique of derivation—in other words, a new principle of development. For each of these, Lonergan cites wisdom as the principle of development by which new meaning emerges from human intelligence.²³³

Dogmatic development raises the question of foundations. How can the same doctrine possess the same meaning while new questions provoke new and ever-deeper understanding, even to the point of showing previous understanding insufficient? Describing wisdom as a kind of *deus ex machina* in the transition from one ordering to the next, Lonergan ascribes to wisdom the function of judging the best way to order a virtual totality capable of receiving several different orders. It draws conclusions from indemonstrable principles, judges the truth and type of intelligibility of the connection between terms, judges the validity of different kinds of reasoning, and generates new systems of knowledge by creating novel orderings of truths. “It judges the purpose of the ordering; whether, when, and how the former ordering is to be kept, or to be extended, or whether a new ordering is to be introduced.”²³⁴

A conceptual foundation revolving around judgments within the mind (“an internal foundation manifested externally”) cannot pretend to resolve disputes regarding different conceptions of being in the philosophy of history, much less can an external foundation whose ultimate basis is only preconceived definitions of terms, about which many philosophers disagree. But when one places foundations in the development of

²³³ CWL 23: 31 and 49.

²³⁴ CWL 23: 51-53, with quote on 53.

preconceptual operations of human intelligence as they are developed and perfected through the intellectual habits of understanding, science, and wisdom, one is able to more and more clearly grasp the concrete intelligibility in sensible data; more and more accurately grasp the meaning of the most primitive terms; and more and more correctly judge the nexuses among them, which in turn form the principles of new definitions and new propositions in the new orderings.²³⁵

Against myriad objections that would exclude wisdom as a foundation because it seems that humans are, in the concrete, exactly the opposite of wise, Lonergan assures us that wisdom itself is a moving foundation. Wisdom itself grows and develops from “an initial degree.”²³⁶ In its humble beginnings, wisdom is a type of foreknowledge of the whole of undifferentiated being, given in the notion of being present in each of us through the same human nature we share and manifested in our common, natural desire to know. Far from being an all-or-nothing acquisition, the habit of wisdom not only grows in degrees but is itself the principle of all growth in knowledge.

Lonergan describes the problem of historicity as an enormous conundrum disrupting theology ever since the Renaissance. Because the causes of knowing are not identical to the causes of being, the historical path of discovery (also called the way of resolution or the analytical way) is not the same as the systematic-theoretical path of teaching (also called the way of composition or the synthetic way).²³⁷ In and of itself, the existence of these two ways of proceeding are not problematic and do not necessarily imply two different theologies, for the same totality of propositions can be ordered in two

²³⁵ CWL 23: 53 and 55.

²³⁶ CWL 23: 65. And, along with the habits of understanding and science, wisdom is present to varying degrees in different persons. See “Analysis Fidei,” the course Lonergan taught at Regis College in 1952 (CWL 19: 467).

²³⁷ CWL 23: 23-25; 39-41; 59-65.

different ways. In fact, when history is ignored, the corresponding elements of the two ways are perfectly equivalent; it is only their order that is reversed.

But the same thing is not understood the same systematically and historically, and so an awareness that distinguishes and relates the two ways is all the more necessary. For example, when accounting for the historical development of theology, one must admit not only that the notion of divine missions comes first in the way of analysis and last in the way of composition but that the understandings of such a notion are actually different throughout history. St. Paul does not understand divine mission the same way that St. Thomas does.²³⁸

Admitting that concepts change in history as the human subjects intending them undergo change, no logical process can transition us coherently from an analytic ordering of knowledge to a synthetic ordering of knowledge on a given topic. As Lonergan puts it, “There is a certain leap here.”²³⁹ But such a leap cannot be a sharply discrete jump from one mountain to another; a bridge must be built if continuity among different understandings of the same dogma is to be defended. The bridge Lonergan constructs is a rough sketch of “the fundamental stages in the development of the human mind,”²⁴⁰ for to systematically distinguish the diverse stages of human growth is to give an explanatory account of the different ways concepts have changed in history. In *De intellectu et methodo* Lonergan identifies three stages of the human mind: the symbolic, the linguist, and the theoretic.²⁴¹

²³⁸ CWL 23: 31; 41-42; 77.

²³⁹ CWL 23: 41.

²⁴⁰ CWL 23: 79.

²⁴¹ CWL 23: 97-117.

In regard to the problem of historicity, Lonergan notes that the increase in science, understanding, and wisdom is intrinsically tied to the life of the senses, different syntheses between the life of the intellect and that of the senses develop through history. As wisdom is less developed, “a sensation–like mode of concept formation” dominates, whereas a more methodical, scientific-systematic mode of concept formation comes to the fore as wisdom grows. Implicitly, the reader realizes that the growth in the subject that allows for such concept formation to develop is the intellectual conversion of *Insight*’s Chapter Eleven, which affirms the rational consciousness of the knower and especially one of its major metaphysical implications: being is the object of the act of understanding, not a thing that is “already out there now.”²⁴²

The issue of the chasm also stems from different historical syntheses between the life of the senses and the life of the intellect. As diverse relations between these two major principles within the human subject, such syntheses constitute ever-multiplying orderings that beg for ever more complex systematizations.²⁴³ The homoousian controversy of the third and fourth centuries serves as a paramount example of the turmoil engendered by the seeming dichotomy between the language of the Gospel and technical philosophical terms.

Lonergan uses the language of *Insight* to bridge this chasm: the intellect understands intelligible form in sensible data, and insight pivots between the concrete and the abstract. If wisdom is the principle of order as well as the principle of correct judgments about the ordering of orderings, then it belongs to wisdom to judge of the different relationships between intellect and sense in the way that systematic theology

²⁴² CWL 23: 141.

²⁴³ CWL 23: 49 and 79.

utilizes non-systematic sources, such as symbolic, intersubjective, and commonsense meanings.²⁴⁴

1.2 Wisdom as Parallel to Modern Science

Another way that Lonergan communicates the urgency of method is by demonstrating how dramatically the notion of science has changed over time. Here Lonergan draws a remarkable analogy: “as philosophy is to wisdom, science is to method.”²⁴⁵ The ancient Greeks conceived of philosophy as birthed from a love for wisdom, and as a type of wisdom practice; modern science is birthed from method and is, de facto, a type of methodical practice. Science is enacted method, with method understood not as a vitally, intelligently conscious application of directives.²⁴⁶ Such directives themselves issue from human understanding, especially from its highest perfection in the right judgment that is wisdom, the turning of the intellect from a commonsense to a scientific-systematic understanding of the whole of being.

The “lag time” between scientific practice and reflection is troublesome on account of the subject and the subject’s need for intellectual conversion. Lonergan presents a compelling case for the need of science to be liberated from basic philosophical counterpositions. These scientific aberrations necessitate the application of one of the rules of general method: reverse counterpositions.

²⁴⁴ CWL 23: 227.

²⁴⁵ CWL 23: 81.

²⁴⁶ CWL 23: 151; 207.

1.3 Wisdom and Theological Method

The five directives comprising Lonergan's general method—understand, understand systematically, develop positions, reverse counterpositions, and accept responsibility for judging—connote everything that is *a priori* in any and all sciences, which, when joined with the *a posteriori* element of relevant data, fuels scientific exploration. Because the five rules of general method are founded on the nature of the human intellect, which remains fundamentally the same however its desire to know takes form, it applies equally to every branch of knowledge while remaining pliable enough to modify itself to particular subject matters. General method must be adapted for theology according to an analogy of truth, since the formal object of theology is God, who so utterly transcends every human category as to be unknowable in God's self. In fact, the notion of truth must be expanded in theology to include not just what we can understand but what God understands, the whole supernatural order of revelations.²⁴⁷

But theologians do understand, although imperfectly and analogically, the truths that God has revealed. Lonergan contends that the very subject matter of theology calls for “a radical transformation of all our rules” and, as a matter of method, must “be treated by way of a special technique”²⁴⁸ that makes room for divine wisdom. Rather than progressing from data through understanding to the truth of judgment, as the other sciences do, theology begins with the truth of judgment—the intellectual assent of faith to revealed truths—and climaxes with an understanding of divine truth. As in several other texts, in *De intellectu et methodo* Lonergan makes his own Vatican I's admonition for

²⁴⁷ CWL 23: 117; 153; 165; 177; 209-213.

²⁴⁸ CWL 23: 209 and 153, respectively.

theologians to strive for an imperfect, analogical, but still highly fruitful understanding of the divine mysteries. And so the central core of his theological method, the “special way of proceeding,” is by analogy with what human reason can know naturally, from the interconnections among the mysteries of faith, and from the final end of man.²⁴⁹

As in any other science, theologians must not shirk the responsibility of judgment, but theological judgments are of a special type: “A judgment is made in accordance with a certain wisdom. But the only wisdom adequate for judging about an understanding of the faith is the wisdom of God, which theologians do not possess.”²⁵⁰ Just as the starting point of theology is a divinely elevated yet still reasonable surrender to divine revelation, the terminus of theological method is humble submission to divine wisdom as it lives in and guides us through the teachings of the church.

1.4 Wisdom and General Method

But true theological understanding is not just a matter of the proper mindset of the subject but actually of a wholesale transformation of the subject, a conversion: “But the real problem is in the subject, who must be turned from his own world to the universe. Hence there is no question here of deducing further elements from those that are known, but of transforming the knower himself.”²⁵¹ In *De intellectu et methodo*, intellectual conversion is characterized as the movement from a symbolic and commonsense understanding to a methodical, scientific-systematic one. Conversion in this context is the transition from the more narrow horizon of commonsense understanding, which seeks

²⁴⁹ CWL 23: 211 and 213; cf. CWL 12: 11-20.

²⁵⁰ CWL 23: 215.

²⁵¹ CWL 23: 143.

only to understand determinate situations—only a particular section of the universe—to the entire universe of being, especially the basic principles constituting the foundations of a given science and, in the case of metaphysics, all of being, *ens commune*.²⁵²

But wisdom is the intellectual habit that acknowledges the first principles of all reality. And so in *De intellectu et methodo*, wisdom and intellectual conversion would seem to be identical in the actual search for scientific-systematic understanding, with intellectual conversion as the cognitional transposition of the metaphysical category of wisdom as a speculative virtue. *Insight* states the same, but in *De intellectu et methodo* Lonergan debuts his identification of wisdom with intellectual conversion on a new stage—an account of both general and theological method. Therefore, the second precept of general method is to understand systematically: to aim at a complete explanation of all phenomena such that the whole universe is understood as a unity in and through the intelligible relations of its parts, an enterprise that is impossible without intellectual conversion. Because no one is born with such knowledge—not even with the idea that systematic understanding is the ultimate goal of our desire to know—such understanding grows only gradually in human history through ongoing conversion, paralleling the growth of wisdom discussed under the problem of foundations.²⁵³

Lonergan denotes wisdom as a moving foundation with roots in the notion of being and a full blossoming only in our final union with divine wisdom,²⁵⁴ but method is the concrete set of directives that guides wisdom's growth, while wisdom is the driving force behind the correct application of method. Lonergan remarks that while method can

²⁵² CWL 23: 137.

²⁵³ CWL 23: 129 and 139.

²⁵⁴ CWL 23: 213.

assist us in employing our own judgment, it never stands in for actual judging,²⁵⁵ and here wisdom is still thought of as the intellectual habit empowering right judgment. And the virtue of wisdom still operates as the metaphysical equivalence of intellectual conversion, which is at the very core of methodologic problems, theological and otherwise.

Thus in *De intellectu et methodo* Lonergan places wisdom and method in a relationship of reciprocity, but with method beginning to take over some of the functions of wisdom: “All knowledge is an accumulation of acts. The function of method is merely to direct, to order, to foster, and to approve such a series of acts.”²⁵⁶ While wisdom is still the principle of right judgment that assures the fruitful application of method, it is telling that method is depicted here as ordering, the paramount function traditionally ascribed to wisdom: “New questions can be solved only by changing the way of ordering responses according to a new method, which is simply not to be found in theological works at the present time.”²⁵⁷ If *De intellectu et methodo* draws the analogical relationship between philosophy and wisdom and science and method as one of enactment, then the conceptual lines between wisdom and method run parallel, leaving unanswered the question of whether they may at some point converge.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁵ CWL 23: 149; 453: “Methodology, however, addresses the very formation of concepts and the preparation for and the proper way to make judgments.”

²⁵⁶ CWL 23: 119. Cf. *Divinarum personarum*, the Trinitarian text first published in 1957 for the use of his students (and now included in the 1964 *The Triune God: Systematics*), where Lonergan presents his own methodically minded “twist” on the traditional virtue of wisdom by assigning it the task of knowing which problem to unravel first—that is, the problem whose solution does not presuppose the solution of other problems. In turn, *intellectus* grasps the answer to the question *sapientia* deems to be “first,” and *scientia* draws out solutions to subsequent questions by deducing from the first solution. CWL 12: 22-25.

²⁵⁷ CWL 23: 31. The importance of wisdom for the ordering of questions strongly foreshadows the role of wisdom a couple years later in *De intellectu et methodo* (1959).

²⁵⁸ Arguing that wisdom acts as both foundation and goal of all five methodological precepts outlined in *De intellectu et methodo*, Dadosky concludes that these guidelines are an extension into methodology of the Thomist idea of wisdom as a habitual possession. In pursuing what seems to me like a continued and

Lonergeran tells us that “Method need only make explicit what is implicit in the structure of the intellectual process,”²⁵⁹ and we can assume that “the intellectual process” in question entails all of the cognitional components laid out in *Insight*. In this spring 1959 course at the Gregorian University, Lonergan retains the metaphysical category of wisdom as an intellectual habit while simultaneously linking it to the practical application of method, where method is conceived as a set of concrete cognitional precepts, and to intellectual conversion, where intellectual conversion is conceived as the key unlocking a whole host of methodological quandaries. At the very least, wisdom is employed in this text as both a metaphysical and a cognitional category: an intellectual habit and an ongoing process of conversion.²⁶⁰

2 *Topics in Education: The Role of Science and Education in Developing Wisdom*

In *Topics in Education*, a series of lectures Lonergan gave in Cincinnati in the summer of 1959, Lonergan mentions wisdom under his exploration of “the new learning,” which he regards as a “transformation of fundamental concepts regarding what learning is.”²⁶¹ The novelty of the new learning that must be judiciously embraced by the Catholic educator includes, among other things, the modern differentiation of science that

explicit distinction on Lonergan’s part between wisdom and method in this text, my interpretation is perhaps more literal than Dadosky’s. However, Dadosky agrees that the transposition of wisdom into method “had just begun” in 1959 and was not completely effected until the breakthrough to functional specialization formalized in *Method in Theology*. See “Lonergan on Wisdom,” 66.

²⁵⁹ CWL 23: 157; cf. 129.

²⁶⁰ Interestingly, in this text method is also sometimes conceived in more metaphysical language as a means to an end (CWL 23: 4-5, esp. n. 3). Conceiving of method in this way reveals its intrinsically problematic nature, as it begs the question of the most fitting way to adapt means to an unknown end. While knowledge is being pursued, the to-be-known is unknown, leaving us with the problem of how to discern the means toward an unknown end.

²⁶¹ Bernard J.F. Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 10 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1993), 131. Hereafter *Topics in Education* is cited as CWL 10.

Lonergan incorporates more and more deeply into his notion of theology in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This new differentiation shifts focus from the formal object of a given science to the group of operations the scientist employs to study that object, a forerunner to transcendental method and a theme given further attention in the 1960 course *De systemate et historia*.

Far from simply an incremental addition of new knowledge, modern science is a perfection in the very notion of science. The evolution in the content and especially in the notion of science mimics the genesis of wisdom, whose paradoxical growth was unraveled at greater length months earlier in the *De intellectu et methodo* course. Just as wisdom starts as an incipient view of the whole and moves from this rudimentary base to more detailed delineations of being that solidify through a gradual accumulation of insights, scientific wisdom also relies on a gradual accumulation of insights. As in the Gregorian course, wisdom in *Topics* is a “foundation that lies ahead,”²⁶² and modern scientific wisdom follows this same paradoxical pattern.

Scientific development is a gradual accumulation of insights marked by a movement toward rather than an actual possession of absolute certainty, since knowledge of the universe is always maturing, gathering more information about conditions, the virtually unconditioned, and the nexus between the two. Such scientific development requires the perfection of judgment that is wisdom—a capacity for knowing whether or not there are further relevant questions to answer before assent can be given, and which questions are the most relevant. Here Lonergan continues a major thread of thought, running through *Insight* and suggested by the directives in *De intellectu et methodo*, that

²⁶² CWL 10: 150.

rewrites modern science, especially its loyalty to method, as a new form of wisdom (although not the only one).

Modern science is sapiential: it seeks to know the entire universe of being, everything in relation to everything. “It [science] is closing in upon a wisdom in the measure that its differentiation of being becomes ever fuller, ever more exact, and extends an ever wider embrace.”²⁶³ This new form of wisdom, the “new learning,” is to be embraced by the contemporary educator, because in helping fill out pupils’ knowledge of beings’ interrelationships, she develops her pupils’ view of the whole, first given in wonder, and thereby imparts wisdom.

To help one’s students become familiar with the recurring pattern of their own basic mental operations, Lonergan implies, is the wisest pedagogy, and exactly what allows those same students to rightly order the objects of diverse sciences. For a Catholic philosophy of education to successfully negotiate the new learning by seriously addressing the problem of historicity, it must transcend mere repetition of first principles and true propositions. Rather, it must become a concrete and existential wisdom to support “the individual coming to grips with the meaning *for him* of true propositions.”²⁶⁴

Here wisdom is still referenced along the lines of Thomas as the habit that selects the terms—first and foremost the notion of being—that *intellectus* uses to construct analytic principles, as in many of Lonergan’s earlier works. And the discernment of the correct notion of being from false conceptions is dialectical; even the authentic development of natural science calls for the conversion of the subject, the transformation of the scientist himself (another echo from *De intellectu et methodo*). Because growth in

²⁶³ CWL 10: 153.

²⁶⁴ CWL 10: 21, 130, 157, 160, 261, with quote on 21 (and with Lonergan’s emphasis).

wisdom is dialectical and naturally limited, a Catholic philosophy of education must open itself to the ultimate perfection of God’s wisdom—God’s knowledge of God’s essence and of everything else in that essence, the “total perfect view of the whole.”²⁶⁵

3 *De systemate et historia*: Wisdom as the Master Operatory Habit

In both the spring 1959 and spring 1961 notes for his course *De intellectu et methodo*, Lonergan contrasts the Greek notion of science with the modern one. He asks whether the various methodologies behind modern science can account for the development of these divergent notions and, if so, what such an account might mean for Catholic theology, its claim to be a science, its internal divisions, and its employment of method (or lack thereof). In the spring 1959 course he provides five rules of general method and claims that they can be adapted, through the use of analogy, to the specialized subject matter of theology. But in the 1961 repetition of the same course, he insists that it is not adequate to conceive of science only analogically; the problem of foundations must be solved, all the more so because a “new historical ideal” has entered into contemporary theological ambition.²⁶⁶

In the 1959 course *De systemate et historia*, Lonergan scrutinizes the modern historical ideal itself, especially its claim to be scientific. Lonergan leverages modern history’s scientific attributes—both classical and modern—to transcend the dialectical

²⁶⁵ CWL 10: 150 and 161, with quote on 150.

²⁶⁶ This same point is repeated in “System and History [*De systemate et historia*],” in *Early Works on Theological Method 2*, trans. Michael G. Shields and ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, CWL 23 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013), 357. Also see “Editorial Report on the Handwritten Notes for ‘De systemate et historia’” in *Early Works on Theological Method 2*, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, CWL 23 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013), 314-357.

opposition between Greek science and modern science in favor of a higher synthesis. The classical Greek ideal of science aims at what is abstract, static, universal, and certain, whereas the modern ideal targets the concrete, dynamic, particular, and probable. Modern history exhibits traits of classical science insofar as it is knowledge through causes and seeks the intelligibility in human happenings, and of modern science insofar as it abandons certitude in favor of increasingly probable conclusions gleaned from several different perspectives on the same topic, some of which will invite development, while others reversal.²⁶⁷

Lonergan goes on to elaborate that modern history, as with all modern sciences, conjoins two distinct movements: a movement from below, in the sense data that is inquired into, and a movement from above, in the outworkings of an explanatory system that, while only a working hypothesis, represents the science as it currently is. But the upper operator itself changes as the science progresses as a whole, producing a series of histories (a series of perspectives on the data) giving rise to the question of “whether a system of perspectives can be devised and delineated.”²⁶⁸ Such a system could fruitfully guide the progression of a science, enfolding the development of positions and the reversal of counterpositions into a larger, explicit, regularly occurring system.

When this prospect is applied to the history of philosophy, what is sought is a philosophy of philosophies with the potential not only to foster future philosophical knowledge but also to serve as an explanatory system that unites all of the sciences because it pertains to knowing and the known, issues of maximum universality. Such a philosophy of philosophies would form the starting point for the systematic way or way

²⁶⁷ CWL 23: 235-241 and 249-250.

²⁶⁸ CWL 23: 251-255 and 257, with quote on 257.

of composition. But to help explain different faith claims as well—a task sure to interest Catholic theology—a system distinct from and more foundational than a philosophy of philosophies would be necessary, covering both reason and faith.

Lonergan gives a rough sketch of the diverse shapes such a system might assume. What Lonergan details in the last and perhaps most significant segment of *De systemate et historia*, as well as throughout the handwritten notes from the same 1959 course, is a system of operational potency. Influenced by his reading of Piaget, Lonergan calls such a system the circle of operations.²⁶⁹

3.1 The Circle of Operations

Of course the notion of a concrete set of regularly recurring and mutually interdependent operations is at the heart of *Insight*'s project of cognitive self-appropriation. Each operation has its presupposition in another, and each has its completion in another. Experience presupposes the data of sense and/or consciousness; understanding presupposes experience as that into which inquiry is to be made; judgment presupposes a concept to be verified and either affirmed or denied. The data of sense and consciousness present not as merely random givenness but as patterned, or ordered; experience is illumined by the activity of insight and is given intelligibility by acts of understanding; and acts of understanding become fully substantive and pass into the realm of truth in the rational assent or dissent of judgment. Once all three operations are

²⁶⁹ CWL 23: 269 and 299.

present, interlocking with one another in the full sweep of human intelligence, the circle is closed.²⁷⁰

In *De systemate et historia* Lonergan claims that science—and, by extension, any human endeavor considered to be a science, such as history, philosophy, or theology—can be understood as a circle of operations, resulting in a “dynamics of system” pertinent for understanding not only concrete, dynamic, sensible realities but also abstract, static, intangible ones. Any circle of operations has its principle in an operatory intellectual habit, its actual application in linked and composite cognitive operations, and its terminus in a system of results with the same structure of interrelationships as that of the operations. Understanding each of these three elements of the circle of operations enacted in scientific endeavor, especially as they mirror the fundamental cognitive circle of experiencing-understanding-judging, will prepare us to apply the same concept to wisdom.

What is operated (the operable, or *operabile*) is simply that which can be operated on; it is the presupposition of a finite operation. In relation to a habit, circle, or system, it is material in relation to something more formal, although it may not be a literally physical object. For example, an operable may be the internal experience of memory, operated on by the act of insight. The operation itself is an intellectual act²⁷¹ and is the

²⁷⁰ CWL 23: 311 and 343.

²⁷¹ CWL 23: 299, n. 72, 315, 342. In one place Lonergan also puts the definition of operation more generally by remarking that “every event is a certain operation” (CWL 23: 341). Such generality helps him extend the notion of operation to the sociocultural realm, which involves not just one subject operating but many groups of subjects operating, as well as the ongoing effects of familial relationships and technological, economic, and political processes, as well as the ebb and flow of particular goods in a society (CWL 23: 326-328; 341; 349). In other places, however, he clarifies that the primary notion of operation is that of intellectual act, but not to the exclusion of an “ulterior practical goal” (CWL 23: 342). In either case, the intellectual nature of operation is paramount, for even the distribution of material goods in a society and the various social orders that ensure such a distribution are merely the physical foundation

means by which an operable is transformed into something else, called the result, end, or simply “something operated” (*operatum*). The fundamental circle of human cognition is an example of successively linked operations, since the result of a previous operation is taken as the presupposition—the operable—of the next operation in the series.²⁷² The pattern of experiencing, understanding, and judging is also called composite since none of the operations are identical and, when taken together, none of them form a cyclical series wherein the first operable and the last resultant are identical.²⁷³ Likewise, because the work of scientific investigation involves conjoined tasks that depend on and are fulfilled by others and issues forth new knowledge, scientific operations are both linked and composite.

One of the unique contributions of *De systemate et historia* is Lonergan’s discussion of the operatory habit (*habitus operatorius*). It is the active potency to a circle of operations, with a different operatory habit empowering a different circle and effecting a distinct differentiation of consciousness in the subject.²⁷⁴ Lonergan emphasizes three attributes of an operatory habit. First, in contrast to the Scholastic notion of operative habit, which informs one potency, an operatory habit can reside in many different potencies simultaneously, or even in many different operators, as in a community of scholars or social institution. Next, its purpose is the attainment of truth, a purely intellectual end; its birthplace and playground are the intellectual pattern of experience, in

of the true spiritual heart of a people, which resides at the level of cultural values, reflecting that people’s understanding of itself (CWL 23: 327).

²⁷² CWL 23: 299-301; 341-343; 348.

²⁷³ CWL 23: 301. What is special about composite operations is the structural similarity their results bear to their operations. Thus the relations among the levels of experience, understanding, and judgment are the same structure as the relations among what is experienced, what is understood, and what is judged, setting up the cognitional and metaphysical isomorphism already presented in *Insight*.

²⁷⁴ CWL 23: 305-307 and 348.

which the detached and disinterested desire to know unfolds unencumbered by instrumentality of any kind. Finally, it is known by its operator explicitly; knowledge of an operatory habit occurs *in actu signato*, by objective reflection on its operation. In contrast, common sense understanding is not cognizant of its weaknesses and limitations, because it is, by definition, simply not self-aware.²⁷⁵

The structural identity between the generic template of habit-circle-system implicated in the fundamental circle of cognition implies something intriguing. The functional order among the operations of experiencing-understanding-judging and the isomorphism between each of these cognitive operations and the correspondent metaphysical element is replicated, at some level, in all scientific processes. In this way, the structure and interrelationships of the sciences are derived from the fundamental circle of cognition.

3.1.1 Wisdom as the Master Operatory Habit

But what is the habit that recognizes the turnings of the fundamental circle of cognition? Of course the light of agent intellect—transposed here, as in *Verbum*, as wonder, the desire for knowledge²⁷⁶—is the lever that turns the wheel of cognition and sustains its motion. But the movement of the wheel and an appreciation of its motion are two different things, with wisdom embodying the latter. Wisdom is mentioned only once in the typed and handwritten notes of *De systemate et historia*, in a reprisal of the section on wisdom in *Insight* that describes its dual role as first philosophy and as gift of the

²⁷⁵ CWL 23: 305-307; 317; 341-342.

²⁷⁶ CWL 23: 341.

Holy Spirit, with the addition of a reference to *Insight* itself. To the question of “What is the genesis of wisdom?”, Lonergan replies that the procedure for gaining wisdom is the self-appropriation espoused and taught in *Insight*, with a basic outline of *Insight*’s chapters.²⁷⁷ Because wisdom has already been established in prior texts as the fruit of self-appropriation, we can patch together a rough interpretation of wisdom in *De systemate et historia* by considering its content on self-appropriation, despite the spare references to wisdom in the text itself.

The novelty that *De systemate et historia* brings to Lonergan’s thought on self-appropriation is the notion and language of the circle of operations. In this context wisdom is the personal appropriation of the fundamental circle of cognitive operations as its constant and undeniable action constitutes our very identity as knowers. Understood as its own circle of operations, wisdom takes on the entire cognitive pattern of experiencing-understanding-judging as its operables and transforms it into a self-reflective knowledge of conscious identity: the self-affirmation of the knower, familiar from *Insight*. The ongoing submission of experiencing-understanding-judging—taken together as a symbolic group—to the self-reflective acts of experiencing, understanding, and judging gradually develops a unique and powerful inner self-awareness and self-knowledge.

In other words, wisdom is the ongoing process of appropriating one’s own experiencing, understanding, and judging by experiencing, understanding, and judging one’s own experiencing, understanding and judging. It is what Lonergan will describe in *Method in Theology* as “applying the operations as intentional to the operations as

²⁷⁷ CWL 23: 325.

conscious.”²⁷⁸ In the language of *De systemate et historia*, wisdom is an operatory habit; its operation is the reflection on one’s conscious performance as a knower; its system of results is self-appropriation and its outworkings in a cognitional theory, an epistemology, a metaphysics, and a methodology.

Wisdom is both operatory habit and overseer of all operatory habits. It can be understood as what Lonergan dubs “operatory abstraction”: wisdom abstracts from operables, operations, and resultants of each and every particular cognitive act to identify the structural composition underlying all human thought. As operatory abstraction, wisdom is the higher synthesis that overcomes the seemingly intractable dichotomy between classical and modern science. Wisdom bridges the divide between the contingent and the necessary, the changeable and the eternal, and the particular and the universal, tracing back the two divergent rivers of classical and modern science to their common wellspring in one identical pattern of cognitive operations.²⁷⁹

Rather than idolizing the strengths of either the classical or modern ideal of science to the exclusion of the other, wisdom recognizes that the act of insight grounds the positive attributes of each ideal and unites them. Wisdom sees the pattern shining forth from behind the mottled, multiform silhouettes of a million different habits and a billion operations, and deciphers their ultimate meaning: the yearning of the human mind for being, known in the totality of true judgments, penetrates through its every movement as it strives to reach the Divine Source of all being and all truth.

In summary, as an acquired, natural virtue, wisdom develops only in tandem with the actuation and development of other circles of operations for other tasks, since its job

²⁷⁸ CWL 23: 317, n. 6.

²⁷⁹ CWL 23: 303 and 317.

is to reflect on the performance of other tasks. It grounds the operations that culminate in the self-affirmation of the knower. Like the Thomist wisdom that is metaphysics, the wisdom that is operatory abstraction unites the sciences by providing basic terms and principles. Diverse sciences obtain their material differentiation from diverse operables; their formal differentiation from diverse circles of operations; and their “originating unity” from the fundamental cognitive circle.²⁸⁰

3.2 A New Definition of “Primitive Terms”

If wisdom is understood as the master operatory habit—indeed, as the operatory abstraction that unites all operatory habits—then an additional and elegant aspect of Lonergan’s transposition of Thomist wisdom comes to light. We have already seen that one of the primary notions of wisdom in Aquinas has its context in the trifacta of *intellectus-scientia-sapientia*, where wisdom is the principle of order and judgment with regard to the primitive terms and first principles grasped by understanding. This connotation of wisdom is affirmed by Lonergan in the spring 1959 course *De intellectu et methodo* in connection with foundations. While not negating the essential role of habits in human life,²⁸¹ in *De systemate et historia* Lonergan suggests another, complementary meaning of “terms.”

As often used by both Aquinas and Lonergan, a term denotes the definition of a fundamental, often metaphysical, concept in philosophy. But in the context of a circle of operations, the fundamental terms are the operations themselves; fundamental properties

²⁸⁰ CWL 23: 341-344; 348.

²⁸¹ In fact, in this text Lonergan seems to strongly emphasize the influence of habits, both personal and public, in sociocultural development. See CWL 23: 333-334.

(perhaps analogous to principles) are relations among the operations; and the formal object (perhaps analogous to conclusions) is what is determined through the circle.²⁸² Over and against conceptual definition and employment of “terms,” which faces the notorious difficulty of philosophical disagreement about their content, an operational definition and employment of terms allows for the maximum normativity that human intelligence can afford, because operational terms can be verified through sapiential self-reflection.

By analogy, we can apply the Thomist triad of terms (selected by wisdom) – principles (grasped by understanding) – conclusions (drawn by science) as follows. As the highest principle, the habit that discerns between being and not-being and knows the highest cause, wisdom induces an expansion of consciousness. If the most fundamental terms are the operations of experiencing, understanding, and judging, then the most fundamental principle is the self-affirmation of the knower. And the most fundamental conclusions are those that flow from such self-affirmation and are explored in cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics.

3.3 Horizon and Wisdom as a Circle of Operations

While the finality of the human intellect is to all being and the finality of the human will is to all being and all good, our ability to consistently achieve such lofty ends is greatly constrained by our limited horizons. Our interests are often inappropriately narrowed, our spiritual interiority underdeveloped, and our intersubjectivity stunted, so

²⁸² CWL 23: 344.

that both the objects and subjects that ought to concern us shrink down to the small size of our own biases, just as a material horizon hides what lies beyond. Horizon as a psychological fact is a basic expression of human polymorphism, the ability we have to shape ourselves in any number of different ways.²⁸³

As a general notion, horizon can be thought of as a disposition. More specifically, it can be defined as “the actual capacity a subject has to perform operations,”²⁸⁴ a capacity that marks the limits of that subject’s world. In turn, one’s own world is a product of the tension between the “universal human finality” to all of being and the limits of one’s particular horizon, with the likelihood that legion difficulties will arise when one “world” attempts to communicate with another.

Another direct implication of horizon is the Scholastic principle that whatever is received is received in accordance with the mode of the receiver, so that operables, operatory habits, operations, and systems are all potentially skewed by the disposition of the subject. Not everything can be equally assimilated by the same subject, nor can different subjects assimilate the same operable equally well. Because horizon can narrow one’s consciousness, any number of data can present and yet remain unable to be assimilated. Because consciousness is selective and formative, what is beyond one’s horizon cannot be assimilated.²⁸⁵

In premature systematization, a group of operations attempts to act on everything rather than the set of operables to which it is most suited. For example, in the case of the neurotic, the fear of persecution becomes the heuristic for interpreting all of experience.

²⁸³ CWL 23: 223 and 338-340.

²⁸⁴ CWL 23: 369. Both the general and more specific notions of horizon are found in the spring 1962 course *De methodo theologiae*, discussed below.

²⁸⁵ CWL 23: 261, 271, 315, 328-330, 335, 339-341, 369, 581-582.

And in premature closure, a group of operations takes on too little, so that one's horizon contracts, as in the student of Aquinas who avoids reading the most difficult passages and is thus never challenged by the real possibility that he may be communicating something foreign to her intellectual location.²⁸⁶ Lonergan portrays premature systematization and premature closure as inevitable dangers of all dynamics of system, yet indirectly points to wisdom as the remedy for both problems.

It is by wisdom that we come to reflect on the fundamental pattern of operations characterizing the thrust of our conscious life toward all being and all goodness, moving us closer to the highest natural integration of our rational life possible and incrementally closing the gap between the absolute object of intellect (all being) and the absolute object of will (all good) and what we can effectively achieve (our horizon). Therefore, the distortions of premature systematization and premature closure exhibited by dynamics of systems can be overcome through wisdom, where wisdom is understood as the greatest natural expansion of our horizon as human knowers. And since dynamics of system is a powerful heuristic for analyzing sociocultural development, wisdom as an operatory habit informing the lives of whole communities may have a major role to play in social change.

3.4 A Note on Order

Consciousness is always organized in some fashion, depending on a wide variety of factors. Interest, bias, pattern of experience, habits, emotions, and values are only some of the factors influencing the organization of consciousness on Lonergan's account.

²⁸⁶ CWL 23: 261.

An overriding but understated theme of *De systemate et historia* is the contention that consciousness is much more existential than its reliance on external and internal data might suggest, a claim he also makes for history. Every human endeavor requires the selective, formative, and vitalizing functions of consciousness to order the relevant materials (operables), means (operations), and ends (operated).

Aquinas tells us that wisdom is an intellectual habit that orders all things based on knowledge of the highest cause, and Lonergan tells us that “nothing is absorbed unless it is ordered within one’s consciousness.”²⁸⁷ The limits of the subject’s horizon are coextensive with the reach of the subject’s habits, already suggesting a connection between horizon and wisdom.²⁸⁸ Under the influence of wisdom, consciousness becomes more effective, at every level, at establishing an order among operables, operations, and operated that will best achieve the highest good of the subject, including the universal finality of his intellect to all of being. The connection between the ordering power of wisdom and the organized nature of consciousness explains why wisdom is eminently applicable to such diverse topics as art and the scale of values.²⁸⁹ For artistic potential consists in the ability to apprehend and effect the order of sensible forms such that,

²⁸⁷ CWL 23: 297.

²⁸⁸ CWL 23: 369. The association between horizon and habit is reflected in the very language that Lonergan uses to describe horizon: “All that lie within that horizon are apprehended, desired, and done with relative ease, while one scarcely attends to or is capable of attending to whatever lies beyond it” (CWL 23: 369).

²⁸⁹ It seems that the question of order runs throughout both *De intellectu et methodo* and *De systemate et historia*, with the underlying search for method begging the question of how to order means toward the end of knowledge. The quest for a series of histories (and ultimately a philosophy of philosophies) in *De systemate et historia* is the quest for an ultimate system that would identify the order of a priori elements of human cognition, an order that could then be applied as a method to all future data of history, philosophy, theology, and so on. To this end, even the preconceptual organization of consciousness that occurs in art is relevant, as it may reveal a pattern relevant to methodology.

together, they compose an intelligibility whose meaning is immanent in the ordered materials themselves.²⁹⁰

In addition, the natural human good is an ordered order, comprised of the mutual relationship between particular goods and the social order, and between the social order and values, which are the “superstructural conditions” at the heart of the human good. While social schemes could not emerge without particular goods in place, social schemes sustain the regular recurrence of particular goods, making such vital goods ultimately subordinate. Likewise, the social order itself is subordinate to aesthetic, intellectual, ethical, and religious values. Particular goods are proximately ordered to the emergence of civilization (the social order, or otherwise simply called “the good of order”), and the social order is proximately ordered to the service of values, which are precisely what makes this or that particular social order good. There also exists an order operative in the opposite direction: values are ordered to the flourishing of civilization, and civilization is ordered to the regular recurrence of particular goods.²⁹¹

As a natural, acquired habit, wisdom ensures the smooth subordination of particular goods to social schemes, and of social schemes to the embodiment of values, which function as the highest aspect of the human good. As a supernatural gift, wisdom elevates the entire natural human good, at each and all of its levels, toward the good of union with the divine.

²⁹⁰ CWL 23: 289-299; 329-332; 642-649.

²⁹¹ CWL 23: 326-328.

4 *De intellectu et methodo* (1961) and a 1961 Lecture at Moraga: Wisdom Understood “Methodically”

Perhaps moved by the publication of the 1960 collection of essays *La crise de la raison dans la pensée contemporaine*,²⁹² the spring 1961 reprisal of Lonergan’s *De intellectu et methodo* course at the Gregorian does not add much in the way of fundamentally new material, but it does set some of the same material in a slightly different context, that of the “ideal of reason.”²⁹³ If the history of our intellectual striving can be read as reason’s ongoing, genetic quest for sufficient self-education and self-constitution, then the changing notion of science is a crucial flash point for reason’s development.

Here again, as in the 1959 version of the same course, Lonergan contrasts the Scotist voluntaristic notion of science, with its problematical divorce from concrete existence, with Aquinas’ notion of science as the generation of conclusions from principles. But precisely because Aquinas’ overwhelming concern lay with the world as it is, his notion of science sprung from the living fountain of intellectual habits further informing our native orientation toward truth. The larger point here is that a deductivistic notion of science, according to which true conclusions are viewed as necessarily following from principles without regard to the subject’s mindset or the intensely real implications of the “Euclidean scandal,”²⁹⁴ is only a counterpositional phase in reason’s

²⁹² Lonergan reviewed this book in *Gregorianum* in 1963; his review was republished in *Shorter Papers*, ed. Robert C. Croken, Robert M. Doran, and H. Daniel Monsour, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 20 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2007), 234-236.

²⁹³ See editorial footnote 147 at the end of Chapter One (the spring 1959 *De intellectu et methodo* course) of CWL 23 as well as all of Doran’s editorial report on the archival notes relevant to the spring 1961 *De intellectu et methodo* course (CWL 23: 350-357).

²⁹⁴ The “Euclidean scandal” refers to the fact that entirely different but equally valid series of diverse systems can be shown to necessarily follow from different sets of principles, a fact that, according to Lonergan, went unnoticed for an extremely long time (CWL 23: 354-355).

self-understanding and is, in fact, opposed to Aquinas' more profound grasp of science as stemming from acts of understanding, of insight.

The schematic notes from the 1961 *De intellectu et methodo* also mirror *Insight's* paradigm of wisdom as constituting both the first principle of philosophy and a gift of the Holy Spirit. In Lonergan's handwriting we find an arrow pointing from "the principle of philosophy" to "epistemology" and another pointing from the same to the phrase "wisdom grows in time."²⁹⁵ Lonergan's denotation of wisdom as epistemology reminds us, first, of the epistemological aspect of wisdom as embodied by intellectual conversion, as explored incipiently in *Verbum* but explicitly in *Insight*. And his denotation of wisdom as developing reminds us of his justification in the 1959 course of wisdom as a moving foundation. His mention of wisdom in these two veins suggests that Lonergan in 1961 was retaining his previous insight into the existence of an epistemological function to wisdom while beginning to allow a different, additional function for wisdom to surface—a foundational function that is distinct from metaphysics and strangely connected with the emergence of method, a connection with depths still to be plumbed.

The summer of 1961 found Lonergan delivering a set of lectures on *Insight* at St. Mary's College in Moraga, California. In a lecture entitled "Wisdom and Self-Appropriation," he repeats much of the same material on wisdom as in *Insight*, explicitly claiming, once again, that self-appropriation, as a source of wisdom, is the solution to the epistemological problem. Even for scholastics, the epistemological problem is not an abstract query of whether knowledge exists but the concrete, personal, and radical investigation of how to acquire wisdom. This investigation cannot be completed by

²⁹⁵ CWL 23: 354.

deducing from self-evident truths, for every truth in its precise meaning depends on a determinate notion of *ens*, and the correct notion of *ens* is the function of wisdom.

In handwritten scribble at the end of the lecture notes, Lonergan seems to indicate that wisdom's familiar Thomist anthem—*omnia ordinat et omnia iudicat*—can be accepted either in principle, or “methodically.” To understand wise order and wise judgment “methodically” is to appropriate oneself as a knower, attending to how one comes to actually know reality and the order in reality, rather than analytically parsing out the need for an intellectual habit to do so. The self-appropriating subject is ultimate because she is the source of meaning; her wisdom discerns being. In 1961, however, the relationship between self-appropriation as the “methodical genesis of the wisdom on which all philosophy depends”²⁹⁶ and the fundamental set of cognitive operations (including decision) that will become the transcendental method of 1972 is not yet forged in a strong and formal sense.

5 *De methodo theologiae* (Spring 1962) and Regis College Institute “On the Method of Theology” (Summer 1962): Wisdom and Method Closer Still

In the spring 1962 course *De methodo theologiae* at the Gregorian University, Lonergan turns his attention to theological method proper. Whereas *De systemate et historia* spoke of circles of operations springing from an operatory habit residing in many subjects, here in the spring of 1962 he speaks of complete groups of combinations of differentiated operations. The emphasis is on the collaboration among different combinations of operations toward a common aim—the integration of the intelligible

²⁹⁶ From “Wisdom and Self-Appropriation,” a lecture Lonergan gave on *Insight* in the summer of 1961 at St. Mary's College in Moraga, California. See Archive Entry 18740DTE060, 4, at <https://www.bernardlonergan.com/archiveitem.php?id=1214>. Accessed on January 31, 2019.

world (which includes doctrines and theology), the interior subject, and the visible world (the world of common sense and dramatic-practical life, including community). Within such an integration is to be resolved the dichotomy between theology conceived as an ideal, eternally immutable science of the intelligible world and theology conceived as a positivist study of changeable, visible tendencies in history.²⁹⁷

In addition to this first problematic, in the spring 1962 course *De methodo theologiae* Lonergan also discusses a second problematic, concerned with theology as a mediated and subalternate science and its relation to the other sciences. Lonergan presents much of the same core material, though in a slightly different format, at the Regis College institute on theological method in the summer of 1962, and so these texts will be analyzed in tandem with one another.²⁹⁸

He begins both courses by explaining the goal of methodology. Method deals immediately with operations, and only mediately (through operations) with subjects and objects. The material object is what a science studies; the formal object is the specific angle from which it is studied. Theology's material object is God, but its formal object is God as revealed in the meaning of God's word and the order of the Body of Christ. De facto formal objects can be considered under the *ratione* of being grasped in and through a certain group of combinations of differentiated operations.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁷ "The Method of Theology [*De methodo theologiae*]," in *Early Works on Theological Method 2*, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, CWL 23 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013), 365-366, especially ed. n. 5, and 429-445.

²⁹⁸ See the "Regis College Institute 'On the Method of Theology,' 9-20 July 1962," in *Early Works on Theological Method 1*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken, CWL 22 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2010), 363, 379, 381, 391-393.

²⁹⁹ CWL 23: 379. (De iure formal objects are those that are expressed in a definition, or perfectly reached through an "ideal scientific habit.") A differentiation is simply an adaptation (*accommodatio*) of an operation to its object, so that in place of one operation inefficiently aimed at multiple different objects, there come to be many operations, each subtly adapted to its particular object. See CWL 23: 367.

Individual objects are known by a determinate group of operations, but a world is attained by a group of combinations of differentiated operations. A world is simply a group of objects, either actually known or (even more so) potentially known; it can also be conceived as a field of possible objects. Method encompasses all possibilities of operations and thus can join together numerous and multifarious worlds, since it comprehends them at their “most radical point,” in and through the operations involved in knowing these worlds.³⁰⁰

5.1 “A Wisdom that Regards *All Things*”: Wisdom as the Integration of Differentiated Worlds

Eventually the process by which lower groups of operations become differentiated into new totalities—a new group of groups—runs up against ultimate oppositions, what Lonergan calls the fundamental antitheses of differentiated worlds. Such radical oppositions form an example of what Doran calls a dialectic of contraries, a concrete unity of opposed principles, where the principles are functionally interdependent and are to be “affirmed, strengthened, and assumed” rather than chosen one over against the other in an absolute and total rejection.³⁰¹

Modes of operations ground differentiations (adaptations) of consciousness, and differentiations of consciousness ground differentiations in worlds. And so worlds are ultimately distinguished based on the subject’s modes of operations. Accordingly, worlds are best defined and described in terms of the operations underlying them.

³⁰⁰ CWL 22: 42, 53, 56-57, 60; CWL 23: 403.

³⁰¹ Robert M. Doran, SJ, *What Is Systematic Theology?* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2005), 168-169, 173-174, 184-187, with the quote appearing on 168.

The sacred world is defined as that which is never immediate. Known only mediately and analogously, the sacred lives beyond the direct reach of human operations; it is intimated in symbols and only dimly flickers within the horizon of the subject. It is the ultimate desire and the ultimate end of human operation, opposed to the proximate (direct) desire and goal, which is the profane world. The profane world is the presented and known domain, the realm of nature as it is known by philosophy, science, and so on. It is wholly circumscribed within the subject's horizon; it is within the ambit, indeed within the control, of intelligent and reasonable operations. The root of the radical antithesis between the sacred and profane worlds lies in the dynamism of consciousness: we are always reaching for what is beyond our grasp.³⁰²

The second radical antithesis is between the outer and inner worlds, an opposition rooted in the very structure of consciousness: "...the subject is never conscious unless he is dealing with some object, but the subject as subject never is an object."³⁰³ The inner world is the field of interiority, of subject as subject, of self-presence. The world of interiority is present even when the subject is not thinking of self. "The fundamental element to interiority is that it is interior; it is always there, immediate, given."³⁰⁴ When the subject (or anything else) is apprehended, desired, or chosen, we cross over into the outer world, the field of objectification.³⁰⁵

Finally, on Lonergan's account consciousness is specialized in a fundamental way in the radical antithesis between theory (science) and common sense. Science as a differentiation in the subject is a technical development of consciousness rarely achieved

³⁰² CWL 22: 43-46 and 60; CWL 23: 395-397 and 405.

³⁰³ CWL 22: 60; CWL 23: 405.

³⁰⁴ CWL 22: 287.

³⁰⁵ CWL 22: 46-49 and 52; CWL 23: 391 and 397-399. Importantly, for an object to be present to the subject, the subject must first be present to herself.

by large swathes of a society. Science and common sense differ dramatically in end, object, language, and structure (ordering of the conscious flow). Science aims at truth in and for itself, common sense aims at truth for its practical application. Science regards things as they are related to each other, common sense regards things as they are related to our own senses and desires. Science employs a technical vocabulary and insists on logic and methodology, common sense employs everyday terms and persuades with rhetoric. Science subordinates all other faculties to intellect in its pursuit of truth. Common sense, in its pursuit of what is practically useful, subordinates intellect as only one part of the dramatic-practical subject deciding what to do and say in the world of everyday living. For common sense is not only the immediate apprehension of the visible world but also the world of community in which other subjects are considered in relation to self.³⁰⁶

Rather than merely suppressing the real and contradictory opposition between the three antitheses, a true integration of such divergent worlds demands an oscillation between them. Lonergan suggests that the contradiction among worlds can be solved by “a certain temporal oscillation” in which a person attends to the visible world of common sense at one time, to the intelligible world of science at another (if at all), to the world of interiority at yet another, and to the sacred world at yet another still.³⁰⁷ As Lonergan

³⁰⁶ CWL 22: 49-55 and 60; CWL 23: 401-407 and 433.

³⁰⁷ CWL 23: 405 and 431. No one is perfectly integrated except for God, who in one and the same act understands God’s self and in that same comprehension knows everything that God can do (thus all possibilities) as well as everything God does (thus all actualities) (cf. CWL 22: 66-67; CWL 23: 431). In contrast, as creatures we must content ourselves with a continuous dynamic cycle of successive differentiations and integrations. We move toward the infinite, but those motions are composite, gradual, slow, and oscillatory.

styles it in the summer 1962 institute at Regis College, “Integration is a matter of being able to move coherently from one world to another, of being able to give each its due.”³⁰⁸

Differentiations of consciousness must admit of an order that can be discovered by wisdom and then intentionally applied to everything from science to the vicissitudes of concrete living. Worlds are integrated through continuous, dynamic oscillations, which are to be made according to “prudent judgment,” or practical wisdom. Similar to the modern notion of science, prudence as a practical intellectual virtue judges the changeable, the contingent, the particular, and the *per accidens*. Similar to the Aristotelian notion of science, wisdom as a speculative intellectual virtue judges everything in reference to and against the standard of the eternal, the necessary, the universal, and the *per se*. But they are both wisdom. And in order for the authentic elements of ancient science not to be abandoned and the accurate elements of modern science not to be admitted in an erroneous manner, a “wisdom that regards *all things*” must be cultivated.³⁰⁹

Especially now that theology as a whole must attend to the empirical as well as the eternal, but still for the sake of intellectual truth (truth sought for its own sake), wisdom must regard all things. “Regard for all things” includes knowing empirical realities for the sake of truth itself, not for some practical end, as in common sense. The

³⁰⁸ CWL 22: 66.

³⁰⁹ CWL 22: 100-108, especially 107-108; CWL 23: 413, 433, 441, 462-463, 675, with quote on 463 (emphasis his). The exact same point is repeated in the 1968 Boston College summer institute on theological method: “We have to get wisdom and prudence together” (CWL 22: 470). The 1964 Georgetown University summer institute on theological method also reiterates the same point, but with an eye toward modern philosophy: modern philosophy is concerned less with speculative wisdom as with the realm of prudence, mirroring the decline in the ancient discontinuity between wisdom and prudence, necessity and contingency. See “Avery Cardinal Dulles’s Notes for Lonergan’s ‘A Five-Day Institute: The Method of Theology,’ 13-17 July 1964, Georgetown University,” in *Early Works on Theological Method 1*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken, CWL 22 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2010), 390. What Lonergan is attempting to accomplish for the contemporary state of theology is a marriage between prudence (knowledge of de facto realities) and speculative wisdom (knowledge of necessary realities).

“wisdom that regards *all things*” appears to be a new type of wisdom, distinct from but not opposed to Aquinas’ notion of wisdom as an intellectual habit. It is neither the speculative wisdom nor the practical wisdom of Aristotle and Aquinas, but a contemporary combination of both that also bears similarity to Newman’s illative sense.³¹⁰

5.2 Wisdom as Self-Appropriation: A Reprise

Most importantly, in the context of the spring 1962 *De methodo theologiae* course and the summer 1962 Regis College institute on theological method, it is the work of the “wisdom that regards *all things*,” including the workings of subjectivity, to order and integrate differentiations of consciousness. The integrating task of wisdom lies primarily on the side of the subject, since it is not so much the worlds themselves as it is the groups of operations that must be integrated.³¹¹ If interiority is the “place” from which one is able to move more effectively among other worlds by appropriating the operations that make them, then self-presence—more specifically, self-appropriation³¹²—holds a certain priority among the various differentiations. Self-appropriation itself “is a medium by

³¹⁰ CWL 22: 289. Lonergan interprets Newman’s illative sense as referring to the potentialities of intellectual light insofar as they exceed what can be explicitly laid out by either logic or method. The illative sense is an expert grasp of the whole context that accounts for the complexities of changeable, contingent, particular, de facto realities. The illative sense is difficult to objectify and communicate but it is essentially an outgrowth of the inchoate but ordered view of the whole that is wisdom (CWL 22: 100-108, especially 100-104 and 372 and CWL 23: 453-455 and 463).

³¹¹ CWL 23: 413. Likewise, it is not primarily the objects of a particular science that need to be integrated as it is the subject who is performing the operations that come to know these objects (CWL 22: 316).

³¹² Because self-presence (interiority) exists regardless of whether or not the subject attends to it but self-appropriation necessitates this attention, there is a subtle but certain distinction between self-presence and self-appropriation. It does appear, however, that at times Lonergan uses the two terms interchangeably in the spring 1962 *De methodo theologiae* course. In Discussions 1 and 2 of the summer 1962 Regis College institute on theological method, Lonergan stresses that interiority and subjectivity generally mean the same thing, although the word “subjectivity” is sometimes associated with false philosophies of the subject, such as immanentism (CWL 22: 268-269 and 287).

which common sense is known reflectively, and by which the world known by common sense, the intelligible world, and the world of interiority are explored in a methodical way.”³¹³

And so the development in Lonergan’s thought that identifies wisdom with self-appropriation, beginning in *Verbum* and continuing into *Insight*, finds a new home in 1962. In particular, wisdom as self-appropriation can be understood in this text as the preconceptual foundation that lies at the basis of all worlds and thus can reduce mutually contradictory spheres of thought to a “prior common root.” For all questions intend intelligibility, whether per se or per accidens intelligibility, and all concepts are implicitly concepts of being. It appears that the intention of all questions toward being integrates the ancient notion of science with the modern one, and the implicit connection to being shared by all concepts integrates the content of theology with the content of the other sciences.³¹⁴

Lonergan explicitly claims that wise judgment orders and integrates oscillations between worlds, and yet he also states that method orders and integrates differentiations of consciousness, which is paramount to saying the same thing. So which is it? It is one and both at the same time, since as we will see shortly, method and wisdom appear to be almost identical in *De methodo theologiae*, at least in the spring and summer 1962 versions.

³¹³ CWL 23: 511.

³¹⁴ CWL 22: 126-129; CWL 23: 495-501. Lonergan himself draws the connection of the intention of being in all questions, all preconceptual acts of understanding, and all concepts to the integration of ancient and modern notions of science, but I am extending it to the second problematic. Theological knowledge and all other scientific knowledge are both within being, just as Lonergan notes that the meaning of the word of God and the order of the Body of Christ are not generically different from the meanings and orders found in other sciences (CWL 23: 391-393).

5.3 Wisdom as Method's Younger Sister

Wisdom orders all things and judges all things because it “expresses the supreme principle itself, namely our intellectual light, and not that bare light by itself but rather as it extends to and is applied to all things.”³¹⁵ But Lonergan insists that methodology must also be an objective expression and manifestation of intellectual light, because it treats the very way concepts are generated and judgments are formed.³¹⁶ As in *De intellectu et methodo*, here Lonergan once again draws a bold parallel between wisdom and method, although not exactly an absolute identification. In our analysis of *De methodo theologiae* that follows, we can relate wisdom to method under the three headings of function, characteristics, and relationship to interiority.

5.3.1 Functions of Wisdom and Method

First, it is clear that while method does everything that wisdom does, such as order worlds, wisdom does not perform all of the same functions as method. In essence, in this spring 1962 course method continues to take over many of the functions of wisdom, with method not only ordering (as in *De intellectu et methodo*) but also judging rightly. Just as importantly, wisdom and method share many of the same characteristics, with Lonergan choosing to underscore the relevance of method's characteristics for theology while still maintaining the significance of the traditional Thomist notion of

³¹⁵ CWL 23: 457.

³¹⁶ CWL 23: 453.

wisdom for conceiving of systematic theology. Finally, in their mutual relationship to interiority, wisdom and method are practically identical.

5.3.1a The Ordering Functions of Wisdom and Method

As already begun in the fall 1959 course *De intellectu et methodo*, Lonergan continues to shift the ordering function of wisdom to method in the spring 1962 course *De methodo theologiae*. In the case of wisdom said simply (*simpliciter*), the ultimate criterion of ordering, on the objective side, is relation to the highest cause. On the side of the subject, we have already seen that in *Verbum* Lonergan follows Aquinas' position that we possess an innate (although undifferentiated) grasp of the whole of being, given in intellectual light. Coelho calls this grasp "inchoate wisdom" and describes it as a permanent, universal, and immutable anticipation of the unity of being. This apprehension, in and of itself, is already an ordered view of the whole.³¹⁷

This inchoate order, through becoming further differentiated and refined within the subject, goes on to order and judge all things.³¹⁸ Likewise, Lonergan states in *De methodo theologiae* that there is an "ordering wisdom" that works in the background of cognitional process, moving us from data to concepts, syntheses, theories, and systems. Similar to the subjective ordering provided by wisdom, method orders based on the interrelations among worlds and the operations that establish these worlds. The order among worlds discerned by method is discussed by Lonergan in terms of exigence

³¹⁷ CWL 22: 102; CWL 23: 627.

³¹⁸ See "Appendix 1: Notion and Problem of Method," a set of undated notes roughly corresponding to the first chapter of the spring 1959 "Understanding and Method" (*De intellectu et methodo*) course, in *Early Works on Theological Method 2*, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, CWL 23 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013), 627.

(demand), withdrawal, return, and mediation (the modification that one world effects on another).³¹⁹

For example, the stark divergences between common sense and theoretical thought processes provoke something of an internal crisis as the subject wonders about the source of their opposing viewpoints and their self-same claim to know what is most important about reality. Just as the systematic exigence draws the thinker into the intelligible world, the critical exigence pulls us into the world of interiority where cognitive acts are observed, related to one another, and understood in relation to the objects they know or can know. And so the world of interiority is a medium by which common sense and science are both known reflectively in terms of their operations.³²⁰

From the world of interiority one can return to the intelligible world to bring the distinctions learned in interiority to bear on more accurate and precise theories of subjectivity. In fact, movement into interiority can mediate any and all theory by identifying in any science the fundamental operations necessarily implied in knowing anything. And the self-understanding achieved in interiority furnishes a basic but profound analogy for understanding one's community "at the whole series of stages of their historical development."³²¹ In fact, any notion of development in history necessitates attention to different degrees of wisdom—different degrees of self-appropriation—in various individuals and schools of thought throughout time. And since

³¹⁹ CWL 22: 284-289; CWL 23: 467.

³²⁰ CWL 23: 487; 507; 511.

³²¹ CWL 22: 67 and 342, with quote on 67. In fact, all historical development can be read through the lens of mediation, one world's repercussions on another. CWL 22: 53-57, especially 55, and 67.

all desire is ultimately desire of God, interiority, common sense, and science are all proximate worlds that mediate the ultimate world of the sacred, of divine wisdom.³²²

But one can also respond to the call of method, through which the world of interiority, the commonsense world, and the intelligible world are all placed in the order just described, through the interrelations of their operations. The methodical exigence “makes the cognitional process used in knowing the visible or intelligible or interior world to be known reflectively and, further, makes this reflective knowledge govern and order any further operations to be performed in knowing these worlds.”³²³ The fundamental notion of method is most apparent in the return from interiority to the world of theory and the world of community. In the end, all development mediates the subject, since the operations pertaining to each world “produce and manifest ourselves,”³²⁴ leading to greater self-knowledge, to greater wisdom.

5.3.1b The Judging Functions of Wisdom and Method

In *De intellectu et methodo*, method assists us in using our powers of judgment, which wisdom rectifies. Method is no substitute for right judgment, and wisdom is still the intellectual habit empowering right judgment. But in *De methodo theologiae*, methodology is said to involve the proper way to make judgments.³²⁵ Lonergan still provides an analysis of wisdom in terms of the nature of judgment, sufficient evidence,

³²² CWL 22: 53-57; 60; 288-289. Lonergan speaks of there being a transcendental exigence in the Boston College institute on theological method in the summer of 1968, but that term does not seem to appear either in the *De methodo theologiae* course of spring 1962 at the Gregorian nor in the Regis College institute “On the Method of Theology” of summer 1962.

³²³ CWL 23: 511.

³²⁴ CWL 22: 59-60.

³²⁵ CWL 23: 453.

the virtually unconditioned, different types of objectivity, and different types of *sapientia*. But besides his emphasis on a “wisdom that regards *all things*,” none of the material is novel, or even particularly well-integrated with his thoughts on method, which in fact take center stage.

In fact, Lonergan allots to wisdom the task of ensuring that theology’s new differentiation as a modern science does not relinquish certainty. However, his analysis of how wisdom accomplishes such a task is relatively superficial, repeating material on wisdom almost verbatim from other courses (especially *De intellectu et methodo*) without much integration of wisdom’s epistemological function as interiority or actual explanation of how wisdom provides certainty (apart from its status as the intellectual virtue of right judgment).

What is noteworthy here is not that Lonergan drops out any mention of wisdom as right judgment—he certainly does not—but that he seems to ascribe to method a more significant role in judgment than before. In *De intellectu et methodo*, the third and fourth directives of method (reverse counterpositions and develop positions) rely on judgment to sort out position from counterposition. And the fifth directive of method exhorts us to accept responsibility for judging, with the reminder that wisdom judges all things rightly.³²⁶ In *De methodo theologiae*, judgment enters into methodology through its dialectical function, which judges regarding the authenticity of developments and the inauthenticity of regressions, reducing them to their correspondent cognitive acts.³²⁷ This dialectical function enters into systematic theology as well, which must be able to

³²⁶ CWL 23: 139-155.

³²⁷ CWL 23: 383-385, 511, 583.

critically and methodically parse out correct positions from counterpositions resulting from theologians' inauthenticity.³²⁸

5.3.1c The Unifying Functions of Wisdom and Method

Finally, method plays an explicit role in bringing unity to both object and subject, and wisdom does the same. It is only from the world of interiority that the twofold split in object and subject, introduced by the dichotomy between the visible world of common sense and the intelligible world of science, can be overcome. The subject herself is divided between these two worlds, since she cannot live in both patterns of consciousness at the same time. The divide in the subject is overcome through the methodological exigence. By withdrawing from the intelligible and visible worlds into the world of interiority, where the subject is aware of his own cognitive acts as well as various patterns of his own consciousness, he discovers the unity underlying all patterns of consciousness: the invariable pattern of experiencing, understanding, and judging that is characteristic of all cognition. If wisdom is understood as the appropriation of rational interiority and thus as almost identical with method, then the unifying power of wisdom with regard to the subject must be the same or at least similar to that of method. But the unifying function of wisdom on the side of the subject is not discussed by Lonergan in this text; rather, the power of wisdom to unify the object is emphasized.³²⁹

The dichotomy between the visible world and the intelligible world resides in the object inasmuch as the dramatic pattern and the intellectual pattern target different

³²⁸ CWL 22: 192-197; CWL 23: 589.

³²⁹ CWL 22: 54 and 138-140; CWL 23: 509.

concerns. Method recognizes the objective unity of knowledge by making its own proper object the totality of being, conceived in and through the framework of operations by which being is known.³³⁰ Each and every cognitional process is unified in having either the intention or the actual achievement of a common end: the assent or dissent of judgment, “It is” or “It is not.” The methodological exigence brings this common end to light in its awareness of the way all cognitional process heads toward judgment, and it transcends the world of interiority once truth is reached. The self-appropriated subject knows the world of interiority, the visible world, and the intelligible world as all contained within being; she knows that they are all the same world in their relation to *ens*, only apprehended differently. And so methodological consideration covers all things, just as the analogy of being does.³³¹

Whereas method orders all being according to the operations through which being is known, and according to the interrelations of those operations, wisdom orders all being in terms of relation to the highest cause. The unity provided by the traditional Thomist notion of wisdom is primarily an objective unity.

The conception of wisdom espoused by Lonergan in his works on theological method from 1962 is not necessarily more restrained than in his earlier works; rather, his conception of what method does and can do is more expansive. As mentioned, wisdom in these texts might be imagined as method’s younger sister; as will be clear directly below in our discussion of their respective characteristics, wisdom can do some of what method can, but not everything.

³³⁰ CWL 22: 27; CWL 23: 383 and 507.

³³¹ CWL 22: 131-136; CWL 23: 499-501 and 507-509.

5.3.2 Characteristics of Transcendental Method and Wisdom

Lonergan lists eight attributes of method: comparative, genetic, dialectical, one, synthetic, concrete, historical-critical, and transcendental.³³² The first three are isomorphic with the levels of experiencing, understanding, and judging, and are illustrated by examples from early Trinitarian thought. Method is comparative: it appeals to the empirical element in things to discover similarities and differences. It is genetic inasmuch as it seeks to understand the differences by attending to a chronological series of developments and making explicit what was implicit in previous tradition. Method is dialectical: it judges concerning all of these changes and reduces them to the presence or absence of conversion and attempts to pin down exactly when a loss of authenticity or a return to authenticity occurred. Its dialectical aspect acknowledges an objective irrational element in the history around a doctrine that went awry and thus introduces the notion of normativity, allowing us to transition from the history of a doctrine to the normativity of the doctrine itself. Wisdom is also dialectical insofar as it judges all thing rightly, separating the wheat from the chaff.

Because it is genetic and dialectical, method is also synthetic—it puts things together and originates the truth. Wisdom is also synthetic. In the context of a single field of knowledge, it is a synthetic overview of all knowledge in that field, and in the context

³³² The spring 1963 *De methodo theologiae* and fall-winter 1963-1964 *De methodo theologiae* courses add “organic” (also termed “synthetic-organic”) to this list. See CWL 23: 383, n. 29; “The Method of Theology [*De methodo theologiae*] Spring 1963: Editorial Reconstruction,” in *Early Works on Theological Method 3*, tr. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 24 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013), 20, 26, 32, 59; and “The Method of Theology [*De methodo theologiae*] Fall and Winter 1963-64: Editorial Reconstruction,” in *Early Works on Theological Method 3*, tr. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 24 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013), 158. Hereafter *Early Works on Theological Method 3* is cited as CWL 24.

of all being, it is an all-encompassing comprehension of the whole. Method is concrete, as it can encompass the most minute details of the here and the now. Likewise, if the marriage of prudence and speculative wisdom generates a new “wisdom regarding *all things*,” then wisdom is certainly concrete, as the concrete refers to all of being.

Method and wisdom are both unifying (“one”). Whereas wisdom orders all being in terms of relation to the highest cause, method orders all being according to the operations through which being is known, and according to the interrelations of those operations. In either case, their object is the entirety of all that can be humanly known.³³³ Method is historical-critical because it puts under the microscope not only the operations of past communities but also of current historians.

Method is also transcendental insofar as it treats operations of intellect and will, whose objects are the transcendentals (being, the true, the good). But it is transcendental in another sense. It adverts more intently to combinations of operations than single operations, and correspondent to combinations of operations is a parallel in the combination of things operated.

And so method takes its stand on the isomorphism between cognitional theory and metaphysics. If human knowledge of a proportionate object is reached through a composite process of experience, understanding, and judgment, it follows that the proportionate object itself is a form existing in matter. The most fundamental form of wisdom, a primitively ordered apprehension of the unity of being that becomes further differentiated as one learns, is also transcendental in this sense. Inchoate wisdom’s own primitive order corresponds to the order in things that it will discover as it continues to

³³³ CWL 23: 457, 501, 507-511.

grow. However, in contrast to the far-ranging aspects of method, the attributes ascribed to wisdom are relatively limited.³³⁴

5.3.3 Wisdom as Interiority and Method as Interiority

In their mutual relationship to interiority, wisdom and method are practically identical. The foundations for method are forged in interiority, spurred on by the critical exigence. “Insofar as there is the self-appropriation of the subject, insofar as he becomes clearly and distinctly aware of his operations, there arises method.”³³⁵ Method is the mediation of the world of theory and the world of community by interiority, the world of the subject operating as subject. All methodology is inevitably formed in terms of the subject, since method is the intellectual aspect of interiority—appropriating what one is doing when one is knowing. In addition to being a function of interiority, method is also a tool for growing in interiority, since it intentionally extends self-presence to the operations constitutive of other worlds.³³⁶

Rational self-appropriation is the intellectual aspect of interiority. If wisdom is transposed generally as rational self-appropriation in *Verbum* and *Insight* and method is simply the practical application of rational self-appropriation toward the gaining of knowledge in *De methodo theologiae*, then wisdom and method appear to hold the selfsame position relative to rational interiority. This inference is upheld in Discussion 2 of the summer 1962 Regis College institute on theological method when Lonergan is

³³⁴ CWL 22: 24-29; CWL 23: 381-387.

³³⁵ CWL 22: 138-140 and 284, with quote on 138.

³³⁶ CWL 22: 273 and 290-291. The other aspect of interiority is existential: it critiques the subject in himself or herself and does so along the lines of horizon, authenticity, conversion, judgments of value, and so on.

asked, “Can you relate interiority to St Thomas’s two kinds of wisdom?” He responds that there are two wisdoms in St. Thomas, wisdom as construed by Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and wisdom as construed as a gift of the Holy Spirit, a couplet repeated from *Insight*.³³⁷ The first kind of wisdom, transposed by Lonergan as rational self-appropriation, is the very structure of the subject laid out in his cognitional theory. Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ notion of wisdom is one of objective order; Lonergan’s interiority analysis is a wisdom of the subject.³³⁸

While not denying the possibility and relevance of objective order, Lonergan’s transposition of *sapientia* is first and foremost the identification of an order, or structure, in the subject. As a subjective order, wisdom helps us ground and explain the proportion among elements of objective order.³³⁹ The new wisdom principally studies the order among cognitive operations and how they develop differently in different individuals; therefore, it is particularly well-suited to exploring historical development. “That type of extension of the notion of wisdom is necessary if we are going to go systematically into history and into notions of development in history.”³⁴⁰

³³⁷ CWL 22: 288-290. For Lonergan’s possible transposition of the gift of wisdom into the terms of interiority, see below.

³³⁸ Cf. the passage from “Wisdom and Self-Appropriation,” a lecture Lonergan gave on *Insight* in the summer of 1961 at St. Mary’s College in Moraga, California: “One tackles wisdom in its principle, not on the side of the all to be ordered and judged, but on the side of the subject that orders and judges. One reaches the order of all, through the principle of that order.” (See Archive Entry 18740DTE060, 1, emphasis his, at <https://www.bernardlonergan.com/archiveitem.php?id=1214>. Accessed on January 30, 2019.)

³³⁹ CWL 22: 67 and 288-291. CWL 22: 67: “By knowing the operations, one can fix, clarify, and eliminate the confusions that are involved in theoretical objects, and the theory throws light on the world of community.”

³⁴⁰ CWL 22: 289.

The emergence of interiority, or self-appropriation, as a central category in Lonergan's work predates that of transcendental method.³⁴¹ As will be seen most clearly in *Method in Theology*, Lonergan understands transcendental method as the proper outworking of (among other things) the self-affirmation of the knower described and enacted in *Insight*. If the epistemological aspect of wisdom is transposed in *Insight* as the self-affirmation of the knower, we can reasonably anticipate that the various functions of wisdom will be taken over, in whole or in part, by the role of transcendental method. But that transposition remains to be discerned, especially in regard to the increasing attention Lonergan lends to conversion in his later corpus. What is exceedingly clear in the early 1960s is the fact that wisdom and method are both identical with the appropriation of rational interiority. So it makes sense that wisdom and method are almost identical concepts at this point in Lonergan's development. They are distinguished, however, by the differences in their respective functions and characteristics, as outlined above.

5.3.4 Wisdom and Conversion

More specifically, we saw in *De systemate et historia* that Lonergan obliquely presents wisdom as the remedy to limitations of horizon; here in *De methodo theologiae* he indirectly picks up on this same thread, remarking that horizon is shifted to the utmost through conversion. Surely the subject's horizon is broadened greatly when reflecting upon the operations themselves, as in the case of wisdom's role as master operatory habit. But conversion is more than a simple expansion of horizon: it is "a change in the very

³⁴¹ According to Coelho, the term "transcendental method" is not used until the spring 1962 *De methodo theologiae* course. See *Hermeneutics and Method*, 116, and CWL 23: 385.

interiority of the subject.”³⁴² It is a reorganization of the subject’s consciousness, of the subject’s world. If conversion is a fundamental reordering, not only of the subject’s relation to objects, but also of the subject’s basic orientation in life, then wisdom as ordering must have a part to play in the process of conversion, but this relationship is not explicitly explored in any of Lonergan’s work from the late 1950s and early 1960s.³⁴³

In *De systemate et historia*, the limitations of horizon posed by premature systematization and premature closure were implicitly set in opposition against the horizon-opening power of wisdom. In *De methodo theologiae* this problematic is transposed into an explicitly theological context. Inasmuch as there is an absence of authenticity—that is, a lack of conversion—the horizon of the receiver will distort the ongoing thematization of faith that is theology, resulting in aberrant understandings of doctrine and of theology itself. And so wisdom and conversion are both touted, albeit indirectly, as solutions to troublesome dynamics of systems and distorted reception of the meaning of the word of God and the order of the Body of Christ.

The more explicit and forceful connection, however, lies in the relationship between conversion and method. For the dialectical function of method not only reduces the authenticity of developments and the inauthenticity of regressions to their correspondent cognitive acts; it also reduces these cognitive acts to the authenticity or

³⁴² CWL 23: 371-373, with quote on 373.

³⁴³ In an item in the Lonergan Archive that would have been composed around the same time as the early part of the spring 1962 *De methodo theologiae* course, Lonergan defines orientation as the direction in which the subject’s exercise of freedom tends. In and of itself, one’s orientation is “an original and originating value” that can be absent, as in the inauthentic drifter, and restored by conversion. See “Appendix 2: Items Related to ‘De Methodo Theologiae,’” in *Early Works on Theological Method 2*, trans. Michael G. Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, CWL 23 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013), 689.

inauthenticity of the whole subject in terms of conversion or lack of conversion, with conversion understood as religious, moral, and intellectual.³⁴⁴

5.4 Theology as Wisdom in *De methodo theologiae* (Spring 1962) and the Regis College Institute “On the Method of Theology” (Summer 1962)

The highest instance of *sapientia simplicitur* is divine wisdom, which understands perfectly all things. The greatest wisdom reached by a creature is the beatific vision, a proximate participation in divine wisdom. Compared to God’s own wisdom and the wisdom of the blessed, theological wisdom is more remote, and has to be learned. It is a subalternated science derived from the science of the wisdom of God and of the blessed. Since only God’s own wisdom is the proportionate principle of understanding God and the mysteries hidden in God, the theologian must rely on God’s wisdom as it is mediated by positive participations such as revelation and the virtue of faith, and by negative participations such as the infallibility of the magisterium.

If sin had not entered the scene, philosophy would have been the reigning science. Now, however, it is theological wisdom that judges all things in the actual order of the universe, since it is uniquely capable of understanding sin, grace, redemption, and so on. Lonergan still follows Aquinas in affirming theology as the science that is about God and everything else insofar as it is related to God. Since everything is ordered to God, theology is a general wisdom that judges and orders absolutely all things.

³⁴⁴ CWL 22: 14-15, 32-33, 140-141, 184-185, 193-194, 260-266, 287-288, 290-291, 303-304; CWL 23: 371, 373 and n. 15, 383-385, 511, 583.

Theological wisdom knows the whole of being, but a view of the whole still stands in need of more particular and detailed viewpoints provided by specialized fields.

The relationship between theological wisdom and the diverse wisdoms of various specialties is one of complementarity and unity. The joining of general, theological wisdom with the complementary wisdoms of the various, specialized sciences is one aspect of the transformation of prudence from the practical (concerned with what is to be done) to the speculative order (concerned with truth per se) discussed earlier. And in its architectonic role, theological wisdom seizes upon an order that connects itself with all of the other sciences by referring all of them to God. A collaboration between the general wisdom of the theologian and the specialized wisdoms of other experts allows theology to incorporate the achievements of modern scientific endeavor, including not only the natural sciences but also philosophy and the human sciences.

Following Aquinas, Lonergan contends that theology acts in both scientific and sapiential ways. As science, it grows in knowledge of God, its proper object, and of everything in relation to God. As wisdom, it stands superior above all other human wisdoms, since it studies God; it locates its own role within the larger system of the other sciences; it judges the value and limitations of other sciences; and it critically appropriates the conclusions of the other sciences for its own purposes. As that which orders and judges all things, theology is architectonic in relation to itself and other fields.

Because theology's architectonic function makes less direct reference to God, its sapiential role is more remote than its scientific one. And yet because Lonergan is acutely interested in the relationship between theology and the human sciences, theology's

sapiential role operates as a prominent theme of Lonergan's courses on theological method in the early 1960s, even when wisdom is not explicitly mentioned.³⁴⁵

In *De methodo theologiae*, the type of theology that can be most easily identified as wisdom and that Lonergan discusses at length is systematic theology, which is set off against both positive and dogmatic theology.³⁴⁶ Lonergan elucidates the differences and connections among positive, dogmatic, and systematic theologies in terms of their respective relations to this dogmatic-theological context. Like all contexts, the dogmatic-theological context is a remainder concept—it is the assumed or implied context of any true theological statement. The dogmatic-theological context first emerged from reflection on scripture and tradition and was crystallized in history through successive transitions from faith to theology. It includes not only truth but also heresy, since truth is dialectical, developing in opposition to error. It contains notions that are proper to theology and absolutely fundamental; they slowly become explicit in the theoretical life of the church and exert a profound influence on all other notions. These fundamental notions are called theological categories, and some are more explicitly developed than others. The dogmatic-theological context exhibits elements of *sapientia* in the way it implicitly orders these categories.³⁴⁷

Systematic theology's specific end is the very purpose of the dogmatic-theological context: the growth in understanding, knowledge, and wisdom so highly

³⁴⁵ CWL 22: 105-108; CWL 23: 361, 391-393, 458-463, 527, 561, 671-673. In at least one pre-*Method* text, the sapiential contribution to theology vis-à-vis other disciplines is explicitly linked to method. In a footnote to the 1961 *De Deo Trino: Pars dogmatica*, Lonergan appears to extemporize the relationship of method to various "integral parts" of theology (positive, dogmatic, systematic, and so on) as a sapiential one. It is the "sapiential or methodical part" of theology that must "preside to distinguish the [other] parts, assign to each its function and duties, and direct the assistance that each gives to the others" (CWL 11: 7, n. 1). This 1961 foreshadowing of the sapiential functions of transcendental method is perspicuous.

³⁴⁶ CWL 23: 531 and 561.

³⁴⁷ CWL 22: 30-31, 170-174, 232, 308; CWL 23: 551-553, 555, 579-589.

praised at the First Vatican Council. In turn, systematic theology would seem to be the proper theoretical incarnation of wisdom, since its proximate and principal aim is to analogically understand the mysteries of faith themselves, which are ultimate principles in a scientific theology. Lonergan characterizes the wisdom of systematic theology as methodically critical, just as he aligns wisdom in general with method in general. The movement from positive theology (history of a doctrine) to systematic theology (understanding the doctrine itself) passes through dialectic, thereby introducing the notion of normativity and effecting the transition from what was said to what was and is true. So systematic theology sifts through opinions and arguments and winnows positions from counterpositions with the categories of horizon, authenticity, and conversion.³⁴⁸

Last but not least, one of the theologian's essential and positive participations in divine wisdom comes in the form of the gifts of the Spirit. In the summer 1962 Regis College institute on theological method, Lonergan hints at a possible transposition of the gift of wisdom into the terms of interiority when he remarks, "The gifts of the Holy Ghost are the adaptation of the subject, his subordination to a superior principle of direction."³⁴⁹

6 *De methodo theologiae* (Spring 1963 and Fall-Winter 1963-1964): Wisdom of the Concrete as Part and Parcel of Transcendental Method

The spring 1963 and fall-winter 1963-1964 *De methodo theologiae* courses can be studied as a certain climax of Lonergan's "Roman Period" spent teaching at the

³⁴⁸ CWL 22: 27, 33, 193-194.

³⁴⁹ CWL 22: 289.

Gregorian, as well as a certain summit of Lonergan's ongoing transposition of wisdom into cognitional-intentional terms during this time period. They recapitulate many topics from earlier courses in this period while giving further shape to elements that will be formally debuted in *Method in Theology*. These dual *De methodo theologiae* courses from the early 1960s represent the clearest presentation thus far of all that transcendental method entails, both in general and for theology in particular. Further, the spring 1963 *De methodo theologiae* course proposes a new idea for wisdom's relation to method: wisdom as included within method. These two texts will be considered together, as they revolve around the same basic ideas; just as importantly, the fall-winter 1963-1964 version adds nothing novel to the position of wisdom vis-à-vis method found in the spring 1963 version. The crucial development in both texts seems to be the deeper incorporation of both wisdom and conversion into transcendental method, through a richer complication of the heuristic notion of horizon.³⁵⁰

6.1 Wisdom and Transcendental Method

In the *De methodo theologiae* courses from the early 1960s, Lonergan revisits the notion of horizon and greatly expands its applications to both method and theology. Horizon is fundamentally a heuristic notion that can be conceived from the image of the bounding circle, the extension and limits of one's vision. A horizon is established by the correlative components of its pole and its field. The image for an insight into the meaning of "pole" is the physical standpoint of the viewer, and for "field" it is the totality of

³⁵⁰ Another crucial development in both these texts is the increased clarity in the distinction and interrelation obtaining among positive, systematic, and dogmatic theology and their respective correlation with experience, understanding, and judgment. See CWL 24: 79-86, 103-110, and 136-147.

visible objects that can be seen from such a standpoint, those things chosen by the viewer to be seen.

The originary pole is the very structure of human consciousness shared by all subjects in common; in the originary pole lies the possibility of conversion, of proper self-constitution. The existential pole is the actual operating subject, operating *de facto* in such and such a way, conditioned relatively by psychological, social, and cultural forces, but constituted absolutely by his existential orientation in the presence or absence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. The implicit or *exercite* field of lived experience is the manifestation or objectification of one's presuppositions, choices, values, judgments, and decisions, and is correlative, simply as a matter of fact, with the existential pole. "What kind of person I am and what kind of world is present to me are correlative."³⁵¹ The explicit or *signate* field of explicit reflection is the correlative of the originary pole by intention; it is philosophy, theology, method, or any other science as it aims to objectify the normative demands of the originary pole.

Lonergan analyzes existential poles and their correlative fields from various horizons—psychological, social, and cultural. For example, in a cultural horizon considered at the level of the individual, the existential pole moves from undifferentiated through differentiated to integrated operations. But its correlative field is an integration among worlds achieved through wise oscillation, as underscored in the spring 1962 *De methodo theologiae* course.

But considered psychologically, socially, and culturally, horizons are only developed in a relative way, and often from outside forces more than anything else. There

³⁵¹ CWL 24: 42-43.

is also the need for conversion, a pinnacle of the existential subject's freedom to choose her own direction, her own self-constitution, consciously, rationally, and deliberately, from the inside. Conversion is a function of existential decision and is potentially a threefold transformation of the existential pole, with a corresponding transformation of entire fields. Intellectual conversion breaks the hold of perceptualism, the mythic notion that knowing is taking a good look, and turns the subject toward a knowledge of the real as that which is affirmed in a true judgment. Moral conversion breaks the hold of self-centered desires and satisfactions—"the good for me"—and turns the subject toward that which is good for its own sake. Religious conversion breaks the hold of the reign of sin—the moral impotence that ineluctably results in irrational social, cultural, and psychological determinations—and turns the subject toward the intersubjective faith, hope, and love characteristic of the reign of God.³⁵²

Transcendental horizon is the absolute and total horizon, outside of which nothing exists. While relative horizon is the result of psychological, cultural, and social development, transcendental horizon results from conversion or the lack of conversion, intellectual, moral, and religious. Transcendental method attends to the transcendental horizon, in both its subjective aspect (all transcendental poles) and its objective aspect (all transcendental fields). In either case, transcendental method seeks to discern horizons through a factual determination that is differentiated relatively in accord with psychological, social, and cultural development and absolutely and critically in accord with intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.

³⁵² CWL 24: 28-30, 32-43, 46-62, 134, 156-157.

It is in the context of this aim that Lonergan comments that “Wisdom has been thought to reside in the speculative domain, prudence in the practical. But once historical consciousness has arisen, there is a need for wisdom regarding the concrete. Wisdom regarding the concrete is understood inasmuch as it is included in method.”³⁵³ Since the concrete refers to all of being, “wisdom regarding the concrete” is clearly identical with the “wisdom regarding *all things*” from the spring 1962 version of the same course, in which the latter phrase symbolizes the marriage of prudence and speculative wisdom that parallels the negotiation between modern and ancient science.³⁵⁴

Lonergan’s claim that transcendental method, or methodical horizon, enfolds wisdom within itself makes eminent sense given the amplified role in judgment that he assigns to method in the early 1960s. The passage under examination occurs in the middle of a discussion that underscores method’s ability to expect, explain, and judge differences. Transcendental method is factual, critical, and evaluative. Method responds to questions by judging facts regarding the degree and kind of development and the presence or absence of conversion in any thinker, work, or statement. It is critical, judging the root division between position and counterposition. It is evaluative, judging what is less and more significant to the theologian.

Wisdom is part and parcel of transcendental method simply because wisdom is right judgment, and judgment is increasingly considered by Lonergan to be a prominent and essential function of method. The importance of judgment in method turns up as

³⁵³ CWL 24: 40-42 and 62-63, with quote on 63

³⁵⁴ The same point surrounding the triffecta of prudence, wisdom, and modern science in the spring of 1962 is repeated in regard to prudence, wisdom, and modern philosophy in the spring of 1965 in the lecture entitled “Dimensions of Meaning.” Here Lonergan speculates, the “entry of philosophy into the realm of the existential and the historical not merely extends the role of philosophic wisdom into concrete living but also, by that very extension, curtails the functions formerly attributed to prudence” (CWL 4: 240).

early as 1959 with *De intellectu et methodo*'s third, fourth, and fifth directives, and the spring 1962 *De methodo theologiae* course characterizes two of method's attributes, dialectic and historical-critical, as expressions of judgment. In the spring 1963 and fall-winter 1963-1964 *De methodo theologiae* courses, Lonergan accentuates the role of judgment in method by describing it not only as dialectical and critical but also as factual and evaluative. In these last two courses, the entire mission of method is to evince progress and unmask aberration through the exercise of critical, dialectical, factual, and evaluative judgment. Our first "case study" showing the credibility of this newly articulated relationship between wisdom and method appears in dialectic, the explanatory mode of transcendental method that most closely aligns with judgment.³⁵⁵

6.1.1 Wisdom and the Dialectical Function of Method

One of the clearest indicators that a shift in Lonergan's conception of wisdom in relation to method has indeed taken place is the concomitant shift in a fundamental function of wisdom, the selection of basic terms, to method. Rather than repeat material from *Insight* and other works on wisdom's selection of the primitive terms that then compose first principles, in these two *De methodo theologiae* courses from the early 1960s Lonergan emphasizes that the ground of basic terms lies in interiority.³⁵⁶ The

³⁵⁵ CWL 24: 62-64. The other three explanatory modes of transcendental method given in these texts are genetic and synthetic-organic, which are both functions predominantly of understanding, and comparative, which is associated with experience.

³⁵⁶ Proper principles of a given science derive their meaning from the actual performance of that science as it moves toward greater and greater determinations of the natures studied by that science. So the proper principles of theology adhere in the intelligibility of the mysteries of the faith—for example, in the psychological analogy for the Trinity, the nature of grace, the organization of the church, etc. CWL 24: 119-120.

subject in himself or herself, not propositions, constitutes the first principle.³⁵⁷ Self-appropriation leads to knowledge of the isomorphism between knowing and known, and the interrelations between the two lead to basic terms.

And prior to the conceptualization of levels of consciousness and the composition of the known are the transcendentals, the openness of the mind toward being, truth, and goodness. Lonergan holds that basic terms in themselves are the transcendentals precisely as they are preconceptual, as defining fundamental existential orientations of the human being. As expressed and objectified in rational interiority, basic terms have to do with knowing, objectivity, and the real. Knowing is a composite of experience, understanding, and judgment; objectivity is a matter of the assembly of the data (experiential), coherence (understanding), and positing (judgment); and the real is what is experienced, understood, and judged correctly.³⁵⁸

Common notions, principles, and terms are operative wherever and whenever a human mind is operative, since they derive from the fundamental structure of human consciousness. Transcendental method itself can also be called foundational or fundamental method, as every affirmation or negation can be analyzed into its origin in the structure of the human mind. Transcendental method expresses the intention of being, and the foundation of all method is the heuristic notion of being, the “to be known.” In fact, the intelligibility of all common principles and notions is, for Lonergan, heuristic,

³⁵⁷ CWL 24: 48 and 98-102. A couple years later, Lonergan will characterize the tendency to designate primitive, abstract propositions as “first principles” and deduce or somehow derive all other truths from such propositions as a hallmark of a classicist worldview. He goes on to sharply contrast such a worldview with the historical mindedness that gives rise to transcendental method, which places concrete foundations in the cognitive structures of the conscious, operating subject. See “The Transition from a Classicist Worldview to Historical Mindedness,” in *A Second Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, CWL 13 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016), 7.

³⁵⁸ CWL 22: 196; CWL 24: 27, 36, 48, 101.

and their heuristic structure is a channel through which proper knowledge, as in theology, can be gained. And the methodical aspect of transcendental method acknowledges the operations through which all of the transcendentals are known, and specifies how proper methods come to know particular realities.³⁵⁹

Significantly, the a priori in every science is the very subject who experiences, understands, judges, and decides, the one who asks “What is it?” and “Is it?”.³⁶⁰

Although common principles and notions are a priori, they still undergo development from lived practice to reflection on practice. However, this fact does not prevent serious philosophical differences, because the need for conversion—and hence the need for dialectic—is ever-present.

Dialectic as a function of transcendental method discerns the transcendental horizon, the presence or absence of conversion in any thinker, work, or statement. Just as various philosophers have meant wildly diverse things by the term “being,” an example often cited by Lonergan in an earlier timeframe to show the need for wisdom, “The same word appears with radically opposed meanings in the process of dialectic.”³⁶¹ The proposal of drastically different connections among so-called basic terms are as numerous as opposed positions exposed by dialectic. The distortion based in non-conversion taints not only terms but premises and conclusions: a positivist understanding of being leads to fundamental premises being understood in a positivist sense, which leads to positivist positions on knowing and objectivity and so on.

The foundational division between progress and aberration is the conflict between common principles as they are exercised in the lived experience of experiencing,

³⁵⁹ CWL 22: 48, 68, 101, 119-129.

³⁶⁰ CWL 24: 7 and 11.

³⁶¹ CWL 24: 27.

understanding, judging, and deciding and common principles as they are reflected upon and made explicit in a science, philosophy, theology, or method. “One is always a human being, and only sometimes a philosopher. And it may be that the philosopher does not quite grasp the human being that one is.”³⁶² Dialectic is fundamentally existential: its exercise as a function of method is a matter of responsible judgment, and its conflicts are resolved by conversion.

Dialectic proceeds concretely through the application of the transcendental principle that what is normative in experience, understanding, judgment, and decision is also normative for all expressions, objectification, and events. The application of this principle traces a regress to the normative *exercitum* (the lived experience) to show the likeness between positions of one time period and those of another, and between counterpositions of one time period and another. A position is defined as the agreement between the lived practice of what normative transcendental structure implies for all human beings by nature (*exercite*) and the explicit reflection (*signate*) on that practice. A counterposition is defined as the disagreement between the *exercite* and *signate*. And in the case of theology, the *signate* is the word of God. Dialectic advances positions and reverses counterpositions, and when it does so regarding the most fundamental realities, it contributes to the selection of basic terms, as Thomist wisdom once did.

³⁶² CWL 24: 121.

6.1.2 Theological Wisdom and Transcendental Theological Method

When horizon and method are both understood heuristically and in conjunction with one another, a transcendental methodological heuristic structure emerges. It is descriptive, explanatory, and directive, and it covers all things, from science and philosophy to history, hermeneutics, and theology. Lonergan summarizes in broad strokes the import of such a method and its application to theology:

We may apply the heuristic structure: description and the four modes of explanation (comparative, organic, genetic, and dialectical) as these determine a series of horizons both from the developmental viewpoint of psychology, society, and culture, and from the viewpoint of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. Such a method includes the genesis of all dogmas and systems, a refutation of all heresies and aberrations, and an understanding of the history that puts doctrines in their concrete context.³⁶³

Lonergan submits that the method outlined above is “automatically theology,” and it is not difficult to understand why. Nothing lies outside of what is transcendental, so the supernatural order is included within the transcendental horizon. Moreover, because transcendental method attends to the transcendental horizon, it attends to all of the conversions individually and in their mutual relations.³⁶⁴

Religious conversion is of course the most essential to theology: theology studies the very word of God, spoken in both Christ and Christ’s church, and in its manifold and perpetual penetration into human history. But our understanding of the word of God can

³⁶³ CWL 24: 82.

³⁶⁴ The theologian attends more to religious, intellectual, and moral conversion than to different aspects of development, since the former are more fundamental and their lack is more likely to infiltrate theological understanding in a destructive way. And yet the theologian does still attend to psychological, social, and cultural development insofar as they bear on the discernment of positions from counterpositions. CWL 24: 63-64.

be confounded by latent theories that the real is equivalent to bodies, and the truth of the word of God can be corrupted by the naïve realism that wants truth to be “the already out there now”; hence the need for the Greek councils to act in historical doctrinal development as the midwife to “Christian realism.”³⁶⁵ And so religious conversion and intellectual conversion are intrinsically connected, with the latter clarifying the former and the former slowly but effectively fostering the latter.

The ultimate rationale for the application of transcendental method to theology is also the simplest: transcendental method changes the theologian. By promoting reflection on the operations employed by theologians, transcendental method is foundational for the work of theology; it unleashes fuller possibilities of what faith illumined by reason may mean and what it can discover. As critical, transcendental method searches out basic philosophical errors that skew dogmatic and theological development. As unitive, it brings together positive, systematic, and dogmatic aspects of theology within the operations of one or many theologians, since these functions of theology are isomorphic with the conscious levels of experience, understanding, and judgment, respectively.³⁶⁶

More than anything else it does in and for theology, transcendental method unveils the transcendental horizon of the theologian. The Regis College institute of 1962 on theological method stressed that the foundation of theology is not the natural structure of human consciousness but that structure as it is transformed by the gift of faith. The interiority of the theologian is a new interiority in which the natural operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding are healed of sin’s wound and elevated to understand the divine mysteries. The source of theological thought is neither

³⁶⁵ CWL 24: 48-51, 57, 64, 83, 124, 134.

³⁶⁶ CWL 24: 53-58, 124, 133-137.

reason nor faith nor reason with the affirmations of faith extrinsically adduced. The source of theology is a new, composite principle, the integration of faith and reason in the theologian's intellect.

In the language of the *De methodo theologiae* courses of 1963 and 1964, the existential pole of theology is the theologian precisely as she is or is not intellectually, morally, and religiously converted. The explicit field of the actual theology that the theologian creates will tend to correlate with his existential self-constitution. Thus every theology exhibits either authenticity or distortion, in accord with conversion or lack of conversion, psychological, social, cultural development or lack of development, in the theologian or theologians.³⁶⁷

Despite Lonergan's position in the spring 1963 *De methodo theologiae* course that wisdom is part and parcel of transcendental method, ample examples of the traditional Thomist notion of wisdom remain in this text, and they all pertain to theology. There is the description of theology as "a certain total vision regarding God and all other things in relation to God"; theology's relationship with the other sciences as sapiential; divine wisdom, the only fully proportionate principle for theology; the supernatural gift of the Spirit that enlightens the church's, and hopefully the theologian's, judgment on supernatural matters; and wisdom as the general way of proceeding in theology, since wisdom is necessary to order questions, problems, and solutions.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁷ CWL 24: 4-5, 7-8, 42-43, 55, 127, 134-135, 150.

³⁶⁸ CWL 24: 5, 8-9, 57, 66-67, 102, 105, 131-133, 146, with the quote appearing on 132.

7 Summary: Wisdom in the *De methodo theologiae* courses and Regis College Institute on Theological Method

Although Lonergan stated in the spring 1962 *De methodo theologiae* course that integration of worlds is the work of wise judgment, Lonergan laid the details of this integration at the feet of method, suggesting once again method's increasing workload vis-à-vis wisdom. In the *De intellectu et methodo* course of 1959, wisdom was method's watchful mentor, making sure method's directives are applied appropriately. Wisdom and method worked together hand-in-hand, but they still appeared distinct, with wisdom being the more functionally foundational role.

But in all of the *De methodo theologiae* courses, the roles of wisdom and method almost seem reversed. Method is the larger, more prominent concept, with wisdom's role beginning to lessen. In the spring 1962 course *De methodo theologiae*, method is the application of a new "wisdom that regards *all things*" toward the conscious and reflective purpose of guiding development—development in each of the worlds (and, by analogy, with each of the sciences) and development in the sense of an integration of worlds. This new wisdom regards all things in and through the appropriation of rational self-presence, just as method regards all things in and through the rational appropriation of cognitive operations.

Here the crucial connection between method and wisdom is not only one of enlargement and reduction, with method's role waxing as wisdom's wanes. This connection certainly holds true, but it can be further specified in terms of the exact functions method begins to take over, the lengthening list of attributes ascribed to method, and their dual connection to interiority. The relationship is also one of

transposition, with traditional wisdom being rewritten in the larger, richer key of cognitive-intentional analysis.

The *De methodo theologiae* courses of spring 1963 and fall-winter 1963-1964 continue where the spring 1962 class left off, repeating several themes while specifying the advantages of transcendental method for theology with greater clarity than before. The spring 1963 version explicitly remarks that wisdom regarding the concrete is included in method, and this contention is borne out in Lonergan's discussion of dialectic's discernment of basic terms. Lonergan's longstanding emphasis on wisdom's role in selecting the meaning of basic terms undergoes a marked shift in the spring 1963 *De methodo theologiae* course. It is now the function of dialectic, not wisdom traditionally conceived, to reduce the opposed meanings of the same basic terms to the existential pole, measured against the originary pole.³⁶⁹

We recall that the first phase of Lonergan's transposition of Thomist wisdom generally conceived wisdom as rational self-appropriation in *Verbum* and *Insight*. But in

³⁶⁹ This same basic position is reiterated in the form of an article originally published in *Gregorianum* at a time practically contemporaneous with the 1963 and 1963-1964 *De methodo theologiae* courses. In the spring 1963 "Metaphysics as Horizon," Lonergan contrasts the expert with the proverbial wise man along the same lines as Aristotle and Aquinas, but using the language of horizon: wisdom is the ultimate and basic horizon, the "unrestricted viewpoint." Considered under the formality of being, metaphysics is equivalent to the objective pole of this unrestricted viewpoint. But, as a science, metaphysics is not equivalent to the total and basic horizon, because the metaphysician may or may not be sufficiently converted. It is the practitioner of transcendental method, attentive as she is to conversion or lack of conversion, that fully embodies wisdom because she represents the subject in its "full and proper stature." Perhaps even more explicitly than in the *De methodo theologiae* courses of the 1960s, here Lonergan again rewrites wisdom as transcendental method, although the transcendental method of 1963 is not identical to that of the early 1970s. Still, in 1963 Lonergan can boldly remark, "in the horizon of the wise man, the philosopher of the Aristotelian tradition, the objective pole is an unrestricted domain, and the subjective pole is the philosopher practicing transcendental method, namely, the method that determines the ultimate and so basic whole." His reasoning is also transparent, with the notion of horizon more fully untying the "knot" presented by various objections to wisdom as foundational in the 1959 *De intellectu et methodo*. It is not enough to say that wisdom is the habit of order that decides which problem should be tackled first, second, and so on, as in *De intellectu*. Rather, "problems and solutions are what they are in virtue of the horizon in which they arise," and transcendental method takes full cognizance of horizon in a way that traditional accounts of *sapientia* do not ("Metaphysics as Horizon," quotes on CWL 4: 198, 204, 199, respectively). Likewise, in the 1963 lecture "Exegesis and Dogma," Lonergan equates the "realm of wisdom" with the realm of self-appropriation and conversion (CWL 6: 156).

the early 1960s there is a hint that Lonergan may be expanding his transposition of wisdom as rational self-appropriation to, perhaps, other kinds of self-appropriation, with the middle term of method as a bridge between wisdom and conversion. And yet the exact relationship between wisdom and conversion is far from clear in these texts.

Insofar as wisdom is increasingly aligned with method in the chronology of Lonergan's thought, and method includes a dialectical function that considers the presence or absence of conversion, we can anticipate that wisdom may eventually come closer to an identification with conversion. But that anticipation must yet be substantiated. In the remainder of our chronological survey, we will witness Lonergan's vision of transcendental method unfold more fully, especially in its promise to unite different operations and disciplines, and we will carefully search for the conceptual location of wisdom in his breakthrough to functional specialization as the proper method of theology.

Chapter Four: *Sapientia* in the Third Stage of Meaning: Wisdom as Transcendental Method and Conversion in *Method in Theology* (1964-1972)

Lonergan's work through 1964 features Thomist wisdom as a richly multifaceted and surprisingly talkative travelling companion. But Thomist wisdom becomes a much quieter interlocutor during what Crowe calls the "post-1965 regrouping of forces for the writing of *Method in Theology*,"³⁷⁰ and wisdom's conspicuous absence in *Method* lends credibility to Crowe's original idea that transcendental method has taken the place of *sapientia*. We can appreciate the intelligence of Crowe's hypothesis more deeply now, after having observed the increasing convergence of transcendental method and wisdom from the late 1950s through mid-1960s.

As will be argued below, I am in fundamental agreement with Crowe that *Method* represents a singular moment in Lonergan's transposition of Aquinas' notion of wisdom into the terms and relations grounded in rational interiority. *Method* effectively completes the transposition of wisdom as rational self-appropriation begun in *Verbum* and continued in *Insight*. According to Crowe, in *Method* wisdom's functions have been assumed by transcendental method itself. The claim that wisdom's role is subsumed as transcendental method in the cognitive-existential context epitomized by *Method* can be evaluated on two fronts: from an overview of method in general, and from an analysis of functional specialization in particular.

³⁷⁰ Crowe, "Lonergan's Search for Foundations," 171.

1 The Fourth Level of Consciousness

Just as the transposition of epistemological wisdom into the self-affirmation of the knower and the transposition of metaphysical wisdom into the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being presupposed *Insight's* basic cognitional theory, the eventual identification of wisdom with transcendental method, dialectic, and foundations presupposes the fourth level of consciousness. Doran indicates the major themes of the second stage of development in Lonergan's position on the subject as value, feeling, judgment of value, decision, and conversion.³⁷¹ Here I will briefly recapitulate the bold lines of Lonergan's position on each of these items in *Method* before responding to the question of where exactly *sapientia* might reside in the third stage of meaning, the emergence of interiority.

As the transcendental notion of the intelligible generates questions for understanding and the transcendental notion of the true and the real generates questions for reflection, the transcendental notion of value drives questions for deliberation. The transcendental notion of value is reached when questions for deliberation—Is it truly good? Is it truly worthwhile?—are met in a judgment of value that answers in the affirmative. As with the judgment of fact, which asserts the existence of a being independent of the subject, the meaning of a judgment of value is independent of the subject. It asserts what is truly worthwhile, regardless of how the subject's mood may incline toward or away from that good at any moment. Again, similar to the judgment of

³⁷¹ Decision is present in *Insight*, but compared to its prominence in *Method*, it is not yet fully articulated or weighted.

fact, the judgment of value has its criterion in the authenticity—the self-transcendence—of the subject.

But between the judgment of fact that knows reality (especially human reality) and the judgment of value that knows the good, there is the apprehension of value as it is given in feelings. Feelings that intend value are not states such as fatigue or irritability, which have a cause, or trends such as hunger or thirst, which have goals or ends. Rather, feelings are “the intentional responses with which your whole being is illuminated when you are presented with the values you might realize.”³⁷² As intentional responses, feelings have objects: either the ontic value of persons or the qualitative value of truth, beauty, virtue, and so on. Such feelings give our intentional consciousness “its mass, momentum, drive, power,”³⁷³ and when they successfully carry us to self-transcendence, we enjoy the peace of a good conscience. Full moral self-transcendence is not reached until the existential commitment of decision, which moves us closer to action.

Lonergan sometimes calls the fourth level of consciousness rational self-consciousness, since it is through decision that the subject chooses not only who she will be, but through herself and for herself, makes herself become that person. In the spring 1963 *De methodo theologiae* course, there are myriad actions associated with the level of decision: in the stage preceding choice there is taking counsel, deliberating, evaluating different courses of action and different ways of being; in the stage of actual choice there is the practical judgment of value that affirms an action as good, from which is spirated the choice or decision; and in the final stage of action there is a disposition of objects and, more importantly, of one’s self.

³⁷² CWL 14: 38, ed. n. 17.

³⁷³ CWL 14: 32.

Although Lonergan specifically calls moral conversion “the existential moment,” every decision has an existential component: we become who we are through decisions. The existentially aware decision to self-constitute is an exercise of personal freedom. When I interiorly speak, “Thus it shall be,” and “thus” is a way of being myself that I intentionally, freely, and knowingly choose, I enact the very decision that I internally speak, and my external actions, whether they deal with things, persons, or God, flow from that decision. Not all decisions are explicitly self-reflective “existential moments,” to recount a phrase from both *Insight* and *Method*. But the ones most responsive to our existential self-constitution reflect conversion, a turning away from the avoidance of responsibility for self-possession and self-gift and a turning toward the embrace of personal freedom.³⁷⁴

2 General Resemblances Between Transcendental Method and Wisdom

Transcendental method is the appropriation of one’s own foundational reality, of who one is as subject, which is implicated in and illuminative of every cognitional-existential endeavor. Transcendental method is the concrete, normative subject appropriating conscious, intentional, recurrent, and interrelated operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding as they occur in a normative pattern that yields cumulative and progressive results.³⁷⁵ Lonergan treats each element of this

³⁷⁴ CWL 24: 41-47, especially 43 and 46.

³⁷⁵ “Experiencing” stands as shorthand for all of the operations of the senses, perception, and feeling. “Understanding” stands as shorthand for all of the major activities of intelligent consciousness; it is preceded by inquiry and imagination and followed by conception and formulation. “Judging” stands as shorthand for all of the major activities of rational consciousness; it is preceded by reflecting and marshalling and weighing the evidence. “Deciding” stands as shorthand for all of the major activities of

definition in kind, a format that will be followed here to elucidate the similarity between transcendental method and wisdom.

2.1 Operations as Patterned, Related, and Recurrent

Prescinding for a moment from the fruit of method, what remains is a transcendental, normative pattern of recurrent and related operations. The conscious, intentional operations constitutive of transcendental method are “patterned” and “related” because they follow upon one another in a concrete order of internal relations—a pattern—characterized by mutual dependence, telos and transcendence, and underlying unity.

Without the data of experience inundating us as soon as we awake there would be nothing to experience; without intelligent inquiry and divergent conceptions there would be no reason to seek truth; without judgment and the reasonable pronouncement of “yes” or “no,” there would be no responsible effort to deliberate on what we should do or be in response to factual knowledge.³⁷⁶ Just as the higher levels of consciousness materially depend on the lower, the lower levels are formally influenced by the higher. Our desire to act virtuously and be persons of value not only inspires all of our judgments of value but also intensifies the passionate disinterestedness of our pursuit of truth, since we cannot begin the process of verifying our hypotheses in earnest unless we have already somehow decided that it is worthwhile to seek truth.

rational self-consciousness; it is preceded by taking counsel, deliberating, evaluating, and is followed by speaking, writing, and doing. CWL 14: 8, 10 and editorial n. 3, 13.

³⁷⁶ CWL 14: 13-14.

Each level of consciousness is distinguished from the next by type of operation and the quality of consciousness that varies with each change in operational task. This modification in the feel of self-awareness can be heightened in one's experience for the sake of clarifying and distinguishing one level from another. What comes to light in the process of self-appropriation is that each level exists for the sake of the next, and all together exist for the sake of knowing and loving the yet incompletely known and imperfectly loved totality, whole, universe.³⁷⁷

The pattern obtaining among the operations is first given in consciousness, is itself experienced as part of the experience of the operations. The pattern itself is an outgrowth of the underlying unity of consciousness, and this unity is simply given, is simply the unity of one functional and functioning conscious process, one self-presence that flows continuously when awake, and in incoherent fragments when dreaming.³⁷⁸ Conscious process is formally dynamic because it spontaneously and inevitably evokes and synthesizes its own components—not just operations but groups of groups of operations, to recall *De systemate et historiae*—into one living whole, and does so attentively, intelligently, rationally, and responsibly.³⁷⁹

Like those of method, the functions of wisdom are recurrent and related operations. Its nexus of functionality centers on consideration, judgment, and ordering, apparently in that order.³⁸⁰ If wisdom first and foremost considers or contemplates God,

³⁷⁷ CWL 14: 13-17.

³⁷⁸ CWL 24: 41-47, especially 43 and 46.

³⁷⁹ Lonergan repeats this language in *Method in Theology* in a short section on Piaget serving as foreground to a later discussion of the human good. See CWL 14: 25 and 28-31.

³⁸⁰ As observed in Chapter Three, Lonergan brings into relief the paradoxical interdependence of wisdom's judging and ordering functions in *De intellectu et methodo*. However, in at least two places he describes judgment as the most derivative function, stating that wisdom judges all because it grasps and orders all. In the notes from "Wisdom and Self-Appropriation," one of a set of forty lectures given in 1961 at St. Mary's College in Moraga, California, he states that wisdom judges all because it grasps and orders all. (See

at least one dimension of its contemplation may stem from its right judgment about divine things, especially its basic assertion of God's existence. But Aquinas' most central statement about wisdom's functions, found in his discussion of the gift of wisdom but surely representative of other forms, highlights the dependence of judgment and order on the consideration of the highest cause.³⁸¹ At least in the way of teaching, judgment proceeds by way of cause, so that judgment about lower causes and effects flows from a consideration of the highest cause. If sapiential judgment is related to consideration of God as highest cause, then sapiential ordering is related to consideration of God as final end, for to grasp the order of something is to understand its relation to its end. Judgment and order also seem to be directly related: to judge rightly about creatures is to understand their order to God.

Because our intellects are most essentially characterized as potency, there is always more to know and appreciate about God. And so the circle of right judgment about divine things leading to a contemplation or habitual consideration of God, which leads to right judgment about earthly things and right ordering of earthly things back to God as first cause and final cause is an ever-spinning circle. And as the temporal realities that are to be related to God as principle and end are always changing, our judgment and ordering of all things to God never cease in this life.

Archive Entry 18740DTE060, 1, at <https://www.bernardlonergan.com/archiveitem.php?id=1214>. Accessed on January 24, 2019.) Further, in the Regis College institute of 1962, wisdom's judgment depends on its ordering of the totality of conditions necessary for the absolute positing of judgment (CWL 22: 102). In my opinion, the paradoxical nature of wisdom in the second stage of meaning (theory) may partly drive its transposition into the third stage of meaning (interiority).

³⁸¹ II-II, 45, 1, response: *ad sapientem pertinet considerare causam altissimam, per quam de aliis certissime iudicatur, et secundum quam omnia ordinari oportet.*

2.2 Operations as Transcendental

In contrast to categorical intention, which asks determinate questions and issues in culturally variant, determinate answers with limited denotation, the transcendental intention of method asks unrestricted questions, seeking what is comprehensive in connotation and unrestricted in denotation. Rather than provide us with answers, the transcendentals are the source of questions. They are unrestricted because questions are unrestricted. They are comprehensive because they intend the whole universe, of which we know only a part at any given time.

The distinction between transcendental and categorical intention corresponds to Aquinas' distinction between wisdom said simply and wisdom said with qualification, a distinction also referenced by Lonergan in the spring 1962 and fall-winter 1963-1964 *De methodo theologiae* courses.³⁸² Wisdom is embodied in a limited way by the artisan whose skill represents a certain ultimate standard in one specific realm of knowledge and practice. But wisdom is embodied in an unqualifiedly ultimate way by the wise person whose knowledge of the highest causes and practice of living in conformity with that knowledge—especially the order of the universe ordained by the Highest Cause—spans across and unites all realms of being.³⁸³ The wise know God as unqualified, formally unconditioned being and as unqualified, absolutely unconditional goodness and love.

The transcendental notions are not knowledge; they are intending, and their object is being. The relationship between intention and being forms a second meaning of “transcendental,” the unity between subjectivity and objectivity. They conjoin diverse

³⁸² CWL 23: 459-461 and CWL 24: 132.

³⁸³ I, 1, 6, response; II-II, 45, 1, response.

operations into one single knowing, unite singly known objects into one compound object, and unite many compound objects into the order of an entire universe of being. Like wisdom, the object of the overarching, transcendental intentionality of human consciousness is the whole universe. And in the light of divine wisdom, the terminal value of transcendental intention is not merely the human good we effect but the redemption of the whole universe wrought by God, “an all-encompassing good” into which human good is integrated.³⁸⁴

The isomorphism between transcendental intending and the order of an entire universe of being finds a Thomist echo in the identity in act between the knower and the known. Knowledge is only possible if the likeness of the thing known can come to be in the knower, but this similarity is effected not merely through the innate receptivity of human intellect but also through its agent intellect, which participates in divine light. This identity in form between the knowing and the known occurs only at the level of understanding.

But it is only in an act of reflective understanding, issuing in an act of judgment—an affirmation or negation of a thing’s act of existence—that the knower really and truly knows concrete being.³⁸⁵ Judgment involves affirmation of the other as other, the reality of difference.³⁸⁶ Through true judgment we affirm that the *esse intentionale* first

³⁸⁴ CWL 14: 112 and 360, with quote on 112.

³⁸⁵ CWL 2: 158-162; 57-59; 95-99, especially 96; 201.

³⁸⁶ There exists an *intentio intellecta* or *esse intentionale* at the level of understanding as well, in the inner word of definition. I choose to highlight here the presence of the intentional at the level of judgment because it illuminates both Aquinas’ and Lonergan’s position that judgment includes affirmation of the other as other, something that knowledge by identity does not fully reach, even though Aquinas’ account of knowledge by identity explicitly acknowledges the modal difference between the form in the thing and the form as understood by the intellect. See CWL 2: 83-85, especially 84; 158-162, especially 162; 196-197, especially 197.

conceived by understanding does in fact accurately represent the *actus essendi* of the thing.

The centrality of knowledge by intentionality is especially apparent in the wise whose noble work is the contemplation of God, whose being transcends the limitations of matter, exposing the limitations of knowledge by identity. As pure act, God's understanding is the same as God's being. The tenant that knowing is by similarity holds no less true for judgment than for understanding: understanding is by similarity between the form of the known and the form of the knowing in the midst of modal difference, while judgment is by similarity between the *esse intentionale* in the knower and the *actus essendi* of the known. Judgment is not simply knowledge of the correspondence between the mental *compositio* reached by understanding and the real *composition* in the thing—it is a known correspondence. “It is only in the second type of intellectual operation, only in the production of the second type of inner word, that intellect not merely attains similitude to its object but also reflects upon and judges that similitude.”³⁸⁷

In this context wisdom's knowledge of God is a singular exception: wisdom's consideration of God includes a grasp of dissimilarity between our idea of God and God's reality, since God's reality is thoroughly unlike our conceptions of God and our process of coming to know God. In God there is no distinction between existence or essence or between intellect and intelligible. There is not even a distinction between God's *intentio intellecta* and the divine *res intellecta*. Wisdom's judicial consideration of God truly reaches knowledge of divine reality through correct judgments, but at the core of its contemplative insight is the acknowledgement of a complete and utter entitative

³⁸⁷ CWL 2: 72.

disproportionate between its intention of God and God in God's self.³⁸⁸ In this way Thomist wisdom is most of all a reflection of the unrestricted or "transcendental" in transcendental intention.

2.3 Operations as Normative

In general, a pattern of operations can be considered normative if it is envisaged as the right way of doing a job—in the case of transcendental method, a verifiable and reliable way of coming to know the universe and to grow as cognitional-existential actors developing at a given time in history. In transcendental method, the pattern of experience, understanding, judging, and deciding is defined as the right way of explaining and facilitating the occurrence of coming to know and choose anything proportionate to human cognitional and existential process. The "ought" of this method is the objectification of the transcendental notions in the form of precepts that express the intentionality of each respective level of consciousness: Be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible.

But how do we know that these precepts, even when unexpressed, are still always immanent, operative, and normative? The foundation of method is not the objectification of subjective process in the form of theories, descriptions, or accounts, all of which can be revised, but in the dynamic structure of conscious, intentional subjectivity itself, which cannot be revised without performing the very activities under question, thereby denying

³⁸⁸ CWL 2: 201, 203, 208.

our “own proper essence.”³⁸⁹ Concepts, words, and propositions about subjectivity are subject to revision, but never in such a way that attention becomes inattention, intelligence becomes stupidity, reasonableness becomes silliness, and responsibility becomes irresponsibility.³⁹⁰

As a perfection of the speculative intellect, Thomist wisdom, too, would seem to bear intrinsic normativity; it is the habit that enables one to consider and judge divine truth and judge and order all other truths easily, promptly, and with pleasure. Like all acts of intellect, to understand and to judge rightly about divine truths is an act that remains in the knower as that knower’s own act and perfection. The divine truths treasured and contemplated by *sapientia* act as a canon against which all other truths are measured.

2.4 Cumulative and Progressive Results

Lonergan defines progressive results as a continuous series of discoveries, and cumulative results as the synthesis of a new insight with all previous valid insights. Progressive discoveries and cumulative syntheses both proceed not from a set of rigid rules but from the innate and spontaneously operative procedures of the human mind encapsulated in method, which acts as “a framework for collaborative creativity.”³⁹¹

We notice a parallel here with the synthetic and progressive character of “insight into insight,” the program laid out in *Insight*’s Preface. Each and every insight is a priori inasmuch as it goes beyond merely empirical consciousness and is synthetic inasmuch as it organizes experiential data into explanatory unifications. And so self-appropriation is

³⁸⁹ CWL 14: 367.

³⁹⁰ CWL 14: 21-23, 367, 382, 389.

³⁹¹ CWL 14: 10, quote on 3.

synthetic because insight into insight provides us with an explanatory unification of the entire set of a priori, synthetic components in our cognitional activity. If every insight unifies and organizes, then insight into insight yields a unification and organization of all departments of knowledge into a metaphysics that is a verifiable and integral heuristic structure, with every metaphysical statement implicating a statement regarding cognitional fact. Furthermore, insight is progressive, begetting further insight. Single insights may combine beyond a mere mastery of subject, coalescing into a higher viewpoint—the emergence of a new structure of insights and their consequents, epitomized by an expansion into new operations, new objects, and new standards for thought and praxis.³⁹²

The epistemological wisdom of *Verbum* is synthetic because it connects the order of thought with the order of reality. Its transposition into the self-affirmation of the knower in *Insight* is synthetic because the unity of the subject's one consciousness, at once empirical, intelligent, and rational, is given in consciousness, thereby fulfilling one of the key conditions for self-affirmation: the subject's reality as a concrete and intelligible unity-identity-whole.³⁹³ And the transcendental method of *Method in Theology* is synthetic on multiple accounts: it shows the unity of all knowledge and highlights the conscious intentional unity from which unified knowledge flows. In addition, it links the invariable structure of knowing with the isomorphic structure of the known, showing the unity between the human mind and the universe of being, between cognitional theory and metaphysics.³⁹⁴ If the self-affirmation of the knower of *Insight*

³⁹² CWL 3: 37-43; CWL 14: 5-6 and 431, especially 5.

³⁹³ CWL 3: 343-371, especially 343-344 and 349-353.

³⁹⁴ The synthetic aspect of transcendental method is closely connected with the second meaning of transcendental reviewed above, as both aspects derive from the intertwined unfolding of the transcendental

acted as a transposition of the epistemological wisdom of intellectual light grasping its commensuration to reality in *Verbum*, then perhaps through an analogy of proportion the synthetic aspect of transcendental method, as an extension of the self-appropriation *Insight* first invited, will prove to have sapiential facets as well.

Transcendental method is progressive insofar as it repeatedly drives and codifies “a sustained succession of discoveries.”³⁹⁵ It applies its awareness of the incessant occurrence of questions and the radical openness of the transcendental notions to the subject’s own experiencing, understanding, and judging as these recurrent and related operations result in knowledge. Further vistas of knowledge open as new data is unearthed that puts previous judgments in doubt, incites new hypotheses, gives rise to further modified judgments, as the circle of method turns again and again.³⁹⁶

Aquinas and Lonergan both describe wisdom in terms that suggest synthesis, indicating a parallel with transcendental method. In the 1962 course *De methodo theologiae* as well as the 1962 institute at Regis College, the integration of differentiated worlds was achieved through a “wise oscillation”; in other words, a synthesis of various differentiations of consciousness is the work of personal wisdom.³⁹⁷ In various pieces from the Roman years, especially *The Triune God: Systematics* (1964) and the *De methodo theologiae* courses of spring 1963 and fall-winter 1963-1964, Lonergan associates the way of synthesis—the way of proceeding from causes to effects, principles

notions. Their extremely close relationship with one another makes intelligible that which is experienced; makes true and real that which is intelligible; makes worthwhile that which is real. In a statement in which “synthesizing” could reasonably be substituted for “compounding,” Lonergan summarizes that “the process of compounding is the work of the transcendental notions, which from the beginning intend the unknown that gradually becomes better known” (CWL 14: 16).

³⁹⁵ CWL 14: 10.

³⁹⁶ CWL 14: 9-10.

³⁹⁷ CWL 22: 66; CWL 23: 405 and 431.

to conclusions, and reasons to realities—with the ordering function of wisdom. In the way of analysis, the order of things themselves is still being learned; in the way of synthesis, the cognitional procedure of teaching mirrors the order in things themselves that wisdom has discerned.

Science is also properly synthetic: it understands causes in their effects, but these causes are only first in a specific realm of being. But wisdom is synthetic in a more ultimate way than science: it reflectively understands and judges causes that are absolutely first in the entire ontological order and orders them into a unified system. It comes to know this system of world process—of universal order—by ordering the most foundational questions as they emerge in the human mind, selecting the inquiry whose solution is necessary to answer all subsequent questions.³⁹⁸

Aquinas also understands the function of wisdom as being eminently synthetic, in at least two ways: in its reference to the synthesis of judgment and its recognition of the unity of all being.³⁹⁹ Judgment is either the affirmation of synthesis between the thing and the form previously understood by the intellect, or the negation of synthesis between the thing and the form previously understood by the intellect.⁴⁰⁰ Although its object is God, the Ultimate Indivisible, wisdom's grasp of divine truth is the synthesis of judgment: affirming God's existence and attributes and denying any composition or imperfections that might accrue to our necessarily analogous understanding of God.

In his interpretation of Aquinas' notion of intellectual light, Lonergan posits that the ground of all knowledge is an inchoate and inborn view of the whole of being: an undifferentiated grasp of unity and an anticipation that the whole universe is

³⁹⁸ CWL 24: 57, 65-67, 146; CWL 12: 21-25.

³⁹⁹ Further, wisdom's contribution to the unity of truth was reviewed at the end of Chapter One.

⁴⁰⁰ *Summa theologiae*, I, 3, 4, ad 2 and I, 16, 2; *De veritate* 1, 3; and *Super Boetium De Trinitate* 5, 3.

intelligible.⁴⁰¹ The existence of a commensuration between our intellect and the universe of being is a truth that has to be learned like any other. This truth is what Coelho reads in *Verbum* as “epistemological wisdom”—the rationally reflective act by which intellect reflects upon itself, grasping its own nature as well as the relationship between its infinite potency and all of being.⁴⁰² In this way, wisdom as the innate and inborn grasp of the unity of being becomes the mature self-knowledge of the wise, who realize the intimacy between the human mind and the universe it understands. The “epistemological wisdom” that Lonergan locates in Aquinas speaks to a synthetic unity between knower and known that spans across sciences, even in the midst of distinction.

As with synthesis, Aquinas and Lonergan both describe wisdom in terms that suggest discovery, once again indicating a parallel with transcendental method. It is precisely the speculative intellect’s discovery of truth, the motion of reason from the more known to the less known, that is guided by wisdom when reason inquires into the divine. Wisdom’s quintessential act may very well be a contemplative grasp of God that rests in the knowledge of the Highest Cause, as the motion of reason rests in the understanding it eventually achieves. But it is no less the work of the wise to seek that rest. Certainly in its functions of teaching and defending, habitual wisdom continually strives to eradicate ignorance and show the intelligibility of being.⁴⁰³ And *donum sapientiae* not only judges speculative matters based on its union with God but also

⁴⁰¹ As Lonergan points out, the metaphysical ground of this anticipation by wisdom is simply the principle of the excluded middle: X either is or is not, and what is not cannot be understood (CWL 2: 98).

⁴⁰² CWL 2: 91-99, especially 99.

⁴⁰³ I-II, 66, 5, response to 4.

directs practical ones, and the number of human affairs in need of wisdom only increases with time.⁴⁰⁴

Lonergan's emphasis on the progressive nature of wisdom looms large in his Gregorian courses from the late 1950s and early 1960s, especially the 1959 *De intellectu et methodo*. Against the objection that would deny the foundational status of wisdom because of the multitude of fools, Lonergan stresses that an initial, relatively undeveloped degree of wisdom is a sufficient foundation for further development. Far from detracting from wisdom's claim, an acknowledgment of development is the humble hallmark of wisdom's beginning. Put simply, the wise one knows how much she does not yet know; far from shunning human development in its many aspects, some agonizing and some beautiful and some both, the wise one lovingly surrenders to it.⁴⁰⁵

Finally, the cumulative and progressive nature of wisdom's functionality is exemplified in its secondary functions. Wisdom's primary functions—consideration of the divine, judgment about the divine and judgment of all else according the divine, and ordering all things to God—ground two secondary functions of wisdom, teaching the truth and refuting objections to the truth.⁴⁰⁶ And so Mabry comments on wisdom's relation to transcendental method thus:

It should already be readily apparent that these operations [*consideratio, iudicium, ordinatio*] are related as an ordered series initiated by the initial experience and grasp of the highest cause. An evaluation is made, which in turns gives way to responsible

⁴⁰⁴ II-II, 45, 3, response and replies to all three objections.

⁴⁰⁵ CWL 23: 49-67. The wisdom of surrender will be explored in further detail in the next chapter.

⁴⁰⁶ SCG 1.1.6: *Unde sicut sapientis est veritatem praecipue de primo principio meditari et aliis disserere, ita eius est falsitatem contrariam impugnare*; cf. I-II, 66, 5, response to the fourth objection, where Aquinas states it belongs to the wise to refute those who deny first principles: *Et ideo sapientia non solum utitur principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum est intellectus, concludendo ex eis, sicut aliae scientiae; sed etiam iudicando de eis, et disputando contra negantes. Unde sequitur quod sapientia sit maior virtus quam intellectus*.

ordering and deliberative teaching. This ordered set of operations yields results, namely, the dissemination of the truth. For Thomas, a true life of contemplation always overflows into a life of activity. Returning to Lonergan's comments about the role of method "in an age of novelty," we see that Lonergan perceives transcendental method (at least as applied in theology) to be capable of identifying and refuting errors and in turn identifying and showing the way forward (i.e., teaching the truth).⁴⁰⁷

3 Functions of Transcendental Method and Objectives of Thomist Wisdom

The Gregorian courses of the late 1950s through the early 1960s saw Lonergan's transcendental method increasingly absorb the three general functions of Thomist wisdom—*considerare*, *iudicare*, and *ordinare*. In Chapter One wisdom was described as bearing foundational, consummate, normative, and unifying roles in Thomas' account of knowledge. As will be seen, transcendental method amply provides for all four of these objectives of Thomist wisdom, leaving behind a set of remainder concepts unique to Lonergan's context. And as might be expected, the functions of transcendental method enlisted by Lonergan follow closely from the constitutive elements of its definition as a normative pattern of recurrent, related, and transcendental operations yielding cumulative and progressive results. While remaining distinct, the meaning of these functions substantially overlap, opening the possibility of multiple ways of reading the proportion between transcendental method's functionality and that of wisdom. What is most important, however, is the striking analogical equivalence in functionality throughout. Lonergan describes the broadest functions of transcendental method as unitive, systematic, heuristic, foundational, normative, critical, and dialectical.⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁷ Eric Mabry, "*Officium Sapientis*: Sapiential Moorings of Lonergan's Notion of Method and Interiority in Thomas Aquinas" (paper presented at the West Coast Methods Institute, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, April 4-6, 2013), 5.

⁴⁰⁸ He also specifies four functions of transcendental method's application to theology.

3.1 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Unitive

The analogical similarity between the unifying function of transcendental method and the unifying objective of Thomist wisdom is transparent. Transcendental method provides a “key to unified science.”⁴⁰⁹ If the spokes of a wheel represent diverse sciences, the hub of the wheel is the same human mind that comes to know in each of them. Transcendental method is simply the appropriation and objectification of one and the same human cognitional process active in every science.

Although in the Aristotelian-Thomist division of knowledge certain sciences might have lesser degrees of absolute intelligibility than others due to matter, they all depend on the first principles whose terms are selected by wisdom. Furthermore, in its metaphysical form, wisdom’s knowledge of potency and act, matter and form, essence and existence, and substance and accident enters constitutively into the explanations proper to different sciences. Likewise, transcendental method is a constituent part of the special methods proper to the other sciences.⁴¹⁰

3.2 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Systematic

The objectification of interiority in transcendental method gives birth to a set of basic terms and relations—its systematic function. A system is an intelligible whole in knowledge characterized by technical language in which terms and relations originate

⁴⁰⁹ CWL 14: 26.

⁴¹⁰ CWL 14: 25-26.

from a single understanding, with the relations fixed by the terms and the terms fixed by the relations.⁴¹¹ The basic terms introduced by transcendental method refer to the operations of cognitional process and the basic relations are the ties that join them with one another. They are the essence of cognitional theory but also ground an epistemology insofar as they capture the dynamism of the concrete subject whose authentic, self-transcendent subjectivity issues into objectivity. Basic terms and relations also ground a metaphysics, since they are isomorphic with ontological structure. Since the source of basic terms and relations is cognitional process, which is exempt from revision at the core of its lived reality but revisable in its conceptualization, transcendental method's systematic function furnishes continuity throughout all sciences without imposing inflexibility.⁴¹²

Thomist wisdom corresponds in a general way to system in the way of synthesis, since the wise know appearance from reality;⁴¹³ the synthetic "way of wisdom" is the way of things in themselves, the way of scientific system. More adequately, however, wisdom is systematic in its right judgment on first principles. The meaning of the most basic term—being—is fixed by wisdom's right judgment (consequent to its contemplation of Unconditioned Being) and enters into the fabric of all the sciences.

3.3 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Heuristic

Transcendental method's systematic function leads into its heuristic one. Heuristic procedures are ubiquitous in modern science and method. Transcendental method's

⁴¹¹ CWL 3: 417; cf. CWL 24: 92.

⁴¹² CWL 14: 23-24, 37, 313.

⁴¹³ CWL 2: 83 and 95.

heuristic strength lies in its ability to build a bridge between the activity of intention and the intended unknown by applying the basic terms and relations of cognitional process. Whenever the unknown is a human subject or an object proportionate to human experiencing, understanding, and judgment, we already know that it is an identity-unity-whole, a compound of potency, form, and act correlative to the levels of consciousness. Wisdom's heuristic function is opaque, but discernable in *Verbum*. Wisdom's inchoate form as a primitive anticipation of the unity of being eventually gives rise to one of the most basic logical and heuristic structures, the law of the excluded middle: either X is or is not.⁴¹⁴

3.4 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Foundational

Transcendental method is foundational because explicit self-possession draws together all sciences into "a higher unity of vocabulary, thought, and orientation" by furnishing common foundations (the pattern of recurrent and related operations); common norms (the transcendental precepts); common systematics (the same basic terms and relations, based on cognitional process); and common procedures (critical, heuristic, and dialectical methods).⁴¹⁵ Self-appropriation binds together the intimate core of all sciences in one and the same normative subject whose normativity stems from self-transcendence, both cognitional and moral. Thomist wisdom is foundational because its study of the Highest Cause, known by theologians to be the Triune God, primarily answers the question of where all reality comes from. Secondly, the foundational

⁴¹⁴ CWL 2: 98; CWL 14: 24-25.

⁴¹⁵ CWL 14: 25 and 26, with the quote appearing on 25.

question of what comes first in human knowledge is answered by wisdom's selection of primitive terms.

3.5 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Normative

Transcendental method's normative function, expressed in the transcendental precepts, is grounded in the "spontaneous, structured dynamism of human consciousness."⁴¹⁶ This normativity can be translated into specific categorical precepts by studying the operations dominant in a given field. Wisdom is normative in the way it judges the principles and conclusions of other sciences against the standard of divine truth. As the first principles which wisdom helps construct are ultimate and normative across all fields, the principles that come first in a given science are ultimate and normative for that science.⁴¹⁷

3.6 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Critical

Transcendental method is critical: it cuts to the root of basic philosophical disagreements by reducing metaphysical disagreements regarding reality to epistemological disagreements on objectivity and distortions in cognitional theory, flawed epistemology to flawed cognitional theory, and mistaken cognitional theory to the inherent discrepancy between the actual thinker's cognitive performance and his or her mistaken objectification of it. The latter is the most fundamental of the triad because

⁴¹⁶ CWL 14: 22-23.

⁴¹⁷ I-II, 57, response and ad 1; I-II, 66, 5, response.

misrepresentations of who we are as knowers inevitably infect epistemology and metaphysics with errors.⁴¹⁸

Lonergan clarifies that wisdom's epistemological moment is a "generalization of the criteriological issue," not the critical one. *Sapientia* does not critically unfold "how our immanent activities also contain a transcendence,"⁴¹⁹ but as right judgment, it correctly grasps and is aware of when an assent or judgment ought to be made based on resolution to first principles. All wise judgments are made based on *resolutio in principia*. One can even say that wisdom is judgment about the criteriological basis of right judgment. But Thomist wisdom does not properly unfold the critical trifecta of cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics.

So while Thomist wisdom cannot be said to be critical in the way envisioned in transcendental method, as its epistemological moment perhaps does not push back far enough to the origin of knowledge in intention, it still points the way to a more methodical development of the connection among thought, objectivity, and reality by heightening, in an absolute way, the connection between reflection in general and reality, and this connection is the epitome of judgment.⁴²⁰ One and the same habit of *sapientia* knows highest causes and, in its indirect validation of the very possibility of demonstrable knowledge, knows our capacity to know.

⁴¹⁸ CWL 14: 23.

⁴¹⁹ CWL 2: 83.

⁴²⁰ For Lonergan's thoughts on the consequences of what seems to him to be an overemphasis on knowledge by identity in comparison with knowledge by intentionality—and he does find both in Aquinas—see CWL 2: 4-5; 83 and editorial note e; 84 and n. 116; 197.

3.7 Transcendental Method and Wisdom as Dialectical

The critical function of transcendental method naturally culminates in its dialectical one. The normative structure of our conscious intentionality is violated often and variously. And so when the critical function of transcendental method untangles the wayward detours of confused cognitional theories, epistemologies, and metaphysics, a dialectic of position and counterpositions appears. But the very presence of this dialectic “only objectifies and manifests the need for man to be authentic” while simultaneously beckoning to conversion.⁴²¹ While not directly causing conversion, it ushers us right up to its threshold by instigating an encounter with people, ideas, and beliefs that shed light on our darkness.

Perhaps because its ratio expressly prescind from will,⁴²² Thomist wisdom lacks the existential overtones to Lonergan’s notion of dialectic. But its judgment of truth from falsity, both at the level of principles and conclusions, and its discernment of reality from appearance still make it a sharp intellectual tool in the theoretical stage of meaning. Perhaps more than any other, transcendental method’s dialectical function would seem to take over wisdom’s consummate aspect by leading us to the grace-framed door of conversion, which for Lonergan represents something absolutely ultimate in the transformation of human consciousness.

In conclusion, the functionality of transcendental method absorbs wisdom into itself, fulfilling Lonergan’s pithy statement from the 1963-1964 *De methodo theologiae* course: “Wisdom regarding the concrete is understood inasmuch as it is included in

⁴²¹ CWL 14: 23 and 324, with the quote on 324.

⁴²² Like all intellectual virtues, wisdom depends on the exercise of will for its operation; however, that is not the issue here.

method.”⁴²³ The functionality of a wisdom that considers highest causes and judges and orders all other truths according to the First Truth bears resemblance to both the definition and the functions of transcendental method. And the reverse is true as well: the functionality of transcendental method generously incorporates the objectives of wisdom. But the structure of transcendental method is multidimensional. It is delineated into two phases of accounting for the meaning-laden data of theology, with four functional specialties in each phase. And so the question arises of how the transposition of wisdom into transcendental method might be further specified in terms of functional specialization.

4 Functional Specialization

The central role of the question in the birth of method was explicitly thematized as early as the 1959 course *De intellectu et methodo*, and in the two *De methodo theologiae* courses from 1963-1964. All methodology is the enlargement of a simple principle: we know insofar as we answer questions.⁴²⁴ But questions can be distinguished from one another in a variety of ways. In the same texts that broach the topic of how to distinguish theological questions and theological material, wisdom is spoken of as what orders the questions and their solutions, suggesting at least a vague connection between wisdom and functional specialization.⁴²⁵

⁴²³ CWL 24: 63.

⁴²⁴ CWL 24: 100.

⁴²⁵ Here I am thinking of the spring 1963 *De methodo theologiae* course and the 1964 *The Triune God: Systematics*, in distinction from the more operational division that comes to the forefront in the fall-winter 1963-1964 *De methodo theologiae* course and strongly presages *Method*. CWL 24: 65-67, n. 68 on 67, and 103; CWL 12: 20-31.

In contrast with material division, Lonergan elects operational division—that is, methodical distinction—as the best way to distinguish different theological questions. In *Method*, Lonergan elaborates on functional specialization as a novel way of treating different theological materials differently, ordering theological questions coherently, and uniting different materials and different questions.⁴²⁶

Functional specialization is the idea of distinguishing all of these things by the fourfold operations of consciousness. In its basic form, functional specialization consists of four groupings of theological tasks, each of which relies on all four operations but greatly accentuates the characteristic operation of its respective level of consciousness—experiencing, understanding, judging, or deciding. By elucidating one single theological process from data to results, the functional specialties that compose this process are organically and intrinsically connected.

Since each functional specialty has a unique goal, each employs a unique methodology distinct from the others and together these distinct methodologies make up one transcendental method. And so transcendental method becomes not just a normative pattern of related and recurrent operations with cumulative and progressive results but a normative pattern of interdependent normative patterns. But because theology reflects on religion in a given culture and both religion and culture change with time and in time, it proceeds in two distinct stages, yielding eight functional specialties total.

⁴²⁶ Although archival work has targeted 1965 as the year that Lonergan made the breakthrough to functional specialization, it has been said that he did not publically disclose this novel concept until 1968 with the lectures at Boston College on transcendental philosophy and the study of religion. See “Transcendental Philosophy and the Study of Religion, 3-12 July 1968, Boston College,” in *Early Works on Theological Method I*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken, CWL 22 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2010), 446-466.

The first stage of transcendental method is indirect discourse that focuses on “hearing” what others have said in and about the religious past. The goal of this first phase is an open, receptive encounter with the past in the research that makes available the data that grounds this encounter’s experiential aspect; in the interpretation of data that understands what a theological author meant; in the history that judges this interpretation by positing the wider context of Christian movements; and in the dialectical procedure that decides which movements or elements in a movement represent positions and which represent counterpositions.

In the second phase of transcendental method, “theology, in response to the past, takes a stand in the present with respect to the future.”⁴²⁷ For the second phase bears witness to the religious word to which the theologian has listened in the first phase, and directly hands on the tradition of that word. It is direct discourse in which the theologian brings their own self-transformation and existential decisions to bear on an objectified horizon in foundations; on the affirmation of theological truths in doctrines; on the intelligible ordering and analogical structure of theological understanding in systematics; and on the experiential manifold of current cultural issues in communications.

The advantages of functional specialization are manifold. What was once an overwhelming project can be reduced to distinct groups of tasks each with its own focus. This simplification also prevents any one theological task from developing “totalitarian ambitions,” attempting to exclude or belittle others.⁴²⁸ And since its eightfold differentiation directly depends on the normative structure of intentional consciousness,

⁴²⁷ CWL 24: 379.

⁴²⁸ CWL 14: 131, 146 and n. 2.

transcendental method proceeds from data to results with extraordinary and verifiable legitimacy.⁴²⁹

5 Wisdom as Functional Specialty: Dialectic

Our first inkling that Thomist wisdom and Lonergan's notion of dialectic may be related in the way of transposition came in the spring 1963 *De methodo theologiae* course, and the same link was present in the winter 1963-fall 1964 version of the same class. The bridge between the two came in the form of basic terms: there is in philosophy a dizzying array of historical development and conflict around the meaning of fundamental notions. Philosophical differences recur in the form of perennial realisms, perennial idealisms, perennial empiricisms. These disagreements are perennial because they are based less in conceptual misunderstandings than in truly contradictory, fundamental existential orientations. By this time for Lonergan, what is meant by "first principles" is not self-evident propositions but the a priori, invariant and normative structure of the operating subject; the most basic or fundamental terms are not even the conceptual meaning of being but the transcendental "openness of the mind" toward being, truth, and goodness as that openness is manifested in cognitional structure; and even the transcendentals themselves are understood in light of the operations we all enact as knowers.⁴³⁰

In Lonergan's work from 1963 and 1964, dialectic discerns the correct meaning of notions like being through an explicit analysis of horizon. It judges and decides

⁴²⁹ CWL 14: 121-138; cf. CWL 22: 446-466.

⁴³⁰ CWL 22: CWL 24: 11, 25-27, 98-101, 119-123.

whether a given horizon, embodied in a particular author, statement, or historical movement, is an expression of our unrestricted desire for knowledge and unrestricted desire for goodness and beauty, or something that falls short of this originary, naturally given subjectivity, thus expressing a contradiction between what one is and what one says one is. Dialectic emerges insofar as “the intelligible, the true, and the good is contrasted with the absurd, the false, and the evil.”⁴³¹ And in this fallen world, a life lived in accord with an unrestricted telos is only possible on a consistent basis as the fruit of conversion, whether that be intellectual, moral, religious, or some combination. And so dialectic, in and of itself, implies consideration of conversion, and dialectical conflicts are resolved by conversion.⁴³²

In the spring 1963 course *De methodo theologiae*, Lonergan describes dialectic itself as a function of both existential decision and the sphere of personal judgment “illuminated by” such decision: “Dialectic, then, removes questions from the field of growing intelligence (description and explanation) to the field of judgment. It does not make a formal judgment: I must decide about my own existence. But it illuminates the act of judgment and reduces opposites to their principles.”⁴³³ In fact, so high is the summit climbed by dialectic that it would appear to have one foot in method and one foot in the ultimately spiritual transformation—the experience and living out of conversion—that nourishes and in fact makes possible the authentic practice of transcendental structure, but which is not fully circumscribed within that methodological structure.

⁴³¹ CWL 24: 21.

⁴³² CWL 24: 30-31, 39, 121.

⁴³³ CWL 24: 27. Compare this to *Method in Theology*, where dialectic illuminates conversion but foundations objectifies it (CWL 14: 129).

Still, it is clear from the *De methodo theologiae* courses of 1963 and 1963-1964 that Lonergan thinks of dialectic first and foremost as an embodiment of methodical judgment. While acknowledging that dialectic brings into sharp relief the inescapable influence that existential decision has on our judgments around positions and counterpositions, he still identifies the dialectical function of method with judgment. Just as importantly, although existential decision intrinsically implicates the possibility of conversion, and conversion is at the heart of dialectic, Lonergan places existential decision largely outside of explicit methodical structure. It remains to be seen, however, exactly how *Method*, with its expanded functionality of transcendental method, clearer distinction and inclusion of the level of decision, and delineation of seven additional functional specialties will substantially shift the very notion of dialectic, and whether that will modify the nascent transposition of wisdom's selection of first terms into methodical dialectic we noticed in 1963-1964.

5.1 Dialectic in *Method in Theology*

In contrast to *De intellectu et methodo*, in the *De methodo theologiae* course of 1963-1964 it is dialectic, not wisdom, that selects first terms.⁴³⁴ And four years later, in

⁴³⁴ Although the point is not made as explicitly in 1957, Lonergan does begin to attribute the selection of first terms to dialectic in *Insight*. For what is the evidence for the truth of metaphysics as Lonergan conceives it? What is the basis of the "long and difficult accumulation of direct and reflective insights" (CWL 3: 508) that eventually culminates in explicit metaphysics? Lonergan communicates this evidence through a military metaphor: such evidence is approached by breakthrough, encirclement, and confinement (508-509). The breakthrough is the self-affirmation of the knower; the encirclement is the protean notion of being as whatever one intelligently grasps and reasonably affirms; and the confinement is the final and actual identification of being with what is intelligently grasped and reasonably affirmed, with this identification issuing in the dialectical opposition of two contradictory notions of reality, knowing, and objectivity. I have chosen to align epistemological wisdom with the self-affirmation of the knower, since self-appropriation is the ultimate (if remote) source of the meaning of primitive notions like being, but it

the 1968 lecture “The Future of Thomism,” Lonergan explains that because it is not logic but the normative, invariant structures of subjectivity—the generators of logic—that are truly foundational, the “first principles” spoken of so frequently in classical Thomism can be transposed as transcendental method in a contemporary cognitional context.⁴³⁵ And in the 1968 Boston College lectures on transcendental philosophy and the study of religion, it is, once again, the authentic subject who is the first principle.⁴³⁶

The same theme is repeated in *Method*, with the explicit appeal to conversion reminiscent of the dialectical function of method in 1963-1964: “Conversion transforms the concrete individual to make him capable of grasping not merely conclusions but principles as well.”⁴³⁷ In turn, one’s notion of objectivity shifts according to the place given to the concrete subject in one’s theological system. When logical proof is held as fundamental, then the concrete normative subject is ignored or thought to be something that must be abstracted from for true objectivity to occur. When the concrete normative subject is positioned as central to every aspect of theology, then objectivity is affirmed as residing in the self-transcendence of that subject in the form of intellectual, religious, and moral conversion. If dialectic is concerned with principles—with what is absolutely

seems true that the dialectical aspect of metaphysical method is what proximately terminates in the basic terms of philosophy, something that does not happen until Chapter Fourteen of *Insight* (long after the self-affirmation of the knower in Chapter Eleven). The dialectical thrust of Lonergan’s transposition of Thomist wisdom in *Insight* has already been nicely captured by Coelho. His account emphasizes the transposition of *Verbum*’s epistemological wisdom into *Insight*’s generalized empirical method, which includes a crucial dialectical aspect, and *Verbum*’s metaphysical wisdom into *Insight*’s explicit metaphysics, which likewise includes a crucial dialectical aspect. See *Hermeneutics and Method*, 35-44, with a helpful summary on 47-48.

⁴³⁵ See the 1968 lecture “The Future of Thomism” in *A Second Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, CWL 13 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016), 46. The same point is repeated in Appendix 1 of the Collected Works edition of *Method in Theology*, entitled “The New Context.” It is an earlier version of what came to be Chapter One of *Method* and was likely composed sometime between 1965 and 1967. See CWL 14: xiii; 340 and editorial n. 1; 343 and editorial n. 5; 366-367.

⁴³⁶ See “Transcendental Philosophy and the Study of Religion, 3-12 July 1968, Boston College,” in *Early Works on Theological Method I*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken, CWL 22 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2010), 421-633.

⁴³⁷ CWL 14: 313.

fundamental in theological system—and conversion empowers us to grasp principles, then the question becomes how exactly dialectic involves conversion, and how exactly dialectic distinguishes between the presence and absence of conversion.⁴³⁸

5.1.1 Dialectic and Conversion

As it turns out, dialectic treats conversion through objectifying and addressing conflict. Most obviously, when the diachronic evolution of functional specialization in the mediating phase is traced, there are noted contradictory styles of research, contradictory interpretations, contradictory histories, and contradictory ways of evaluating these histories. All these may be influenced by inappropriately limited or distorted horizons—by a lack of conversion. The objectification of conversion into a horizon in foundations, the articulation of doctrines within that horizon, the systematic understanding of those doctrines, and the communication of that understanding to the current situation which produces new data in the present and for the future may also all be subject to aberration, because there can be unauthentic conversion (what one might call “alleged conversion”). And even authentic conversion is an ongoing and ever-precarious process.⁴³⁹

If horizon is the scope of our knowledge and the range of our interests, then not all differences in horizon are contradictory and thus not all our “dialectical” in the sense relevant to the fourth functional specialty. Complementary differences in horizon represent legitimate divergences in interests and specializations, for example in the

⁴³⁸ In what way conversion constitutes a “first principle” will be discussed under Wisdom as Functional Specialty: Foundations.

⁴³⁹ CWL 14: 126-127, 232, 252, 237, 254, 380, 393.

variety of professions. Genetic differences in horizon unfold successive stages in a process of development, for example in the current work studying the development in Lonergan's transposition of wisdom. Complementary horizons can be bridged and the successive movements of genetic horizons can be traced.

But dialectical differences in horizon are those that necessarily imply mutual negation: they can only be overcome through religious, intellectual, or moral conversion. What is considered true, good, beautiful in one horizon is harshly condemned as false, evil, ugly in its dialectically opposed horizon. Each of these horizons regards the rejections of its opposite as the one and only intelligent, reasonable, and responsible course of action, and will eventually, at a certain point in its development, marshal significant resources to objectify its views on intelligence, reason, responsibility, even love.

5.1.2 The Urgency of Dialectic for the First Phase of Theology

Dialectic's most fundamental task is the overturning of bias. Because historians can occupy dialectically opposed horizons, critical history does not, on the whole, issue in uniform results. Historical judgment can be flawed, exposing the need for something beyond judgment to resolve historical conflicts. The goal of interpretation is not only to understand the author but to understand one's self, since the latter grasp directly impacts the former. But conversion or lack of conversion significantly shifts the self that is to be

understood. Special research is also impacted by conversion or its absence, since differences of horizon dictate which data is noticed and which is overlooked.⁴⁴⁰

5.1.3 The Structure of Dialectic

Theology must meet the matter of value directly, since its data is the data of human consciousness, and this data is already laden with meaning.⁴⁴¹ The “new theology” Lonergan advocates for in *Method*, the theology whose path will be lit by transcendental method, is empirical, interpretive, and historical. It mediates between a religion and the significance and role of that religion in a cultural matrix.⁴⁴²

Accordingly, the central function of dialectic is “to clarify concrete instances in which authentic and inauthentic existence have given rise to oppositions within religion or within theology” and it accomplishes this through “a technique that objectifies subjective differences and promotes conversion.”⁴⁴³ This technique is comprised of an “upper blade” of operators and “lower blade” of the materials to be operated on. In a theological context it focuses directly on contradictions within and between Christian movements.

The operators of dialectic are twofold: develop positions and reverse counterpositions, the same precepts that composed the third and fourth directives of the “general method” of *De intellectu et methodo*. Positions are statements that are consistent with conversion and are developed by being integrated with new data and discoveries.

⁴⁴⁰ CWL 14: 222-223; 230-232; 394-396.

⁴⁴¹ For the significance of theology’s receptivity to data already laden with meaning “from above downward,” see Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?*, 125 and 137.

⁴⁴² CWL 14: 3; 371-378.

⁴⁴³ CWL 14: 386.

Counterpositions are statements inconsistent with conversion and are reversed by the removal of inconsistent elements. Dialectic arranges competing truth claims, classifies them, reduces them to their roots, and manifests their extremes by developing alleged positions while reversing alleged counterpositions. In all of this it prepares the way for existential encounter.

5.2 Evidence of a Transposition

If dialectic is truly a transposition of Thomist wisdom, then it must fulfill the objectives set out by Thomist wisdom. And it does. Dialectic is foundational insofar as it reduces opposed histories, interpretations, and researches to conversion and lack of conversion as opposed principles. Dialectic is consummate insofar as it initiates encounter among persons at the level of value, including transcendent value, preparing the way for what is ultimate—conversion.

Dialectic is normative insofar as it underlines the true nature of a fundamental, ongoing process in the world constituted by human meaning: authenticity is ever a withdrawal from inauthenticity, and the standard for authenticity is self-transcendence. It accents the impact “from above downwards” of values and decisions on every aspect of life, every historical investigation, every interpretation, and every inquiry of research. The unity surveyed in dialectic is of the concrete, dynamic, and contradictory oscillation between authenticity and unauthenticity that is the ongoing process of the human world. Finally, dialectic is an indispensable requirement for ensuring the unity proper to an

authentic deployment of the second phase of theology, protecting it against the destructive plurality of dialectically opposed horizons.

5.3 Dialectic as Epistemological Wisdom

As reviewed in Chapter Two, in *Verbum* epistemological wisdom is the unique act of judgment that reflects upon its nature and proportion to reality. As a specialization in decision, dialectic foregrounds self-knowledge and the radical revolution in self that is conversion in a vastly more explicit way. While Lonergan's extrapolation of Thomist wisdom's "epistemological moment" is an intentional heightening of judgment, the wisdom of dialectic is the thematization of the entire fourth level of consciousness. "It is meeting persons, appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their defects, and allowing one's living to be challenged at its very roots by their words and by their deeds."⁴⁴⁴

The dramatic difference between the operations of judgment and decision notwithstanding, the analogy of proportion is clear. Epistemological wisdom is an exceptionally self-reflective judgment of fact; dialectic is a set of judgments of value and decisions that invites exceptionally penetrating self-critique and perhaps existential decision. Epistemological wisdom posits the synthesis between our self-knowledge and our knowledge of the universe. Dialectic not only develops knowledge of the other; it also reflects the newly affirmed value of the other back on oneself, to sound out a resonance or dissonance, paving the way for a potentially self-determining and other-

⁴⁴⁴ CWL 14: 232.

embracing decision. Dialectic is the outgrowth of the reciprocal relationship between knowledge of self and knowledge of the other. It grasps the value or disvalue in the other studied by history, and from that grasp a decision proceeds to develop positions in line with conversion, to reverse counterpositions in an effort to remedy conversion's absence, and perhaps to change one's own way of thinking and living.⁴⁴⁵

The epistemological wisdom of *Verbum* was transposed in *Insight* as the self-affirmation of the knower, but *Insight*'s account of decision was underdeveloped compared to *Method*. In *Method* the idea of self-affirmation is expanded in an existential direction to become the appropriation not only of experiencing, understanding, and judging, but of deciding and loving as well.⁴⁴⁶ And so the self-affirmation of the knower becomes transcendental method. Moreover, the functional specialty of dialectic can be thought of as an extension of epistemological wisdom, but transposed into the fourth level of consciousness. Through a preparation for existential encounter rather than logical persuasion, dialectic illuminates, but does not demonstrate, the polymorphic foolishness at the heart of bias while beckoning us to the foundational, consummate, normative, and unitive wisdom of conversion.⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴⁵ CWL 14: 237-238, 254, 380-381.

⁴⁴⁶ Although Lonergan does not explicitly affirm a fifth level of love in consciousness in *Method*, it is telling that in at least one point in the text he phrases the transcendental precepts to include love, since the understanding throughout *Method* is that one transcendental precept summarizes the normative thrust of one entire level of consciousness. "It [conversion] is total surrender to the demands of the human spirit: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be in love" (CWL 14: 252). There are other places, however, where he quite clearly designates love as belonging to the level of decision (CWL 14: 103).

⁴⁴⁷ CWL 14: 251, 321, 336. Also see CWL 12: 14 and editorial n. 27 for Doran's and Monsour's suggestion that an earlier statement by Lonergan may anticipate the functional specialty dialectics: "Still, foolishness is manifold: different people are unwise in different ways."

5.4 A Further Verification: Dialectic and the Universal Viewpoint

In addition to filling in the deficiencies of the first phase and overturning bias, dialectic has a more ultimate aim—the formation of a comprehensive viewpoint. This “high and distant” aim of dialectic is a comprehensive viewpoint in which each and every contradictory viewpoint underlying conflicting Christian movements, their conflicting histories, and their conflicting interpretations is grasped in its character, oppositions, and relations with the others, forming a single unifying perspective on Christian (and perhaps even interreligious) conflict. The “high and distant” aim of dialectic sounds remarkably similar to the universal viewpoint of *Insight*, and in a footnote discussing the simplifying power of functional specialization, Lonergan asserts that this is the case.⁴⁴⁸

Recall that the concept of being is not the foundation of the explicit and critical metaphysics presented in *Insight*. Metaphysics is based, instead, on the prior, more “primitive terms” of wondering intelligence and critical reflection of concrete, normative subjectivity. As the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being, metaphysics is the highest viewpoint naturally possible and is coincident with the metaphysical wisdom of *Verbum*. But Lonergan’s metaphysics is also dialectical, evaluating any philosophical or theological claim based on its conformity to or divergence from foundational cognitional reality. Because meaning occurs within being, dialectical metaphysics can also judge the truth of an interpretation. And so within the integral, heuristic structure of metaphysical wisdom there emerges a heuristic structure, a potential totality of genetically and dialectically ordered viewpoint that Lonergan calls the “universal viewpoint.” By

⁴⁴⁸ CWL 14: 124-125; 146, n. 2.

indicating that what was termed a universal viewpoint in *Insight* becomes the functional specialty of dialectic, Lonergan also implicitly aligns wisdom with dialectic.⁴⁴⁹

6 Wisdom as Functional Specialty: Foundations

Dialectic captures the climax of the “from below upwards” movement from experience in research, up through understanding in interpretation and judgment in history, to the decision that clarifies authenticity from unauthenticity. But the decision reached by dialectic is only partial. The fourth functional specialty “tends to eliminate evidently foolish oppositions and so narrows down issues, but is not to be expected to go the roots of all conflict, for, ultimately conflicts have their ground in the heart of man.”⁴⁵⁰ In other words, dialectic cannot know for sure whether its designation of position versus counterposition is absolutely correct, as conversion actually occurs outside of the strictures of methodical consideration. What begins once dialectical analysis ends is not technically the functional specialty of foundations but conversion itself.⁴⁵¹

6.1 Foundations and Conversion

Because it only clarified conflict but could not resolve it, dialectic wielded conversion as a winnow in a somewhat gross manner. To parse position from counterposition it relied on whatever authenticity the theologian had already achieved and the way in which he was challenged by the otherness of the religious deeds, persons,

⁴⁴⁹ CWL 3: 572-591.

⁴⁵⁰ CWL 14: 134.

⁴⁵¹ CWL 14: 254, 379, 390.

and movements of history. Still, it employs conversion as a dependable compass, using it as a criterion to decide among alternatives.

Because foundations is the objectification of triple conversion itself, and the fifth functional specialty orbits around conversion as around a “first principle” in a different way than the fourth. Foundational reality is the horizon established by religious, moral, and intellectual conversion as they are operative in individuals, groups, cultures, and societies. Foundations is the objectification of that horizon; it is the existential element of the second phase of theology that shepherds the entire methodical process, even exerting a retrograde influence on the first phase.

A foundation is what is first in an ordered set. The objectification of conversion is the “first” in a set of more and more complete objectifications of the priority of existential decision and love in religious and theological development, cascading down from foundations all the way to communications. In this way foundations is the absolutely first methodical step in the mediated phase of methodical theology, the stage that directly discourses on what is and what is not, that consciously and deliberately decides “one’s horizon, one’s outlook, one’s worldview.”⁴⁵² It shapes the framework in which doctrines are affirmed, systematics draws its analogies, and communications gain traction.

⁴⁵² CWL 14: 250-253 and 394-396, with quote on 251.

6.2 Foundations and General Categories

In 1963-1964, it was dialectic rather than wisdom that judged the correct meaning of primitive terms. But from 1964 to 1972, dialectic moves from judgment to decision. And because the functional specialty of dialectic is neither fully informed by the presence of conversion nor fully capable of thematizing conversion, its approach to foundational reality is through distinction of position from counterposition. Foundations, on the other hand, mobilizes the foundational reality of conversion to determine the meaning of primitive terms which, in the thought and language of *Method*, are categories.

Foundations derives both general and special categories from its objectification of conversion. The transcendental notions ground the possibility of questions and answers, but categories make them determinate. Like all objects of knowledge, categories are intended by operations. Just as the principle of theology is not reason and not faith but reason illumined by faith, the theologian working in the fifth functional specialty concerns herself with both general and special categories, with both interiorly and religiously differentiated consciousness.

General categories regard objects that are shared between theology and other disciplines, furnishing the basic anthropological component of theology. The basis of their derivation is, in a word, transcendental method. Basic terms are the fundamental cognitive-existential operations and basic relations are their interconnections. The broadening of basic terms and relations gives rise to derived terms and relations that indicate the objects known in operations and correlative to states.

Like the wise metaphysician whose knowledge of the Supreme Cause helps him grasp the meaning of *ens*, the wisdom of the self-appropriated practitioner of transcendental method bestows transcultural and “exceptional validity” to general categories. While the explicit formulation of basic terms and values may fluctuate with cultural change, the foundational reality they signify never changes. But this remarkable soundness only enters into the fabric of theology when general categories are verified in the theologian’s own conscious living as an authentic man or woman, where they pass beyond the status of provisional models to become descriptions of reality.

6.3 Foundations and Special Categories

The lived reality of grace is universal and transcultural, one and the same gift offered to all people at all places and times. In distinction from its manifestation, which is culturally variant, the transcendence of God’s gift of love—the efficacy of religious conversion—places it above human comprehension. In at least some way, knowledge necessarily precedes all human loves, but divine love is exceptional. It is not conditioned by prior human knowledge but conditions the emergence of humanity’s spiritual, existential, cognitive, affective search for God. It is not beholden to any cultural formulation. It is, instead, the principle that infuses otherworldliness into a culture; the principle that promotes cultural progress; the principle that is trespassed when cultures decline.

In religiously differentiated consciousness the gift is orientation to transcendent mystery, and the primary and fundamental meaning of God is the term of that orientation

rather than the content of a concept. This orientation is an otherworldly falling-in-loving and being-in-love with Someone transcendent in lovableness and is thus being in love without limitations, qualifications, conditions or reservations: it is total and complete self-surrender. When theology proceeds from a theoretical differentiation of consciousness to one grounded in graced interiority, the dynamic state of otherworldly love is the transposition into a methodical theology of what in a theoretical theology was the habit of sanctifying grace. The same dynamic state, which of itself is operative grace, issues in acts of love, hope, faith, repentance, and so on, introducing the notional difference of cooperative grace. Lonergan states that the dynamic state of being in love with God is conscious with the consciousness of the fourth level, but admits a critical caveat: it is coincident not with the entirety of the highest level of human consciousness (decision) but with that level's fulfilment in religious conversion. "It takes over the peak of the soul, *apex animae*."⁴⁵³

For Lonergan, the gift of God's love that is the basic special category derived in foundations is intrinsically connected to but not identical with authentic religion. By "religious word" is meant an expression of religious meaning and value. But the religious word is twofold. There is the prior, inner word of God flooding our hearts with love. It is essentially an unmediated experience of the mystery of love and awe. Usually the inner word is not objectified but instead "remains in subjectivity as a vector, an undertow, a fateful call to dreaded holiness."⁴⁵⁴ The outward word consists in the traditions, practices, and teachings of an authentic religion. It is historically conditioned, not in a relativistic

⁴⁵³ CWL 14: 103.

⁴⁵⁴ CWL 14: 109.

manner but as demanded by the integration of religious meaning with other meanings and the de facto variation of religious expression according to different realms of meaning.

The relationship of the outer word of authentic religion to the inner word of God's love is not incidental. They both come from God, especially when the outer word marks the entrance of God's constitutive and incarnate meaning into human history, as it does with Christianity. "The religious principle is God's gift of his love, and it forms the basis of dialogue between all representatives of religion. The Christian principle conjoins the inner gift of God's love with its outer manifestation in Christ Jesus and those that follow him."⁴⁵⁵ It is constitutive of the unfolding of divine-human communion in history. So on one hand, Catholic Christians do not separate their experience of God's love from the Holy Spirit; on the other, they affirm God's gift of love given to us in the Spirit, but also embrace the universal salvific will of God and recognize that the gift may be operative in individuals who do not appropriate it to the Third Person of the Trinity.

And so theological foundations in a Christian context rests on two special basic categories at the heart of religiously differentiated consciousness: the religious experience of the gift of God's love and the terms and relations born from the specifically Christian expression of that gift. Derived special terms and relations, which Lonergan lays out in four sets, start with the subject in love with God (basic terms and relations) and move to subjects in community, the source of their togetherness in the Divine Community of the Holy Trinity, the difference between authentic and unauthentic Christianity, and the power of Christian authenticity to overcome decline by facilitating redemption.⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵⁵ CWL 14: 332.

⁴⁵⁶ CWL 14: 101-104; 108-111; 114-120; 272-274.

6.4 Evidence of a Transposition

If foundations is truly a transposition of Thomist wisdom, then it must fulfill the objectives set out by Thomist wisdom. And so it does. As the functional specialty in the second phase of theology that embodies decision, it acknowledges the transformation of the subject's existential self-constitution in conversion as foundational reality, as the ultimate "first principle." When the theologian falls in love, his being becomes being-in-love, and then that dynamic state becomes a first principle of actions, words, decisions, feelings, values, desires, and fears. It especially impacts our discernment of values: in *Method* God's gift of love is the first principle at the level of decision, because our apprehension of values depends on what we love, and God's gift transforms our apprehension of values.⁴⁵⁷ From the concrete normative subject's unrestricted questioning and native desire for self-transcendence—and their fulfillment in conversion—foundations derives basic general and special categories that act as primitive terms in theology.

Like the first principles that Thomist wisdom indirectly validated, which were formed partly from intellectual light and partly from sensory knowledge, the categories derived by foundations are the a priori, "upper blade" that are further specified, developed, and adapted by the "lower blade" of data.⁴⁵⁸ And because general categories are common to many disciplines, the combination of general and special categories allows for a sapiential function to theology.⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵⁷ CWL 14: 101 and 103, n. 12.

⁴⁵⁸ CWL 14: 273-274.

⁴⁵⁹ See the important passage from *The Triune God: Systematics*: "And so, although theology in the exercise of its sapiential function uses and should use other sciences such as logic, methodology, and

Foundations takes its stand on religiously differentiated consciousness as expressing the supernatural consummation of our natural desire for God. Because it explicitly welcomes into human consciousness Someone of the deepest meaning and the highest value, being in love with God is the consummate fulfillment of our conscious intentionality. As the existential commitment of the theologian to all that she holds dear, foundations objectifies the normative horizon of conversion. The normative dimension of foundations is most pronounced in its explicitly religious dimension, for the dynamic state of being in love with God in an unrestricted fashion transvalues all our values and the knowledge born of that love (faith) transforms all our knowing.⁴⁶⁰

Foundations provides the second phase with “the unity of a grounding horizon.”⁴⁶¹ For it provides the basis from which doctrines will choose to affirm authentic positions from the many alternatives offered by dialectic; the existential context in which systematic understanding has its full intelligibility; and the basic message of authenticity that is to be inspired through communications. Moreover, the categories derived by foundations collaborate hand-in-hand in all of the three mediated functional specialties that foundations informs.⁴⁶²

philosophy, nevertheless it is up to theology to determine the proper ends of each of these other sciences.” (CWL 12: 103 and editorial n. 59) as well as from the fall-winter 1963-1964 Method of Theology course: “The sapiential use of theology has to do with its relationships to philosophy, the human sciences, the natural sciences, the humanities, the arts, history—in a word, the rest of the academic world” (CWL 14: 102).

⁴⁶⁰ CWL 14: 102 and 111-114.

⁴⁶¹ CWL 14: 135; cf. CWL 22: 462.

⁴⁶² CWL 14: 127; 132-137, especially 135; 237-238.

6.5 Foundations as Metaphysical Wisdom

In *Method*, answers to the questions of cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics are ingrained into the very biphasic structure of the general or “basic science” that is transcendental method. As in *Insight*, all three kinds of questions and their answers come from the data of consciousness. The functional specialty of foundations heightens the normative horizon of consciousness that is conversion. When it objectifies intellectual conversion, it produces general categories—basic terms that name conscious and intentional operations, and basic relations that name elements in the dynamic structure of consciousness connecting operations with one another. Metaphysics as the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being is incorporated into foundations as one set of derived general categories. And so the metaphysics of *Insight* (and thus metaphysical wisdom) is transposed into a central category derived by foundations, a category that then becomes one of the three central elements—cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics—in the “basic and total” science of transcendental method.⁴⁶³

⁴⁶³ CWL 3: 415-428; CWL 14: 23, 27, 268, 294-295, especially ed. n. 23 on 295, and 317. The enfolding of cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics within transcendental method constitutes a significant moment in Lonergan’s thought on both method and metaphysics. Coelho sees this moment as occurring as early as 1962 and then meticulously shows that the “total and basic horizon” of the wise man in the 1963 “Metaphysics as Horizon” coincides with the “general science” (containing all three elements) that is transcendental method in the 1972 *Method*. See *Hermeneutics and Method*, 125-128, 189-192, 203, and 211.

7 Caveat to A Transposition

At this point we may notice a cognitive dissonance at a crucial location in our transposition of Thomist wisdom into Lonergan's cognitional-intentional analysis, a dissonance not explicitly negotiated before because the horizon then formed by Lonergan's notion of the subject belonged to an earlier phase of his development, one in which decision was not at the forefront. In and of itself, the fact that transcendental method is imbued with essentially existential components and necessarily existential implications, but Thomist wisdom is not,⁴⁶⁴ begs an obvious question. What is the basis of comparison between the two, and is it valid?

In an indirect response to this query, Frederick Lawrence notes that Lonergan's method navigates philosophical and theological conflict through an appeal not to argumentation but to encounter, the existential forerunner of conversion. According to Lawrence, Aquinas' synthesis of the special categories of Christian tradition and the general categories of Aristotle successfully performed the sapiential role of the control of meaning by ordering theological tasks into *lectio*, *disputatio*, and *praedicatio*. But he believes that Lonergan's dialectic and foundations, unlike the other functional specialties, find no clear correspondence in this sapiential framework. He argues for understanding

⁴⁶⁴ Although it is true that wisdom as an intellectual habit bears some relation to the will insofar as one can will to consider divine truth and then will to judge and order other truth by the measure of divine truth, Aquinas parses intellectual from moral habits precisely on the basis that one's will need not be good to exercise intellectual virtue. On this reading, one can be wise, intimately familiar with the workings of the universe in the intricate interrelations of all its parts as they form a whole, but still be quite intent on carrying out evil actions. One can quite reasonably argue that the wise person, through his contemplation of divine things, is in a privileged position to grow in love of God and neighbor, but this is not by any strict necessity in Aquinas' rendering of the natural speculative habit.

transcendental method as a transposition of Thomist wisdom but not for specifying it further.⁴⁶⁵

And yet the fact that contextual differences between Aquinas and Lonergan comprise the only significant remainder—the only “excess” in transposition—left after an analysis of the general resemblances of Thomist wisdom and transcendental method may actually suggest the accuracy of our attempt to trace Lonergan’s transposition further into functional specialization. The justification would seem to lie in what Lonergan calls an analogy of proportion, a model of conceptual development at the heart of his notion of transposition and the same mode of argumentation that Lawrence applies for the other functional specializations. In a methodical, empirically conceived theology, new developments are continuous with the old by an analogy of proportion.⁴⁶⁶

On this account, then, if the judgments surmising the role of wisdom in Aquinas’ metaphysical system are true and the judgments surmising the role of transcendental method in Lonergan’s cognitional-existential system are true, and wisdom plays the same kind of role in Aquinas as transcendental method in Lonergan, then our transposition can be verified and judged as a legitimate and truthful inference. In *Method* transcendental method’s functionality in comparison to that of Thomist wisdom is one of even greater expansion than was present in the early to mid-1960s. If we grant on the basis of our immediately preceding argument that a transposition is valid, it still seems that

⁴⁶⁵ Frederick G. Lawrence, “Lonergan and Aquinas: The Postmodern Problematic of Theology and Ethics,” in *The Ethics of Aquinas*, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 437-455, especially 439 and 447-448.

⁴⁶⁶ “If a theology will be continuous with Thomism, for example, it will stand to modern science, modern scholarship, and an associated philosophy as Thomism stood to Aristotelianism.” See “A New Pastoral Theology,” in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, CWL 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 293.

transcendental method is not a coextensive transposition of wisdom.⁴⁶⁷ Rather, it is a superabundant one: as the crucial 1963-1964 *De methodo theologiae* course explained, wisdom is included within transcendental method. Transcendental method surely performs the same functions and objectives in Lonergan's system that wisdom did in Aquinas', but its line of vision stretches far beyond what the proportion of analogy, in and of itself, sees.

8 Wisdom as Conversion

At this juncture we may ask why Thomist wisdom becomes dialectic and foundations rather than potentially triform conversion itself, the subject's "self-transcendence reaching its summit."⁴⁶⁸ After all, wisdom is foundational, consummate, normative, and unitive, and conversion embodies all of these dimensions in an essential way. Indeed, wisdom and conversion would appear to be intimately conjoined, if not identical. But how can Thomist wisdom be transposed by Lonergan into all of these things—transcendental method, dialectic, foundations, and conversion—without contradiction or confusion?

The answer lies in the structure of the "new foundation" of the renewed theology Lonergan maps out in *Method* and in his distinction between lived reality, spontaneous

⁴⁶⁷ This "excess" is perhaps what stops Lawrence from extending his argument to dialectic and foundations. I concur with Lawrence that Lonergan elevates Aquinas' hermeneutics of interiority from a primarily cognitive basis to an existential and practical hermeneutics that enfolds the cognitive within itself. But the judgment transposing Aquinas' primarily metaphysical account of wisdom into what will ultimately become Lonergan's primarily cognitive-existential context (as the next chapter will show even more strongly) seems sound to me, as long as it answers all relevant questions (as the next chapter will do more thoroughly).

⁴⁶⁸ "Philosophy of God," 1972.

objectification, and reflective objectification.⁴⁶⁹ The new foundation is not a set of first principles enfolding primitive terms but the theologian transformed by conversion.

Understood as the subjective aspect of conversion, wisdom is the radical transformation of self-appropriation and self-knowledge into self-transcendence that occurs, ultimately, under the influence of grace. It is the bare fact, the lived reality, the ongoing and ever-precarious process of religious, intellectual, and moral conversion.

The wisdom of conversion also has an objective aspect. Conversion is spontaneously objectified in the dramatically changed attitudes, ways of thinking, speaking, judging, valuing, and acting that are only proximately removed from the lived reality of conversion itself. For example, religious conversion is spontaneously objectified in a transformed way of living imbued with the fruits of the Spirit; moral conversion is spontaneously objectified in an apprehension and enactment of value in alignment with what is truly good over against individual and group bias, with success experienced as a happy conscience and failure experienced as an uneasy one; and intellectual conversion is spontaneously objectified in the consistent practice of raising and pursuing all further questions over against the short-sightedness of common sense bias and perhaps also the practical (but not yet explicitly thematized) awareness that truth is what is known in verified judgments and knowledge of the true is knowledge of being.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶⁹ CWL 14: 390.

⁴⁷⁰ See Doran, "What Is Conversion?", 2011, 18-19 for these two more spontaneous implications of intellectual conversion. His understanding of the complexity of intellectual conversion in Lonergan is extremely helpful, because Lonergan often speaks of intellectual conversion from the angle of its full thematization in a particular intellectual position, but this would seem to me to be a reflective rather than spontaneous objectification of intellectual conversion.

Because we have the ability not only to undergo and spontaneously express conversion in our lives but also to explicitly advert to it, formulate it, affirm its presence in our lives, decide to continuously renew it, and surrender ourselves to the fostering of communal transformation, conversion has a reflective objectification—what might be called the “superstructure” or “thematization” of conversion. Such objectification is reflective “when one endeavors to state just what is the source, what are the conditions, what are the full implications of conversion.”⁴⁷¹

While dialectic reflectively objectifies a nascent awareness of value and disvalue into a hypothetical schema of positions and counterpositions, foundations boldly moves this reflective objectification a vast step forward by fully and certainly stating the whole horizon fixed by religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. Since every subject knows and observes transcendental method to the extent that he or she is attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, this method is lived experience. As the self-appropriation that applies operations as intentional to operations as conscious, transcendental method is spontaneous objectification. Finally, the reflective objectification of transcendental method would seem to lie in the formal and well-developed thematization of this method, with its long litany of implications, in a work like *Method*.

Just as consciousness is not an operation above experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding but the quality of experience, of self-presence, that accompanies each kind of operation and morphs along with it, wisdom in our conscious intentionality is not a redundant reflection on self-reflection or a self-appropriation of self-

⁴⁷¹ CWL 14: 390.

appropriation at a potentially infinite remove.⁴⁷² Rather, the subjective aspect of wisdom is simply self-appropriation reaching its ultimate transformative height in the self-transcendence of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. And the objective aspect of wisdom is any and all direct objectifications, both spontaneous and reflective objectifications, of that foundational reality.

9 Summary: Wisdom as Transcendental Method

Chapter Three ended with the anticipation—already supported by Crowe, Coelho, and Dadosky—that the various functions of Thomist wisdom are to be taken over by the role of transcendental method. With the foregoing review of *Method*, we are finally in a position to fully verify that hypothesis in the affirmative.⁴⁷³ We have witnessed that each of wisdom’s major functions—considering the highest causes, judging, and ordering—are amply incorporated, in various ways, into the notion of transcendental method, as are wisdom’s objectives—foundation, consummation, normativity, and unity—into the functions of transcendental method. As Dadosky comments, “The transcendental precepts of be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, and be responsible are the application of the habitual propensity of wisdom both as foundation and goal.”⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷² CWL 14: 12 and 18.

⁴⁷³ To my knowledge, this hypothesis was first formulated by Crowe in 1984 and then taken up again by Coelho in 2001, Lawrence in 2002, Doran and Monsour in 2007, Mabry in 2013, and Dadosky in 2014. Crowe and Coelho both suggest that the transposition of wisdom into transcendental method should be specified further into dialectic and foundations, while the remaining scholars stop at transcendental method at large, with Dadosky emphasizing the new order ushered into theology by the wisdom of functional specialization. In contrast to earlier interlocutors, Dadosky analyzes divine wisdom in *De redemptione*, which is the wisdom of the Cross in healing the disorder within human persons and the universe introduced by sin. See the conclusion for an analysis of *De redemptione*.

⁴⁷⁴ “Lonergan on Wisdom,” 62.

But the transposition of Thomist wisdom into transcendental method supersedes even what an analogy of proportion suggests. What propels the enfoldment of sapiential functions into the two functional specializations that emphasize existential decision, judgments of value, and conversion is precisely what Lonergan clarifies throughout *Method* and other works from the early 1970s: it is only on the basis of a full understanding and acceptance of modern science, modern philosophy, and modern scholarship that transcendental method makes the most sense and bears the clearest urgency. Although the transcendence of truth guarantees the possibility of valid transposition, Aquinas' personal, cultural, intellectual, and historical context is simply not the same as Lonergan's, and this legitimate, but not contradictory, difference in relative horizon makes for a strong distinction in their respective conceptions of wisdom.⁴⁷⁵ And yet Lonergan's transposition of Aquinas' notion of wisdom retains the attributes that were most essential to Aquinas' conception—foundation, consummation, normativity, unity, and the ability to consider highest causes and judge and order everything else according to that consideration—and greatly enriches them, advancing their significance in a cognitional-existential context responsive to contemporary theological and cultural challenges.

⁴⁷⁵ As true, truth is in the knower, but as transcendent, it is independent of any subject. Once the evidence for the fulfillment of the conditions for a conception to be affirmed is sufficiently grasped, we know with confidence—and know that we know—that such a thing exists or is true. Nothing less than the sufficiency of the evidence guarantees the transcendence of truth, and yet nothing more is demanded by our rationality to issue in the absolute positing of judgment. CWL 24: 118.

Chapter Five: *Sapientia* in the Fourth Stage of Meaning: Wisdom as the Self-Surrender of Love in Post-*Method* Works (1972-1982)

Despite the relative paucity of data on wisdom in Lonergan's corpus from 1972 through 1982, his explicit statements on and implicit understanding of Thomist wisdom in the last segment of his scholarly career are remarkably multidimensional. Lonergan's transposition of wisdom has occupied a genetic rather than dialectical horizon through the thirty-plus years of development reviewed thus far, even including the landmark shifts of *Insight* and *Method*. And given his consistent support for a theology analogously continuous with the permanent achievements of Aquinas, wisdom can be appropriately interpreted in the last set of Lonergan's writings from a hermeneutic of continuity. Accordingly, the implicit identification of wisdom with the living experience of conversion in *Method*, spontaneously objectified in changed meanings, values, and patterns of living and reflectively objectified in the functional specialties of dialectic and foundations, will be applied as a simplifying hermeneutic to the seemingly disparate data of Lonergan's last decade of scholarly life.

In all these three permutations of wisdom as conversion, the transposition of wisdom into conversion remains at the level of decision, an aspect of consciousness that Doran describes as essential to the second stage of development in Lonergan's position on the subject. But he designates the two final stages in Lonergan's position on the subject as the increasing centrality of love and the movement of love "from above downward" in consciousness.⁴⁷⁶ Doran's is one of several voices affirming that a distinct way of being conscious, that of love, represents not only a distinct stage in the

⁴⁷⁶ *Theology and the Dialectics of History*, 19-33.

development of Lonergan's theory of subjectivity but also a "fifth level" of consciousness. Lonergan's account of love substantially intersects with his account of conversion (especially religious conversion) and thus can be incorporated into yet another, fuller transposition of Thomist wisdom.⁴⁷⁷

Thus in what follows a further, fuller transposition of Thomist wisdom, now conceived as self-transcendence in community or self-surrender to communion, both human and divine, will be constructed. The overarching context around wisdom in Lonergan's later writings comes from his notion of human subjectivity as self-transcendent and wisdom as successive self-transcendence sublated by love, with the later notion necessarily involving love as a distinct level of consciousness. And so conversion, self-transcendence, and love will first be studied (Sections 1, 2, and 3). Then, as with the analysis of wisdom as transcendental method in Chapter Four, Lonergan's transposition of wisdom as love will be broken down into the ways it fulfills foundational, consummate, normative, and unitive functions, mirroring these same roles played by *sapientia* in Aquinas. Under this fourfold rubric, the sapiential nature of all love will be underscored (Section 4) before attending to religious love as a more specific, and even more ultimate, form of existential wisdom (Section 5). Since explicit mention of wisdom as love occurs infrequently in Lonergan's works, relevant material throughout Lonergan's corpus and in the secondary discussion will be examined, while still giving prominence to Lonergan's later works for their overall emphasis on love.

⁴⁷⁷ In fact, beginning in the 1972 "Philosophy of God" lectures, Lonergan himself explicitly recognized a fifth level, although this recognition sometimes seems to have waxed and waned. See Jeremy Blackwood's groundbreaking *And Hope Does Not Disappoint: Love, Grace, and Subjectivity in the Work of Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J.* (Milwaukee: Marquette University, 2017).

1 Conversion and Self-Transcendence

Chapter Four ended with the position that the lived experience, spontaneous objectification, and reflective objectification of conversion are foundational, consummate, normative, and unitive relative to other key elements in Lonergan's anthropology. And so conversion acts as an implicit transposition of Aquinas' notion of wisdom. Conversion is indeed a concept as basic and indispensable to Lonergan's thought as wisdom is to Aquinas'. And even in his post-*Method* works, Lonergan does not seem to abandon his tacit alignment of wisdom with conversion.

For example, in the 1979 lecture "Horizons and Transpositions," Lonergan compares the notion of wisdom with the notion of horizon. From one angle, wisdom would seem to be more expansive, because it regards all that exists. But horizon, Lonergan explains, is actually the broader term; it is the boundary of a subject's interests and knowledge, regardless of whether her interests are truly worthwhile values or what she thinks is true is actually true. Precisely because wisdom concerns being—all that is—it excludes the nonbeing of human aberrations, aberrations both in knowledge and morality.⁴⁷⁸ In the sphere of morality wisdom transcends the sinful attitude of constant self-seeking to embody what is truly good, what is truly of value. But in the concrete dynamics of human living, wisdom can only consistently embody what is really true and what is really good by conversion. As Crowe remarks, "The wise person sees beyond the

⁴⁷⁸ CWL 17: 426.

horizon of the unwise.”⁴⁷⁹ And so wisdom is not any or all horizons but the horizon that objectifies multiform conversion.⁴⁸⁰

In *Method* and beyond, conversion represents the high point of self-transcendence as well as what makes consistent self-transcendence even possible. Without question, intellectual, moral, religious, and psychic conversion are “fundamental forms of self-transcendence”⁴⁸¹; they are absolutely necessary for authenticity. But conversion is not the only modality of self-transcendence. The transposition of Thomist wisdom in Lonergan’s later work demands that we situate wisdom in a larger movement of self-transcendence than simply conversion. There are at least two reasons for this situating. First, although it is made consistently authentic and pure only through religious conversion, the naturally proportionate love of human community characteristic of the wise person—clearly a central instantiation of self-transcendence—is not completely coextensive with any conversion, raising the question of how such natural love can be grafted onto Lonergan’s later transposition of wisdom. Second, this exact question is answered for us in 1974 when it is within the larger location of successive sublations sublimated by being-in-love, including the naturally proportionate love of human community, that Lonergan himself suggests that Thomist wisdom should be retained.

⁴⁷⁹ “Rhyme and Reason: On Lonergan’s Foundations for the Works of the Spirit,” 320, from *Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes*, ed. Michael Vertin (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2000).

⁴⁸⁰ CWL 17: 415 and 424-426. Recall that this same point is made over ten years earlier, in the 1963 “Metaphysics as Horizon.”

⁴⁸¹ CWL 14: 313.

1.1 The Converted Self as the Transcending Self

Expounding on Lonergan's 1974 essay "Self-Transcendence: Intellectual, Moral, Religious,"⁴⁸² Doran reviews each conversion as a "movement from" and a "movement toward." Moral conversion turns us from the apparently good to the really good and enacts a transformation of feeling, from feelings that are inherently self-interested (satisfying or dissatisfying, pleasant or unpleasant) to feelings that are intentional responses to values as these are interrelated according to an integral scale correspondent to the structure of consciousness itself. And intellectual conversion—the transposition of the epistemological wisdom of *Verbum* into the self-affirmation of the knower in *Insight*—replaces the insidiously destructive myth that knowing is simply taking a good look with the "startling strangeness" of the realization that the real is known through true judgment.

Through the experience of a supernatural love, religious conversion transports us to a mysterious new horizon of being and acting whose unrestricted and unconditional source is entitatively disproportionate to human nature. Existentially first but also intellectually in a derivative way, religious conversion is a movement away from the distorted worldview in which what is actually proximate is held to be ultimate; it is a

⁴⁸² "Self-Transcendence: Intellectual, Moral, Religious," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, CWL 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 313-331.

movement toward the authentic worldview that humanity is not the terminal value because there exists Someone greater than humanity.⁴⁸³

Psychic conversion recovers the integrity of the aesthetic dramatic dimension of human living. It transforms from a repressive to a constructive function “the censorship exercised with respect to the entire field of what is received in empirical consciousness.”⁴⁸⁴ Not everything that is given is received into one’s empirical consciousness, whether that be data “from below” (from the neural unconscious, the fragmentary consciousness of the dream, and from the outside world that we sense in what is normally meant by “experience”) or “from above” in the form of communally received meanings and values.⁴⁸⁵ Only that which one is open to receive is received. As explained by Doran, this censorship is exercised by dramatically patterned intentional consciousness as well as the habitual accumulation of one’s insights, judgments, and decisions as they join with one’s imagination and one’s mindset.

The emergence of these images and affects is necessary for a subject to live from a vital connection between what Lonergan in *The Triune God: Systematics* describes as being conscious in “two ways,” one way through our sensibility, replete with desires, fears, joys, and sorrows, and another way through the progressive outworking of conscious intentionality, in which we experience, understand, judge, and decide.⁴⁸⁶ An integral rather than distorted emergence of these sensible elements into the higher levels of conscious intentionality is crucial, since these images and affects not only emerge in

⁴⁸³ Doran, “What Does Bernard Lonergan Mean by ‘Conversion’?,” Essay 40 in *Essays in Systematic Theology: An E-Book*, Lonergan Resource (2011), 1-19, <http://lonerganresource.com/book.php?1>, accessed October 24, 2018. Cf. similar language of “from” and “to” applied to conversion in CWL 14: 392.

⁴⁸⁴ Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?*, 111.

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 124-143.

⁴⁸⁶ CWL 12: 139.

the transition from neural unconsciousness into the psychic consciousness, the transition whose integral functioning is effected by psychic conversion. These images and affects also shepherd successful cognitive performance and help prepare our affective and intersubjective life for its ultimate completion in the vertical finality of interpersonal love, including divine love.⁴⁸⁷

In each and every conversion an about-face occurs, and thus the newly transcending self is a denial of the transcended self.⁴⁸⁸ The “movement from” in each conversion is not a rejection of the de facto limitation proper to being human; it is a repudiation of deviation. But the transformed self toward which conversion moves is a greater self, a new self, the true self. This “greater self” is marked not just by the repudiation of unauthenticity but by the embrace of authenticity that is self-transcendence.⁴⁸⁹ Thus the converted self is the transcending self. But if self-transcendence is the common result of the dynamic, personal, communal, and historical process that is each different type of conversion, might there not exist a common waywardness that each type of conversion also overturns in some manner?

⁴⁸⁷ Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?*, 109-122, especially 115-116 and 167-168. Also see “What Does Bernard Lonergan Mean by ‘Conversion’?”, 19-20.

⁴⁸⁸ CWL 14: 105 and 107. In the 1969 Method in Theology seminar at Regis College, Lonergan uses the language of the “self qua transcended and the self qua transcending,” explaining that the self that is transcended is the one not yet in love (in need of religious conversion); the one that seeks satisfactions above all, neglecting the question of value (in need of moral conversion); and the one that is enclosed by a false image of knowledge (in need of intellectual conversion). See Archive Entry 52200DTE060, 35-36, <https://www.bernardlonergan.com/pdf/52200DTE060.pdf>. Accessed on October 3, 2018.

⁴⁸⁹ See CWL 14: 329-330 and Doran, “What Does Bernard Lonergan Mean by ‘Conversion’?”, 6-19.

1.2 Conversion as from Lovelessness to Being-in-Love

Doran answers this question in the affirmative, analyzing each of the conversions through the primary template that is the essence of religious conversion: a movement from the radical lovelessness or self-enclosure of the isolated individual to the self-transcendence of being-in-love. Doran portrays lovelessness as the fundamental state of existential being in which one is convinced (whether articulated or not) that one is ultimately alone in this universe, even if one has human companionship.⁴⁹⁰ This isolation corresponds to sinfulness as distinct from moral evil, sinfulness as the privation of total loving.⁴⁹¹ It is broken most fundamentally and definitively in religious conversion, which floods the individual's heart with the awareness of being loved in a transcendent and unconditional fashion and empowers him or her to love God in return and to love all others with the love of God.⁴⁹²

This reorientation of one's own self-presence as a being-with-a-Transcendent-Other reverberates through the other three conversions. For it is precisely the privation of total loving that makes the moral criterion of "what's in it for me" appear as an unquestioned, normative necessity and keeps us from asking whether some satisfactions may only be apparently good. And it is precisely the horizon of total lovableness and total loving that makes us consistently seek the true good, not only for oneself but for all others. Moreover, it is precisely the self-enclosure of radical lovelessness that inappropriately constricts the range of one's interests and concerns, and it is precisely

⁴⁹⁰ Doran, "What Does Bernard Lonergan Mean by 'Conversion'?", 12.

⁴⁹¹ CWL 14: 228.

⁴⁹² Something can be experienced without being adverted to or thematized. In this way it is quite possible to be loved by God and to love God in return, in a supernatural way, without perceiving it in the manner that other elements of experience are perceived because and inasmuch as they are adverted to.

intellectual conversion that opens up the cognitional field so that we can pursue questions of meaning and value beyond ruthlessly utilitarian aims. Religious conversion fully emancipates our desire to know by lifting psychic resistance to asking relevant questions.⁴⁹³

But perhaps it is the need for psychic conversion that most directly connects to religious conversion's transformation of individualistic aloneness. As outlined below, Lonergan seems to draw a direct line, pulsating "vertically" up from the unconscious and the psyche, through intentional operations, to the state of being-in-love, including otherworldly love. It is through falling and being-in-love that the subject achieves affective self-transcendence.⁴⁹⁴ As Doran conceptualizes it, the vital stream of our psychic life can be a nourishing source for the affective self-transcendence of love to the precise degree that it is allowed to flow freely, without undue censorship from dramatically patterned intentionality and imagination over neural demands, and allowed to connect with the intentional operations of experience, understanding, judgment, and decision that likewise support and guide our love for self, others, and God.⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹³ Doran, "What Does Bernard Lonergan Mean by 'Conversion'?", 7-9.

⁴⁹⁴ CWL 14: 270.

⁴⁹⁵ Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?*, 167-168. Doran distinguishes between psychic conversion and affective conversion; the latter is the "cumulative product of the conversion process." Ibid., 228, n. 79. Construed along the lines suggested by Doran, affective conversion is what Lonergan means when he instructs us that "In the measure that that summit [being-in-love with God] is reached, then the supreme value is God, and other values are God's expression of his love in this world, in its aspirations, and in its goal. In the measure that one's love of God is complete, then values are whatever one loves and evils are whatever one hates so that, in Augustine's phrase, if one loves God, one may do as one pleases, *Ama Deum et fac quod vis*. Then affectivity is of a single piece." (From "Horizons," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, CWL 17 [Toronto: University of Toronto], 2004, 18.)

2 Successive Degrees of Self-Transcendence

Lonergan distinguishes religious, moral, and intellectual conversion and Doran has found partly in Lonergan the basis for a psychic conversion. Lonergan conceives of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion as “three distinct phases in the unfolding of the human spirit, of that eros for self-transcendence” that goes beyond itself cognitively in knowledge, effectively in morality, unrestrictedly in religious love.⁴⁹⁶ If the intellectual, moral, and religious are three phases in one single thrust to self-transcendence, phases that harmonize with each other, then the psychic conversion that helps transform the affects accompanying intentional operations cannot be discordant with any of these other moments in self-transcendence; rather, it frees the subject to operate in the sphere of intentionality more authentically.⁴⁹⁷

How can this single massive thrust to self-transcendence be specified apart from conversion, in a way that forms the larger context in which conversion occurs and is situated both theoretically and methodically? In at least five relatively late works in

⁴⁹⁶ “Natural Knowledge of God,” in *A Second Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, CWL 13 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016), 110.

⁴⁹⁷ Strictly speaking, the “lowest” level of consciousness, that of the psyche, as well as the “highest,” that of interpersonal love, are not intentional, because they do not refer to objects. (Here what I mean by “psyche” is the subconscious, what is coming to the fore in the dream, what is more immediately the juncture with the neural unconsciousness than is experience. But “psyche” can also refer to the first intentional level of consciousness, experience, and Doran sometimes uses it that way. In any case, in *Method* Lonergan tells us that he uses the word “intentional” in a psychological sense, to give language to a basic fact about experience, understanding, judging, and deciding—they refer to objects. By and through operations, the subject becomes aware of objects and the objects becomes present to the subject, and this presence is a psychological event. CWL 14: 11. Correlative to his definition of intentional is Lonergan’s notion of object: “an object is simply the referred content of an intentional act” and “an object is what is intended in questioning and becomes known by answering questions.” See CWL 17: 22 and CWL 12: 103.

All of this is not to say, however, that the level of psychic consciousness, the level of love, oneself, and another subject besides oneself cannot all become objects in the sense of being conceptually objectified. And in a secondary meaning Lonergan gives to the word “object”—“that towards which self-transcending heads”—clearly other subjects are objects insofar as they are known and loved (CWL 12: 111-112; CWL 17: 21-23).

Lonergan's corpus—"Mission and the Spirit" (1974), "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness" (1977), "Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon" (1978), "Horizons and Transpositions" (1979), and "A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion" (1980)—Lonergan characterizes the one, unified unfolding of the human spirit in terms of "successive degrees of self-transcendence."⁴⁹⁸ And he will explicitly claim that these successive degrees of self-transcendence transpose Thomist wisdom. Let us piece together from these various sources a fuller picture of the human spirit and where wisdom resides.

2.1 Horizontal Processes and Horizontal Finality

In "Horizons and Transpositions" and "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness," Lonergan elucidates the dialectical development of history through an ingenious appropriation into cognitional-existential terms of Aristotle's definition of nature as an immanent principle of movement and rest. A first component of this appropriation is captured by what Lonergan calls "a series of horizontal processes."⁴⁹⁹ The absolutely most basic horizontal process is what Lonergan terms the "undifferentiated eros" of our unconscious. The "hidden root" of our conscious intentional activity is, it turns out, not conscious or intentional at all. It houses primordial desires and fears but is also "pregnant" with the dreams and fears, memories and anticipations that will come to inhabit the fragmentarily conscious psyche as well as the receptivity of fully conscious experience.

⁴⁹⁸ CWL 16: 200.

⁴⁹⁹ CWL 17: 413.

Once the subject begins dreaming, there emerges the distinctly psychic self, the subject that is only “fragmentarily conscious.”⁵⁰⁰ In this most primitive form of consciousness, the subject has not yet actually achieved any form of self-transcendence; however, in her pregnant symbolic “dream of the morning,” she is anticipating her self-transcendence in the manner of images. She is concerned with what is other than her, although not yet even awake.⁵⁰¹

Next come the horizontal processes coincident with the four levels of consciousness so familiar to any student of Lonergan. Now awake and experiencing, the subject tends to the larger environment in a movement toward the outer stimuli of sensations, perceptions, and feelings. After experience, each subsequent horizontal process manifests our freedom, spiritual exigencies, and potential for self-transcendence more and more clearly. After experience, each intentional level has its own principle of movement—the spontaneous emergence of questions—and each has its own principle of rest—the satisfactory answering of these questions.

In “Horizons and Transpositions,” Lonergan talks about nature as a series of horizontal processes, but it is not difficult to grasp that at least the conscious intentional processes in this series—experience, understanding, judgment, and decision—are instances of what Lonergan described, more than thirty years earlier, as instances of horizontal finality. In the 1943 “Finality, Love, Marriage,” horizontal finality is the relation of a thing to its commensurate end, whether that be of an appetite to its

⁵⁰⁰ See CWL 17: 316 as well as “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” in *A Third Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, CWL 16 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017), 169.

⁵⁰¹ As Lonergan puts it, in the dream there have appeared “both a self and a self’s conscious relation to some other.” From the 1969 lecture “Faith and Beliefs,” in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, CWL 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 33.

proportionate motive or a process to its proportionate term.⁵⁰² As will be shown forthwith, this type of finality will be contrasted with vertical finality in Lonergan's description of the "ascensional structure"⁵⁰³ of human subjectivity in general, the relationship of lower to higher levels of consciousness, and of human being in general to the divine nature and the gift or self-communication of that divine nature.

2.2 Vertical Process and Vertical Finality

Each horizontal process is distinct, but with each higher one supervening upon the lower and involving greater self-transcendence. What is more, traversing through these horizontal processes is a vertical process that

springs from an undifferentiated eros, commonly referred to as the unconscious, influences in turn each of the horizontal movements, and finds its proper goal beyond them in a self-transcending being-in-love that begins in the home, reaches out to the tribe, the city-state, the nation, mankind, and finds its anchor and its strength in the agape of the New Testament.⁵⁰⁴

And so a series of horizontal processes join with a single vertical process to yield an approximation of how human nature actually operates in the concrete. Conceived in this way, our concrete human nature, according to Lonergan, is a "tidal movement" that begins before consciousness, unfolds through experience, understanding, judgment, and decision, and finds rest only beyond all of these, in the dynamic state of being-in-love.

⁵⁰² For example, the varied acts of reflecting, weighing and marshalling the evidence, and verifying that are "movement" at the level of judgment are commensurate to that level's term or "rest," the inner assent or dissent of an actual judgment. See "Finality, Love, Marriage," in *Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988), 17-23. Hereafter *Collection* is cited as CWL 4. The notions of horizontal and vertical finality return in the 1974 "Mission and the Spirit" as well. See CWL 16: 22.

⁵⁰³ From "A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion," in *A Third Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, CWL 16 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017), 199.

⁵⁰⁴ CWL 17: 413.

What in “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness” was the beginning of a “tidal movement” is referred to in “Mission and the Spirit” as “the passionateness of being.”⁵⁰⁵ The “passionateness of being” is an upwardly directed eros, the aesthetic-dramatic dimension of human life that underpins, accompanies, and overarches the subject’s conscious intentionality. This aesthetic-dramatic dimension of human life underpins intentional consciousness in the transition from the neural unconscious to the psychic conscious; accompanies intentional consciousness in lending a mass and momentum of feeling to experience, understanding, judging, and deciding, making “even our exercise of these operations a dramatic sequence of events,”⁵⁰⁶ to quote Doran; and overarches intentional consciousness to transform the elemental “we” of primordial intersubjectivity into the interpersonal relations of loving communion.⁵⁰⁷

While it is the ultimate term of vertical process, the consummate *propter hoc quod*, love itself can be construed as a horizontal process. As a principle of movement, love is both purgative and illuminative: it withdraws us from selfishness and calls us to ever more fervent self-sacrifice (purgative), but it does so within a larger clarity of purpose and strength of commitment to the good of the beloved (illuminative). As a principle of rest, love stops at nothing until union with the beloved is achieved (unitive).⁵⁰⁸

This “tidal movement” is a vertical process in which each successive moment is, proximately in relation to the next and remotely in relation to even higher levels, a

⁵⁰⁵ CWL 16: 169 and 28.

⁵⁰⁶ *What Is Systematic Theology?*, 166.

⁵⁰⁷ CWL 16: 28-29.

⁵⁰⁸ CWL 16: 169. In *Method*, these traditional three ways of spiritual growth are applied specifically to otherworldly love, but here he appears to make no distinction. See CWL 14: 271.

manifestation of “vertical finality.”⁵⁰⁹ In cognitional-existential terms, it is self-transcendence. In metaphysical terms, vertical finality is to an end higher than the proportionate end; like all cases of finality, vertical finality is a relation that is grounded in potency and thus obscure, known only when actuated to some degree.⁵¹⁰ It presupposes a hierarchy of entities and ends in which the lower is subordinate to the higher or, in the language of “Finality, Love, and Marriage,” it is the relation of any lower being or lower level of appetite and process to any higher being or higher level of appetite and process.⁵¹¹

In evolution as in cognitional theory, instrumental and participative vertical finality conjoin, since nothing stops the lower from not only serving but also entering into the higher. This mixture of instrumental and participative vertical finality is typified by the notion of sublation that Lonergan applies to the relationship of one level of consciousness to another. A sublating set of operations certainly introduces something new and distinct; it goes beyond the sublated set of operations and represents a new principle of conscious intentional activity. But sublating operations also integrally preserve the sublated operations in all their proper perfection and significance, giving them a higher organization, an extended range, and a higher relevance.⁵¹² Judgment, for example, is the affirmation or negation of a conception of understanding, not the wholesale transformation of that conception into something foreign. But understanding

⁵⁰⁹ For example, in *Insight* Lonergan alleges that the unconscious neural level is an upwardly directed dynamism seeking fuller realization proximately at the sensitive psychic level but also remotely (and no less truly) on the even higher levels of art, the drama of human community, philosophy, culture, and religion.

⁵¹⁰ CWL 3: 479 and 482; CWL 16: 25-26.

⁵¹¹ CWL 4: 20.

⁵¹² CWL 17: 36.

also teleologically serves judgment; the intelligible is incomplete without the true and the real.

The absolute finality of human being to God is vertical finality in the strictest sense, since the divine order is beyond the proportion of any possible natural creature. But the fact that the vertical finality of our nature to God's glory is absolute does not limit its telos to the instrumental type by which we are subordinate to and serve the divine. By faith we also proclaim that, through God's personal self-communication, we somehow enter into and participate in the divine life.⁵¹³

And as the complexity of the universe almost demands and logic certainly allows, one and the same thing bears horizontal finality to its commensurate end, vertical finality to a relatively disproportionate level of being or appetite or process, and absolute finality to the absolutely disproportionate self-sufficient Goodness. If the entire universe operates thus, human nature is a microcosm of the order of the universe, since it is a series of horizontal processes traversed by a vertical process. In each individual human subject, vertical finality not only names the relation among conscious intentional operations but also expresses the teleological line Lonergan draws from the neural unconscious to the psychic conscious and up even further to the conscious state of being-in-love. Running through all our horizontal processes is "the vertical drive from undifferentiated eros to agape."⁵¹⁴ But as vertical finality speaks most elegantly to concrete plurality, in "an aggregate of self-transcending individuals there is the

⁵¹³ CWL 4: 20-23; CWL 16: 22-23.

⁵¹⁴ CWL 17: 415.

significant coincidental manifold in which can emerge a new creation,”⁵¹⁵ the community borne by love, whether that be a family, a people, or a religion.

2.3 Wisdom as Successive Self-Transcendence Sublated by Love

This distinction between horizontal and vertical finality in human subjectivity may help contextualize Lonergan’s explicit assertion in the 1974 lecture “Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation” that wisdom is not simply conversion (the implicit claim of *Method*) but the entire movement of self-transcendence in human subjectivity. Considered comprehensively, this movement includes the self-transcending structure of the subject’s intentional consciousness in multiple linked horizontal processes, which is sublimated “vertically” by being-in-love, and this most prominently and preeminently in religious conversion:

For him [Aquinas] theology was not only science but—something better—wisdom; and this we can retain in terms of the successive sublations observed in intentionality analysis, where the curiosity of sense is taken over by the inquiry of intelligence, where inquiry is taken over by rational reflection, where reflection prepares the way for responsible deliberation, where all are sublimated by being-in-love—in love with one’s family, in love with the human community, in love with God and his universe.⁵¹⁶

Here the phrase of “successive sublations” calls to mind “the tidal movement” that is the normative source of meaning in history, for that movement was described in

⁵¹⁵ CWL 16: 29.

⁵¹⁶ “Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation,” in *A Third Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, CWL 16 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017), 51. Interestingly, in *Insight* Lonergan associates sublimation, whose more original context would appear to be depth psychology, with potency as the ground of finality, confirming his account of love as involving vertical finality in an essential way. See CWL 3: 479.

similar language as “an ongoing process of self-transcendence.”⁵¹⁷ The emergence of consciousness from unconsciousness represents a degree of self-transcendence no less genuine than do the intentional operations, but Lonergan chooses here to highlight the successive sublations revealed by intentionality analysis.

If we read the passage from “Aquinas Today” in the wider context of “the tidal movement” of concrete human nature as it mounts from the unconscious to conscious intentional operations to rest only in love, Lonergan seems to be suggesting that Thomist wisdom is best transposed as this ongoing process of self-transcendence. And this ongoing process of successive sublation has what might be termed an intentional dimension of consciousness in the unfolding of sensitivity, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility, and a more explicitly interpersonal dimension of consciousness in the state of being-in-love, which sublates everything else. Taken together, these successive sublations form a sapiential structure in human subjectivity.

The intentional dimension of sapiential self-transcendence—the natural unfolding of human intentionality as it experiences, understands, judges, and decides in a series of “horizontal processes” that have their own proportionate terms while also serving and entering into higher levels according to vertical finality—has already been implicitly transposed by Lonergan as transcendental method. For transcendental method is the appropriation of one’s own foundational, consummate, normative, and unitive cognitional-existential structure. Further, the implicit transposition of wisdom as the lived experience of conversion indicates the sapiential facets of a vertical exercise of freedom

⁵¹⁷ CWL 16: 169 and 200. Here Lonergan omits what he calls elsewhere the first “stage” or “degree” of self-transcendence, the emergence of psychic consciousness from neural unconsciousness, especially as it is first manifested in the dream (but ostensibly not limited to that primeval occurrence).

from an old horizon of meaning and value to a new one not proportionate to the one preceding it and, in fact, contradictory with the old one.⁵¹⁸

But here in 1974 the further “vertical” dimension of sapiential self-transcendence—the subject as falling and being-in-love—is introduced as a novel transposition of what should be “retained” of Thomist wisdom, with the clear implication that religious love is the most ultimate sublation and thus the must ultimate wisdom. In the two sections that follow, this dual claim—that both natural and supernatural love are wisdom in the way that they sublate conscious intentionality—will be evaluated in terms of the sapiential characteristics of love in Lonergan’s thought.

3 Love as Ultimate Self-Transcendence

Although decision represents a crowning moment of existential self-consciousness, the level of love goes beyond moral agency and, in fact, ensures authentic moral agency, for being-in-love provides the horizon in which new values are apprehended and new patterns of living are hazarded. And especially in the supernatural love of religious conversion, “our capacity for moral self-transcendence has found a fulfilment that brings deep joy and profound peace.”⁵¹⁹ It is ultimately the intersubjective communion—the union that *is* love—that grounds the authenticity of self-transcendence in its every form.

⁵¹⁸ CWL 14: 223.

⁵¹⁹ CWL 14: 118.

3.1 Love as a Fifth Level

In a 1972 series of lectures titled “The Relationship of the Philosophy of God and the Functional Specialty, Systematics,” Lonergan argues that the philosophy of God and the functional specialty of systematics should be held distinct but not separate, since they have a common origin and a common goal. They both arise from the religious experience of God’s love and they both aim to discover the meaning of that experience and to appraise its value, especially by promoting more clearly and deeply into consciousness the presence of love, which is “the major factor in the integration and development of persons.”⁵²⁰

When asked in a question-and-answer session whether love, in and of itself, intrinsically involves insights, concepts, or judgments, Lonergan answers in the negative: “You can say it [love] is on the fifth level.”⁵²¹ This marks Lonergan’s first recorded identification of love as a fifth level of consciousness, which is explained, in part, by the concept of horizon. As Blackwood expands, love is “a new horizon within which deliberating, judging, understanding, and experiencing are done; it is not simply a new set of deliberations, judgments, understandings, or experiences; it is the summit of self-transcendence, going beyond these four levels.”⁵²²

In the context of wisdom considered as the entire successive movement of self-transcendence, the basis of considering love as a distinct level is the way it brings the

⁵²⁰ From the first and third of a series of three lectures Lonergan gave at St. Michael’s Institute, Gonzaga University, Spokane, on December 9, 1972, entitled “Philosophy of God” and “The Relationship between Philosophy of God and the Functional Specialty ‘Systematics,’” in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, CWL 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 177 and 210-211, with quote on 211.

⁵²¹ From the second of the three lectures mentioned above, titled “The Functional Specialty ‘Systematics,’” in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, CWL 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 193.

⁵²² Blackwood, *And Hope Does Not Disappoint*, 104.

self-transcendence involved at every other level to an absolute summit. And the affirmation of love as a fifth level here, as in many other works from 1972 to 1982, occurs with particular reference to religious love, for the dynamic state of being-in-love with God is “the ultimate stage in a person’s self-transcendence.”⁵²³

At the level of love, the subject surrenders himself to the good of the other in total self-gift. Self-surrender in its most mature form may very well be prepared for, in the way of development, by moral conversion. But moral conversion is not entirely captured by a wholehearted dedication of self to the good of another. In moral conversion, our autonomy disposes of itself, deciding who we are to be.⁵²⁴ But when we are in love, we put our autonomy at the disposal of the other, allowing our freedom to be molded by acting for the beloved’s good and helping shape the beloved’s freedom to love self, others, and God more deeply as well. But the key affirmation of the uniqueness of love vis-à-vis the other levels is the fact that it comprises a distinct way of being conscious—that is, of being self-present—that sublates or fulfills other ways of being conscious.⁵²⁵

3.2 Love as a Way of Being Conscious

How can the state of being-in-love be described and explained as to its immanent constitution? As for the explanation of its existence, being-in-love has “its antecedents,

⁵²³ CWL 17: 193.

⁵²⁴ CWL 17: 315.

⁵²⁵ Toward the establishment of the fifth level in these particular terms, see Blackwood, *And Hope Does Not Disappoint*, as well as Patrick H. Byrne, “Consciousness: Levels, Sublations, and the Subject as Subject.” *MJLS* 13 (1995): 131-150. Doran’s contributions to this position are central and significant as well. They span several works and are nicely summarized in Blackwood, *And Hope Does Not Disappoint*, 171-208.

its causes, its conditions, its occasions,”⁵²⁶ but ultimately it is self-justifying. No one argues oneself into being-in-love; love simply “proves itself” through the good fruits it bears. It justifies and explains everything else.⁵²⁷ As for a description of the state of being-in-love in terms of intentional consciousness, Doran comments, “If you are really in love, the one with whom you are in love enters into the very constitution of your consciousness, even if you are not physically together with that person. Your very self-presence is a ‘being-with.’”⁵²⁸

As Lonergan explains in *Method*, it is by the subject’s intention that the object becomes present to him or her. In analogy but without the intentional component, it is by the subject’s loving that the beloved becomes present to him or her. And the concrete, interpersonal union of love is not completely effected until the beloved returns the lover’s love, becoming a lover as well, and the lover receives it, becoming a beloved as well. As Lonergan styles it in *Method*, if both subjects have not avowed their love, they are not truly in love.⁵²⁹ Love is defined by the mutual presence of self-donation, a notion that applies to the inner life of God as well, for although God is one, God is not solitary.

3.3 Love and the Relationship Between Person and Community

As inchoate wisdom is, in its rational dimension, a primitive but ordered grasp of undifferentiated being, inchoate wisdom in its existential dimension is the elemental “we” of pre-individuated intersubjectivity. Likewise, it is from the more developed “we” of

⁵²⁶ CWL 14: 100-101.

⁵²⁷ CWL 13: 193.

⁵²⁸ Doran, “What Does Bernard Lonergan Mean By ‘Conversion’?”, 12.

⁵²⁹ CWL 14: 109.

community that the individual emerges: “In other words the person is not the primordial fact. What is primordial is the community. It is within community, and through the intersubjective relations that are the life of the community, that there arises the differentiation of the individual person.”⁵³⁰

4 The Sapiential Nature of All Love

In his clear recognition of love as constitutive of an interpersonal, indeed communal, reality that conditions the subject’s self-presence as a being-with, Lonergan positions love as the foundational, consummate, normative, and unitive sublation of every other modality of self-presence and self-transcendence. As with experience, understanding, judgment, and decision, the meaning of the term “love” can be known fully only by self-appropriation—in this case, the appropriation of the mutual presence of self-donation experienced in loving relationship.⁵³¹ But the inner coherence of love’s sapiential nature in relation to other facets of Lonergan’s theory of subjectivity can be laid out as follows.

⁵³⁰ CWL 17: 210-211. A concrete example of this can be traced in the genesis of the child’s differentiation within his or her family. As Lonergan conceived it in 1972, the “we” of spousal love and the symbiotic “we” of mother and child give rise to the “we” of the family, and it is from within that “we” of the family that the “I” of the child emerges.

⁵³¹ CWL 14: 365.

4.1 Love as Foundational

In *Insight*, Lonergan reminds us that no deeper foundation exists than what is offered by our “pragmatic engagement”⁵³² as knowers and actors. In *Insight*, cognitive foundations largely pivot on the self-affirmation of the knower, which reveals such self-affirmation as “immanent law,” for any attempt to deny the transcendental structure of Lonergan’s account of knowing inevitably necessitates that structure. Doran observes that Lonergan’s treatment of wisdom vis-à-vis the problem of foundations in *De intellectu et methodo* contains “resonances (though not yet explicit affirmations) of components to foundations that are over and above the cognitional, that in a way ground even the cognitional.”⁵³³ Lonergan himself complains in 1972 that Aristotle’s thought on wisdom, which seems to inform much of Aquinas’, is “too intellectualist.”⁵³⁴ For the purpose of understanding love as existentially foundational wisdom, the question then becomes, in what way does love ground our moral and cognitional engagement and shape even our preconscious and barely conscious processes?

One response suggested by Lonergan and elaborated on by Doran has to do with a major line of orientation and development within subjectivity, the movement “from above downward” in consciousness. Orientation is a way of organizing one’s inner life as well as the intersection of that interiority with the outer world; it is, simply put, “the direction of development.”⁵³⁵ It is no coincidence that Lonergan uses the word

⁵³² CWL 3: 356.

⁵³³ *What Is Systematic Theology?*, 93.

⁵³⁴ From the 1972 lecture “What Are Judgments of Value?,” in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, CWL 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 150.

⁵³⁵ CWL 14: 51.

orientation in two principal contexts: affectivity and religiosity, with love in the center of both. Our feelings orient us “massively and dynamically in a world mediated by meaning”; they are the “effective orientation” of our entire subjective being.⁵³⁶ By discerning in consciousness a movement directed “from above downward,” Lonergan shows how the direction of our development—our orientation in life—is rooted in love and the affective change wrought by love, which in turn influence every other element of our human subjectivity.

The self-correcting, onward march of cognitive development, which eventually culminates in love for the known—thus embodying the traditional adage of *nihil amatum nisi prius cognitum*—is situated within a larger context of community and history that is an inverse movement of development, one expressed in the phrase *nihil vere cognitum nisi prius amatum*. And so an individual’s cognitive operations occur, recur, and are inevitably formed by what and whom one loves, and “this context is all the more complex and extensive the richer the culture and the more nuanced the social arrangements one has inherited.”⁵³⁷

4.1.1 Love as Foundational for Value Recognition

Lonergan portrays development from above as affective, first set into motion by love, and he portrays love as chronologically and contextually first, as foundational. The foundational nature of love can be analyzed both abstractly and concretely. At a general

⁵³⁶ CWL 13: 63.

⁵³⁷ From the first of three lectures on religious studies and theology given by Lonergan at Queen’s University in 1976, entitled “First Lecture: Religious Experience,” in *A Third Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, CWL 16 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017), 122.

level, love reveals values, motivates our embodiment of those values, and inevitably steers one's cognitive pursuits, sensory perceptions, and psychic life.⁵³⁸ It does so not only through the new value it uncovers but also by the tremendous change in affectivity that intends that value. This alteration in affectivity is one way by which lower levels of consciousness and even unconscious neural demands are sublated into a higher horizon.

4.1.2 Love as Foundational for Individual Development

Love is even more clearly foundational when considered more concretely, in the course of human development, and this is how Lonergan usually approaches the issue. Love takes hold in the affectivity of the infant, the child, the student, the believer; on affectivity rests the apprehension of values; on the apprehension of values rests belief; following on belief is growth in understanding, and understanding engenders specific schemes of experience.

Experiences accrue and are configured toward the confirmation of this belief-driven growth in understanding, but “with experiential confirmation the inverse process may set in,” an original appropriation of truth and value by moving “from experience to understanding, to sound judgment, to generous evaluation, to commitment in love, loyalty, faith.”⁵³⁹ The circle continues to turn when the subject who has stood on their own two feet, who has immanently generated their own grasp of ideas and affirmation of facts and submitted their belief to a more personal and critical appropriation than before,

⁵³⁸ From “An Interview with Fr Bernard Lonergan, S.J.,” in *A Second Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, CWL 13 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016), 188; cf. CWL 16: 101 and CWL 17: 331.

⁵³⁹ CWL 16: 175.

begins to hand on their own development to their children, community, students, and so on, acting out of love for those will receive the fruits of their labor through socialization, acculturation, and education.⁵⁴⁰ In both the abstract and concrete analysis, love is foundational precisely insofar as it is a principle in the movement “from above downward.” As foundational principle, love is “first” in an ordered set of relationships,⁵⁴¹ both interior and exterior, that together carry along the subject in a determinate direction of development, orienting her in a larger cosmos of being, truth, value, and love.

In this concrete universe, however, progress is never an uninterrupted line of pure development. Lonergan is perhaps best known for his emphasis on the necessary order of cognitive development from below upward. But the healing vector of love operates from above downward to overcome decline by revealing values and making them effective in one’s living. Love is the power by which—and loving community is the context in which—we become capable of actually transforming our human condition.

4.1.3 Love as Foundational for Psychic and Spiritual Wholeness

The medium through which love acts is the relationship between value and feelings: “So our feelings, whether momentary or deep and lasting, both reveal to us where values lie and give us the power and momentum to rise above ourselves and

⁵⁴⁰ See the 1977 “Theology and Praxis” in *A Third Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadasosky, CWL 16 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017), 192, and the 1976 “Questionnaire on Philosophy: Response” in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, CWL 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 362. This movement from above downward can be traced in a variety of applications: existential (in the determination of who the subject is to be) as well as interpersonal (in the determination of the subject’s relations to others) and practical (in the determination of our world as a better or worse place to live in, especially in the creation of social policies affecting the good of order). See CWL 16: 45.

⁵⁴¹ CWL 16: 45.

accomplish what objectively is good.”⁵⁴² Love may be more readily identifiable in consciousness as the affective fulfillment of yearning for the other, for the dramatically modified affectivity that almost always marks falling in love is easily located at the fifth level, above and distinct from moral concerns. But as a transformation of the whole person, love “seeps down” even into the neural unconscious and psychic conscious and thus into the sometimes chaotic and mysterious tangle of our emotional lives.

Lonergan holds that the psychic level “ushers into consciousness not only the demands of unconscious vitality but also the exigences of vertical finality,”⁵⁴³ the call to love and be loved. Authentic, lasting, mutually life-giving love never occurs without the integral cooperation of the symbolic operator. It functions at the juncture between the neural unconscious and the psychic conscious, releasing the images and affects that help guide us through vital, undifferentiated intersubjectivity into the individuation process; through culmination of the individuation process into mutual self-mediation, where individuation is benevolently shaped and lovingly shapes another’s individuation process; and through mutual self-mediation to blossom most fully and finally in an interpersonal state of being-in-love.

This integral cooperation of the symbolic operator is ensured by psychic conversion, which, although ultimately a function of God’s grace, is drawn into emergence precisely inasmuch as the whole subject *wants* to move further and further away from lovelessness in all its forms to the *complacentia* of being-with, being loved by, and loving the beloved. Integral functioning of the topmost level of consciousness—the mutual self-surrender of love—“pulls” the psychic and neural into integral alignment

⁵⁴² CWL 17: 15-16.

⁵⁴³ CWL 16: 28-29, with quote on 28.

with its own vertical finality even as that love is aided greatly and necessarily by the “mass and momentum” of spontaneous affect and the fertile potency of neural process for its very emergence, sustenance, and enrichment. In this way psyche and spirit are dynamically and harmoniously oriented to one another, and their correspondence is part and parcel of being-in-love and staying in love; such correspondence embodies both “from below upward” and “from above downward” movements in human development.⁵⁴⁴

4.2 Love as Consummate

In Lonergan’s anthropology, any significant shift on any level of consciousness inextricably calls for a change on other levels. If the moral cognizance of the fourth level is a principle of self-control, then the awareness of being loved and loving in return—the fifth level of consciousness—is the principle of self-gift and thus provides the first four levels with their ultimate telos.

Thus love is a distinct way of being conscious that functions as ultimate good and ultimate telos to everything else in Lonergan’s anthropology. Without denigrating the intrinsic value of any other component of human living, love makes everything else desirable and done for the sake of the beloved and for union with the beloved.⁵⁴⁵ The teleological “pull” of love on other components of human life is construed by Lonergan as the relation between potency and actuation, the fulfillment of intentionality, the fulfillment of affectivity or *complacentia*, and a higher systematization or horizon.

⁵⁴⁴ CWL 3: 555 and Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?*, 110-112 and 168.

⁵⁴⁵ CWL 3: 720-721.

4.2.1 Love as Actuation

Lonergan relies on the metaphysical ideas of potency and act to suggest the finality of individual subjectivity for interpersonal communion. Love actuates the capacities inherent in consciousness by providing a disproportionate “new beginning” that overcomes unauthenticity in its most basic and general form—the isolation of the individual subject. This transformation of individualistic isolation into the togetherness of love takes on different forms at different places in Lonergan’s corpus.

For example, in the 1943 “Finality, Love, and Marriage,” Lonergan delineates four aspects of one and the same love. As the act of a faculty in the individual subject, love can be understood as: (1) the desire for the good in the will of an individual subject, which is in potency for actually attaining the good, and (2) the act or process of the will moving toward the beloved, which brings the desire to fruition. As the act of a subject, love is the principle of union between two different subjects as they are (3) united in their pursuit of a common end (as in friendship) and (4) united in the enjoyment of the common end they actually attain together. (1) and (2) are individual potency and act, while (3) and (4) are social or historical potency and act. The point to this metaphysical representation is not simply that all four simultaneous aspects of love manage to connect affective motive with the intelligible self-expression of the principle of this motive, and at both the individual and social levels. The more profound idea is that, by the participative vertical finality that operates in both the individual and the group and in both nature and grace, there results “an intensification of the higher by the lower, a stability resulting not from mere absence of tension but from positive harmony between different levels, and,

most dynamic, the integration by which the lower in its expansion involves a development in the higher.”⁵⁴⁶

For example, in the multilayered dynamism of Christian marriage, sexual eros has a natural horizontal finality to children and a natural vertical finality to a human friendship that integrates, at the level of reason, a more spiritual actuation of eros and sex. In turn, by grace, this friendship bears a still further and more profound vertical finality to the special order of charity between husband and wife, which has as its purpose to enrich the life of sanctifying grace, which has as its ultimate purpose the beatific vision and incorporation into the triumphant mystical body in heaven. In this way, Christian marriage is a natural institution with a supernatural end; it is the process of various potencies coming to disproportionate and graced actuations.⁵⁴⁷

By the time of *Method*, Lonergan has brought in, alongside actuation, the more personalist notion of fulfillment to denote love’s impact on affectivity, as well as the idea of transcending the limitations of individual subjectivity. But Blackwood notes that the language of “fulfillment” is even somewhat imprecise compared to the later language of sublation. While it is true that love fulfills individual subjectivity and that fulfillment is capable of appropriation, especially affectively and retrospectively, it is perhaps more explanatory (and more expansive) to say that love sublates our subjectivity, for sublation includes but extends further than the idea of fulfilment.

⁵⁴⁶ CWL 4: 36.

⁵⁴⁷ CWL 4: 23-24 and 44-48; Blackwood, *And Hope Does Not Disappoint*, 22-26.

4.2.2 Love as the Fulfillment of Conscious Intentionality

Because we are able to transcend ourselves cognitively, what we naturally intend is the whole universe. If in *Insight* Lonergan interpreted Aquinas to understand wisdom as an accumulation of insights that stands to the universe of being as common sense stands to the particular and imaginable,⁵⁴⁸ then this accumulation of insights is, to recall a sapiential descriptor from *Verbum*, essentially a development in understanding reality and especially in understanding the human mind that understands reality.⁵⁴⁹

But a problem remains, for which only a more existential wisdom is the solution. Lonergan frames the quandary, rather provocatively, as a question about the notion of the real and our tendency to project self: “Is the real to be identified with the universe of being, or is it to be settled by my autobiography?”⁵⁵⁰ Our intention of being is our pure, disinterested, and detached desire to know, and correlative to this “subject pole” is the “object pole” that it intends, “a universe of being whose reality corresponds to the totality of true judgments.”⁵⁵¹ But my world—what objectively corresponds to the horizon of my interest and values—is not the universe of being, is not the totality of true judgments and true values. The reasons for this intellectual and existential discrepancy are manifold, including the dichotomy between animal knowing and fully human knowing, the tragic interference of moral impotence with the exigence of the pure desire to know and do the truly good, and the dialectic of psyche and spirit.

⁵⁴⁸ CWL 3: 331.

⁵⁴⁹ In the 1958 Halifax lectures on *Insight*, Lonergan also makes oblique reference to wisdom as a development of understanding and judgment in the subject, a development that brings her horizon into coincidence with the objective universe of being.

⁵⁵⁰ CWL 5: 183.

⁵⁵¹ CWL 5: 182.

To return to the initial problem of horizon and its relation to wisdom: if the world of my interests and values are solely my concerns, narrowly circumscribed by my desires, fears, sorrows, joys, and so on, my horizon may very well represent a state of psychic limitation that is aligned neither with my desire to know nor with the real exigence of my psychic life for the spiritual. For as Lonergan makes clearer in his post-*Method* works than in *Method*, and clearer still compared to *Insight*, the psyche has vertical finality for the intentionality of spirit. The tidal movement that begins before consciousness is teleologically oriented toward spiritual life and the fulfillment of spiritual life in the altered affectivity of love.

Doran boldly clarifies a nuance in Lonergan's distinction of psyche and spirit that is easy to miss. The dialectic between psyche and spirit is not that between contradictories: one does not need to be overcome for the other to flourish. Rather, true human flourishing consists precisely in the admission into consciousness of the fruitful tension between psyche and spirit, the endless navigation of the interplay between the very movement of life (psyche) and the intentional search for direction in that life (spirit). Lonergan calls this harmonious cooperation between dual principles of human development the "law of genuineness."

Metaphysically, genuineness is the pregnant tension between potency as limitation and potency as finality.⁵⁵² In the subject, it is the appropriation, in and by the whole person, of the conscious tension between what limits oneself to current patterns of thinking and living and what propels oneself to new patterns of thinking and living. Genuineness is not necessarily the successful navigation of limitation and transcendence

⁵⁵² CWL 3: 479.

in all instances, which is impossible, but the patient and humble “willingness to persevere”⁵⁵³ in this intricate, demanding, but incredibly rewarding negotiation.

Here it is tempting to strictly associate the transposition of Thomist wisdom in *Insight* with the detachment of the pure desire to know. After all, wisdom as an intellectual habit is the universal principle of good judgment and global order, and as fully actuated, it is the apprehension of this universal order.⁵⁵⁴ While not negating the clear but indirect association of wisdom with the self-affirmation of the knower, Lonergan suggests, in the same text, a further, more existential read of wisdom: wisdom is the higher principle of synthesis that reconciles the natural and innocent self-centeredness of psyche with the intellectual detachment of the pure desire to know the universe of being. For as the human subject develops, the “requirement of genuineness-for-him shifts from the simple demand of the pure desire for detachment to an ever more intelligent” and “more wise” exercise of that desire.⁵⁵⁵ In other words, the human subject can guide her own psychic development towards its fulfillment by consciously aligning it with the universe-intending operation of spirit and the consummate resting of love, which is the ultimate fulfillment of both psychic longing and intentional striving.

⁵⁵³ Gerard Walmsley, *Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism: The Polymorphism of Consciousness as the Key to Philosophy* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2008), 77.

⁵⁵⁴ CWL 6: 40 and 67.

⁵⁵⁵ CWL 3: 502-503. Here in this passage in *Insight* on the law of genuineness, we first catch glimpse of a theme that will repeat in Lonergan’s later works, especially the 1959 *De intellectu et methodo*: the paradoxical nature of wisdom. The navigation of conscious and unconscious components of one’s development toward greater genuineness involves asking the right questions about one’s “unconscious initiatives, their subsumption under the general order intelligence discovers in the universe of being, their integration in the fabric of one’s habitual living” (CWL 3: 501). The selection of the best questions to ask of this field requires wisdom, but we cannot become wise and discriminating without focusing on the right questions. As with all vicious circles of logic, Lonergan encourages us to look to development, which is “a series of emergent leaps from the logic of one position to the logic of the next” (CWL 3: 502).

The linchpin to this reading of a more existential aspect of wisdom, present even in *Insight*,⁵⁵⁶ is the notion of self-transcendence. The pure desire to know is the eros of the mind, achieving its full term in knowledge of the real. Correct judgment goes beyond oneself to what is, and “what is” is not conditioned by one’s knowledge. And so the intentional operations of experience, understanding, and judgment all drive toward cognitional self-transcendence. The more existential operations of deliberating and deciding, issuing in judgments of value, beget moral self-transcendence, which Lonergan sometimes calls “real self-transcendence” or “performative self-transcendence.”⁵⁵⁷ In a good decision, I come to intend, know, and enact what is really good, which transcends “what is in it for me” and what seems most pleasing to me in this moment.

In love, I leave behind the subject-to-object relationship of intentional operations and reach the absolute height of self-transcendence, “forgetting myself” in ecstatic union with the beloved, making the good of the beloved my greatest good and making my self-presence a “being-with” the beloved. And, finally, in the “complete self-transcendence” of religious love, I abandon myself with no qualifications, reservations, or limitations to the belovedness God bestows on me, in the love I return to God and with which I love my neighbor for God’s sake.

All of these changes in the subject can be trailed back to a shift from lovelessness to love, and all are successive stages in the single thrust to self-transcendence.⁵⁵⁸ Love is a fulfillment of conscious intentionality because it brings the intellectual self-forgetting

⁵⁵⁶ I would still characterize the overall tenor of *Insight*’s transposition of Thomist wisdom as intellectual. Even in the passage laying out the law of genuineness, wisdom is explicitly portrayed as helping us discriminate between the right and the wrong questions that will help usher into consciousness the tension between conscious and unconscious components of development. CWL 3: 502.

⁵⁵⁷ CWL 17: 35, ed. n. 9.

⁵⁵⁸ CWL 13: 109.

of the pure desire to know across the threshold of my subjectivity to reach the subjectivity of another intelligent and loving being. Intellectual self-forgetting finds rest in existential self-forgetting. For moving one's horizon into coincidence with the universe of being means not just understanding the most expansive possible order of intelligibility—the goal of rational wisdom—but coming into communion with other intelligent beings that are also part of the universe of being through the existential wisdom of love.⁵⁵⁹

4.2.3 Love as Affective Fulfillment

Although the pure desire to know bears an affective tension that is markedly different from the affective tensions of ordinary intersubjective living, our intentional strivings for knowledge, along with our psychic longing for communion with the other, find rest in the affectivity of love. How can the affectivity of loving interpersonal relationship be described, from the standpoint of both a faculty psychology as well as a cognitional-existential interiority analysis?

For Aquinas, the will is a rational appetite. Just as knowledge arises from a similitude of a thing's form coming to be in our intellect, love makes the lover *connaturale* and *conveniens* with the beloved.⁵⁶⁰ If our properly voluntary, intellectual desire is a rational appetite, then the affective affinity between the will and a good is the

⁵⁵⁹ CWL 5: 183, 193, 265-266.

⁵⁶⁰ *In sent.* III, 27.1.1 ad 2 and 27.1.3 ad 2. This general structural similarity, however, does not negate equally significant structural dissimilarities. One of the more important dissimilarities is the fact that in knowledge, an object proceeds as term within the intellect, but this does not happen within the procession of love.

will's *complacentia* in that good. This rest is, technically, caused by the object of appetite, the good itself, while love itself can be called *complacentia* in the good.⁵⁶¹

In Aquinas there can be discerned a dual meaning to *complacentia*—love as the principle of desire (incipient enjoyment) when the beloved or the beloved's good is absent or love as the principle of delight (full enjoyment) when the beloved or the beloved's good is present. The will rests in the beloved in and through its delight in the beloved, and this rest is not inactivity but actuation; this enjoyment is full when real union with the beloved has been reached.⁵⁶² Lonergan's comments on *complacentia* in the 1969 Method in Theology seminar, while cursory, closely parallel Aquinas' binary emphasis: the subject seeks to rest in the goodness of the beloved when one is interiorly moving toward the beloved, and achieves this rest once in the state of love. *Complacentia* is the affective response to the beloved and is connected with a value judgment affirming the beloved's goodness, an affirmation that is, in turn, connected with a more global value judgment affirming the goodness of universal order.⁵⁶³

In a series of three brilliant articles from 1959, Crowe argues that prior to its entirely valid but perhaps relatively overemphasized status as the principle of all activity, including intellectual activity, the faculty of will is also, for Aquinas, the term of a process that begins in the attractiveness of the beloved. This term is a quiescence in the goodness of what is known as existent by the intellect; it is the simple, receptive *complacentia boni*. It is prior to and more fundamental than the motion, tendency, or impulse—the will's active seeking of the good—that is *intentio boni*. Under this reading,

⁵⁶¹ *ST*, I-II, 26, 2 and 23, 4.

⁵⁶² See Michael S. Sherwin, O.P., *By Knowledge and by Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 2005), 77-79.

⁵⁶³ Archive entry 52200DTE060, 29-30. See <https://www.bernardlonergan.com/pdf/52200DTE060.pdf>, accessed on October 3, 2018.

complacentia is not the actuation of striving and the affective experience of satisfaction in finally reaching the good; it is the actuation of a receptive potency to be in harmony or in “pleasing agreement” with the goodness of all that exists in the universe.⁵⁶⁴

If *complacentia* is rest in the beloved or the beloved’s good that fulfills all intentional striving and psychic longing, it is the consummate change in affectivity wrought by the dynamic state of being-in-love. *Complacentia* is the affective mark of existential wisdom, the wisdom that Lonergan disengages as the consummate term of a whole “tidal movement” of successive “stages” in self-transcendence.

4.2.4 Love and Community as a Higher Horizon

Just as interpersonal relations marked by mutual self-gift *are* love, the horizon of shared meanings and values, common conceptions and judgments, *is* community.⁵⁶⁵ And authentic community sublates the needs, wants, and goals of the individual not by sacrificing them to be lost in some amorphous whole but by sweeping them up into a larger scheme—the good of ordered interpersonal relationships—in which the individual’s search for meaning and value at every level finds fulfillment in loving interpersonal relationship.

If moral conversion means moving beyond individual satisfactions and partisan group interests to true values, in the language of Lonergan’s emergent probability, a plurality of morally self-transcending subjects are “ready to snap” into a higher

⁵⁶⁴ Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, ed. Fred Lawrence, Supplementary Issue of Lonergan Workshop 16 (Atlanta: Scholar’s Press, 2000); originally published as three articles in *Theological Studies* 20 (1959): 1-39, 198-230, 343-395. Also see Blackwood, *And Hope Does Not Disappoint*, 93.

⁵⁶⁵ CWL 14: 76-77.

systematization, a community of love.⁵⁶⁶ Just as the intellectual wisdom of rational self-appropriation moves us formally into a universe of being and meaning, the existential wisdom of love moves us into a universal context of interrelational meaning in which our self-transcendence is for the sake of others, and community is the consummate expression of that self-transcendence-for-others.⁵⁶⁷

4.3 Love as Normative

Although it is not usually explicitly included in his list of transcendental precepts, enough work has been done to show that love is a permanently operative, immanent, and accessible imperative of consciousness for Lonergan.⁵⁶⁸ Love is “demanded by natural right” with no less legitimacy than intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility. For the difference between transcending oneself for the good of the other and remaining in self-enclosure is a qualitative and verifiable difference in consciousness. By introducing into a single consciousness a communal “we” that goes beyond the single individual and binds her in belovedness and commitment with the other, love introduces a new norm for her subjectivity—the good of the other and the good of “us.”

Dadosky writes that the transcendental precepts of *Method* (be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, and be responsible) are “the application of the habitual

⁵⁶⁶ From the June 17th question-and-answer session from the 1974 Lonergan Workshop at Archive Entry 809A0DTE070. See <https://www.bernardlonergan.com/pdf/809A0DTE070.pdf>, 8, accessed on October 22, 2018.

⁵⁶⁷ See “The Future of Christianity,” in *A Second Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, CWL 13 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016), 130-131.

⁵⁶⁸ There is actually at least one place in *Method* where Lonergan appears to name love as a transcendental precept: “It [conversion] is total surrender to the demands of the human spirit: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be in love” (CWL 14: 252). Also see Blackwood’s discussion in *And Hope Does Not Disappoint*, 127 and 135.

propensity of wisdom both as foundation and as goal.”⁵⁶⁹ In Lonergan’s post-*Method* works the declaration of love as a fifth level of consciousness that sublates all others implies that love is part and parcel of the normative horizon that is wisdom. In fact, love represents the inbreaking of a new horizon, a transformation of *my* interests and values to *our* interests and values, where the norming value is the good of the other and the good of “us.” Although falling-in-love is not, strictly speaking, the inevitable outcome of one’s choice or even the result of two persons’ decisions, it cannot be sustained or enriched without ongoing decisions and deliberate commitments.⁵⁷⁰

4.4 Love as Unitive

Lonergan describes sublation as enacting “a vast simplification” of that which is sublated,⁵⁷¹ and describes wisdom as the all-consuming sublation of all levels of consciousness by being-in-love. While the external outworking of love may eventually involve enormous complexity, struggle, and sacrifice, the way it internally simplifies all of one’s inner conscious life is readily acknowledged by anyone who has ever been in love. For love “transforms an ‘I’ and ‘thou’ into a ‘we’ so intimate, so secure, so permanent, that each attends, imagines, thinks, plans, feels, speaks, acts in concern for both.”⁵⁷² Just as decision sublates sense (experience), intelligence (understanding), and reasonableness (judgment), thereby unifying feeling, knowing, and doing, love sublates

⁵⁶⁹ “Lonergan on Wisdom,” 62.

⁵⁷⁰ See the question-and-answer session on June 18th of the 1974 Lonergan Workshop at Boston College, found in Archive Entry 810A0DTE070, 1-2, <https://bernardlonergan.com/pdf/810A0DTE070.pdf>, accessed on October 10, 2018.

⁵⁷¹ CWL 17: 330.

⁵⁷² CWL 14: 34.

decision, knowledge, and feelings into a new horizon of being and action. Love unifies all lower levels of consciousness within a higher orientation, a distinct way of being conscious and of being in the world.

Love itself is union, the unity of a state of interpersonal relations that is verifiable as the presence of an existential togetherness with another.⁵⁷³ The unity of persons in a state of love is described by Lonergan as a “quasi-identification” that can have various organic and psychic roots: for example, in vital intersubjectivity, sexual eros, and the “emotional identification” that precedes and undergirds the differentiation of an individual from his or her family. But these types of identification pertain more to what Lonergan describes as the “first way of being conscious,” in which we passively undergo sensitive affects, hopes, dreams, sorrows, pains, and so on. The “second way of being conscious”—our conscious intentional capacities for responsibly acting on judgments that we make regarding natural and human realities—is nourished and set in motion by this sensitive stream of psychic life but also guides its direction and helps us negotiate its sometimes troubling aberrations.⁵⁷⁴

Within this more spiritual way of being conscious, love is a “quasi-identification” of the lover with the beloved. The known is in the knower by way of intentional existence; the beloved is in the lover “by way of real inclination and quasi-identification,”⁵⁷⁵ but this identification or union is not anything above, beyond, or

⁵⁷³ Since the presence of the beloved in the lover is constituted in and through love rather than produced by love, love itself is interpersonal union; it does not produce a unity of persons. See Blackwood, 157, n. 60, as well as CWL 2: 209-210 and CWL 4: 27.

⁵⁷⁴ See Doran, *Trinity in History: Missions and Processions* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013), for an account of how our participation in and imitation of the divine relations help heal a deeply flawed dimension of “interdividuation”—the distorted mimesis explored by Girard—that occupies much of the psychic field.

⁵⁷⁵ CWL 12: 677. Also see 675: “Love is unitive by reason of its act inasmuch as the love in the lover is in a way the beloved in the lover.”

formally different in any way from the love itself. In his gloss on Aquinas' account of *amor procedens* from *Contra Gentiles*, Lonergan stresses the fact that the presence of the beloved in the lover is exactly the same entity as the act of love in the lover. Although there is clearly no motion in God, the "dynamic presence" of the beloved in the lover can be understood as the term of a movement in the movement's proportionate principle. The beloved is known in the intellect by the production of an inner word; but the beloved is present "dynamically" in the will as the term of an inclination toward the value of the beloved. From understanding's intellectual self-expression in a judgment of value there is an intelligible procession of love in the will, and this procession of love constitutes the presence of the beloved in the lover. By final causality there is the *amari* of the beloved; while the final causality of this *amari* may be operated *by* the beloved, it is *in* the lover rather than the beloved. Here again, love is union: the *amari* of the beloved in the lover is one and the same act as the *amare* of the lover for the beloved.⁵⁷⁶

In the early 1960s, Lonergan called attention to the "wise oscillation" among "worlds" that shifts an individual's subjectivity from one focus to another, with wisdom understood as the integration of those worlds by the achievement of an interiority that allows one to shift consciously and easily among them. From the perspective of 1974, wisdom is still unitive, but is considered here as the unitive power of love, which sublates all aspects of conscious intentionality within an individual's subjectivity and brings that individual's subjectivity into union with another in a kind of identification.

⁵⁷⁶ CWL 2: 209-213, especially 209-210.

5 Religious Love as the Ultimate Form of Wisdom

All love is self-surrender, but loving God has its origin in God's own transcendent love; the self-surrender of religious conversion is ultimate and unrestricted; in all of this it transcends the natural order. Like the paradox of finite wisdom that can only find complete fulfillment by wedding itself to infinite wisdom,⁵⁷⁷ authenticity of self can only be attained through going beyond self, and so each conversion is essentially a self-transcendence or self-surrender. But the meaning of self-surrender, especially in the sense of love for another person, enters into the constitutive meaning of religious conversion more deeply than in the other conversions, and not solely with reference to God.

The complete self-transcendence of supernatural being-in-love has much in common with other forms of love, as it involves a subject-to-subject relationship. But through the grace of religious conversion a radically novel interpersonal situation obtains, in which the human subject is related to the three divine subjects, to the Father and the Son through sanctifying grace and to the Spirit by the gift of charity. This communion of a human person with Eternal Persons is an initiative of unconditional divine love and invites, implores, and bestows on us a state of unrestricted being-in-love that flows into self-sacrificing love for our neighbors.⁵⁷⁸

In one sense, religious love is the ultimate form of wisdom for a simple reason: human beings are not the highest beings and we are not the terminal value of the

⁵⁷⁷ CWL 4: 86-87.

⁵⁷⁸ The gift of God's love, in and of itself, is something that can be, and often is, initially experienced without being known. So while the intersubjective situation of grace obtains wherever God's gift of love is received, accepted, and returned—and thus a truly religious horizon obtains wherever this divine-human communion applies—it is entirely possible that one's relationship with the Triune God can be objectively constituted but not reflectively objectified and thus not known in an explicit sense of knowledge as a compound of experiencing, understanding, and judging. See CWL 14: 101-106.

universe. God is. And so if the natural and the supernatural are truly distinct orders,⁵⁷⁹ then the reception and return of divine love are higher than the reception or return of human love. If even “natural” love is eminently sapiential, then all the more so is supernatural love. For Lonergan, being-in-love with God is the foundational, consummate, normative, and unitive source of self-transcendence in every sphere, not simply that of explicit religious belief or even that of explicit religious experience.

5.1 Religious Love as Foundational

Just as the unconditional intelligibility of God is the ultimate ground and condition of all intelligibility and the unconditional goodness of God is the ultimate ground and condition of all goodness, so too the unconditional love that God has for us is the ultimate ground of our unconditional love for God, other human beings, and ourselves. And so, as the unconditional self-transcendence of otherworldly falling-in-love, religious love is the supernaturally revitalizing ground of all self-transcendence. Lonergan conveys this ground as the determinant of a higher horizon in which the subject is spiritually reborn by the bestowal of divine love. This divine love constitutes the divine-human interpersonal situation, the mutual indwelling, that is the state or situation of sanctifying grace.⁵⁸⁰

⁵⁷⁹ For Lonergan’s discussion of Philip the Chancellor’s breakthrough to the theorem of the supernatural, see CWL 1: 16-21, 176-178, 184-187; CWL 6: 44-45 and ed. n. 19 on 44; CWL 10: 242; CWL 17: 422-423. For thoughts on why Philip’s discovery legitimizes the use of general categories in theology, see Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?*, 82-85.

⁵⁸⁰ See the subsection “Religious Love as Unitive” below for the distinction from *The Triune God: Systematics* between the habit of grace and the state or situation of grace, and for a clarification on the “constitution” of this state or situation of grace.

5.1.1 Religious Love as the First Principle of Conversion

The distinction among the three conversions Lonergan explicitly treats means that one can technically be converted in one sphere without being converted in the other, for they represent three distinct modalities of self-transcendence. However, in the concrete, one conversion usually leads to another, or at least increases the chances of another occurring (and vice versa in the direction of breakdown). The normal course of transformation is from religious to moral and then from religious and moral to intellectual, but their overall relationship is characterized as much by interdependence as by direct causation.⁵⁸¹ Still, all three conversions are grounded in God's grace, and religious conversion acts as a sapiential "first principle" to intellectual and moral conversion.

The causative relationship between religious conversion and moral conversion is perhaps the easiest to appreciate. Even if religious conversion were held to do nothing else, Christian communities are almost unanimous in affirming that it overcomes moral impotence. The power of supernatural love aligns good intentions with good performance.⁵⁸²

When it comes time for it to inform systematic theology, religious conversion is greatly aided by intellectual conversion, which guards theology from false controversies,

⁵⁸¹ CWL 14: 226-228; CWL 16: 236-237; CWL 17: 318 and 331; "Doctrinal Pluralism," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, CWL 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 86; and "Moral Theology and the Human Sciences," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, CWL 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), 308-309. One fascinating implication of the dependence of intellectual on religious conversion, as Doran points out, is that there ultimately exists a religious or theological grounding even of sciences and disciplines other than theology. See *What Is Systematic Theology?*, 102 and n. 40.

⁵⁸² CWL 14: 394.

anthromorphisms, and stunted objectives. Intellectual conversion is also foundational for theology. As Doran explains, “with *Method in Theology* the three dimensions of conversion that Lonergan affirmed are reciprocally related to two differentiations of consciousness that provide theology with its foundations, namely, interiorly differentiated consciousness and religiously differentiated consciousness.”⁵⁸³

Religious conversion needs moral and intellectual conversion. Without the discernment afforded by moral conversion, religious experience can be indiscriminately conflated with eroticism, to destructive effect. And as Lonergan puts it rather frankly in *Method*, “Without intellectual conversion, religious experience is not understood, or, if it is understood, then not correctly.”⁵⁸⁴ Intellectual conversion is required to accurately distinguish the meaning of divine immanence from transcendence in ways not unduly dominated by animal extroversion, the mythic worldview that being, even divine being, is the “already out there now.”

Lonergan pronounces, quite reasonably, that “The authentic Christian strives for the fullness of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.”⁵⁸⁵ When all three conversions occur in the same individual or through many individuals in the same community, moral conversion sublates intellectual conversion and religious conversion sublates them both, but they continue to be interdependent. The religiously converted subject never ceases to intend the transcendentals of the intelligible, the true, the real, and the good.

Just as the good is beyond the true and the real, intellectual conversion is sublated by moral conversion. But even at the natural level, love is what fully reveals values to be

⁵⁸³ Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?*, 93.

⁵⁸⁴ CWL 14: 394.

⁵⁸⁵ CWL 17: 86.

apprehended by our feelings and makes them effective in our living, and this truth is even more emphatic with supernatural love. And so religious sublates moral conversion.

Wherever and whenever it is welcomed, supernatural value and supernatural meaning become a “new and efficacious” ground for intellectual and moral pursuits.

5.1.2 Religious Love as Foundational for Other Loves

Lonergan contends that religious love grounds both domestic and civil devotion by reconciling us and committing us to the “obscure purpose of our universe,”⁵⁸⁶ which is the love of God in Christ Jesus. If the obscure purpose of our universe is to magnify God’s glory by manifesting God’s love (a love that is known “in Christ” by the Christian), then the reception and return of that love is the highest order of interpersonal relationship in the universe. To the extent that the social and cultural orders are receptive to the ever-deeper incorporation of religious value into the fabric of human living, they become ever more solidly grounded on God’s own faithfulness, which partners with humankind to overcome the problem of evil with an absolutely supernatural solution.

Where welcomed and embodied, this solution heals and elevates every interpersonal relationship through a supernatural faith that is founded in the unfathomably transcendent excellence of the unrestricted act of understanding that is God; through a supernatural hope that is founded on God’s wisdom in designing our universe with an order that allows for both good and evil, for progress and decline, and on God’s goodness in providing for the redemption of what is evil in our universe; and,

⁵⁸⁶ CWL 16: 123.

most of all, through a supernatural charity that is founded on God's own love for the universe, which redeems it by returning goodness, mercy, and peace in the face of evil, cruelty, and violence and invites us to do the same. "It follows that love of God above all and in all so embraces the order of the universe as to love all men with a self-sacrificing love."⁵⁸⁷

5.2 Religious Love as Consummate

While our capacity for self-transcendence may be clearly revealed by our unrestricted questioning, only supernatural being-in-love completely fulfills that capacity. If the enduring ground of our own self-transcendence comes from God's gift of love to us, so too does its fulfillment.

5.2.1 Religious Love as Actuation

To explicate the relationship between created subjectivity and the infusion of God's love into the very core of that subjectivity, Lonergan leans once again on the metaphysical language of potency in relation to act. The basic continuity of divine grace with human capacities—conceived as the supernatural actuation of natural human potential for a disproportionate end—is cogently framed only through analogy. In the Thomist stream of thought as well as Lonergan's, God is understood as the consummate fulfillment of transcendental strivings but with an acknowledgment of the drastic

⁵⁸⁷ CWL 3: 722-723, 746, and 763, with quote on 722-723.

discontinuity between God's intellect and will and our own, whose wisdom and goodness are participated.

As unconditional being-in-love, grace habitually "actuates to the full the dynamic potentiality of the human spirit with its unrestricted reach, and, as a full actuation, it is fulfilment, deep-set peace, the peace the world cannot give, abiding joy, the joy that remains despite humiliations and failure and privation and pain."⁵⁸⁸ Insofar as it intrinsically involves no apprehended object and corresponds to the unrestricted character of the transcendental notions, religious love is an experience of mystery.⁵⁸⁹

Just as grace does not destroy nature but completes it, religious conversion is complete self-transcendence. It does not abolish the need for human development and community but instead crowns human development and love with an absolute and transcendent dignity and beauty, especially when it blossoms forth in love for neighbor. "It [the gift of God's grace] is in this life the crown of human development, grace perfecting nature, the entry of God into the life of man so that man comes to love his neighbor as himself."⁵⁹⁰

5.2.2 Religious Love as the Fulfilment of Conscious Intentionality

Our capacity for self-transcendence is expressed in our unrestricted ability to ask questions that touch on all of the transcendental notions. Our cognitional intention of

⁵⁸⁸ CWL 13: 110.

⁵⁸⁹ Archive Entries 52200DTE060 (see <https://www.bernardlonergan.com/pdf/52200DTE060.pdf>, 36-37, accessed on October 3, 2018) and 52400DTE060 (from the second part of the fifth lecture on July 11th at the Regis College 1969 Institute on Method in Theology, found at <https://www.bernardlonergan.com/archiveitem.php?id=2064>, 7-8, accessed on October 16, 2018).

⁵⁹⁰ CWL 13: 110.

being is unrestricted, with the entire universe as its ultimate object. Our existential orientation not only runs parallel to the cognitional in unrestricted extension for what is unrestrictedly good and unrestrictedly lovable; it is also the condition for intellectual integrity.

For what is consummately intelligible is also consummately lovable, but that is not all. All of our cognitional endeavors occur authentically only in a context of loving community, because love is the efficacy of judgments of value motivating the pursuit of truth. And so a wholehearted, effective, and habitually constant surrender to the intelligible and the true good is only possible within the higher horizon of religious love, which makes consistently possible and consistently actualized a loving self-surrender to both God and fellow human being.

Our graced, self-transcendent love for God and for neighbor is distinct from either our natural knowledge or our supernatural knowledge, but it conditions the authenticity of both. For central to religious conversion is a loving acceptance of the order of the universe, the order conceived by divine wisdom and willed by divine goodness. This loving acceptance turns our subjectivity from self-centeredness to selflessness, aligning our existential (and even our psychic) orientation with our native intellectual thrust for the entire universe of being and meaning. And, in turn, this existential self-surrender straightens and strengthens our intellectual self-surrender to all truth.

5.2.3 Religious Love as Affective Fulfillment

The recognition of transcendent value “consists in the experienced fulfillment of our unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence, in our actuated orientation towards the mystery of love and awe.”⁵⁹¹ That fulfillment is *complacentia*, which is both generically similar and specifically different from the *complacentia* of the “lesser” loves of family and community Lonergan also discusses so often. It is not the fulfillment of a particular longing but the all-encompassing “fulfillment of getting beyond [all] one’s appetites and desires and wishes and impulses”⁵⁹² in an unrestricted fashion.

It is an affective resting in God, but such a dramatic and supernatural fulfillment of affectivity can remain a “hidden vector” in one’s life. It is not something that we achieve but something that we receive, accept, and ratify; it comes “quietly, secretly, unobtrusively,” and we often know about it only by retrospectively witnessing its fruits in our lives.⁵⁹³ Through grace, it is given to all, but this experience of resting in God usually needs a religious tradition to be encouraged, interpreted, guided, and developed.

Supernatural *complacentia* is the affective mark of the supernaturally existential wisdom of receiving and appropriating God’s unconditional love. Whereas the *complacentia* of natural love is, more generally, the affective mark of the total self-transcendence of love in which the lover rests in union with the beloved, the

⁵⁹¹ CWL 14: 112.

⁵⁹² CWL 13: 146-147.

⁵⁹³ CWL 13: 131 and 146-147, with quote on 131.

complacentia of supernatural love is read by Doran as the affective awareness of receiving God's unconditional love.⁵⁹⁴

5.2.4 Religious Love as Higher Horizon and Kingdom of God

Religious love “determines the horizon of total self-transcendence by grounding the self and its self-transcendence in the divine lover whose love makes those he loves in love with him, and so with one another.”⁵⁹⁵ This horizon is a concrete plurality of human subjects whose supernatural relationship to God and each other forms a new whole, the kingdom of God. In this new good of order, the members are connected through their love by and for the head, who is Christ. Our supernatural knowing and loving of God, made possible by the theological virtues springing from grace, are directed to the ultimate end, which is the essential goodness of God, but are also proximately directed to the general supernatural good of order, which is the body of Christ.⁵⁹⁶

Grace establishes a doubly interpersonal situation, one between the believer and the Trinitarian God and one between the believer and potentially all of her fellow human beings, since the gift of grace is universal. An individual human subject is an integration of the material and spiritual; a community formed through the proportionate love of family and people is an integration of subjects centered around a common horizon of common meanings and values. But the kingdom of God consists in a still higher integration, above merely human community, with an originating value in divine

⁵⁹⁴ Doran, “‘Complacency and Concern’ and a Basic Thesis on Grace,” *Lonergan Workshop* 13 (1997): 57-78.

⁵⁹⁵ CWL 17: 22-23.

⁵⁹⁶ CWL 12: 511; CWL 14: 112-113.

goodness and a terminal value in the goodness of the whole universe as it speaks the divine goodness.

The elevation in central form that is sanctifying grace corresponds to an elevation to a higher horizon of interpersonal relationships.⁵⁹⁷ More proximately, it is the gift of charity that brings one to love God in return, love one's neighbor as oneself for the love of God, and lovingly accept the goodness of the current world order as a sign of God's own love. Again, more proximately, it is charity that sets up a new and consummately good order in this world, the mystical body of Christ.⁵⁹⁸ "This ultimate, cosmic, good of order to which disproportionate love draws human subjects and, through human subjects, the entire universe, is the kingdom of God."⁵⁹⁹

5.3 Religious Love as Normative

The transformation of the "heart of stone" into the "heart of flesh," which for Lonergan is the work of operative grace, bestows on us the very lovable-ness of God, who is love by essence. But from this dynamic state of supernatural love flows the supernatural habit of charity, which loves God with God's own love and, with faith and hope, attains God *uti in se est*. Through the bestowal of God's love in and through sanctifying grace, God raises our very being to be "normed" by God's own being, and through the theological virtue of charity, we, in return, love God with God's own love,

⁵⁹⁷ In 2007 Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer argued for the transposition of the scholastic notion of the habit of sanctifying grace into the terms of conscious intentionality as a supernatural enrichment or "elevation" of the unity of consciousness ("central form"—the essence of the soul). See "Sanctifying Grace in a 'Methodical Theology,'" *Theological Studies* 68 (2007): 52-76.

⁵⁹⁸ CWL 5: 381.

⁵⁹⁹ Blackwood, *And Hope Does Not Disappoint*, 226.

and everyone and everything else for the sake of God. Religious love is “measured” by God’s own self.⁶⁰⁰ Because we are made in the image of God, who is self-transcending, we are capable of transcending ourselves, reaching authenticity and becoming principles of beneficence and benevolence to all beings.

5.3.1 Religious Love and the Scale of Values

Religious conversion breaks into human history a “new horizon” of supernatural love. The state of otherworldly being-in-love provides immanently generated criteria for authentic moral values, for religious love encounters and affirms God’s own meaning and values, welcoming their entrance and deeper penetration into every human affair.

If transcendent value is the goodness and truth of God’s own being, knowledge, and love, then religious values apprehend transcendent value. Religious values are normative for the entire scale of values developed by Lonergan insofar as schemes of recurrence at the higher levels condition the recurrence of schemes at the lower. Our graced apprehension and embodiment of religious values make personal integrity possible, because religious love is love for the divinely created and willed universe, and the order of the universe “includes pre-eminently the good that persons are, enjoy, and possess.”⁶⁰¹ By conditioning the authenticity of personal values, which then authenticate cultural values, with cultural values authenticating social values, and social values

⁶⁰⁰ Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?*, 119.

⁶⁰¹ CWL 3: 721.

authenticating vital values, religious values norm to divine standards the healthy operation of the whole scale.⁶⁰²

5.4 Religious Love as Unitive

In the 1964 *The Triune God: Systematics*, Lonergan distinguishes the habit of sanctifying grace, which denotes the physical accident received in the soul of the just, from the state or situation of grace.⁶⁰³ This divine-human interpersonal state of grace, the divine indwelling,⁶⁰⁴ is a state of union between God and the one whom God loves and loves God in return. It is a union by way of the beloved in the lover (“quasi-identification”) and the known in the knower (intentional existence).

Mutual indwelling applies not only to the divine-human relationship but to the intra-Trinitarian life. The divine will is God in God’s self and therefore the Holy Spirit, who proceeds in God as Love, is God. God’s love of God’s self implies total rather than

⁶⁰² The relationship among the levels of value runs the inverse way as well: the functioning of the lower levels sets the scope for the questions and problems that must be answered and solved by the higher levels, and provokes the operations that will reach a higher synthesis within more inclusive schemes of value. See Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?*, 177-179 and 190-192.

⁶⁰³ Notice that here Lonergan still strongly maintains the traditional idea of grace as an absolutely supernatural entitative habit received in the essence of the soul. His emphasis here, and later on in his career, on grace as an interpersonal situation does not negate the traditional emphasis of grace as a habit that heals and elevates the soul of the individual recipient. It merely calls attention to the interpersonal ramifications of the gift, which Lonergan will later yoke to the divine-human communal process of redemption in history.

⁶⁰⁴ It is not incorrect to describe the interpersonal state of grace as the divine indwelling in the soul of the just—this is the explicit claim that Lonergan makes in *The Triune God: Systematics*, that “the indwelling of the divine persons is constituted through the state of grace” (Assertion 18), which appears to be an interpretation not only of Aquinas’ theology of the divine missions in general but of *ST*, I, 43, 3 in particular. However, further qualifications in Lonergan and Lonergan scholarship have and should be made. First, Lonergan does not mean to imply here that the state of grace is somehow the cause of the divine indwelling, but rather that what is constituted through the state of grace is a divine-human interpersonal situation. Again, Aquinas’ and Lonergan’s position is perhaps best understood in reference to external contingent predication: “if there is the Father’s love because of the Son, if there is the Spirit as sent, if there are the consequent terms sanctifying grace and the habit of charity, and the other virtues and gifts that flow from sanctifying grace, then there is constituted a divine-human interpersonal situation” (CWL 12: 513, ed. n. 119).

quasi-identity: “the proper object of divine love is the divine goodness which is identical with God.”⁶⁰⁵

But if love is identification in the sense of the mutual self-donation that constitutes union between lover and beloved, the perfect identity implied by God’s knowledge and love of God’s self is analogously mirrored in the quasi-identification of God with humanity in the divine missions. This quasi-identification is expressed most clearly and visibly in the visible mission of the Son, in which God gives God’s self to the extravagant point of assuming human nature in the incarnation, almost bringing God “too close” to us.⁶⁰⁶

6 Summary: Wisdom as the Self-Surrender of Love

The exigence for authenticity is “man’s deepest need,” but consistent self-transcendence is only possible through the living wisdom of conversion. Wisdom was already implicitly identified as conversion in *Method*, but love as a way of being conscious quite distinct from and in fact radically conditioning other forms of self-transcendence was left somewhat ambiguous. Wisdom was not yet clearly identified in its ultimate instantiation as the sublimation of all other forms of self-transcendence by the unrestricted self-surrender of divine-human love.

Just as what sublates does not abolish what is sublated but complements, fulfills, and perfects it, these successively higher integrations of wisdom do not repudiate the lower. In 1976 Lonergan calls wisdom “the comprehensive reasonableness” of sound

⁶⁰⁵ CWL 2: 210-211.

⁶⁰⁶ CWL 3: 747.

judgment and in 1979 he identifies it with the normative horizon of truth and value and again (as at numerous places in the past) references Aquinas to affirm wisdom's role as the intellectual habit that knows the true meaning of being. And he makes all of these statements without contradiction or confusion, even though he had in 1974 explicitly claimed that wisdom consists in the successive sublations of the ever-self-transcending dynamics of human consciousness, with the most ultimate form of wisdom represented by being-in-love with God and God's universe.⁶⁰⁷

Nor does the explicit identification of being-in-love with God as the highest form of wisdom in Lonergan's post-*Method* works abrogate his implicit identification of wisdom with transcendental method in *Method*. For although love was not recognized as a fifth level in *Method*, it was included at the fourth level within transcendental method, with supernatural love acting as both principle and end to all fourth level activities. In Lonergan's post-*Method* works, wisdom is rewritten, beyond its cognitive form sketched in *Verbum* and *Insight*, as the self-appropriation of the psychic, experiencing, intelligent, reasonable, free, responsible, and loving subject whose authenticity consists in self-transcendence.⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰⁷ These three claims are found in the 1975 "Christology Today: Methodological Reflections" (CWL 16: 75), the 1979 "Horizons and Transpositions" (CWL 17: 425-426), and the 1974 "Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation" (CWL 16: 51).

⁶⁰⁸ CWL 17: 402.

Conclusion

And so what, finally, becomes of Aquinas' notion of wisdom in the later Lonergan? The answer, in brief, is that the traditional Thomist notion of wisdom becomes, in the more existential terms of the later Lonergan, the potentially fourfold conversion of the human subject, as this conversion is initiated, deepened, and sustained by being-in-love. In the more cognitive dimension, wisdom is the development in the subject, via self-appropriation and ultimately self-knowledge, that serves as the foundation of any discipline. In this way, Lonergan's transposition of Aquinas' notion of wisdom implies a tremendous transformation in the very foundations of our knowledge of the world and of ourselves.

In *Verbum, Insight*, and the Gregorian courses, wisdom resides primarily at the level of judgment, with some scattered signals indicating a more existential extension into decision. As Chapter Three made clear, 1959 proved to be an especially critical year in the transposition, as *De intellectu et methodo* suggested (but, in my view, did not demonstrate) an identification of wisdom with transcendental method. Here wisdom was identified as a cognitional "moving foundation," while method seemed to be a companion concept: both were still necessary and relevant to modern demands on theology.

But as time went on, method's role grew tremendously, not only taking over many of wisdom's functions but also manifesting its own unique and legion purposes. Eventually in 1963 wisdom was understood as included within method, with method in possession of greater significance and functionality. Chapter Four read *Method in Theology* (1972) as the complete (albeit indirect) identification between wisdom and

transcendental method initiated in an incomplete way in 1959. *Method* was also analyzed as Lonergan's implicit re-interpretation of wisdom as the lived experience of conversion and thus his transposition of wisdom at the "fourth level" of consciousness. More specifically, in terms of functional specialization, wisdom shifts into the dialectical decision that brings the mediating phase of theology to the clear-headed conflict between conversion and lack of conversion and the foundational decision that objectifies conversion to ground the mediated phase of theology.

When *Method* underscores the existential component in all human knowledge and activity, the prior emphasis on wisdom as sound judgment is not repudiated but complemented. If wisdom as decision sublates wisdom as judgment, then wisdom as conversion sublates wisdom as decision. Wisdom as conversion denotes the foundational reality of radically transformed subjectivity, but the ultimate principle of this radically transformed subjectivity is the mutual self-mediation of love, both human and divine. As early as 1972, Lonergan recognized this love as a "fifth level" of consciousness, the existential sphere of self-surrender to the other.

If religious conversion—the gift of God's love—acts as a principle to moral conversion and intellectual conversion, there is a sense in which wisdom as love sublates wisdom as conversion, although in the case of religious conversion one could still reasonably argue for their coextension as well. Hence in the post-*Method* works reviewed in Chapter Five, wisdom is identified precisely as the sublation of all forms of self-transcendence by love.

1 An Avenue for Further Research: Love of Divine Wisdom as Participation in the Inner-Trinitarian Life of God

Doran has recently advanced a position building on Lonergan's Trinitarian systematics and affirmation of the universal mission of the Holy Spirit that allows for a real relation to the Son even in those who do not know or accept the divine revelation of the Son's visible mission. Building on what has become known as Lonergan's "four-point hypothesis," Doran hypothesizes in his *The Trinity in History* that these persons might be related—through the habit of charity that participates in the passive spiration of the Spirit from the Father and the Son—to the Second Person of the Holy Trinity in knowing and loving divine wisdom. Further research might explore how Lonergan's transposition of Aquinas' notion of wisdom could shed additional light on the relationship we have to the Word, which Doran elaborates as being (among other things) a relationship to divine Wisdom through charity. Here I can only sketch a (very) preliminary outline of a possible future enlargement of Doran's thesis.⁶⁰⁹

1.1 The Invisible Mission of the Son

According to Doran's expansion of Lonergan's later Trinitarian analogy, *memoria* and faith share in divine active spiration, which is the active loving of the Father and Son for each other. This very love is the Holy Spirit, the *Amor procedens* of passive spiration; charity participates in passive spiration. The self-presence of one who knows herself to be unconditionally beloved is the analogue for the Father; the word that is an expression of

⁶⁰⁹ For the sake of brevity, here I will assume a theological context formed around Lonergan's four-point hypothesis; Doran's extension of Lonergan's later Trinitarian analogy; and Doran's work on the invisible mission of the Son and its connection to faith, cultural values, and social grace.

the goodness of being loved this way is the analogue for the Son; and the charity that is the love of God in return is the analogue for the Holy Spirit. Because charity is a share in the Holy Spirit, who is related by a relation of origin to the Father and the Son, it serves as a created base for a created relation to the Father and Son, who dwell in us as uncreated terms of this distinct, created relation.

Can we say more about the invisible mission of the Son? Doran and the later Lonergan both understand the Son as generated from the Father's being-in-love with the very goodness of the divine essence. And so the Son is the eternal judgment of value affirming the very loveliness of God, an inner word that, in expressing this mutual love of the Father and Son, actually "breathes" the Spirit of love together with the Father. In us, our recollection of having received the life-long and life-transforming gift of God's unconditional love (*memoria*) speaks a judgment of value (faith) affirming the goodness of such a remarkable gift. Consequently, faith is a participation in the invisible mission of the Word, because faith acknowledges the goodness of God's love, just as the Word is a judgment of value expressing the Father's love. As a response to the universally given gift of God's love in the Holy Spirit, faith itself also becomes universal, although sometimes as hidden as the original gift of divine love.

Because the Word is an expression of the goodness of a Father that has mercy on the good and the bad and breathes a Spirit that has power even to raise the dead, even the universalist faith that participates in the invisible mission of the Word contains the seeds of the nonviolent triumph of good in return for evil. And because the very analogue for the Word is a judgment of value spirating love, the further articulations or manifestations

in human history that are “spoken” from the heart of this universalist faith are judgments of value as well, Trinitarian participations of the *verbum spirans amorem*.

1.2 Reading *De redemptione* (1958) through the Lens of *The Trinity in History*

From Doran we learn about the way that *memoria* and faith ground a nonviolent, self-sacrificing charity, and charity gives way to acts of loving that change, through individuals and communities, the course of human history. The way *memoria* and faith ground charity is a participation in active spiration, and the way charity proceeds from this awareness of being divinely loved and the consequent judgment of value is a participation in passive spiration, the Love that is the Holy Spirit. According to Doran, such participation in the Spirit relates us back to the Son in love of divine wisdom. But one of Lonergan’s own texts, the 1958 *De redemptione* manuscript, gives us more detail on how this might be the case, discussing the ability of wisdom to order the whole tapestry of our internal life by mirroring the way God’s wisdom redemptively restores the universe. *De redemptione* is exceptional in relation to other works from the 1950s, as it represents an early attempt by Lonergan to cast wisdom in a more existential light, and does so with a focus on supernatural wisdom that is exceptional in relation to all of Lonergan’s corpus.⁶¹⁰

⁶¹⁰ Most likely completed one year after the publication of *Insight*, *De redemptione* also serves as confirmation of the transposition of wisdom into self-appropriation that *Insight* effected: “It remains, therefore, that one attains human wisdom to the extent to which through an understanding of what understanding is one grasps at least the broad lines of all things and by them knows their order and mutual interdependence...” (CWL 9: 305).

1.2.1 Current World Order

As with Doran, Lonergan fixes the redemptive role of human wisdom cooperating with divine Wisdom at the level of cultural value and against the staggering backdrop of the entire universe of being. Above all, in *De redemptione* Lonergan affirms the sovereignty of divine wisdom in the enactment of current world order. Current world order is a supernaturally righteous order: it is the order of divine justice that is conceived by divine wisdom, chosen by God's will, caused by God's power, and able to be discerned in created things. It is defined by a number of key components, many of which Lonergan takes directly from Aquinas, but tinged throughout by the generalized emergent probability of *Insight*. The order of divine wisdom is characterized as follows: God directly wills everything good, God indirectly wills natural evil and the evil of punishment, and God merely permits culpable evil; natural forms and laws inhere in created things by which they spontaneously move to their proper ends; there operates an interconnected, circular conjunction of laws that ensure a sure course of events, including the rhythm of human life; God solely effects this "common course of events and order of the universe" by leading each creature to its proper end as through secondary, instrumental causation; and every event depends on God, since God alone is the proportionate cause of the universal order on which every event depends.

Most importantly, the purpose of the universe is to manifest the goodness of God, and does so most preeminently in the way God draws good from evil. Since everything exists for the sake of the perfection of the universe, and the perfection of the universe for the sake of magnifying God's glory, everything that is speaks the goodness of God. In

our current world order, evils are allowed to occur, but through Christ, the order of divine justice is so well integrated into the current world order that God draws good from evil, and the greatest good of order comes about in the body of Christ.⁶¹¹

1.2.2 The Exterior and Internal Orders and the Order of the Universe

In *De redemptione*, Lonergan establishes three levels of the human good: (1) particular goods, which are objects of desire; (2) the external good of order, which is the concrete dynamic scheme by which, through a repetition of coordinated operations, there flows a continuous stream of particular goods (as examples, Lonergan references the domestic, economic, and political orders); and (3) the cultural good, which pertains to the perfection of intellect and goodness of will by which human beings are interiorly ordered, a perfection that conditions the external order of society.

And so all three levels are interconnected with one another as well as dependent on grace. Particular goods flow freely to the extent that there exists a structure, a good of order, that ensures continuity and equity in their delivery. In turn, the good of order is shaped by the cultural values that decide the form that order should take and guide any changes made in that order toward the highest and truest possible good. Finally, if by reflection, judgment, and will we choose the good of order, our deliberations to this effect are only consistently beneficial when they are the fruit of an interior ordering of our reason, and everything else through our reason, to divine wisdom as to supreme norm and ultimate end.

⁶¹¹ CWL 9: 133-143, 157, 349-359, 583, 657.

Furthermore, Lonergan understands all three levels of human good, but especially the connection between the interior order of the human being and God's grace, in relation to universal order. To the extent that we are well-ordered in our interior and exterior lives, we are well-integrated with the order of the universe and, through that order, "intelligibly linked to God and the rest of humanity and all other creatures."⁶¹² For when the image of God within us is violated through the reign of sin, the order of the universe is disrupted. The constantly evolving order of the world, if it is to genuinely mirror God's own goodness and wisdom, emerges in true historical progress and is disrupted by the decline wrought by sin. It takes the ultimate spiritual wisdom, the law of the Cross most clearly revealed and effected in the life and death of Christ, to repair and reintegrate universal order in line with God's love and justice.

1.2.3 Cultural Value and Wisdom

Never one to neglect cognitional theory or metaphysics, Lonergan naturally links particular goods with the potency correlative to experience; the good of order with the form correlative to understanding; and cultural good with the act correlative to judgment. And so wisdom, the perfecter of judgment and the establisher of order, is connected with the cultural good. Just as it is foolish to choose false cultural values—whatever ultimately darkens our intellect and makes impotent our wills—it is wise to choose true ones. Cultural good is the wisdom whereby we choose authentic values and the goodness whereby we will them. While Lonergan has perhaps not yet fully disengaged judgments

⁶¹² CWL 9: 373. Also see CWL 9: 141-143; 269-301.

of fact and judgments of value at this point in his corpus, it appears that he associates wisdom with judgment and goodness with will. Perhaps, Dadosky suggests, the desire to carry out wise judgments is what makes the will good, so that wisdom also practically penetrates into the will.⁶¹³

John Volk expounds at greater length on the nature of cultural wisdom in terms of value judgments in *De redemptione*. Speaking of the Trinitarian ramifications of human wisdom, Lonergan comments that “it is the mark of a wise person to utter a true word on the basis of evidence clearly grasped, and of a good person to breathe love on the basis of a good truly affirmed.”⁶¹⁴ Comparing this language to similar language in the earlier *Verbum* and the later *The Triune God: Systematics*, Volk contends that although wisdom is not precluded as belonging to true judgments of fact in *De redemptione*, it predominately pertains to judgments of value. The evidence grasped by the one who wisely understands and speaks a word regarding the best good of order is the evidence of goodness.⁶¹⁵ And in contrast to understanding, which by definition can only grasp possible intelligibilities, wisdom orders both intelligibility and nonintelligibility: the vision of wisdom sees beyond what is toward what is not but what ought to be, which is a function of value.⁶¹⁶

Here Lonergan clearly still distinguishes between the wisdom necessary to choose truly beneficial social orders and the goodness of will necessary to enact them, thus still speaking in the language of faculty psychology. Nevertheless, in this 1958 work Lonergan begins to pioneer a more existential reading of *sapientia*. As already realized

⁶¹³ “Lonergan on Wisdom,” 54.

⁶¹⁴ CWL 9: 299.

⁶¹⁵ “Lonergan on the Wisdom that Regards All Things: Insights from *De Redemptione* and *Early Works on Theological Method*,” *Lonergan Workshop* 27 (2013): 315-346, especially 320-326.

⁶¹⁶ CWL 9: 397, 401, 407.

by Aquinas, *sapientia* can be practical and, Lonergan here adds, wisdom yields judgments of value that discern which good of order is truly good.

1.2.4 Cultural Value and the Wisdom of the Word

In any case, the relationship of wisdom to the social order is clear: "...particular goods increase with the good of order, and order grows in accordance with the wisdom of those who make judgments and the goodness of those who make decisions."⁶¹⁷ In turn, our wisdom grows in proportion to the depth of our relationship, established in sanctifying grace, to the Father through the Son in the Spirit. And because Christ communicates not only what belongs to human nature but also what belongs to the Word of Wisdom, Christ's signs can be sourced for developing our judgment, strengthening our will, and even transforming our social and particular goods. In the incarnate Wisdom of God, the Word made flesh, we witness the inauguration and perfection of the kingdom of God, the greatest and wisest order to emerge in history.

2 Our Relationship to the Divine Word through "Love of Wisdom": A Few Questions

But if the created relation to the Son that the theological virtue of charity grounds is, for non-Christians, a created relation of love for the invisible Word understood specifically as divine *wisdom*, can Doran's assertion be further mined with the analogy between human wisdom and divine wisdom as the touchstone? Three questions come to

⁶¹⁷ CWL 9: 299.

mind. First, (2.1) how exactly does our share in the proceeding Love of God (the Spirit), given in charity, ground a love for divine wisdom? (2.2) And how might wisdom conceived as knowledge and love of the universe connect us in loving relationship to the Word? (2.3) Finally, how does this theme—love of divine wisdom through love of the universe—manifest in our consciousness and in our world, in ways additional to the work Doran has already done around self-sacrificing charity, the law of the cross, and social grace? In what follows, I will attempt a (very) preliminary answer to these linked questions, instigated by Doran’s pioneering refinement to the four-point hypothesis.

2.1 The Spirit of Love and the Word of Wisdom

First, how exactly does our share in the proceeding Love of God (the Spirit), given in charity, ground a love for divine wisdom? An answer to his question is fairly clear from Doran’s emphasis on the nonviolent and forgiving nature of charity as it is told in the Gospel and Lonergan’s position in *De redemptione*. To the extent that the meanings and values defining our respective cultures encourage or repel the self-surrender of love that returns good for evil, to that extent do we not only share in the Spirit (participated by charity) but also illuminate or deface the Word of Wisdom. That Word of Wisdom is revealed definitively in Christ, who pleaded with the Father on the cross to forgive His murderers and told us to forgive our enemies in kind.

But true cultural good, promoted by the wisdom of self-surrender, still authentically relates us back to the Word of Wisdom, even those of us who do not know or accept Christ. For the Word is called Wisdom not solely because it is the *verbum*

expressing all that the Father knows. The Word is also the *verbum spirans amorem*, a judgment of value giving way to an act of love in response to the goodness of all that the Father knows and loves, and, most of all on Lonergan's later account, in response to the unoriginated Agape that the Father *is*. What is lovingly spoken, lovingly judged of value in the spoken Word, is the goodness of the Father's love for all, not simply the Word. And this love is, for us, undeserved love that is also undeserved mercy.

Again, according to Lonergan's later Trinitarian analogy, the Father is not just understanding speaking a word but originating love; the Son is judgment of value expressing that love; and the Spirit is originated loving. The Word of Wisdom is spoken love, who, in turn, breathes love. Then any act of love that ultimately flows from our recognition of our undeserved reception of merciful love (understood by Doran in its reception as *memoria* and in its recognition as faith), which then gives way to a desire to share the goodness of this love with others, even our enemies (understood by Lonergan and Doran as charity), mirrors the Word of Wisdom, where the human analogue for wisdom is read as the self-surrender of love. Thus the habit of charity can be construed, along the lines of Doran, as a love for divine Wisdom.

2.2 Love for God and Love for the Universe

And how might wisdom conceived as knowledge and love of the universe connect us in loving relationship to the Word? Love of God and love of the universe comprise a remarkably consistent dyad in Lonergan's work; knowledge of the universe (an important

form of wisdom, on both Aquinas' and Lonergan's accounts) and self-knowledge are also intertwined.⁶¹⁸

Lonergan often discussed love for God's ordering of the universe as an essential element of religious conversion, an idea that seems especially fertile for our interreligious (and nonreligious) times as well as consonant with Aquinas' idea of wisdom vis-à-vis the universe. Just as Doran postulates faith as the global judgment of value saying "yes" to the goodness of God's love, with the doctrinal affirmation of social grace as a further judgment of value, a further articulation of this universalist faith, we may suggest that any and all judgments of value affirming the goodness of universal order are also extensions of faith. The ways that all of the various parts of the universe contribute to the beauty of the whole shine forth a divine pattern, and wisdom discerns this template. For the world has been designed by the Master according to the "pattern" of the Word through which it was created, the Word of Wisdom that is spoken as a superabundant Expression of Love, a supreme pronouncement on the goodness of divine love that is mirrored by our own recognition of the universe as a pronouncement of this same divine love. And so a knowledge and appreciation of universal order relates us to the invisible Word. Indeed, in Doran's analogy of grace, the divine love that, in us, is appropriated in *memoria*, interiorly spoken in faith, and returned to God and others in charity "has about it something that seems to emanate from the foundation of the universe."⁶¹⁹

⁶¹⁸ Textual references to these dyads are abundant. In *Insight*, charity wills the order of the universe for love of God, and everything and everyone that is in the universe. In *Method*, faith shifts our terminal value from simply the human good to the good of the entire universe. Also in *Method* and later works, the question about the goodness of the universe inevitably turns into a question about God, and a loving acceptance of the universe leads to a loving acceptance of someone responsible for the universe.

⁶¹⁹ *Trinity in History*, 34.

3 Final Thoughts: Wisdom as the Humility, Patience, and Autonomy of Love

Finally, how does this theme—love of divine wisdom through love of the universe—manifest in our consciousness and in our world? We might point to humility, patience, and respect for autonomy as auxiliaries to the self-sacrificing charity already underlined by Doran. Articulating the connection between genuineness and wisdom in the struggle for self-transcendence, Gerard Walmsley remarks, “Genuineness involves a developed wisdom and a commitment to properly human development.”⁶²⁰ In light of Lonergan’s later identification of wisdom as successive degrees of self-transcendence, I would revise this to read, more simply, that such genuineness, such basic and dialectic growth in the human subject, *is* wisdom. Wisdom is the development, the movement, toward greater and greater degrees of self-transcendence. To borrow a description from “Christology Today,” wisdom can be described as the “truly human development...of conscious subjects moving cumulatively through their operations to the self-transcendence of truth and love.”⁶²¹

The genuine human development that is wisdom calls for humility at an intellectual and existential level. Speaking of the unrestricted field intended by the transcendental notions, Lonergan notes that “it is only because we can ask more questions than we can answer that we know about the limitations of our knowledge.”⁶²² Put another way, the fool can ask more questions than the wise man can answer; however, unlike the fool, the wise man knows exactly what this lacuna means. In Lonergan’s cognitional-intentional anthropology, the wise one is the subject with the greatest awareness of—the

⁶²⁰ *Lonergan on Philosophical Pluralism*, 77.

⁶²¹ CWL 16: 73.

⁶²² CWL 23: 26 and 33.

one most at home in—the unrestricted questioning of the transcendental notions. She humbly realizes that the depth and breadth of her knowledge of the universe of being is quite limited, and yet has the fullest and most certain grasp of the unrestricted nature of her own questioning.

But the wisdom of the whole and holistic human being is also an appropriation of our existential orientation open to grace. Just as cognitional wisdom recognized not only the limitations of our actual, present knowledge of the universe but also the unlimited nature of our conscious intentionality, existential wisdom recognizes not only the distortions of our freedom and irresponsibility, their consequent contribution to decline and need for redemption, but also our unrestricted longing for unlimited goodness and unconditional love.

In addition to humility, the demands of existential wisdom call for patience as well as a deep respect for the autonomy of the other, for “to will the order of the universe ...is not to demand that all things be perfect in their inception but to expect and will that they grow and develop.”⁶²³ To love a universe that has been growing and developing for billions of years, and to love a God that patiently guides and delights in such a process, is to call upon our own patience.

The divine bestowal of freedom is so generous that it allows us to “co-create” ourselves along with God’s interior action. Respect for one’s own freedom and the freedom of the other, including the respect that comes with the acknowledgement that growth is dialectical and, in this current world order, includes mistakes, sins, corrections, and constant conversion, is a sign of love for the universe and, indirectly, love for God.

⁶²³ CWL 3: 721.

The truly wise humbly and patiently embrace the healing of their sinful distortions and the elevating of their natural limitations, surrendering them both to grace.⁶²⁴ The “wise one” conquers her natural limitations and sinful distortions not in inauthentic drifting or withdrawing from life or in the equally blind striving of alienated subjectivity to conform to an inauthentic culture, religion, or theology but in the paradoxical surrender to self-transcendence in all its forms, especially that of love, which acts in human history as the power of conversion.

Even more paradoxically, the supernatural wisdom of religious conversion lies not in striving but in surrendering: not in striving to conquer evil with more evil but in surrendering to the law of the cross, which counsels and demands a nonviolent return of good for evil. For Christians, the incarnate Wisdom of God is the surest sign of a humble, patient, freedom-respecting love that invites but does not force love in return. It is a love that asks for acceptance and self-surrender even when knowledge “fails” and must bow to mystery.

As both truth and praxis, the law of the cross is perhaps the most divinely psychodramatic, and the most clearly supernatural and redemptive embodiment, of the more general principle of nonviolence. This principle of nonresistance—that is, acceptance—can be found in many other world religions, and even in the personal philosophies of those who identify as “nonreligious.” In Lonergan’s beautiful words, if

⁶²⁴ For a creative excursion into the connection between humility and wisdom in Aquinas, see Alina Beary, “The Curious Case of Ivan Karamazov: A Thomistic Account of Wisdom and Pride,” *HeyJ* LIX (2018): 34-44. Also worthy of special mention in this vein is Dadosky’s article “Woman without Envy: Reconceiving the Immaculate Conception,” *Theological Studies* 72 (2011): 15-40. Therein he discusses humility and gratitude as crucial antidotes to the pride and envy that often erupt into internal and external violence and threaten our spiritual peace. The article speculates on the example that Mary’s freedom from such violent dynamics (flowing from her immaculate conception) sets for our grace-filled imitation of the divine. In the Catholic tradition Mary is known as *sedes sapientiae*; it may be worthwhile to explore the connection between Mary’s humility and her wisdom and her uniqueness among feminine representations of supernatural wisdom.

in humility and simplicity we accept things as they are, we can advance to a knowledge of God and an intimacy with God that will leave us convinced that what, as philosophers, we may call his wisdom and goodness are in truth wisdom and goodness—surpassing wisdom and surpassing goodness.⁶²⁵

⁶²⁵ CWL 5: 376-377.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Materials by Aristotle

Metaphysics. Translated by Hippocrates G. Apostle. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 1966.

Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Martin Ostwald. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996.

Posterior Analytics. Translated by Hippocrates G. Apostle. Grinnell, IA: The Peripatetic Press, 1981.

Primary Materials by St. Thomas Aquinas

In Aristotelis libros peri hermineias et posteriorum analyticorum expositio. Edited by R. Spiazzi. Turin: Marietti, 1955.

In duodecim libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio. Edited by R. Spiazzi. Turin: Marietti, 1950.

Super Epistolas Sancti Pauli Lectura. Edited by Raphaelis Cai. Rome: Marietti, 1953.

Expositio super librum Boethii de trinitate. Edited by R. Spiazzi. In *S. Thomas Aquinatis opuscula theologica*. Vol. 2. Rome: Marietti, 1954.

Lectura super Ioannem. Edited by Raphaelis Cai. Rome: Marietti, 1952.

Quaestiones disputatae de veritate. Volume 22, *Opera omnia iussa edita leonis xiii p.m.* Rome: Typographia polyglotta, 1970-1976.

Sententia libri ethicorum. Volume 47, *Opera omnia iussa edita leonis xiii p.m.* Rome: Typographia polyglotta, 1969.

Summa contra gentiles. Volumes 13-15, *Opera omnia iussa edita leonis xiii p.m.* Rome: Typographia polyglotta, 1918-1930.

Summa theologiae. Volumes 4-12, *Opera omnia iussa edita leonis xiii p.m.* Rome: Typographia polyglotta, 1888-1906.

(Translations consulted)

The Division and Methods of the Sciences. Questions V and VI of his Commentary on the "De Trinitate" of Boethius. Translated by Armand Maurer. 4th ed. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986.

Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Translated by J. P. Rowan. 2 vols. Chicago: H. Regnery, 1961.

Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by C.I. Litzinger. 2 vols. Chicago: H. Regnery, 1964.

Exposition of the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle. Translated by Pierre Conway. Québec, Canada: La Librairie Philosophique M. Doyon, 1956.

Summa theologiae. Translated and edited by T. Gilby and T.C. O'Brien. 60 vols. London: Blackfriars, 1964-1973.

Treatise on Happiness. Translated by John A. Oesterle. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1982.

Treatise on the Virtues. Translated by John A. Oesterle. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1984.

On Truth. Translated by R.W. Mulligan, J.V. McGlynn, and R.W. Schmidt. 3 vols. Chicago: H. Regnery, 1952-1954.

On the Truth of the Catholic Faith: Summa contra gentiles. Translated by Anton C. Pegis, James F. Anderson, V.J. Bourke, and Charles J. O'Neil. 4 vols. Garden City, NY: Hanover House, 1955.

Primary Materials by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J.

(Published, by title)

"Appendix 1: Introduction to the Notion and Problem of Method." In *Early Works on Theological Method 2*, translated by Michael G. Shields and edited by Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, 591-641. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 23. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013.

"Appendix 2: Items Related to 'De Methodo Theologiae.'" In *Early Works on Theological Method 2*, translated by Michael G. Shields and edited by Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, 643-707. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 23. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013.

“Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation.” In *A Third Collection*, edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, 34-51. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 16. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017.

“Avery Cardinal Dulles’s Notes for Lonergan’s ‘A Five-Day Institute: The Method of Theology,’ 13-17 July 1964, Georgetown University.” In *Early Works on Theological Method I*, edited by Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken, 377-420. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 22. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2010.

“Christology Today: Methodological Reflections.” In *A Third Collection*, edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, 70-93. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 16. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017.

“Doctrinal Pluralism.” In *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, edited by Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, 70-104. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 17. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.

“Dimensions of Meaning.” In *Collection*, edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, 232-245. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 4. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988.

Early Latin Theology. Translated by Michael G. Shields. Edited by Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 19. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2011.

“Editorial Report on the Handwritten Notes for ‘De Systemate et Historia.’” In *Early Works on Theological Method 2*, translated by Michael G. Shields and edited by Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, 314-349. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 23. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013.

“Faith and Beliefs.” In *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, edited by Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, 30-48. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 17. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.

“Finality, Love, Marriage.” In *Collection*, edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, 17-52. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 4. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988.

“First Lecture: Religious Experience.” In *A Third Collection*, edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, 111-123. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 16. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017.

“The Functional Specialty ‘Systematics.’” In *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, edited by Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, 179-198. Collected

Works of Bernard Lonergan 17. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.

“The Future of Christianity.” In *A Second Collection*, edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, 127-139. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 13. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016.

“The Future of Thomism.” In *A Second Collection*, edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, 39-47. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 13. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016.

“Regis College Institute ‘On the Method of Theology,’ 9-20 July 1962.” In *Early Works on Theological Method 1*. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 22. Edited by Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2010.

Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 1. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2000.

“Healing and Creating in History.” In *A Third Collection*, edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, 94-103. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 16. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017.

“Horizons.” In *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, edited by Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, 10-29. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 17. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.

“Horizons and Transpositions.” In *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, edited by Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, 409-432. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 17. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.

Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. Edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 3. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1992.

“*Insight Revisited*.” In *A Second Collection*, edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, 221-233. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 13. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016.

“An Interview with Fr Bernard Lonergan, S.J.” In *A Second Collection*, edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, 176-194. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 13. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016.

“Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought.” In *Collection*, edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, 133-141. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 4. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988.

- “Metaphysics as Horizon.” In *Collection*, edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, 188-204. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 4. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988.
- Method in Theology*. Edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 14. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017.
- “The Method of Theology [*De methodo theologiae*].” In *Early Works on Theological Method* 2, translated by Michael G. Shields and edited by Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, 359-589. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 23. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013.
- “The Method of Theology [*De methodo theologiae*] Fall and Winter 1963-64: Editorial Reconstruction.” In *Early Works on Theological Method* 3, translated by Michael G. Shields and edited by Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, 87-158. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 24. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013.
- “The Method of Theology [*De methodo theologiae*] Spring 1963: Editorial Reconstruction.” In *Early Works on Theological Method* 3, translated by Michael G. Shields and edited by Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, 3-86. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 24. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013.
- “Method: Trend and Variations.” In *A Third Collection*, edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, 10-20. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 16. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017.
- “Mission and the Spirit.” In *A Third Collection*, edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, 21-33. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 16. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017.
- “Moral Theology and the Human Sciences.” In *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, edited by Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, 301-312. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 17. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.
- “The Natural Desire to See God.” In *Collection*, edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, 81-91. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 4. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988.
- “Natural Knowledge of God.” In *A Second Collection*, edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, 99-113. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 13. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016.
- “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness.” In *A Third Collection*, edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, 163-176. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 16. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017.

“A New Pastoral Theology.” In *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, edited by Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, 221-239. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 17. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.

The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ. Translated by Michael G. Shields. Edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 7. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2002.

Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism. Edited by Philip J. McShane. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 18. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2001.

Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964. Edited by Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 6. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1996.

“Philosophy of God.” In *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, edited by Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, 162-178. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 17. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.

“Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon.” In *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, edited by Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, 391-408. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 17. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.

“A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion.” In *A Third Collection*, edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, 194-213. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 16. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017.

“Questionnaire on Philosophy: Response.” In *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, edited by Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, 352-383. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 17. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.

The Redemption. Translated by Michael G. Shields. Edited by Robert M. Doran, H. Daniel Monsour, and Jeremy D. Wilkins. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 9. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2018.

“Regis College Institute ‘On the Method of Theology,’ 9-20 July 1962.” In *Early Works on Theological Method*, edited by Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken, 3-374. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 22. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2010.

“The Relationship between Philosophy of God and the Functional Specialty ‘Systematics.’” In *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, edited by Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, 199-218. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 17. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.

“Report on Archival Notes Relevant to the Spring 1961 Course ‘De Intellectu et

Methodo.” In *Early Works on Theological Method 2*, translated by Michael G. Shields and edited by Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, 350-357. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 23. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013.

“Review of Edmond Barbotin, Jean Trouillard, Roger Verneaux, Dominique Dubarle, Stanislas Breton, *La crise de la raison dans la pensée contemporaine*.” In *Shorter Papers*, edited by Robert C. Croken, Robert M. Doran, and H. Daniel Monsour, 234-236. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 20. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2007.

“Self-Transcendence: Intellectual, Moral, Religious.” In *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, edited by Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, 313-331. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 17. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.

Shorter Papers. Edited by Robert C. Croken, Robert M. Doran, and H. Daniel Monsour. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 20. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2007.

“System and History [*De systemate et historia*].” In *Early Works on Theological Method 2*, translated by Michael G. Shields and edited by Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, 231-313. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 23. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013.

Topics in Education. Edited by Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 10. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1993.

“Theology and Man’s Future.” In *A Second Collection*, edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, 114-126. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 13. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016.

“Theology and Praxis.” In *A Third Collection*, edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, 177-193. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 16. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2017.

“Theology and Understanding.” In *Collection*, edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, 114-132. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 4. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988.

“Transcendental Philosophy and the Study of Religion, 3-12 July 1968, Boston College.” In *Early Works on Theological Method 1*, edited by Robert M. Doran and Robert C. Croken, 421-633. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 22. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2010.

“The Transition from a Classicist Worldview to Historical Mindedness.” In *A Second Collection*, edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, 3-10. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 13. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016.

The Triune God: Doctrines. Translated by Michael G. Shields. Edited by Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 11. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2009.

The Triune God: Systematics. Translated by Michael G. Shields. Edited by Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 12. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2007.

Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on Insight. Edited by Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 5. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1990.

“Understanding and Method [*De intellectu et methodo*].” In *Early Works on Theological Method 2*, translated by Michael G. Shields and edited by Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, 3-229. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 23. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2013.

“Variations in Fundamental Theology.” In *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, edited by Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, 240-258. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 17. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.

Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas. Edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 2. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1997. Originally published as “The Concept of *Verbum* in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas.” *Theological Studies* 7 (1946): 349–92; 8 (1947): 35–79, 404–44; 10 (1949): 3–40, 359–93.

“What Are Judgments of Value?”. In *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, edited by Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, 140-156. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 17. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.

(Unpublished archives from *Bernard Lonergan Archive: Resources in Lonergan Studies* at bernardlonergan.com, listed by serial number)

10034DTE040 from Lonergan’s 1945-1946 course of lectures, entitled “Thought and Reality,” given at Thomas More Institute; set of notes taken by Martin O’Hara

18740DTE060 “Wisdom and Self-Appropriation,” one of a set of forty lectures given in 1961 at St. Mary’s College in Moraga, California; transcription by Robert M. Doran

2966ADTE070 from Lonergan’s 1979 course on *Method in Theology* at Boston College; from the first part of November 8th’s Q&A session;

transcription by Robert M. Doran

- 809A0DTE070 from the 1974 Lonergan Workshop at Boston College; from the Q&A session on June 17th; transcription edited by Robert M. Doran
- 52200DTE060 from the fourth lecture at the Regis College 1969 Institute on Method in Theology, on July 10th; transcription edited by Robert M. Doran
- 52400DTE060 from the second part of the fifth lecture at the Regis College 1969 Institute on Method in Theology, on July 11th; transcription edited by Robert M. Doran
- 810A0DTE070 from the 1974 Lonergan Workshop at Boston College; from the Q&A session on June 18th; transcription edited by Robert M. Doran
- 815A0DTE070 from the 1974 Lonergan Workshop at Boston College; from the fifth Q&A session on June 21st; transcription edited by Robert M. Doran
- 98700DTE080 from the 1981 Lonergan Workshop at Boston College; from the second Q&A session on June 16th; transcription edited by Robert M. Doran

Secondary Materials

- Beary, Alina. "The Curious Case of Ivan Karamazov: A Thomistic Account of Wisdom and Pride." *Heythrop Journal* LIX (2018): 34-44.
- Blackwood, Jeremy W. *And Hope Does Not Disappoint*. Marquette Studies in Theology 88, edited by Andrew Tallon. Milwaukee: Marquette University, 2017.
- Byrne, Patrick. "Consciousness: Levels, Sublations, and the Subject as Subject." *MJLS* 13 (1995): 131-150.
- . "Phronêsis and Commonsense Judgment: Aristotle and Lonergan on Moral Wisdom." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 71 (Supp. 1997): 163-177.
- Coelho, Ivo. *Hermeneutics and Method: The 'Universal Viewpoint' in Bernard Lonergan*. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2001.

- Crowe, Frederick E. "Lonerger's Search for Foundations: The Early Years, 1940- 1959." In *Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes*, edited by Michael Vertin, 164-193. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.
- . "Doctrines and Historicity in the Context of Lonergan's *Method in Theology*." In *Lonerger and the Level of Our Time*, edited by Michael Vertin, 28-40. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2010.
- . "Rhyme and Reason: On Lonergan's Foundations for Works of the Spirit." In *Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes*, edited by Michael Vertin, 314-331. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.
- . "Son of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions." In *Appropriating the Lonergan Idea*, edited by Michael Vertin, 324-343. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1989.
- . "The Spectrum of 'Communication' in Lonergan." In *Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes*, edited by Michael Vertin, 53-77. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004.
- . "The Task of Interpreting Lonergan." In *Appropriating the Lonergan Idea*, edited by Michael Vertin, 145-160. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1989.
- . *Three Thomist Studies*. Edited by Frederick Lawrence. Supplementary Issue of Lonergan Workshop 16. Atlanta: Scholar's Press, 2000.
- Cunningham, Francis. *The Indwelling of the Trinity*. Dubuque: Priory Press, 1955.
- Dadosky, John D. "Lonerger on Wisdom." *Irish Theological Quarterly* 79 (2014): 45-66.
- . "Midwiving the Fourth Stage of Meaning: Lonergan and Doran." In *Meaning and History in Systematic Theology: Essays in Honor of Robert M. Doran, SJ*, edited by John D. Dadosky, 71-92. Marquette Studies in Theology 68, edited by Andrew Tallon. Milwaukee: Marquette University, 2009.
- . "Woman without Envy: Reconceiving the Immaculate Conception," *Theological Studies* 72 (2011): 15-40.
- Doran, Robert M. "'Complacency and Concern' and a Basic Thesis on Grace." *Lonerger Workshop* 13 (1997): 57-78.

- . “Two Ways of Being Conscious: The Notion of Psychic Conversion.” Essay 43 in *Essays in Systematic Theology: An E-Book*. Lonergan Resource, 2011.
<http://lonerganresource.com/book.php?1>.
- . *Theology and the Dialectics of History*. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1990.
- . *The Trinity in History: A Theology of the Divine Missions*. Volume I: *Missions and Processions*. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2012.
- . “What Does Bernard Lonergan Mean by ‘Conversion’?” Essay 40 in *Essays in Systematic Theology: An E-Book*. Lonergan Resource, 2011.
<http://lonerganresource.com/book.php?1>.
- . *What Is Systematic Theology?* Toronto: University of Toronto, 2005.
- Dunne, Tad. “Being in Love.” *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 13 (1995): 161-175.
- Emery, Gilles. *Trinity in Aquinas*. Ypsilanti, Michigan: Sapientia Press, 2003.
- Friel, Christopher. “Lonergan’s Notion of Being.” *Heythrop Journal* 57 (2016): 511-531.
- Hirschfeld, Mary L. *Aquinas on the Market: Toward a Humane Economy*. Cambridge, Michigan: Harvard University Press, 2018.
- Jacobs-Vandegeer, Christiaan. “The Hermeneutics of Interiority: Transposition in the Third Stage of Meaning.” In *Meaning and History in Systematic Theology: Essays in Honor of Robert M. Doran, SJ*, edited by John D. Dadosky, 191-216. Marquette Studies in Theology 68, edited by Andrew Tallon. Milwaukee: Marquette University, 2009.
- . “Sanctifying Grace in a ‘Methodical Theology.’” *Theological Studies* 68 (2007): 52– 76.
- Johnson, Mark F. “The Sapiential Character of *Sacra Doctrina* in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas: The Appropriation of Aristotle’s Intellectual Virtue of Wisdom.” PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1990.
- . “God’s Knowledge in Our Frail Mind.” *Angelicum* 76 (1999): 25-46.
- Lamb, Matthew. “Lonergan’s Transposition of Augustine and Aquinas: Exploratory Suggestions.” In *The Importance of Insight: Essays in Honour of Michael Vertin*, edited by John J. Liptay, Jr., and David S. Liptay, 3-21. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2007.
- Lawrence, Frederick G. “Lonergan and Aquinas: The Postmodern Problematic of Theology and Ethics.” In *The Ethics of Aquinas*, edited by Stephen J. Pope, 437-

455. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 2002.

Mabry, Eric. “*Officium Sapientis*: Sapiential Moorings of Lonergan’s Notion of Method and Interiority in Thomas Aquinas.” Paper presented at the West Coast Methods Institute, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, April 4-6, 2013.

Maritain, Jacques. *Distinguer pour unir ou Les degrés du savoir*. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1932.

Mongeau, Gilles M. *Embracing Wisdom: The Summa Theologiae as Spiritual Pedagogy*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2015.

Renic, Dalibor. *Ethical and Epistemic Normativity: Lonergan and Virtue Epistemology*. Marquette Studies in Theology 74, edited by Andrew Tallon. Milwaukee: Marquette University, 2012.

Sommers, Mary Catherine. “Contemplation and Action in Aristotle and Aquinas.” In *Aristotle in Aquinas’ Theology*, edited by Gilles Emery, OP, and Matthew Levering, 167-185. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Te Velde, Rudi. *Aquinas on God: The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae*. Hants, England: Ashgate, 2006.

Volk, John. “Lonergan on the Wisdom that Regards All Things: Insights from *De Redemptione* and *Early Works on Theological Method*.” *Lonergan Workshop* 27 (2013): 315-346.

Walmsley, Gerard. *Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism: The Polymorphism of Consciousness as the Key to Philosophy*. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2008.

Wilkins, Jeremy D. *Before Truth: Lonergan, Aquinas, and the Problem of Wisdom*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 2018.