'Our Feet are Mired In the Same Soil': Deepening Democracy with the Political Virtue of Sympathetic Inquiry

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‘OUR FEET ARE MIRED IN THE SAME SOIL’: DEEPENING DEMOCRACY WITH THE POLITICAL VIRTUE OF SYMPATHETIC INQUIRY

by

Jennifer Lynn Kiefer Fenton, B.A., M.A.

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

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ABSTRACT
‘OUR FEET ARE MIRED IN THE SAME SOIL’: DEEPENING DEMOCRACY WITH THE POLITICAL VIRTUE OF SYMPATHETIC INQUIRY

Jennifer Lynn Kiefer Fenton, B.A., M.A.
Marquette University, 2019

This dissertation puts American philosophers and social reformers, Jane Addams (1860-1935) and John Dewey (1859-1952), in conversation with contemporary social and political philosopher, Iris Marion Young (1949-2006), to argue that an account of deliberative equality must make conceptual space to name the problem of ‘communicatively structured deliberative inequality’. I argue that in order for participatory democracy theory to imagine and construct genuinely inclusive deliberative spaces, it must be grounded in a relational ontology and pragmatist feminist social epistemology.

The literature has largely developed deliberative inequality in terms of access (e.g., participation costs) and ‘impoverished capacities’ for political participation (e.g., political-process illiteracy; public debate skills). This literature has failed to appreciate the communicative dimensions of deliberative inequality. Individuals who occupy historically stigmatized social groups may participate at a communicatively structured disadvantage in participatory forums not because of their own impoverished capacities, but because of the identity-prejudiced stereotypes of their interlocutors.

Chapter 1 situates Young’s communicative democracy in contemporary deliberative democracy literature and shows the inadequacies of liberal individualism, assumed by much of traditional deliberative theory, for naming and addressing the problem of communicatively structured deliberative inequality. Chapter 2 draws on literature in feminist and resistance epistemologies as well as the social identity approach within contemporary social psychology theory to flesh out the problem of communicatively structured deliberative inequality. Here, I provide a relational ontology of prejudice and examine it’s impact on one’s epistemic and deliberative standing. Chapter 3 draws on the work of Addams and Dewey to develop a relational ontology of political agency as well as the pragmatist feminist epistemology of communicative democracy.

Addams and Dewey, like Young, saw exclusion as a serious social and political problem, and they looked to democratic norms and practices as a resource for social justice. Thus, Chapter 4 looks to Addams and Dewey’s writings and Addams’s leadership at Hull House as a resource for communicative democracy, and more particularly, for addressing deliberative inequality and imagining and constructing inclusive deliberative spaces in light of the problem of communicatively structured deliberative inequality.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Jennifer Lynn Kiefer Fenton, B.A., M.A.

I am able to imagine epistemic resistance because of the blessing of having watched my family and friends actively resist and protest institutions, practices, values, and relationships that marginalize people’s epistemic and deliberative standing on the basis of such things as gender, class, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, creed, or because of their social frailty.

From my mother, I have learned that epistemic resistance requires the courage to seek out the stories of those who are different from you, the openness to be changed by those stories, and the boldness to protest one’s diminished deliberative standing in her community through confidently asserting – sometimes quite loudly – one’s own story into social space. From my father, I have learned about commitment, to one’s faith in a higher good and to justice, and commitment to others who will sometimes fail us in this. From my brother, I have learned that epistemic resistance is had through a spirit of constant inquiry and the courage to know for no other reason than to know. From my late Great-Grandmother Carrie Kiefer I have learned that a home that is grounded in compassion, hospitality, and grace can be a refuge from authoritarianism. From my friends at B’s, that epistemic standing can be restored with humor, wit, a few curse words at the wrap station, and through solidarity with one another.

I wish to express thanks for Dr. Margaret Urban Walker and Dr. Nancy Snow for paving roads in academia for this type of project and for giving oxygen to it’s early flames, at a time when I could not even see that there was any smoke. And I am grateful to Dr. Stephen Franzoi for welcoming me into his social psychology graduate seminar and for working with me during the early stages of this project and celebrating this kind of interdisciplinary work.

I am filled with gratitude for my first philosophy professors at Geneva College, Dr. Robert Frazier and Dr. Esther Meek. Thank you Dr. Meek, for loving me in the classroom as a woman philosopher at a time when I could not yet love myself as such, or others for that matter. Thank you Dr. Frazier, for accepting me just as I am, for affirming my intellect and passion, and for validating me to my peers as a full and equal knower and deliberator. My life has been richly blessed by your investment in me and by the friendship and love you have bestowed on Russ and me over the years.

I wish to express gratitude to my Committee, for valuing my project and for providing me with fruitful feedback and welcoming me into the academic community: Dr. Theresa Tobin, Dr. Kevin Gibson, Dr. Jessica Wolfendale, and Dr. Carianne Hayslett. I am especially grateful to Kevin Gibson for being a champion for women in philosophy and for years of academic friendship and mentoring, as well as for his intelligent British humor that I have more often than I would like to admit, laughed at and pretended to
understand, and then later figured out on the drive home. And I am especially grateful to Theresa Tobin for letting me use philosophical inquiry as a way to sort out personal problems. As was the case in this dissertation, I have worked through a personal problem towards the discovery of political problems. In this way, your pedagogy has breathed the feminist proclamation, “The personal is political!” to life for me. The thoughtfulness and academic rigor of your work and your compassion for others are a powerful force in the world and in my scholarship. This project and I have been enriched by your support, encouragement, and friendship.

The completion of this project would also not have been possible without the intellectual friendships I have formed over the years with many of my students. Their willingness to work towards creating democratic community with me and with one another is a constant source of inspiration. I am most especially grateful to the first group of graduate students who took Ethics in Public Service with me, for appreciating the worth of my research but also for sharing their stories and the stories of others to enrich this research and motivate it further.

I wish to also thank friends and family who have supported me over the years, through checking in to see how I was and how the writing was going, and for knowing when it was time to say, “Get writing, girl!” and when it was time to help me have compassion for myself. To Lynnae Fenton and Mom Fenton especially for this, and to the Fenton family for supporting Russ and I in our journey to Wisconsin.

I am grateful for safe space to vent fears and insecurities, space that was made in community with Britney and Jordan Larson, Rachel and Travis Hatt, Carrie Allbaugh, and Joe and Charis Gordon. To Joe especially, thank you for your intellectual friendship over the years and for bravely questioning epistemic norms and for using your own epistemic standing to affirm others as knowers. I wish to also express gratitude to Kelly Muston for supporting me as I completed the final revisions of the dissertation. She has given me the tools to protect myself from my worst insecurities, insecurities that motivate the rabbit-hole-digging self, and to empower me into a more confident and assured self.

I wrote the conclusion of the dissertation for Tess Maier. She sent me encouraging (and sometimes annoying) emails every 6 weeks for a solid year. I humbly hope that my completion of this dissertation can play a small role in validating for her, that her support in the lives of so many people is something that is meaningful and important in the world.

Last, I wish to express gratitude to Russ, my life partner for these last 10 years and in my journey to this day. Although I do not express my gratitude when you do it, I am thankful to you for calling it to my attention when I am behaving in ways that are more authoritarian than democratic. Our marriage and friendship is a daily reminder to me of the rich life that can be had through a commitment to political equality, active and sympathetic listening, cooperative problem solving, ongoing feedback loops and openness to change and growth, and epistemic humility and patience.
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation puts American philosophers and social reformers, Jane Addams (1860-1935) and John Dewey (1859-1952), in conversation with contemporary social and political philosopher, Iris Marion Young (1949-2006). The dissertation brings these figures together because, although they were separated by almost a century in time and grounded in distinct philosophical traditions, they all saw exclusion as a serious social and political problem. And they looked to democracy as a means for repairing exclusion and as a resource for social justice. They all believed deeply that democratic norms like political equality, transparency, reason-giving in decision-making processes, and the inclusion of diverse social perspectives in those decision-making processes and democratic discussion, could give us a way out of exclusion and a way into more fulfilling social life with one another.

Ultimately, the dissertation develops a pragmatist feminist social epistemology from the thought and activism of Addams and Dewey, and introduces this as both a foundational contribution for Young’s communicative democracy theory, as well as a resource for doing communicative democracy and realizing deliberative equality.

The title of the dissertation is inspired by Jane Addams’s opening words in Democracy and Social Ethics (1902), where she acknowledges the facticity of human interdependence. This fact of interdependence motivated her life’s work to promote democratic values and facilitate inclusive social spaces where those values may be put into practice. On this fact of interdependence she writes,

…As members of the community [we] stand indicted. This is the penalty of democracy, - that we are bound to move forward or retrograde together. None of
us can stand aside; our feet are mired in the same soil, and our lungs breathe the same air. (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 112, the emphasis is mine)

This dissertation argues that the relational ontology that is emphasized in this appreciation for human interdependence, is a foundational feature of communicative democracy, and ultimately, is what enables for it to be a facilitator of social justice. Democracy as such must be understood as far more than a mere aggregation of personal preferences. Adolescents often “take it to a vote” thinking themselves civilized, mature, and democratic. But the fact that preferences are widely held is not an indication that those preferences are reasonable or that they are just. Democracy reduced to popular elections or special interest politics, or on the other end of the spectrum, democracy surrendered to elitist representative protections, ultimately both collapse into a form of rule that is based in power.

But democracy fulfilled through inclusive and vibrant public discussion, that goes all the way down to our most basic institutions (e.g., the family, the workplace), bases the legitimacy of decision-making not in power, but in reason-giving, discussion across difference, coordinated activity, and ongoing cooperation. Democracy as such is not just a form of political machinery, but it is an ethics and an epistemology. It is as Dewey remarks in a great deal of his work, a way of life. To say that democracy is an ethics and an epistemology is to say that it is a way of interacting with, communicating with, and knowing one another. And to say that democracy is a way of life is to say that norms of political equality and inclusion must govern all of our social interactions, so that through the implementation of these procedural values, human beings may more fully participate in all of social life. This requires working to make physical and procedural space, as well as communicative space, for all individuals to participate in the formation and ongoing
evolution of the institutions, practices, values, and relationships that frame their lives and possibilities.

The problems modern democracies must solve are complex. Inclusive democratic communication about these problems is sometimes messy and disorganized. But with the right attitude, these processes can also be creative and cooperative and celebrate, rather than deny, difference. The decisions we make in these contexts are difficult, fallible, and experimental. But they are also open-ended and forward-looking, and because of this, they celebrate continued conversation with one another.

This dissertation argues that the ability to accurately identify and define these complex social problems and to begin strategizing remedies for them is enriched by more inclusive democratic communication, in both our formal political institutions and in all of our modes of interacting with one another. This mode of inclusive, participatory, collective decision-making makes us better and more fulfilled people. We become better and more fulfilled in this rich sense not simply because we participate in campaigns or because we “rock the vote”. Rather, because we interact with one another in ways that honor their political agency through having discussions and not simply backing decisions with force, through including diverse perspectives at the table, and through communication at that table that honors one another as epistemic and deliberative equals.

This dissertation makes the case that doing the deep sense of deliberative equality that I have alluded to thus far, is much harder to realize than we would like to believe.

Oppression impacts one’s access to formal deliberative forums. One can be formally barred from a deliberative forum on the basis of her gender. Or, the costs to participate in a deliberative forum may be too high for someone in poverty (Cooper,
2006, p. 69). For example, a town meeting that is scheduled at 7PM on a Tuesday may require a single mother who works second shift to take off of work to attend the meeting, often without pay, and to find and perhaps pay for transportation to the meeting and perhaps even childcare. For those who live in poverty, the costs of participation are too high in this case, and this is a result of their marginalization.

Even assuming that one’s access to participation in a deliberative forum is not formally blocked, and even assuming that participation costs are not too high for citizens, one’s membership in a stigmatized group can still detract from her inclusion in deliberation because oppression has hidden, communicative dimensions. Young explains, “Where there are structural inequalities of wealth and power, formally democratic procedures are likely to reinforce them, because privileged people are able to marginalize the voices and issues of those less privileged” (Young, 2000, p. 34, the emphasis is mine).

One’s membership in a social group that has historically been stigmatized or marginalized, can shape how the problems she brings forward for public consideration are framed, whether her anger at such problems is interpreted as righteous indignation or lunacy, whether those problems even make it to the agenda for deliberation, and ultimately, whether an individual is seen as a knower by her peers. These are the communicatively structured dimensions of deliberative inequality, and they impact the power of one’s participation, that is, her epistemic and deliberative standing.

In this project I am particularly concerned to provide an account of communicatively structured deliberative inequality, inequalities that result not from a lack of access to participatory forums nor from a lack of capacity to participate in those
forums (certainly both of these are very real concerns for social justice theorists concerned with inclusion, democracy, and deliberative equality), but rather from a lack of epistemic and social standing to be received, included, acknowledged, and genuinely respected and heard as a deliberator and as a political equal.

I have much in mind here what Miranda Fricker has introduced as “testimonial injustice” where “prejudice on the hearer’s part causes him to give the speaker less credibility than he would otherwise have given” (Fricker, 2007, p. 4). Fricker is especially concerned with testimonial injustices rooted in identity prejudices, “prejudices against people qua social type” (ibid.). She takes as a central case of this, “the injustice that a speaker suffers in receiving deflated credibility from the hearer owing to identity prejudice on the hearer’s part, as in the case where the police don’t believe someone because he is black” (ibid.). I suspect that this form of epistemic injustice is precisely what present-day women have in mind when they recount having been “mansplained”.

What participatory democracy theory is in need of is an appreciation for the power of prejudice and epistemic injustice in our communicative lives and on our deliberative standing. So to take the example of women as a social group, women who have both formal access to participatory forums (e.g., legally protected rights for participation, institutions that welcome their participation, and agents that encourage it) and strong communicative capacities for participation in those forums (e.g., good academic backgrounds, strong critical thinking skills, affinity for leadership, good public speaking and communication skills) may still participate at a communicatively structured disadvantage in those forums not because of their own doing or failings in capacities, but because of the identity prejudices of their interlocutors. Call this form of deliberative
inequality, *identity-prejudiced communicative inequality.* Call the harm that results from this inequality, deterioration in one’s *deliberative standing.*

So what is identity-prejudiced communicative equality? Why does it matter to me? And why does it matter *for us?* Put simply, identity-prejudiced communicative inequality is to be made to feel small because of *who one is,* that is, because of one’s membership in a stigmatized social group or economic class. Identity-prejudiced communicative inequality arises when one is *made to feel small* in communication with others because of her interlocutors’ identity-prejudiced habits of interacting with her. Her interlocutor’s identity-prejudiced habits of interaction are based in an assumption that she has nothing of much importance to say, and that her observations about her social world are not reliable or are simply not of any real epistemic significance for forming social knowledge and for making decisions.

Sadly, some members of our society have been made to feel so small for so long that they can no longer imagine themselves as knowers, or as participants in democratic and social life. Some individuals are not regularly made to feel small because of who they are, but they have been made to feel small in various ways throughout their life, and they tap into that in order to be compassionate allies for those who are regularly made to feel small. Many individuals who have been made to feel small in this way actively protest this marginalization of their epistemic and deliberative standing. They protest and resist this in creative and brave ways.

This project looks to these experiences of lost and wounded deliberative standing, as well as to individual and communal attempts to re-legitimate deliberative standing in communicative interactions and democratic spaces, as an inspiration for communicative
democracy theory. I view my project as one small part of a developing body of academic thought and activism that recognizes and attempts to respond to José Medina’s call to action for democratic societies:

In democratic societies, given their commitment to free and equal epistemic participation, there is a prima facie interest and obligation to detect and correct the systematic disparities in the epistemic agency that different members of society can enjoy and the inequalities associated with them. (Medina, 2013, p. 4)

Young’s critique of deliberative democracy comes out of her wider critique of liberal individualism that is expressed throughout much of her work. But on my analysis, this critique of liberal individualism is itself based in a relational ontology and social epistemology that she leaves largely unarticulated. Young primarily justifies communicative democracy in terms of social justice and inclusion, but she leaves the epistemological dimensions of her undertaking somewhat less developed.

As a whole, the dissertation aims to provide an account of such an ontology and epistemology through drawing on recent work in feminist and resistance epistemology, the social identity approach within social psychology theory literature, and through looking to the historical thought and practice of American philosophers of democracy and social reformers, Jane Addams and John Dewey. Ultimately, the dissertation introduces a pragmatist feminist social epistemology for communicative democracy. I argue that for participatory democracy theory to imagine and construct genuinely inclusive deliberative spaces, it must have a relational conception of political agency, a relational account of prejudice, and be grounded in a pragmatist feminist social epistemology. I look to the thought of American philosophers and social reforms, Jane Addams and Dewey, to help me construct this relational framework and pragmatist feminist social epistemology, as
well as for resources for strategizing transactional and institutional remedies for identity-
prejudiced communicative inequality.

Chapter 1 situates Young’s communicative democracy in contemporary
deliberative democracy literature. Deliberative democracy can be broadly defined as a
body of democratic thought that bases the legitimacy for lawmaking in the public
deliberation of citizens, and in so doing, promotes reason over power in politics
(Benhabib, 1996; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Young, 1996, p. 122). Deliberative
democrats theorize deliberation as an open and inclusive exercise or process where
citizens who are free and equal engage in reasoned discussion with one another for the
purposes of resolving public problems and forming agreed-upon policies.

This chapter shows the inadequacies of liberal individualism, assumed by much of
traditional deliberative democracy theory (hereafter, deliberative theory), for naming and
addressing the problem of communicatively structured deliberative inequality. Young is
particularly concerned that the underlying individualism assumed by deliberative theory,
particularly owing to its roots in classical liberalism, problematizes deliberative theory’s
commitment to political equality and inclusion. Traditional deliberative theory idealizes
too narrow an account of democratic participation through its construction of
deliberation, an account that emphasizes consensus, impartiality, and correctness. Young
is critical that this picture of deliberation is itself a problem for inclusion, full democratic
participation, and deliberative equality.

Not all democratic theorists have assumed classical liberalism as a starting place
for democracy. Quite to the contrary, American pragmatists Jane Addams (1860-1935)
and John Dewey (1859-1952), rooted democracy in a relational ontology, and as a result,
developed a robust conception of democracy as a resource for realizing social justice in contexts of diversity, pluralism of values, social inequality, and oppression. Both Addams and Dewey were committed to a relational ontological foundation for democracy. They developed a deeply participatory and inclusive conception of democracy and put it into practice at Hull House, the social settlement that Addams founded with Eleanor Gates Starr in Chicago in 1889. They were also both ahead of their time in how they thought about prejudice, social grouping and inequality, and the communicative dimensions of oppression. Thus their work is rich with resources for enriching Young’s communicative democracy.

Young is sensitive to the communicative dimension of deliberative inequality, particularly it’s more implicit dimensions. In her earlier work she argues that oppression persists in “body aesthetic dimensions” in society, what she explains as “interactive habits, unconscious assumptions and stereotypes, and group-related feelings of nervousness and aversion” (Young, 1990, p. 148). Young anticipates the contemporary implicit bias research here. As this body of research has attempted to show, these quieter dimensions of oppression significantly impact one’s epistemic standing in democratic communication. In her later work, *Inclusion and Democracy* (2000), Young pushes deliberative theory towards a more robust *communicative* picture of democratic participation that is more apt to enable for deliberative equality. She does not, however, develop this problem of the implicit dimensions of communicatively structured deliberative inequality in significant or systematic detail in this later development of communicative democracy (2000).
Chapter 2 attempts to fill this gap in communicative democracy, and fills out Young’s relational ontology by constructing an account of communicatively structured deliberative inequality that is based in a relational account of prejudice. I draw on thought in feminist and resistance epistemologies, as well as empirical research in social psychology to do this. This chapter serves as a bridge between Young’s communicative democracy and Addams’s and Dewey’s contributions. Young briefly points to social psychology theorists working in the social identity approach in her discussion of social groups in “Five Faces of Oppression” (1990, p. 45; citing Turner, et. al., 1987). The social identity approach, based in Henri Tajfel’s empirical research in the 1970’s, poses a challenge to the social psychology corpus: that the social dimension of human psychology has been lost within a great deal of social psychology research and theory, namely because of the individualistic assumptions held among researchers and theorists about both the nature of identity and of prejudice. Following after Tajfel’s school, John Turner has introduced a relational account of prejudice that is important for grasping the significance of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality and for conceptualizing the relational ontology at the heart of Young’s communicative democracy. Interestingly, Addams and Dewey’s ontology and thought on prejudice anticipates this research. The chapter concludes by pointing towards these historical insights.

Both Chapters 3 and 4 of the dissertation look to Addams and Dewey’s conceptions and practice of democracy as a resource for communicative democracy. Chapter 3 continues the ontological work of Chapter 2 by examining Addams’s thought on group moralities and Dewey’s thought on prejudice. Addams exhibits her sensitivity to communicative inequality in both her practice and in her discussions of group
moralities. And Dewey offers a progressive account of prejudice that is also consistent with an appreciation for what I am calling identity-prejudiced communicative inequality.

In Chapter 3 I also begin to fill in the epistemology of communicative democracy by showing that Addams and Dewey saw communicative inequality as a social and political problem and that they envisioned democracy as a robust social epistemology with the resources to remedy this problem and promote a more inclusive, participatory body politic. Addams and Dewey are concerned that human subjectivity hinders the production of social knowledge, and they believe this is further problematized by modern industrialist society, group moralities, and prejudice. Democracy as they envision it and attempted to put it into practice at Hull House, is an ethical and epistemic way of relating with others that breathes into life the norms of political equality, reasonableness, publicity, and importantly, inclusion in contexts of diversity, pluralism of values, social inequality, and oppression.

The final chapter of the dissertation builds on the historical foundation established in Chapter 3 to show that not only were Addams and Dewey concerned with deliberative equality and it’s communicative dimensions, but they actually strategized ways to realize their robust conception of democracy in spite of it. Here I look to Addams and Dewey’s writings and Addams’s leadership at Hull House as a resource for communicative democracy, and more particularly, for addressing deliberative inequality and imagining and constructing inclusive deliberative spaces in light of the problem of communicatively structured deliberative inequality.

As a whole, my project aims to provide a pragmatist feminist social epistemology for communicative democracy. I build this account from Charlene Haddock’s Seigfried’s
recent recovery of Jane Addams and John Dewey’s philosophy of perplexity and method of sympathetic inquiry (Seigfried, 1996, 2002). Here I also explore the benefits of thinking about sympathetic inquiry as a type of hybrid epistemic-moral political virtue for democracy.

This dissertation is a form of epistemic resistance to identity-prejudiced communicative inequality in more ways than one. First, it establishes theoretical space in participatory democracy theory for naming identity-prejudiced communicative inequality. Second, it introduces two important projects for democratic theorists, practitioners, and advocates: (1) imagining and constructing inclusive deliberative spaces in light of this problem and (2) strategizing communicative practices and norms of interaction that can themselves challenge identity-prejudiced stereotypes and mitigate their harmful effects on individuals’ deliberative standing in communicative and epistemic interactions.

And finally, the dissertation is my own form of epistemic resistance and protest. The project as a whole has come to symbolize, both in the problems it grapples with as well as in the process of writing the thing itself, a journey of trying to be seen as a knower, by others, as well as to myself.
CHAPTER 1

THE RELATIONAL ONTOLOGY AND PRAGMATIST FEMINIST SOCIAL
EPISTEMOLOGY OF IRIS MARION YOUNG’S
COMMUNICATIVE DEMOCRACY

1. Introduction

This chapter demonstrates the value of a communicative conception of democracy like Iris Marion Young’s for both identifying and responding to the challenges that deliberative inequality pose for inclusion and democracy. I situate this discussion of communicative democracy in the deliberative democracy literature, and I focus my discussion of deliberative inequality to what James Bohman has termed ‘communicatively structured political inequality’ (Bohman, 1996, p. 117).

In this project I am particularly concerned to provide an account of communicatively structured deliberative inequality, inequalities that result not from a lack of access to participatory forums nor from a lack of capacity to participate in those forums (certainly both of these are very real concerns for social justice theorists concerned with inclusion, democracy, and deliberative equality), but rather from a lack of epistemic and social standing to be received, included, acknowledged, and genuinely respected and heard as a deliberator and as a political equal.

The chapter argues that informal norms of communication carry over into formal deliberative realms, and in contexts of social inequality and oppression, this gives rise to a form of deliberative inequality that has gone overlooked by traditional deliberative theorists, namely, what I introduce as ‘identity-prejudiced communicative inequality’ in Chapter 2.
I have much in mind here what Miranda Fricker has introduced as “testimonial injustice” where “prejudice on the hearer’s part causes him to give the speaker less credibility than he would otherwise have given” (Fricker, 2007, p. 4). Fricker is especially concerned with testimonial injustices rooted in identity prejudices, “prejudices against people *qua* social type” (ibid.). She takes as a central case of this, “the injustice that a speaker suffers in receiving deflated credibility from the hearer owing to identity prejudice on the hearer’s part, as in the case where the police don’t believe someone because he is black” (ibid.).

One of the many reasons Fricker’s attention to the *epistemic* dimensions of injustice is important is because, much like pragmatists like Jane Addams and John Dewey, it challenges categorical distinctions between ethics and epistemology as sub-disciplines in philosophy. Fricker mourns, “It does seem… a pity that ethics has not traditionally taken our epistemic conduct into its remit” (Fricker, 2007, p. 2). Something of this sort can be said of deliberative theory as well: It does seem a pity that deliberative theory has not traditionally taken our epistemic conduct, particularly epistemic injustices that result from identity prejudices, into its remit. This is especially concerning because of deliberative theory’s historical emphasis on the alleged epistemic value of participatory democracy.

What deliberative theory is in need of is an appreciation for the power of prejudice and epistemic injustice in our communicative lives and on our deliberative standing. There is a both a practical and theoretical concern here. Practically, how does the presence of identity-prejudiced epistemic injustice stifle deliberative standing and foster deliberative inequality? And theoretically, how does the presence of identity-
prejudiced epistemic injustice stifle attempts by deliberative theorists to justify the legitimacy of democracy on the basis of its epistemic value?

Take for example the fact that women are far more likely to be interrupted than men.\(^1\) This impacts the communicative possibilities for women in both informal communications \textit{as well as} in public space. In this case, a communicative inequality arises as a result of gender-based norms of interruption, that is, as a result of gendered habits of communication that are on some level, implicit and precognitive. I develop an account of these identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities in further detail in the following chapter of the dissertation. Various informal communicative norms like norms of interruption “enable men to assume wide powers as speakers” (Bohman, 1996, p. 119). Thus despite their access to formal deliberative forums, women’s talk gets less space to be heard, gets distorted in “the various back-and-forth mechanisms of dialogue through which public deliberation works”, and even gets dismissed altogether (Bohman, 1996, p. 118). Where this norm of interruption is in place, the fullness of women’s deliberative standing remains an open question.

To review, women who have both formal access to participatory forums (e.g., legally protected rights for participation, institutions that welcome their participation, and agents that encourage it) and strong communicative capacities for participation in those forums (e.g., good academic backgrounds, strong critical thinking skills, affinity for leadership, good public speaking and communication skills) may still participate at a communicatively structured disadvantage in those forums not because of their own doing or failings in capacities, but because of the identity prejudices \textit{of their interlocutors}. Call

\(^{1}\) See Zimmerman and West (1975) and more recently, Hancock and Ruben (2014).
this form of deliberative inequality, *identity-prejudiced communicative inequality*. Call the harm that results from this inequality, deterioration in one’s *deliberative standing*.

Both Bohman (1996) and Young (1990; 2000) seem to have an appreciation for these more communicative and implicit dimensions of deliberative inequality, but both have also left this problem underdeveloped in their theorizing about political equality and deliberation. Bohman makes mention of “implicit forms of unequal power, influence, and resources that…continue to operate in the public sphere” in his account of deliberative inequality itself (Bohman, 1996, p. 123). In her earlier major work *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (1990), Young talks of the “body aesthetic” dimensions of oppression, “interactive habits, unconscious assumptions and stereotypes, and group-related feelings of nervousness and aversion” (Young, 1990, p. 148). She even makes the point that, “If unconscious reactions, habits, and stereotypes reproduce the oppression of some groups, then they should be judged unjust, and therefore should be changed” (Young, 1990, p. 150). Yet Young does not revisit this implicit dimension of communicative inequality in her later major work specific to democracy, *Inclusion and Democracy* (Young, 2000).

This chapter argues that Young’s conception of communicative democracy fares much better than traditional deliberative models for both identifying and addressing identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities. Young’s communicative democracy is uniquely situated for this project because of two important reasons relating to how it understands the nature of political agency: (1) it bases political agency in a relational ontology; (2) it bases democratic communication in a pragmatist feminist social epistemology that advocates for a broader understanding of deliberation as well as of
democratic communication more generally than has been traditionally held by
deliberative theorists. Ultimately, Young’s communicative democracy pushes democracy
past formal deliberation towards a broader, more inclusive appreciation of democratic
communication processes.

The chapter contrasts Young’s robust, relational conception of political agency
with the individualistic one assumed by traditional deliberative theorists. As I
characterize it, this traditional approach assumes the ontological individualism and
veritistic epistemology of classical liberalism. As a result, deliberative theory has tended
to underemphasize the value of the educative and preference-transformative capacity of
deliberation. But as this chapter eventually argues, this underemphasized and
underappreciated aspect of deliberative democracy (i.e., preference transformation) is
crucial for making the kind of theoretical space in democracy theory that makes possible
the naming and identification of identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities as well
as for, more practically speaking, makes space for programs that aim to reduce such
communicative inequalities themselves.

Despite Young’s sharp criticism of actual deliberative theories, she views
deliberative democracy understood as an ideal as an important starting place for realizing
social justice and inclusion. Young is also drawn to deliberative democracy because,
unlike models of democracy based in social choice theory, deliberative theory bases the
legitimacy of political decision-making on reason-giving rather than on power (Young,
1996, 2000). Thus the chapter begins by examining the features of deliberative
democracy that Young is drawn to: political equality, reasonableness, publicity, and
inclusion (Young, 2000).
In Section 3 of the chapter, I move through Young’s critique of deliberative theory and her introduction of an alternative, more inclusive conception of participatory democracy, what she terms, ‘communicative democracy’. Here I introduce three major critiques and points of contrast between deliberative and communicative conceptions of democracy: First, communicative democracy is critical of narrow constructions of deliberation-as-argument, favoring a wider, more inclusive conception of deliberation-restructured-as-public-reasonableness. Here I develop Young’s critique that a construction of deliberation-as-argument has the unintended consequence of violating some of the very norms deliberative democracy idealizes, namely, inclusion. Young broadens and restructures deliberation as *public-reasonableness* to account for this problem. One important characteristic feature of deliberation-restructured-as-public-reasonableness, among other things, is that it does not assume that consensus must be a starting place of, or goal for, deliberation.

A second critique and point of contrast, is that communicative democracy is critical of the emphasis within traditional deliberative theory on impartiality and correctness. Later I explore the individualistic ontology assumed in this emphasis on impartiality and construction of deliberation-as-argument, as well as the veritistic epistemology assumed in this emphasis on correctness. Rather than impartiality, communicative democracy favors the inclusion of multiple social perspectives in public processes. And rather than correctness, communicative democracy looks to those inclusive public processes for identifying and framing public problems as well as strategizing potential remedies for them.
A third critique and point of contrast between deliberative and communicative conceptions of democracy, is that communicative democracy challenges us to broaden our conception of democratic communication beyond deliberation altogether. Young is uniquely aware of the identity-prejudiced and communicative dimensions of deliberative inequality. Thus her account of communicative democracy introduces not only a wider conception of deliberation-restructured-as-public-reasonableness, but also a wider account of political participation. That is, communicative democracy does not isolate political participation to deliberation, but looks to other alternative communicative methods of political participation. Young introduces five additional communicative methods in her work: greeting and acknowledgement of one’s interlocutors, rhetoric, narrative (Young, 2000), and even questioning (Young, 1997) and protest (Young, 2001).

Young’s critique of traditional deliberative theory flows out of her wider critique of liberal individualism itself. Young does not, however, develop this underlying critique in a systematic way in any of her writings on democracy. Thus in Sections 4 and 5 of the chapter, I make this contribution to her work and to the literature. The contrast between deliberation-as-argument and deliberation-restructured-as-public-reasonableness rests on a point of divergence between each respective theory’s underlying ontology and epistemology. By way of critical contrast with the individualistic framework assumed by deliberative theorists, I introduce Young’s alternative relational ontology and pragmatist feminist social epistemology in the third and fourth sections of the chapter.

Section 6 examines the implications of an individualistic framework on how political philosophers think about the value of participatory democracy itself. Here the chapter articulates the overarching argument of the chapter, that communicative
democracy is uniquely situated to name identity-prejudiced communicative inequality. Besides making space to name and reflect on remedies for this form of deliberative inequality, this pragmatist feminist framework for communicative democracy makes space to make a powerful justification for the legitimacy of democratic institutions on both epistemic and justice-producing grounds.

2. Deliberative Democracy in Context

Young is drawn to deliberative theory for its emphasis on four norms that she finds valuable for theorizing justice in contexts of diversity, pluralism of values, social inequality, and oppression: political equality, reasonableness, publicity, and inclusion (Young, 2000). Her relationship with democratic theory was tenuous, however. She made sharp criticisms of contemporary deliberative theory, yet she also saw deliberative theory as an important starting place for theorizing social justice. Despite the flaws invoked by deliberative theorists, deliberative democracy understood as an ideal puts forward four specific norms that are necessary for theorizing justice in contexts of diversity, pluralism of values, social inequality, and oppression: (1) political equality, (2) reasonableness, (3) publicity, and (4) inclusion (Young, 2000). From these fundamental norms one can derive further democratic values and practices like transparency to one’s constituents, accountability of public officials, free expression, equal access to participation, and expectations of reason giving in the justification of decisions. Thus Young takes deliberative democracy as her starting place for theorizing its reincarnation, communicative democracy.

There is a strong theoretical connection between democracy and justice where democracy exists “under ideal conditions of inclusive political equality and public
reasonableness” (Young, 2000, p. 17). Democratic institutions protect political autonomy by ensuring checks and balances of power, maintaining transparency of public decision-making, and protecting various avenues for holding public officials accountable to serving the public (e.g., protecting a free press). More than merely protecting political autonomy, deeply participatory democratic institutions serve as an avenue for exercising and developing one’s political agency. And epistemically speaking, inclusive democratic processes like transparency, accountability, free expression, equal access to participation, and expectations for reason-giving in the justification of decisions are the best means by which a society discovers the most just policies.

The introduction of deliberative democracy theory in the 1980’s played a significant role in clarifying democratic ideals and defending democracy against alternative political institutions. Deliberative democracy can be broadly defined as a body of democratic thought that bases the legitimacy for lawmaking in the public deliberation of citizens, and in so doing, promotes reason over power in politics (Benhabib, 1996; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Young, 1996, p. 122). Deliberative democrats theorize deliberation as an open and inclusive exercise or process where citizens who are free and equal, engage in reasoned discussion with one another for the purposes of resolving public problems and forming agreed-upon policies.

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2 It should be noted that this language of ‘discovery’ is one that the pragmatist feminist social epistemology of communicative democracy that I defend in this dissertation will ultimately question. On the pragmatist feminist epistemology of communicative democracy that I defend, terms like ‘designing’ or ‘generating’ might be more appropriate for expressing the open-ended processes of producing just policies that this framework advocates.

3 Joseph Bessette is credited with the introduction of the term ‘deliberative democracy’ with his 1986 publication, “Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government”. Bessette was concerned to resolve a tension between aristocratic and populist conceptions of democracy, and introduced ‘deliberative democracy’ as a third, reason-giving alternative to aristocracy and populism. Aristocratic democracies tend towards elitism and populist democracies towards mob-rule, both power-based institutions. In contrast, deliberative democracy introduces a reason-giving requirement that distinguishes it from power-based conceptions of democracy. While Bessette introduces the term for the first time in the literature, he roots the concept of deliberative democracy in the original intent of the framers themselves.
Deliberative theorists introduce deliberation to qualify democracy and protect it from charges of populism, or ‘mob rule’. Without the deliberative qualification there is a tendency to lean towards elitism as a protection against populism. The deliberative qualification demonstrates that despite their differences, both extremes (i.e., populism and elitism) collapse into a form of rule that is ultimately based in power. A third way, deliberative democracy, escapes this dichotomy by looking towards reason-giving and deliberation processes rather than power, as the basis for political legitimacy.

It is helpful to explore the merits of deliberative democracy by way of contrast with an alternative conception of democracy, preference-aggregative democracy. On an aggregative model, “the goal of democratic decision-making is to decide what leaders, rules, and policies will best correspond to the most widely and strongly held preferences” (Young, 2000, p. 19). On such a model, individual citizens’ preferences are assumed as fixed or given and may be formed in isolation from discussion with others, and decision-making processes are understood as competitive negotiations. As John Elster has explained, “the goal of politics is [seen as] the optimal compromise between given, and irreducibly opposed, private interests” (Elster, 1997, p. 3).

The aggregative perspective of democracy is embodied in contemporary social choice theory, rooted in the work of French philosopher and mathematician Nicolas de Condorcet (1743-1794). Social choice theory is a cluster of approaches that is concerned

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4 For an early development of this argument in the literature, see especially Cohen (1986).
5 Condorcet was influential in early democratic theory for introducing a method of tallying the collective outcome of individual choices expressed through voting. Condorcet’s approach was influential during the birth of democracy because it served an important role in defending democracy against competing forms of government on the basis of its epistemic powers to obtain a correct answer. Elizabeth Anderson (2006, 10-11; citing Condorcet 1995 [1785]) summarizes Condorcet’s jury theorem nicely: “If voters (a) face two options, (b) vote independently of one another, (c) vote their judgment of what the right solution to the problem should be (i.e., they do not vote strategically), and (d) have, on average, a greater than 50% probability of being right, then, as the number of voters approaches infinity, the probability that the
with the aggregation of individual preferences, usually expressed in modern democracies through the secret ballot. Social choice theory takes as its goal the ordering of social preferences of various alternatives, usually by way of assessing the results of a voting procedure of some sort. While the results of preference aggregation processes are public (e.g., election results), the decision-making process of each preference holder (i.e., a voter) is not. Voters are not asked to share the reasons for their decision on ‘the secret ballot’ and they are not tasked with basing their votes on any reasons. They could, after all, flip a coin in the voting booth.

There are a number of reasons to be critical of aggregative models of democracy on empirical grounds alone. Aggregative models assume that individuals are the best judges of their own interests. But people are not infallible judges of their own interests and often become better judges of their interests upon reflection, education, and dialogue with others. Aggregative models also assume that individuals will defend their [perceived] best interests. Relatedly, the model assumes that the preferences people express in a voting exercise, for example, are a good guide to what they really do prefer (Elster, 1986, p. 6). But people quite frequently vote against their own self-interest under the influence of political propaganda. Or they do so as a result of other social and economic factors like economic hardship or as a concession to a perceived lesser evil than another alternative. Lastly and speaking to empirical problems for aggregative models of democracy, political scientists have pointed to a host of mathematical difficulties that arise when attempting to aggregate preferences. There simply is not a majority vote will yield the right answer approaches 1 (and rapidly approaches 1 even with modest numbers of voters).

For example, Arrow’s Theorem (Arrow, 1951/1963). Philip Pettit (2001) has also shown in his discursive dilemma that how a collective decision is framed (premise-based or conclusion-based) can have
settled enough account of its empirical reliability for it to serve as an epistemological justification for the political legitimacy of aggregative democracy.

Beyond these empirical concerns, aggregative models fail on reasons relating more blatantly to justice, and this critique is largely what makes deliberative democracy such an attractive alternative for Young. The mere aggregation of individuals’ preferences is not indicative of promoting public goods and justice. Her point is normative and pertains to justice, “Policies ought to be adopted not because the most powerful interests win but because the citizens or their representatives together determine their rightness after hearing and criticizing reasons” (Young, 1996, p. 122).

History and present are rife with examples of individuals preferring and agreeing within groups to choose leaders and enact policies that conflict with democratic norms themselves. For example, the result of the voting procedure could be one that restricts freedom or equality of some members of society (e.g., majority opinions in the antebellum south about slavery).7 Citizens’ preferences for particular leaders or policies can be rooted in reasons relating to self-interest rather than to a conception of the public good, and as a result, they can actually contradict a conception of the public good.

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7 Significant impact on the outcome of the aggregate. Condorcet (1785/1995) himself acknowledges this problematic possibility in his note of the paradox of voting.

7 See especially Borgida, Federico, and Sullivan’s (2009) anthology, *The Political Psychology of Democratic Citizenship*. Their collection is an excellent demonstration of the appreciation within political psychology for various forms of deliberative inequalities, including communicative inequalities and in particular, communicative inequalities based in the more implicit dimensions of oppression. Specifically, they have included a number of publications from authors on issues of persuasion, group identity and intergroup relations, and stereotype and prejudice. For an historical account of strategic racism and political identity formation in U.S. politics, see also Ian Haney López’s (2014) *Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism & Wrecked the Middle Class*. 
This point is famously made by John Elster (1986/1997) in his influential paper, “The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory.” It is also a point that is commonly cited as an objection to democracy itself. However, Elster and other early deliberative theorists draw attention to the fact that this objection is more appropriately made of social choice models of democracy, not deliberatively qualified models. Elster’s central concern with social choice theory is that uncoordinated private choices can lead to outcomes that are far worse off for the body politic than what “could have been attained by coordination” (Elster, 1986/1997, p. 4). That is, the central concern of politics is with ‘the common good’, and more particularly, “with the cases in which [that common good] cannot be realized as the aggregate outcome of individuals pursuing their private interest” (Elster, 1986/1997, p. 4). Thus a reduction of politics to ‘the aggregate outcome of individuals pursuing their private interests’ defeats the very purpose of politics itself.

While individual preferences may *coincide* with the common good, there is no necessary correlation between the two. Rather, it is as Joshua Cohen explains, “The interests, aims, and ideals that comprise the common good are those that *survive* deliberation, interests that, on public reflection, we think it legitimate to appeal to in making claims on social resources” (Cohen, 1989/1997, pp. 76-76, the emphasis is mine). Deliberation has this potential because of the reason-giving requirement inherent in the

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8 Along with Bessette’s “Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government” (1980) and Cohen’s “An Epistemic Conception of Democracy” (1986), Elster’s (1986/1997) influential paper was an important early work for initiating the contemporary deliberative democracy literature. Here Elster makes a persuasive and influential critique of ‘the private-instrumental view of politics’, by which he has in mind a preference-aggregative and social choice theory model of democracy.

9 Elster’s in depth critique provides a number of objections to the inadequacy of social choice theory as a collective decision-making procedure. He organizes his objections into two sets: “First, that the preferences people choose to express may not be a good guide to what they really prefer; and secondly, that what they really prefer may in any case be a fragile foundation for social choice” (Elster, 1986/1997, p. 6).
activity itself. Thus like Elizabeth Anderson, Cohen takes it that deliberative processes are “constitutive, not accidental features of democracy” (Anderson, 2006, p. 11).  

So while the activity of voting, for example, is commonly perceived by the populous as an expression of democracy, considered as a political action in isolation from any kind of meaningful democratic communication (e.g., public debate, deliberation, etc.), it actually has no way of holding citizens accountable to form preferences on the basis of reasons concerning the public good rather than private, self-interested preferences. That this is the case means that the process could itself function to bring about grossly unjust results, throwing into question whether voting really is an ideal expression of democracy. In Young’s words, “Indeed, the aggregate outcome can just as easily be irrational as rational” (Young, 2000, p. 21). The normative argument here is that power should not be backed by force – whether in the form of a monarch, an authoritarian regime, or even popular vote – but rather, it should be backed by reasons that are publicly accessible to all for consideration and debate.

The reason-giving requirement inherent in deliberative democracy makes it an appealing alternative to aggregative models for a number of other reasons relating to justice. Deliberative theorists commonly source deliberation as the basis for political legitimacy. Developing out of consent theory and Rawls’ introduction of public reasons in Political Liberalism (1993), deliberative democracy idealizes deliberation as a normative justification for political coercion.  

Citizens consent to and submit their autonomy to coercive political decisions by way of deliberation. Political decisions can

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10 Anderson (2006) makes this point in her development of a Dewey-an epistemology of democracy. Here she is contrasting deliberative democracy with the preference-aggregative mechanism embodied by the Condorcet Jury Theorem.

11 On this, Bohman has poignantly remarked, “Consent is, after all, the main feature of democracy” (Bohman, 1996, p. 4).
be normatively defended on the basis that they are the result of public processes of reason-giving and deliberation among free and equal citizens. So, to return to the example of voting, voting is democratic not simply because it expresses the opinion of the majority, but because it motivates discussion about the public good as a mechanism for forming a majority opinion.

Deliberative theorists also point to the epistemic value of deliberation. Joshua Cohen’s (1986, 1989/1997) and David Estlund’s (1997) work has been influential within the contemporary deliberative theory literature for introducing an epistemic account of the value of deliberation. Cohen’s early paper, “An Epistemic Conception of Democracy” (1986), is widely referenced for having initiated the reason-giving requirement (i.e., deliberation) to epistemic justifications for democracy. While Cohen makes no use of the term ‘deliberative democracy’ in this paper (recently introduced only six years prior by Bessette, 1980), his paper is important for the deliberative democracy literature because he introduces an account of voting that is deliberative in character in his introduction and defense of a normative account of voting, which he calls ‘epistemic populism’.

Populism is defensible, Cohen argues, when it is conditioned on an epistemic, or reason-giving, conception of the voting process. A vote is reason-giving when it consists of three main elements, the last of which introduces the deliberative qualification for epistemic democracy: (1) an independent standard of correctness (e.g., the common good), (2) a cognitive account of voting, that is, the view that voting expresses beliefs about what policies will in fact realize that independent standard, and (3) an understanding of decision making “as a process of the adjustment of beliefs, adjustments that are undertaken in part in light of the evidence about the correct answer that is
provided by the beliefs of others” (Cohen, 1986, 34). While significant for the deliberative democracy project, Cohen’s deliberative, epistemic democracy makes a number of faulty assumptions that are an eventual subject of scrutiny in this chapter.

Some deliberative theorists have argued that another benefit of public, reason-giving processes is that they promote the perception of legitimacy among citizens.\textsuperscript{12} And drawing on Mill, some theorists point to the educative value of “the public exchange of arguments and reasons” (e.g., Christiano, 1997).\textsuperscript{13} On this perspective, deliberation makes people “better informed…more skillful participants in the arts of politics” and stimulates sympathies towards others (Zakaras, 2007). Drawing on the thought of John Stuart Mill, Alex Zakaras argues that deliberation can stimulate the kinds of intellectual and epistemic virtues (i.e., humility, imagination, and skepticism) that are necessary for maintaining individuality and avoiding conformity to tyrannical traditions and norms (Zakaras, 2007).

Deliberation requires that one’s preferences be made public and explained, and this process requires that she appeal to reasons and that those reasons move beyond self-interest to wider audiences, and thus make wider appeals to justice. This process requires that one examine her preferences and transform them into publicly accessible reasons, that is, reasons that are reasons for a wider, pluralist, public because they appeal to a

\textsuperscript{12} It is important to point out that this political psychological justification for the legitimacy of deliberative democracy is descriptive and should be distinguished from normative legitimacy accounts. My project assumes the value of both normative and descriptive justifications and does not attempt to defend either or both.

\textsuperscript{13} Christiano’s mixed approach to the value of public deliberation does tend to emphasize the more epistemic justification for deliberation. He does concede to the educative justification for deliberation, however, writing that, “Democratic institutions and in particular institutions of discussion and deliberation have a large impact on whether individuals have the opportunities to reflect on and come to a better understanding of their interests and to arrive at a more reasoned point of view” (Christiano, 1997, p. 258).
common interest, a common good, or justice more generally. The very activity of politics itself (understood as involving some form of discussion or deliberation) tends to focus participants towards discussion about and considerations of the common good and through that, to generate conceptions of the common good (Elster, 1986; Cohen, 1989).

Young explains how this transformation takes place:

In the deliberative model political actors not only express preferences and interests, but they engage with one another about how to balance these under circumstances of inclusive equality. Because this interaction requires participants to be open and attentive to one another, to justify their claims and proposals in terms acceptable to all, the orientation of participants moves from self-regard to an orientation towards what is publicly assertable. (Young, 2000, p. 27)

Young is drawn to the educative and preference-transformative capacity of deliberation. Whereas the aggregative model assumes that preferences are fixed and that the primary goal of politics is to aggregate them, deliberative democrats argue that one important goal of politics is the education of one’s preferences through, and as a result of, contact with others. In Estlund’s words, an aggregative model is an “incongruous means” for creating justice, particularly because human preferences are not, as social choice theorists wrongfully assume, pre-political and ‘given’, but are shaped, developed, and nurtured through processes of public deliberation, and I will eventually argue, democratic communication more broadly understood to include such things as greeting, rhetoric, storytelling, comedy, the arts, protest, and even questioning and exploratory speech (Estlund, 1997, p. 11).

Yet this educative feature of deliberation has been underemphasized in much of the traditional, deliberative theory literature. Scholars fail to appreciate its significance for the realization of democratic norms, and overlook it as having anything to do with

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making political legitimacy justifications altogether. Joshua Cohen (1996) has even expressly denied the significance of the educative capacity of deliberation. He asserts that preference transformation is not a proper goal of deliberative democracy, but rather, is a mere byproduct of it (Cohen, 1996, p. 100).

I think this unlinking of the educative capacity of deliberation from political legitimacy justifications is a theoretical mistake with roots in the ontological individualism and veritistic social epistemology of traditional deliberative theorists. I revisit this point in the closing section of the chapter. It is also one reason why Young’s conception of communicative democracy fares much better than traditional deliberative models for naming the problem of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality, and through this, creating space for strategizing resolutions for it.


Young offers a formal critique of deliberative democracy in Inclusion and Democracy (2000). But her earlier work in Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990) lays important ontological and epistemological groundwork for this critique. Here I draw from both of these seminal works on inclusion and democracy as well as other influential writings to develop a Youngian critique of traditional, deliberative theory. As I analyze Young’s thought, the various critiques that can be brought against deliberative theory are unified by their problematic foundation in an ontological individualism and veritistic social epistemology. And this is precisely what makes traditional constructions of deliberative theory inadequate for conceptualizing and naming identity-prejudiced communicative inequality.
I use ‘veritistic’ in the sense that Alvin Goldman (1999) used it, to describe a consequentialist epistemology concerned with knowledge outcome where knowledge is understood as true belief and knowledge practices are, “evaluated in relation to their contribution to veritistic value, to their truth-tracking potential” (Peter, 2007, p. 341). This chapter contrasts this epistemology with Young’s epistemology, what I am analyzing as a pragmatist feminist social epistemology.

Young is critical that deliberative theorists formulate too academic and elitist a construction of deliberation understood as argument that enables, and in some cases even promotes, exclusion. Bohman comments, “Deliberation, too, seems to be elitist, more appropriate to university seminars and scientific communities than to the general public” (1996, p. 3). This particularly academic conception of public deliberation has been described by José Martí as, “a collective form of argumentation, where arguing consists in exchanging reasons, for or against certain proposals, oriented to the goal of rationally convincing others…and it is supposed to lead us, at least ideally, to rational consensus” (Martí, 2005, p. 29).

Argument has a history of conditioning participation on meeting norms of dispassionate speech and articulateness. The association of argument with dispassionate speech has received notable scrutiny from feminist theorists and contemporary pragmatist thinkers, scrutiny that it is outside of the scope of this project to reiterate in great detail. I will mention two important conclusions from this body of literature that are relevant for developing my project. The first is a point about the origin of the association of argument with dispassionate speech and articulateness, and the second is a point about the strategic, identity-prejudiced use of it to enforce existing power relations.
First, the association of argument with dispassionate speech has complex historical origins in Western philosophy, where reason has been elevated over the emotions, and the mind elevated over the body. Joan Tronto attributes a great deal of the stigmatization of the affective dimensions of moral decision-making and the marginalization of women’s moral knowledge to social and economic changes of the eighteenth century during which a transformation took place, “from the more organic, integrated way of life of people into a way of life organized around the requirements of wage labor and the market” (Tronto, 2009, p. 32). Tronto identifies this time period and social context as influential for the introduction of the dichotomy between the private, domestic sphere where women’s moral sentiments were welcome and the public, political sphere where they were excluded in favor of more ‘impartial’ constructions of moral reasoning.\(^\text{15}\)

Young does not endeavor to conjecture the historical underpinnings of these dichotomies. Rather, she takes the attitude that such things, “quite possibly [come] about through a set of fateful, historical accidents” (Young, 1990, p. 127). Whereas there has been a positive association of reason and mind with the masculine and elite, there has been a negative association of the emotional life and body with the feminine and servant and slave classes. Regardless of its basis, it presently problematizes inclusive democratic practices.

The second conclusion from this literature that is relevant for my project, is that under the cloak of ‘impartiality’, agents in positions of social power have historically enforced this reason-emotion dichotomy inconsistently, for example, through favoring

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\(^{15}\) See Fenton (2015) for a more detailed account of this dichotomy as it pertains to resistance emotions and corporate dismissal of activists’ moral claims on them.
men’s anger as ‘righteous indignation’ and women’s as ‘hysteria’. To be clear, this kind of inconsistent, identity-prejudiced enforcement of the reason-emotion dichotomy can arise as a result of the enforcer’s gender-socialized communicative habits and biased perceptions, biases that operate at a lower or more implicit level of consciousness and are unknown to the agent. However, individuals sometimes strategically enforce the reason-emotion dichotomy in gendered, identity-prejudiced ways. In strategic enforcement, the ‘enforcer’ is, on some level, aware of the communicative success of these practices for maintaining his dominant epistemic standing in the communicative context. In both implicit and strategic instances of identity-prejudiced enforcement of the reason-emotion dichotomy, these communicative practices function to maintain power in gender relations or other group-based relations of power through both diminishing the deliberative standing of the speaker whose speech is enforced by them, and more generally, through communicating this diminished deliberative standing to bystanders or third parties to the communicative act.

In non-democratic institutions like classist systems and monarchies, if political decision-making power is based in reason, and if those in power are the only ones seen as possessing reason, the maintenance of the reason/emotion dichotomy through social norms and social enforcement and the acceptance of it by non-elites insulates the status quo institutions, authority-figures, and practices from being challenged. Higher-status social groups tend to occupy academic and elite classes that stand to benefit from the maintenance of these opposing categories and stigmatization of one. One’s elite status is

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maintained by way of contrast with the Other, “deviant and inferior” (Young, 1988, p. 285). Again, this power dynamic can function on implicit levels or be used strategically.

Similar to the norm of dispassionate speech, the association of argument with articulateness (e.g., tone, grammar, regional accent, or diction) has complex origins in classist systems where elites have more and better access to education, but it can also be used strategically by academic and political elites to maintain quiescence. Norms of articulateness tend to be culturally specific to the expression tendencies of the more socially privileged (Young, 2000, pp. 38-39). Deliberation specifically has been styled after Western institutions of scientific debate, modern parliaments, and courts. These institutions have historically been male-dominated and were formed in “class- and race-differentiated societies” (Young, 1996, p. 123). ¹⁷

It is possible that participants in these Western deliberative institutions debated under relative political, economic, and social power (though this is unlikely). Even were this the case, it is problematic to extrapolate these norms of dispassionate speech and articulateness onto a contemporary conception and practice of deliberation that operates in a wider social context of social inequality and oppression. One should not need special education or training in formal argumentation or familiarity with particular jargons and methods of discourse for democratic participation. Borrowing from Mill, we ought not to assume that the generality of epistemic norms, communicative norms, or of a practice (i.e., deliberation-as-argument) is evidence “that it is, or at all events once was, conducive to laudable ends” (Mill, 1869/1988, p. 4).

The worry for Mill, echoed and enriched in Young’s own account of cultural imperialism, is that closed, elite communities create epistemic, communicative, and moral norms that are assumed as universal and are then imposed on others (Young, 1988; Young, 1990). Because such norms and perspectives are part of the dominant culture, they get assumed as universal and go unnoticed as perspectives. When at first these elite communities are forced to become formally inclusive under the expansion of human rights of participation, the norms are not questioned and get assumed as universal standards of knowing, communicating, and conduct. The relevant points here are that the communicative culture of traditional deliberative institutions – which to reiterate, historically conditioned membership on white, male, elite status – is assumed as a universally accessible and epistemically advantageous communicative culture, and it goes unnoticed that this communicative culture is actually one among many in a given society.

To protect deliberation from the elitist creep of norms of dispassionate speech and articulateness, Young introduces a more general requirement of reasonableness. Rather than norms of dispassionate speech and articulateness, one need only meet a basic expectation of reasonableness in discussion, which Young explains as, “being open to listening to others and having them influence one’s own views, and expressing one’s own claims upon them in ways that aim to reach their assent or understanding” (Young, 2000, p. 38).

Although not significantly developed in her work, we can extract some information about what Young has in mind for a wider and potentially inclusive conception of deliberation-restructured-as-public reasonableness from one of her intermediary publications, “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative
Here Young briefly develops a broader account of public reasonableness than is permitted by traditional accounts of deliberation-as-argument.

Here Young criticizes deliberation-as-argument for its overly idealized deliberative procedure, which is agonistic and competitive (Young, 1996). Drawing from Cohen (1989), Young explains this traditional conception of deliberation as reasoned argument where, “participants come to a political problem with an open mind about its solution” and are “not bound by the authority of prior norms or requirements” (Young, 1996, p. 122). They “put forward proposals and criticize, and each assents to a conclusion only because of the “force of the better argument”” (ibid.). For example, Cohen assumes deliberation-as-argument in his construction of an ideal deliberative procedure: “Reasons are offered with the aim of bringing others to accept the proposal” (Cohen, 1989/1997, p. 74).

Under this traditional construction of deliberation-as-argument, “parties to dispute aim to win the argument, not to achieve mutual understanding” (Young, 1996, p. 123). This restriction of political communication to ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ reintroduces a power dynamic to the democratic forum that is consistent with the power dynamic of force that deliberative theorists are themselves critical of. Speakers who tend towards more exploratory forms of speech are at an inherent disadvantage to participate in these types of argumentative exchanges. The rules of the discussion ‘game’ have already been made and they have not been party to this process.

To promote formal inclusion, deliberative theorists allege that political and economic power is bracketed in this exchange. The faulty assumption here, however, is

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18 This piece is ‘intermediary’ in the sense that it was published between what I have referred to as Young’s two seminal works specific to inclusion and democracy, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (1990) and *Inclusion and Democracy* (2000).
that the formal exclusion of political and economic influence in decision-making will fully neutralize the power of individuals. But the account, as Young is keen to point out, ignores the complex ways that political, economic, and social power impacts one’s formal access to deliberative spaces, her capacity to participate in those spaces, and also very importantly her deliberative standing in that space.

But given the complexity of public problems, why not instead of adversarial, competitive communication, an “open reciprocal recognition of the point of view of everyone” (Young, 1996, p. 122)? A wider and potentially more inclusive conception of deliberation, restructured as public-reasonableness more broadly understood, will include alternative modes of speech that while not formally structured as argument, introduce perspectives on issues and problems that are reasonable.

Deliberative equality requires both that each have “the equal opportunity to make proposals and criticize” and that “their speaking situation [is] free from domination” (Young, 1996, p. 122). Restricting deliberation to argument makes space for deliberative inequality on the basis of both elitist communicative conditions for participation, and contentious domination in communicative activities where academics and clever citizens intellectually bully less formally trained speakers. As Young explains, “Argument is not the only mode of political communication, and argument can be expressed in a plurality of ways, interspersed with or alongside other communicative forms” (Young, 1996, p. 125).

The fascination with formal argument is inherently elitist in more ways than one. Beyond the fact that it establishes a threshold for participation that tends to favor the communicative cultures of social elites and enables for identity-prejudiced strategic
enforcement, it also idealizes consensus as both a starting place and a goal for deliberation. There are a few reasons to worry about consensus as a starting place or goal for deliberation. In pluralist societies characterized by diverse social experiences and understandings, we cannot assume that this unification is so easy (Young, 2000, p. 41). Furthermore, we cannot assume that when there is some unification on premises or on the way a problem under consideration has been framed, that that unification is not itself a result of social inequality.

Take for instance John Gaventa’s famous investigation of industrial power and quiescence in the Central Appalachian Valley. He observes that despite great wealth in the region, most Appalachian-mountaneers live in tremendous poverty yet have extremely low political participation rates and are relatively unorganized as labor groups. Common thinking in Appalachian studies at the time was that this inactivity, lack of upheaval or rebellion, relative social stability, and quiescence can be explained by “the culture or circumstance of the deprived themselves” (Gaventa, 1982, p. 40). Gaventa argues against this trend in thought, that the political response of an oppressed group or class (or lack of response) is often itself a result of a complex history of power relations that are difficult to observe and operate in complex ways. The Young-ian point here is that like quiescence, consensus must also be understood as a possible result of social inequality and power. Borrowing from Gutman and Thompson, “If moral differences are as deep and pervasive as pluralists [like Young] believe, they can be eliminated in politics only by repression” (Gutman and Thompson, 2004, p. 28).

There are a variety of stages of formal argument that require some level of consensus for continued participation in the communicative act, and identity-prejudiced
communicative inequalities can impact the direction towards which the consensus requirement is pushed on all of those levels. We can compartmentalize argument into three parts in order to analyze the various stages at which the communicative practice of argument is vulnerable to the elitist creep of a false consensus: (1) its starting place, (2) its process, that is, as a style of discourse itself, and (3) its goal. First, argument begins with a problem or issue that has already been selected and defined. In formal argument, parties “cannot proceed unless there are some premises that all the discussants accept” (Young, 2000, p. 37). Some level of consensus is required just for argument to get started.

This reduction of deliberation to argument fails to account for the communicative processes that generate the object of deliberation itself, that object being a problem that interlocutors agree is a problem and on how it has been framed. That is, formal arguments are constructed about problems that the parties to the argument agree are problems worthy of dispute. The reduction of deliberation to formal argument ignores the multidimensional ways that power operates in the formation of social consensus about public problems. How has this problem under deliberative consideration come to be seen as a public problem? Who has participated in defining it? How have power relations in society shaped this definition process? Are there, for example, alternative ways that the problem could be framed that go undiscovered or get dismissed because of identity-prejudices towards the speakers who are bringing forward those framings? To borrow from Bohman, “Inequalities of power enter into the very definition of the problematic situation to be deliberated upon…in the way in which problems are defined and thus
“framed,” often in such a way that the participatory success of powerful groups is ensured” (Bohman, 1996, p. 117; citing Gamson, 1993).

Consider the current Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement of the 2010’s. Activists are attempting to introduce a problem for public consideration. Judith Butler sheds light on the underlying moral claims in the activist chant, “Black Lives Matter”:

It is a statement of outrage and a demand for equality, for the right to live free of constraint, but also a chant that links the history of slavery, of debt peonage, segregation, and a prison system geared towards containment, neutralization and degradation of black lives, but also a police system that more and more easily and often can take away a black life in a flash all because some officer perceives a threat. (Yancy and Butler, 2015)

One challenge for the progress of the Black Lives Matter movement has been the counter-activist movement of whites chanting, holding signs, or posting signs outside their residences that read, “All Lives Matter”, “Blue Lives Matter”, and “We Back the Badge”. This public response misunderstands and even distorts and dismisses the problem being proposed by BLM. Butler explains: “It is true that all lives matter, but it is equally true that not all lives are understood to matter which is precisely why it is most important to name the lives that have not mattered, and are struggling to matter in the way they deserve” (Yancy and Butler, 2005).

If we map a traditional deliberative paradigm and its assumption of consensus as a starting place for deliberation onto this example, we have problematized the possibility for deliberation to even get started. Parties cannot agree on whether there is a problem worth considering at all, and because the counter-activist party enjoys a privileged deliberative standing relative to social power relations with regard to race, this perspective dominates the discourse.
All this is to say that the very process of coming to define public problems is itself a significant, communicative practice. Bohman (1996) has a modest appreciation for this point. Drawing on the political science literature on framing and agenda setting, he explains, “Power can be expressed in the way in which problems are defined and thus “framed,” often in such a way that the participatory success of powerful groups is ensured” (Bohman, 1996, p. 117; citing Gamson, 1993, pp. 6-8). Bohman concludes that agenda setting is itself a deliberative activity and an indicator that a “basic threshold” of political equality is operating in communicative space. That is, whether an individual or group can even bring an issue or problem forward for public consideration is a good empirical indicator of deliberative equality.

Despite her critique of consensus as a starting place for deliberation, Young does not abandon some sense of unity in support of an utterly fractured body politic. Importantly, her critique is only that too strong a conception of consensus as a starting place problematizes deliberative equality. Young advocates a weak unity based on meeting three conditions, two of which are normatively substantive: (1) Citizens need only share in their having been ‘thrown together’ in regional proximity or through economic interdependence as a starting place for political communication. Beyond this basic condition of interdependence, such “people who live together, who are stuck with one another” must share two very basic, substantive values: (2) “a commitment to equal respect for one another” and (3) some agreement on “procedural rules of fair discussion and decision-making” (Young, 1996, p. 126).

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19 See also Bachrach and Baratz’s (1970) work on agenda setting. Bureaucratic institutions can themselves filter out various framings of problems, particularly those framings that draw connections between the proposed problem and the structure of the institution itself. In such cases, Bachrach and Baratz explain that a “non-decision” is produced.
Deliberation-as-argument is vulnerable to the elitist creep of a false consensus in its second stage because as a process of putting forward one’s reasons, defending them, and interrogating the reasons of others, it assumes a consensus on an appropriate method of discourse. As was demonstrated in my earlier exposition of norms of dispassionate speech and articulateness, no such consensus among free and equal citizens in this communicative method was ever had. Rather, in this stage of argument, an elitist communicative culture is assumed as neutral and universally accessible, and non-elites must conform to this as a condition for their participation.

One of the worries that motivates this critique is that in contexts of social inequality and oppression, social elites can dictate how problems are framed as well as what communicative methods and norms any discussion about those problems is conditioned upon. Susan Dieleman (2015) has recently argued that Young senses an additional injustice at work in political processes of problem-framing, definition-formation, and deliberation-uptake, namely, a hermeneutical injustice. Drawing on the work of Miranda Fricker (2007), Dieleman maps Fricker’s conceptions of testimonial and hermeneutical justice onto Young’s critique. Dieleman explains testimonial and hermeneutical injustice,

Speakers – typically members of historically disenfranchised groups – can be wronged [testimonial] as bearers and providers of knowledge because they might be subject to identity prejudices that affect how credible we think they are or [hermeneutically] because they might live in a society that hasn’t developed the concepts needed to express their experiences or the interpretive tools needed to understand their particular communicative style. (Dieleman, 2015, p. 794)

Whereas testimonial injustice attaches to the speaker in the form of identity prejudices, hermeneutical injustice is structural and attaches to speech itself (Alcoff, 2010, p. 129). Social inequality and oppression can skew the very hermeneutical
resources available to describe one’s social experiences to others. And whereas the elite rarely find themselves without words to describe their experiences since their experiences and expressions of those experiences have been normalized and assumed as universal, “the powerless, on the other hand, must make do with the social meanings available to them, many of which will be inadequate to the task of interpreting and communicating their own experiences” (Dieleman, 2015, p. 801).

Young deepens her critique of consensus-based politics in her later work, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy” (2001). Here she anticipates Fricker’s conception of hermeneutical injustice perhaps most clearly in her account of a ‘discourse’:

A system of stories and expert knowledge diffused through the society, which convey the widely accepted generalizations about how society operates that are theorized in these terms, as well as the social norms and cultural values to which most of the people appeal when discussing their social and political problems and proposed solutions. (Young, 2001, p. 686)

Even where formal conditions of deliberative inclusion are met, a discourse may limit the hearing that a particular person or group can get because their insights and claims do not assume the dominant discourse, and the dominant discourse lacks the hermeneutical resources to make sense of the insights and claims being expressed. What is more, because a dominant discourse may include “falsifications, biases, misunderstandings, and even contradictions” that frequently go unnoticed by those who assume the dominant discourse, such discourses may also produce a false consensus (Young, 2001, p. 685).

Young gives the example of a dominant discourse of poverty where “there seems to be wide agreement that poverty should be conceptualized as a function of the failure of
individuals to develop various skills and capacities necessary for inclusion in modern labor markets” (Young, 2001, p. 686). Thus deliberative forums created to discuss ‘the problem of poverty’ will have already smuggled a number of normative assumptions: the myth that all have equal access to participate in labor markets, the assumption that justice is merely a matter of distribution of resources and access to jobs (and not, as Young has argued in much of her work, a question of participation), that labor markets are themselves the best structure for economically organizing a society, and importantly, an atomistic and individualistic ontology.

To take this example further, consider a common tension within community-based organizations. An activist program planner for a community-based organization is sensitive to the history of racial and gender inequality in the community she represents. She has a more relational and institutional conception of poverty and its causes. However, she is often compelled by board members and donors to address poverty merely at a distributive level (e.g., in the form of a food pantry) and in a paternalistic form, when she would much rather couple these relief-services with programs that aim to boost the participatory political power of the organization’s constituents. In such cases, major decision-makers for the organization assume the dominant discourse of poverty, one of liberal individualism and a distributive paradigm of justice. Thus, one’s participation in discussion about problem identification and program planning is conditioned on conforming to that discourse.

Finally, deliberation-as-argument is vulnerable to the elitist creep of a false consensus in the assumptions it makes about the goal of deliberation. The approach assumes that the epistemic practice of argumentation is at it’s best, truth-conducive, and
at a minimum, at least consensus-producing. That is, deliberation is seen as epistemically valuable because at a minimum, it convinces others to consent to some remedy for a problem and at best, because it discovers the correct answer to a problem. This first alternative is problematic for the same reasons that it is as a starting place for deliberation. Young’s general concern about argument-towards-consensus is that too strong a commitment to this, “can incline some or all to advocate removing difficult issues from discussion for the sake of agreement and preservation of the common good” (2000, p. 42). When deliberative processes are framed by “longstanding and multiple structural inequalities”, people may arrive at agreement that “is at least party conditioned by unjust relations and for that reasons should not be considered a genuinely free consent” (Young, 2001, p. 685).

This second purported goal for deliberation, discovery of a correct answer, is problematic because it assumes that correctness is a possible goal for political decision-making. Besides rejecting the atomistic and individualistic ontology of liberal individualism, communicative democracy must also be skeptical of the veritistic social epistemology assumed in this final stage and goal of deliberation-as-argument. I develop this point in further detail later in this chapter.

From the critique offered here of deliberation-as-argument we can arrive at a more robust conception of deliberative equality than has been enabled by deliberative theorists. It requires not just equal, formal access to participation in deliberation, but equal participation in the identification and defining of public problems and in the formation of the communicative cultures and norms that govern the deliberation process itself. Here I have shown that deliberation-as-argument actually worsens deliberative
inequality because it universalizes a particular mode of discourse most familiar to elites and establishes it as a threshold for participation.

Here I have focused on problematic tendencies in the construction of deliberation-as-argument related to consensus: it’s emphasis on consensus as a starting place and possible goal of deliberation and it’s assumption of some sort of social consensus about the necessity of this mode of discourse for political decision-making processes.

Recall that I have claimed that deliberative theorists assume a faulty individualistic ontology and veritistic social epistemology in their constructions of deliberation-as-argument. In the two sections that follow, I will develop alternative relational ontology and pragmatist feminist social epistemology of communicative democracy by way of critical contrast with this individualistic framework. This framework struggles to identify and makes sense of communicatively structured deliberative inequality, and more specifically, to name identity-prejudiced communicative inequality. Thus, a deliberative theory that assumes this framework will struggle to meet the strong sense of inclusion Young idealizes for democracy.

4. Young’s Relational Ontology

The relational framework of communicative democracy that I develop in this and the following sections of this chapter will introduce and develop some important concepts to deliberative democracy: the concepts of (1) social identity, (2) socially situated standpoint and perspective, (3) epistemic standing. The pragmatist feminist conception of communicative democracy that I am developing in this project appreciates the complex ways that these three are impacted by one’s relative position in a given society where there are relations of power, oppression, and privilege.
Young develops her conception of identity from three traditions, all linked by their deeply relational conceptions of identity: (1) the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas, (2) the sociology of Stephen Epstein, and (3) the social psychology of John Turner. Owing to Habermas, Young sees identity “not as an origin but as a product of linguistic and practical interaction” (Young, 1990, p. 45; citing Habermas, 1987, pp. 3-40). One’s social identity results from “an internal organization of self-perception concerning one’s relationship to social categories, that also incorporates views of the self perceived to be held by others” (Young, 1990, p. 45; citing Epstein, 1987, p. 29).

Young eventually turns to Turner’s social psychology to establish an account of the social group because of their shared belief that “neither social theory nor philosophy has a clear and developed concept of the social group (Young, 1990, p. 43; citing Turner et. al., 1987). Borrowing from Turner, she explains, “Group categorization and norms are major constituents of individual identity” (Young, 1990, p. 45; citing Turner et. al., 1987).

It is worth noting that Turner’s research and thought eventually develops into the social identity approach that is under consideration in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Turner studied under, and eventually researched and published with, Henri Tajfel, pioneer of the approach. Tajfel introduces the concept of social identity in his research on intergroup relations: it is “that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255).

Young points out that on the classical liberal framework, social groups are primarily thought of as either aggregates or associations of individuals. Both of these
perspectives assume that identity is ontologically prior to one’s membership in a group. Whereas the associative model thinks of individuals as individuals coming together with the purpose of pursuing a shared goal that has been formed in isolation from one another prior to their association, the aggregative model assumes an attributional account of social groups as combinations of individuals based on similar and categorically essential attributes (Young, 1990, pp. 43-44).

For example, the American legal system and political discourse around it uses the language of ‘discrimination’ to talk of group-based exclusions, by which is meant, “conscious actions or policies by which members of a group are excluded from institutions or confined to inferior positions” (Young, 1988, p. 272). Young draws attention to the roots of this narrow linguistic framework of ‘discrimination’: a faulty conception of social groups as aggregates or associations. The language that dominates political discourse in the U.S. does not have the ontological tools to conceptualize the discourse of oppression as used by new social movements, a structural phenomenon that results from power relations (Young, 1988, p. 270). Discrimination, aggregates, and associations are all “methodologically individualist concepts” that fail to identify the complexity of group identifications (Young, 1988, pp. 272-3).

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20 For an excellent example of the limitations of concepts of ‘discrimination’ and ‘disparate impact’ in the American judicial system, see King, et. al., 2011. Their research sampled 219 cases from over 1,000 cases in employment law in (non-appellate, non-jury) federal district court cases between 2000 and 2008 where charges of discrimination were brought against employers or workplaces on the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender. They found that while “scientists agree that contemporary discrimination is manifested in [various forms of microaggressions]”, and that while “both targets and outsiders are aware of and recognize contemporary forms of discrimination”, this was not reflected in case decisions (pp. 55, 70). “Only behaviors that were clearly intended to cause harm to racial minorities or women (i.e., microassaults) were consistently correlated with decisions in favor of plaintiffs” (p. 69). The authors also point to case law the offers judges more discretion in assessing intent (e.g., McDaniel v. EagleCare, Inc., 2002) and hostile work environment (e.g., Curry v. District of Columbia, 1999) as evidence that judges’ perceptions and interpretations themselves may be limited by outdated conceptions of identity-prejudiced harms.
Similar to the concept of ‘discrimination’, ‘oppression’ has historically been conceptualized through the lens of liberal individualism as “the exercise of tyranny by a ruling group”. Talk of oppressed groups commonly assumes an attributional account of the social group where individuals are assumed as having chosen membership in the group of say, African Americans, because of self-identified “essential attributes” (Young, 1990, p. 40). But this is actually backwards since unlike associations, social groups “emerge from the way people interact” and relations of power that are outside of an individual’s own processes of self-definition (Young, 2000, p. 90).

To borrow Young’s language, there is a certain “thrown-ness” about social group membership. “One finds oneself as a member of a group, which one experiences as always already having been” (Young, 1990, p. 46). And because sometimes these groups emerge from relations of domination, “because one group excludes and labels a category of persons”, one finds oneself thrown into a social group that is already “associated with specific attributes, stereotypes, and norms” (Young, 1990, p. 46).

A problematic conclusion is sometimes drawn from the attributional account of the social group: because many stereotypes and prejudices target (and identify and define) group attributes, the thinking is that the elimination of groups through some kind of “colorblindness” to individuals’ group membership can resolve problems of discrimination and exclusion (Young, 1990, p. 46). But thinking about justice for social groups in this way – by way of discrimination and the denial of difference – ignores the socio-political histories of social groups, social statuses that such groups inherit, social-political processes of being grouped and related patterns of domination, as well as the ontological significance and meaning of one’s self-identification process with a group.
itself. By denying difference, this attributional approach denies the reality of group-based sociopolitical, economic, and epistemic disadvantages or privileges that accompany social group membership.\(^{21}\)

Importantly, Young is concerned that even a progressive, politics of identity assumes the faulty, individualist associative and attributional conceptions of the social group.\(^{22}\) By contrast, the politics of difference that Young advocates understands group differentiation, “as a function of structural relations rather than constituted from some common attributes or dispositions of group members” (Young, 1997, p. 385). The basis for affinity with a social group is not common attributes – indeed, such a perspective permits the reification of attributional over-generalizations and the perpetuation of group stereotypes – but rather, the basis for affinity with a social group is the fact that individuals in a particular social group have some shared social perspectives of their social reality as a result of their membership in the group.\(^{23}\)

The strengths of this non-attributional approach to the social group is that it both allows individuals to understand themselves in terms of their membership in a group (i.e., it does not deny difference), and leaves ontological space for individuals to redefine themselves within those social groups (i.e., fluidity). The approach acknowledges the underlying socioeconomic and political patterns of social relations between groups, as

\(^{21}\) To reiterate my earlier point, I do not here have in mind one’s epistemic capacities to know as much as one’s epistemic standing in a discourse to be received as a knower. That is not to say that the former is not a concern for social justice theorists. It is simply not the focus of the dissertation.

\(^{22}\) Young develops this critique in fuller detail in her later work, where she considers the implications of attributional constructions of the social group in the context of inclusion and democracy (Young, 2000). Because the American political climate is one where interest-group pluralism and preference-aggregative conceptions of democracy are assumed, justice claims by social groups for recognition (e.g., LGBTQ rights) often get distorted as competitive and divisive claims for cultural domination. But Young clarifies, “Most group-conscious political claims, however, are not claims to the recognition of identity as such, but rather claims for fairness, equal opportunity, and political inclusion” (Young, 2000, p. 107). For Young’s early examination of interest-group pluralism see also Young, 1990, Chapter 3 “Insurgency and Welfare Capitalism.

\(^{23}\) See also Young, 1994, “Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective”.
well as group member’s privileges and disadvantages relative to their membership and those social relations. Thus it makes space for affirming, rather than denying, difference.

Young conceives of social groups as both relational and fluid. Groups are the result of social processes, both between one another as well as within the groups themselves among the individuals who identity with the group. And importantly, these social processes of social identification and intergroup relations can evolve. Young’s point of clarification is that “one first finds a group identity as given, and then takes it up in a certain way… Those who identify with a group can redefine the meaning and norms of group identity” (Young, 1990, p. 46).

Young’s introduction of an intersectional account of oppression in “Five Faces of Oppression” (1988) – which eventually gets republished as Chapter 2 of Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990) – is situated in this critique of liberal individualism and account of social identity and the social group. Young points out in her later work, “Considered relationally, a social group is a collective of persons differentiated from others by cultural norms, practices, special needs or capacities, structures of power or privilege” (Young, 2000, p. 90). This cultural feature of the social group, and the notion that one has a unique social perspective and epistemic standing based in her cultural affinity with a social group, is lost in aggregative and associative models of social groups.

On a relational ontology, oppression refers to structural phenomena that immobilize or diminish[es] a group” (Young, 1990, p. 42). It often results from, “unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions, media and cultural stereotypes, and structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms – in short, the normal processes of everyday life” (Young, 1990, p.
It is systematic in that its success relies on institutional processes, “which prevent some people from learning and using satisfying and expansive skills in socially recognized settings, or … inhibit[s] people’s ability to play and communicate with others or to express their feelings and perspective on social life in contexts where others can listen” (Young, 1990, p. 38).

Young’s relational ontology of the social group gives her the framework she needs to define oppression as such, not the result of intentional and coercive tyrannical power, but rather as the result of intergroup relations themselves. Young is careful to clarify that this structural account does not deny the fact that “within a system of oppression individual persons…[can] intentionally harm others in oppressed groups” or deny that “specific groups are beneficiaries of the oppression of other people, and thus have an interest in their continued oppression” (Young, 1990, p. 42). One’s oppression does not necessarily correlate with a tyrant, domination (“that is, constraints upon oppressed people to follow rules set by others”), or an oppressing group (Young, 1990, p. 38). But one’s oppression does often correlate with a social group that is privileged in relation to one’s oppressed social group.

A problem arises for this structural and systematic account of oppression that Young must tackle, however. Namely, how can such a theory identify oppressed people if it resists attributional analyses of social groups? That is, the task is “to compare oppressions without reducing them to a common essence or claiming that one is more fundamental than another [and] one can compare the ways in which a particular form of oppression appears in different groups” (Young, 1990, p. 64). To meet this burden, she
introduces “five faces” of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence.

Young’s treatment of exploitation has roots in a Marxist critique of the labor market where, “some people exercise their capacities under the control, according to the purposes, and for the benefit of other people” (Young, 1990, p. 49). This results in more than mere material deprivation, but in deprivation of self-worth. Within that market system, people are marginalized if, “the [assumed] system of labor cannot or will not use them”, for example, the elderly, mentally ill, disabled, or formerly-incarcerated (Young, 1990, p. 53). Young explains eloquently, here “a whole category of people is expelled from useful participation in social life and thus potentially subjected to severe material deprivation and even extermination” (Young, 1990, p. 53).

Young’s account of powerlessness reveals the implications of material conditions on individuals’ social standing. Young defines powerlessness in terms of “nonprofessionals”, “blue collar”, “manual labor”, and “working class”. By contrast, those who occupy professional “white collar” jobs enjoy opportunities for the progressive development of their capacities, some supervisory authority over others and themselves, and respectability in broader social life (Young, 1990, p. 57). Powerlessness arises as a result of various relations in the labor market, but it is more far reaching than one’s professional life. Within bureaucratic organizations, most people “do not regularly participate in making decisions that affect the conditions of their lives and actions” (Young, 1990, p. 56). However, within those same organizations, power is dispersed widely among many agents, and “the powerless are those who lack authority or power even in this mediated sense” (ibid.).
This last point about respectability in broader social life speaks to one’s epistemic standing and is significant in application to one’s deliberative standing. To borrow from Young,

In daily interchange women and men of color must prove their respectability. At first they are often not treated by strangers with respectful distance or deference. Once people discover that this woman or that Puerto Rican man is a college teacher or a business executive, however, they often behave more respectfully toward her or him. Working-class white men, on the other hand, are often treated with respect until their working-class status is revealed. (Young, 1990, p. 58)

I have developed the fourth face of oppression, cultural imperialism, in my exposition of deliberation-as-argument. People who experience cultural imperialism frequently encounter “dominant meanings of a society” and as I have argued, dominant discourses themselves, in ways where those norms are assumed as objective and impartial (Young, 1990, pp. 58). This can, “render the particular perspective of one’s own group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the Other” (Young, 1990, p. 58-9). The fifth face of oppression, violence, is a face of oppression because it, or the threat of it, is framed by a social context that systematically targets members of a group on the basis of their membership in that group (Young, 1990, p. 62).

Young admits that distributive injustice may be a contributor to each of these faces of oppression, but she clarifies that “none is reducible to distribution and all involve social structures and relations beyond distribution” (Young, 1990, p. 9). In fact, distributive explanations for oppression frequently “ignore the social structure and institutional context that often help determine distributive patterns” – structures and institutional contexts such as “issues of decision-making power and procedures, division of labor, and culture” (Young, 1990, p. 15).
Each of the faces of oppression share at least one common characteristic: they all block individuals from full social or political participation by sustaining the institutional and relational conditions for the deterioration of self-worth and ultimately, political agency. We get a sense of Young’s account of political agency in this discussion of oppression and domination. It consists of the capacities for (1) self-development, that is, exercising and developing one’s capacities and expressing their experiences and (2) self-determination, that is, “participating in one’s action and the conditions of one’s action” (Young, 1990, p. 37; citing Young, 1979). Assuming democracy, oppression ultimately comes down to a question of participation. Each face of oppression blocks individuals in some way from full social or political participation because the deterioration of self-worth and self-development of capacities limits the formation and exercise of one’s political agency.

When Young turns towards deliberative theory in her later work (2000), she worries that the individualistic ontology explored here is assumed within deliberative theory itself. Thus the concepts of social identity, socially situated standpoint and perspective, and epistemic standing never make it into the theory. As a result, traditional deliberative theory cannot appreciate how these are impacted by one’s relative position in a given society where there are relations of power, oppression, and privilege.

Within deliberative theory, the power relations that frame oppression and privilege get reified by the democratic norm of impartiality. Perhaps owing to Rawls’ propensity for ideal theory and political thought experiments, some deliberative theorists speak of deliberation as an activity that can be had in isolation from any actual interlocutors. If one is impartial, she can merely imagine the possible arguments, consider
them, and arrive at a solution for the problem. For example, Cohen commits his ideal deliberative procedure to this in writing that, “Outcomes [of deliberation] are democratically legitimate if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals” (Cohen, 1996, p. 73, the emphasis is mine). I take it by his use of ‘could be’ that he has in mind some kind of armchair, deliberative thought experiment where one imagines and considers the arguments of her interlocutor(s).

This norm of impartiality is especially prevalent in Estlund’s construction of deliberation. In an attempt to avoid a veritistic social epistemology of democracy, Estlund introduces what he calls a “moderate epistemic proceduralism” (Estlund, 1997, 2008). Estlund worries that a veritistic social epistemology must eventually invoke “logically prior” and procedurally-independent standards to evaluate the correctness of the results of deliberation processes (Estlund, 1997, p. 180). Besides the fact that Estlund never seem to escape the veritistic language of “getting it right” in his critique of a “correctness theory of legitimacy”, many of the seven (7) “moderate needs” he sets out for proceduralism are far from moderate.

For example, participants must, “accept and address a shared conception of justice”, “evaluate arguments fairly”, and they must do so “irrespective of [their] identities” (Estlund, 1997, pp. 190-1). Estlund fails to appreciate the fact that an individual’s “personal, educational, and cultural variety of life experiences”, allotted for in Requirement 6, sometimes make shared conceptions of justice difficult, particularly in contexts of social inequality and oppression where marginalized participants may be putting forward an alternative conceptions of justice itself for public consideration. When one is blocked from full participation in social life and democratic processes because of

oppression as I have developed it, her identity in that dominant system is a relevant subject for public consideration. Moreover, the inclusion of identity-based experiences is a necessary feature of challenging assumptions and forming wider social knowledge about that dominant system. Finally, Estlund seems to theorize the possibility of social inequality and oppression right out of his moderate needs for an epistemic proceduralism since his final and seventh requirement is that, “participants’ needs for health and safety are sufficiently well met that it is possible for them to devote some time and energy to public political deliberations, and in general all are literate” (Estlund, 1997, p. 191).

Young’s communicative democracy breaks from this speculative tradition. For Young, impartiality is the communicative space where powerful perspectives and experiences get universalized and biases go unchecked. Whereas an individualistic ontology requires impartiality and the stripping away of difference for political knowledge and decision-making, a relational ontology looks towards inclusion as a morally significant practice that results from the social fact of our relationality and unique socially situated standpoint and perspective. And it looks towards difference as an epistemic resource for the production of social knowledge in light of that relationality. Young explains,

Do[ing] justice through public processes…entails at least two things. (1) First, democratic discussion and decision-making must include all social perspectives. (2) Second, participants in the discussion must develop a more comprehensive and objective account of the social relations, consequences of action, and relative advantage and disadvantage, than each begins with from their partial social perspective. (Young, 1996, p. 385)

In this passage, Young’s advocates for the importance of both (1) developing an understanding of individuals as socially situated and an appreciation for the inclusion of diversely socially situated standpoints and (2) developing an appreciation for the
structural relations that frame that socially situated standpoint. That we are constituted relationally and occupy different socially situated standpoints within those relations necessitates a need for more inclusive social inquiry processes. But those inquiry processes must go beyond merely formal inclusion. They must be based in an appreciation for the structural inequalities that frame individuals’ communicative standing in those formally inclusive deliberative processes.

Young’s critique of concepts like discrimination is important to recall here because it not only serves as the foundation for a relational account of the social group and robust account of oppression, but it makes a further point about the communicative dimensions of oppression. Within the language of liberal individualism, language that dominates political discourse, there is a hermeneutical deficit, that is, a limited vocabulary for people in oppressed social groups to make sense of their experiences or get traction in having them heard.

Young anticipates Fricker’s concept of hermeneutical injustice here, explaining that the very concept of oppression itself – understood not in terms of domination but as new social groups understand it, namely, “systemic and structural phenomena that are not necessarily the result of the intentions of a tyrant” – is one that struggles to get uptake because the “political discourse [of liberal individualism] does not have a place in this social ontology for structuration and social groups” (Young, 1988, p. 272). With Nancy Fraser, Young is critical that some groups have “exclusive or primary access to …the means of interpretation and communication in a society” (Young, 1988, p. 285; Citing Fraser, 1987).
This point is one that will resonate strongly with survivors of domestic violence or victims of sexual harassment who were harmed before the 1970s when the very terms used in the courts now to describe their experiences were not available. A more contemporary example is found in the recent introduction of the term ‘mansplaining’ throughout feminist social media outlets.

5. Towards a Pragmatist Feminist Social Epistemology

The relationally based account of oppression in communicative democracy is the foundation of a pragmatist feminist social epistemology. I develop this epistemology here by way of critical contrast with some patterns of thought in traditional epistemic, deliberative theory. Socially situated standpoint, or diversely socially situated perspective, is the unique perspective an individual has as a result of her social reality and social identity. An epistemology that is sensitive to the existence of a diversity of socially situated perspectives within any given society idealizes inclusive deliberation processes among those differently situated social perspectives as an epistemic resource. Rather than idealizing “the melting away of difference”, such an epistemology will look to difference as an epistemic resource (Young, 1990, p. 47). And it will also be sensitive to the ways that social identity and oppression impact one’s epistemic standing in political communication. As Elizabeth Anderson has explained,

Most of the problems democracies are asked to solve are complex, have asymmetrically distributed effects on individuals according to their geographic location, social class, occupation, education, gender, age, race, and so forth…We therefore need a model of democracy in which its epistemic success is a product of its ability to take advantage of the epistemic diversity of individuals. (Anderson, 2006, p. 11)

25 See Fricker, 2007, pp. 150-152 who provides an exploration of this example as a kind of hermeneutical injustice.
A pragmatist feminist social epistemology should be contrasted with the veritistic social epistemology assumed by traditional deliberative theorists. I use ‘veritistic’ in the sense that Alvin Goldman (1999) introduces the term, as denoting a consequentialist, \emph{truth-tracking} epistemology. A veritistic social epistemology understands knowledge in the traditional sense of ‘true belief’. It will be concerned with evaluating social practices on the basis of their knowledge-producing results, that is, whether they “have a comparatively favorable impact on knowledge as contrasted with error and ignorance” (Goldman, 1999, p. 5).

The focus of the deliberative, epistemic democracy project has tended to be the enhancement of political legitimacy justifications. The argument goes that democratically formed decisions, particularly those conditioned on deliberation, tend towards higher epistemic accuracy and reliability than those made by alternative authoritarian political institutions. José Martí explains the epistemic conception of deliberative democracy that comes about as a result of this work:

Deliberative democracy is justified, and the political decisions made through a deliberative procedure are legitimate, because democratic deliberative procedures have more epistemic value than the other \emph{democratic alternatives}. And this means that decisions made by such procedures are more likely to be right \emph{in general} – where rightness must be some process-independent and intersubjectively valid standard, than decisions made by other democratic procedures. (Martí, 2005, p. 33)

Fabienne Peter (2007) has pointed out that much of traditional deliberative theory tends to assume the correspondence theory of truth that underlies Goldman’s veritistic social epistemology, that “what \emph{makes} sentences or propositions true are real-world
truthmakers” (Goldman, 1999, p. 68). Goldman himself points to the similarities between his account and deliberative theory in a chapter on epistemic democracy. Citing Estlund’s (1990) and Cohen’s (1986) cognitive accounts of voting:

The rough idea [of epistemic democracy] is that the aggregate of votes by a large body of voters has a strong propensity to be accurate, or correct, if each voter has even a slight propensity toward correctness. *This entire approach is predicated on the idea that voting involves a judgment that can be accurate, or true, an approach that would be congenial to the epistemic project before us.* (Goldman, 1999, p. 316)

Goldman’s epistemic democracy is primarily interested in investigating those institutions and social practices that harm or enhance voters’ accuracy, what he calls “voter core knowledge” (VCK). He characterizes VCK as, “the main type of knowledge that is critical to the task of voters”. Voter core knowledge is “correct” if the voter answers the voter’s “core voter question” (CVQ) accurately: “Which of the two candidates, C or C’, would, if elected, produce a better outcome set from my point of view?” (Goldman, 1999, p. 323). Goldman defines “outcome set” as the “complex combination of outcomes” that may result from a particular candidate who is elected. Such outcomes might include the cost of living, the crime rate, the cost of healthcare, etc. There are any number of combinations of outcome sets and the *actual* outcome set is one among them. Each voter is assumed to have some “intrinsically valued outcomes”, and “a preference ordering over the outcome sets” (Goldman, 1999, p. 322). Goldman specifies that in an “optimally functioning democracy”, voters will answer the CVQ correctly, that is, each individual voter will vote for the candidate whose actual resulting outcome set correctly correlates with her intrinsically valued outcome set (Goldman, 1999, p. 320).

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26 To be fair, Goldman seems to endorse a correspondence theory of truth in a qualified sense that requires “metaphysical clarification” and is a last resort on the basis of his view that rival theories “are subject to crippling objections” (Goldman, 1999, p. 68).
Ultimately, Goldman’s worry is that political science research in the past fifty years has quite consistently found that “ordinary American citizens have minimal, even abysmal, knowledge of textbook facts about the structure of American government, the identity of their elected officials, and fundamental facts about contemporaneous foreign policy” (Goldman, 1999, p. 317). The thrust of the concern is that voters frequently vote in ways that are not consistent with their own self-interest. Thus Goldman’s primary concern is advancing institutions and social practices that improve core information for voters so that they may more accurately and reliably (epistemically speaking) advance their self-interest. One example he provides for this is the journalistic use of “Ad Watch” during campaigns to remedy the spread of mistruths and slanting by candidates (Goldman, 1999, p. 337-8). Goldman suggests that “the press should comprise a set of experts who would report, interpret, and explain political events in a way that serves the veritistic interests of voters, especially their interest in core voter knowledge” (Goldman, 1999, p. 340). In such practices “reporters [would] examine campaign ads for truthfulness and realism, trying to expose smears and misrepresentations” (Goldman, 1999, pp. 337-8).27

Goldman defines the goal of democracy primarily on a social choice framework: “A plausible interpretation of the idea that democracy is for the people is that democracy aims to effect outcome sets that are relatively preferred by a majority of the electorate (or as large a plurality as possible)” (Goldman, 1999, p. 326). That is, for Goldman, deliberation gets entirely submerged into a social choice theory. As David Copp has explained this, [Goldman] thinks that “the realization of democratic ends” requires that

27 It is worth noting that such organizations do presently exist in service to American voters, and that they were actively operating to fact-check candidates during the 2016 Presidential campaign.
most voters get their relatively most preferred outcome set. He concludes that the success of democracy in its own terms depends on voters’ having core knowledge” (Copp, 2002, pp. 208-209; citing Goldman, 1999, pp. 326, 329). Against this, Copp (2002) has poignantly argued, “that the goal of democracy is not to produce outcome sets that are preferred by a majority. The goal is, rather, to equalize political power and authority” (Copp, 2002, p. 212).

To build from Copp’s analysis, Goldman understands ‘correctness’ relative to a voter’s preferred outcomes and outcome sets. That is, he thinks that the primary epistemic problem for democracy is the frequency with which voters mistakenly vote for candidates who do not actually cohere with their preferences. Certainly this is a problem for modern democracies, but it is not the primary problem democracy attempts to address.

Democracy is primarily concerned with checks and balances on power, and this is preserved through the preservation of epistemic and moral norms of reasonableness, political equality, publicity, and inclusion. Where the preferred outcome set of the majority is some leader or policy that conflicts with democratic norms themselves, “the failure of an election to produce an outcome set that is preferred by a majority is not necessarily any failure of democracy” (Copp, 2002, p. 210). Thus a primary epistemic problem for evaluating the epistemic success of a democracy will be how well it’s institutions and practices prevent citizens from holding preferences that themselves interfere with the realization of those norms. *What Goldman – and all social choice theorists, for that matter – misses is that the content of, and basis for, voter’s preferences*
is itself an important subject of inquiry for a social epistemology of democracy. Call this the Relativistic Preferences Critique (RP Critique).

One worry with conceptualizing democracy on this kind of veritistic social epistemology is that the account limits the epistemic value of democracy to the epistemic accuracy of voting, that is, the ability to “recognize those nominees who are best in terms of [voters’] preference orderings” (Goldman, 1999, p. 346). To be clear, Goldman points to deliberation as an important feature for enhancing VCK (Goldman, 2000). He explains “debates and other deliberative events” as one of many “players and institutional structures that figure prominently in the flow of political information” (Goldman, 1999, p. 334). A veritistic social epistemology of democracy ultimately assumes “that the success of democracy depends on its producing outcomes that are preferred by the majority of voters” (Copp, 2002, p. 208). But here Goldman understands deliberation primarily as a mechanism for enhancing VCK and not at all in terms of the voters’ preferences and preference orderings themselves. Thus he instrumentalizes deliberation to VCK because he never escapes a preference-aggregative conception of democracy. Goldman misses the important point that deliberation has epistemic value far beyond the enhancement of VCK. This is a risk for any correctness-oriented epistemology of deliberative democracy.

Besides the RP Critique, a second worry for conceptualizing democracy on this kind of veritistic social epistemology is that this emphasis on correctness in democratic decision-making assumes a particularly naïve account of the nature of a public problem.28

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28 It is important to point out, as Copp has, that Goldman does not deny the significance of evaluating social institutions and practices on grounds other than knowledge consequences, that is, true belief: “His idea is simply that since true belief is valuable, “the knowledge impact of various policies is worth determining even if that impact is trumped, in certain spheres, by other values”’” (Copp, 2002, p. 207; citing...
While Cohen’s and Estlund’s epistemologies of democracy escape the RP Critique through conditioning the epistemic accuracy of democratic political decisions on some form of deliberation, because they assume some version of deliberation-as-argument, they both fail to fully escape a veritistic social epistemology.29

By contrast, Elizabeth Anderson (2006) explains the significance of a free press and deliberation in terms of enhancing voter preferences and outcome sets themselves: “A free press, public discussion and hence mutual influence prior to voting are constitutive, not accidental feature of democracy…Discussion is needed prior to voting in part to help voters determine what problems are genuinely of public concern. Without such discussion, they have little to go on but their private preferences” (Anderson, 2006, p. 11). Anderson has rejected a veritistic social epistemology of democracy in favor of what I would call a pragmatist feminist one. She looks to Dewey’s experimentalist model as the appropriate basis for an epistemology of democracy for its ability to address three essential features of democracy: “the epistemic diversity of participants, the interaction of voting with discussion, and feedback mechanisms such as periodic elections and protests” (Anderson, 2006, p. 8).

Goldman, 1999, p. 6). However, this point does not remedy the fact that on the whole, Goldman’s epistemology of democracy is inadequate for assessing what I have identified as the primary epistemic problem for evaluating the epistemic success of a democracy, namely, how well it’s institutions and practices prevent citizens from holding preferences that themselves interfere with the realization of those norms. My project is concerned with preferences based in identity-prejudices and their communicative dimensions (i.e., identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities). Thus while Goldman’s approach offers some important resources for the epistemology of democracy, it is an incomplete epistemology for both capturing the complexity of public problem and the kinds of political decision-making processes we need in that context, and for conceptualizing deliberative inequality, and particularly, for naming the problem of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality. As a result of this, it is inadequate then for justifying the political legitimacy of democracy on epistemic grounds.

29 For example, Cohen explains that deliberation both increases “the likelihood of a sincere representation of preferences and convictions” and “shape[s] the content of preferences and convictions as well” (Cohen, 1989/1997, pp. 76-77).

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29 For example, Cohen explains that deliberation both increases “the likelihood of a sincere representation of preferences and convictions” and “shape[s] the content of preferences and convictions as well” (Cohen, 1989/1997, pp. 76-77).
The earlier discussion of deliberation-as-argument emphasized the problematic value of consensus and impartiality for the approach. Deliberation-as-argument also tends to emphasize correctness as a possible and desirable goal for deliberation where “parties to dispute aim to win the argument” (Young, 1996, p. 123). Deliberation-as-argument assumes that correctness – “the existence of rightness in political decisions” – is a possible and desirable goal for deliberation and that impartiality – “the possibility of knowing which is the right (or impartial) decision” – is an indicator that such a ‘correct’ decision has been arrived at fairly (Martí, 2005, p. 29).\(^{30}\) For Cohen, “voting expresses beliefs about what the correct policies are…not personal preferences for policies” (Cohen, 1986, p. 351).

While this clarification gets Cohen out of the RP Critique, he must eventually invoke procedure-independent standards on which to evaluate the “correctness” of chosen policies (Estlund, 1997). Recall that Cohen assumes deliberation-as-argument in his construction of an ideal deliberative procedure: “Reasons are offered with the aim of bringing others to accept the proposal” (Cohen, 1989/1997, p. 74). Cohen’s assumption here is that under some ideal deliberative conditions, voters will either accept the proposal as correct or the deliberation processes will go to a vote.\(^{31}\) By contrast, Young’s restructuring of deliberation-as-public-reasonableness looks towards achieving “mutual understanding” and can be understood as a form of cooperative problem-solving (Young, 1996, p. 123).

\(^{30}\) This emphasis on consensus in conceptions of the common good and in justice is pervasive in Cohen (1986, 1989/1997) and Estlund (1997).

\(^{31}\) Cohen does clarify, “The fact that [deliberation] may so conclude [with a vote rather than an agreed-upon proposal] does not, however, eliminate the distinction between deliberative forms of collective choice and forms that aggregate nondeliberative preferences” (Cohen, 1989/1997, p. 75).
I want to briefly turn to the literature in applied ethics in public service to develop this alternative conception of deliberation-restructured-as-public-reasonableness. Caroline Whitbeck (1996) and Terry Cooper (2016) have argued that it is more appropriate to think of ethical problems in public service less in terms of moral dilemmas and more in terms of an engineering design problem. Unlike theoretical moral dilemmas, real world ethical issues rarely occur in the form of either-or, but rather, are filled with a multitude of ambiguities. There are any given number of resolutions for an ethical problem, any given number of ways of defining an ethical problem, and competing roles and obligations to consider. These problems are situated in organizational structures and cultures that may be more or less toxic and may require serious revisions to be more supportive of responsible professional conduct. Unlike modern moral philosophers solving riddles in arm-chairs, professionals must also make decisions within time-constraints and take into consideration practical consequences.

The analogy here is between this description of real world ethical issues in terms of an engineering design problem to how we ought to think of public problems and democratic deliberations around them. As in design, citizens must first identify the various stakeholders to a problem and consult them as epistemic resources for identifying and articulating it’s various dimensions. Much like deliberations in engineering design problems, this inclusive participation is instrumental to citizens’ self-development because it creates space for the expression of one’s political autonomy and it fosters the social conditions for citizens to nurture their political autonomy through discourse with others.
As in design where there are limited resources, time constraints, and competing obligations to stakeholders, deliberations must be inclusive of the various stakeholders to the problem, and those stakeholders must be seen as both epistemic resources and moral authorities for designing and evaluating possible resolutions for the problem. This is because as in design, the uniquely correct solution or remedy rarely just presents itself.

When the problem-solving communicative exercise is framed as a cooperative rather than an antagonistic one (as it is in the design approach), this can motivate people to consider the perspectives of others and be open to reconsidering their own perspectives in light of that hearing. If it comes down to deciding between two possible remedies, deliberators determine which alternative is better than the other. Group process of defining the “better” and “worse” alternatives will inevitably bring to the forefront values and assumptions that themselves can become subject to deliberations in the decision-making process. The language of “correctness” in such group processes is out of place.

In assuming a veritistic social epistemology, deliberation-as-argument fundamentally misidentifies the goal and epistemic value of inclusive, participatory political processes: to widen epistemic resources for engaging in the design approach. Understood non-aggregatively, politics is not a process of working together (or quite often, against one another) to discover the correct answer, but rather, it is a process of working together to agree on a good answer. Deliberation-restructured-as-public-reasonableness is a cooperative process of identifying problems and imagining and creating better and worse alternatives to those problems. In this process, the inclusion of diversely situated social perspective and an awareness and appreciation for
communicatively structured inequalities among participants, are *epistemically* significant practices.

In contrast to a veritistic social epistemology, this proceduralist social epistemology emphasizes “the intrinsic merits of intellectual practices” (Peter, 2007, p. 341). It defines knowledge as the result of an appropriately *designed* process of inquiry and emphasizes the epistemic value of fair deliberative processes themselves and does not instrumentalize the value of these processes on the basis of their epistemic production (ibid., the emphasis is mine; citing Goldman, 1999). This view “dispenses with the idea that a procedure-independent standard is necessary to assess the quality of the knowledge-producing practices” (Peter, 2007, p. 341).

Peter captures the distinction between a veritistic and a proceduralist social epistemology nicely through drawing on the feminist standpoint epistemology of Sandra Harding and the philosophy of science of Helen Longino. Longino draws a distinction between three senses of knowledge: (1) knowledge-producing practices; (2) knowing; and (3) the content of knowledge, or outcome of knowledge-producing practices (Peter, 342; citing Longino, 2002). Traditional epistemologists view knowledge-producing practices as a process of belief acquisition and define knowing and the outcome of knowledge-producing practices independently of these processes of belief acquisition.

Against this traditional view, feminist standpoint epistemologists, feminist philosophers of science, and pragmatist feminists hold that knowledge is situated in various social constructs and institutions (e.g., cognitive styles, background beliefs, relations to other inquirers). That is, what a person knows and how it is known is uniquely framed by the perspective, or standpoint, of the knower. His or her socially
situated standpoint significantly influences these varied epistemic perspectives. On this framework, knowing and the outcome of knowledge-producing practices cannot be evaluated independently of knowledge-producing practices themselves, because knowers play an active role in constituting the object of knowledge.

While [on some level] it makes sense to think of VCK in veritistic terms as Cohen does in his cognitive account of voting, deliberative epistemic democracy invokes a category mistake in assuming this kind of veritism in its construction of deliberation. This is because once deliberation becomes the primary epistemic feature of democracy on the whole, rather than merely being considered instrumental to the voting act itself, we are no longer in the business of evaluating ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ voter decisions. Rather, the task before us is much more epistemically complex: identifying and analyzing complex political problems, making complex public policy decisions, and analyzing voter preferences themselves for their consistency with norms that maintain democratic processes and participation (i.e., political equality, reasonableness – or reason-giving –, publicity, and inclusion).

To return to a prior example, the social phenomenon of mansplaining reveals the complex relationship between one’s social identity, socially situated standpoint, and her epistemic standing in communicative practices. One’s socially situated standpoint as a woman can shape her appreciation for social issues like gendered assumptions about epistemic authority. Sometimes one’s socially situated standpoint has unique insights into social realities (e.g., that mansplaining is an epistemic problem); sometimes it creates ‘blind spots’ to social realities (e.g., the existence of mansplaining itself).
Such perspectives are deeply rooted in our social identities, which arise out of social relations and historical patterns of domination and oppression. One’s epistemic standing is her social authority to bring forward her socially situated standpoint in this process and be heard in the social knowledge processes of identification and presentation of social problems and in formulations of potential solutions for such problems. If one has strong epistemic standing, her socially situated knowledge is generally trusted and respected; if one has weak epistemic standing, her socially situated knowledge is generally distrusted and disrespected through practices such as non-inclusion, dismissal, or distortion. The strength of one’s epistemic standing may be relatively stable across contexts, or it may vary depending on the social context and on what social identities are more or less salient in that context.

The design approach discussed above embodies a pragmatist feminist social epistemology. Building from the analysis of this chapter, we are now in a position to define a pragmatist feminist social epistemology. (1) It will reject norms of consensus and impartiality through situating itself in a relational ontology that is aware of the unique socially situated perspectives of individuals as a result of their social locations and social positions among social, political, and economic relations of power. (2) It will emphasize the significance of the inclusion of these diverse perspectives, and it will do so on both epistemic and moral grounds. Epistemically, inclusion enhances processes of identifying problems and processes of designing political responses to them. And morally, inclusion enhances individuals’ abilities to both practice and nurture their political agency. (3) Flowing out of 1 and 2, a pragmatist feminist social epistemology will construct democratic communication in broad ways that include rhetoric, activism,
exploratory speech, and even dissent.\(^{32}\) It will reject a veritistic social epistemology in favor of a proceduralist one that emphasizes knowledge practices rather than knowledge results. In so doing it will invoke pragmatist notions of experimentalism and “democratic fallibility” (Medina, 2013, p. 5).

6. Conclusion: Communicative Democracy’s Wider Reach, Communicatively Structured Deliberative Inequalities

We have seen that democracy theorists originally introduced deliberation as a condition for democratic processes in order to protect democratic theory from the critique that democracy is inevitably doomed to collapse into elitism or populism. This has been part of a larger project aiming to defend democracy, understood and refined as deliberative democracy, against alternative forms of government (e.g., monarchy, authoritarianism, oligarchy, populism, etc.). Thus deliberative theorists have focused a great deal of attention to specifying the ways that deliberation promotes the legitimacy of democracy against alternative forms of government.

Deliberative theory has tended to underemphasize the value of the educative and preference-transformative capacity of deliberation for making these justifications. Cohen asserts that a deliberative conception is not “marked by the assumption that political discussion aims to change the preferences of other citizens” (Cohen, 1996, p. 100). He continues, “Though a deliberative view must assume that citizens are prepared to be moved by reasons that may conflict with their antecedent preferences and interests, and that being so moved may change those antecedent preference and interests, it does not suppose that political deliberation takes as its goal the alteration of preferences” (ibid).

\(^{32}\) See especially Anderson (2006) for a development of the epistemic value of dissent in Dewey’s philosophy of democracy.
Cohen’s denial of a link between preference transformation and justifications for deliberative democracy is admittedly confusing, particularly because he also emphasizes that “democratic politics should… shape the ways in which the members of the society understand themselves and their own legitimate interests” (Cohen, 1989, 69). So too, Jon Elster calls the educative function of deliberation a by-product of political activity, an essential byproduct that we should not turn into the main purpose of political activity (Elster, 1986, pp. 19-20). As we have also seen, a veritistic and correctness-oriented, non-deliberative social epistemology of democracy like Goldman’s never tackles the central problem for preference-aggregative constructions of democracy: the arbitrary nature of voter’s preferences and their orderings.

From a social justice approach, however, the communicative processes of publicly considering preferences, is itself the source of democracy’s epistemic value. On the traditional deliberative epistemic model, how citizens’ preferences are formed, ordered, changed, and evaluated is not a subject of consideration. But preferences are the result of values, and values (e.g., racism) have epistemic dimensions. We expect people to have good reasons for their values, so a deliberative epistemology of democracy must have the resources for evaluating the epistemic origins of held preferences and preference orderings themselves, so that it can confront preferences that conflict with democratic norms (e.g., racism, epistemologies of ignorance).

Thus democracy must be interested in doing more than creating institutions and social contexts that equip people with the ability to vote in a way that is consistent with realizing their goals (i.e., outcome sets), it must also have the theoretical space to advance institutions and social contexts that equip people with epistemic resources for
interrogating preferences themselves to see that those are consistent with the maintenance of democracy. Surely racism is not such a preference.

Recall that I have claimed that communicative democracy fares much better than traditional deliberative models for both naming and making space to address communicative inequalities, specifically identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities. I have also claimed that this is because, unlike traditional deliberative theory. Communicative democracy bases its conception of political agency in a relational ontology and bases democratic communication in a pragmatist feminist social epistemology. An account of deliberative democracy that takes communicatively structured deliberative inequalities seriously will attend to the epistemic and normative significance of the educative and preference-transformative potential of deliberation.

Here I want to briefly emphasize the epistemological significance for participatory democracy theory of a minor point Young makes. One further criticism of the emphasis on consensus within traditional deliberative theory I have not yet discussed is important to bring up here. The assumption of a common good or shared understanding as a starting place for deliberation “obviates the need” for the move from self-regarding thought to enlarged thought and wider appeals to justice that democratic communication requires (Young, 2000, p. 42). Practically speaking, the educative and preference-transformative capacity of democratic communication may be precisely what democracy needs for reducing deliberative inequality.

There is an important theoretical point to be made here also, a point that has gone overlooked by traditional deliberative theorists: Once the problem of identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities is acknowledged, the educative and preference-
transformative capacity of deliberation becomes an integral aspect of reinforcing both (1) justifications for democracy that appeal to the epistemic results of deliberation and (2) justifications for democracy that appeal to the protection of citizens’ political autonomy.

This is because the value of deliberation-restructured-as-public-reasonableness as an ideal communicative practice is that it creates space for the expression of one’s political autonomy and it fosters the social conditions for citizens to nurture their political autonomy through discourse with others. In doing so, it both protects and enhances citizens’ political agency and their epistemic powers. Thus communicative democracy marries two commonly detached justifications for democracy through its emphasis on the epistemic value of the educative and preference-transformative capacity of deliberation and democratic communication.

Whereas a veritistic social epistemology evaluates democratic institutions and processes on the basis of their truth-tracking potential, a pragmatist feminist social epistemology will evaluate democratic institutions and processes on the basis of a variety of epistemic goods that are intrinsic to knowledge-producing practices themselves.

Young realizes that the strategic, identity-prejudiced enforcement of norms of dispassionate speech and articulateness remains a worry for deliberative equality whether the standard for deliberation is academic argument or broader constraints of reasonableness. Thus she also argues throughout her work that deliberation is one among a range of communicative activities with social value. So besides restructuring deliberation-as-public-reasonableness, she also defends the epistemic significance of alternative modes of democratic communication, namely, communicative activities such
as greeting, rhetoric, narrative, and even questioning and protest (Young, 1997, 2000, and 2001)

Indeed the introduction of new language by social movement is one example of an epistemic benefit of Youngs’ communicative democracy, one that traditional deliberative theorists miss. Interestingly, Merriam-Webster provided a description of “mansplaining” in their “Words We’re Watching” forum and have since March of 2018, added it to their dictionary. They explain it as, “what occurs when a man talks condescendingly to someone (especially a woman) about something he has incomplete knowledge of, with the mistaken assumption that he knows more about it than the person he’s talking to does” (Meriam-Webster, n.d.).

Such terms are often not introduced in formal deliberation processes, but rather, are introduced by activists demanding for a hearing in deliberation processes that make no space for their participation or lack the hermeneutical resources to make sense of or give the charges political uptake. Such terms prompt and motivate the debate and public deliberations that conceptually fill the terms out themselves. For example, during the 2012 presidential campaign, candidates commonly invoked language of “the 1%” and “the 99%” that was popularized in the Occupy Wall Street protests of 2011 (Fenton, 2015).33

In this introductory chapter to the dissertation I hope to have established that communicative democracy can more fruitfully envision deliberative equality by making theoretical space to name the problem of communicatively structured deliberative inequalities. As a theory of social justice, the strength of communicative democracy lies

33 Like his contemporaries, deliberative theorist Jon Elster misses this communicative potential for activism because he pulls political theory apart from political activism far more than Young (Elster 1986/1997; Young, 2001).
in the fact that it rests on a relational ontology and pragmatist feminist social
epistemology that makes room for concepts of social identity, socially situated
standpoint, and epistemic standing and appreciates how these are impacted by one’s
relative position in a given society where there are relations of power, oppression, and
privilege. This argument also introduces the theoretical framework for defending
communicative democracy as itself a theory of democratic legitimacy.

The pervasive and surreptitious nature of communicative inequalities brings to
light the fact that everyday communicative practices and norms have significant
implications for deliberative equality and social justice. The realization of communicative
democracy requires a shift in public consciousness about the very nature of democracy:
far from a mere political institution, democracy is an ethical and epistemological ideal.
In what remains of the dissertation, I attempt to “fill out” communicative democracy as
such. Chapter 2 of the dissertation does this by providing a more detailed account of
identity-prejudiced communicative inequalities.
IDENTITY-PREJUDICED COMMUNICATIVE INEQUALITY

1. Introduction

In Chapter 1 I developed a critique of traditional deliberative theory on the basis of its assumed individualistic ontology and veritistic social epistemology, a framework that emphasizes problematic norms of consensus, impartiality, and correctness. As a result of this individualistic framework, traditional deliberative theorizing has often failed to appreciate some important concepts that are significant for an account of deliberative equality, namely, ‘social identity’, ‘diversely situated social perspective’, and ‘epistemic standing’. Owing to this, deliberative theory has struggled to appreciate how these phenomena are impacted by one’s relative position in a given society where there are relations of power, oppression, and privilege. Thus on the whole traditional deliberative theory misses the communicative dimensions of deliberative inequality, as well as how these relations impact one’s standing in deliberative spaces, that is, one’s deliberative standing.

This chapter provides an account of communicative inequality. Here I am interested in investigating how people are communicatively situated, on the basis of their social identities. I am particularly concerned that in contexts of social inequality, oppression, and privilege, some peoples’ marginalized social identities serve as a basis for their diminished deliberative standing (and some peoples’ privileged social identities serve as a basis for their inflated deliberative standing). I am especially interested in exposing some of the more implicit dimensions of communicative inequality since those
have largely been underappreciated in deliberative theory and often go undetected in deliberative spaces. I draw on literatures in feminist epistemology, resistance epistemology, and social psychology to develop this account of communicatively structured deliberative inequality.

Before moving on I want to make a few clarifications about how I will use some important terms in this project. These terms denote concepts that are presently under investigation, so my purpose here is not so much to offer a developed explanation of them, as it is to provide a general framework of their relations with one another.

*Communicative inequality* denotes the communicatively structured dimensions of deliberative inequality that are under consideration in this project. Communicative inequality arises as a result of a wide range of *communicative and epistemic practices and habits* that are situated in intergroup social relations of power where there is oppression and privilege and group-based social inequality.

By ‘communicative’ I mean nothing out of the ordinary, only any activity (verbal or non-verbal) among two or more individuals where *at least one individual* attempts to convey information to another individual. As we will see in cases of being ignored, silenced, or dismissed, only one individual is initiating a transfer or exchange of information, but this does not entail that the silencing or dismissing interlocutor is not, through his silencing and dismissal, engaged in some sort of communicative practice. Thus in this type of context, only one individual is necessary for the interaction to be analyzed as communicative. On my account, communicative interactions themselves can function to communicate as well. To clarify, an individual’s communicative interactions with another person can function to communicate information to bystanders, information
that is particular to the relations of power and relative epistemic and deliberative standing of participants in the original, communicative interaction.

One task for this chapter is to introduce examples of communicative and epistemic practices and habits that sustain communicative inequality through looking to empirical research as well as through drawing on the experiences of members of stigmatized groups. Another goal of this chapter is to situate our theorizing about these practices and habits and about deliberative standing in a relational ontology of prejudice. I borrow some of the terms I use in this discussion from Miranda Fricker, specifically ‘identity-prejudicial’ and ‘collective social imagination’, but I develop them beyond her usage (Fricker, 2007).

Communicative and epistemic practices and habits are identity-prejudiced when they are (either explicitly or implicitly) informed by identity-prejudiced stereotypes. Fricker defines an identity-prejudicial stereotype as, “a widely held disparaging association between a social group and one or more attribute, where this association embodies a generalization that displays some (typically, epistemically culpable) resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective investment” (Fricker, 2007, p. 35). Identity-prejudiced stereotypes have origins in the universal cognitive tendency towards ingroup and outgroup biases (i.e., ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice), but they should be clarified from these intergroup processes in two senses: (1) they operate in a specific social context of social inequality between two or more social groups, and (2) they function in those intergroup relations to sustain the dominance or elite status of one group over the other(s).
On my framework, identity-prejudiced stereotypes are housed in the *collective social imagination*, a concept Fricker leaves largely undeveloped. As I develop the concept, the collective social imagination refers to what some social psychologists have explained as, “a socially structured field within the individual mind” that consists of stereotypes, categorical associations, and archetypes that support images of various social identities, of one’s own social identity and perceived ingroup, the social identity of perceived outgroups, *as well as* perceptions of the power relations between those groups (Turner and Oakes, 1986, p. 250). This content of the collective social imagination is socially informed and sustained through social interaction – a wide range of communicative and epistemic practices and habits – and is neither exclusively cognitive nor exclusively affective. This content has *epistemic* dimensions and implications in the broad sense that it influences perceptions of the social world and knowledge practices and formation, and it has *ethical* dimensions and implications in the broad sense that it concerns social life, interaction, and communication. Thus in social contexts where there are intergroup social relations of power, oppression, privilege, and group-based social inequality, the collective social imagination is both informed by *and sustains* these relations.

I want to clarify my use of the phrase “identity-prejudiced communicative and epistemic practices and habits” a bit further. In this project I avoid making a categorical distinction between practices and habits because I want to refer to a collection of communicative and epistemic activities as a whole that may range on a spectrum between volitional activity and ‘attention to’ on one end of a spectrum, and non-volitional activity, habitual compulsion, and even more primal “modalities of body comportment” on
another end of a spectrum (Young, 1980/2005, p. 32). I want to resist the dualisms assumed in much of social psychology, between cognitive and affective processes in attitudes like prejudice, and between explicit and implicit levels of conscious awareness of such attitudes. Rather, attention and compulsory habituation are extremes on a spectrum within the varied and the wide range of activities that diminish deliberative standing and exacerbate communicative inequality.

Suffice it to say for now that: (1) The collective social imagination consists of identity-prejudiced stereotypes (among other things) that inform a wide range of communicative and epistemic practices and habits; (2) Conscious awareness of the identity-prejudiced stereotypes that inform these various communicative and epistemic practices and habits varies among practices and habits and among individuals; (3) Although philosophically interesting, whether identity-prejudiced stereotypes are held at implicit or explicit attitudinal levels does not really matter for my purposes in this particular project, since I am presently only examining the sociopolitical impact of them on deliberative standing and am not constructing an account of ethical responsibility for

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34 In this paper, “Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Modality, and Spatiality”, Young provides a feminist phenomenological analysis or women’s more inhibited uses of their bodies and physical space. Young’s discussion of the phenomenology of gendered body comportments here anticipates her later introduction of the “body aesthetic dimensions of oppression” in Justice and the Politics of Difference (Young, 1990, p. 148).

35 Tamar Gendler’s (2008; 2011) work may be useful for challenging these dichotomies assumed within social psychology between implicit and explicit attitudes, and between cognitive and affective conceptions of these attitudes. Gendler introduces the concept of alief as a mental state that involves, “the activation of an associative chain…that can happen regardless of the [explicit] attitude that one bears to the content activating the associations” (Gendler, 2008, p. 650). It is, “associative, action-generating, affect-laden, automatic, agnostic with respect to its content, shared with animals, and developmentally and conceptually antecedent to other cognitive attitudes” (Gendler, 2008, p. 641). But alief is neither like belief nor like imagination, cognitive states which are both propositional, and Gendler makes the strong case that it can persist in spite of our reflective beliefs. She also suggests that we “leave room for an analogous notion that bears the relation to desire that alief bears to belief”, a type of presire (which she leaves to be developed by others) (Gendler, 2008, p. 642). I suspect that much of this work might be incredibly fruitful for challenging some of the dichotomies I am concerned with in the social psychology of prejudice, but indulging this fascinating line of inquiry further is outside of the scope of the present project.
such biases\textsuperscript{36}; (4) Therefore, it would be better to refer to this wide range of communicative and epistemic practices and habits as something like \textit{prabits} for ease of reference and to contest the dichotomies I have expressed concerns about.

To review, an \textit{identity-prejudiced prabit} is any communicative or epistemic practice, habit, or modality of body comportment that is based in identity-prejudiced stereotypes. Identity-prejudiced prabits contribute to communicative inequality through impacting the \textit{deliberative standing} of interlocutors in deliberative spaces. They do this through either [or both] depreciating the standing of some or inflating the standing of others in ways that are uniquely connected to intergroup social relations of power where there is oppression and privilege and group-based social inequality, and this connection is had \textit{through}, or by way of, identity-prejudiced stereotypes, which are sustained in the collective social imagination.

The following section of the chapter (Section 2) situates my account in James Bohman’s work on communicative inequality. While Bohman’s account is important within deliberative theory for initiating a turn towards the communicative dimensions of deliberative inequality, his treatment of communicative inequality is underdeveloped in terms of some of the more recent work in epistemology and social psychology that examines the relationships between oppression, knowing, and \textit{epistemic standing}.

Thus in Section 3 of the chapter I turn to Miranda Fricker’s work on testimonial injustice as a model for the basic structure of communicative inequality. Here I argue that one’s testimonial standing (what Fricker has characterized in terms of ‘testimonial excess’ or ‘testimonial deficit’), results from a wide range of identity-prejudiced

\textsuperscript{36} Although, very interesting attempts to examine responsibility for implicit biases have been recently made. See especially Daniel Kelly and Erica Roedder’s (2008) paper, “Racial Cognition and the Ethics of Implicit Bias” and Jules Holroyd’s (2012) paper, “Responsibility for Implicit Bias”.
communicative and epistemic practices and habits. I incorporate social psychology empirical research and literatures in prejudiced communication to provide some examples of these identity-prejudiced prabits.

In Section 4 of the chapter I raise concerns about individualistic constructions of the collective social imagination and of prejudice. I worry that Fricker commits her account to this and that contemporary empirical research often assumes it as well. Section 5 of the chapter responds to these concerns by making the case that the collective social imagination must be understood in terms of a relational account of oppression that understands prejudice beyond the universal cognitive tendency towards ingroup and outgroup biases and in terms of the relations of power that inform what I have called *identity-prejudiced stereotypes*. I look to the social identity approach within social psychology as a mechanism for introducing this foundational relational ontology of prejudice.

As was demonstrated in Chapter 1, Young relies on some of the thought that eventually becomes the social identity approach in her development of the social group, and Addams and Dewey anticipate some of this thought. Thus this chapter both offers an account of communicative inequality and serves as a bridge between Young’s thought and Addams’s and Dewey’s contributions.

2. Situating Identity-Prejudiced Communicative Inequality

In Chapter 1 I pointed to James Bohman’s work on deliberative democracy as an exception to the individualistic limitations I assigned to traditional deliberative theory, specifically because of his appreciation for the influence of oppression on one’s deliberative standing. He explains,
Cultural pluralism heightens the uncertainty of achieving deliberative uptake, as well as the problems of gaining mutual recognition and respect...some groups can make the case that such failure to convince others with their public reasons is part of a larger pattern. (Bohman, 1996, p. 107)

Thus Bohman concludes rightly, “deliberative theorists must distinguish between merely formal “opportunities” to deliberate and the capacity to make “fair use” of one’s public reason” (Bohman, 1996, p. 122). He defines deliberative inequality as “asymmetries of public capabilities and functioning that persist in most public spheres” (Bohman, 1996, p. 110, the emphasis is mine). Bohman introduces a typology of deliberative inequality consisting of three basic types: (1) power asymmetries, (2) communicative inequalities, and (3) “political poverty” (Bohman, 1996, p. 110, the emphasis is mine).

Like Young, Bohman worries that without particular protections, deliberation can become elitist because some individuals “have greater cultural resources (such as knowledge and information)” and are thereby “more capable of imposing their own interests and values on others in the public arena” (Bohman, 1996, pp. 112-3). And also like Young, he sees a potential tendency towards elitism within deliberative democracy that many traditional deliberative theorists miss, namely, that deliberation can itself become the stage for unequal influences of social and economic power in a society.

In his account of communicatively structured deliberative inequality Bohman seems to have in mind Young’s fourth face of oppression, cultural imperialism. For example, he points out that the official language of political deliberation, or even a dominantly accepted style of discourse (e.g., deliberation-as-argument) may favor particular groups (Bohman 1996, p. 116). Bohman provides a contemporary example
where a non-public discourse gets assumed as universal. Contrasting the civil rights movement with the contemporary prolife movement he explains,

However, as opposed to the civic rights movement, [the prolife movement] has not found public resonance and forms of expression outside of the churches from which it originated. It has not succeeded in translating the movement’s reasons into the public sphere; they remain non-public, however widely convincing and widely shared among citizens. (Bohman, 1996, p. 137)

In such narrowly defined discourses, what counts as ‘public reasons’ and modes of justification becomes restricted through the ideologies and interpretive frameworks of the dominant group, and these are assumed as objective standards for justification in political discourse (Bohman, 1996, p. 117). So to build on Bohman’s example, women who wish to challenge some or all of the teachings or positions held within these Christian communities, often have their speech constrained by a dominant discourse of Christian fundamentalism, a discourse that restricts justifications for conduct to biblical literalism (and problematically assumes the possibility for an impartial and infallible reading of the text).

Recall my treatment of deliberation-as-argument in Chapter 1. Here I introduced this as a type of cultural imperialism where one’s participation in a deliberative forum is conditioned on meeting norms of detachment and assertive speech that are already operative in the social context. However, when deliberation-as-argument is assumed as the only appropriate discourse for a particular deliberative forum, it can function in this space to harm one’s deliberative standing in a way that disproportionately impacts her particular social group. In the case of deliberation-as-argument, one’s deliberative standing is diminished by communicative and epistemic practices and habits that are not directly the result of identity-prejudiced stereotypes, but that disproportionately harm her
as a result of her oppressed social identity. I will call the communicative and epistemic practices and habits that function towards this type of group-based disproportionate harm, *disparate impact prabits*.

Disparate impact communicative inequality arises because of communicative forms of cultural imperialism where discourses (e.g., deliberation-as-argument) are assumed as the only appropriate mode of discourse. In disparate impact communicative inequality, one’s social identity is a salient feature of why her deliberative standing is harmed (Bohman, 1996, p. 117). Disparate impact prabits get their force (to contribute to communicative inequality) from functioning within a social space of intergroup relations of power where there is oppression and privilege and group-based social inequality.

An account of communicative inequality should not be limited to communicative forms of cultural imperialism, however, since this does not capture the identity-prejudiced nature of some individuals’ deliberative standing. Argument is not itself identity-prejudiced, nor is it the type of discourse that is prompted by identity-prejudiced stereotypes. But many of the communicative and epistemic prabits that contribute to communicative inequality are *directly informed by* identity-prejudiced stereotypes and in such cases I will refer to them in terms of being *identity-prejudiced prabits*.

This is an important distinction that Bohman does not articulate clearly enough. While his account of deliberative inequality identifies three forms, one of which is communicative inequality (i.e., power asymmetries, communicative inequality, and political poverty), Bohman’s introduction of a ‘capacity-based conception of deliberative equality’ largely emphasizes the need to introduce institutional remedies for the third form of deliberative inequality, political poverty. Political poverty is “a group-related
inability to make effective use of opportunities to influence the deliberative process” (Bohman, 1996, p. 125). Thus his attention to remedying the impoverished capacities of marginalized individuals overshadows any consideration of the identity-prejudiced dimensions of deliberative inequality.37

Bohman measures effectiveness in deliberation as the ability “to initiate a public dialogue about an issue or a theme – a dialogue in which the deliberator’s reasons may receive deliberative uptake” (Bohman, 1996, p. 125). He provides minimal examples to clarify, but he seems to take it that deliberative equality largely rests on a society having “the presumption of a set of minimum, shared public capacities” (Bohman, 1996, p. 127). Here he appears to have in mind capacities that are both agential (e.g., personal skills and abilities) and structural (e.g., participation costs). Thus on this capacity-based account, deliberative equality can be enabled through introducing institutions and forums that “eliminate inadequate functioning among their citizens” (Bohman, 1996, p. 128).

Bohman describes communicative inequality in terms of a restricted hermeneutics where public conversation around problems is constrained for some social groups because limited cultural resources exist in the dominant discourse for those problems to receive uptake and be effective. But he concludes that the primary reason such participants’ voices cannot be converted into influence in public dialogue is because, “they lack a vocabulary in which to express their needs and perspectives publicly”

Some context is important here. Bohman uses this capacity-based conception of deliberative equality as a way to mitigate a concern that policies that are intended to be correctives of social inequality often miss the deliberative sources of social inequality. To borrow his example, we ought to be suspicious of correctives for deliberative inequality like granting automatic veto power to minority groups or representatives. Not only do these types of consequentialist correctives conflict with basic norms of political equality, but more than this, they also fail to address the underlying deliberative inequalities that have resulted in the need for such correctives altogether, namely, exclusion of the minority group in question from full participation in the deliberative processes leading up to the vote for which they have veto power (Bohman, 1996, p. 109). This feature of Bohman’s account of deliberative equality is not a point of disagreement for me.
(Bohman, 1996, p. 121). This is why later when he develops his capacity-based account of deliberative equality he points to the significance of liberal institutions that protect free speech as a place through which “emerging publics” can introduce new dialogues and terms (Bohman, 1996, p. 136).

But Bohman’s capacity-based account reduces communicative inequality to what I have called ‘disparate impact communicative inequality’. Recall that disparate impact prabits are not directly informed by identity-prejudiced stereotypes but disproportionality harm groups because of the force they get in social spaces of intergroup relations of power where there is oppression and privilege and group-based social inequality. Generally, they are neutral communicative and epistemic prabits that are, “interacting with group-based power relations and norms that are already operative in the social context” in ways that disproportionately impact an individual’s deliberative standing because of her social identity.38

Bohman rightly shifts the focus in deliberative inequality theory from one’s available material resources to access deliberative spaces, to their social and epistemic power in those deliberative spaces. My worry for Bohman’s account, however, is that it’s focus on deliberative capacities and functionings overshadows another significant dimension of deliberative inequality that oppressed people must grapple with on a daily basis, that is, the presence of identity prejudices on the part of their interlocutors in their communicative and epistemic exchanges. On a capacity-based conception of deliberative inequality, any corrective measures to address political poverty are vulnerable to conditioning participation on assimilation to dominant constructions of deliberation. Moreover, it will ignore the problem of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality,

38 I credit Theresa W. Tobin for articulating this point.
that even when oppressed people assimilate their speech to the dominant discourse, they are often vulnerable to identity-prejudiced prabits that marginalize their deliberative standing.\textsuperscript{39} But as I have already pointed out, identity-prejudiced communicative inequality is not resolved through attention to oppressed peoples’ capacities, but to attending to the identity-prejudiced prabits that produce them!

My aim is to shift the focus in theorizing about deliberative inequality from oppressed persons’ deliberative capacities for participation, to their deliberative uptake by fellow deliberators, that is, from political poverty to identity-prejudiced communicative practices, and ultimately, from what oppressed people can and should do to be included, to what people with identity-prejudiced inflated deliberative standing can and should do to include.

While Bohman’s account is important within deliberative theory for initiating a turn towards the communicative dimensions of deliberative inequality, his treatment of communicative inequality is underdeveloped in terms of some of the more recent work in epistemology and social psychology that examines the relationships between prejudice, knowing, and epistemic standing (e.g. Miranda Fricker). Here is where it is important to turn to Miranda Fricker’s useful conception of testimonial injustice for support in developing my account.

3. Contributions from Feminist and Resistance Epistemologies and Social Psychology Empirical Research

Recall that Miranda Fricker introduces the label ‘identity prejudicial’ to denote “prejudices against people \textit{qua} social type” (Fricker, 2007, p. 4). Identity prejudices arise

\textsuperscript{39} I should note that I do not think that Bohman’s deliberative theory necessarily lacks the conceptual tools to make this distinction, only that the distinction is underdeveloped in his account.
within relations of social power, and importantly, social power is exercised through both practical social co-ordination and imaginative social co-ordination. Fricker explains, “There can be operations of power which are dependent upon agents having…shared imaginative conceptions of social identity” (Fricker, 2007, p. 14). For example, in the case of the exercise of gendered identity power, “both parties must share in the relevant collective conceptions of what it is to be a man and what it is to be a woman” (Fricker, 2007, p. 15). Fricker roots identity prejudices in “the collective social imagination [which] inevitably contains all manner of stereotypes and … is the social atmosphere in which hearers must confront their interlocutors” (Fricker, 2007, p. 38). In such contexts, speakers from oppressed groups can suffer an injustice that is epistemic in nature because they receive “deflated credibility from the hearer owing to identity prejudice on the hearer’s part” (Fricker, 2007, p. 4).

Recall also that Bohman acknowledges that political participation “depend[s] in crucial ways on the uncertain cooperation of others” (Bohman, 1996, p. 128). Fricker’s account brings to light an important feature of communicative inequality, namely, the persistence of identity prejudices in the cooperative context on which deliberative uptake is dependent.

Fricker takes as the central case of testimonial injustice “identity-prejudicial credibility deficits”. Such credibility deficits harm one primarily “in her capacity as a knower” and because of the centrality of knowing to human functioning, she is

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For an excellent example of this in racialized identity power, see Devine and Elliott (1995), whose research at the University of Wisconsin seems to have revealed this collective social imagination about blacks. Gendler summarizes, “The traits most frequently cited were: lazy, ignorant, musical, stupid, unreliable, loud, aggressive, athletic, rhythmic, low in intelligence, sexually perverse, uneducated, poor, hostile, and criminal (Devine and Elliott 1995, pp. 1144-1146; cited in Gendler, 2011, p. 43). Importantly, even subjects who expressly rejected the accuracy of these stereotypic traits were aware of them, demonstrating the persistence of the collective social imagination even in spite of explicitly held beliefs.
“symbolically degraded qua human” (Fricker, 2007, p. 44). Identity-prejudiced credibility deficits have a secondary harm for individuals, a potentially “ongoing process of erosion” of one’s epistemic abilities, epistemic confidence, and even may hinder her development of certain epistemic virtues like intellectual courage and perseverance (Fricker, 2007, p. 50).

There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between the primary and secondary harms of identity-prejudiced credibility deficits because the subject is “exclude[d] from trustful conversation” and through this, is marginalized in the kind of participatory practices that are essential for self-development (Fricker, 2007, p. 53). Linda Alcoff has explained this poignantly, “Such exclusions have cumulative effects: being denied credibility means that one is precluded from developing one’s intellectual abilities. Doubt from others often leads to self-doubt, hesitation, reticence to speak, and thus an inability to formulate clearly one’s thoughts” (Alcoff, 2010, p. 131). In this process of erosion, “the subject of the injustice is socially constituted just as the stereotype depicts her”, and it may even come to be “a causal force towards its own fulfillment” (Fricker, 2007, pp. 55, 57).

We should extend this account of harm onto identity-prejudiced communicative inequality: (1) one is harmed primarily as a knower and political agent (and symbolically qua human) and (2) one is harmed secondarily because she is deprived of the kinds of safe epistemic and communicative spaces that are conducive to nurturing her political capacities and agency.41

41 Indeed even the marginalize-ing interlocutor is harmed in this sense since through his marginalization of the Other, he imposes restrictions on the epistemic potential of the communicative act.
There is convincing empirical evidence for Fricker’s claim that identity-prejudiced stereotypes can impact an individual’s assessment of another’s credibility and competency.\textsuperscript{42} Perhaps where this has been most clearly evidenced is in literatures examining credibility and persuasion in communications, marketing and advertising, and criminal justice.\textsuperscript{43} Tess Neal found that in trial proceedings, perceptions of female experts’ credibility was particularly low when female experts were not perceived as likeable, but that likeability was not a significant factor for credibility for male experts (Neal et al., 2012).\textsuperscript{44} In a later review of the literature, Neil explained that while expert gender typically does not appear to influence ultimate decisions in criminal cases, it does sometimes seem to influence damage awards in civil cases (Neil, 2014). In journalism and media studies, Maria Brann and Kimberly Himes found that, after controlling for physical attractiveness, televised male weather newscasters were perceived to be higher in competence, composure, and extroversion than their female counterparts (Brann and Himes, 2010).

\textsuperscript{42} This research has origins in work on social cognition and attitudes that investigated the breadth of the halo effect, a cognitive bias in which, “the tendency for judgment of a novel attribute (A) of a person [is] influenced by the value of an already known, but objectively irrelevant attribute (B)” (Greenwald and Banagi, 1995, p. 9). Early studies on the halo effect demonstrated a cognitive bias to favor someone or something on the basis of an association with attractiveness, height, fancy gift-wrapping, or even association with a more prestigious institution. Anthony Greenfield and Mahzarin Banaji were among the first to examine similar implicit attitude associations in application to socially stigmatized groups in their (1995) groundwork publication, “Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes”. Prior to this much of the research on social cognition and attitudes focused on examining consumer attitudes, self-esteem, and political ideologies.

\textsuperscript{43} For an excellent review of this literature, see Zhu et. al., 2016. They point to a number of studies that evidence the persistence of the halo effect where “characteristics which should have little or no bearing on whether a researcher is judged as credible” impact perceptions of credibility and competence evaluations. Such factors include but are not limited to physical attraction, age, demographic similarity to the perceiver, race and gender (p. 863). Indeed the presence of such biases among jurors and judges is a major shared assumption of trial advocacy courses that instruct law students in \textit{Voir Dire}.

\textsuperscript{44} See also, Neal, 2014. For an additional, but more dated, investigation of race-motivated assessments of credibility in the judicial system, see Sheri Lynn Johnson’s (1996) “The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility”.
Some more recent research has demonstrated gender disparities in perceptions of competency within the STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and math), fields historically dominated by men. STEM faculty members were randomly assigned resumes to evaluate. Corinne Moss-Racusin and fellow researchers found that despite having the exact same qualifications, Jennifer’s were perceived as less competent than John’s and were less likely to be offered jobs or mentoring opportunities as a result. When they were offered jobs, Jennifer’s were hypothetically offered an average of 13% less than John’s (Moss-Racusin, et. al., 2012).45

Identity-prejudiced stereotypes seem to be predictive of more general assessments of character as well. Jason A. Okonofua and Jennifer L. Eberhardt (2015) conducted a study at Stanford University on K-12 teachers’ perceptions of student infractions, and importantly, teacher-perceptions of student behavioral patterns over time. Eberhardt and Okonofua found that there was no racial disparity in recommended discipline for students’ first infractions. However, there was a disciplinary racial disparity in recommended discipline and faculty perceptions of students after a second infraction. At this second-infraction level, teachers were more disturbed by the behavior of black students, more likely to recommend severe punishment, and more likely to label the student a “troublemaker”.

Fricker’s work focuses on testimonial exchanges and perceptions of credibility. I do not think that deliberative standing is unlike testimonial standing. I am interested,

45 See also Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan’s (2004) widely cited study demonstrating racial disparities in callbacks for interviews. Resumes with White sounding names (Emily and Greg) received 50% more callbacks for interviews than resumes with Black sounding names (Lakisha and Jamal). It is important to note, however, that this research does not demonstrate perceptions of competency were a significant causal factor for callback disparities and there could exist alternative motivations among participants (e.g., overt racism, feeling more comfortable working with members of one’s own ingroup, or also assessments of competency).
however, to develop a broader conception of how identity-prejudiced stereotypes impact one’s deliberative standing than Fricker’s focus permits. I do this by examining not only the role of identity-prejudiced stereotypes in perceptions of credibility, but also their role in communicative and epistemic practices and habits that support the diminishment of an individual’s deliberative standing.

One reason communicative democracy must broaden its catalog of identity-prejudiced prabits beyond testimonial exchanges is that the type of communicative acts and knowledge practices that testimonial exchange restricts itself to, promotes too narrow and veritistic an account of knowing. That is, testimonial injustice focuses on assessments of testimony, the communicative and epistemic act of uttering a declarative statement about a fact of the matter, veritistic “truth-tracking” knowledge practices like those embodied in a criminal or civil trial procedure. In a trial procedure, hearers in a courtroom are tasked with evaluating the truth of statements brought forward by a defendant and witnesses.46

But I have explained in Chapter 1 that the types of problems communicative democracy is interested in identifying, defining, and strategizing resolutions for, are far more like design problems in engineering than discovering the truth of a defendant’s claim to innocence.47 Certainly speakers’ credibility weighs into their deliberative standing in problem-solving discourse. One’s deliberative standing in this context is powerfully affected by her perceived credibility when she makes declarative statements,

46 Fricker herself relies on Goldman’s veritistic social epistemology in her articulation of the damage that testimonial injustice imposes on the epistemic system. To be fair to Fricker, she does seem to resist some of this veritism and lean towards a standpoint epistemology through talking of “truths” rather than “the truth”: “Prejudice presents an obstacle to truth, either directly by causing the hearer to miss out on a particular truth, or indirectly by creating blockages in the circulation of critical ideas” (Fricker, 2007, p. 43).

47 For an introduction to the design approach for solving moral problems, see especially Whitbeck (1996) and Cooper (2016).
but it is also impacted by other communicative practices. Besides declarative speech acts we have to consider a range of other communicative and epistemic prabits that are impacted by identity prejudices, for example, habits of interrupting and speech accommodation. A pragmatist feminist social epistemology will resist the tendency in traditional, veritistic social epistemology to analyze knowledge practices solely in terms of epistemic production. Owing to this, it will also resist thinking about epistemic practices (and communicative practices of an epistemic nature) solely in terms of declarative statements.

In what remains of this section I will introduce some examples of identity-prejudiced prabits that support identity-prejudiced diminished deliberative standing. This discussion is not intended to provide an exhaustive list of identity-prejudiced prabits, but to introduce some examples that collectively demonstrate the wide range of communicative and epistemic dimensions of communicative inequality. One of my interests here is to examine some of the communicative prabits that promote and deteriorate one’s testimonial credibility specifically, and one’s deliberative standing more generally. It is important to note that estimations of credibility motivate some communicative and epistemic practices and habits, so insofar as credibility is informed by identity-prejudiced stereotypes, resulting communicative practices will be as well. It is also important to acknowledge a reinforcing circle here: identity-prejudiced stereotypes that are housed in the collective social imagination motivate identity-prejudiced prabits, and identity-prejudiced prabits sometimes function to reinforce the problematic content of the collective social imagination.

\footnote{48 I use the term ‘motivation’ in the broad sense that social psychologists use it to denote underlying causes for action and behavior that the agent may or may not be consciously aware of in general, or may or may not be attending to in a given moment.}
Destructive language patterns often accompany identity-prejudiced estimations of credibility deficit. One example from the clinical psychology literature is that of “crazy-making language” that questions the sanity of the speaker. This type of language often invokes the norms of dispassionate speech discussed in Chapter 1 to dismiss the testimony of an individual on the basis of its emotional delivery rather than its content. Here an individual’s alleged testimonial credibility deficit is supported through a communicative practice, as well as to bystanders.

It is reasonable to suggest that gender might be a salient trigger for crazy-making language in light of some recent research on gendered emotion stereotypes that was conducted by Lisa Barrett and Eliza Bliss-Moreau (2009). Barrett and Bliss-Moreau found gender disparities in whether subjects would evaluate a frowning or sad target face dispositionally (“S/he’s emotional.”) or situationally (“S/he’s having a bad day.”). Not surprisingly, they found that women were far more likely to be perceived dispositionally.

This research demonstrates that someone’s gender is a significant indicator for whether she will be perceived as being emotional, or as expressing emotion because a particular situation warrants it (Barrett and Bliss-Moreau, 2009, p. 654). The identity-prejudiced use of crazy-making language is situated within gender-inequality where rationality has historically been associated with masculinity, whiteness, and more elite social classes. Thus women and people of color may be particularly vulnerable to crazy-making language.

The use of rhetorical questions in communicative interactions can also function to dismiss a speaker’s voice or marginalize her contributions. As Randi Gunther has explained, such questions “are never true questions of inquiry” and attack a person’s right
to even make a claim or argument” (Gunther, 2000). The use of rhetorical questions as a form of dismissal, challenge an individual’s moral standing in a relationship or in the community.

Perhaps less pernicious than crazy-making language or dismissive questioning, is the communicative prabit of interruption. Evidence suggests that identity-prejudiced stereotypes can motivate interruption. For example, while Adrienne Hancock and Benjamin Rubin’s research did not find any notable differences in the language a participant used when speaking with a woman vs. a man, they did find that participants tended to interrupt more when their communication partner was a woman (Hancock and Rubin, 2014).

Some political commentators have suggested that this research could explain patterns of interruption that occurred during the first of three presidential debates during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Race. Crockett and Frostenson (2016) reported that during the September 26, 2016 debate, Donald Trump interrupted Hillary Clinton 51 times whereas Clinton interrupted Trump only 17 times (Crockett and Frostenson, 2016). What is more, they also counted that Clinton was interrupted 70 times by moderator Lester Holt, whereas Holt only interrupted Trump 47 times (ibid.). In her analysis of the debate, Peggy Drexier also found that Lauer provided a more diverse series of questions to Trump than to Clinton (Drexier, 2016).

Like dismissive questioning, identity-prejudiced norms of interruption can function to diminish a speaker’s standing to bring moral claims to her community. This message of standing can be conveyed both to one’s interlocutor and to bystanders of the communicative interaction. In the latter types of cases, the interrupter both assert’s his
dominant moral standing to his interlocutor and communicates information about his and his interlocutor’s relative epistemic standing to bystanders.

Identity-prejudiced stereotypes can inform one’s style of speech as well. There is evidence that in competitive intergroup settings, there are often group-based linguistic disparities in how ingroup vs. outgroup members are described.\textsuperscript{49} Researchers observed racial disparities in how victims were depicted in media coverage of Hurrican Katrina (Sommers, et. al., 2006). For example, authors pointed to “the widely circulated photo captions that described a Black man as “looting” and a seemingly comparable White couple as “finding food”’’ (Sommers, et. al., 2006, p.40). This speech adjustment in describing outgroup members is particularly pervasive in political campaigns where one’s speech is intended to be persuasive.\textsuperscript{50}

There is also evidence that communicators will adjust their style of speech according to the perceived characteristics of their interlocutor. Janet Ruscher explains, “In intergroup settings, such assumptions often are based on the stereotypes associated with the listener’s apparent group membership” (Ruscher, 2017, p. 12). For example, communicators often use secondary baby talk (e.g., simplified and cute words, higher pitch, simpler words, and shorter sentences) in interactions with an elderly person who is demented or a person with a developmental cognitive disability, but owing to identity-prejudiced stereotypes about the elderly as a social group and about the disabled as a social group, they may also overextend this speech style to elderly people in general or to a person with a physical disability who is not cognitively disabled (Ruscher, 2017).

\textsuperscript{49} For a review of some of this literature see Anoll, Zurloni, and Riva, 2006, p. 238.
\textsuperscript{50} See for example Anolli, Zurloni, and Riva, 2006.
Speakers also sometimes under-accommodate speech for people when they do not feel (on some explicit or implicit level) that the listener or interlocutor deserves care, concern, or warmth. For example, speakers might be curt, dismissive, cold, or impatient with foreigners and immigrants they identify as outgroup members, implying that they “are not worthy of attention nor should they be accorded the privileges of valued group members” (Ruscher, 2017, p. 13). This underaccommodation towards outgroup members has also been observed in immediacy behaviors (e.g., smiling, leaning towards someone when speaking, open posture, nodding, etc.) in intergroup communicative interactions (Trawalter and Richeson, 2008).

Perhaps the most striking evidence for the impact of identity-prejudiced stereotypes on one’s deliberative standing has been demonstrated in the healthcare setting. Researchers found a correlation between physicians’ implicit bias levels and patient perceptions of care. Patients were given a Primary Care Assessment Survey that assessed perceptions of “patient-centered care”. This survey defined patient-centered care as consisting of: (1) patient-centered interpersonal relationship (e.g., feeling that the physician was caring and concerning), (2) communication (e.g., feeling that one’s questions were answered), (3) trust (e.g., perception that the physician has knowledge), and (4) contextual knowledge (e.g., feeling that the physician knows one’s values and beliefs). Based on these surveys, researchers found that patients who were black were much more likely to report having had unsatisfactory interactions when their physicians’ scored higher in implicit bias (Green et. al., 2007).  

51 For a thoughtful and empirically backed compilation of the stories of people of color in the healthcare system, see especially Augustus White and David Chandoff’s (2011) book, Seeing Patients: Unconscious Bias in Health Care.
It is important to note that the survey defined patient-centered care in a way that is consistent with shared decision-making models of patient care and physician-patient interaction. Within the medical ethics literature, shared decision-making is commonly contrasted with more paternalistic models which have been widely refuted on both theoretical grounds and on empirical grounds for failing to be effective in producing and supporting compliance in patients with their treatment plans.

One benefit of shared decision-making is its ability to mitigate a potential conflict between respecting patient autonomy and fulfilling the physician’s obligation of beneficence to the patient. On this approach the patient and physician are seen are moral equals and work together to weigh the pros and cons of different treatment plans for the individual patient according to her values and realistic compliance possibilities (Katz, 1992). Not surprisingly, in its early theoretical phases, some scholars referred to the shared decision-making model as a ‘deliberative model of care’ (Emanuel and Emanuel, 1992). This research suggests that in some contexts, identity-prejudiced stereotypes can function to fundamentally shift a communicator’s mode of interaction from one of mutual epistemic respect and participation, to one of epistemic authority and elitism.  

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52 For an excellent review of these arguments see Buchanan, 2002.
53 Jose Medina’s work introduces another important perspective here, namely, that of the more general relationship between social identities and epistemic character. He hypothesizes that one’s tendency towards epistemic vices or virtues may be determined by her social identity. That is, social privilege may incline an individual towards epistemic attitudes and habits that contribute to the creation and maintenance of bodies of ignorance – vices of epistemic arrogance, epistemic laziness, and closed-mindedness. He asks the question, “Could the privilege of knowing (of always being presumed to know), of always being heard as a credible speaker, of always commanding cognitive authority, sometimes spoil people?” (Medina, 2013, p. 30) By contrast, marginalized people may tend towards epistemic attitudes and habits that make them both better knowers, and also vulnerable to abuse by epistemically spoiled people: epistemic humility, intellectual curiosity and diligence, and open-mindedness. The interesting point to take from Medina’s work is that social identity can problematize deliberative equality even in the absence of identity-prejudiced prabits just in virtue of our epistemic vantage point.
4. Individualistic Tendencies in Theorizing about Prejudice and the Collective Social Imagination

Fricker situates identity prejudices in “the collective social imagination”. She explains that “shared imaginative conceptions of social identity” constitute the collective social imagination and this is the socially sustained and informed conceptual framework through which identity power operates (Fricker, 2007, p. 14). Building from Fricker’s model, I want to suggest that this conceptual framework also produces (and is informed by) a wide range of identity-prejudiced prabits that support one’s testimonial standing, and even more broadly, her deliberative standing.

Ultimately, I am critical that Fricker’s account of prejudice and construction of the collective social imagination is not conceptually rich enough to capture the pervasiveness of identity-prejudices in human interactions. Thus we need a broader understanding of the collective social and epistemic hermeneutical context that frames the role of identity-prejudiced stereotypes in communicative practices. In the next section of this chapter I will look to the social identity approach within social psychology as an ontological framework for doing this.

Fricker detaches credibility deficit from credibility excess. This is something I want to resist in the account I am constructing here because it misses the interdependency of oppression and privilege in power relations. Fricker resists connecting credibility deficit to excess because she thinks this would reduce her account to a distributive paradigm of justice that is inappropriate for measuring epistemic goods (because epistemic goods are not material, finite, or in short supply) (Medina, 2013, p. 62).

But this does not mean that credibility deficits and excesses are not interdependent in some contexts. One’s epistemic standing is the result of more
integrated and complex communicative processes. As many career women know, *one can be made deficient* in a meeting where her male colleague enjoys identity-prejudiced inflated epistemic standing or identity-prejudiced inflated intellectual esteem. This logic of interdependence applies to perceptions of moral esteem in social contexts as well, when for an example, during in conversation at a party a stay-at-home-mom *is made deficient and invisible* by contrast with a celebrated stay-at-home-dad who “even changes diapers!”

This logic extends even further though, because the content of negatively-valenced stereotypes for stigmatized groups are themselves informed and maintained through relationships of comparison with positively-valenced stereotypes towards dominant groups. The important point here is as Medina explains, “Perceptions of credibility and authority are forms of social recognition that are bound to be affected by the cultural habits of recognition available for differently positioned subjects with respect to different social groups” (Medina, 2013, p. 63). That is, what Fricker has called “negative identity-prejudicial stereotypes” are maintained in the same complex “collective social imagination” where other [more esteemed and non-disparaging] identity, prejudice, and stereotypes are cognitively and affectively housed. Moreover, the content of these negative identity-prejudicial stereotypes is maintained *in relation to* positively-valenced identity-prejudicial stereotypes. All this is all to say that Fricker’s inclination to pull credibility deficit apart from credibility excess has individualistic consequences for how we conceptualize the social relations that make up the collective social imagination.
Recall that I want to look to the social identity approach within social psychology to fill out our conception of the collective social imagination. The purpose of this is to both enhance my account of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality and to situate my account more fully in a relational ontology. The social identity approach within social psychology literature has important contributions to make to this project, specifically for the critique it offers of individualistic conceptions of prejudice and for its appreciation for the deeply relational nature of prejudices.

Before defending the approach as a mechanism for understanding the relational nature of the collective social imagination and the identity-prejudiced stereotypes it informs, I will briefly situate the approach in the social psychology literature. There have been two trends in the social psychology literature on prejudice that have fueled and maintained an individualistic conception of the collective social imagination: (1) defining prejudice in terms of personality and (2) defining prejudice in terms of cognitive error. As we will see, the social identity approach in social psychology theory challenges this individualism and introduces a robust, relational account of the collective social imagination. The post-World War II intellectual economy saw an explosion of social psychology research on group processes that scholars suspected could explain the political violence of the Holocaust (e.g., conformity, obedience to authority, and prejudice). It is important to note that prior to this time, prejudice was not identified as a social problem, but rather, was widely perceived as natural and unproblematic.

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54 Theodor Adorno explains the central problem that guided much of this research, to “explain the willingness of great masses of people to tolerate the mass extermination of their fellow citizens” (Adorno, 1950, p. v).

55 For example, sociologist William Sumner introduced the term ‘ethnocentrism’ in his 1906 sociological book, *Folkways*, to explain individuals’ universal tendency towards favoritism of their own group and negative evaluation of other groups by contrast with their own. His account is isolated from any appreciation for relations of power, social inequality, oppression, and privilege. He writes, “Each group
During this time, Theordo Adorno introduced the authoritarian personality model to explain prejudice (Adorno, 1950). Rooted in Freud’s psychodynamic model, Adorno constructed prejudice as a symptom of a personality structure in which repressed aggression towards one’s authoritarian parents manifests itself as out-group prejudice. The authoritarian personality is one where, “the individual respects and defers to authority figures, is obsessed with rank and status, is intolerant of ambiguity and uncertainty, has a need for a clearly defined and rigidly structured world, and expresses hatred and discrimination against weaker others” (Hogg and Abrams, p. 33). Adorno ultimately hypothesized that German upbringing in the 1920s created a society of people with authoritarian personality disorders primed to participate in the Holocaust.

Also during this era of intense investigation of intergroup conflict, Gordon Allport introduced the cognitive-error account of prejudice in his influential book, *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954). Here he defined prejudice as a negative attitude, “an antipathy [that may be felt or expressed] based on faulty and inflexible generalization” (Allport, 1954, p. 9). Theorists working in the social identity approach point out that one assumption on this approach is that, “these attitudes are, in some deep sense, both unfounded and unreasonable” (Reynolds, Haslam, and Turner, 2012, p. 48).

The cognitive-error construction of prejudice holds that they are the inevitable results of individual cognitive processes, shortcuts that are necessary for navigating a complex social world (Reynolds, Haslam, and Turner, 2012, p. 49). In this approach the nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt to outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn” (Sumner, 1906/2008, I.15). While Sumner is certainly not the first to observe the ease with which individuals group and the resulting behavior of that grouping, his introduction of the term ‘ethnocentrism’ marks the beginning of the modern, formal study of this sociological and psychological phenomenon.
social problem of prejudice gets reduced to “faulty and flawed”, yet necessary, psychological processes (ibid.). So while personality constructions of prejudice reduce it to individual personality, cognitive-error accounts run the risk of reducing prejudice to individual cognitive processes that, while seen as universal, are also assumed to operate in relative isolation from other individuals’ cognitive processes.

The “cognitivist revolution” of the 1970’s and 1980’s continued this project of conceiving of prejudice in terms of cognitive error, emphasizing, “how normal psychological and social processes foster and maintain prejudice and stereotyping” (Dovidio, et. al., 2010, p. 4). Much of the research of this cognitive-error period demonstrated some serious concerns for personality constructions of prejudice on the basis of their predictive power. Scholars whose research and theory would eventually become the social identity approach were influential in making some of these objections to personality models. Because they reduce prejudice to individual personality, personality constructions of prejudice struggle to predict which outgroup will be the target of social comparison as well as of the authoritarian’s aggression. Importantly, these accounts also fail to explain why prejudiced aggression is so often a collective phenomenon.

Against the personality model, Henri Tajfel believed that intergroup conflict could be explained by far more ordinary cognitive processes and behavioral tendencies. Rather than a personality disorder, Tajfel’s research on minimal group paradigms demonstrated how basic and universal the tendency towards ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice is. It is independent of conflict, affect or relationship, or even perceived similarities. Researchers established group associations based in as

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meaningless shared identities as possible, such as preference for one of two paintings. In his 1982 literature review, Tajfel points to a conservative estimate of 30 studies that all showed ingroup-favoring bias as a result of minimal or near-minimal categorizations (Tajfel, 1982, p. 24). The conclusion from this research is that social categorization is itself sufficient to cause intergroup competition and conflict. One need only draw a line in the sand.

Tajfel’s cognitive emphasis is not without its flaws, however, and this can be demonstrated through turning to the recent research in implicit bias. Until now I have avoided discussion of implicit biases in my account of identity-prejudiced prabits. This may be strange in light of the vast amount of empirical research on it since the introduction of the implicit-association test (IAT) by Anthony Greenwald and colleagues (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz, 1998). Here I want to sidebar briefly to explain why I have avoided framing my account of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality in terms of implicit biases.

Recently the implicit bias research has come under significant scrutiny. Critics point out that often times the research pointed to in implicit training programs is not examining subconscious beliefs specifically, but rather, is examining communicative habits and patterns of prejudice more generally (without necessarily demonstrating how implicitly or explicitly these prabits are held). That is, researchers have failed to meet the burden of proof to sufficiently demonstrate that implicit biases are indeed implicit. A number of meta-analyses of the implicit bias research shows that the IAT test has both a low test-retest reliability and low predictability.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{57} It is outside of the scope of my project to indulge this empirical debate in much detail here. \textsuperscript{58} See for example Oswald, et. al., 2013; Forscher, et. al., 2018; and Goldhill, 2017.
Low test-retest reliability means that participants in a study could get better at taking the test with practice. Since IAT tests are now quite popularized and can even be taken online, one concern for low test-retest reliability is that a study on implicit bias research cannot assess whether participants’ results are being affected by external exposure and practice-sources. Take for example a participant in a gender-focused implicit bias study who has high IAT scores but has expressed egalitarian views about women. It is entirely possible that he could believe and regularly do a lot of very sexist things but simply be quite good at, and motivated in the laboratory setting to, self-policing his responses to conform with what he knows are more “politically correct” responses. Thus his high IAT score is only explanatory of what he really believes and knows he believes, not an indication that he has beliefs about gender that he doesn’t know he has. Take another example where a participant is good at both self-PC-policing and adjusting lower-cognitive levels of bias as a result of practice. He could have sexist beliefs, know that he has sexist beliefs, but be quite good at censoring those in both expressive and interactive contexts with others. Or he could just be a very good egalitarian person all the way down to his implicit core.

It is also entirely possible that the attitudinal dualism assumed in the social psychology discourse is faulty. I have chosen to talk of identity-prejudiced practices and habits in terms of ‘prabits’ so as to bracket this debate. Recall that I have defined an identity-prejudiced prabits as any communicative or epistemic practice, habit, or modality of body comportment that is based in identity-prejudiced stereotypes. This is because I want to be able to refer to a collection of communicative and epistemic activities that as a whole support diminished deliberative standing. On my account, identity-based prabits
range on a spectrum between volitional activity and ‘attention to’ on one end of a spectrum and non-volitional activity and habitual compulsion on another end of a spectrum.

Suffice it to say that various forms of intergroup communication often function to diminish the deliberative standing of stigmatized groups. In some individuals these biases may be consistent to the core with their explicitly held racist or sexist beliefs that they regularly indulge and ideologically maintain, and in some individuals these biases may be habituated patterns of interaction that are not entirely consistent with their expressed and perceived beliefs but are maintained and nurtured through the collective social imagination. The important point about thinking of the more “implicit” prejudices in terms of habit is that the language of “habit” captures the unfixed and developmental nature of attitudes in a way that the implicit/explicit dichotomy fails to capture.  

One suggestion I want to make is that much of the contemporary discourse around implicit bias research reiterates the cognitive-error construction of prejudice because this discourse largely avoids discussion of, and in some cases even consideration of, the social and communicative processes that inform the conceptual content of the implicit biases themselves.  

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59 It is outside of the scope of this chapter to test and defend this developmental hypothesis, however, this hypothesis would also seem to explain the low test-retest reliability for the IAT. I do not wish to deny the empirical significance of a study’s meeting a basic threshold of re-testability, only to introduce another perspective on people’s seeming ability to get better at the tests. Reframing lower-cognitive prejudices in terms of habits makes space for us to conceive of them as potential sources for social change.

60 I suspect that framing implicit bias in this way – as cognitive-error – is precisely what makes it a popular entry-point for talking about race- or gender- inequality among likely offenders. Olivia Goldhill explains, “One likely reason implicit-bias testing and training became to popular is that it’s socially unacceptable to be seen as prejudiced. Discrimination still clearly exists; we needed an explanation; implicit bias provided one. It’s personally convenient to recast subtle forms of prejudice as unconscious bias” (Goldhill, 2017).

61 I thank Officer Jarod Prado, part of a group within the Madison Police Department called Judgment Under the Radar for sharing with me his experiences working with and developing contemporary implicit bias training programs. Officer Prado’s approach appreciates the deeply relational nature of race-biases and
avoid is conveying a restrictive picture of prejudices where an individual’s implicit prejudices are understood solely in relation with that particular individual’s explicit beliefs, thoughts, or judgments. That is, the contemporary discourse around implicit bias research reduces prejudice to an internal dialectic that one has with oneself, dislocating it of its deeply social foundation in the collective social imagination.

The important point to take from all of this is that these approaches ultimately promote an individualistic ontology of prejudice that misses the larger, social, institutional, and structural relations that inform the content of those prejudices (e.g., negatively-valenced stereotypes and categorical associations). The social identity approach that I introduce in the following section of this chapter interrogates these individualistic assumptions and argues that prejudice does not flow from faulty and flawed cognitive processes, but rather, from faulty and flawed social realities and, “through group identities and associated political and social ideologies, to shape the psychology of the individual” (Reynolds, Haslam, and Turner, 2012, p. 50). Elizabeth Anderson puts this nicely, explaining that universal and ordinarily innocent cognitive processes can be “the vehicle[s] for spreading structural injustice to new contexts” (Anderson, 2012, p. 170).

5. Grounding Identity-Prejudiced Communicative Inequality in a Relational Ontology Through the Social Identity Approach

It is important to note that Henri Tajfel himself was careful to insulate his research from the individualistic cognitive-error turn in social psychology. In his 1981 book, Tajfel explains that stereotypes do not create “intergroup social situations” and that emphasizes the influence of power relations in society for sustaining what I am referring to as “the collective social imagination” in this project.
neither the origins nor contents of stereotypes can “be disassociated from the prior existence and the special characteristics of a conflict of interests” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 225). While early theorists like Tajfel who emphasized the social cognitive perspective of intergroup relations were “clearly intrigued with the power of social categories, [they also] understood that the intense negative sentiments that often accompany intergroup dynamics were in fact the central problem to be addressed” (Park and Judd, 2005, p. 109).

Tajfel’s colleagues explain that his research was, “anti-individualistic in orientation in that it attempt[ed] to explain large-scale, shared uniformities in social behaviour” and ultimately “derives social conflict and stability from people’s relations as group members” (Turner and Oakes, 1997, p. 240). Tajfel does this through introducing the concept of social identity, what he defines as, “the individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership” (Turner, 1975, p. 7; citing Tajfel, 1972, p. 292).

Before Tajfel’s research and thought, social psychology had largely assumed a fixed and fundamental personal self, and any social dimensions of that self were conceived of as additives or as superimposed on top of that fixed personal identity (Reynolds, Haslam, and Turner, 2012, p. 64). With Katherine Reynolds, Turner explains that on Tajfel’s social identity theory (SIT), there is a crucial distinction between individual self-esteem, which is rooted in one’s personal identity, and collective self-esteem, which is rooted in one’s social identity (Turner and Reynolds, 2001, pp. 139-

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62 Park and Judd do point out that the cognitive approach did eventually come, “to define prejudice as a consequence of outgroup stereotypes, rather than negative outgroup stereotypes as a consequence of prejudice.” This launched a considerable amount of research that was, “devoted to stereotype elimination and change as a mechanism for achieving more harmonious intergroup relations” (Park and Judd, 2005, p. 112).
Social identity is the part of the self-concept “that is determined by social
categories” (Trepte and Loy, 2017, p. 4).

Tajfel and colleagues eventually theorized that ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice are the results of attempting to achieve the positive distinctiveness of one’s social group in order to maintain positive self-esteem. Tajfel explains, one’s ingroup, “may provide a basis for the building up of a positive self-image, [particularly] if [the ingroup] managed to preserve a system of positive evaluations about “folkways,” mode of life, social and cultural characteristics” (Tajfel, 1982, p. 11).

Turner clarifies social identity, “An individual defines himself as well as others in terms of his location within a system of social categories – specifically social group membership – and social identity may be understood as his definition of his own position within such a system” (Tuner, 1975, p. 7). Turner theorizes that social identity cannot be had in isolation from comparative social categorization. Social groups do not exist in isolation from one another, and they do not come into existence merely through voluntary association. To the contrary, “A group becomes a group in the sense of being perceived

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63 For example, under some conditions individuals were found to endorse distributing resources in ways that would negatively impact them as individuals, but would promote the positive distinctiveness of their self-identified ingroup in contrast to an outgroup, showing that under certain conditions, the salience of one’s social identity can become so powerful that that they will act against their own individual self-interest (Turner, 1975). This research might explain the tendency of individuals to vote for candidates whose policies are in direct conflict with their own self-interest, but who are self-identified by voters as part of their ingroup.

64 On Turner’s clarification, positive distinctiveness is a cognitive activity of one’s social identity, not of one’s personal identity.


66 As early as 1978 Turner began refining his thinking about the process of self-categorization and eventually introduced the Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) (Turner, 1999). It is important to note that Turner’s SCT is not an alternative to social identity theory (SIT), but might be more appropriately seen as a development from it. Turner studied under Tajfel in the 1970’s and the two of them mutually researched, developed, and advanced SIT and so both of these theories “share many of the two researchers’ mutually developed ideas (Trepte and Loy, 2017, p. 1-2). I refer to this entire research program (SCT and SIT) as ‘the social identity approach’. For a concise review of the major intersections and distinguishing features between SIT and SCT, see Trepte and Loy, 2017.
as having common characteristics or common fate only because other groups are present in the environment” (Turner, 1975, pp. 7-8; citing Tajfel, 1972, p. 295, the emphasis is mine).

Tajfel’s early research on minimum group paradigms demonstrated the salience of group-identity for intergroup conflict and prejudice. But this research struggled to consistently demonstrate that social categorization was itself sufficient to predict ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice. Tajfel’s findings only seemed to support the claim that outgroup prejudice is a possible, not a necessary, result of intergroup relations (Turner, 2005). Michael Billig calls this invariance of prejudice, “the waxing and waning of warfare” and of prejudice (Billig, 2002, p. 178). That is, in intergroup relations, “sometimes there is socially shared bigotry; sometimes there is not; sometimes an ideology of tolerance might be widespread” (Billig, 2002, p. 178).

Billig points out that some additional explanatory component beyond self-categorization is called for to account for the waxing and waning of prejudice. He suggests that, “the additional elements are not psychological factors but are historical and cultural elements” (Billig, 2002, p. 178). He also suggests that because Turner assumes a cognitive approach to prejudice, even he fails to appreciate the affective dimensions of ideologies and social myths about groups (Billig, 2002, p. 178).  

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67 Billig’s suggestion is significant here because it interrupts the cognitive/affective dichotomy that is often assumed in the psychology of prejudice. Billig’s point is that, “What is required is not merely the addition of ‘emotional variables’ to the prevailing cognitive perspective but a theoretical reassessment of the apparent distinction between cognition and emotion…The emotion within an ideology of hatred is not something extra that is added to a cognitive interpretation; it is part of that interpretation” (Billig, 2002, p. 184). There is a strong potential connection between Billig’s social constructionist position here and Tamar Gendler’s (2008; 2011) recent work on alief, but it is outside of the scope of this project to take this line of inquiry any further here. Since this constructionist position emphasizes the social and discursive construction of the emotions, it will also be interesting to consider how conceptualizing identity prejudices in terms of aliefs and conceptualizing identity-prejudiced prabits in terms of habits, could potentially clarify some of the assumptions that fuel the contemporary implicit bias debates.
What Tajfel missed in his initial studies was the role that the experimenters themselves played in introducing the salience of participants’ social identities. Turner explains that, “the major independent variable was not simply ‘group classification’,” but a temporary social identity that was provided by the experimenter (Turner, 1975, p. 14). Researchers were introducing variables for people to base grouping on, as well as the insecure conditions that would motivate participants to try to maintain positive distinctiveness through ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice. On the whole, the laboratory setting itself made social identity salient, and it introduced the conditions that motivate a shift from personal to social identity.

Like Billig, Turner (2005) is aware of the deeply context-sensitive nature of intergroup conflict, explaining that power and prejudice have “a social, political, historical, and ideological dimension which is in fact always at work in the experimental demonstration of supposedly generic facts” (Turner, 2005, p. 18, the emphasis is mine). In his later work, Turner examines how power emerges from, functions within, and sustains these systems of social categories. The important point for Turner’s account is that he sees group perceptions as indicative of social realities themselves, not “simplifications or distortions” of social reality (Haslam, Reicher, and Reynolds, 2012, p. 207). So Tajfel’s initial experiments not only neglected the role the experimenter plays in introducing the salience of social identity and instigating outgroup prejudice through

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68 For an example of how stigmatized individuals are shifting the salience of social identities to their advantage in order to challenge the constraints of gendered social identities in blue-collar workplaces, see Amy Denissen’s (2010) paper, “The Right Tools for the Job: Constructing Gender Meanings and Identities in the Male-Dominated Building Trades”. Denissen shows that women creatively manipulate gender roles to exercise their agency and resist gender dualities in highly context-sensitive ways. One strategy she observes is that women often shift the basis for membership in the workgroup itself by implicitly drawing attention away from gender towards more shared identities such as class, regional identity, or race (Denissen, 2010, p. 1061).


making positive distinctiveness insecure, but they also neglected the various social,
political, historical, and ideological contexts that frame intergroup relations and instigate
outgroup prejudices.

On the social identity approach, understanding prejudice requires an orientation
not only to the nature of the cognitive and psychological processes that produce
prejudice, but also “to the way in which these processes reflect and are responsive to
variability in the social context and ongoing social and political dynamics” (Haslam et.
al., 2012, p. 202). Turner recognizes that human beings are both individual persons and
group members, and this is not just a social phenomenon, but a psychological one. Turner
and colleagues explain:

As well as being individual persons...people also have social identities that are
grounded in their group memberships. Social identities reflect the cognitive and
emotional significance of such groupings, and they are implicated in processes
that are critical in shaping and changing people’s minds, motivations and

In short, social identity formation does not happen in a vacuum from existing
social and political patterns of exclusion, inequality, and oppression. These social
relations make up the social world that social identity formation navigates. Far from
being a collection of individual inductions of social groups, the content of the stereotypes
and categorical associations relied on in self-categorization is the inherited result of
social, political, historical, and ideological forces. This complex social world is the
context that frames social grouping, social identity formation, and one’s efforts towards
maintain positive distinctiveness. Turner and Oakes explain that processes like social

70 On Turner’s framework these cognitive and psychological processes are possible sources of
prejudices, but are more generally, “processes that allow us to be social and cultural beings” (Haslam et al.,
influence and norm formation produce “a socially structured field within the individual mind” that consists of “in-group–out-group categorizations [that] more or less directly reflect social relations” (Turner and Oakes, 1986, p. 250). This “socially structured field” is precisely how we should think about the collective social imagination that frames identity-prejudiced prabits.

Indeed, this is quite how Young explains the interaction between social identity, oppression, and situated knowledge: Individuals are thrown into “structured social fields” that are “prior to their individual subjectivity, both ontologically and historically” (Young, 1997b, p. 391). They are positioned in these structures through social processes and interactions (ibid., p. 392). This robust framework is what leads Young towards a pragmatist feminist social epistemology that necessitates more inclusive democratic communication and a “transformative deliberation” where the diversity of individuals’ social perspectives and situated knowledge are looked to as a resource in democratic communication (Young, 1997b, p. 402). This pragmatist feminist social epistemology was embodied in Jane Addams’s work and practice at Hull House, and is exhibited in the vibrant picture of democracy she shared in her writings. As Addams and her contemporaries like John Dewey knew, however, its fruition requires genuine communicative equality of the kind I have tried to develop in this chapter.

71 Young’s explanation of this is insightful and worth including in full here. “The idea of social perspective presumes that differentiates groups dwell together within social processes with history, present arrangement, and future trajectories larger than all of them, which are constituted by their interactions. Each differentiated group position has a particular experience of a point of view on those social processes precisely because each is a part of and has helped produce the patterned process. Especially insofar as people are situated on different sides of relations of structural inequality, they have differing understandings of those relations and their consequences” (Young 1997b, p. 394).
6. Conclusion: A Relational Ontology of Prejudice as a Theoretical Basis for Identity-Prejudiced Communicative Inequality

In Chapter 1, I explored Young’s concerns with how liberal individualism restricts understanding of social groups to individualistic, aggregative and associative models. As we saw, deliberative theorists who assume this individualistic framework are unable to conceptualize oppression as a structural and systematic feature of social relations between social groups. Deliberative theorists also often assume elitist and non-inclusive constructions of deliberation that privilege the communicative norms that are common among the dominant group in society, and in so doing, theorize some people and some problems out of deliberation. One goal of this chapter has been to show how this individualistic account of the social group maps on to contemporary conceptions of prejudice, and how this could potentially limit and restrict contemporary attempts to understand the fullness of identity-prejudiced communicative inequality.

As was detailed in the previous chapter, non-elites and oppressed individuals may have difficulty formulating problems into argument form as a consequence of their poorer educational backgrounds (i.e., political poverty) or they may lack the kind of time and material resources required for political participation (i.e., too high of participation costs). But critiques of deliberation-as-argument and other communicative forms of cultural imperialism only capture disparate impact forms of deliberative inequality where communicative and epistemic prabits that are not directly the result of identity-prejudiced stereotypes disproportionately harm individuals on the basis of their oppressed social identity. In this chapter I introduced an account of communicative inequality that includes, but goes beyond disparate impact communicative inequality.
My claim has been that even if oppressed people do meet the conversational restraints of various forms of cultural imperialism (e.g., deliberation as argument), they are frequently subject to the identity-prejudiced prabits of their interlocutors in deliberative spaces in ways that diminish their deliberative standing. In this account I am ultimately trying to fill out Young’s depiction of the body aesthetic dimensions of oppression – “interactive habits, unconscious assumptions and stereotypes, and group-related feelings of nervousness and aversion” – as they impact one’s deliberative standing (Young, 1990, p. 148).

Identity-prejudiced prabits are surreptitious, pervasive, and systematic. They are surreptitious because many of them often operate on lower levels of consciousness and implicit levels below belief. They are pervasive because they result from universal cognitive-affective tendencies. They are systematic because of a cyclical relationship between the collective social imagination and the identity-prejudiced prabits that it informs, and the ways in which these prabits reinforce the collective social imagination.

The picture of prejudice that the social identity approach provides, one that locates the collective social imagination and identity-prejudiced stereotypes in existing social realities, reveals that group processes are both a potential source of outgroup prejudice and a potential source for social change. The following two chapters of the dissertation draw on the contributions of American philosophers and social reformers, Jane Addams and John Dewey, for imagining strategies for transforming the collective social imagination in this way. Their radical, relational ontology and rich understanding of group moralities and prejudice anticipates Young’s conception of social identity and identity-prejudiced communicative inequality. And their writings and practice are rich
with resources for strategizing institutions, practices, and norms that on the whole, aim to challenge the identity-prejudiced stereotypes that fuel communicative inequality, and to construct genuinely inclusive deliberative spaces that protect, restore and nurture the deliberative standing of all individuals.
CHAPTER 3

INSIGHTS FROM JANE ADDAMS AND JOHN DEWEY FOR COMMUNICATIVE DEMOCRACY: DEMOCRACY AS SOCIAL ETHICS

1. Introduction

Chapter 2 of the dissertation focused on filling out the relational ontology of communicative democracy through providing an account of communicatively structured deliberative inequality that emphasizes its identity-prejudiced dimensions. In what remains of the dissertation I will look to the thought and practice of American philosophers Jane Addams (1860-1935) and John Dewey (1859-1952) to fill out the pragmatist feminist social epistemology that I grounded Young’s communicative democracy in, in Chapter 1.

Communicative democracy, I have argued, makes theoretical space to name communicatively structured deliberative inequality as a problem for democracy. In doing so, it also introduces two important projects for democratic theorists, practitioners, and advocates: (1) imagining and constructing inclusive deliberative spaces in light of having named and acknowledged the presence of communicatively structured deliberative inequalities and (2) strategizing communicative practices and norms of interaction that can themselves challenge identity-prejudiced stereotypes and mitigate their harmful effects on individuals’ deliberative standing in communicative and epistemic interactions.

Addams and Dewey are important resources for my project for a number of reasons. First, they were strong advocates of a robust conception of democracy and democratic communication. Like Young, they believed that norms of democracy, particularly conceptions of political equality and inclusion, were vital for realizing social
justice in contexts of diversity, pluralism of values, social inequality and oppression. Like Young, they worried that narrow constructions of democratic communication (e.g., deliberation-as-argument) and norms of impartiality, consensus, and correctness problematized genuine inclusion.

Second, they were critical of liberal individualistic constructions of the self and advanced a rich, relational ontology in its stead. Because they saw individuals in a given society as interconnected and interdependent parts of a whole, they saw oppression as a function of social relations. So like Young they were able to appreciate the complex ways that individuals can be excluded, particularly as participants in democratic processes and social life more generally.

Addams and Dewey’s thought and work is situated in the period of urban industrialism of the late 19th and early 20th century, so they were not conscious of social identity in the same empirically based way that I developed it in Chapter 2. However, they were both ahead of their time in how they thought about social grouping and prejudice and the impact of these on participatory exclusion. As they saw it, many of the features of modern industrial capitalism – extreme wealth disparities, labor exploitation and hostile labor relations, urban poverty, displaced migrant and immigrant populations – exacerbated the epistemic limitations already inherent in human subjectivity through producing group divisions, social group hierarchies based in inequitable relations of power, and harmful prejudices towards more marginalized social groups.

Thus a third reason to look to Addams and Dewey as resources for communicative democracy is because they saw democracy as itself a mechanism for resolving many of these problems. As Matthew Festenstein has recently pointed out,
Dewey appreciates that class hierarchies and social division distort social knowledge, and he believes democracy can counteract this (Festenstein, 2018). Although they did not articulate it in these terms, Addams and Dewey treated democracy as a type of social epistemology that appreciates that knowledge is socially situated and looks to inclusive communicative practices as a mechanism for identifying and resolving “problems of practical interest” (Anderson, 2006, p. 13).\(^{72}\)

Like Young, Addams and Dewey did not restrict their conception of democracy to formal institutions, check and balances, the protection of rights, and electorate processes. They saw such democratic institutions as “political machinery”, useful only insofar as they promoted and realized human flourishing. Throughout his works, Dewey contrasts political democracy with democracy understood as “a way of life”, and assuming this wider and fuller understanding of democracy, Addams frequently refers to democracy “as social ethics”.

As I understand it, to say that democracy is a way of life and is a social ethics is to say that democratic norms of political equality, transparency, reasonableness, and inclusion must govern all of our social interactions so that through the implementation of those procedural values, human beings may fully participate in all of social life, including the formation of more substantive values and norms that will govern their collective social life. Dewey explains:

> The key-note of democracy as a way of life may be expressed, it seems to me, as the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in formation of the values that regulate the living of men together: which is necessary from the standpoint of both the general social welfare and the full development of human beings as individuals. (Dewey, 1888/1996, LW 11. 217)

\(^{72}\) Anderson explains that Dewey characterized democracy as an experimentalist process that requires, “the use of social intelligence to solve problems of practical interest”. In this description, she references Dewey’s (1939) “Creative Democracy: The Task Before Us” and Putnam, 1990.
By ‘social ethics’, Addams has in mind an evolution of morality from an individualistic and narrow conception of one’s obligations to her familiars, to a wider “acceptance of social obligations” to all of those with whom one is connected to under modern urban industrial life (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 8). Charlene Haddock Seigfriend explains Addams’s worries about an individualistic morality poignantly: “If, in our contempt for others, we limit the circle of our acquaintances to those whom we have already decided to respect, “we not only circumscribe our range of life, but limit the scope of our ethics” (Seigfried, 1999, p. 209; citing Addams 1902/2002, p. 8). By contrast, social ethics requires that citizens, “must turn out for one another, and at least see the size one another’s burdens” (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 7).

Thus democracy as social ethics makes ethical demands on citizens that are of an epistemic nature, ethical demands to know responsibly. Democracy requires “engaging the participation of epistemically diverse knowers” and “collective, experimentally-based learning from the diverse experiences of different knowers” (Anderson, 2006, p. 8). I will refer to the cooperative and inclusive social practices and processes that promote social knowledge, social inquiry. As Addams describes it, an ethics of “turning out for one another” and understood as a way of life, democracy socializes our ethics and requires responsible social inquiry. This requires an epistemic openness to inquire into the problems that face those with whom we fail to acknowledge under individualistic morality, and it requires an affective openness to be moved by these encounters.

73 It is important to distinguish my usage of this term from Dewey’s. Dewey uses the term ‘social inquiry’ in places to denote the application of scientific investigation to social life and interaction, and he seems to have in mind the formal academic discipline of sociology which had been established at the University of Chicago only a few years before his arrival there (1892). See especially Dewey’s Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938/1996, LW 12).
Addams and Dewey saw democracy as a way to resolve the epistemic limitations of human subjectivity that are exacerbated in intergroup social relations of power where there is oppression, privilege, and group-based social inequality. They believed that through refinement from the grips of liberal individualism, democratic communication and interaction could potentially combat social inequality, exclusion, and prejudice. And like Young, they viewed difference as far from something that should be denied or assimilated, but as an epistemic resource for democratic communication (Young, 1997b).

Many of the practices at Hull House aimed to combat group-based divisions among diverse immigrant populations living in cramped quarters with one another. Addams and Dewey saw Hull House as a model for what democratic relations could be in society as a whole, a community of different socially situated individuals engaging in cooperative and inclusive processes and practices of forming social knowledge.\(^{74}\) And, Addams used her writings about Hull House neighbors to combat identity-prejudiced stereotypes about marginalized citizens, the immigrant, the prostitute, and more generally, the urban poor. These stereotypes and social myths, housed in the collective social imagination, functioned to deteriorate the sense among social and political elites that such individuals were and should be treated as political equals. Thus a fourth reason to look to Addams and Dewey’s work and the practices at Hull House as a resource for communicative democracy, is because it is rich with strategies for realizing the more inclusive, democratic interactions that communicative democracy idealizes in light of communicative inequality.

\(^{74}\) See especially Addams’s series of speeches on the social settlement in Addams, 1893a; Addams, 1893b; and Addams, 1899. See especially Addams (1907/2005) *Newer Ideals of Peace: The Moral Substitutes for War* where she looks to the Hull House community as a model for a “cosmopolitan affection” for all of humanity that “breaks through the tribal bond” of the older ideals of peace (p. 6).
In the next section of the chapter (Section 2) I introduce the reader to Jane Addams, Hull House, and Addams’s and Dewey’s relationship. In Section 3 of the chapter I introduce the relational ontology that informed their shared vision of democracy. Here I draw some important connections between their thought and Young’s critiques of preference-aggregative conceptions of democracy.

In Section 4 of the chapter I introduce the challenges that Addams and Dewey identified for realizing this conception of democracy. Like many of the pragmatists, Addams and Dewey were deeply worried about the epistemological and ethical limitations of human subjectivity. They were especially concerned that many of the conditions of modern industrial capitalism exacerbated this problem. They also combatted individualistic trends in their constructions of the social group and of prejudice, and in this, were remarkably ahead of their time.

Addams and Dewey saw democratic communication as a type of social inquiry practice that could counteract exclusion. Although they do not specify it as such, democracy for them is social epistemology. Section 5 of the chapter demonstrates how they theorized democracy in this way, and in so doing, fills out the pragmatist feminist social epistemology that I based communicative democracy on in Chapter 1 of the dissertation.

This chapter establishes some significant connections between contemporary communicative democracy rooted in the work of Iris Marion Young and Addams’s and Dewey’s conceptions of democracy as social ethics and as a way of life. As a whole, the chapter aims to begin to fill in the epistemology of communicative democracy by showing that Addams and Dewey saw exclusion as a serious social and political problem,
that they identified identity-prejudiced forms of exclusion, and that they looked to
democratic norms and practices as a resource for social justice. This chapter establishes
the basic ontological and epistemological framework of Addams and Dewey’s conception
of democracy in order to set the stage for the final chapter of the dissertation where I will
look more specifically at some of the practices, programs, and methods of inquiry that
Addams and Dewey made use of in order to address deliberative inequality.

2. Jane Addams, John Dewey, and Hull House

Jane Addams is most renowned for her leadership in the social settlement
movement and founding of Hull House in Chicago’s West Side during the industrial
revolution and American progressive era. While Addams is well known as America’s
first social worker, she is underappreciated within the historical philosophy canon for her
contributions to American philosophy. She is often recognized for her practical rather
than for her intellectual contributions to the progressive movement and pragmatist
thought. Thus she has wrongly come to be seen as the hands and feet of the thought of
American philosophers John Dewey, William James, and George Herbert Mead.

Recent scholarship has begun to challenge this assumption that Addams was
merely implementing American pragmatism in her work. Scholars have established that
Addams’s writings are themselves philosophically significant. Additionally, Addams
enjoyed intellectually rigorous friendships with John Dewey and George Herbert Mead,
professional philosophers at the University of Chicago. There is persuasive evidence that
professional philosophers like Dewey and Mead saw Addams as an intellectual peer and
they were strongly influenced by Addams and their time with her at Hull House.
We should be careful not to reduce Addams’s contributions to American pragmatism to classic gender stereotypes. Hamington explains that while Dewey is remembered as “the great intellectual” and as “mind generating theory”, Addams is often seen as the woman activist, “body experiencing and caring”, thinker and doer (Hamington, 2009, p. 37). Against this historical memory of the two figures, Hamington among others point to evidence that Addams’s intellectual contributions were an important part of the development of Dewey’s thought, and that Addams’s writings were themselves philosophically significant. Moreover, a pragmatist feminist framework will challenge this dichotomies operative in such an assumption, dichotomies between thought/action, mind/body, theory/practice, and reason/affect.

Addams co-founded Hull House in 1889 with her lifelong friend Ellen Gates Starr. The site they chose for Hull House was at the intersection of a number of working class immigrant neighborhoods on Halsted Street in Chicago. Hull House can best be described as a type of community based organization and center for social reform. Hull House coordinated social clubs and gatherings with the local neighbors and was a lively center of intellectual and political debate and social reform. Addams modeled it after Toynbee Hall, a social settlement located in a crowded and poor area in the East End of London that Addams visited while traveling as a young woman. Toynbee Hall was part of the social Christian movement within upper-middle-class circles in England. This movement, one that inspired Addams, emphasized living among the poor and “social cooperation among works and social cooperation across class lines” (Knight, 2010, pp. 62-3; citing Knight, 2009, pp. 66-69).

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Residents of Hull House were women from privileged backgrounds who were dedicated to doing social good among the poor and committed to realizing the core ideals of the progressive movement (e.g., inclusive democratic communication, education, and economic reform). Hull House residents visited the homes of the most impoverished neighbors with charity baskets, but Hull House was far more than a mere charitable institution. It regularly hosted visits and lectures from scholars at the University of Chicago and leading social and political theorists, it provided seed money and meeting space for neighbors engaged in collective action, and it hosted meetings between employers and laborers. In this sense, it served as a forum for various democratic processes and as a facilitator for democratic participation.

Addams’s leadership at Hull House was vital. One of the many roles she played was that of a type of University Chair. She facilitated social clubs, provided leadership in curriculum selection for these social clubs, and frequently lectured or hosted discussion during them. Hull House social clubs were a hybrid of intellectual activity, social activism, and play. Members were from different socioeconomic backgrounds and would often meet to read and discuss an academic text, a piece of literature, or a play. This time was deeply social and often followed by festivities like a dance or games.

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76 Addams uses the term ‘social groups’ in places in her writings about these groups. She has in mind voluntary associations, however, so I have chosen to clarify these as ‘social clubs’ throughout in order to avoid confusion with my use of ‘social groups’ thus far in the dissertation. Addams clearly has in mind an association here, since these were voluntarily entered, ironically, by people from different social groups.

77 Addams recalls her involvement in building curriculum for social clubs (Addams, 1910, p. 347), for instance, through encouraging one social club to include Josiah Royce’s *Aspects of Modern Philosophy* so that they could see that, “Herbert Spencer was not the only man who had ventured a solution of the riddles of the universe” (Addams, 1910, p. 347).

78 Addams proudly wrote about the role that Hull House social clubs played in the early education of many of the neighbors, “I see scores of young people who have successfully established themselves in life, and in my travels in the city and outside, I am constantly cheered by greetings from the rising young lawyer, the scholarly rabbi, the successful teacher, the prosperous young matron buying clothes for blooming children. “Don’t you remember me? I used to belong to a Hull-House club” (Addams, 1910, p. 345-6).
In this project I draw on Addams and Dewey’s philosophy of democracy thought without significant distinction. Thanks to the remarkable scholarship of pragmatist feminists over the past 25 years, there is a substantial body of literature that has established the mutual interdependency of Addams and Dewey’s thought about democracy and social ethics. These thinkers have brought forward incredible evidence for Addams’s influence on Dewey’s thought, and from this have concluded that their work in this was mutually influential. Before moving on to provide an overview of their shared picture of democracy, I want to briefly highlight some of the significant work that has been done to connect their thought. Here I will also make a few humble contributions to this work through drawing attention to some important intersections in their work that has not yet been substantially explored in the literature, namely, their thought about social issues that they believed exacerbated democratic exclusion.

Dewey moved to Chicago in 1894 to accept a research and teaching position at the University of Chicago and shortly after established the experimental school (Hamington, 2009, p. 37). He visited Hull House not long after it opened (1889) and praised Addams for her work there and for “giving him insight into matters” (Hamington, 2009, p. 37). Maurice Hamington (2009) comments that Addams and Dewey were “intellectual soul mates” from this very first meeting (p. 37).

Dewey eventually became a regular speaker at and visitor to Hull House. As Hamington explains, “There was much intellectual cross-fertilization between Hull

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80 Addams mentions Dewey’s “many talks” at Hull House as well as a series of lectures he gave on Social Psychology (Addams, 1910, p. 237, p.435). See also Deegan, 1988. She recounts that Dewey taught at Hull House both in an official capacity through University of Chicago Extension classes and lectured in a less formal capacity within various settlement social clubs (Deegan, 1988, p. 251).
Addams was seen as an unofficial faculty member of the University of Chicago, and when Hull House incorporated in 1897, Dewey became a board member.

Dewey’s thinking about democracy was deeply influenced by his friendship with Addams, from his time at Hull House, from the many conversations and correspondences he had with Addams, and from reading her writings themselves. Indeed he seems to be drawing on his experiences at Hull House in *Democracy and Education* (1916) (Seigfried, 1999, p. 213). And his daughter, named after Jane Addams, recounts in her *Biography of Dewey* that, “his faith in democracy as a guiding force in education took on both a sharper and deeper meaning because of Hull House and Jane Addams” (Deegan, 1988, 252; citing Jane Dewey, “Biography of John Dewey”, pp. 29-30).

Dewey frequently cites Addams’s speeches and writings in his work on social ethics and political philosophy, and footnotes to many of these passages are included in this discussion and throughout this chapter as a whole. A few of those passages in

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81 See also, Mary Jo Deegan (1988), who tracks Addams’s relationships with various intellectuals at the Chicago School. Deegan notes that the “religious” Chicago school of men treated Addams as an ally and “a vital leader, although primarily within women’s restricted sociological sphere” (p. 163). Mead, Thomas, and especially Dewey had greater openness towards women as colleagues and professionals, in part due to Addams influence on them. Deegan notes that Addams was an illustration to them of the intellectual woman, providing them “access to empirical data, controversial audiences and speakers, and organizational skills to fight for social change” (Deegan, 1988, 163). She concludes that Addams, Dewey, and Mead all, “had a fundamentally similar approach to social science, democracy, and education that bound them together as colleagues and friends” (Deegan, 1988, p. 250).

82 This in itself demonstrates the fondness with which Dewey thought of Addams. Additionally, Dewey dedicates *Liberalism and Social Action* (1935) “To the Memory of Jane Addams” and frequently publicly acknowledged the vital role of the social settlement and Jane Addams to the city of Chicago. See especially, Dewey’s address to a Child Health and Protection Annual Meeting (LW 17.517) and Dewey’s address to “Mrs. Swan, Mr. Chairman, Miss Addams and Friends” at his 70th birthday party where he specifically writes, “I have learned many things from Jane Addams. I notice that with her usual modesty she attributed to me some of the things in Chicago which she and her colleagues in Hull House did...” (LW 5.421).

83 Indeed Dewey’s own remarks about women in philosophy are evidence that he would have considered Addams an intellectual peer. In “Philosophy and Democracy” (1918) he writes positively of diversity in philosophy, “...when women who are not mere students of other person’s philosophy set out to write it, we cannot conceive that it will be the same in viewpoint or tenor as that composed from the standpoint of the
particular are worth drawing attention to because they demonstrate the influence of Addams’s thought about social groups, prejudice, and social psychology on Dewey’s thought, topics that are particularly relevant to my project in the dissertation.

For example, in his treatment of group behavior in *Ethics* (1908), Dewey engages in a discussion where he identifies a number of criticisms of ingroup virtues like loyalty. This discussion is brief, however, and he points the reader to Addams’s writings for further development on the topic since, “the problems which [these ingroup virtues] cause in modern democracy have been acutely described by Jane Addams” (Dewey, 1908/1996, MW 5.135-6).  

Maurice Hamington unveils a series of correspondences in which Dewey credits Addams for having changed his mind in the course of one of their debates at Hull House about a particular philosophical problem of antagonism (Hamington, 2009, pp. 37-38). Dewey writes to his wife about the event that Addams had “converted him” (Hamington, 2009, p. 38; citing Menand, 2001, p. 313). Then he writes to Addams, “Not only is actual antagonism bad, but the assumption that there is or may be antagonism is bad….I’m glad I found out about this before teaching social psychology” (Hamington, 2009, p. 38; citing Menand, 2001, p. 314, the emphasis is mine). Indeed Dewey includes her work among a number of professional scholars in his list of references for his course, “Social Institutions and the Study of Morals” (Dewey, 1923-4/1996, MW 15.269, 272).  

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84 Here Dewey references Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics* (1902), pp. 222-77 and Addams, *Newer Ideals of Peace* (1907), Chapter V. Later in this chapter I discuss these passages in more detail.

85 Here Dewey references two specific discussions in Addams’s *Democracy and Social Ethics* (1902): her accounts of the Pullman Strike and labor relations (Chapter 5: Industrial Amelioration) and her accounts of political reform (Chapter 7).
I draw attention to these passages and correspondences because they demonstrate the influence of Addams’s thought on Dewey’s, but also because the content of these passages demonstrates that Addams and Dewey regularly conversed about intergroup conflict and the conditions that exacerbated it. Dewey praised Addams’s work at Hull House because he believed it embodied the kinds of communicative and epistemic practices that could combat the intergroup social processes that fueled intergroup conflict, processes I have identified as ingroup and outgroup biases and identity-prejudiced stereotypes. Seigfried explains, “He thought especially noteworthy its ability to ‘provide means for bringing people and their ideas and beliefs together, in such ways as will lessen friction and instability, and introduce deeper sympathy and wider understanding’” (Seigfried, 1999, 213).

3. Situating Addams and Dewey’s Conception of Democracy in Their Relational Ontology

Addams and Dewey’s conception of democracy is shaped by their ontology. Like Dewey, Addams held that human beings are primarily social and relational creatures, not isolated and atomistic individuals. Seigfried notes that this “principle of the interdependency of persons on one another” is a central thesis in all of Addams’s writings (Seigfried, 2013, p. 151). Regina Leffers praises Addams for her “distinctive ability to see individuals as wholes that are interconnected and interrelated parts of ever-larger wholes…When she saw the gentleman wearing a nicely finished suit, she saw at the same time the woman who must have finished that suit in a rank and dingy basement” (Leffers, 1993, p. 69).

86 See especially Dewey’s “The School as Social Centre” (1902/1996, MW 2. 91). Here he looks to Hull House as a model for the school.
Marilyn Fischer’s language of “organic interconnection” captures this feature of their ontology nicely (Fischer, 2010, p. 51). Addams believes that as society becomes more interdependent given the evolving and more complex organization of human associative life under industrialism, it becomes more appropriate to conceive of it as an “organic aggregate”.

Dewey also rejects the individualism assumed under classical liberalism, likening the sociopolitical sphere to an organism. This relational ontology informs Dewey’s conception of “individuality”, by which he has in mind political agency or political agency:

The fact is, however, that the theory of the “social organism,” that theory that men are not isolate non-social atoms, but are men only when in intrinsic relations to men, has wholly superseded the theory of men as an aggregate, as a heap of grains of sand needing some factitious mortar to put them into semblance or order…For the picture which is drawn of democracy is, in effect, simply an account of anarchy. To define democracy simply as rule of the many, as sovereignty chopped up into mince meat, is to define it as abrogation of society, as society dissolved, annihilated. (Dewey, 1888/1996, EW 1. 231)

Not only does this passage give insight into Dewey’s relational ontology of political agency, but it also reveals the tension he identifies between this relational conception of political agency and a preference-aggregative conception of democracy. Rather than seeing individuals as isolated individuals, Dewey defends a view of individuals as relational where the wellbeing of each is inextricably linked to the wellbeing of the whole. That is, we come into our fullest individuality (i.e., political

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87 Fischer references and draws this language from Addams’s *Philanthropy and Social Progress* (1893) here.
88 See especially two of Dewey’s earlier works on democracy, *The Ethics of Democracy* (1888) and “Christianity and Democracy” (1893).
89 In “The Ethics of Democracy”, Dewey also defends an account of democracy that aims to protect it from mob rule in the same sense as Joseph Bessette (1986), something I developed in Chapter 1 of the dissertation. Dewey writes, “But the heart of the matter is found not in the voting nor in the counting the votes to see where the majority lies. It is in the process by which the majority is formed” (Dewey, 1888/1996, EW 1. 234).
agency) in and through relationships with others, not independently and apart from society.\textsuperscript{90} Dewey sees that his notion of individualism cannot be realized through the uncoordinated exercise of individual rights or through decision-making based on tallies of citizens’ uncoordinated preferences. Rather, liberties and preferences must be coordinated “with the pursuit of the social good of all” (Shook, 2013, p. 9).

Dewey challenges the individualistic assumptions built into his contemporaries’ conceptions of democracy. Assuming an atomistic and aggregative conception of individuals, these conceptions of democracy reduce it to a framework more suitable to aristocracy, where one special interest group of political and social elites coercively governs another group. Liberal individualism maps this dichotomy onto a conception of democracy, rendering a narrow account where democracy is reduced to those formal institutions and mechanisms that protect the governed from abuse by the governing (e.g., checks and balances, individual rights and liberties, and electorate processes).

Democracy properly understood, however, ruptures this dichotomy between the ‘governing’ and ‘governed’ because it idealizes the government as itself the expression and articulation of the will of the society. “Society, as a real whole”, for Dewey, “is the normal order” (Dewey, 1888/1996, EW 1. 232). That is, political democracy is an expression of society, not a distinct entity from that Society. A government can be said to be democratic in this sense when it “represents men so far as they have become organically related to one another, or are possessed of unity of purpose and interest” (Dewey, 1888/1996, EW 1. 232).

\textsuperscript{90} This resonates strongly with Young’s own account of the social group. See especially Young, 1990 where she writes, “Societies do not simply distribute goods to persons who are what they are apart from society, but rather constitute individuals in their identities and capacities” (p. 27).
On the individualistic ontology of classical liberalism, political agency is constructed as something that is sacrificed, or undergoes a restriction, as a result of the coercive force of government. When located in the relational ontology of Addams, Dewey, and Young, democracy is reconceptualized – both in its formal, institutional structures and as a feature of all social relations – as a mechanism through which individuals can come into their fullest potentiality.

Addams and Dewey were critical of liberal individualistic conceptions of political agency, what Dewey explains in some of his later works as an “opportunistic, laissez-faire conception of freedom”. For Dewey, individual freedom is not understood as freedom from interference, but rather, as a freedom to participate in human social life and through that, the completion of one’s own individuality. Democracy as a way life is the process whereby the individual “is brought to completion” (Festenstein, 1997, p. 79).

The language of deliberative democracy is useful for understanding the central role of participation in Addams and Dewey’s thought. Addams and Dewey take it that inclusive participation and communication is so valuable for democracy because it is the means by which citizens explore and test their individual preferences in coordination with others. During this social inquiry, wider preferences emerge and values evolve from individualistic morality into social ethics. This is because as Matthew Festenstein explains, “Traditions of shared communication [like those that Addams and Dewey endorsed and practiced] tend to establish bonds of trust and sympathy and to lead

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91 See, Liberalism and Social Action (1935) and Freedom and Culture (1939). See especially Dewey’s essay, “The Future of Pacifism” (1917). Here Dewey both demonstrates his appreciation for Addams as an intellectual and contrasts her pacifist position with “laissez-faire” accounts of pacifism that were philosophically underdeveloped and “opportunistic” (Dewey, 1917/1996, MW 10.266-7; citing Addams’s (1917) paper, “Patriotism and Pacifists in War Time”).

92 Robert Westbrook explains that Dewey saw any “limitations on full democratic participation in social life [as]… a subtle way of suppressing individuality”. To the contrary, “the development of individuality required the democratization of all social institutions” (Westbrook, 1991, pp. 433-434).
individuals to identify their interests with those of the broader community” (Festenstein, 1997, p. 88). Democratic communication has a “transformative effect” on individuals (Festenstein, 1997, p. 88). Thus institutions and social practices and norms that emphasize inclusive participation, create space for individuals to explore their values and transform them from self-interested, to more socialized interests.

This conception of political agency is remarkably consistent with Young’s connection of social justice with two overarching values that are constitutive of the good life, self-determination and self-development. Young defines self-development in contrast with the social condition of domination, as the ability to “participate in determining one’s actions and the conditions of one’s action”, and she defines self-development in contrast with the social condition of oppression, as the ability to “develop and exercise one’s capacities and express one’s experiences” (Young, 1990, p. 37). Young clarifies that social justice is not itself the realization of these values, but “the degree to which a society contains and supports the institutional conditions necessary for the realization of these values” (Young, 1990, p. 37).

Although Young does not speak in terms of political agency here, the connection she draws between social justice and the institutions and practices that enable for self-determination and self-development gets at the heart of Dewey’s individualism and the conception of political agency that is central to communicative democracy (Young, 1990, pp. 37, 39). This account of political agency is the logical consequence of a communicative democracy framework that is based in a relational ontology, makes space to name oppression through a rich conception of social identity, and views the inclusion of diverse social perspectives as a vital feature of social inquiry practices and processes.
that aim to identify and define practical problems and social conflicts and coordinate efforts to resolve them. In her later work where she specifically introduces communicative democracy, Young explains that under ideal social and political conditions of “inclusion, equality, reasonableness, and publicity”, citizens would fulfill their political agency in this way (Young, 2000, p. 31).

Addams explains the notion of organic connection through the language of unity. She explains that like an organism, in order to function well the various parts or an organization or of society must work towards a common aim, “make an effort to unify it, and protest against its over-differentiation” (Addams, 1893a, p. 23). But this should be clarified from the type of forced consensus that communicative democracy is cautious of. Addams does not understand efforts to unify the social organism as a process that occurs at the expense of individuals. She idealizes democratic communication as a mode of insulating the process of unification from a false consensus through moving from the expressed needs of each individual part towards a conception of the good of the organism.93

Like Young, Addams defines unity by contrast to coercion and false consensus.94 She was critical of the tendency among political leaders, as well as in social settlement houses, to set goals for American social life without forming genuinely inclusive social

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93 Regina Leffers (1993, p. 73) explains Addams, “Looking at the broader community as an organic whole also requires us to value its individual parts and take into consideration the needs of the community as a whole together with its resources. This broader scope requires that we investigate problematic social conditions and do what we can to improve them, endeavor to refine our methods of democratic government so that an ever-increasing number of voices are able to contribute to decision making, educate people of all ages to value difference when it is expressed, appreciate and respect the voice of others, and conscientiously work cooperatively with others.”

94 Dewey explains that at the heart of Addams’s philosophy is the goal of replacing coercion with the full consent of the governed, and this consent is grounded in (1) education, (2) democratic institutions, and (3) the process of forming common social ends among “the cosmopolitan inhabitants of this great nation” (Dewey, 1945/1996, LW 15. 196; referencing Addams). It is worth noting that in this passage Dewey not only provides an analysis of Addams’s conception of democracy as social ethics, but defends Addams’s as having a philosophy.
knowledge of the needs of the most marginalized. She explains eloquently, “No one so poignantly realizes the failures in the social structure as the man at the bottom, who has been most directly in contact with those failures and has suffered the most” (Addams, 1910, p. 183).

Neither Addams nor Dewey endorsed a philosophy of assimilationism. For them, unity does not entail uniformity. Dewey condemns the “melting pot” theory of assimilation in a critical discussion of American nationalism: “Our unity cannot be a homogenous thing like that of the separate states of Europe from which our population is drawn; it must be a unity created by drawing out and composing into a harmonious whole the best, the most characteristic which each contributing race and people has to offer” (1916/1996, 10. 202-211).

And while Dewey does mention the value of the public school to ‘assimilate different races to our own institutions’ in “The School as Social Centre” (1902), he shortly thereafter clarifies this as a type of process of Americanization that is distinct from de-nationalization. In de-nationalization, which he condemns, “[Children] lose the positive and conservative value of their own native traditions, their own native music, art, and literature” (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2. 85). Dewey’s writings on assimilation must be understood in the context of the inclusive conception of communicative democracy that he would have endorsed. In his advocacy of Americanization and assimilation to American institutions, he has much more in mind an invitation to immigrants to participate in political and social life, something much more akin to Addams’s conception of organic connection and unity.

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95 See also Dewey, 1945/1996, LW 15. 196-7 where he verifies and celebrates this feature of Addams’s thought.
To borrow Young’s terms, the organic connection of the social organism requires that the community as a whole attend to fostering the institutions, norms, and practices that both protect and nurture each individual’s capacity for self-determination and self-development. This requires that the community advance institutions, norms, and practices that protect and nurture each individual’s ability to bring forward moral concerns, through protecting each individual’s epistemic and moral standing in her community to bring such concerns forward and participate in processes of strategizing resolutions for these problems.

Dewey praises Addams’s appreciation for diversity as an epistemic resource.96 As Hamington explains in his development of Addams’s philosophy of diversity, “[Addams] came to view culture as both a source of moral knowledge and as source of social energy” (Hamington, 2009, p. 115). He continues, “She did not distinguish between the moralities of different cultures – one being more desirable than the other. A culture with a long history of development has a cache of moral wisdom to impart” (p. 117).97

Addams and Dewey’s appreciation for diverse social perspectives bears striking resemblance to Young’s point in “Difference as a Resource for Democracy”, that different social perspectives contain differently situated knowledge and, “from each perspective some aspects of the reality of social processes are more visible than others” (Young, 1997b, p. 394). And like Young, this shared feature of their thought is what motivates all of these thinkers towards the endorsement of inclusive and responsible

96 See especially Dewey’s introduction to the (1922/1945) reprinting of Addams’s Peace and Bread in Time of War (LW 15. 537).
97 See especially Hamington’s (2009) Chapter 6, “Widening the Circle” for an excellent, but not uncritical, consideration of Addams’s philosophy of diversity.
social inquiry, a framework that I have labeled a pragmatist feminist social epistemology in this project.

3. Epistemic Concerns

Thus far I have argued that Addams and Dewey saw democracy as a way of life and as a social ethics that transcends formal political institutions. I have tried to demonstrate that much like Young, they valued participatory democracy as an important resource for theorizing and enacting social justice. Although Addams and Dewey do not use the contemporary language of deliberative democracy, they idealized democratic norms of political equality, inclusion, transparency, and reasonableness in much of their work. Communication and interactions that are governed by norms of equality and inclusion affirm the moral standing of each individual, and this inclusive participation is epistemically valuable because it counteracts the epistemic limitations inherent in human subjectivity, limitations that are exacerbated in intergroup social relations of power where there is oppression, privilege, and group-based social inequality.

In this section of the chapter I highlight some of the problems that Addams and Dewey constructed this account of democracy as social ethics and responsible social inquiry, around resolving. While some of the specific problems they grappled with were unique to their own context in an emerging industrial capitalist society (e.g., migration of Blacks to Northern industrial cities in the aftermath of the Civil War, and immigration on a scale that is massive in comparison to today’s numbers), my claim here is that they identified group-based exclusion as the central ethical and epistemic problem for their society, and they were critical of institutions, norms, and practices that exacerbated the underlying identity-prejudiced stereotypes that enabled and sustained that exclusion. As
we will see, Addams and Dewey seem to appreciate a more relational account of the
social group and of oppression, and this informed their conception of exclusion and their
resulting vision for an inclusive social epistemology that I will discuss in further detail
later in the chapter.

Addams and Dewey envisioned democratic communication, properly understood,
as a cooperative and inclusive practice and process of forming social knowledge, and this
is motivated by their pragmatist appreciation for the socially situated nature of knowledge
and the epistemic limitations of human subjectivity. The pragmatists rejected a spectator
theory of knowledge, and this was a particularly prominent feature of Dewey’s
epistemology. Dewey amusingly writes, “A standpoint which is nowhere in particular
and from which things are not seen at a special angle is an absurdity” (Dewey, 1931,
1996, EW 3. 14-15). So long as we remain spectators, we remain blind to the meaning of
another’s experience.

Traditional philosophy positively idealizes a disconnect from blindness (e.g.,
Descartes’ thinking self; Rawls’ veil of ignorance; Kant’s impartiality) and views the
spectator’s stance as a means to escape our subjectivity. But on the pragmatist account,
we are all spectators of the lives and meaning of others, and so objectivity is not had by
detaching oneself from her ‘subjectivity’, but by immersing oneself in the subjectivities
of the lives and projects of others with whom one shares associative life. Put simply,
objectivity is made through inclusive intersubjectivity.

Concerns with the epistemic limitations of subjectivity are a central feature of
pragmatist standpoint social epistemology. William James explained it in terms of
“blindness in human beings” and advocated the importance of moving towards an
understanding of the inner lives and meanings of others for forming more conclusive social knowledge (James, 1899/1983). James’s essay explores the epistemic limitations of human subjectivity, and moreover, reflects on the harms that arise from this, namely, a failure to appreciate the inner meaning and significance of others’ lives. Seigfried (1996) explains, “We…often misjudge the significance of lives different from our own…This congenital blindness toward the feelings of peoples and creatures different from ourselves is the greatest obstacle of the ethical life” (Seigfried, 1996, p. 222).

Addams and Dewey were particularly concerned that some of the consequences of their contemporary time exacerbated these epistemic limitations inherent in human subjectivity. Thus they constructed democracy as a kind of social ethics and social inquiry, what I am modeling a pragmatistic feminist social epistemology after in this project, with this problem in mind specifically. What I am calling their pragmatist feminist social epistemology attempted to grapple with these problems and protect and advance their rich notion of human organic interconnection and political agency in light of them.

They believed that the conditions of the modern city under industrial capitalism introduced new social problems that were unique to their time. This evolving form of associate life brought with it new ethical challenges: “growing ranks of the working poor and unemployed”, the exploitation of workers, inadequate housing and labor conditions, and the challenges of immigration and relocation from rural to urban settings which included crime and social dislocation (Seigfried, 1999, 213). In response to this evolving social context, one’s understanding of her moral obligations must evolve from

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98 Seigfried has in mind William James’s (1899/1983) essay, “On Certain Blindness in Human Beings”.

individualistic morality to a wider acceptance of her social obligations to all of those with whom she is connected to under modern urban industrial life.  

Most notably, Addams and Dewey believed that industrial economies increased the interdependency and interconnection of citizens. But they also saw that the division of labor and the complexity of society produce a façade of economic and social independence. It is important to note here that one of the ways that this façade of independence was sustained during this time was by Bootstrap theories of morality that explained poverty as a function of individual failure rather than a structural social problem.

Under conditions of gross economic inequality, elites have the power to retreat from the kinds of social experiences that are vital for responsible social inquiry into the industrial system that frames collective life. That is, those that benefit from industrial capitalism also enjoy the privilege of retreating from the suffering that this system produces for others. This class-based spatial stratification has both moral and epistemic dimensions and implications. Dewey explains the epistemic distortions that arise from the interaction of human subjectivity with increasing wealth divides in society: “[The aristocrats become ignorant of the needs and requirement of the many; they leave the many outside the pale with no real share in the commonwealth” (Dewey, 1888/1996, p. 99).

Addams was deeply influenced by John Stuart Mill’s thought. Louise Knight (2010) notes that Addams read the *The Subjection of Women* (1869) when it was reissued in 1885 with *On Liberty* (1859) (pp. 56-57). His thinking on the tyranny of tradition served as a basis for Addams’s pragmatist view that as social structures evolve, so must our moral thinking. Addams’s and Dewey’s pragmatist habit of questioning the origin and relevance of practices, norms, and mores echoes Mill’s concerns about the tyranny of tradition, that is, that we must examine the original basis for and continued relevance of traditions to ensure that they do not tyrannically impede human development and progress. Indeed, Addams proclaims in rhetorical fashion in *Newer Ideals of Peace* (1907/2005), “How far are we responsible when we allow custom to blind our eyes to the things that are wrong?” (p. 95). Addams also refers to his philosophy of the individual in a society, in her discussion of the individual as part of a social organism (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 117).

Addams is critical of this discourse of poverty. In Chapter 4 I develop this in further detail through analyzing her account of charity in *Democracy and Social Ethics* (1902/2002).
In this passage Dewey draws a connection between the epistemic limitations of privilege and the exclusion of the oppressed from social life.

Addams’s articulates more precisely the implications of this on our ethics. She explains that the patriotic sense of responsibility to one’s neighbors that is quite natural in a small village become lost in the great city:

When the villager becomes a city resident and finds his next-door neighbors prosperous and comfortable, while the poor and overburdened live many blocks away where he would never see them at all, unless he were stirred by a spirit of social enterprise to go forth and find them in the midst of their meager living and their larger needs. (Addams, 1907/2005, p. 131)

Hull House residents did not insulate themselves from the poor spatially or emotionally. Addams, residents, and visitors had epistemic access to the fact that, “all about [them were] men and women who have become unhappy in regard to their attitude towards the social order itself…All are increasingly anxious concerning their actual relations to the basic organization of society” (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 6). In this way, Hull House was an “epistemological portal into urban life”, and one aim of the final chapter of the dissertation is to examine these practices and programs as a resource for communicative democracy (Hamington, 2001, p. 106).

Addams and Dewey also both have a rich appreciation for how ingroup favoritism and prejudices problematize democratic inclusion and deliberative equality. Addams generally has in mind the social psychological phenomenon of ingroup favoritism in her...
discussions of “group moralities” (Addams, 1907). Addams and Dewey use the term “prejudice” quite loosely in their work to refer to ingroup favoritism, stereotypes, and prejudices as I have developed them in Chapter 2. However, there is reason to believe that when they do have in mind outgroup prejudice, they do not theorize it in isolation from the social and political historical patterns of oppression and domination that have produced the specific group divisions of her time. They invoke neither a personality nor a cognitive-error account of prejudice, but have a structural and relational one.

Addams overarching thesis in *Newer Ideals of Peace* (1907) is that older ideals of peace – namely the virtues of group loyalty (i.e., ingroup favoritism), group identity formation by way of opposition to another group (i.e., outgroup prejudice), and peace by way of coercion – are inadequate for establishing peace in the changing American, and even global, context.102 This context is one where peoples of different ethnicities, religious traditions, and cultural mores are increasingly coming into more contact with one another and, in the case of the modern American city immigrant, living amongst each other. While perhaps necessary in earlier times. The older ideal of peace, “gets in the way and prevents the growth of that beneficent and progressive patriotism which we need for the understanding and healing of our current national difficulties” (Addams, 1907/2005, p. 132).

Addams provides a host of examples where this patriotism of the clan harms social relations: the conception of the immigrant had by her contemporaries, the

102 Addams (1907/2005) explains that “mutual hate” is often the basis for group affiliation, and that while this “tribal fealty” may have roots in fellowship, “When it is carried over into civilized life it becomes a social deterrent and an actual menace to social relations” (pp. 87-88). The attitude of the original Americans (she has in mind the Framers and early-American colonizers) persists in her contemporary time, to the detriment of democracy. She characterizes the framers as, “members of the newly conscious nation [who] considered all those who were outside as possible oppressors and enemies, and were loyal only towards those whom their imagination included as belonging to the national life” (p. 75).
conception of “the criminal” held by the police officer and politician, the view that the weak are justified in being dominated by the strong held by advocates of child labor, and the conceptions employers associations and trade unions have of one another. It is important to admit that in her discussions here, Addams largely talks of tribal loyalty in terms of ingroup and outgroup biases (i.e., ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice) and seems to depict these as functioning in a social context of relative social equality, and this is particularly the case in her discussion of labor relations. So here her thinking about prejudice does not move beyond the individualism of the cognitive-error ontology of prejudice I brought criticism against in Chapter 2.

There is reason to believe that Addams was concerned with how some forms of ingroup favoritism were connected with particular prejudices, however; and also, that she saw that these disproportionately functioned to harm marginalized individuals in society. Explaining the group morality of the ‘original American’ towards the new wave of immigrants she writes that Americans have “not yet admitted them into real political fellowship” (Addams, 1907/2005, p. 22). She explains that this is rooted in “an attitude of contempt, of provincialism, this survival of the spirit of the conqueror toward an inferior people” (Addams, 1907/2005, p. 29).

Addams sees that stigmatizing attitudes towards immigrants are more than a mere result of flawed cognitive processes. She understands that they are situated in structural relations of power. Although she does not invoke the language of prejudice here, she appreciates that the present power relations in society are in some way functioning to

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103 See especially Addams discussion of labor relations in *Newer Ideals of Peace* (1907/2005).
104 Seigfried notes that Addams is “far ahead of her time in her awareness of her own class and ethnic privilege and in her insights into how such privilege subtly undermines the dignity and effectiveness of the poor and working classes and less favored ethnic groups” (Seigfried, 2002, p. xii).
inform the content of those prejudices and determine which groups will be targeted and harmed through them.

For example, in “Our National Self-Righteousness” (1933), Addams discusses her concerns with “the spirit of superiority” held by so many original Americans (In Elshtain, 2002). And in “Americanization” (1919), she proclaims that the collective stigma against aliens in the United States is “particularly stupid” (In Elshtain, 2002, p. 246). Seigfried characterizes Addams as having spent a life filled with “unceasing efforts to explain the contributions of diverse ethnic groups to an American public that wanted to treat them as an undifferentiated underclass” (Seigfried, 2002, p. xxxv). Addams often depicts the Hull House residents as initially prejudiced towards the neighbors, and she uses stories of these encounters between residents and neighbors to dismantle some of the popular pejorative prejudices of the poor that were held by upper- and middle-class “original” Americans.105 She does not make excuses for their prejudices or explain them away as ingroup/outgroup processes, but rather, condemns them and corrects them.

Addams’s criticisms of group morality are insightful because they point to a basic incompatibility between ingroup and outgroup biases and democratic communication. The morality of group loyalty (i.e., ingroup and outgroup biases) is a morality of force, rule by power and coercion. Addams admits that even some of the labor unions, which she is generally charitable towards in her descriptions, are often hasty to wage war and slow to diplomacy.

Addams and Dewey were remarkably ahead of their time in their understanding of the impact on democratic social relations, of both the more general and universal

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105 See for example Addams’s discussion of the fictional charity worker in the chapter entitled, “Charitable Relations” in *Democracy and Social Ethics* (1902/2002).
cognitive processes of ingroup and outgroup biases, and of the socially informed processes of identity-prejudiced stereotypes. This is particularly evident in Dewey’s “Racial Prejudice and Friction” (1922). Unlike many of his contemporaries, Dewey sees race as a social construct and explains prejudice in terms of a political and social history of social relations.

Dewey situates the roots of racial prejudice in the universal cognitive tendency in humans to fear what is new and strange (Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 245). He seems to have in mind here, the concepts of ingroup and outgroup bias and stereotypes. He explains them in terms of pre-cognitive habits, “a spontaneous aversion which influences and distorts subsequent judgments” (Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 243).

But Dewey does not resort to the cognitive error account of prejudice held by his contemporaries, that prejudices are reducible to universal cognitive processes of hasty generalization (what he calls the popular “intellectualist” view). Rather, he seems to profoundly appreciate the social, economic, and political factors that give content and social life to particular prejudices about particular social groups. Race prejudices do not exist in a society in an egalitarian way, that is, they do not equally disadvantage all groups. Rather, they are conceived and nurtured in contexts of inequality and oppression. Like John Turner, Dewey seems to take it that prejudices do not themselves cause oppression, but rather, they are a result and reflection of problematic intergroup social relations of power.

On this framework, Dewey would have worried that a more powerful, more dominant group can introduce, frame, and maintain the negatively-valenced stereotypes of marginalized groups as a function of maintain social power. Dewey seems to
appreciate the fact that negatively-valenced stereotypes of identified outgroups often function to justify the existing relations of power and social inequality in both the minds of the dominant class and of the marginalized.\textsuperscript{106} As I have shown, Addams too seems to appreciate this on some level. While she speaks of the problematic patriotism of the clan as a universal human tendency, she does not see its negative effects as egalitarian. Groups who occupy positions of social, economic, and political power influence and give social life to the content of the prejudices of groups who lack power.

Dewey defends a rather unpopular view of race at the time that gives insight into how he thought about social groups.\textsuperscript{107} He explains as a matter of scientific fact that races are not biologically distinct categories, writing,

\begin{quote}
Race is an abstract idea; according to science it is largely a mythical idea, since all peoples now powerful in the world are highly mixed. But mankind requires something concrete, tangible, visible, audible to react against. Race in its popular usage is merely a name given to a large number of phenomena which strike attention because they are different. (Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 246)
\end{quote}

Addams also endorses this view, writing in the early pages of \textit{Newer Ideals of Peace} (1907),

\begin{quote}
Early associations and affections were not based so much on ties of blood as upon that necessity for defense against the hostile world outside which made the life of every man in a tribe valuable to every other man. The fact of blood was, so to speak, an accident. The moral code grew out of solidarity of emotion and action essential to the life of all. (Addams, 1907/2005, p. 6)
\end{quote}

While Dewey sees that “scientifically, the concept of race is largely a fiction”, he also has an appreciation for the “practical reality” that this social categorizing has had on

\textsuperscript{106} For example, Dewey mentions the large sums of money African Americans spend on “devices to take the kinks out of their hair” to assimilate, demonstrating an appreciation for this complex social process (Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 246).

\textsuperscript{107} Indeed, Dewey’s lecture, “Racial Prejudice and Friction” was given in 1922 at the height of a eugenics movement among academics in the U.S. The 1915 World’s Fair in San Francisco hosted a “Eugenics Booth” and the Museum of Man celebrated its 1915 opening in San Diego with an exhibit of 30 busts that purported to demonstrate seven distinct and hierarchical racial categories (See San Diego Museum of Man, 2017).
some groups (Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 251). Gregory Pappas explains that Dewey saw that “each racial prejudice has its own particular history and unique set of causes” (Pappas, 1996, p. 54). Dewey believes that it can be “safely concluded” that the political factors are the most responsible “for converting antipathy to the foreign into definite racial friction” (Dewey, 1922/1996, MW 13. 249).

What is perhaps most striking about Dewey’s analysis of race prejudice and friction is his appreciation for the ways that political opportunists exploit the universal roots of race prejudice, the fear of what is new and strange. What has its roots in growth and self-preservation is exploited by humans “as an efficacious way of accentuating the antagonism between groups” (Pappas, 1996, p. 53). Dewey later writes in an address at the 23rd Annual Gathering of the NAACP in 1932, “…those who want the greatest profits and those who want the monopoly, power, influence, that money gives, can get it only by creating suspicion, dislike and division among the mass of the people” (Dewey, 1932/1996, LW 6. 230).

Dewey’s sense is that political elites have and continue to introduce chaos and division among the public so as to break down democratic social relations and enable for the persistence of aristocracy. They prey on “race, color and creed, and…other things…to divide people in order that a few may have a monopoly of privilege, power and influence” (Dewey, 1932/1996, LW 6. 230). Because they divide so as to conquer, he suggests here that the resolution for this breakdown is, “a cooperative economic and social order” (Dewey, 1932/1996, LW 6. 230). As we will see in Chapter 4, many of the cooperative and democratic social relations Dewey has in mind were embodied through Hull House activities and programs.
5. Democracy as Social Ethics

Addams and Dewey’s account of social inquiry, and what I am modeling a pragmatistic feminist social epistemology after in this project, is critical of narrow constructions of deliberation-as-argument, idealizations of impartiality, and veritistic constructions of knowledge. Recall from the earlier discussion that on Addams and Dewey’s framework, social inquiry as I have developed it in the Chapter is valuable because it protects and fulfills political agency. But it is also valuable because it produces better knowledge.

Like Young, the pragmatists were suspicious of the claim that one could observe and theorize from an impartial standpoint. The epistemic limitations of human subjectivity necessitate a kind of inclusive social standpoint epistemology for Addams and Dewey. No individual knows from an impartial standpoint nor has perfect or complete epistemic access to a fact or a truth.

Addams believes that the only appropriate response to an acknowledgement of human subjectivity and interdependence is an epistemic openness to inquire into the problems that face those with whom we fail to acknowledge under individualistic morality. In closing *Democracy and Social Ethics*, her most notable defense of social ethics, Addams points to the epistemic and moral implications of her relational ontology in light of the problems of industrial capitalism:

> We are all involved in this political corruption, and as members of the community stand indicted. This is the penalty of democracy, - that we are bound to move forward or retrograde together. None of us can stand aside; our feet are mired in the same soil, and our lungs breathe the same air. (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 112)

Thus individuals who enjoy political, economic, and social power in societies where there are group divisions, social group hierarchies based in inequitable relations of
power, harmful prejudices towards more marginalized social groups, and resulting spatial stratification have an obligation to seek out meaningful social relations with diverse Others. Addams was sensitive to how class, race, and gender could limit one’s knowledge of social problems, and also of how it could limit one’s epistemic and moral standing in a community. Epistemic responsibility in this context requires unveiling faulty assumptions of objectivity and privileged social perspectives, what Young has articulated in terms of “cultural imperialism” (Young, 1988).

Addams came to realize that privilege enables for people to avoid encountering the poor and the powerless, and that power enables for people to avoid taking seriously the knowledge claims of the poor and powerless. Yet to get to a full understanding of a social system, one must consider the totality of subjective experiences of that social system. Addams explains, “No one so poignantly realizes the failures in the social structure as the man at the bottom, who has been most directly in contact with those failures and has suffered the most” (Addams, 1910, p. 183). Thus privilege and power exacerbate the epistemic limitations of one’s subjectivity and enable for social ignorance, as well as the perpetuation of social myths about marginalized groups.

Gaining epistemic access to how diverse others experience shared systems of associative life (e.g., industrialism) is a necessary requirement of evaluating those systems of associative organization. In fact, Judy Whipps (2004, 127) explains that Addams’s “stress on the importance of diversity and pluralism” is rooted in pragmatist concern that “multiple viewpoints are essential to the process of philosophical epistemology.” Building from Addams, Whipps characterizes knowing on the pragmatist

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108 For a discussion of Addams’s social epistemology in relation to recent literature in standpoint epistemology, see Reginal Leffers’s (1993) paper, “Pragmatists Jane Addams and John Dewey Inform the Ethic of Care”, especially page 70.
model as: (1) a social endeavor (2) that is experience dependent and (3) always conditional in that it rests on multiple voices which are always being introduced.

The emphasis on responsible social inquiry is a central feature of Addams’s social ethics. She proclaims in the first pages of *Democracy and Social Ethics*, “We are under a moral obligation in choosing our experiences, since the result of those experiences must ultimately determine our understanding of life” (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 8). Addams assumes that a wide range of experiences with diverse others will result in sympathy and habits of care towards them. She sees this resultant sympathy as the basis for the health of the social organism and “the foundation and guarantee of Democracy” (Addams, 1902/2002, p.7).

Dewey understands what I am calling “social inquiry” in terms of a “method of cooperative intelligence” whereby intelligence gets “socialized” (Dewey, 1935/1996, LW 11. 39). He explains that democracy requires far more than political machinery like voting and the protection of individual rights, but cooperative and inclusive knowledge practices that permeate all of society. Here Dewey connects this social epistemology to his account of political agency, explaining that the use of these cooperative processes of

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109 See Hamington (2009), especially Chapter 4, where he develops Addams’s belief in the potential of genuine embodied encounters with different others for stimulating affective and active habits of care.

110 While voting is an important democratic institution, Dewey believes that it merely acknowledges the current pulse of the organism and marks an open-ended decision in the life of the society. Dewey values the quality of public discussion more than the consensus had through voting. See especially Anderson, 2006, who explains, “On Dewey’s model, votes and talk reinforce one another, the votes helping to insure the government officials take citizens’ verbal feedback seriously, the talk helping to define and articulate the message conveyed by votes” (p. 14). See also Pappas, 2012, who explains that for Dewey, public discussion aims for “the amelioration of a particular shared problem that affects everyone to different degrees” (p. 66).

111 See Anderson 2006, who explains, “Dewey stressed that for democracy to work, it was not enough to simply institute legal arrangements such as representation and periodic elections. Culture had to change too, so the citizens at large, interacting with one another in society, welcome diversity and discussion, and take an experimental attitude toward social arrangements” (p. 14).
intelligence is the means by which to develop the capacities of each individual for the health of the social organism.

In social inquiry, agents move from disagreement towards universalization through public deliberation about knowledge claims that have been put forward as “candidates for universalization” (Droege, 2002, 175). Much like in the natural sciences and in the design approach I developed in Chapter 1 of the dissertation, better knowledge is produced when the process is one of cooperative and inclusive, ongoing dialogue and when the conclusions these processes yield are viewed as experimental and open-ended. Another benefit of this open-endedness is that it insulates knowledge practices from a false consensus.

In order for social inquiry to be democratic, it must be possible for individuals of all backgrounds to bring forth knowledge claims, and those claims must be acknowledged and validated by the community and then fairly and collectively interrogated. Dewey takes it that disagreement in this process can often be a sign that the parties to dispute are not similarly situated, that some factor from one of their standpoints has failed to have been considered in the assertion of the fact (Droege, 2002, p. 175). This resonates with Bohman’s point that when a group in society fails to get a hearing in the community, this is an indication that there is some kind of faction in society that begs address. Such factions are not remedied on an institutional level through laws and policies, but in social relations themselves.

The practice of bringing forth knowledge claims for public consideration is educative and potentially preference-transformative for citizens, and it is central to Dewey’s conception of political agency. Participation in democratic forms of life
cultivate what Dewey calls ‘the scientific morale’ which he characterizes in *Freedom and Culture* (1939) as,

…[A] willingness to hold belief in suspense, ability to doubt until evidence is obtained; willingness to go where evidence points instead of putting first a personally preferred conclusion; ability to hold ideas in solution and use them as hypotheses to be tested instead of as dogmas to be asserted; and (possibly the most distinctive of all) enjoyment of new fields for inquiry and of new problems. (Dewey, 1939/1996, LW 13. 166)

Another important feature of Addams and Dewey’s understanding of social inquiry is that it challenges the tendency in academic philosophy to divorce epistemology from ethics. Addams and Dewey would have agreed with Fricker that, “It does seem…a pity that ethics has not traditionally taken our epistemic conduct into its remit” (Fricker, 2007, p. 2). The connection between our epistemic and ethical lives is poignantly conveyed in Addams’s objections to “shutting one’s self away from that half of life” that struggles and suffers. Here she explains that such a retreat from the knowledge of others is, “to live out but half the humanity to which we have been born heir and to use but half our faculties” (Addams, 1893a, p. 2).

6. Conclusion: Intersecting Voices

Like Young, Addams and Dewey were critical of epistemological norms of impartiality, consensus, and correctness, norms that are assumed in narrow constructions of democratic participation (e.g., deliberation-as-argument). They were also concerned that social inequality and oppression and domination could produce false and coercive consensuses. Because of this, they rejected conceptions of knowledge that idealized impartiality, and favored a standpoint social epistemology instead. They did not see democratic communication as a mechanism for arriving at correct answers, but rather,
envisioned democracy as “a community of critical inquiry” much more akin to the design approach I developed in Chapter 1 than to a veritistic social epistemology (Festenstein, 1997, p. 79).

As in design, citizens must first identity the various stakeholders to a problem and consult them as epistemic resources for identifying and articulating it’s various dimensions. During that process we may come to understand the problem in new ways. Much like deliberations in engineering design problems, this inclusive participation is instrumental to citizens’ self-development because it creates space for the expression of one’s political agency and it fosters the social conditions for citizens to nurture their political agency through discourse with others.

As in design where there are limited resources, time constraints, and competing obligations to stakeholders, deliberations must be inclusive of the various stakeholders to the problem, and those stakeholders must be seen as both an epistemic resources and moral authorities for designing and evaluating possible resolutions for the problem. This is because as in design, the uniquely correct solution or remedy rarely just presents itself. When the problem-solving communicative exercise is framed as a cooperative rather than an antagonistic one, this can motivate people to consider the perspectives of others and be open to reconsidering their own perspectives in light of that hearing. If it comes down to deciding between two possible remedies, deliberators determine which alternative is better than the other. Group processes of defining the “better” and “worse” alternatives will inevitably bring to the forefront values and assumptions that themselves can become subject to deliberations in the decision-making process. The language of “correctness” in such group processes is out of place.
Design thinking relies on listening and engagement with stakeholders, and thus it can be empathetic. It relies on collaborative brainstorming for potential remedies and discussion that weighs the various pros and cons of these potential remedies for the various stakeholders considered. In this sense, design thinking can be cooperative and inclusive. It also involves the eventual implementation of the selected “better” remedy, and thus it is active. It frames this remedy through the scientific attitude. The remedy is seen as a temporary and intermediary solution, one that we are comfortable continuing to monitor for shortcomings or when newly effected stakeholders or problems emerge from the evolving systems that the remedy operates in. Thus design thinking is critically reflective, fallibilist, experimental, open-ended, process-oriented, and systems-oriented.

As Addams and Dewey envision it, democracy is about a way of living together and a way of knowing one another, and thus, it requires habits conducive to that aim. Pappas suggests that these habits include, “the virtue of openness, with a willingness to test and revise”, “a certain sensitivity to context”, “sensitivity to whose interest counts in one’s community”, patience and an ability to not always expect “a quick fix or result”, and an ability to “embrace uncertainty” (Pappas, 2012, p. 72).

I think Addams and Dewey have the beginnings of something like this in their philosophy of democracy and practice of it at Hull House, and I introduce this in Chapter 4 as a political virtue of sympathetic inquiry. In this chapter I also look to the programs at Hull House, as well as to Addams’s writings about Hull House, for examples of practices and norms that attempted to challenge the intergroup cognitive processes that fuel identity-prejudiced communicative inequality and to construct genuinely inclusive
deliberative spaces that protect, restore and nurture the deliberative standing of all individuals.
CHAPTER 4

DEEPENING COMMUNICATIVE DEMOCRACY: WIDENING INGROUPS AND RECONSTRUCTING THE COLLECTIVE SOCIAL IMAGINATION

1. Introduction

In Chapter 3 of the dissertation I aimed to show that Addams and Dewey were deeply concerned with various forms of group-based participatory exclusion in order to set the stage for the fourth and final chapter of the dissertation. In this Chapter I will turn to their thought as well as the activities, programs, and practices at Hull House as a resource for the two projects I identified for communicative democracy when I opened Chapter 3: (1) imagining and constructing inclusive deliberative spaces in light of having named and acknowledged the presence of communicatively structured deliberative inequalities and (2) strategizing communicative practices and norms of interaction that can themselves challenge identity-prejudiced stereotypes, work towards reconstructing the collective social imagination that houses them, and mitigate their harmful effects on individuals’ deliberative standing in communicative and epistemic interactions.

Like Young, Addams and Dewey endorsed a broader understanding of deliberation and democratic communication than traditional deliberative theorists. As Dewey powerfully explains, “argument alone breeds misunderstanding and fixes prejudices” (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2.91). For Addams and Dewey, democratic communication transcends argument. It involves habits that “go beyond the intellectual capacities associated traditionally with reason and logic” (Pappas, 2012, p. 61).

Modes of communication and interaction like play, storytelling, and even activism are important facilitators of justice. Addams and Dewey believed that these types of
practices were a means for reducing prejudices and widening “ingroups”, and to borrow the language of Young, “for speaking across difference” (Young, 1997b). Hull House was the experimental locus for this investigation, and for this reason, it is the subject of this final chapter of this dissertation.

Hull House activities and social life embodied the broadened account of democratic communication that Young idealizes, and Addams exemplifies methods of forming social knowledge responsibly in intergroup contexts that are based in social relations of power where there is oppression and privilege and group-based social inequality. Thus there is good reason to look to their work for resources for communicative democracy, specifically for imagining new ways of relating and communicating with one another that appreciates the complex ways that intergroup processes of ingroup and outgroup biases and identity-prejudiced stereotypes function in communicative contexts to deteriorate deliberative standing.

Recall from Chapters 2 and 3 that I contrasted ingroup and outgroup biases (i.e., ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice) from identity-prejudiced stereotypes. Borrowing from Fricker, I initially defined an identity-prejudiced stereotype as, “a widely held disparaging association between a social group and one or more attribute, where this association embodies a generalization that displays some (typically, epistemically culpable) resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective investment” (Fricker, 2007, p. 35). Identity-prejudiced stereotypes have origins in the universal cognitive tendency towards ingroup and outgroup biases (i.e., ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice). But as I developed in Chapter 2, they should be clarified from these intergroup processes in two senses: (1) they operate in a specific social context of social
inequality between two or more social groups, and (2) they function in those intergroup relations to sustain the dominance or elite status of one group over the other(s). That is, identity-prejudiced stereotypes are unique from universal, cognitive tendencies of ingroup and outgroup bias in that they target a particular social group and are a result and reflection of intergroup social relations of power where there is oppression, privilege, and group-based social inequality.

The chapter begins (Section 2) by looking to some of the Hull House programming and activities as examples of democratic social inquiry in practice. In this discussion I specifically focus on Addams’s appreciation for Play and Education in democratic relations, and how this emphasis informed her leadership in Hull House programs and activities. I use this discussion as a way of developing and demonstrating the conception of social inquiry that is at the heart of the pragmatist feminist social epistemology of communicative democracy that I introduced in Chapter 3. Recall that in Chapter 3, I explained social inquiry as, “the cooperative and inclusive social practices and processes that promote social knowledge”, and I anticipated this in my discussion of the design approach in Chapter 1. As will demonstrate, Addams was drawn to these forms of human interaction because of their potential for combatting intergroup processes of ingroup and outgroup bias and widening ingroups.

Section 3 of the Chapter introduces Addams’s method of sympathetic inquiry as a regulatory mechanism for social inquiry. Addams believes that Hull House neighbors, people from diverse immigrant populations, could widen their perceived ingroups and enjoy meaningful social life with one another because of a spirit of sympathetic inquiry. Similarly, Hull House residents who were from more privileged social standpoints than
immigrant neighbors were able to have responsible and meaningful epistemic encounters with neighbors because they practiced sympathetic inquiry. In this sense, sympathetic inquiry can function to both widen one’s ingroup and to combat identity-prejudiced stereotypes about marginalized citizens, the immigrant, the prostitute, and more generally, the urban poor.

Because of socially and economically based spatial stratification in the modern industrial city, the reach of Hull House programs and activities was limited to neighbors who lived near Hull House and to progressive social elites who visited there. In Section 4 of the Chapter, I demonstrate how Addams makes use of her writings about Hull House to reach a wider public in order to combat identity-prejudiced stereotypes about the poor, and to educate this wider public in the method of sympathetic inquiry itself.

Addams does not develop sympathetic inquiry as a political virtue, but she does introduce it often in her discussions of political virtues that she is critical of for failing to enact, or blatantly contradicting, democracy as social ethics. Thus there are some benefits to thinking about Addams’s method of sympathetic inquiry in a virtue ethics framework. I consider how constructing sympathetic inquiry as a type of hybrid epistemic-moral political virtue might be particularly useful for combatting communicatively structured deliberative inequality and for communicative democracy more generally.

2. Communicative Democracy in Practice at Hull House

Dewey called Hull House as “a social clearing house”, a place where there was “a mixing people up with each other…under conditions which will promote their getting

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112 This is especially evident in Addams’s reflections Twenty Years at Hull House (1910).
acquainted with the best side of each other” (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2. 90). His characterization of it paints a vibrant picture that is worth including in full here.

It is not merely a place where ideas and beliefs may be exchanged, not merely in the arena of formal discussion – for argument alone breeds misunderstanding and fixes prejudices – but in ways where ideas are incarnated in human form and clothed with the winning grace of personal life. Classes for study may be numerous, but all are regarded as modes of bringing people together, or doing away with barriers of caste, or class, or race, or type of experience that keep people from real communion with each other. (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2. 90)

*Play* performed a vital role in establishing social conditions for people from diverse backgrounds to get acquainted in this way, “with the best side of each other”.

Addams believed that play was an important mechanism for creating community. Hull House hosted a variety of social events and social clubs that were facilitative of play, and the imaginative processes of play were vital to Addams’s philosophy of education.

Addams was deeply sympathetic of young people living in the modern industrial city, which seemed to be deprived of space for play. Unlike earlier forms of work on the homestead, industrial labor provides no outlet for expression, play, or creativity. Addams values play for a host of reasons. First, play provides joy to its participants and offers an escape from the monotony of factory work. Second, observing the Play of children can be a source of great pleasure for members of the community. The vibrant imagination of the child “reaffirm[s] the beauty and joy in the world” and can be “a wellspring of refreshment to a jaded city” (Addams, in Elshain, p. 416).

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* Addams applies this sympathetic view to an analysis of restless and problematic youth in the city. She explains that the thrill of being chased by the “coppers” among urban boys is not unlike the “the practice of country boys who go forth in squads to set traps for rabbits or to round up a [rac]coon” (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 26). Both are expressions of the spirit and restlessness of youth. Here she draws attention to the shared desires and needs of the original American and the immigrant, but the different social structures that frame those desires and needs.
Third, play is particularly valuable for marginalized people because it generates a space where one can, “be at ease in a ‘world’,” with others who may be different from them (Lugones, 1987, p. 12). María Lugones draws attention to the fact that marginalized people must often travel to worlds where they cannot be at ease, because in those worlds, they must be constantly be subjected to the “arrogant perception” of those who occupy positions of privilege within the existing social relations of domination and oppression (Frye, 1983). Arrogant perception imagines the Other as *for him*, or as Frye explains, “organize[s] everything seen with reference to themselves and their own interests” (Frye, 1983, p. 67).

Play, however, makes new worlds for people to share. Lugones is clear that it is an *attitude* of playfulness, not the game itself, that generates this social space. Much like the pragmatist feminist conception of social knowledge, playful activities are experimental and open to surprise. They have no rules, or at least, have no fixed rules that are sacred. In the world that is generated through playful activity, individuals interact intentionally and creatively, but they “are not wedded to a particular way of doing things” or to playing a particular role competently (Lugones, 1987, p. 16).

And fourth and finally, play generates a world where oppressed people who are regularly subjected to the identity-prejudiced stereotypes of the collective social imagination, can be at ease. But it also generates a new world where people who occupy different positions in structural relations of inequality, can discover one another and one another’s worlds, where arrogant perception is transported into *loving* perception. Lugones depicts this as epistemically valuable particularly for combatting privileged people’s epistemologies of ignorance:
We discover that there are “worlds” in which those who are the victims of arrogant perception are really subjects, lively beings, resistors, constructors of visions even though in the mainstream construction they are animated only by the arrogant perceived and are pliable, foldable, file-awayable, classifiable. (Lugones, 1987, p. 18)

Besides this social value, Addams also sees that play has epistemic and social value. Play is a facilitator of the imaginative life. It promotes and trains participants in the skills necessary for social inquiry. Addams suspects this is the reason that so many artists are preoccupied with trying to recapture the spirit of youth (Addams, in Elshain, p. 417). She celebrates the diverse group of immigrants’ children who play with one another at Hull House, demonstrating another reason why play is both epistemically and socially valuable. Play with diverse others gives citizens opportunities for imagining possibilities with others as well as for imagining oneself into the lives and experiences of other individuals' worlds. Play cultivates the imaginative capacities that are epistemically valuable for imagining creative resolutions for social problems in social inquiry. It also gives participants practice at considering the contributions of diverse socially situated knowers.

Hull House responded to the deprivation of space for play and time for recreation in the modern industrial life through establishing various forums for play (Addams, 1893b). Besides organizing adult social clubs, Hull House started a kindergarten and hosted boys and girls clubs for teenagers. They added an art gallery in 1891, a playground of almost a full acre in 1892, a gymnasium that included rooms for men’s

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114 In “The School as Social Centre”, Dewey (1902/1996, MW 2. 91-2) specifically points to Hull House activities as an example of how to realize democratic education through play. Dewey remarks that he “sometimes think[s] that recreation is the most overlooked and neglected of all ethical forces”, explaining further that, “there is no force more likely to count in the general reform of social conditions than the practical recognition that in recreation there is a positive moral influence which it is the duty of the community to take hold of and direct.”
clubs and a “diet kitchen” for providing food to the poor and sick in 1893, a club house in 1898, and a theater with a coffee house in 1899 (Knight, 2010). At its peak, Hull House involved over thirteen buildings over an entire city block. Further additions included a swimming pool, art studio, music school, library, labor museum, drama groups, and a boarding club for girls (Knight, 2010).

Addams’s appreciation for the value of play, game, and recreation in a democratic society developed out of her intellectual relationship with George Herbert Mead (1863-1931). Mead came to the University of Chicago in 1894 by invitation from Dewey shortly after Dewey’s appointment there (Hamington, 2009, p. 38). Like Dewey, Mead enjoyed an intellectual friendship with Addams and spent time visiting and lecturing at Hull House.  

Mead does not develop an ethics in his writings, but his general way of thinking about the self as a social process echoes Dewey’s conception of “individuality” (i.e., political agency) has ethical implications. He introduced a social interaction theory of the self, and this is a foundational principle of identity that is assumed by social identity.  

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115 While many of the activities at Hull House were important features of social life in the neighborhood, the playground project at Hull House is worth mentioning specifically. At the time of its inception, the notion of a playground was a relatively new idea that became widely publicized due to Jane Addams’s influence, which initiated what sociologists refer to as “the playground movement”. Addams served as a vice-president of the Playground Association of American (PAA) when it was formed in 1907 and furthered the movement more still with her defense of the value of play in her 1909 publication of *The Spirit of Youth and City Streets*. The PAA went on to implement many of the first urban playgrounds in America. Hull House’s playground boasted open space of almost an acre, sandboxes, swings, outdoor game areas and play structures, and indoor play areas. See Frost, 2010.  

116 For an excellent historical account of their relationship, see Deegan (1988, pp. 118-121). Deegan explains that Mead and his wife, Helen, became involved in Hull-House almost immediately after their arrival in Chicago. Mead was an advocate for women’s rights, and wrote significantly on “issues directly related to Addams’s interests; education, war, democracy, labor, immigrants, social settlements, and the relation between theory and practice” (p. 106). Besides a list of social programs the Mead worked on with Addams, Deegan also provides an in depth analysis of how Addams’s thought and practice influenced Mead. She cites correspondences in which Mead thanks Addams for her “very remarkable paper”, compliments her on her recent publication of *Twenty Years at Hull House*, and offers a charitable review of *Newer Ideals of Peace*. In the last of these, Mead criticizes some of the logical organization of Addams’s argument, but nevertheless validates and reiterates Addams’s argument, “that government must reflect the will of the people instead of being an arm of repression” (p. 119).
theorists as well as by Young. For Mead, the self “arises in the process of social experience and activity”, that is, it is a product of social interaction (Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, 1934, 135; cited in Keith, 333). Heather Keith explains, “Mead’s commitment is to a vision of the self as always growing within a wider ecology of others – a web of relationships – while still retaining the uniqueness of an individual organism” (Keith, 1999, p. 333). Because society emerges from the self, which is always understood in relation with other selves, there arises from this interdependency an obligation to attend to the social institutions and social practices that frame the formation and cultivation of that self.

Like Mead, Addams saw Play and Game as vital parts of nurturing political agency. Play and Game are important social process for the developing social self because they stimulate the process of thinking and feeling in terms of others. Young children engage in role-playing when they play ‘house’ or ‘cops and robbers’, an activity that involves taking on the attitudes and perspectives of others. Game, a more advanced form of play, introduces an entire complex system of social interaction that frames these various forms of role-playing. At this higher level of social interaction, individuals begin to think of themselves (or their role) as parts of a whole, anticipating the reactions of others and envisioning their role in the establishment, maintenance, and evolution of the system.

It is important to note that when Addams and Mead conceive of Game as a more advanced form of Play, they do not have in mind the strategic, rational-choice conception

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117 See especially Keith (1999). Keith argues that Mead’s conception of the social self serves as an important psychological foundation for politicizing an ethics of care.
of Game advanced within Game Theory.\textsuperscript{118} In her descriptions of children doing Play, Addams avoids describing it in agonistic terms like “contest, winning, losing, battling”.\textsuperscript{119} Unlike the playful attitude, Game assumes rules, “rules that inspire hostility”, the importance of competence, and the spirit of “a conqueror, and imperialist” (ibid.). This form of play is hostile to the cultivation of cooperative skills. And it is the antithesis of loving perception among differently socially situated individuals.

Play was a vital part of Addams’s social ethics because it created safe worlds for differently situated individuals to see themselves as political equals. It also enabled for people to cultivate the imaginative, creative, and cooperative skills necessary for social inquiry. Hamington argues that Addams extends Mead’s conception of play much further than he himself does (Hamington, 2009). She sees that the social interactions and imaginative processes that occur in children’s play are themselves “the basis for a democratic citizenry that can sympathetically understand diverse community members” (Hamington, 2009, p. 153).\textsuperscript{120}

I wish to highlight two additional features of Addams’s social ethics that are brought forward in this discussion of Play at Hull House (and that might be a valuable lesson for contemporary community-based organizations). First, Hull House residents resisted the urge to paternalistically coordinate Play at Hull House. Addams explains that

\textsuperscript{118} It is outside of the scope of this project to provide a developed critique of Game Theory. However, it should be noted that as a kind of social choice theory, Game Theory is subject to a number of the critiques of a preference aggregative model of democracy that I outlined in Chapter 1 of the dissertation.

\textsuperscript{119} See Lugones, 1987, who uses these descriptors in her account of agonistic play (p. 15).

\textsuperscript{120} See especially, Hamington, 2009, who explains, “Play is the great social stimulus, and it is the prime motive which unites children and draws them into comradeship. A true democratic relation and ease of acquaintance is found only among the children in a typical factory community because they readily overcome differences of language, tradition and religion, which form insuperable barriers to adults. ‘It is in play that nature reveals her anxious care to discover men to each other’ and this happy and important task children unconsciously carry forward day by day with all the excitement and joy of co-ordinate activity. They accomplish that which elders could not possibly do, and they render a most important service to the community” (p. 153; citing Addams, 1905, p. 132).
the organizing and running of adult spaces for Play was itself “a neighborhood affair” (Addams, 1893b). Second, this insulated them from introducing the kinds of agonistic Games of the conqueror. The conquering player destroys the types of worlds where one can be at ease with herself in communion with differently socially situated others.

Addams’s philosophy of education emphasizes the significance of Play as I have developed it here. Like her picture of Play, Addams believed education was valuable insofar as it prepared citizens for responsible social inquiry through cultivating skills in “cooperative intelligence, contextual relevance, connected learning, and imaginative exploration” (Hamington, 2009, p. 151).

Addams is critical of the conquering attitude within many of the adult education programs made available to immigrants and the poor. She explains that while these programs may equip some with the tools of reading and writing, it “gives them no real participation in the industrial and social life with which they come in contact” (Addams, 1899). It is important to note, that Addams connects this failure to provide the kinds of educational opportunities that might prepare and enable people for participation, with the identity-prejudiced stereotypes of educators (i.e., social elites) towards their students (i.e., Hull House neighbors who were immigrants and poor). She explains this identity-prejudiced stereotype as connected to a social myth among educators, “that it is not possible for the mass of mankind to have experiences which are themselves worth anything, and that accordingly, if a neighborhood is to receive valuable ideas at all, they must be brought in from the outside, and almost exclusively in the form of books” (Addams, 1899).
On Addams’s and Dewey’s conception of democracy, education that prepares people for citizenship should nurture political agency in the sense I developed it in Chapter 3. This is nurtured through the bringing of people from differently socially situated perspectives together under ideal conditions that will promote their ability to get to know one another sympathetically and equip them with the skills in social inquiry. Dewey praises the programs at Hull House for embodying this, “Classes for study may be numerous, but all are regarded as modes of bringing people together, of doing away with barriers of caste, or class, or race, or type of experience that keep people from real communion with each other” (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2. 91). In this way, Play and Education as Addams understands them can be facilitative of developing the capacities among marginalized people that are vital for fuller participation.

Thus in this way, Addams’s leadership in Hull House programs and activities can be understood as an attempt to respond to the “political poverty” form of deliberative inequality that was highlighted in Chapter 2. But Play is also facilitative of reducing communicative inequality. When implemented properly, Play and Education have the potential to facilitate both imaginative and real space that is conducive to cultivating sympathetic understanding among diverse community members and equipping them with the kinds of habits that are necessary for social inquiry.

What is interesting about the facilitative role of Play and Education in producing the habits necessary for responsible social inquiry, is that social inquiry is itself facilitative of widening ingroups. So in this way, these activities are not only facilitative

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121 And throughout her writings, Addams celebrates the great example children are for society in this: “They readily overcome differences of language, tradition and religion, which form insuperable barriers to adults… [accomplishing] that which elders could not possibly do, and [rendering] a most important service to the community” (Addams, 1905, p. 132).

of combatting the political poverty form of communicative inequality, but they are also facilitative of combatting the identity-prejudiced form of communicative inequality.

It is helpful to turn back to John Turner’s work at this point to support my claim here. On Turner’s approach to social identity theory, social competition (i.e., ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice) is one among three ways that individuals can achieve positive distinctiveness of one’s social group in order to maintain self-esteem. Social competition is triggered where social identity is made salient and where it is made insecure by unstable power hierarchies (Turner and Reynolds, 2001). Thus because Play and Education reduce the salience of social identity through widening the ingroup through appealing to more shared identities, and because they generate space that alleviates some of the insecurities that are operative in unstable power hierarchies, they reduce social competition.

This is precisely why Addams’s uses Hull House as an example in many of her writings, but particularly, in *Newer Ideals of Peace* (1907) where she develops her pacifist position. Here she condemns the older, coercive source of peace in “tribalistic morality”, in favor of a newer ideal of peace that results in “cosmopolitan affection” (Addams, 1907/2005, p. 131). Whereas past eras brought people together through opposition to a common enemy (e.g., war), Addams believes her current time requires the bringing of people together through social sympathy, what I am characterizing here in terms of widening ingroups.

3. Addams and Dewey’s Philosophy of Perplexity and Method of Sympathetic Inquiry

In the opening pages of *Democracy and Social Ethics* (1902/2002), Addams points out that one’s experiences determine her understanding of life, and this occasions
an obligation to choose diversified experiences. This obligation flows out of Addams’ epistemology: each is epistemically limited by her subjective experiences of the social world, thus each can only gain fuller knowledge of social problems and possible resolutions for those problems through more diversified encounters with other subjective experiences of that social world.

At the heart of both Addams’s and Dewey’s social epistemology and conceptions of democracy is a philosophy of perplexity. Seigfried (2002) has introduced this as a method of perplexity and Hamington (2009) has called its result ‘sympathetic knowledge’. He explains sympathetic knowledge: “[It] entails openness to the possibility of caring for others,” which has the potential for motivating individuals to “act on behalf of others so that they may flourish and grow” (Hamington, 2009, p. 71).

For Addams and Dewey, democratic social relations depend on more than mere exposure to difference, that is, on more than diversified human experiences, particularly because of the features of industrial capitalism that exacerbate the epistemic limitations of human subjectivity. Exposure to diversity alone is inadequate to address the social ills of industrialism, particularly if it rests on misunderstandings of, and indifference towards, one another. Thus for Addams and Dewey, exposure to differently socially situated Others must be conditioned on sympathetic social inquiry. Building from our definition of social inquiry, sympathetic social inquiry (hereafter sympathetic inquiry) is: the sympathetic, cooperative, and inclusive social practices and processes that promote social knowledge.

As Dewey and Addams develop perplexity, it is an uncomfortable and “bewildering” experience occasioned by new and strange experiences that the agent lacks
the resources to explain, understand, and resolve (Addams, 1910, p. 68). Perplexity is a cognitive-affective with significant epistemic potential, a possible starting place for learning and deeper understanding. This uncomfortable emotional phenomenon postulates a choice for the agent: either grant or deny perplexity its epistemic potential, “either continue to hold onto her assumptions or call them into question” (Seigfried, 2002, p. xxvi).

Dewey’s contrast between mental habits of uncritical thinking and reflective thinking is helpful for thinking about the choice that perplexity prompts. Uncritical thought is a habit of holding onto assumptions, whereas reflective thought is, “an attitude of suspended conclusion”, a willingness “to maintain the state of doubt and to carry on systematic and protracted inquiry” (Dewey, 1910, MW 6. 191).

Similar to Dewey’s model of moral development, for Addams perplexity functions to initiate further inquiry that can lead to wider understanding and as Seigfried notes, “more effective value orientation” (Seigfried, 2002, p. xxix). The epistemic potential of perplexity is only fulfilled, however, when the agent moves beyond uncritical thinking towards reflective thinking, when the agent begins to engage the perplexing encounter with a kind of sympathetic inquiry. This move happens when the perplexed agent chooses not to explain away the encounter, but to engage in the encounter with sympathetic inquiry. Dewey explains the choice to inquire further as “more or less

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123 Addams describes the bewildering experience of perplexity at poverty in Twenty Years at Hull House (1910, pp. 68-9; as cited in Knight, 2010, p. 49). And interestingly, Dewey cites this fear of new and strange experiences as the very source of race prejudice and friction (Dewey, 1922, MW. 13. 243). Although the term was not formally introduced in psychology until 1957 by Leon Festinger, I suspect what Dewey really has in mind in his development of perplexity is a type of cognitive dissonance.

124 Seigfried also notes that Addams shows in her writings, “how social sympathy can be aroused and developed through the perplexities we feel in the normal course of everyday life, specifically those caused by the clashes of beliefs, habits, and interest inevitable in highly diversified societies” (Seigfried, 2002, p. xxiii).
troublesome” because it requires that the agent have a “willingness to endure a condition of mental unrest and disturbance” (Dewey, 1910/1996, MW 6. 191).

Because perplexity is so unsettling, people often attempt to resolve it as quickly and easily as possible with past experiences and existing knowledge, accepting the first and easiest explanation at its “face value” (Dewey, 1910/1996, MW 6. 191). Because prejudices are framed by complex social histories and social myths operating in the collective social imagination, the mind often has prejudicial resources readily at its disposal for explaining away encounters with Others that occasion perplexity.

Sympathetic inquiry is epistemically valuable because it is attentive to the collective social imagination and not determined by it. Assuming the experimentalism of a pragmatist feminist social epistemology, sympathetic inquirers consider other perspectives, try on arguments, imagine differently socially situated perspectives. Eventually through the practice of sympathetic inquiry, individuals can come to care for the problems others face, expand their sense of obligation beyond their own “world”, and coordinate their preferences with the pursuit of the social good of others. Sympathetic inquirers form a conception of “shared interests” with the Other, and this makes it possible for them to acknowledge problems that face the Other as public problems.125 Wider preferences emerge and values evolve from individualistic morality into social ethics.

Dewey explains that sympathy has a kind of moral knowledge that brings an individual to an appreciation for “the claims of others” (LW 7.270):

125 This language of “shared interest” is particularly prominent in Dewey’s *Democracy and Education* (1916) and “The Public and Its Problems: An Essay on Political Inquiry” (1927).
tool, *par excellence*, for analyzing and resolving complex cases…sympathy supplies the *pou sto* for an effective, broad, and objective survey of desires, projects, resolves, and deeds. (MW 5.303; cited in Pappas, 2008, p. 199)

On my reading, Addams’s conceives of sympathetic inquiry as the formation of narrative knowledge where narrative knowledge is understood as narratively based understanding and where ‘understanding’ and ‘knowledge’ are seen as an experimental and ongoing epistemic process of coming to understand and appreciate as opposed to a more traditional definition of knowledge as a completed, and closed results of inquiry. Its constitutive properties are epistemic patience and non-paternalistic listening. The result of this process is kind of empathy as analogical thinking, a cognitive-affective state of wider social understanding and appreciation of the Other.

Narrative knowledge plays an important role in sympathetic inquiry. Whereas statistical knowledge arises as a result of looking in on and observing the Other, narrative knowledge arises in the process of *engaging* with the Other. Statistical knowledge avoids perspective taking and a genuine encounter with the Other, thus it fails to escape an individualistic ontology. Acceptance of a relational ontology and an appreciation for the epistemic limitations of subjectivity, exacerbated by industrial capitalism, necessitates moving beyond statistical and observational knowledge to narratively based and perspectival types of understanding.

The formation of authentic narrative knowledge requires the suspension of prejudicial cognitive explanations that might be more readily available to the inquirer. This suspension of judgment is the epistemic patience Dewey has in mind in his account of reflective thinking. Addams speaks to the importance of epistemic patience and suspension of immediate judgments in “The Subjective Necessity for Social

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126 I use the terms ‘narratively based understanding’ and ‘narrative knowledge’ interchangeably hereafter.
Settlements”. Here she explains that Hull House residents ought to have “a scientific patience in the accumulation of facts” (Addams, 1893a, p. 23). They cannot compromise the philosophy of the solidarity of the human race on the basis of one “drunken woman” or “idiot boy”, and they must be “emptied of all conceit of opinion and all self-assertion, and ready to arouse and interpret the public opinion of their neighborhood” (Addams, 1893a, p. 23).

Pointing to Hull House as an example, Addams emphasizes the importance of non-paternalistic listening in the formation of narrative knowledge and resolution of social problems. She explains that Hull House functions in a diverse neighborhood without preconceived notions of the needs of the neighborhood residents. Rather, Hull House waits for interaction with neighborhood residents to prompt and articulate its purpose. Addams defends this conception of non-paternalistic listening and care consistently throughout *Democracy and Social Ethics* (1902) as well as in “The Function of a Social Settlement” (1893).^{127}

Unlike a charitable institution, Hull House residents under the leadership of Addams emphasized working *with* the poor, rather than *for* them. For instance, Hamington points out that Hull House provided, “seed money and organization support for [the] start-up… of a boarding club that would accommodate working women and provide flexibility in rent collection should hard times, such as strike, arise,” but the

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^{127} Addams’s practice anticipates Tronto’s four-pronged model of care, particularly the last requirement of responsiveness. As Tronto (2009) develops this feature of care, care giving requires both competence and responsiveness to the needs of the care receiver. This entails that one use the needs of the care receiver, as well as the care receiver’s response to the care giver, as an epistemic resources for providing care. Developing on this, Sheldene Simola explains, “Sensitivity and responsiveness to the feelings, concerns, and particular circumstances of individuals is critical” (Simola, 2003, p. 354). Working within the business ethics literature, she points to examples of crisis management resolutions that both succeeded and failed to condition care on this feature of responsiveness, and in more successful cases, company’s “sought to hear, understand, and be responsive to the subjective voices, experiences, and contexts of community members … rather than operating on an assumed knowledge of the members” (Simola, 2003, p. 358).
club’s leadership was turned over to working women themselves (Hamington, 2001, p. 113). In this way, Hull House sought to arrive at an understanding of human needs discursively, and to politically empower the poor and oppressed.

Narratively informed social knowledge sees problems that the observer may miss. What is more, the process itself of forming narrative knowledge – listening and interacting with another as she tells her story, and perhaps even exchanging one’s own story – is a deeply social activity during which a kind of deliberation happens. Beliefs, commitments, customs, and decisions are socially and historically framed for one another. Explaining one’s beliefs, commitments, and customs through the storytelling act itself and answering questions about those beliefs, commitments, and customs for the story listener is a type of deliberative negotiation process during which values and preferences are shared, compared, and perhaps revised in light of newly formed understanding of the Other.

4. Widening Ingroups and Combatting Identity-Prejudiced Stereotypes

Many of the Hull House activities and programs aimed to disrupt ingroup and outgroup biases among Hull House neighbors, immigrants who stood in relations of relative socioeconomic equality with one another. In the larger context of American society, however, Hull House neighbors were stigmatized cultural minorities who lived in or near poverty. Addams observed the persistence of identity-prejudiced stereotypes among her contemporaries, people of affluence and influence that did not directly come into contact, let alone have meaningful encounters, with Hull House neighbors. Such citizens played important roles in maintaining and benefiting from industrial capitalism, one benefit being the ability to spatially remove themselves from the neighborhoods of
the working poor. Given their unacknowledged interdependence, Addams saw this insulation of the privileged from the poor as epistemically irresponsible.

Spatial stratification that is based in socioeconomic or racial grouping poses a significant challenge for Addams’s conception of deliberative equality because it enables for people with socioeconomic and political power to retreat from meaningful encounters with those who are different from them. Addams’s speeches, papers, and books offer more than a mere recounting of Hull House programs and residents’ experiences with the neighbors. Her writings are themselves an important part of advancing her social epistemology and combatting identity-prejudiced stereotypes about the immigrant groups and marginalized neighbors of Hull House.

In the opening pages of Democracy and Social Ethics (1902), Addams provides expressed permission of it’s reprinting in The Atlantic Monthly, The International Journal of Ethics, The American Journal of Sociology, and The Commons. Ellery Sedgwick describes the editors, writers, and reading public of The Atlantic Monthly as a progressive “high-cultural elite” with “waning influence” on the political and social climate of the day (Sedgwick, 1994, p. 2). Given Addams use of these forums for distributing her writings, as well as the high illiteracy rates concentrated among the industrial urban community, it is reasonable to conclude that Addams is using her writings to reach a broader audience than she interacted with on a daily basis at Hull House.

Addams is concerned about the public perception of social settlements, and she is concerned to ensure that communication about settlements to the reading public do not
misrepresent and soften the urban challenges neighbors and residents faced.\footnote{128}{This is most clearly evidenced in the Preface to what she calls her “reminiscences”, *20 Years at Hull House* (1910). Addams explains two purposes for the book, the first of which is to offer some insights into the early struggles of Hull House in the hopes that this would combat an increasing public perception of the “superficiality” of social settlements. Her second motive, what she considered a more “unworthy” one, stems from her desire to “extinguish” two proposed biographies that depicted life at the Settlement as “all too smooth and charming” (Addams, 1910, p. viii).}

Hamington explains, “Addams used what she learned through listening to people’s stories to inform her writing and activism” (Hamington, 2004, p. 109). More than this, Addams used what she learned through listening to people’s stories to inform *others* through her writing, and this writing was *a part of* her activism.

Addams frequently relies on narrative throughout her writings to challenge identity-prejudiced stereotypes of immigrants and the poor in an effort to reconstruct the collective social imagination of her contemporaries. Her arguments for economic and political reform are most always accompanied by the *stories* of marginalized people’s experiences of industrial capitalism, the urban youth, the immigrant, the prostitute, or the factory worker.\footnote{129}{Indeed Addams’s approach to social and political philosophy, a rhetorical approach that develops her argument in accompaniment with narrative, is perhaps why many traditional philosophers have failed to see her philosophical contributions. In response to this I reiterate Dewey’s point that argument alone “breeds misunderstanding and fixes prejudices” (Dewey, 1902, MW 2.91).}

Addams’s fictional charity visitor in *Democracy and Social Ethics* (1902) is probably not an actual person, but rather, an example of what Hull House residents are like upon their arrival at Hull House. The charity visitor “is a young college woman, well-bred and open-minded” (Addams, 1902, p. 12). Yet she struggles at first to understand her encounters with the working poor. She is awkward, she lacks experience of their ways, and she is quick to cast moral judgment on them.\footnote{130}{Addams’s own reflections on the early mistakes of residents at Hull House demonstrate that she probably sees the charity visitor, a good-willed but naïve young woman, as a reflection of herself when she first opened Hull House (*Twenty Years at Hull House*, 1910).}

In her story of the fictional charity visitor, Addams emphasizes that the charity visitor at first feels a kind of discomfort and bewilderment as she observes the visited
family. She is confused by many of their practices, she is judgmental of how they prioritize their financial decisions given their state of poverty, and at times she is even disgusted by them. She is shocked by the head of the visited family’s familiarity with the “horrors of the salon,” disturbed by the daughter’s imprudent spending on dresses despite her pitiful home furnishings “little decorations, [and] scanty supply of books”, concerned about the ease with which the visited family greets the early marriage of their daughters, and morally reproachful of urban gangs of boys who are so frequently arrested.

The reader becomes more acquainted with the visited family through the charity visitor. The head of the family has recently been blacklisted in a strike. In his absence from work, he has “sunken down into martyrdom,” content to visit the public library daily to indulge in reading and take visitations from other workman, counseling them in their efforts in labor relations (Addams, 1902, p. 13). Meanwhile, his wife shows no signs of disdain for this, and even supports him with a “scanty income” earned through sewing and cleaning. The charity visitor initially concludes that this man is lazy and his supportive wife imprudent.

At this point it is important to note that Addams is doing something important with her story of the charity visitor here. She is demonstrating for the reader what a failure to greet perplexity in a responsible way looks like. Thus far the charity visitor has explained away her perplexity, accepting the first and easiest explanation at its “face value”, which in her case is based in identity-prejudiced stereotypes (Dewey, 1910, MW 6.191).

Addams pushes the story of the charity visitor further, however. She means to demonstrate not simply how the charity visitor initially fails to realize the epistemic
potential of perplexity, but to also demonstrate how one might embrace and fulfill that epistemic potential through continued processes of sympathetic inquiry. The charity visitor continues to visit the family and in the process, gets to know their stories. She even begins to think analogically about her own experiences and those of the visited family.

The charity visitor reflects on some of her own experiences and begins to compare them with her growing understanding of the visited family. She thinks of two of her own friends from more privileged backgrounds who are presently supporting their husbands. Her companions actually encouraged their husbands to pass on employment opportunities that were inconsistent with their moral convictions and might tarnish their reputations in their social circles. Both the head of household of the visited family and the charity visitor’s friends’ husbands are enjoying a life of reading and political engagement as a result of their temporary unemployment.

The charity visitor gains a new appreciation for the choices of the visited family because she perseveres towards sympathetic inquiry in response to an initially perplexing experience. Her moral condemnation of both the head of household and his supportive wife become reframed for the reader in a way that disrupts socioeconomically constructed differences and distance. The charity visitor begins to realize a certain inconsistency about praising her own friends’ moral character for supporting their husbands while rebuking the striker’s wife for her imprudence. She sees that the striker’s wife has made the greater sacrifice than her own friends because the stakes are so much higher. The charity visitor begins to wonder if the wife of the visited family is actually more morally mature than her own acquaintances.
After further investigation, the charity visitor sees that the clothing the daughter spends all of her earnings on ‘imprudently’ is a social necessity for her. She uses it to communicate a higher social standing than she holds, and through that, gain entrance into more elevated social circles. Early marriage limits the amount of mouths that need fed in a household. The prospects for a family are even better if one’s daughters marry into a more elevated social circle. The charity visitor comes to see that the thrill of being chased by the “coppers” among urban boys is not unlike “the practice of country boys who go forth in squads to set traps for rabbits or to round up a coon” (Addams, 1902, p. 26). The problem for urban youth is not a moral failing on their own parts, but it is based in a social problem that results from industrial capitalism: the universal restlessness of youth attempting to navigate an urban environment with limited outlets for play. The charity visitor comes to see the social systems that frame the lives and choices of the visited family.

Through her use of the narrative of the fictional charity visitor, Addams invites her insulated reading public into the perplexity experienced Hull House residents themselves. She puts their perplexity on display and then directs the reader through the proper response to perplexity, which for Addams is through sympathetic inquiry towards wider social understanding. This process is made more accessible to the reader because the narrative is told from the perspective of someone like them: the charity visitor is an important mediator for social comparison. Vicariously and imaginatively, the reader is invited on the charity visitor’s journey towards wider social knowledge. Through this mediation the reader learns “to penetrate to deeper levels of meaning – to go below the
surface and find out the connections of any event or object, and to keep at it” (Dewey, 1916, MW 9.335).

Addams believes that narrative has important epistemic power. Unlike the newspapers, she appreciates literature because it brings people into “contact with social experience” (Addams, 1902, p. 8). On this she writes, “The popular books are the novels, dealing with life under all possible conditions, and they are widely read not only because they are entertaining, but also because they in measure satisfy an unformulated belief that to see farther, to know all sorts of men, in an indefinite way, is a preparation for better social adjustment – for the remedying of social ills” (Addams, 1902, p. 8). Indeed, the most profound stories and characters are often based in authors’ real experiences with different people and their ability to bring readers to a genuine encounter and understanding of those characters. And the moral wisdom of a reader or literary critic is rooted in her wide range of experiences with different socioeconomically and spatially located characters.

As Richard Rorty has explained, narrative is valuable for moral thinking because it introduces readers to, “strange people (Alcibiades, Julien Sorel), strange families (the Karamazovs, the Casaubons), and strange communities (the Teutonic Knights, the Nuer, the mandarins of Sung)” (Rorty, 1989, p. 80). Narratives enable readers to imaginatively explore potential resolutions to problems and their meanings for the parties involved. They function to reveal, “how a situation comes to be the particular problem that it is” (Walker, 2007, p. 72). Unlike a moral dilemma posed in an ethical theory course textbook, narrative more authentically represents moral problems because it brings
forward the values and obligations, and most importantly, the relations, that frame the moral problem and moral decision-making of the character (Walker, 2007, p. 116).

Another important feature of narrative is its ability to make us vulnerable to the Other. When we read a novel, we quite naturally indulge in an open-minded consideration of the perspectives shared through the story. We sympathize with the villain. We grasp the complexities of an immoral act without despising the actor herself. Yet in real life encounters with the Other, the persistence of prejudices are such that we frequently avoid taking on this novel-like sympathy.

Novel-like sympathy is difficult to implement in everyday interactions for a few reasons. Many of the social spaces in which our real life encounters with the Other happen, fail to make space for or even discourage the exchanging of our narratives. Additionally, we may avoid taking on this novel-like sympathy in real life encounters because unlike the solitary activity of reading a novel, real-life encounters require making oneself vulnerable to another person. While reading a novel, one can safely suspend her own beliefs, commitments, and customs without feeling a sense of jeopardizing her identity. One can pretend to agree with the main character without fearing that her own beliefs, commitments, and customs will be lost in social space, without fearing that her listening, appreciation, and understanding will go unreciprocated or be abused. Thus SI requires an openness to seeking out narratively based understanding, and the formation of this kind of understanding requires a kind of social trust in the Other.

True perspective taking requires trying on the beliefs, commitments, and customs of the Other. Importantly, and particularly in contexts when we disagree strongly with the beliefs, commitments, and customs of the Other, this requires considering how the Other
could have come to form those beliefs, commitments, and customs and why she might feel a sense of communion with them. This perspective-taking feature of the formation of narrative knowledge moves the listener to a kind of analogical thinking, and interestingly, analogical thinking is an important feature of empathy.\(^{\text{131}}\)

There is a kind of meta-narrative process at work in Addams’s tale of the charity visitor and in Addams’s use of the first-person perspective in much of her writing more generally. The charity visitor, and Addams’s herself when she writes from the first person, are more readily available analogical references for Addams’s readers. The reader can ease into the perplexing experience through her connection with the charity visitor or her connection with Addams. Addams’s story of the charity visitor is a narrative about someone forming narratively based understanding of the Other, and that ‘someone’ is someone very much like Addams’s readers.

Because of how the political ideologies and social myths propagated by the more powerful can highjack the narratives of the marginalized, Addams’s introduction of alternative narratives through her writings has the potential to challenge the collective social imagination towards reconstruction through challenging the validity of these narratives as well as to “show how restricted the scope of the dominant identities [themselves] really [are]” (Walker, 2007, p. 155).

5. Conclusion: Beyond Mere Method, Sympathetic Inquiry as a Political Virtue

Addams does not develop sympathetic inquiry as a political virtue, but she does introduce it often in her discussions of political virtues that she is critical of for failing to

\(^{\text{131}}\) See especially Gentner, et. al., 2013; Thagard and Shelley, 2001.
enact, or blatantly contradicting, democracy as social ethics (e.g., charity). There may be some benefits to thinking about Addams’s method of sympathetic inquiry in a virtue ethics framework, however. In this final section of the Chapter I want to consider how constructing sympathetic inquiry as a type of hybrid epistemic-moral political virtue might be particularly useful for combatting communicatively structured deliberative inequality and for communicative democracy more generally.

In her discussions of social ethics most specifically, Addams expresses a concern for citizens to extend the sympathy that is more naturally felt towards one another within familial and private institutions to the larger social and political institution (Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics*, 1902/2002). In her concerns to widen sympathy, Addams demonstrates an appreciation for the fact that, unlike the concern and care that is felt naturally for familial relations, concern and care for the Other must be worked at and cultivated. Indeed, the sympathy that is called for in sympathetic inquiry may not naturally arise. Thus like the virtues, it may be something the agent has to actively work towards cultivating and habituating if not trained in the proper way towards it.

Sympathetic inquiry does seem to be more of a habit than a skill, however. Indeed, Dewey develops thinking in these terms, as thinking habits and habits of inquiry. He also believes that these thinking habits have implications for the moral life. While

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132 Pragmatists were deeply rooted in Aristotle, and I think it can be argued that they would have developed sympathetic inquiry in terms of the virtue ethics framework. However, it is outside of the scope of this project to defend Addams and Dewey as virtue ethicists.

133 On this she writes, “Just when our affection becomes large enough to care for the unworthy among the poor as we would care for our own kin, is certainly a perplexing question. To say that it should never be so, is a comment upon our democratic relations to them which few of us would be willing to make” (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 31). See also, Whipps (2004, p. 123) who explains, “Addams believed that to stay isolated from people engaged in the daily struggle for survival “deadens the sympathies and shrivels the power of enjoyment”…Addams understood that neither individuals nor groups could have a meaningful existence or advance in complex industrial and technological societies without jointly creating societies that allow space for public work together towards mutual aims. Interdependence, diversity, or the need for hearing the voices of “others,” is essential to Addams’s pragmatist and feminism – indeed she believed that having many diverse experiences was a moral responsibility.”
Dewey does not expressly discuss the role of sympathy for reflective thought in *How We Think* (1910), in his discussion of social feeling in *Psychology* (1887) he emphasizes that “it is impossible to over-estimate [its] importance in the emotional life” and that it is “the source of all moral feeling” (Dewey, 1887/1996, 2. 285, 288). As Gregory Pappas (2008) explains, “Dewey insisted on emphasizing the habits of inquiry required to find out what a present morally problematic situation calls for” (p. 126).\textsuperscript{134}

Because communicative democracy as I have developed it in this project consists of interactive practices, sympathetic inquiry can be conceptualized in terms of the regulatory habits (virtue) that govern those practices. The pragmatist feminist social epistemology of communicative democracy rejects the possibility that moral reasoning can be conducted from a neutral, impartial standpoint, healthy habits of inquiry in social relations are critical. The ability to take on the attitude of others is how the self comes into its completion, and the habit of sympathetic inquiry promotes that. It brings people into their fuller “individuality”\textsuperscript{135} so that they may flourish, by making possible the overarching values that are constitutive of a good life, *self-determination* and *self-development*.\textsuperscript{136}

Sympathetic inquiry is a *political* virtue because it brings individuals into their political agency through the interactive practices of communicative democracy. That is, it is conducive to expanding one’s orientation to a wider *public*. As I explained earlier, through the practice of sympathetic inquiry, individuals can eventually come to *care* for the problems others face, expand their sense of obligation beyond their own “world”, and

\textsuperscript{134} Pappas cites Dewey: “Wide sympathy, keen sensitiveness, persistence in the face of the disagreeable, balance of interest enabling us to undertake the work of analysis and decision intelligently are the distinctively moral traits – the virtues of moral excellence” (1920/1996, MW 12.173-4). Dewey

\textsuperscript{135} See Dewey, 1888/1996, EW 1. 231.

\textsuperscript{136} See Young, 1990, p. 37.
coordinate their preferences with the pursuit the social good of others. Sympathetic inquirers form a conception of “shared interests” with the Other, and this makes it possible for them to acknowledge the problems that are problems for the Other, as shared, public problems.

On a virtue ethics framework, sympathetic inquiry would be understood as a mean response (between excess and deficiency) to some sphere of action or feeling, which in our case, is perplexity. Recall that I have defined sympathetic [social] inquiry as the sympathetic, cooperative, and inclusive social practices and processes that promote social knowledge, and I developed its constitutive properties as epistemic patience and non-paternalistic listening.

I want to suggest something like Marilyn Frye’s (1983) conception of arrogant perception may be a good candidate for an epistemic-moral vice that is deficient of the mean in its response to perplexity. The arrogant perceiver assimilates the Other to his own use, and through this, subverts her political agency and her deliberative standing. The arrogant perceiver denies recognition to the Other’s needs and in so doing, diminishes her moral standing. He denies her the communicative context to express those needs effectively, and in so doing, diminishes her epistemic and deliberative standing. Because the arrogant perceiver sees the Other as for him, he comes close to missing, or misses entirely, experiencing the perplexity that the encounter occasions itself, because the Other is not even an Other in relation to him, but is an object under and for him.

I also want to suggest that something like dis-authorized perception may be a good candidate for an epistemic-moral vice that is an excessive of the mean in its response to perplexity. By contrast with the arrogant perceiver who misses perplexity, the
dis-authorized perceiver is paralyzed by it. He is baffled and disoriented by his appreciation for the radical subjectivity and differently socially situated perspective of the Other. She is too much an Other for interaction and communication. I borrow the language of “dis-authorization” from Linda Alcoff’s use of it in a critique of the popular resistance to speak for others among academics as the result of a [proper] appreciation for the epistemic salience of one’s privileged social perspective. In this case, the radical subjectivity of the Other, “is taken as an absolute dis-authorization of all practices of speaking for” (Alcoff, 1991-2, p. 29). Because the dis-authorized perceiver experiences the perplexity that the encounter with the Other occasions so severely, she marginalizes the Other. Rather than subverting the Other’s political agency like the arrogant perceiver, the dis-authorized perceiver abandons the Other’s political agency to seclusion and isolation from all of social life.

What is interesting about this thought experiment is that in both arrogant perception and dis-authorized perception, there are signs of a perceiver who has little practice interacting in meaningful ways with differently socially situated others. The arrogant perceiver lacks a wide range of experiences of relations of social equality, so he is unmoved by perplexity. The dis-authorized perceiver lacks a wide range of experiences of relations of social inequality, so he is overwhelmed by perplexity. This points to the significance of some forms of “exposure therapy” for the cultivation of the political virtue of sympathetic inquiry, which I would like to suggest can be observed at places like Hull House.

See also Young’s (1997a) paper, “Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought”.

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137 See also Young’s (1997a) paper, “Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought”.
Sympathetic inquiry is a substantive virtue in the weak sense of arising from the assumption of democratic norms of political equality, transparency, reasonableness, and inclusion. But it is procedural in the sense that it does not itself endorse a particular account of these norms in practice, but rather, methodologically regulates the epistemic and communicative practices that define them (a process which is ongoing, experimental, and open-ended). Because sympathetic inquiry is procedural in this sense, it insulates itself from two common critiques of the virtue ethics tradition. First, there is the charge that the virtues are too culturally relative, and as such, can be distorted in ways that benefit the dominant class and sustain the existing power relations in a given society. But sympathetic inquiry is not substantive enough to produce this problem, and it is constructed with the expressed aim of remedying this kind of cultural imperialism.

Then there is the charge that the virtues are too individualistic and that they do not readily map on to ethical concerns about structural relations of power. Elizabeth Anderson has raised this concern for Miranda Fricker’s (2007) virtue-based resolution for testimonial injustice, the epistemic virtue of testimonial justice” (Anderson, 2012). As Anderson explains, testimonial injustice is a transactional and structural form of injustice in that it arises from “particular exchanges or interactions between one person and another” (Anderson, 2012, p. 164-165). Fricker herself constructs it in this way. But then she looks to an “individual virtue-based remedy” that Anderson worries may not be able

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138 For an example of this type of argument, see Susan Okin’s (1998) paper, “Feminism, Moral Development, and the Virtues”. Okin argues that Aristotle’s political and ethical picture is so dependent on the exploitation of oppressed classes that it is not, without substantial revision, a salvageable theory. Maurice Hamington (2001; 2009) also worries about this and resists developing sympathetic inquiry in the virtue ethics framework because of it, preferring instead to develop it in an embodied ethics of care. Hamington believes along with Nel Noddings that one concern for virtue theory is that it “does not challenge liberal notions of isolated individualism the way that care theory does” (Hamington, 2015; citing Noddings, 2010, pp. 125-137). I do not object to Hamington’s construction of sympathetic knowledge as such, I simply want to try on the virtue ethics framework here to see if it is useful for thinking about the relationship between sympathetic inquiry and deliberative equality.
“to address structural epistemic injustices that may have locally innocent (non-prejudicial) causes” (ibid., p. 167). Linda Alcoff frames the problem with the interrogative: “Can volitional epistemic practice correct for non-volitional prejudices?” (Alcoff, 2010, p. 128).

As Anderson explains, there are other ways beyond identity-prejudices that “disadvantaged social groups can be unjustly denied credibility” (Anderson, 2012, p. 169). She cites ingroup favoritism and shared-reality bias as examples. Both are universal cognitive tendencies with epistemic advantages in some contexts. What is interesting about Anderson’s critique, for my purposes here, is that she ultimately points towards some kind of conception of epistemic democracy as the virtue of epistemic justice for transactional injustice of this kind!

And this is precisely how I have tried to develop sympathetic inquiry, as a hybrid epistemic-moral political virtue that is constituted through social processes rather than in individuals. If “group segregation along lines of social inequality”, is the vector that turns innocent cognitive biases into “vehicles for spreading structural injustice to new contexts”, then perhaps the picture of communicative democracy and sympathetic inquiry as I have developed it in this dissertation are conducive for remedying communicatively structured deliberative inequality (Anderson, 2012, pp. 171, 170).

If responsible social inquiry is constructed as a capacity that is brought to fruition through relational and developmental processes like Play and Education, then it may be a candidate for being nurtured as the corrective habit for reconstructing the collective social imagination and its identity-prejudiced habits of social inquiry and communication.

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Sympathetic inquiry should not be understood as a practice of “controlling one’s biases and prejudices”, mind over matter.\textsuperscript{140} I have tried to show in this chapter that properly cultivated, sympathetic social inquiry has affective dimensions and reaches down into disposition, and that this can stimulate the natural widening of ingroups. And it can challenge identity-prejudiced stereotypes and in so doing, begin the processes of reconstructing the collective social imagination that houses them for the sympathetic inquirer. Thus understood as a political virtue of sympathetic inquiry, it could be potentially transformative for affectively reconstructing the experience of perplexity itself, and it could in this way, be an incredibly robust potential resource for alleviating the harmful effects on individuals’ deliberative standing in communicative and epistemic interactions.

\textsuperscript{140} It is important to point out that this language is incredibly common in the contemporary trend towards implicit bias training in various workplaces and public agencies. Thus one practical implication of developing sympathetic inquiry in the virtue ethics framework, is that it creates the conceptual resources to push our theorizing about ingroup and outgroup biases out from this legalistic framework and into a more unified conception of the social self.
CONCLUSION

Addams and Dewey would have agreed with Young that democratic norms of political equality, reasonableness, publicity, and inclusion are a vital starting place for theorizing justice. Although they were separated by almost a century in time and grounded in distinct philosophical traditions, they valued and developed a construction of democracy that promotes open and transparent reason-giving processes in politics. They rejected power-based and preference aggregative constructions of democratic decision-making, that gets implemented through special interest group politics.

Addams and Dewey would have also agreed with Young, that because deliberative theory has largely developing these norms through the lens of liberal individualism, it has failed to appreciate the ways that relations of power, oppression, privilege, and social inequality impact the realization of those norms in both formal democratic institutions and in all of social life.

The very core of communicative democracy, I have argued, is a relational ontology that makes theoretical space to name communicatively structured deliberative inequality and to identify, identity-prejudiced epistemic and communicative practices and habits. Relations of power that produce oppression, privilege, and social inequality have consequences on our deliberative standing, on whether we will be received, included, acknowledged, and genuinely respected and heard by others as a political equal, as a Deliberator.

Deliberative theorists put forward a refined and narrow construction of deliberation-as-argument that excludes people who lack the opportunities to develop the capacities necessary for this form of participation (i.e., political poverty). Argument
emphasizes the importance of agreement as a starting place and/or goal for discussion, and because of this, it can function as a vehicle for the perpetuation of culturally dominant norms.

There is a second layer to the cultural imperialism of deliberation-as-argument. The discourse of argument idealizes the speaker as dispassionate, articulate, quick-witted and clever, and impartial. This functions to privilege elites, who are more likely to be educated and skilled in the cultural traditions of argument. In the context of social inequality, oppression, and privilege, the assumption of argument itself functions as a form of cultural imperialism where it is normalized and is assumed as a neutral discourse.

Because argument has historically been valorized as the appropriate method for discovering truth both within modern philosophy and in the American judicial system, and because truth has historically been conceptualized within the liberal tradition as discoverable and as singular, this conception of deliberation-as-argument struggles to map on to more complex problem-identification and problem-solving processes like those that societies must grapple with.

But even more than all of this, the assumption of deliberation-as-argument reduces a robust and wider world of democratic communication solely to deliberation, and in doing so, it limits the scope of our social knowledge. Young, Addams, and Dewey appreciate both the moral and the epistemic benefits of inclusion. At its best, inclusive democratic communication can protect, restore and nurture the deliberative standing of all individuals, and it yields better social knowledge.

Beyond narrow constructions of deliberation-as-argument, Addams in particular saw that the emotional and imaginative domains of human social life are vital features of
communication. To borrow from Dewey again, “argument alone breeds misunderstanding and fixes prejudices” (Dewey, 1902/1996, MW 2.91). Young introduces five additional communicative methods in her work: greeting and acknowledgement of one’s interlocutors, rhetoric, narrative (Young, 2000), and even questioning (Young, 1997) and protest (Young, 2001). Anticipating Young’s communicative democracy, Addams takes up Young’s invitation to situate argument in narrative. And she looks to activities and practices like Play as a mechanism for producing epistemic goods, like imaginative inquiry, practice at cooperative exploration, and practice and appreciation for diverse social perspectives.

In Chapter 3 I argued that Addams and Dewey were deeply concerned with ingroup and outgroup biases as well as identity-prejudiced stereotypes. Recall that identity-prejudiced stereotypes are unique from universal, cognitive tendencies of ingroup and outgroup bias, in that they target a particular social group and are a result and reflection of intergroup social relations of power where there is oppression, privilege, and group-based social inequality. Thus prejudice harms particular socially situated groups. I have made the case that Addams and Dewey saw this, and that they were motivated to construct their conception of democracy around resolving it.

There is a tendency in the contemporary political discourse to overlook the significance of ordinary communicative processes in our understanding of democracy. Deliberative theorists also tend to limit the expanse of democratic communication in assuming that its appropriate place is in formal, institutionalized political venues (and perhaps only even in a representative form). To the contrary, communicative democracy

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141 Dewey advocates the role of imagination and emotional sensitivity even in his account of deliberation in the natural sciences (Pappas, 2012, p. 61).
widens democratic communication to include a broad range of interactive practices and it challenge us to think of democratic space as boundless.

Addams and Dewey go so far as to say that social space is the proper place and origin of healthy democratic communication and democracy more generally, and that the institutionalization of democracy into formal processes only a side effect. They would be critical of contemporary democratic experimentalism programs that tend to reduce their focus for democratic reform to institutions. Such programs do not go deep enough. The emphasis on arriving at formal principles for the design and structure of democratic institutions misses an integral aspect of democracy for Dewey, namely, “the embodiment in citizens of certain virtues” in their ordinary communicative and epistemic practices (Pappas, 2012, p. 71).

It is interesting that Young eventually looks to “City Life” as a normative ideal for communicative democracy, especially in contrast with Addams’s and Dewey’s concerns with the negative potential effects of the modern urban city for social knowledge and meaningful social life (Young, 1990). But all of these theorists appreciated the fact that in the city, “being together entails some common problems and common interests” (Young, 1990, p. 238) and that because of this, “we are bound to move forward or retrograde together” (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 238).

Hull House protested the challenges of the modern city, and so I believe Young would have felt quite at home there. The city is filled with problems but boundless in its potential for enriching social life. Hull House was a laboratory for democracy and democratic communication and inquiry. So there is good reason to continue to look to activities and programs, as well as Jane Addams’s and other thinkers’ writings about Hull
House, for further resources for strategizing democracy, and deliberative equality more specifically.

Young suggests four virtues of the normative conception of the city: social differentiation without exclusion, variety, eroticism, and publicity. Future research should develop the political virtue of sympathetic inquiry in the context of this ideal city. Speaking specifically to the eroticism of the city, Young describes it in terms of a place where one can “lose one’s identity” and where we can “take pleasure in being open to and interested in people we experience as different” (Young, 1990, p. 239). There is much more to be said about this erotic mystery and Play as I developed it in Chapter 4. I am particularly interested to explore this line of research further as a way of constructing an account of public reason. This account would develop democratic rationality in terms of the design approach of Chapter 1, and would function to fill out Addams’s and Dewey’s conception of social inquiry.

The language of “implicit bias” is becoming increasingly more popular in mainstream culture, and organizations – private and public – have increasingly been looking to “implicit bias training programs” as a way to affirm the importance of inclusion and diversity. But this discourse has struggled to escape the individualistic, cognitive-error account of prejudice that I developed and expressed concerns about in Chapter 2. I also mentioned in this chapter my resistance to two dualisms within the social psychology literature, between cognitive and affect and between implicit and explicit attitudes. I am hopeful to further my critique of this discourse through examining how conceptualizing identity-prejudiced communicative activity in terms of a habit may interrupt both of these dualisms. This may give us conceptual space to interrogate what is
really going on in “implicit bias”. It will be interesting to explore the possibilities of sympathetic inquiry if communicative inequality is reconstructed in terms of habit.

One worry for sympathetic inquiry is its dependency on narrative, as I have constructed it. While narrative can give us access to the inner meanings of Others, narratives can also be used to propagate social myths and motivate divisiveness. So much more work needs to be done that establishes ways to protect sympathetic inquiry from this risk. I suspect that one way to insulate sympathetic inquiry from this problem is to emphasize its attitudinal and relational context, a spirit of inclusive, experimental, and open-ended communicative practices among diversely situated social perspectives.

Young, Addams, and Dewey all looked to practice as an inspiration for theorizing about social justice and democracy. This reorientation of philosophic method brings into focus the significance of practice and activity in the social world. In conceptualizing democracy, the arrogant perceiver sees a thing to be had, something you can get, possess, own, with the right political machinery. This mechanization of participation compartmentalized it from our ethos, from our way of life and of interacting with and knowing one another. The dis-authorized perceiver is overwhelmed by the difference, the complexity, the potential chaos, and retreats from participation. But these perceivers both miss something important, namely, that democracy is not a thing, but it is a verb. We do democracy, and we do it together.

…As members of the community [we] stand indicted. This is the penalty of democracy, - that we are bound to move forward or retrograde together. None of us can stand aside; our feet are mired in the same soil, and our lungs breathe the same air. (Addams, 1902/2002, p. 112, the emphasis is mine)


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