Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Maritain on the Student-Teacher Relationship in Catholic Higher Education

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EMMANUEL LEVINAS AND JACQUES MARITAIN ON THE STUDENT-TEACHER
RELATIONSHIP IN CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION

by

Timothy W. Rothhaar

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ABSTRACT
EMMANUEL LEVINAS AND JACQUES MARITAIN ON THE STUDENT-TEACHER RELATIONSHIP IN CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION

Timothy W. Rothhaar
Marquette University, 2022

The purpose of this dissertation is to serve as a stepping stone to a larger philosophy of the Catholic university. Its thesis argues that Catholic universities have lost their way by means of faith, identity, and ethical crises, and in order to recover these we must return to the primordial student-teacher relationship embedded in a Catholic philosophical anthropology. Beginning in the mid-20th century, with roots at the turn of the century, Catholic universities took a decided secular move away from their theological roots beginning with Fr. Theodore Hesburgh’s reimagining of the Catholic university as a corporate entity. As a result, they began to embrace competition with non-Catholic schools in the areas of power and prestige, instead of forming citizens of good character and faith. This idea directly contrasts with Pope St. John Paul II’s *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* wherein Catholic universities are centers of faith and reason whilst encouraging the building up of laity in the Christian life. Contra both, I argue for a third way between them in order to break up the limiting dichotomy.

To do this, I borrow the base intersubjective ethic from Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas and pair it with the theocentric humanistic pedagogy of French Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain. I argue Levinas gets at what is central to a Catholic philosophical anthropology in treating the Other, the one who is not me, as one with dignity and so initiated into dialogue. This may sound like a plea to welcome anti-Catholic sentiment simply because it is different, but it is actually a step in recovery towards authentic Catholic education because of the need to re-welcome its own intellectual tradition. To that end, Maritain’s understanding of the student-teacher relationship embodies this ethic such that students are able to voice whatever they please—including Catholic theology—without fear of reprisal and learn wherever their souls lead. So, too, Catholic professors are able to teach virtually anything they please whilst, ultimately, leading students to forming their minds. I conclude by placing my project in the context of all higher education.
There are too many people to name who have helped me accomplish the completion of this dissertation. In no particular order, I want to thank my parents, Chuck and Chris, who never gave up believing in me, supporting me through all the sleepless nights, and always leaving the light on. I also want to thank my Uncle Richard, a chemist offering his kind advice on academic matters and the occasional paper edit. All of your love and pep talks got me through the darkest days.

Next, I would like to thank Sebastian Luft who kindly guided me through the paperwork and ups-and-downs of registrations and all the necessary-but-headache-inducing checkboxes of graduate school.

Without adequate space, I want to thank from the bottom of my heart Noel Adams for years of conversation and his kind guidance on the completion of this dissertation. A topic both near and dear to our hearts, it was an honor to work beside you, and I hope this project bears fruit in years to come.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a prolegomenon to a larger philosophy of the Catholic university which encompasses all of the various aspects of its existence. It does not concern itself to raise questions about why universities exist or whether they should exist. Its concern is the structure and function of Catholic universities in 21st century America. It does not endeavor to answer every single question posed about the dimensions of the Catholic university. Primarily, I want to investigate the student-teacher relationship as the foundation of all universities with special emphasis on Catholic universities in light of human dignity. Insofar as relationship pertains to ethics, and ethics pertains to institutions, there is a unique conception of the Catholic university. This dissertation intends to expound on that conception. For these reasons, its intended audience, aside from philosophers, theologians, and educationists, is the academic administrator in charge of running a Catholic university. Here presented are the chapters, their contents, and argumentation.

My argument is the student-teacher relationship is the foundation of all universities, Catholic and secular. Catholic universities, however, have “lost their way” (identity, faith, etc.) because of the adoption of secular principles in their runnings and structures. So, to recover these things (faith, etc.), we must return to the roots of the university as

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1 The term “university” is a broad and complex term, varying in definition over the past 800 years since its inception. Contemporary theoreticians on the university, such as Ronald Barnett, will argue there are at least forty or so versions of the university from “entrepreneurial” to “environmental”. I do not go to that specific of a definition. All I mean in this dissertation by “university” is a tertiary level of education (“higher education”) terminating in a college degree with/without graduate-level credentials. It includes “college” as well because the enterprise to teach, learn, and research as professors and students are all coherent goals of this level.
such and start over. The principle characteristic of Catholic education is a classical liberal arts curriculum (of various kinds) for the formation of human character, the promotion of the well-rounded citizen to better serve one's neighbor, and the knowledge necessary for salvation.

Chapter one details a select history of American Catholic higher education beginning with Pope Leo XIII and the debate over the “heresy” of “Americanism” leading into the landmark 1967 document the *Land O’ Lakes Statement* wherein American Catholic higher education shifts from Vatican-based influence to lay control. The chapter also offers a compare/contrast of this document with Pope St. John Paul II’s *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, his apostolic constitution on the nature of Catholic universities. Chapter two lays out Emmanuel Levinas’s ethical phenomenology. Levinas is crucial for this project because, as demonstrated above, relationship is a crucial component to Catholic universities and Levinas’s ethics is relational. This feature distinguishes him from the rest of philosophy, and his Jewish roots offer a dialogue with Catholicism. Chapter three presents the philosophy of education of Jacques Maritain, which I use to form the basis of the concrete interaction of the student-teacher relationship, modifying Levinas’s ethics with content to fit the classroom. Chapter four unites the concepts of the previous three chapters into one argument, explaining the convictions of all the contents culminating in what I call “neo-restorationism,” the mediating step to returning the Catholic university

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2 Some Catholic schools are already practicing things like promoting Catholic teaching *because* they did not adopt certain secular paradigms in their operations (organization, mission, etc.) in the first place.

3 Not necessarily something akin to the Great Books program, as the Jesuits historically use their own *Ratio Studiorum*. 
to its proper roots. This chapter is the heart of the dissertation as it is the core argument for the movement of the Catholic university moving forward. Chapter five takes the space to respond to several major objections, notably the business model of the university and how the ethical-relationship combats it.

What is important to note is where this project is going a la Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Levinas considering Levinas’s work is lesser known than his counterpart Maritain. Catholic higher education has a “continental” feel beneath it, the style out of which these philosophers philosophize. Catholic higher education mirrors the philosophies of these three thinkers in ways that play out in the actual philosophies. Husserl, for instance, has a phenomenology stating it can make sense of all things relevant to (i.e., contained in) consciousness, whereas Heidegger’s phenomenology pertains strictly to the life of the individual on earth as oriented towards his/her own projects. Levinas’s philosophy challenges both, especially Heidegger, to the primacy of intentional consciousness and the individual’s self-interested ends by placing Otherness, that which is outside the self, first in the order of being.

In essence, Catholic higher education has a Husserlian intentionality towards the power, prestige, and pleasures of high academic rank. It seeks to achieve these ends via a Heideggerian obsession with self-interested projects directed solely towards its own ends. Levinas, however, reminds us that life is not about us, that other people exist and impose responsibilities on us in ways similar to a child towards a parent. I am not free to do as I please because other people “precede” me, that is, they come before my own wants and wishes. He, along with Maritain, reminds us Catholic higher education exists to serve
God and neighbor, not the interests of a select few. Select few Catholic schools actually do not need Levinas’s insight for they are already living and teaching godly Catholicism in their schools. As for the rest, they need a reset button. They need to return to their roots in service towards others, namely students (and faculty), which the foregoing schools already embody. I argue this service, and the root of all universities both secular and religious, is found in the student-teacher relationship.

Freedom, in Maritain’s educational philosophy, concerns liberation of the mind, another way of saying to strengthen one’s mental acuity. The mind is much like a muscle: it must be worked regularly to maintain its tone, strength, and virility or it weakens. One must consistently work at intellectual exercises to “build” the perspicacity of one’s intellect. This exercise is important because the mind is used all of one’s life: in labor, love, and leisure. To simply go along with what society teaches is antithetical to the life of the mind and the free individual. Countries need capable citizens to think on their feet, not just in governmental matters (e.g., free elections), but also for the promotion of a free population. In this way, Maritain links his notion of the freedom of the free citizen with freedom in the classroom. Just as the free citizen has the freedom to pursue her own ends, so too, the liberal arts enables the student space for freedom of thought.

Here is how I am “separating the sheep from goats”. Other than a sincere attempt to live out the tenets of the Catholic faith as laid out in the Catholic catechism, there are no other qualifications. I will differentiate certain understandings of Church teaching in this regard throughout the dissertation.

I do not wish anyone to think I am taking a political stance on either side of the spectrum here.
On this note, Maritain argues the experience of freedom in learning is more internal than external. My environment is always conditioning me in some fashion, but I do have the freedom to act towards my situation according to my own free will, including how one responds to the teacher and the texts offered. Learning in the classroom allows me to act in accord with my better nature by ordering my passions. In this way, one grows in character when studying the liberal arts because the mind aligns itself with higher things, compared to the mechanism of scientistic types of pedagogy. It is not only a freedom from passion, it is a freedom from totalitarian kinds of education. Teachers cannot help but influence their students to grow and walk along their own paths, at least in liberal arts education. Growth and learning cannot happen, however, when teachers have preconceived notions of the student they are trying to mold, a kind of totalitarianism of the classroom. Students fashioned into products will only become consumers unable to think critically about the world.

The specificities of curriculum will no question vary from Catholic university to Catholic university. What unites them is a coherent philosophical anthropology rooted in Catholic theology. Formal education can handle a religious education handed on over the centuries when that education is rigorous, thoughtful, and morally upright. The Catholic university argued for in this dissertation provides all of these to the benefit of our children.
II. THE HISTORICAL PROBLEM

It is no controversy that the Catholic Church has her own take on metaphysics. Borrowing from Plato, Aristotle, and the Church Fathers’ own insights, she has crafted her own theo-philosophical anthropology over her two-millennia existence. Included in Church teaching is the notion that God made humankind in His image (*imago Dei*), that there is something about human beings that reflects divine nature, namely the ability to love and to reason. Being made in God’s image bestows on us an inherent dignity, or an indissoluble worth and respect, about our nature. It can never be sold or given away, but it can be violated. The ways of violating one’s dignity are too numerous for this dissertation, but it will touch on the ways a relational-spiritual violation can happen to students of Catholic universities. Since this dissertation concerns Catholic universities, one way is in the curriculum (particularly philosophy and theology) according to formal education’s understanding of philosophical anthropology.

It starts with the turn of the twentieth-century and the controversy over the American bishops claiming the Catholic Church has not the authority to command them. I will proceed to explain the aforesaid controversy and how it leads into the curriculum debates of the American 1940s and 50s. I will then discuss how these debates were the

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6 The theme of dignity is taken up more extensively in the succeeding chapters on Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Maritain, and argumentation for the student-teacher relationship. Levinas is necessary, as I will explain at the end of the chapter, for “grounding” the university in relationship in order to justify the student-teacher relationship. Like Maritain, dignity plays a role in his philosophizing. Maritain is necessary for embodying Levinas and making the student-teacher relationship concrete in the university.

7 Meaning the magisterium—the teaching body of the Church—and the pope, referred to as “the Vatican” onward.

8 There is a recommendation for Catholic schools to adopt secular values in promotion of their missions and morals.
foundation of major historical events in American Catholic higher education. These events culminate in the now infamous Land O’Lakes Statement, and so I will expound the document’s contents and provide its philosophical presuppositions in the educational philosophy of Fr. Theodore Hesburgh, its primary author. Next, I will do the same exposition for the four documents of Catholic higher education—with emphasis on the student-teacher relationship—immediately succeeding the Land O’Lakes Statement with emphasis on Ex Corde Ecclesiae, the Vatican’s official document on Catholic higher education. I will then explain the Ex Corde Ecclesiae’s take on the student-teacher relationship, compare it with the Land O’Lakes Statement, and finally address the historical problem we find ourselves in light of this pedagogical development.

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9 These debates parallel the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, major influences on Levinas’s thought.

10 Also taken up in the Levinas and Maritain chapters.
Americanism

Pope Leo XIII founded the Catholic University of America (Washington, D.C.) in 1887 in order that Catholic teachers could instruct the laity in the faith, beginning with philosophy and theology as those are the foundational projects to any education. In 1895, Leo authors the first of two letters addressed to the American Church to encourage the Catholic faithful to be steady in their faith. More a celebration of America than a condemnation, there was a general worry that American Catholics, while faithful to Church doctrine, were starting to stray from their moral and intellectual foundations. Americans were known for separating Church and State in a way unbefitting the Church, namely, the reduction of Church authority to civil authority. Leo worried that American Catholics were being led astray by their secular counterparts in separating the Catholic Church and public law. He addresses two key areas: “the advancement of learning [and]

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11 The history taken up here and throughout this dissertation would look significantly different if I were engaging eminent philosopher Charles Taylor whose work describes the unfolding of how secularism came to replace a religious mindset in Western culture. Of course any project would look differently through the lens of any philosopher’s understanding of history, Taylor is especially known for his contributions to the question of religiosity in the 20th century. I decided to exclude him from consideration for three reasons. First, any dissertation needs limits, and for what I am saying here Taylor did not fit my goals. Taylor is discussing all of the West as such over many centuries, whereas I am referring to a corner of it regarding a semi-niche topic. Including Taylor seemed excessive. Second, while I could include the relevant parts of Taylor—which would require further explanation of how his project may or may not fit into my own—the purpose of the history presented here is to demonstrate conceptual continuity over the past 120+ years of thinking about American Catholic education. The ideas thereof are located in their historical contexts, and Taylor’s inclusion would seem to overcomplicate the issue. Last, the concretion of what to actually do about the problem of recovering American Catholic education’s roots is more practical than theoretical. A history working in the background as to how we are living—or not—in a secular age is a fine thing, but I simply do not need it. One could easily argue, however, Taylor’s tracing of secularity to the present day could contribute to a solution by pointing us in the right direction for how not to go about Catholic education, but it also could not. I would much prefer to stick to primary source material and let the documents therein speak for themselves, the authors, and the climate in which they were crafted. There is a theoretical root as to why American Catholic education is the way it is, and it is found in the historical documents discussed in this chapter. I thought it better to keep the analysis as simple as possible. Any hermeneutic errors are strictly my own. See Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
a perfecting of methods in the management of Church affairs.”

I will focus on the former. Leo encourages faculty and students to develop all their faculties because “an education cannot be deemed complete which takes no notice of modern sciences.” For Leo, education is not simply character development through theology, yet, there was a worry that American Catholic religion was waning in favor of democratic principles as the sole foundation of morality: “…it would be very erroneous to draw the conclusion that in America is to be sought the type of the most desirable status of the Church, or that it would be universally lawful or expedient for State and Church to be, as in America, dissevered and divorced.”

Education aids in establishing the Catholic faith among the American laity, and though the pope does praise America for its “pro religion” stance of welcoming Catholic worship, he laments that the Church and State are separated. The Catholic Church, whose principle and purpose being to promote and encourage the salvation of all peoples represented by Leo, is concerned that earthly cares carry more weight than either eternal or everlasting ones. Since the Church does not have an immediate influence on public law, there is concern for denigrating the influence of religion and morality.

Leo followed up his Longinqua in 1899 with the now infamous Testem Benevolentiae, or, “Concerning New Opinions, Virtue, Nature and Grace, With Regard to

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13 Longinqua, §7.

14 Longinqua, §6.

15 By which he means allowing it to exist.
Americanism”. Testem Benevolentiae adopts a much more serious tone: “the object of this letter is not to repeat the praise so often accorded, but rather to point out certain things which are to be avoided and corrected.” Leo has in mind the theological liberalism of Fr. Isaac Hecker. Hecker was a Redemptorist priest who went to Rome asking the pope for permission to establish an English-speaking house (compared to the German one he lived) so as to evangelize easier the English-speaking population of New York. Not only was he denied, but the Redemptorists expelled him for disobeying a direct order to stay in America, hence the controversy. The root of Hecker’s liberalism is his belief that clergy ought to have more freedom in their own orders to move their missions about and make their own (theologically inspired) decisions outside the order and direction of a superior. Specifically, Hecker thought the Church had to adapt to the age it was situated in so as to better serve Her people. More specifically, “the Church ought to adapt herself somewhat to our advanced civilization, and…show some indulgence to modern popular theories and methods,” in other words, change Church doctrine to make converts.

Leo dismissed Hecker’s philosophy, through Testem, by pointing out the Church is the best judge of adapting to an age, not the individual. His condemnation is not directed at Hecker per se, but the entire philosophy of “Americanism” (one he represents), which

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17 McAvoy, The Great Crisis, 379. His description of the matter is similar to Husserl’s description of phenomenology as descriptions of intentional experience, which I will explain in the succeeding chapter.

18 McAvoy, 380.
is never given a proper definition. In general, Americanism refers to the tendency of American Catholics, especially the bishops,\textsuperscript{19} to adopt Protestant values in an attempt to appear faithfully assimilated into American culture. Americanist proponents tended to value “[New World] intellectual freedom…in contrast to Old World Authoritarianism.”\textsuperscript{20} It was thought that the Vatican did not appreciate the American Catholic adaptive situation, and so its influenced waned whilst American bishops could decide what was best for their flocks.\textsuperscript{21} The “American ideal” of freedom of expression made it easy to justify any position one wanted. American bishops were concerned Catholic laity were being given too much tradition when really they needed progression. Leo was concerned that because liberalism\textsuperscript{22} was a core tenant of American government and culture, American Catholics would slide into being Protestants. In particular, there was thought to be a bishopric emphasis on “social, political, and cultural issues,” not doctrine.\textsuperscript{23} Since doctrine is the defining feature of any religion, identifying itself apart from others, Leo thought were American Catholics to absorb a less reserved philosophy of life, they might forfeit their eternal salvation. What evolved as “Catholic liberalism” combined the social doctrine of the Church with the openness of American freedom of expression and


\textsuperscript{20} Hitchcock, \textit{Americanism}, 243.

\textsuperscript{21} E.g., how best to teach them Church doctrine.

\textsuperscript{22} Here meaning ideas that challenge traditional reasons for holding Catholic theology.

experimentation with new ideas. But involvement with socio-political liberalism was not a theological issue. Leo was hitting more on theological liberalism, a theology that makes palatable difficult moral and theological teachings to encourage more conversions. That kind of mindset greatly affected the psyche of American Catholic educators.

*The Augustinian/Thomist Debate*

The fundamental problem facing educators before and after WWII, especially theologians, is how does Catholic education move forward. There are two options. On the one hand is the Augustinian-Bonaventurian model (related to the “religious” model above) which emphasizes faith formation and personal conviction. It places its curricular-pedagogical goal in the hands of faculty as potters of the students’ souls in teaching them how to live as Christians. It acts as a journey for the student in discovering the finer points of Christian living. On the other hand is the Thomistic model taking its cue from Scholasticism. It emphasizes teaching theology as a science (systemized knowledge) with intellectual rigor geared more towards academic study. Its goal is to form students in knowledge of the Catholic faith informed by Church doctrine as passed on by theologians. This approach has more of an official endpoint in mind, providing explanations of theological material for students to be able to defend in private or public

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24 This miscommunication is further part of the misunderstandings between the Vatican and American bishops.

25 The problem is fundamental because how one goes about Catholic education impacts how the faithful are formed, thus denoting the future of the Church in the United States. Educators were uncertain whether a classical, character-based education was better for forming Catholic consciences (and so to live as faithful Catholics), or a deeper, more sophisticated theology would combat the rising secular forces in society depleting Catholic morals via an apologetic and academic ethos.
about the Church and faith. These options, however, do not oppose each other as St. Thomas Aquinas himself was not only an “intellectual”. The name is misleading because his faith guides and leads him through philosophical questions the same as it does for St. Augustine or St. Bonaventure. That is not strictly the case for either approach’s proponents as the following three positions exemplify.26

Positions on theological education are framed by a distinction between “college” and “university”. “College” is understood to refer to undergraduate education, while “university” to graduate. Colleges are found within universities (e.g., the Klinger School of Arts & Sciences at Marquette University) teaching undergraduates the basics of their fields. Graduate schools, depending on the field, are there to deepen instruction often in technical ways not available to the general population. Fr. Gerald B. Phelan argues not only that theology is the queen of the sciences, but that there is a distinction between how theology is taught at colleges compared to universities. Theology is more of an intellectual, scientific pursuit (what one might call “systematic” today) and religion more about morality and the general character of the school. The former ought to have all the resources necessary (funding, etc.) to do theology at a “higher level,”27 something like rigorous academic work deepening religion, while colleges instruct religious virtue. Theology is built on top of religion, and “intellectual revival” is the heart of Phelan’s position.

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27 Young, Theological Education, 14.
Fr. Francis O’Connell develops the idea of a theology for the laity for colleges in
not only advising an increase in religious devotion in such courses, but in building up the
student to “engage in intelligent discussions of religious issues” so as to “harmonize
Revelation and reason”. In that sense, Phelan’s concepts of theology and religion are
blended together, but function as an apologetic to educate the laity in the basic truths of
the Catholic faith so as to permit intelligent discussion, defense, and dissemination of
Catholicism. Fr. John Courtney Murray sides with O’Connell and Phelan on the notion
of instilling religiosity (understood in a practical-pastoral context as living God’s Word),
but disagrees that it should serve an apologetic function. Murray accepts graduate level
theology as a more advanced treatment of theological truths, but theology for the college
student teaches the livability of faith in order to “energize [students’] spiritual life.” It
is not a bunch of doctrine for memorization and defense, but an instantiation of what it
means to be a Christian. For Murray, colleges and universities need to provide the kinds
of theologies students want, need, and desire to learn because “those of us who teach
should learn from those of you who learn from us.” Among these three theologians,
there is a consistent push for laity, in particular in colleges, to gain some kind of upper
hand in American society through theological education whether through a personal-
Augustinian approach on living one’s life as a Christian, or through an intellect-centered
academic approach in defending the truths of the Faith. These positions are indicative of

28 Young, 15-16.
29 Young, 21.
30 Young, 18. Like Levinas, Murray also discusses relationship, except he lays out the relationship of
Church and State, not intersubjectivity.
the debate and resolutions to come in the following decades of Catholic higher education. Before elaborating on these, it is important to note the concept of “need” arises frequently in Pamela Young’s description of pre-Vatican II Catholic higher education.

The notion of a theology for the laity was gaining traction right when laity began pouring into Catholic universities. Catholic colleges were originally founded to encourage men into seminary. From grade school through tertiary studies, (young) men were surrounded by clerical teachers and administrators. The entire process was built to push them along a path of God and service, but as lay people were admitted to universities, the sheer numbers (due to the G.I. Bill) overwhelmed the amount of priests and religious needed to keep up with enrollments. The laity, as Fr. John M. Cooper argues, do not have the same needs as seminarians. They are “preparing...for life in the world [not a religious order]” and “many technical matters that are essential to the professional theological equipment of the confessor, the parish priest or the religious teacher are quite unnecessary for the layman or laywoman.” Sister M. Madeleva Wolff backs this notion up with her support of religious education stating most lay Catholics and religious Sisters “have little better than a good eighth-grade education in religion” given that all the best courses and instructions are reserved for seminarians. Without an education, Catholics could not be expected to live our their faith in a meaningful way. They needed to be taught in such a way that their faith could be lived out and intertwined with their everyday lives and professional obligations. The best way Cooper and Wolff

31 Young, 23-24.
32 Young, 25.
33 Young, 30.
believed that to be the case was through classroom instruction. But classroom instruction can also include more rigorous, academic lessons as the Thomistic approach emphasizes. Fr. Walter Farrell, O.P., argues that speculative theology is what makes a college or university Catholic given that it is on theological bases that one can call oneself Catholic at all. Instead of teaching faith, the Thomistic approach “presupposes faith” with the notion that “theology can be [intellectually] learned” and not simply lived.\(^{34}\) The emphasis for Farrell is on the how—how should theological material be presented. The Thomistic, intellectual approach is preferable because, presumably, it allows for less error due to its systematic organization: students need organization, and they can more easily see how theology fits into everyday life when they know how to classify it. This position is elaborated on by Fr. Bernard Cooke, S.J., by explaining that the pastoral function traditionally found in religion is bounded to theology in the latter’s “deepening and clarifying the faith commitment of the students.”\(^{35}\) Students need to know how their faith differentiates them from non-Catholic theologies. Theology is taught and religion, understood as practical theology, flows from that into one’s life. These needs, rather their debates, are what fundamentally shaped theological education in the coming years.

It is also possible this entire debate is nothing but semantics as Roy Deferarri has said.\(^{36}\) To say it is semantics is misleading because, though subtle, the slight gradation of difference in the wording and course descriptions, etc., makes the problem what it is. The problem is whether one is learning theology (of which one need not a religious

\(^{34}\) Young, 38, emphasis mine.

\(^{35}\) Young, 45.

\(^{36}\) Young, 44-45.
affiliation) or religion (where living out one’s faith is is part and parcel of knowing it).

What complicates matters further is that the Augustinian/Thomistic debate is not as clean as it seems. There are complex factors behind the scenes leading to these positions which I cannot elaborate here, but can offer an instantiation relevant to this dissertation.

Thomistic advocates are not opposed to faith-as-a-journey in the classroom. As I pointed out earlier, Thomas himself was working out his faith in his work. No question there are Catholic scholars who do this without thinking about it, and the Thomistic advocates are certainly not opposed to the working out of one’s spiritual struggles. Of course, the Augustinian approach lacks the rigor expected of tertiary-level education. Each approach has a weakness, but the trouble lies in the outcomes of such positions. What happens (or is supposed to happen) to students who take seriously these curricular approaches? The needs of students are as infinite as their souls are deep, and either position will certainly lack what good the other offers. The Augustinian might provide a deep engagement with one’s own convictions, but the Thomistic might enhance such convictions with academic theology, and in theory, there is no telling why one could not simply adopt a both/and approach.

This process of religion as “a life to be lived” rather than speculated developed to the point of separating the pastoral side of theology completely from the classroom. The

37 A diverse student body, university politics, increased lay faculty, and “the professionalization of campus ministry.” Young, xiii.

38 There were complaints that Cooper’s Christ-centered approach to theological education is “less rigorous than what would be acceptable” in today’s college. Young, 9.

39 Young, xvi.
“abandonment of the Augustinian perspective”40 is bad for such theologians because for them it represents a decline in authentic Catholicity given one can be “professionally trained” anywhere. Yet, one could argue the opposite case just as easily. The university classroom is not there for students to explore their faith in creative ways, it is there to properly instruct them in the near non-objectionable aspects of faith (e.g., dogma) in ways they—in the past or present—could not access for themselves. Professional training with Catholicism cannot be found anywhere else, so Catholics need it to find work and function in society. What comes of this debate for this dissertation is that theologians were taking seriously the fact that students have specific needs outside theology,41 shaping the future of American Catholic higher education, and these positions are indicative of future developments, most notably the Land O’Lakes Statement (LOL) in 1967. As the structure of the Catholic university shifted, so did the attitude toward Catholic academic promise. Before I discuss LOL, I will first describe the basic structure of Catholic universities up to that point with some commentary on historic events to further denote the place of Catholic higher education in the 21st century.

Complications Leading up to the Land O’Lakes Statement

Coming out of the Catholic intellectual scene was this desire for intellectual rigor. Monsignor John Tracy Ellis’s essay “American Catholics and the Intellectual Life”42 puts into words what many Catholic academics were thinking but not expressing outright.

40 Young, xii.

41 Needs and poverty take up a major section of the Levinas chapter.

“Intellectual Life” spurns people to action because enough pressure had built within Catholic higher education that people were tired of being pushed around by secular counterparts and wanted more freedom, understood as interaction with the outside world. Philip Gleason writes the “rising chorus of complaints about [Catholic] separatism, ghettoism, the siege mentality, undue reliance on crude pressure-group tactics, and the pervading smugness and complacency that would later be called ‘triumphalism’” in lay publications like Commonweal and Cross Currents. Catholic educators came wanting less inferiority and more achievement.

Because Catholics had difficult living conditions, Ellis argues American Catholics had issues with intellectual accomplishments compared with “what the immigrant status implied by way of poverty, hardship, yes, and even illiteracy.” Intellectual achievement was not realistic. Gleason clarifies the economic situation is “too great a priority to the moral development of students as opposed to their progress towards intellectual excellence.” And for that reason, “any true intellectual distinction [among Catholics]… would have met with very slight appreciation in the United States.” There simply was not enough historical precedent among lay American Catholics to justify pursuing intellectual work. The unfortunate “state of Catholic leadership in most walks of life”

43 Gleason, Contending with Modernity, 288.
44 Ellis, Intellectual Life, 18.
45 Gleason, Contending with Modernity, 290.
46 Ellis, Intellectual Life, 19.
47 Never mind the entire Thomistic/Augustinian debate. That was the beginning of serious academic consideration amidst lay backlash.
also did not help building scholarship.\textsuperscript{48} He cites a study determining “the relationship between scientific eminence and church membership” of which only three Catholics are found out of 303 scientists.\textsuperscript{49}

Ellis’s conclusion is that the time of material poverty in the laity has passed, and time was ripe for change in American Catholic intellectuality, away from strict moral development and towards the life of the mind.\textsuperscript{50} His solution is for Catholics to stop moping about the past and work harder. He writes, “it is…a unique opportunity that lies before the [American] Catholic scholars which…may inspire them to do great things.”\textsuperscript{51} No matter the intellectual excellence boost to Catholic higher education, Catholics “were not in a position to define academic excellence.”\textsuperscript{52} Catholic universities required models, and they found them in Ivy League schools and upper-tier State schools (e.g., Stanford). What Catholic higher education required was a means of integrating the student learning experience in unique ways separate from these schools. An attempt was made with neo-Thomism, which perished almost as quickly as it arose.

Neo-Thomism, sometimes referred to as neo-Scholasticism, is the 20th century revival of the methods and philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas catalyzed by Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical \textit{Aeterni Patris}, encouraging institutions of Catholic higher learning to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{48} Ellis, \textit{Intellectual Life}, 47.
  \item \textsuperscript{49} Ellis, 48.
  \item \textsuperscript{50} Ellis is taking a step back to analyze part of the background problem, much like Husserl takes a step back from the scientific world to analyze ideal essences.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} Ellis, \textit{Intellectual Life}, 59.
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Gleason, \textit{Contending with Modernity}, 295.
\end{itemize}
promulgate his philosophy and theology. It was a reaction against the claims of modern philosophy to destroy metaphysics and provide anew a foundation in natural science. It gained momentum up to the 1950s because of seminarian pedagogy—the priests educated in the decades before were trained in the neo-Scholastic method, and they in turn became the succeeding generation of professors. The breakdown occurs in neo-Thomism’s philosophical side seeking to provide a comprehensive worldview. The main source of criticism actually originates in students.

There are three main critiques of neo-Thomism. First, how it was taught. It did not help that there were ill-prepared teachers for neo-Thomism’s many formulaic deductions. Because it was a method, it required more “training” than most other schools of philosophy. One could not simply pick it up and instruct students in how to philosophize. For that reason, students often complained that “philosophy was simply ‘memory work’.” Not only these, but also its “dryness, formalistic technicality, remoteness from the present, and a lack of clear relevance” to other disciplines. Beginning with students, neo-Thomism was on a downward path.

Second, like the unprepared teachers, neo-Thomism’s different interpretations added to the confusion of its official positions. Sometimes the matters at stake were so obvious, a non-philosopher could readily understand them. Other problems even specialists had difficulty. For example, whether Thomas’s thought was accurately

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54 Gleason, *Contending with Modernity*, 299.

55 Gleason, 299.
portrayed by his historical interpreters. That raises a problem for Catholic educators, for how can different schools of Thomistic thought claim to unify the Catholic university when those differences seek to undermine it? Add to the problem the confusion in the student body and you have the second critique.

The third problem shared by students and professors alike was the increasing authoritarianism of the Thomistic school. By “authoritarianism” one really means Church authority. Neo-Thomism had become associated with the institutional Church to the effect that the teaching of one’s ideas implied the other. It was becoming an ideology. Students were, on the contrary, finding themselves attracted to subjective modes of inquiry in order to better understand their own inner movements. Neo-Thomism, for them, was stagnant and needing an affective component to enhance philosophical reflection. As the tension between “conservative” neo-Thomists and “liberal” detractors increased—notice the similarity between pro-Americanization “progressives” and Church traditionalist “conservatives” in the Americanist controversy—the Catholic Church initiated Vatican II, effectively eliminating the debates on the need for religion and theology, but adding a new debate on the place of freedom in the Catholic university.

An instance of this new debate is the Catholic University of America’s rector, William J. McDonald, forbidding progressive thinkers from speaking on campus so as not to become partisan in the Vatican II theological debates. One theologian, Fr. Hans Küng, relished his rejection with a national speaking tour. His lecture “The Church and

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56 The Second Vatican Council, more popularly known as “Vatican II,” was an ecumenical council announced by Pope John XXIII lasting from 1962-65 to encourage spiritual renewal, ecumenism (Christian unity), and dialogue with modernity.

57 Gleason, Contending with Modernity, 306.
Freedom” discussed the shift in Church thinking about obedience, law, and subsidiarity. Among his many claims, Küng called for a wider acceptance of freedom of conscience, that is, the obligation of the Church to support her people’s judgment on the truth of theological dogma. Catholics ought not be obligated to accept anything they do not personally approve. Küng denies that this tendency leads to relativism, albeit he does not explain how, for the freedom he is advocating resonates with the American Catholic public—freedom from authority. This freedom is too powerful to resist amid the demands for less authoritarianism in academic speech. One such case is the University of Dayton controversy that leads into the secularization of Catholic boards of directors.

In fall 1966, an unnamed philosophy faculty member accused other philosophers in the department of teaching heresy and views opposed to the magisterium. Immediately the campus erupts into discord with factions supporting both parties, but the issue does not lie with the faculty or administration, rather with the bishopric. The unnamed faculty member first writes directly to the archbishop, Karl J. Alter—who would rather have not involved himself—before confronting Dayton’s board of directors. Alter asks Dayton’s president, Fr. Raymond Roesch, to find the truth of the claims, who forms an ad hoc committee of associated members of the university to investigate the heretical claims. The committee finds said accused faculty innocent, yet the “complainants called Roesch’s report a whitewash.”\(^{58}\) A second committee is formed with non-Dayton affiliated people who in-turn did not clear the accused faculty of heresy, but neither did they condemn.

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\(^{58}\) Hence the mentioning of it in this dissertation.

\(^{59}\) Gleason, *Contending with Modernity*, 311.
Regardless, the situation was exacerbated by the report’s position that individual Catholics ought respect the magisterial authority of the Church, but respect does not apply to the university itself because the relationship to the magisterium is “indirect” and hence “outside of all authority”. The main issue underlying this relationship between faculty, university, and magisterial teaching is academic freedom, which I will return to in a moment. For now, heretical teaching or not, do faculty have the right to say what they want at Catholic universities? The president’s ad hoc committee suggested “yes” because the university’s purpose is to become secular, meaning “a new freedom for [people] to perfect the world in a non-religious way.” The call was not taken seriously and had no backlash. Still, “never before had a formally constituted faculty committee at a Catholic university flatly recommended secularization as the policy to follow,” and the process of secularizing Catholic education was a long process. I will briefly trace this process through the laicization of boards of directors in order to address the larger problem of academic freedom.

Laicization began well before Vatican II’s decree that the laity ought to have a more active role in Church function. It was only after the Council that such involvement was officially permitted and encouraged. Laicization is

a shorthand term for the process, differing in detail from one place to another, whereby Catholic institutions of higher education gained more or less complete autonomy from their ‘sponsoring religious bodies’ by adding sizable numbers of

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60 Gleason, 311.

61 Gleason, 312.

62 Gleason, 312.

63 From Pope Leo XIII’s 1899 *Testem Benevolenciae* to the Council’s start date.
lay persons to the boards of trustees that held the ultimate authority over those institutions.64

Such authority could only obtain after several serious obstacles were overcome.65 First, laity had no academic qualification. Due to the need to train priests and religious to fulfill teaching duties, laity were usually forbidden from pursuing pedagogical roles in the university. Second, laity with such qualification were often secular, and because of the Catholic nature of the university, their contributions were ignored. Third, the consistent debt Catholic universities faced without endowment prevented them from paying laity a livable salary. “Catholic colleges and universities depended largely on tuition revenue,” and with lower fees coming into the school, administrations could not pay lay faculty. Schools often had “heavy reliance on part-time faculty, and above-average teaching responsibilities.”66 On top of the practical problems facing laity involvement, there were conceptual ones as well.

First, coupled with the training problem above, religious members communicated their university’s mission better than laity. Laity were treated with suspicion that “religious traditions, academic values, and institutional goals” would be communicated to students in a manner acceptable to the administration.67 Second, and most controversial, before Vatican II Catholic universities “rejected concepts of academic freedom and

64 Gleason, Contending with Modernity, 312.
faculty rights” in secular universities. This notion will be revisited in the following section. It suffices to say that Catholic administrators’ rights, actual or presumed, were to ensure orthodoxy. Thus, intervention in matters pertaining to such orthodoxy was the responsibility of the board of directors. Third, promoting laity—not clergy—to positions of power (e.g., board of directors) would potentially damage Catholic schools’ reputations, making a secular academy. Various plans to renegotiate ownership and control of Catholic universities from religious orders to laity after Vatican II sparked outcry from both parties. One lay faculty at St. John’s University decried the transfer of ecclesiastical control to lay control as “a blueprint for the complete secularization of Catholic higher education.”

Established above, lay involvement began well before Vatican II in the form of professional schools. Small Catholic colleges expanded their liberal arts offerings to include “business, law, medical, dental” and various professional types of schools. The laity grew in influence because, unlike the religious, they had increased numbers from their specializations. One does not make a living as a lay person portraying a priest or nun.

This expansion couples with the discussion of the religion/theology debate over Catholic curriculum. Increased enrollment, again, prompted colleges to expand their course offerings because students demanded more options. The relationship to lay faculty hence underwent a major shift. First, and most obvious, universities needed lay faculty to teach such courses. Clergy were not equipped to deal with professional

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68 Leahy, 19.
69 Leahy, 20.
70 Leahy, 20.
courses, and lay faculty with formal schooling could solve the problem. Second, “changing aspirations in Catholic higher education” provided lay faculty an opportunity to showcase their talents.\footnote{Leahy, \textit{The Rise of the Laity}, 23.} Catholic universities began to adopt a secular mentality over university prestige. Religious background takes a backseat to professional advancement in teaching positions. There was a desire for greatness alluded to in the previous section that is rooted in this shift to professionalization. Third, as lay faculty contributions increased, there was a growing message that laity were treated as second-class citizens. They “felt administrators treated them as employees” instead of people.\footnote{Leahy, 24.} Fourth, stated above, Vatican II’s desire for laity to share in greater responsibility influences some schools (e.g., St. Louis University in 1967) to appoint only laity to boards of trustees. Trustees are in charge of the financial runnings of the school, which leads me into my fifth point: their professional training in business forms the laity to share in university financial responsibility. Catholic universities started to understand the nature of finance—you cannot exist only on tuition and existing benefactors. You need people (laity) with a personal interest in the university to contribute financially within. Such people will only do that with a position of power to influence the direction of the school.\footnote{This direction of the school mirrors Husserl’s intentionality.} That position of power points us to my sixth point, that is, religious control of Catholic universities might mean no federal money. The State of Maryland’s Court of Appeals struck down a previous decision to grant federal money to religious universities because the religious control of those schools granted them a sectarian character. One lawyer

\footnote{Leahy, \textit{The Rise of the Laity}, 23.}

\footnote{Leahy, 24.}

\footnote{This direction of the school mirrors Husserl’s intentionality.}
representing the religious schools recommended Catholic schools function more like secular universities, instituting “tenure, promotion, and sabbatical leave” and also academic freedom. Last, the clergy themselves played major role in laicization through their defense of the laity. Former Notre Dame president Fr. James Burns, CSC, argues “excluding lay people from university faculties…would deprive institutions of badly needed talent,” and one solution was to finance graduate education for some Catholic students in order to hire them immediately for teaching upon graduation.

I said at the end of the previous section the secularizing of Catholic higher education was a long process. This current section describes that process less the details appropriate for this dissertation. The question of academic freedom as the norm for faculty, however, is intimately tied to laicization and pervades the literature on Catholic higher education. It will now be discussed through the most influential document in American Catholic higher education.

The Historical Moment: The Land O’Lakes Statement

The Land O’Lakes Statement (LOL) is a 1967 document signed by 20+ members of Catholic university administration and staff, relinquishing traditional control of American Catholic universities by ecclesial authority in favor of a self-legislating autonomy and freedom from outside influence in the wake of Vatican II as a mark of the

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75 Leahy, 26.

76 Including Fr. Theodore Hesburgh (president of the University of Notre Dame 1952-1987) and Fr. Paul Reinert (president of St. Louis University 1949-1972). These men are the catalysts for many of the changes consequent of laicization.
modern university and the Church’s contemporaneity. It stresses the need for Catholic universities to adapt to the times by permitting an open air of dialogue between the Church and secular ideas, emphasizing academic freedom as the key to the Catholic university’s engagement with the world. This document catalyzes an era of the American Catholic university in its authoritative break with the magisterium on matters of faith and morals, believing itself to be the primary determiner of theological doctrine. It was not met without controversy, however, and there are numerous build-ups to a formal resolution of its questionable message in its wake (e.g., Kinshasa, 1968 and Rome, 1969), the pinnacle of which is contained in Pope St. John Paul II’s 1990 apostolic constitution *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* (ECE). Its architect, Fr. Theodore Hesburgh, touches very little on the student-teacher relationship (and its importance), but its implications are profound for the functioning of the Catholic university. I will briefly expound the important contents of this document, and on the student-relationship, to contrast it with the contents of ECE on the same subjects.

The document’s first sentence begins “The Catholic university today must be a university in the full modern sense of the word, with a strong commitment to and concern

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79 Fr. Hesburgh discusses teachers and students in spurts throughout his corpus. In “Toward a Globalized Education” Hesburgh argues for a liberal arts education to humanize the materially impoverished parts of the world without any reference to his faith or the Catholic Church. His argument is based on the premise that the university and the Church are not at odds—anything the university as an institution wants to do the Church supports by default. See Theodore M. Hesburgh, *The Humane Imperative: A Challenge for the Year 2000* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), 63-83.
This idea of becoming modern is historically influenced. Catholic universities were struggling to adapt to Protestant American culture with higher standards of academic production in the wake of the “Catholic ghetto mentality” plaguing Catholic/American relations. In essence, Catholic groups would segregate themselves from contemporary American discourse for fear of persecution or a disinterest in academic matters, preferring character development instead, and that was the LOL committee’s mindset: to be modern means to be in touch with the world and its happenings like the fresh air of Vatican II. As a university, that meant discussing the problems of contemporary society with other faith traditions, but it also comes with a certain theoretical influence.

Academic excellence is obtained through, what in the very next sentence is perhaps the document’s most memorable and controversial: “To perform its teaching and research functions effectively the Catholic university must have a true autonomy and academic freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind, lay or clerical, external to the academic community itself.” Such a thought sent shockwaves through the Catholic educational community. How can a Catholic university call itself “Catholic” without any reference to authority, namely, Vatican authority? Fr. Hesburgh argued that Catholicism is much bigger than rules and conduct. Catholicism ought to get its universities up and

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80 Land O'Lakes Statement, 336.


82 Land O'Lakes Statement, 336.
running with freedom and maneuverability through the bureaucratic red tape so notorious in institutions of higher education. For Fr. Hesburgh, the Catholic university is an entity unto itself that is capable of determining what is in its own best interest. For Fr. Hesburgh, the Catholic university is an engagement with the world within a certain cultural context. Catholicism manifests differently in each school and “is perceptibly present and effectively operative” in the Catholic university, which lays out in the broad categories of the succeeding sections.

Section two claims the presence of Catholicism on Catholic university campuses is primarily established by theologians. What makes the Catholic university separate from the State is that academic theology is an exceptionally “high priority” because theology defines Catholicism. Accordingly, section three states theologians are to explore “the total religious heritage of the world” to conclude the meanings of theology for Christian anthropology for the sake of theological dialogue. Section four elaborates this notion of exploration as ecumenical interdisciplinary dialogue between theology and the rest of the university.

Theology is necessary to enlighten all of the disciplines insofar as they proceed to understand God’s creation, but theology cannot do its best work without understanding

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83 Hesburgh once famously noted “I knew that if I were going to see Notre Dame grow into a first-rate Catholic university I could no longer have to get permission from a Provincial every time I needed a new lawn mower” in Alice Gallin, *Independence and a New Partnership*, 1.

84 This philosophy mirrors Heideggerian philosophy’s emphasis on pursuing one’s own projects ahead of the interests of others, which I will explain in the following chapter.

85 *Land O’Lakes Statement*, 337.

86 *Land O’Lakes Statement*, 337.

87 *Land O’Lakes Statement*, 337.
these disciplines on their own terms. In building up the other disciplines, and aiding in solutions of “the problems of modern culture,” theology must dialogue with as many fields as possible. Theology, as an inquiry into God’s nature, understandably influences the Catholic nature of the school. It is only appropriate that it carry more weight. Yet, the document makes another remarkable claim, that “there must be no theological or philosophical imperialism.” Philosophy and theology cannot interfere with the methodology of other disciplines. Each discipline is an island unto itself regarding its methodology for gathering knowledge, and they are free to come to their own conclusions apart from these. Dialogue here respects other fields as ends in themselves. “There will necessarily result from the interdisciplinary discussions an awareness that there is a philosophical and theological dimension to most intellectual subjects when they are pursued far enough.” That is to say, LOL holds not all fields have philosophical and theological roots. Theology cannot enrich itself when delimiting the claims of other disciplines. This kind of interdisciplinary dialogue is only possible when “the Catholic university has a broad range of disciplines.” Fewer disciplines equals less opportunities for discussion. It helps having “considerable strength” in said disciplines for the dialogue to be fruitful and works best when scholars want interdisciplinary dialogue for their own good. The interdisciplinary dialogue of section four leads into the surveying state of the Catholic university in section five.

88 Land O’Lakes Statement, 338.
89 Land O’Lakes Statement, 338.
90 Land O’Lakes Statement, 338.
91 Land O’Lakes Statement, 338.
Section five advises the Catholic university to be the “critical reflective” agent of the Church, as all universities monitor national trends. Its purpose here is to track all the internal movements of the Church in order to “objectively evaluate them.” LOL does not specify how, only that “the Church would thus have the benefit of continual counsel from Catholic universities” for the university has heretofore rarely played a guiding role in Church happenings. Sections six and seven state outright that research is encouraged in all fields. Special preference is given to “problems of greater human urgency or of greater Christian concern.” It is never clarified which issues qualify as greater concern.

One might say it is implied the issues of the late 1960s—American government and urban issues—since they are cited in section seven as opportunities for service. The Catholic university, in addition, is ready to serve “society in all in parts” including the State. But the Catholic university must also “carry on similar activities” to the service of the Church. Once more, it is not specified what kinds of activities are acceptable.

Then LOL makes an odd move. Section 8, “Some Characteristics of Undergraduate Education,” expresses the manner in which undergraduates are to be educated. It includes some implications of how students are to be instructed and teachers who instruct them. This section argues that students need the freedom to develop themselves in

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92 Land O’Lakes Statement, 338.
93 Land O’Lakes Statement, 338.
94 Land O’Lakes Statement, 338.
95 Land O’Lakes Statement, 338.
96 Maritain’s educational goal is to create good citizens.
97 Land O’Lakes Statement, 338.
relation to the times as modern citizens. To be integrated with society, students need “a collegiate education that is truly geared to modern society,” an education that does not shy away from debating difficult topics or hard positions while contributing to the building up of community: “the intellectual campus of a Catholic university has no boundaries and no barriers. It draws knowledge and understanding from all the traditions of mankind [sic].” Teachers are expected to teach non-Catholic material (note: all traditions). That’s well and fine considering there are insights found in all kinds of authors, but there is a worrying implication about ignoring the rest of the Catholic intellectual tradition. This education is set against a backdrop of “the effective intellectual presence of the theological disciplines [that] will affect the education and life of the students in ways distinctive of a Catholic university”—the modern Catholic university will teach and challenge material outright that was previously forbidden. It used to be that Catholic schools only taught Catholic sources (philosophy and theology) to their students as a training in the faith. Due to a changing of times and interest in contemporary topics, especially in the wake of Vatican II, that was about to change. Students would be encountering more diverse types of material than ever before, except without the instruction in the faith, and their character development hinged on their direct involvement in social justice.

Then the document goes on to explain how the campus community functions.

Section 9 describes the Catholic campus is made not just for study, but for the expression

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100 Interest in phenomenology piqued and Levinas also makes use of justice, but I will not be discussing it.
of one’s Christianity in a Catholic atmosphere. LOL describes it as living out faith “experientially and experimentally,” by which the authors mean new ways of being Catholic in the world. As section 8 describes the student as autonomous, section 9 includes that autonomy in “find[ing] the meaning of the sacraments for themselves by joining theoretical understanding to the lived experience of them…for a full, meaningful liturgical and sacramental life.”\(^{101}\) Again, part of this sacramental life seems to be one’s measure in contributing to social justice causes—“inner-city social action, personal aid to the educationally disadvantaged, [etc.].”\(^{102}\) The section goes on further to mention that the kind of “person-to-person relationshi[p]”\(^{103}\) developed between students and faculty is a consequence of taking “Christian truth...seriously,” but it is led towards the end of, again, “consecrat[ing] their talent and learning to worthy social purposes.”\(^{104}\) And so the Catholic community is on display as one living a life ready to help the neighbor. This theme is continued in the final section.

Section ten offers an account of the university’s administrative structure. Because the Catholic university cares for students as people, and not just business assets, the university ought to reflect the learning community described in section 9 by offering “appropriate participation by all members of the community of learners in university decisions.”\(^{105}\) The democratic ideals of the United States are reflected in the university

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\(^{101}\) *Land O’Lakes Statement*, 340. Again, echoing Heidegger’s self-directed projects called “care”.

\(^{102}\) *Land O’Lakes Statement*, 340.

\(^{103}\) *Land O’Lakes Statement*, 340. Again, a major theme in Levinas, Maritain, and the following chapters.

\(^{104}\) *Land O’Lakes Statement*, 341.

\(^{105}\) *Land O’Lakes Statement*, 341.
governance. As a result, the Catholic university is constantly evolving with the times, and must reflect the necessary outcomes of society. For example, moving with the market, which also implies for LOL “[necessary] basic reorganizations of structure.”

To achieve this end, “a great deal of study and experimentation will be necessary to carry out these changes, but changes of this kind are essential for the future of the Catholic university.” The section and the document closes with a reminder that “the Catholic university of the future will be a true modern university,” yet Catholic in its commitment to God and service to society and His people. I will now explain what Fr. Hesburgh has in mind as per the university’s modernity in a speech he gave to the National Catholic Educational Association (NCEA), then briefly summarize the relevant sections for this dissertation of the major documents leading up to ECE in order to relate LOL to the present discussion.

**Hesburgh’s Vision of the Catholic University**

Fr. Hesburgh was asked to keynote the 1969 meeting of the NCEA’s annual conference. He spoke on the theme of change and its necessity for Catholic higher education. Not only education and the Vatican, but the general 1960s upheaval of all things historical in American culture served as a prominent reminder that times change, and so do people and institutions. The most important aspects of change in Catholic

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higher education, for Hesburgh, are the “basic ideas behind the structural changes [that] will be operative in the new structures.”110 The first idea is the change from religious (clerical) to lay trustees, the laicization spoken of earlier.

I will not rehash that material, only remind the audience laicization is generally the first major change to university structures after which follows all others. With the change to lay-control of boards, laity now make all policy decisions for the university with university statutes pronounced “under a state charter”.111 In other words, the Catholic university is now a separate institution from the Catholic Church—it is “largely independent of both” public and church authority.112 His speech mirrors LOL wherein it was declared the Catholic university must have freedom from “authority of whatever kind, lay or clerical,” internal or external to the university.113

Staying with the theme of freedom, Hesburgh elaborates further the ecclesial relationship. Because academic freedom (censure) was a sore topic in university/Vatican relations, Hesburgh’s solution comes from laicization in that the break with authority “remove[s] from the bishops and the magisterium of the church all the possible embarrassments that can come from an institution that is totally in the service of the church without being the church or the magisterium.”114 Next comes the dagger to positive magisterial relations: “The Catholic university, thus conceived, operates as a

111 Hesburgh, The Changing Face, 70.
112 Hesburgh, The Changing Face, 70.
113 Land O’Lakes Statement, 337. This position is relevant to Heidegger’s notion of “projection”.
114 Hesburgh, The Changing Face, 71, emphasis mine.
civil corporation, under a state charter and lay control.”¹ⁱ⁵ That is to say the Catholic university does what it wants when it wants without any recourse to another. The Catholic university does, however, “truly answer to [the Church and the State] and is organizationally responsible to neither.”¹¹⁶ How can the university answer to the Church or State without having any organizational responsibility? It’s a concern in the above documents, how Catholic universities are to organize themselves. Generally the documents are in accord to give more power to Catholic universities to govern themselves with the qualification, as I emphasized, that the gospel be witnessed and magisterial authority be respected. That kind of responsibility is the kind that gets in the way of professionalization.

The heart of professionalization is competence. Again, without repeating the above history, Catholic universities need competent teacher-scholars to prove their worth to the academic world. They will not attract students with a history of unacceptable academic performance. Professionalization also means the university structure is oriented towards academic excellence. Schools are free to decide their own standards of curriculum, tenure, and promotion. These are all well and fine, but professionalization symbolizes something deeper for Hesburgh, namely, severing “unmotivated obedience” towards Church hierarchy.¹¹⁷ He is trying to state without stating it that the same hierarchy has prevented Catholic higher education from becoming what it could be. In order to run a top-tier university, one needs peers to compare oneself. Catholic universities only had

¹¹⁵ Hesburgh, 71.
¹¹⁶ Hesburgh, 71.
each other heretofore to compare notes, but when all these schools are mediocre, it does not give one much incentive to try harder. The teaching authority of the Church transitions to the teaching authority of the scholar, which then impacts the students and teachers.

His philosophy of the teacher is understandably shaped by this move to professionalism. Professionalism eliminates any need for non-research oriented faculty because to gain traction at an elite university, one must produce copious amounts of material, an implication for the student-teacher relationship. Hence, teaching takes a backseat, and the teacher is more dead weight than a contributing member to university community. Research, however, is promoted to head of the class because it is what brings prestige, and with prestige comes respect. Catholic schools are no longer the victims of “ghetto mentality” as Ellis thought. The structure must shift to allow for these changes to start.\(^{118}\)

Hesburgh notes that this structural transition for Catholic university faculty “will sound strange to other secular institutions” who had already implemented such changes.\(^ {119}\) How can a Catholic university be secular? He might mean “secular” as a synonym for “lay-controlled,” but lay-controlled universities need not break with magisterial authority the way he does. “Secular” is celebrated in the *Land O’Lakes Statement* (“freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind, lay or clerical”) as synonymous with autonomy. He even goes so far to say “there is the assumption that

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\(^{118}\) How Catholic schools begin to “experience themselves” changes, the experience of one’s experiences as what one lives through is a topic Husserl takes up.

\(^{119}\) Hesburgh, *The Changing Face*, 73, emphasis mine.
being Catholic means being unfree” regarding academic freedom related to the magisterium.\textsuperscript{120} The importance of theology in the Catholic university, which all the above documents support, Hesburgh qualifies with “theology…must enjoy the same freedom and autonomy as any other university subject because, otherwise, it will not be accepted as a university discipline” and without that, “the university will never really be Catholic.”\textsuperscript{121} But how that theology is taught is another question.\textsuperscript{122} Here, he links teaching to the notion of the student.

He comments, in passing, that the teachers eliminated by university research preference “made ecumenism a reality in Catholic institutions of higher learning” before the word was used with any regularity.\textsuperscript{123} That’s problematic in ways he does not address because he does not see the problem—teachers are necessary for him to promote the ecumenism sought in LOL and praised here. Yes, university matters are bigger than the ecumenism in them, except there is constant discussion about community involvement, social justice, and the common good. How else does one change society without reference to otherness? And an otherness that needs dialogue, not war. Catholic universities mirror change in their students and campuses.

Hesburgh briefly lists the three main issues for students on Catholic campuses. First, he observes that students demand “relevancy” in all their courses. Given the revolutionary push of the American 1960s, it is understandable students want material

\textsuperscript{120} Hesburgh, 74.
\textsuperscript{121} Hesburgh, 73.
\textsuperscript{122} Recall the Augustinian/Thomism debate.
\textsuperscript{123} Hesburgh, \textit{The Changing Face}, 74.
that matters. He quickly nixes it, arguing that the only relevant material necessary are those subjects and questions relevant to our being, those of the liberal arts. Who else can communicate their importance but teachers in an ecumenical context? “Ecumenical” because of the globalized world related to student involvement, the second issue he touches on. In essence, these are the beginnings of student government. Hesburgh describes the urgency with which students want to change the world and healthily take advantage of university resources without any elaboration, but he makes an interesting move to the final student concern in religiosity and service. He singles out student devotion of “service to the poor and disadvantaged” as a kind of prayer. What that means for the university is that new avenues ought to be opened for students with questions about- and answers for social ills, not simply those “who mixed chemicals or measured elements in the laboratory,” because such former students are examples of Christian compassion. Hesburgh ends his keynote with encouragement to keep the changes coming for Catholic higher education’s survival. The changes do keep coming beginning with the Kinshasa Statement and its sister projects.

Kinshasa, Rome, Catholic University in the Modern World

Leaving off Fr. Hesburgh and transitioning in to the major documents leading up to ECE, is the Kinshasa Statement (Kinshasa, hereafter), the briefest of the documents. It was a position paper adopted by the International Federation of Catholic Universities (IFCU) stating in broad outline the nature of the Catholic university. The IFCU met at

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124 Recall the demand for graduate courses of the 1920s.

125 Hesburgh, The Changing Face, 79.

126 Hesburgh, The Changing Face, 79. This kind of openness is akin to Heidegger’s “mood”.
the Lovanium University in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo to discuss “the Catholic university in the modern world,”¹²⁷ but *Kinshasa* does not really expound on the nature of the Catholic university as LOL does. Affirming the “institutional commitment the Catholic university brings to its task [of] the inspiration and illumination of the Christian message,” Catholic universities embody “Catholic ideals attitudes, and principles” in all facets of university life.¹²⁸ Like LOL, Kinshasa holds “the Catholic university must be an academic institution, a community of scholars, in which Catholicism is present and operative”¹²⁹ and goes onto to copy LOL saying that this presence is maintained through the academic excellence of theological scholarship.¹³⁰ Recognizing the uncertainty of the times, *Kinshasa* also notes “the Christian community itself is uncertain of the future of the Catholic university.”¹³¹ It then provides nine objectives Catholic universities are to fulfill: integrating all knowledge “in light of the wisdom of Christian revelation,” connect theology to all areas of knowledge, making knowledge available to all, “to study and research problems of high Christian and human priority” (e.g., the family), a learning community for all, an environment where all participate in university life, promotion of ecumenism, university service to society, and

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¹²⁷ *Kinshasa*, 342.

¹²⁸ *Kinshasa*, 342-343.

¹²⁹ *Kinshasa*, 343, emphasis mine.

¹³⁰ The *Land O’Lakes Statement* is a strictly American document used by worldwide organizations, whose content is modified over the next half decade. *Gravissimum educationis* is a very broad Vatican II document on the importance of Catholic education. The American situation is unique insofar as there is an explicit break from Vatican authority (magisterium) on Church teaching.

¹³¹ *Kinshasa*, 344.
preparing students to contribute to the common good.\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Kinshasa}, however, then makes a move away from the spirit of LOL in saying “Catholic universities are dedicated by an institutional commitment which includes a respect for and voluntary acceptance of the Church’s teaching authority.”\textsuperscript{133}

The spirit of this line reflects a move away from the self-consuming individuality of LOL. Instead of deciding for itself whom it will obey, Catholic universities will incorporate Vatican authority into themselves. How the university embodies it is never explained. The document references Pope Paul VI saying a Catholic university “draw[s] inspiration from the light of revealed truth [becoming] a center for development and diffusion of an authentic Christian culture.”\textsuperscript{134} Still, it is not an indication of explicit Vatican teaching, but it does not negate academic freedom. The document simply places limiters. In other words, Catholic universities ought not have the unlimited freedom LOL wants because faithfulness to the Vatican in matters of faith, values, and morals precedes one’s own desires.

This train of thought is continued in the \textit{Rome Statement} (\textit{Rome}, hereafter), another position paper with implications for the student-teacher relationship. Like \textit{Kinshasa}, \textit{Rome} copies what it wants from LOL, notably the paragraph on the Catholic university:

\begin{quote}
The Catholic university today must be a university in the full modern sense of the word, with a strong commitment to and concern for academic excellence. To
\end{quote}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Kinshasa}, 344-345. \\
\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Kinshasa}, 345. \\
\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Kinshasa}, 345.
\end{flushleft}
perform its teaching and research functions effectively the Catholic university must have a true autonomy.\textsuperscript{135}

Also like Kinshasa, Rome modifies this position with “nor is this [statement] to imply that the university is beyond the law: the [Catholic] university has its own laws which flow from its proper nature and finality.”\textsuperscript{136} An aspect of that nature is its orientation towards truth:

Though all natural truth is readily accessible to us through the exercise of our innate ability to grasp and to understand reality, the authentic Christian message is not available to us except with a guarantee of doctrinal authority, which is the magisterium of the Church.\textsuperscript{137}

The theological truth and its communication, which LOL and Kinshasa situate at the center of the Catholic university, is not possible without the magisterium. Kinshasa further underscores this point in concluding that a Catholic university guides “a community of persons who are diverse in experience and in function…and who, whatever their task, draw inspiration from the light of revealed truth.”\textsuperscript{138}

Second, Kinshasa notes the value of ecumenism, a “forming of thinkers fully equipped for dialogue,”\textsuperscript{139} something Rome associates with witnessing the gospel. The Catholic university is “an ideal setting for dialogue” with peoples of all beliefs, and they are places to take advantage of the “ecumenical contacts of a high level” for cooperation

\textsuperscript{135} Rome, 348.
\textsuperscript{136} Rome, 348.
\textsuperscript{137} Rome, 348.
\textsuperscript{138} Kinshasa, 344.
\textsuperscript{139} Kinshasa, 344.
in common goals. It connects ecumenism with theology’s task to investigate all things related to God and Church in “modern culture and all the areas of intellectual study.” But as ecumenism is practiced, students must be taught.

*Rome,* unlike *Kinshasa,* dedicates a section to students in the classroom. “Section III, B. Teacher-Student Relationship in the Classroom” lays out its conditions and aspects. The document presumes that Catholic universities will have trained faculty and the necessary facilities to carry out scientific research. With those in place, *Rome* founds the student-teacher relationship on “the discovery and diffusion of knowledge,” yet it places three intersubjective principles at their base. First, the objectivity of truth is an absolute demand without exception. *Rome* argues the main purpose of the Catholic university is to pursue truth, and truth must remain at the forefront of all inquiry or the entire system will become arbitrary and collapse. The pursuit of truth happens in the classroom. Since students and teachers are working together towards knowledge, the second principle of intersubjective communication takes shape. Students, as

140 *Rome,* 360.

141 *Land O’Lakes Statement,* 337.

142 *Land O’Lakes Statement,* 337.

143 By “scientific,” the *Rome Statement* means *scientia,* systematic knowledge, not the natural sciences. It references laboratory work, but the Catholic university for *Rome* encompasses far more than laboratory research.

144 *Rome,* 348.

145 Intersubjectivity is the cornerstone of Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics and a crucial component of Jacques Maritain’s philosophy of education.
explained, demanded more than just lectures from their universities—they wanted some kind of subjective component for exploring their own inner worlds. *Rome* does not object, but subjectivity can become overwrought, needing objectivity to level it. Rather than discredit students for their contributions, they ought to be co-creators with their teachers of knowledge in the truth-seeking process (the second principle). The universality (objectivity) of knowledge “should also be universal in its becoming”.

The third principle is the application of these two principles because they are the means “which charity assumes in the intellectual sphere” for the benefit of all.

The final major document before *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* (ECE) is “The Catholic University in the Modern World” (*Modern World*, hereafter). Like the previous documents, *Modern World* was created by Catholic university representatives invited to a worldwide conference hosted by the IFCU and the Vatican. Also like the previous documents, *Modern World* discusses the nature and objectives of the Catholic university, saying virtually the same thing in its own words. For instance, like *Kinshasa* and *Rome*, it adopts LOL’s position on autonomy in reference to its “teaching and research functions” with one crucial difference. *Modern World* leaves out the qualification “modern”: “A Catholic university today must be a university in the full sense of the word,” not “the full modern sense of the word.”

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146 *Rome*, 361.

147 *Rome*, 361.


149 *Modern World*, 43.

150 *Modern World*, 43, author’s emphasis.
from external authority LOL espouses. It makes all the more sense how Modern World can adopt Rome’s position on the university’s relationship to the magisterium: “[in affirming] the autonomy of the university we do not mean that it stands outside the law,” a rejection of LOL’s “academic freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind.”¹⁵¹

One authority not rejected by Kinshasa, Rome, or LOL is the authority of the ecumenical encounter.

Modern World makes ecumenism an objective for the Catholic university in “preparing persons qualified to participate in serious interfaith discussions” for the purpose of spreading the gospel. Adopting Rome’s position, Modern World emphasizes the necessity of theology to “cooperate ecumenically with other institutions” in researching the same topics for reconciliation between Christian churches.¹⁵² But as ecumenism is utilized for research, so students must be taught.

Like Rome, Modern World has its own section on teaching students. It focuses more on the student in the Catholic university itself than the student proper. That being said, it compares well with Rome’s section on the student-teacher relationship insofar as it shares certain themes. For instance, the primary aim of teaching is to “help [students] to be contributing members of society” and are “confronted with values which, reaching beyond man’s [sic] mortal limitations, challenge a more restricted view of reality”¹⁵³ at the service of the theology department.¹⁵⁴ It is close to the aims of Rome in witnessing to

¹⁵² Modern World, 52.
¹⁵³ Maritain discusses making students good citizens and Levinas the value of human life.
¹⁵⁴ Modern World, 47.
the gospel, albeit worded in a slightly more secular tone. The root of university teaching is “a genuine respect for the dignity and freedom of each person,” especially as it refers to freeing students from their own prejudices for a more just society. Students are free to make up their own minds, in honest academic deliberation, apart from their teachers. “[D]ialogue is a normal means of cultural and human growth.” It is the only way for freedom to conquer indoctrination, another point shared with Rome and Ex Corde Ecclesiae, the final document in our consideration.

Ex Corde Ecclesiae

Ex Corde Ecclesiae (ECE), “From the Heart of the Church,” is an apostolic constitution, the highest Church document concerning important doctrinal matters. It is a set of rules or laws given to the faithful to help fulfill and clarify some spiritual or societal concern. Previously, only ecclesiastical universities (those founded directly by the Holy See) had juridical norms via their own apostolic constitution (Sapientia Christiana). This new document is for other Catholic universities, those founded by religious orders, dioceses, or lay people with the intent of promoting a Catholic worldview and “students…ready to shoulder society’s heavier burdens and to witness the

155 Modern World, 47. Maritain’s philosophy of education addresses education as freedom, Levinas the dignity of the human person.

156 Modern World, 48.


158 Individual Catholic universities have unique charisms of their own. St. John Paul II lays out the character common to all. It is written with many dogmatic and theological assumptions. Those will not be explained unless necessary for comprehending its meaning. While several revisions of its content went through the the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), I am working with the basic theory in order to propose a new direction in Catholic higher education. The USCCB is the community of bishops in the United States.
faith to the world” (§6). Individual Catholic universities have unique charisms of their own, and this document lays out the character common to all. It is written with many dogmatic and theological assumptions, which will not be explained unless necessary for comprehending its meaning. While several revisions of its content went through the the USCCB, I am working with the basic theory in order to propose a new direction in Catholic higher education.

Catholic universities are traced back to the first instances of the university, manifesting with a specific mission peculiar to the Catholic Church. Like all universities, they are dedicated to creativity and “the dissemination of knowledge for the good of humanity” (§1). Their common purpose is to research, teach, and educate students in their search for knowledge. Unlike non-Catholic (e.g., State) schools, Catholic ones unite two poles of human experience: “the search for truth and the certainty of already knowing the truth” (§1), or, faith and reason. The more specific task of the Catholic university is to unite the search for truth with the source of truth’s origin, that is, God. More on this notion in a moment.

Catholic universities are places where the Christian mind can flower through the “unselfish transmission [of truth] to youth and to all those learning to think rigorously, so

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**159** Even that is a controversial matter, one which will be touched on throughout this dissertation. Also, I will be using parenthetical citations for this section only, simply because it is much easier on the eyes to note the section rather than footnote every paragraph. Unlike the other cited documents, ECE has numbered sections.

**160** There are at least three different definitions of faith in the context of “faith and reason” in Catholic higher education. One definition is faith as teaching the Catholic intellectual tradition. A second is faith as a synonym for piety alongside teaching the Catholic intellectual tradition. A third definition may or may not involve the first two, but focuses on creating a sense of “safety” for students, faculty, and staff to discuss faith matters in the classroom, etc. without fear of ridicule, contempt, or job loss. One might call it a Catholic devotion of sorts. “Faith” is used in all three senses in this text because the pope wishes to instill all three in Catholic universities.
as to act rightly and to serve humanity [society] better” (§2). Accordingly, Catholic universities are places for dialogue with the culture of the world. Culture is a technical term here with two meanings. First, the humanistic meaning of the “effort to bring the world itself under [humankind’s] control by [its] knowledge and [its] labor,” and second, the socio-historical meaning of “express[ing], communicat[ing], and conserv[ing] in his works great spiritual experience and desires, so that these may be of advantage to the progress of many, even of the whole human family.” Culture is a combination of humanity’s attempt over time to subdue nature for its dominion and share the wisdom gained in the search for truth. St. John Paul II is careful not to differentiate distinct cultures in the sense that all of humanity is separate. Yes, there are various peoples on the earth, but for him “there is only one culture: that of man, by man and from man [sic]” (§3). Catholic universities inherit that culture in humanistic- and scientific pursuits. Because all people are united in a shared humanity, the Catholic university can faithfully “explor[e] the mysteries of humanity and of the world, clarifying them in the light of revelation” (§3). The text then shifts to a discussion of truth.

As Catholic universities serve humankind, everything they do is also in service of the Catholic Church, while rooted in the conviction that all truth is connected to God, the ultimate Source of truth. The pursuit of truth is the Catholic university’s responsibility and primary means of service given that, contrary to State schools, it pursues “the whole truth about nature, man [sic], and God” (§4). The Catholic university boldly proclaims

161 Not one of the previous documents defines “culture”.

162 John Paul II, *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, 61. This quote is taken from a footnote, not the document.
truth because it is the root of all other values, “freedom, justice and human dignity”¹⁶³ among the highest (§4).¹⁶⁴ All aspects of truth in all disciplines are sought after and explained in light of their relationship to God, Who is the source of all truth.

The search for truth unites faith and reason, which together build up humanity to reach its full potential. Faith contains “the salvific message of the Gospel” and reason all knowledge of nature (§6). Given the near all-encompassing reach of these, the Catholic university is able to “dialogue with people of every culture” (§6). Culture is where we find ourselves, and the gospel message coming out of Catholic universities renews it by putting it into relationship with all fields of knowledge.¹⁶⁵ This includes science and technology which can explore the economic and industrial sectors. By themselves they are meaningless, but Catholic universities can evaluate the good of advancements for society’s benefit through “the moral, spiritual, and religious dimension[s] in its research” unique to its Christian background (§7). Behind the meaning of scientific and technological questions and research is “the very meaning of the human person,” which the Catholic university has the greatest access to because it incorporates all the previous dimensions (§7). To best search out and understand this meaning, the Catholic university itself requires constant renewal, that is, a checking of itself ensure that its search is

¹⁶³ Dignity is a complicated philosophical term. It basically amounts to a respect for the human being made in the image and likeness of God, that is, given reason and a will. There are certain things one ought not ever do lest one trespass against it, something holy and sacred. Things like torture, war, and genocide all come to mind, but dignity includes everyday life, too, ordinary decency and courtesy for instance. That expands into institutions, considering people provide the means necessary to make them work. Institutions —marriage, government, university—exist because people exist. And that’s enough to demand the university, as an institution, treat people with dignity, especially students and teachers. This notion of dignity will return in the succeeding chapters.

¹⁶⁴ Nullifying this family of values, or losing this intentional state (which Husserl discusses) would in essence erase the identity of the Catholic university.

¹⁶⁵ Note the overlap with the Rome Statement.
impartial—its only interests are the gospel, faith, truth, and the common good. By establishing Jesus and faith as the foundations, the Catholic university is freed from any political agenda.

With the introduction complete, St. John Paul II moves into the first section, identity and mission, explaining the core identity, nature, and objectives of the Catholic university. Catholic universities are academic communities that uphold and promote “human dignity and...cultural heritage” primarily in their teaching, research, and the services they can offer to their communities (e.g., clinics) (§12). Catholic universities are guaranteed institutional autonomy and academic freedom so that they can do their jobs with minimal outside interference as long as “the rights of the individual person and of the community are preserved within the confines of the truth and the common good” (§12).

With that being said, all Catholic universities must have certain features to be Catholic. I will provide a brief summary of each one. First, the academic community must have Christian inspiration, that is, a spirit of following the Christian lifestyle of charity. You need Catholics to make a Catholic university, else it is just a school like any other. Individual Catholics making up the academic community (in whole or partially) creates this very spirit, flowing into point number two: “continuing reflection in the light of the Catholic faith” on human knowledge, which the Catholic university wishes to build (§13). The Catholic university adds to humanity’s knowledge through its faith, initiating a dialogue with the world in the pursuit of truth. Third, the university must remain

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166 The principle of subsidiarity.
faithful to the Christian message (the gospel) as passed on by the Church. It cannot
tolerate heretical or alternative interpretations to the contrary when done in a spirit of
hostility towards God and the Church. The fourth point, the Catholic university must
commit itself to serving God’s people in their journey to “the transcendent goal” of
Heaven (§13). As all universities teach, research, and provide services, the Christian
message makes the Catholic university different as “Catholic ideals, attitudes, and
principles” permeate the campus (§14). The spirit of these schools is distinct from non-
Catholic ones, but the Catholic university can still be a research institution, one
characterized by four principles: “(a) the search for an integration of knowledge, (b) a
dialogue between faith and reason, (c) an ethical concern, and (d) a theological
perspective” (§15). St. John Paul II then elaborates on each of these.

One discipline’s knowledge is never completely separate from another. All fields of
knowledge work together to integrate their discoveries, but Catholic universities
determine the meaning of each field by putting Jesus at their center with a philosophical
anthropology in the light of the gospel. Accordingly, faith and reason work together in
coming to “bear harmonious witness to the unity of all truth” (“the certainty of already
knowing the truth,” §1) because all truth is rooted in God (§17). The methods of one
discipline cannot contradict faith when its intentions for truth are pure. But the search for
truth cannot be unmitigated. It must be tempered with ethical consideration of the human
person. “Knowledge is meant to serve the human person,” and its research is guided by
moral norms (§18). Science and technology especially need to be careful because the
primacy of the technical threatens the dignity of the human person and our relation to
God (§18). Theology is the most important discipline for the Catholic university because it unites all knowledge and meaning in all fields, providing “an orientation not contained within their own methodologies,” namely to God (§19). Quickly shifting to research, St. John Paul II makes a point that interdisciplinary studies are of utmost importance for students in directing them to “an organic vision of reality and to develop a continuing desire for intellectual progress” (§20). They help students see connections between the disciplines, but intellectual reflection opens the mind to more questions than answers, and so the place of faith becomes clear: “the complete answer to [questions] can only come from above…” (§20). Faith completes the circle, so to speak, in linking reason to God. Ethics, aside from faith, is held in highest esteem because “the moral implications…in each discipline are examined as an integral part of the teaching of that discipline” which drives development of the whole person (§20). In other words, students’ characters are formed according to how each subject treats of ethics. The ethics of a discipline is part and parcel of the discipline itself. For example, theology be taught in accords with “Scripture, [sacred] tradition, and the church’s [sic] magisterium” (§20). Regardless of one’s field, a student will be educated for “the service of society and of the church [sic]…and to give the witness of their faith to the world” (§20). Having explained the nature and objectives of the Catholic university, St. John Paul II moves into section two—the university community.

Bringing the Christian message and Catholic ideals to the world is only possible when the spirit of Jesus lives in the campus community uniting its members in “a

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167 Chapter three will emphasize this point.
common dedication to the truth, a common vision of the dignity of the human person, and, ultimately, the person and message of Christ which gives the institution its distinctive character” (§21). The university community has the spirit of Jesus flowing through it because of its dedication to truth, dignity, and the gospel. Such are generative of “freedom and charity” by which the university members engage one another in contributing to the common good of the school in the capacity they are able (§21). For example, St. John Paul II places teachers in high esteem, regarding they ought to be “witnesses and educators of authentic Christian life” (§22). Teachers are exemplars of professional accomplishment and Christian humility. Similarly, students are tasked with developing an authentic Christian lifestyle in light of their ongoing search for truth. They are to provide Christian witness in their professions (§23). I will elaborate on these sections after the rest of this summary.

Administrators are to grow the university through servant-leadership. Religious orders, usually the founders of Catholic universities, are to prepare religious vocations for the world. Laity drive the university because of their upper-level positions. The future of Catholic universities depends on them and their responsibility. Non-Catholics also contribute to the Catholic university’s mission by providing professional formation for students in their fields. Having sketched the university community, St. John Paul II discusses the Catholic university’s place in the Church.

The Catholic university must have a relationship with the Church, local and universal, for its identity as Catholic to remain complete. It thereby contributes to the spiritual life of the Church in relating the Vatican to the rest of the world. Because of this
institutional relation, fidelity to the magisterium “in matters of faith and morals” (§27) is essential both for the school and individual Catholics. Non-Catholics are only expected to respect the Catholicity of the school in exchange for respecting their religious freedom. Bishops have a special responsibility to promote the school on top of ensuring and building Catholic identity, but they are not autocrats dictating university policy. Rather, they are co-authors with the university community.

The Church accepts academic freedom in respect to each academic disciplines’ confines, but places an asterisk next to theology. The theology must be orthodox no matter what, else the university becomes secular in the sense of adopting the world’s norms and charter. The Catholic university must represent the Church as best it can, and because theology is what makes the capital “C” Church Catholic, it must be a priority. Theologians “develop and more effectively communicate the meaning of Christian revelation” as passed down through the Bible, tradition, and the magisterium (§29). They must be wary, though, that they speak within the confines of the bishop’s authority. The rest of the document goes on to explain the role of Catholic universities in their localities, pastoral ministry, evangelization, and cultural dialogue. As stated above, I will now explicate the role of students and teachers in ECE to contrast it with LOL, paving the way for the current academic situation in Catholic higher education.

The Student-Teacher Relationship According to Ex Corde Ecclesiae

The teacher is the focal point where all the positive, Christian attitudes of inquiry and virtue combine in university lifestyles. They are the fulcrum around which students model their academic lives, not only in scholarship, but also in conduct. The Catholic
professor is a multi-layered example of how one ought to live one’s life. That may sound
flippant, but St. John Paul II lays out Catholic university teachers’ lives are ones of
holiness, “which evidences attained integration between faith and life, and between
professional competence and Christian wisdom” (§22). They are proof that it is possible
to live a professional, academically excellent life and one of faith, hope, and charity.

Humanism, note, is at the core of this vision for the teacher: “all teachers are to be
inspired by academic ideas and by the principles of an authentically human life” (§22).
Knowledge-learning and searching are at the heart of the academic, intellectual life.

They are in no ways incompatible with the authentic religiosity advocated in Kinshasa,
Rome, Modern World, and now ECE, which connects with Rome on the student-teacher
relationship as per dignity of the student.

Students are understood as ideal apprentices. They are the ones around whom
teachers direct most of their professional energy. The Catholic student is a clay sphere
for whom one is responsible for molding into a responsible citizen and a witnessing
Christian. Not only are they to receive professional training, but more importantly a
spirituality to guide them in how to lead Christian lives. It happens through the
cultivation of their minds in humanistic study as it grows their “ability to wonder, to
understand, to contemplate, to make personal judgments, and to develop a religious,
moral, and social sense” (§23). These principles are at the heart of a liberal arts
education. Again, humanism plays a key part in their development. The acceptance of
all things human to improve one’s character is by no means a rejection of all things

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168 Jacques Maritain’s conception of humanism is rooted in the Judeo-Christian imago Dei. It has nothing
to do with a secular humanism.
divine. The two are intertwined, albeit separate.\textsuperscript{169} Students learn how to seek the divine in the search for knowledge and truth. Compare with the student-teacher relationship of the Rome Statement: objectivity of truth, intersubjective relationship, and contribution to knowledge as charity. ECE affirms there is a real, universal truth accessible by all. Students and teachers cooperate in discovering it, hence the document affirms the importance of the student-teacher relationship for the instruction of knowledge. Because teachers are humble enough to know their knowledge is limited,\textsuperscript{170} there is openness to student insight. Clearly ECE adopts principles from the preceding documents, but it is not without some controversy. ECE’s philosophy of the teacher and student contrasts with LOL, which I will now explain before moving onto the context of the current debates on this issue in Catholic higher education.

*Land O’Lakes Statement & Ex Corde Ecclesiae on Students and Teachers*

*Ex Corde Ecclesiae* sees teachers as the highlight of the Catholic university, as exemplars of authentic Christian living because they teach their disciplines with a “coherent world vision” (§22), inspiring students to live Christian lives in “freedom and charity” towards their neighbors and in their studies (§21). Students are understood to be apprentices of a kind, tasked with developing an authentic Christian lifestyle in light of their ongoing search for truth and are to provide Christian witness in their professions. Like LOL, ECE endorses student engagement with the modern world to more effectively challenge its injustices and embrace its advancements. Teachers are permitted to teach

\textsuperscript{169} This relationship will be expounded in chapter two.

\textsuperscript{170} ECE presumes it is a quality of the Catholic teacher.
any material they find helpful or necessary in the completion of their courses in shaping their students for their fields. One would think Catholic material is a given since the nature of the liberal arts is education for a whole life, and Catholic universities promote a Catholic worldview. Students encounter material through the “lens” of the Gospel and Catholic doctrine for what it means to be a Christian today. Both parties have a responsibility to promote and integrate the gospel in their work. In particular, theologians have the specific task to uphold magisterial teaching in their research and classrooms.

On this point, ECE gives bishops canonical status to interrupt a university’s functioning when its orthodoxy is at stake. “Each bishop has a responsibility to promote the welfare of the Catholic universities in his diocese and has the right and duty to watch over the preservation and strengthening of their Catholic character” (part II, §2). That is to say, the bishop can prevent a theologian from teaching and researching at a Catholic university should said theologian be treading in dangerous waters.

Here lies the major tension with LOL. Hesburgh et al., thought that any juridical interference from the Vatican (e.g., canon law) was a violation of the freedom necessary for a university to be a university, hence the desire for autonomy, for example, enforcing what theologians can and cannot say. And the word “Catholic” simply meant, or appeared to mean, the broad atmosphere and de facto position of the school on social matters, regardless of what individual faculty think. But what happens when faculty don’t think what the Church thinks?\textsuperscript{171} Each text offers different answers.

\textsuperscript{171} It is possible the Catholic university will cease to exist, reminiscent of Heidegger’s “anxiety” in the next chapter.
Unlike LOL, ECE places squarely the Catholic university within the Church as a member of Christ’s Body. The Church is seen as an evangelizing agent to the specific territory it finds itself while dialoguing with its local community and embracing the goodness thereof. But ECE makes it much bigger than what the individual thinks. The Catholic Church is a community of believers much like a university is a community of learners. As noted, ECE elaborates on all the breadth of topics listed above in LOL, but it sees teachers and students differently. In LOL, the student is treated as an autonomous agent capable of making decisions for oneself apart from external authority as noted in the opening section. The student is his/her own boss. Now there is no question we need to make our own decisions in everyday life. Not as self-actualizers per se, but as members of the mystical Body, one with reference to other people. LOL practically desires a radical individualism for teachers to teach what they want (regardless of whether it violates Catholic values, morals, and theology), while acknowledging human interdependence anyway, whereas ECE wants community to be founded on the Gospel (faith). These philosophies affect how students and teachers respond and interact with each other and the university institution. Hence, two major schools developed out of these documents in a kind of post-Vatican II free for all.

The Historical Problem

As established, the *Land O’Lakes Statement* attempted to implement the insights of Vatican II into American Catholic universities. It was the result of the IFCU’s discussion about the “ways Catholic universities might join in the renewal of the Church

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172 This notion of “sight” is crucial for understanding Husserl’s notion of phenomenology.
sparked by Vatican II.”¹⁷³ *Kinshasa, Rome,* and *Modern World* lay out their own philosophies on how Catholic universities are to function now that the Church is formally dialoguing with modernity. The practical and theoretical problems discussed above all play an important role in the direction of post-LOL, but the transposing of religious control to “independent boards of trustees” comprised of lay- and religious people and placing university prestige (e.g., research) ahead of missional work¹⁷⁴ generated a split in understanding the Catholic identity (character) of Catholic universities between what Christopher Janosik calls pluralism and restorationism.¹⁷⁵

Proponents of restorationism¹⁷⁶ advocate a closer relationship to the Vatican and less interaction (e.g., dialogue) with the secular world. For them, identity is centered on the tradition of the Church, and the meaning of being “Catholic” precedes the meaning of “university”. Things like autonomy— independence from Vatican influence— inhibit authentic Catholic teaching and spirituality because the Church does not follow the world: she follows Jesus. As Janosik puts it, “identity is inextricably tied to…the charism of the founding religious group, and a distinctive educational pedagogy which


places faith at the center of the intellectual enterprise,”177 and the goal of faith is salvation.

Proponents of pluralism,178 however, prefer distancing Catholic universities from the Vatican so as to exercise more governance over their schools as they see fit. Vatican control is seen as a paternalism inhibiting academic greatness and the expression of truth. Without autonomy, Catholic universities would be devoid of “the resources necessary to continue their mission of education”179 at a reasonable rate because dependence on the often slow bureaucratic process of the Church in handling everyday affairs is far too tedious for a university. For pluralists, identity coincides with autonomy, and autonomy is about survival: Catholic universities, no matter their ecclesial relationship, would not exist at all were schools not free to govern themselves. Both movements, though, have their problems, each of which negatively affect the student-teacher relationship.

Restorationism misses the goodness of pursuing knowledge180 and the promises dialogue can bring, whereas pluralism pushes a non-religious “outcomes” agenda at the expense of legitimate authority. This research seeks to alleviate these strains by putting the conversation back on the initial one who makes the university possible: the student.


180 While associated with a liberal arts education that engages the arts and sciences, restorationism has a penchant for ignoring rigorous scientific pursuits in favor of a comfortable religiosity.
Restorationism understands that professors must actually communicate knowledge to students for the latter to learn, yet it seems a de-emphasis on research may actually hurt student growth. In seeking to educate for faith, restorationists may have neglected research to the bane of their students: a new piece of knowledge may be just what a student needs.

Pluralism, on the other hand, has the inverse problem: too much research takes away from professors giving their students proper attention in- and outside the classroom. Faculty know all too well the pressures coming with seeking tenure, providing service, and grading over many hours. These pressures are partially rooted in the self-governance of the university: without any outside input—morally or spiritually, directly or indirectly—administrations are free to treat their faculty however they like. A new approach is needed between restorationism and pluralism.

*Ex Corde Ecclesiae* explains why “Catholic universities are the very heart of the Catholic Church,” namely, because they evangelize all whom enter their doors, Catholic or not, and evangelization is the spreading of the gospel—a necessity for faith, an essential aspect of my argument. The pope’s intention was to define the Catholic university such that, regardless of individual mission, the schools could perform their institutional obligations in communion with the Vatican. One might even say ECE was a direct rebuttal of LOL given the pope’s citation of Canon Law 810 wherein a teacher is to be dismissed if he/she is found to lack Catholic doctrine and morals, something LOL calls

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into question.\textsuperscript{182} ECE needs more backing on the student-teacher relationship because the conversation surrounding restorationism and pluralism is tired. Like the Augustinian/Thomistic debate of the pre-Vatican II era, the current debate is changing due to the times: online courses, student loan debt, funding cuts, et al. Catholic universities need to justify their existences, and “the effort at [a] definition [of Catholic universities] began with the \textit{Land O’Lakes Statement}.”\textsuperscript{183} This dissertation argues that to begin solving the current crises in Catholic higher education, a necessary mediating step is required to refocus the conversation(s) towards the Catholic university’s twofold end of gospel witness and formation of citizens. I begin with Levinas’s phenomenological ethics.

As I have noted throughout this chapter, Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics serves as my jumping off point. Since relationship is the basis of the university, the reason for using him is that his ethic is one comprised entirely of intersubjectivity. His Jewish roots have a wide array of connecting points with Catholicism, especially Jacques Maritain, bridging our historical, cultural, and theological gaps. Levinas’s own reading of Judaism as an ethic encompassing the alterity of the Other creates a metaphysical and ethical space to work out much of the tension in Catholic higher education. In order to better explain how his ethic works, I will briefly cover his two primary influences, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, then explain his ethic and put it in relation to spiritual poverty (need) concerning the student-teacher relationship.

\textsuperscript{182} John Paul II, \textit{Ex Corde Ecclesiae}, 63 (footnote 49). Non-Catholic faculty need only live a moral life and respect the Catholic Church.

\textsuperscript{183} Gleason, \textit{Contending with Modernity}, 321.
III. THE ETHICS OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS

Emmanuel Levinas’s concern for the subject (the self) arose out of a concern that ethics had lost its way in post-WWII Europe. His approach to ethics is through human relationships, an intersubjectivity of surrender, of giving way to the Other.\textsuperscript{184} What this means for us will become apparent in this chapter. While it is debatable whether or not his work is the result of the Holocaust, this project is not historical in nature, so it will not be discussed at length. What I will briefly elaborate is the influence of Edmund Husserl’s and Martin Heidegger’s philosophies on Levinas’s thinking since the latter is as much of a response to them as it is an original philosophy in its own right. I will then explain Levinas’s account of the face-to-face encounter with its parallel- and application to the student-relationship. I will conclude that Catholic university life as preparatory work for good citizenship is founded on student-teacher relation. This chapter does not concern Levinas’s thoughts on education and its myriad of applications as that has already been done,\textsuperscript{185} and his educational philosophy is embedded in his ethics anyhow. Questions important for Levinas and his larger project concern the State, justice, and the political. I will not be elaborating on these as they are outside the confines of this project, but I shall add a word near the end on the importance of justice and briefly the formation of the

\textsuperscript{184} Capital “O” “Other” refers to a person, lowercase “o” “other” refers to objects.

State as it interplays in the background of the student-teacher relationship in the Catholic university.

It raises the question as to why bring Levinas into the question of American Catholic higher education. He is neither American nor Catholic. One might argue that universities already utilize him in an indirect way when they put learning and post-university life first, ahead of market pressures, expansion, and net worth. Given American university culture, that is highly unlikely even for Catholic schools. Levinas is needed to steer American Catholic universities back onto the path for which they are purposed, and it begins the student-teacher relationship. First, I must explain his intellectual influence to underscore his ethic.

*Husserl and Heidegger’s Influence*

For Levinas, the base human relationship is I-Other, or self-Other, an instance of the smallest possible group. The student-teacher relationship is a broader function of the I-Other relationship. I say “function” because any two people can relate in any number of different ways. The fundamental expression of the I-Other relationship is one of learning, pedagogy, or student-teacher because of the “newness” of the Other before me, similar to the encounter with new material in a course. The Other, the one who is not me, teaches me about herself. In the abstract, it is minimally that there are other selves in the world. In concretion it is dependent on the context. Personal and professional relationships are based on the I-Other, and no matter the situation, there is an Other to teach and an I to be taught. What makes the university situation unique is that the student

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186 His Judaism is not an issue for Catholics because his ethics is compatible with Catholicism.
and teacher are both abstract and concrete: relationship-wise they relate pedagogically because of the I-Other structure and professionally they relate pedagogically because formal learning happens in universities. There are two levels of pedagogical relationship going on. In order to understand these levels, how they work for Levinas, and how they work in this dissertation, one must first glance into the work of Husserl and Heidegger.

Like any philosophy, Husserl and Heidegger’s thought is difficult and complex. Because this dissertation does not concern itself with these thinkers but Levinas, it will suffice to summarize a few concepts to provide the necessary background for understanding how Levinas’s project works, their place in my argumentation, and the connection to Catholic higher education.

Husserl’s project is to explain how human consciousness finds meaning in the world by experiencing essences.\(^{187}\) “Consciousness” is a bit of a complicated term for Husserl, but generally he means “a comprehensive designation of ‘mental acts,’ or ‘intentional experiences,’ of all sorts.”\(^{188}\) It is through these intentional experiences that he argues meaning can be found through the foundational concept in his philosophy “intentionality”. For something to be intentional it is directed or “about” something. For example, when I swing a baseball bat I intend to hit a baseball. The act of swinging has meaning for me: hitting the ball to get on first base. In consciously choosing to swing, I form meaning in my everyday life by “seeing” for what purposes baseball has for me.

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\(^{187}\) Husserl has the Platonic notion of essence as that which makes something what it is. He thinks experience gives us \textit{a priori} knowledge (essences) through consciousness of what the experience of an experience is.

But Husserl takes a step back from the ordinary world to understand how that intention is even possible. He finds it in the field which came to be known as phenomenology.

Phenomenology is the study of how things, or phenomena, appear to consciousness. A phenomenon is something—material or immaterial, actual or fictive—that I can experience, whether through memory, the senses, thought, emotion, other people, or virtually anything one can imagine. What makes my experiences unique as an individual is that I live through them. They form my inner and outer worlds as what I know to be meaningful on a daily basis. In experiencing something, it is present, that is it “appears” to my consciousness. It is somehow interacting with me in a way I find important. What matters to Husserl is that my ability to have and create intentional acts (e.g., swinging a baseball bat) matters most because without intentionality, I cannot begin to make sense of the world. For Husserl, nothing escapes intentionality. Nothing appears to my consciousness without being intentional, or about something in the world, because to be conscious is to be conscious about something. I am who I am in light of my intentional experiences such that were I to lose my intentional states about the world, I would lose my identity, or sense of selfhood. Not only these, but intentionality for Husserl is strictly cognitive, that is to say, I can only have intentional experiences as mental experiences, ones my consciousness can comprehend as images.

Returning to the baseball example, I can swing and miss and experience the sadness and frustration of striking out. Or I can swing and hit a single experiencing the elation of driving home two runs. In either situation, I am having experiences I am able to grasp as complete in themselves: swing and sit, or swing and run. Nothing is beyond
these experiences of being on the ball field here because they are all comprehensible as
ideas, or essences. In swinging and missing, the idea of sadness is now present to me in
my consciousness. In swinging and hitting, the idea of elation is present to me. It is “in”
me, but will pass and I will experience something else.\textsuperscript{189} It is nothing my intentionality
cannot handle.

It is important to note that sight has an important place in Husserl’s thought as an
“ocular paradigm of knowledge, truth, and reality.”\textsuperscript{190} He utilizes sight, seeing, and
vision as metaphors (usually) when describing how one goes about phenomenology
because all things are “visible” to consciousness and intentionality. Even with the
baseball example above, yes, I am literally seeing the ball with my eyes, but notice how
the concept of intentionality has a “sight” assigned to it: my consciousness “sees” the
object it is experiencing (e.g., swinging the bat) in what Husserl calls an “adequate
perception,” that is, one that has an equal ratio of “sight” to intention.\textsuperscript{191} In other words,
what I see is what I get because my intellect fully comprehends the intentional object. In
order to comprehend or “see” something one needs “light,” an illumination.
Consciousness is “illuminated,” it gains new information and understands it, when it
generates intentional acts by interacting with the world around it. Heidegger picks up on
Husserl’s notion of intentionality and interaction with the world, not strictly as
comprehending essences through experience, but as generating personal meaning for


\textsuperscript{190} David M. Levin, \textit{The Philosopher's Gaze: Modernity in the Shadows of Enlightenment} (Oakland, CA:
University of California Press, 1999), 67.

\textsuperscript{191} Husserl, \textit{The Shorter Logical Investigations}, 402.
oneself by engaging in functional activities. Heidegger begins by emphasizing individual human existence.

“Dasein” is Heidegger’s word for “human existence,” but not in a biological or anthropological sense. Philosophically, Dasein is a being\(^{192}\) whose consciousness is aware of the meaning of its own existence as being constituted here in existence. In other words, a human being aware of the meaning of its existence on earth.\(^{193}\) As one interacts with the world over the course of one’s life, one seeks out meaning for it. The term Heidegger uses for meaningful interaction with the world is “care”. Care shifts Husserl’s notion of intentionality in that, as intentionality has consciousness orienting itself towards objects in the world as they concern intelligible structures of consciousness, care has one orienting oneself toward the world as concerns one’s concrete existence and the projects of one’s life.\(^{194}\) It is a kind of openness towards the world taking in what the world has to offer for my benefit. Care manifests as action, the doing of things in the world, and comes in three dimensions: projection/understanding, thrownness/disposedness, and fallenness/fascination under the umbrella of anxiety and moods. I will unpack these terms one at a time.

Anxiety is, in general everyday life, the awareness of the possibility of the non-existence of certain realities given the choices I make. For instance, say I choose to enter

\(^{192}\) Generally understood to be a concrete human being or a community or culture, but spoken of in the abstract, neutered (impersonal) sense.

\(^{193}\) Husserl emphasized the meaning of objects in the world for me. Heidegger is emphasizing one’s own meaning for oneself in the world.

\(^{194}\) Care is also called “being-in-the-world” and Heidegger uses it as a pre-Husserlian intentional stance because, for Heidegger, before I can be intentional about the world I must first exist (or “be there”) in the world. This concern is wholly outside of my discussion, and I mention it only for the reader’s benefit.
the Major League Baseball draft because I want to become a professional athlete. There is a distinct possibility I will not be drafted. I begin to experience anxiety because I am aware (self-conscious) of a world where I am not playing baseball. Anxiety also has a more pointed meaning for Heidegger as the existential response to the awareness of a world where I might not exist, that is, an awareness of my own death where I “[find myself] face to face with the ‘nothing’ of the possible impossibility of [my] existence.”

Not the death of something in the world, like my baseball career, though it can cause anxiety. Heidegger’s focus is anxiety literally over my own finitude where I am left open to the fact that I will not be here. As a result, it arises within me a state of existential distress over all possibility in the world as related to projection.

Projection is the openness of possibility (freedom) and the choices one can make towards the future. My existence can only act within certain constraints, and I cannot do something unless it is available to me in possibility. For instance, I cannot become a baseball player without a field, a team, or any knowledge of the game. It is also possible I can have all of those things and still reject playing it. Understanding puts projection into practice. It is the idea that I find things meaningful when I interact with them for the purposes—any purpose—I desire. For instance, should I want to become a baseball player, I use cleats, a ball, and a bat to play the sport. That is to say, I use these objects for the sake of this project, and this breeds meaning into my existence. Both understanding and projection “have nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan

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196 *I understand*, that is, *I grasp* that things have meaning for me.
that has been thought out,” in the sense of an invisible hand guiding one towards some further end because I have my projects in the present moment.197

In the present moment, I also find myself having been “thrown” sometime in the past. Thrownness is finding myself put in a world not of my own choosing, yet I find the world matters to me for completing projects (e.g., playing baseball), that is, the things I want to pursue. Sometimes I cannot manage to obtain the things I need to complete the projects I want. At this point, recalling anxiety, I experience myself as a finite creature. I am limited in that I cannot escape the fact that I exist, but I can change the way my existence interacts with the world. In this way, I can “shed” my thrownness by being receptive to the things I find important. This receptiveness is what Heidegger calls “disposedness”.198 Being disposed is being able to receive things in a certain way, in particular for my use. For instance, in wanting to use a baseball field to practice running the bases I need to have a disposedness to want to run. Even with a disposal to run, in this instance, my interaction with that world and the things in it is affected by what Heidegger calls moods.

Moods are not subjective states of mind or personality. They are quite literally what my individual meaning consists of at a given moment.199 A mood is my interior stance, how I am receptive (open) to receiving the world. On an everyday basis, I find myself in these different moods (e.g., anger, silliness) and they influence how I interact

198 In ordinary language, one might say one is “predisposed” to do something.
with things I find important. For instance, I find that baseball is important to me. What I normally find funny when in a silly mood (say, tripping over a bag) is now aggravating me because I find myself in an angry mood, say, over my own inability to develop a skill. The anger changes how I receive the important object, and I begin to see all things through this mood. In this way, thrownness/disposedness acts as a kind of determination—I can only have so many possible moods towards something in the world. For example, I am angry, sad, or depressed about my running ability. The possibility of success is not an option in those moods because I am not open to it.

Success and relata are not possible in a state of “fallenness” either. Fallenness is the notion that I, the self, am disconnected from realizing my own “potentiality”. I have lost the ability to relate to myself in a way that characterizes my actions as my own. In this way, fallenness is related to what Heidegger calls an “inauthentic” self. For him, to be fully alive is to own one’s life as one’s own. An authentic life is one that is mine, one where I determine my projects, my choices, my relation to others, and what I think about the world by myself. To be determined by others is to have a “they-self,” a life determined by others in which I am concealed from myself and the world. This absorption happens by means of fascination.

\[ \text{Anger (or any mood) filters how I do everything—drive, read, eat—and is not simply a state of mind. I can be angry and not express anger in an obvious way.} \]

\[ \text{Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 225.} \]

\[ \text{Heidegger, 220.} \]

\[ \text{Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 68.} \]

\[ \text{It is debatable whether the “they” (society) is a bad thing for Heidegger. Really, what matters for him is that my authenticity is never lost.} \]
Fascination is the idea that something that holds my attention to the effect that I lose my authenticity. I can be so caught up in worldly affairs and the concerns of others that I forget who I am and what I am about. Heidegger gives the example of idle talk as “the possibility of understanding every thing without previously making the thing one’s own [inauthenticity].” In other words, knowing facts (theoretical knowledge) does not necessarily make known to me the relevance of those “facts” for my own concrete existence. Facts, theoretical knowledge, can be “idle talk” when they serve to distance me from myself by becoming absorbed in their contents and not my own life. Heidegger indirectly implies the best way to exist is for myself away from other people, lest I become too concerned with them, and focused on my own existence else I become inauthentic.

The above fundamental structure of human existence lead to what Heidegger calls a “totality of entities” or “involvements”. Totalities are interconnected projects utilized as ways of inhabiting the world. It makes use of things as equipment or tools because things help me to complete tasks. For example, students are studying at a desk when the lamp’s bulb burns out. One of them goes to the closet for a fresh bulb in order to put it into the lamp, in order to study, in order to pass a class, in order to graduate, in order to… and so on. One small action is connected to a host of other “projects”. Were I not able to

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205 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 213. Idle talk is uncritical discourse about the world. It is an inauthentic form of discourse.

206 One could argue *Dasein* is, like “they,” an authentic community composed of authentic individuals. That debate is outside my dissertation, and I mention authenticity to underscore the centrality of the self in Heidegger’s philosophy.

choose things for myself, these projects would never come to completion. Totalities absorb the world into me and me into the world. As a result, because I have the ability to take things into myself and make them my own, everything is reduced to me. Everything is now mine.

Post-Hesburgh universities have a similar feel. Instead of serving their communities in a way akin to St. John Paul II’s philosophy, rather they monopolize resources into themselves for their own projects. For instance, faculty labor is utilized to produce research papers. Faculty are persuaded to expend energy towards article production instead of dedicating more time to care of their students. Most universities prefer this setup because the articles produced generate free publicity, higher rankings, and greater probability in attracting grants. In this way, they embody the Husserlian call to intentionality: their cognition is oriented towards ideas of fame and fortune. Heidegger summarizes these projects, again, as totalities. To Heidegger’s “totality” Levinas opposes “infinity,” hence the title of his magnum opus, Totality and Infinity.

When Levinas begins philosophizing, he places his project squarely in the context of war: “Does not lucidity…consist in catching sight of the permanent possibility of war?”\(^\text{208}\) Now Levinas is a thinker known for his lack of clear writing,\(^\text{209}\) so knowing whether he is speaking philosophically or literally is important.\(^\text{210}\) “War” for Levinas has

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\(^\text{209}\) It was customary in the French intellectual milieu to purposefully write in an obscure manner to prove to one’s peers a certain level of intelligence. Levinas is exceedingly clear in his explanations about his philosophy during his interviews.

\(^\text{210}\) He is metaphorical elsewhere in the text.
two meanings. First, it is literal war. A common reason why countries take up arms is because they cannot come to some kind of agreement. Both sides contend the other is not being rational because the opposing side is not meeting the other’s demands. War is the only reasonable thing left to do, and it has a way of “suspend[ing] morality”\textsuperscript{211} such that the rules of right and wrong are dismissed, ignored, or brushed off (temporarily) in favor of a greater cause. As long as the enemy is annihilated, what does it matter whether one is acting morally? For this reason, Levinas adds that politics is the “art of foreseeing war and winning it by any means,”\textsuperscript{212} and it wins by turning the private lives of individual citizens into a public cause: anyone can be annihilated, or murdered, at any time. Ethics is necessary to end this all because we are vulnerable, hence the second meaning.

The second meaning of war is the struggle between rational systems of philosophy to gain dominance over each other. Every time a systematic or similar type of rational thought comes up, it gains followers and opponents.\textsuperscript{213} These fight \textit{ad nauseum} until another system comes along challenging them, and the fighting starts all over again. It is a never-ending cycle for dominance built upon the structure of rational thought. The problem for Levinas is that in these systems, one is relating to an abstract entity, not anything personal that can speak\textsuperscript{214} to me in an intimate way. In particular, Levinas has Heidegger’s neutered “Being” in mind.\textsuperscript{215}

\textsuperscript{211} Levinas, \textit{Totality and Infinity}, 21.

\textsuperscript{212} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{213} E.g., Platonism and Aristotelianism, or Communism and Capitalism.

\textsuperscript{214} Speech will have key meaning for Levinas later on.

\textsuperscript{215} “Being,” that which makes things intelligible for me, is impersonal. In \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger has human beings relating to Being, not God.
It is out of the twofold meanings of war that Levinas can base his ethic, which I will describe further below. In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas is speaking literally about war as a production of Heideggerian philosophy\(^{216}\) and is speaking philosophically about war when referring to the kind of philosophy he understands Heidegger’s to encapsulate. The idea of being encapsulated is of utmost importance for Levinas. To be encapsulated is to be part of a totality. Expanding on Heidegger’s notion, a totality is the complete comprehension and completion of something, or to be comprehended and completed as a unity of some larger whole. In human relationships, he designates this comprehension “sameness”. Sameness is a kind of totality “where self and the other are treated as though they are [one].”\(^{217}\) They are treated as the “same” insofar as totalizing a human being into sameness is to categorize one in such a way that one can be grasped and broken down into pieces, much like a philosophical concept. Much like war. One is simply encapsulated and comprehended as part of a larger idea in the universe. In this way, sameness is anything that is united under a single concept. Applied to human relationships, sameness is the category of how the self\(^ {218}\) understands its place in the universe. For Levinas, the self is characterized by the habit of reducing and making all things similar- and identical to me. When I encounter something in the world foreign to me, I immediately bring it under my rule. I do not stop to consider whether something or

\(^{216}\) Levinas holds that Nazism can be found in Heidegger’s philosophy. The importance of that conversation is outside the confines of this dissertation. I am only mentioning it so the reader knows what is going on in the background, but it will receive no treatment here.


\(^{218}\) The I, the subject, the principle of identity.
someone has an identity independent of me in such a way that I leave it be. Rather, I consume these things so that they become part of me—they become the same as me—for as an autonomous being, the self has the power to do what it pleases.

The autonomous self in Heidegger, and to a lesser extent Husserl, does not engage in the kind of “letting exist” that Levinas encourages. These facts are important because they are same philosophies present in contemporary Catholic higher education today. Husserl and Heidegger parallel the early debates and Fr. Hesburgh quite well, while Levinas pairs with St. John Paul II and, as I will later show, Jacques Maritain. Husserl and Heidegger are needed not only to explain Levinas, or help to explain Levinas, but also to give ground for my argumentation as to the history and elaboration of Catholic higher education. Their phenomenologies are present in the history of Catholic education and philosophies of Catholic educators and institutions without full consciousness because these philosophies are used indiscriminately. They underlie what Catholic institutions of higher learning are trying to do, and I argue it is inherently selfish like the Heideggerian self. Levinas offers a reclamation of the self in recognition of the Other, similar to the student-teacher relationship, but he needs help because the I-Other relationship by itself is not developed enough in his work to stand alone in institutional education. Hence my inclusion of Maritain. These lines of thought will be argued in chapter four. For now, I will now layout Levinas’s argumentation in this text by laying out his philosophy of the self, the relation of self and Other, some epistemological notes
throughout, an explanation of key terms for him and this dissertation, the student as poor-Other, and conclude with a word on the student-teacher relationship.

The Organization of the Self

In the student-teacher relationship, the teacher is the self and the student is the Other because, while the Other instructs the self in Levinas’s account, it is the student who is “foreign” (other) to the teacher on the basis that the student approaches the teacher to learn in the university. The overlap, one will see, is that there is an encounter between student and teacher, both learn from each other, and both share a common world. To understand how these dynamics work, I will first elucidate the nature of the self according to Levinas.

In order to establish precisely in what ways the self is separated from the Other, Levinas must first clarify what it is about the the self that makes it a self. Husserl’s notion of intentionality explicated at the beginning of this chapter holds that consciousness is always conscious of something, namely, an object in my field of vision. It is taken almost for granted that I, the subject, am relating to objects exterior to me such that they come to me for consumption by my intellect, whereby they become mental representations. Similarly, Heidegger’s intentionality is oriented towards objects in the world as they manifest according to their practical usage in my day-to-day affairs. But Levinas picks up on an aspect of human experience that the former have overlooked. If Husserl’s notion of selfhood is consciousness of something, and Heidegger’s is the use of something, then Levinas’s is the enjoyment of something. Now, a clarification is in order.

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219 Sensibility, need, desire, face, responsibility, poverty, and third party.
Levinas is working out what a self by itself looks like separated from other people. Selfhood, for him, arises with “relations that are produced within the same.”\textsuperscript{220} In other words, what makes my life singular is somehow intertwined with my relating to things as the same as me. (We can safely acknowledge Levinas means a human self.) Philosophically, selfhood is “to have identity as one’s content.”\textsuperscript{221} That is to say, the self is a being that relates to itself with all the things that it claims as its own, things it claims to be part of it. This notion of identifying things as oneself implies there are things not of oneself. Those things are “other,” or things of relative difference between themselves.\textsuperscript{222} When something other is identified as mine or part of me, it ceases to be other and is one with what Levinas calls “psychism”.\textsuperscript{223} Psychism is his term for the inner life, that is, the world constituted by me in that I “[establish myself] as commander of the world,” as one who determines all things for myself.\textsuperscript{224} Levinas argues that the inner life is characterized by enjoyment (pleasure), the most basic constitution of a self.\textsuperscript{225} Enjoyment is an ontological structure—a way of being or existing—that the self cannot help but concretely embody. Its main concern is “growth and plenitude”\textsuperscript{226} characterized by pleasure, or as “living from…”, by which he means I live from that

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\textsuperscript{220}Levinas, \textit{Totality and Infinity}, 110.
\textsuperscript{221}Levinas, \textit{Totality and Infinity}, 110.
\textsuperscript{222}E.g., a ketchup bottle and a baseball are not the same thing, but they are, say, inanimate. They are also identifiable as belonging to me.
\textsuperscript{223}Levinas, \textit{Totality and Infinity}, 110.
\textsuperscript{224}Adriaan T. Peperzak, \textit{To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas} (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1993), 148.
\textsuperscript{225}Levinas will be describing the hedonist’s lifestyle.
\textsuperscript{226}Large, \textit{Reader’s Guide}, 183.
\end{flushright}
which gives me life or vitality. Not biological life, but inner life, the things that make me come and feel alive as a human being. I use things, yes, but not in a strictly utilitarian sense of means to ends as one uses a hammer to pound nails for a house, or a bat to play baseball, and an ongoing list of projects in Heidegger’s sense. I use them because I get pleasure from them, I live from them, and this pleasure is independent from use in that it makes me happy. When pleasure is understood as happiness, however, it is not necessary for life because I can still live and not take pleasure in things, but when I do take pleasure, it “nourishes” me in a way no other thing can. Pleasure, now taken as nourishment, is an “invigoration” of my life, “the transmutation of the other into the same.” Relative others become the same (they become one) when they are consumed. For example, a spectator can consume a ketchup slathered hot dog at a baseball game, both of which are consumed for my enjoyment. I consume things for no other reason than I enjoy them, not because I can think them in my mind as ideas, nor use them for projects. I enjoy things for their own sake, including books and learning. Enjoyment, then, has several meanings working alongside each other: pleasure, “living from…,” happiness, and nourishment. The common denominator here is that these are all forms of consumption—turning otherness into sameness. Students tend to turn the otherness of a text into the sameness of themselves when they, process, and expound on the contents. They take pleasure in being “nourished” by the texts.


228 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 110.
Not only do I take pleasure in things, but the act by which I am nourished. For example, I enjoy eating bread itself, but I also enjoy the bread in the act of eating. I am nourished by what I do while I do it. Even hunger pangs give me enjoyment when I anticipate I can satiate them. In this way, “enjoyment is the ultimate consciousness of all the contents that fill my life”\textsuperscript{229} because everything I enjoy brings me happiness, etc.

Notice that this relationship is with something other, something not me and is concrete involving real objects. Notice, also, that in the concept of nourishment lies “need”.

The notion of need is a complicated term for Levinas. It is not the same “as a simple lack”\textsuperscript{230} as something I do not have, or an insignificant poverty. Rather, the things we live from do not “enslave” us, but we enjoy them. Lying in the sun, I feel the warmth on my skin. It is not for my survival, yet neither do I reject it as something bad for me. I enjoy it, and as the enjoyment is mine\textsuperscript{231} my independence as a self arises from it, else the sunlight would already be part of me and I would have no need to pursue it. In a sense, I “need” the sunlight not so much to nourish my body as much as to nourish my inner life. What makes a “need” different than sheer want is that we take delight in having needs. I enjoy being “needy” of sunlight because I can anticipate how it feels. Delight is found in waiting for the satisfaction: “Need, a happy dependence, is capable of satisfaction, like a void, which gets filled.”\textsuperscript{232} In this way, need is something that gives birth to abundance when it is fulfilled. Enjoyment allows me to be “at home” with myself, that is, it creates

\textsuperscript{229} Levinas, \textit{Totality and Infinity}, 110.

\textsuperscript{230} Levinas, \textit{Totality and Infinity}, 114.

\textsuperscript{231} Similar to Heidegger’s idea of the authentic self realizing itself through projects within a totality.

\textsuperscript{232} Levinas, \textit{Totality and Infinity}, 115.
a kind of experience that is solely my own. Specifically, I form myself by integrating the relative, impersonal other not by opposing it as one idea opposes another, but in surrounding myself with it. But I would not be able to experience need and enjoyment without a body.

I need a body to help me enjoy life because, as temporal creature, it takes time for me to fulfill my needs. I am not a beast, so I must labor, change my environment to suit my needs whether that means building a house or a baseball field. “Need” in this case does not demonstrate the deprivation of human existence, but its inventiveness. Unlike Heidegger, who would add a litany of reasons why I am building this or that architectural piece in order to establish an authentic self, Levinas points out we simply enjoy the building for its own sake. I take pleasure in standing, say, on a roof in the sun not just because I like the warmth, but because what I am doing (laboring) makes me happy. Base running drills are hard work, but its an enjoyable work I like for no other reason that my liking it. I am consuming the sun and pleasure in building as I build. I am consuming the smell of freshly cut grass and dirt when I sweat rounding third. In all these things I enjoy I am not thinking about them. I am, again, consuming them, and my body makes it possible. They come to me as they are, I enjoy them in the present, and I seek them out according to my desires. It is how my selfhood is formed. Becoming a self by itself, here, means becoming independent from totality by separating oneself from the whole. For Levinas, it occurs when needs are filled. My needs are mine, not anyone else’s, and so they make me independent from the rest of existence. “Ipseity” is the term for this uniqueness of one’s life.
Ipseity designates one who lacks “the individuation of a concept,” or one who is not part of a genus.\(^{233}\) I am “withdrawn” into myself in solitude, outside of any concept (that is, part of any whole) or relationship. My existence is solely for myself by myself. I am self-sufficient. Again, enjoyment here is not psychological or biological because there is a joy in just existing, outside of my projects (doing things for the sake of something else). Any action I take springs from enjoyment because enjoyment is my existence. I build a house and run bases because building and running are enjoyable before any specific content they inhabit. In this way of one “having pleasure” before some kind of act, Levinas asserts that self is not ontological (having being) but axiological (having value).\(^ {234}\) I do not begin to become a self by “assuming being” in something greater than me, but by enjoyment in my inner life. The things I enjoy are not objects under some grand theoretical system. Yes, they can be literal material things, and I consume them, but the nourishment they provide are not, for Levinas, part of some larger system. They just are, much like my enjoyment.

But just as enjoyment is not reducible to mere use or utility, neither is it reducible to intentionality. Levinas’s critique of Husserlian intentionality is centered on Husserl’s fixation with all thought as a kind of sight as noted above. When “seen” through the eye of consciousness, all thought is reducible to representations in the mind because everything I experience, for Husserl, is rooted in cognition. Levinas says, “the object of representation is indeed interior to thought: despite its independence it falls under the

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\(^{233}\) Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 118.

\(^{234}\) Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 119.
power of thought.”

Being intentional, and thereby in the mind, no intentional object—that is, nothing in the mind—escapes the intellect’s grasp. There is no room for anything unique, nothing to spontaneously surprise me in intentionality. Not only this, but while objects and consciousness are distinct from one another, the latter still manages to “produce” (bring about) the objects as endowed with meaning, that is, I am oriented towards it in a way that it matters to me not anyone else. Everything is not just reducible to consciousness, but is reducible to me, the self. Levinas rejects this notion of intentionality because, as I will explain, he holds there is an aspect of human experience (the encounter with the Other) that escapes intentional awareness. Not only that, but I experience it at a level “invisible” to consciousness at level of pre-cognitive sensibility. That is, I feel something about this Other that I do not experience with mere thoughts. Something is “beyond” thinking here, something is beyond intentional consciousness.

Before Levinas can get there, he must first explain how his basic notion of the self as formed in enjoyment does not simply duplicate enjoyment as intentional.

Husserl’s notion of intentionality involves my producing meaning by constituting (actively relating consciously to) objects, whereas Heidegger’s would have me use objects as tools for accomplishing projects. Here, Levinas inters the body, as discussed above, in order to offer a response. The body is, metaphorically, “indigent,” needy, and “naked” to consciousness because needs are absences, but again, not mere absences. The indigent, poor body as an absence cannot be represented or used in a way pleasing to

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235 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 123.

236 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 127.
intentionality. The function of the body, for Levinas, is to establish my position on the earth. Both the earth and my body are corporeal and needing nourishment in order to live and thrive. What I enjoy is not “my life as the represented is within representation,” but my life as nourished. Rather than constitute or use them, I assume objects into myself by passivity, by welcoming them for consumption rather than somehow actively engaging them as in a conversation. To welcome is to be receptive, to let things into oneself, not to manipulate or destroy. The concrete world makes it possible for there to be consciousness and thereby intentionality, utilization, or welcoming of objects at all. The primary place I welcome objects is in the elements.

Like enjoyment, the elements are “primitive” in that they underlie representation and utilization, but what gives them primacy in experience is that they are uncontainable or non-possessable. Husserl and Heidegger, who want to comprehend everything in abstraction or projects, overlook the fundamental set up of the world I inhabit as concerns enjoyment. Enjoyment happens in the elements. I am immersed in the things I enjoy—I absorb the sunlight, I smell the air, I drink cool water, I feel the soil between my fingers. Yet, these nourishments are themselves first immersed in the elements, and the elements are not objects. Odd as it sounds, the elements are for

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238 Welcoming as a kind of receptivity is similar to Heidegger’s *Dasein*, except I am not mastering the world for my own benefit.

239 By which he means Mother Nature—plants, animals, fire, et al. Also, the word “element” reminds one of a first principle, a notion important Levinas’s thinking here.

240 Levinas plays with the word “prime” as literally meaning “first,” yet also denoting an association of being “in nature,” as in, “Tarzan swings on his rope in nature.”
Levinas not objects because they are “too indeterminate, too formless.” Levinas says “The element comes to us [on all sides].” There is nothing to really limit them in a phenomenological sense. The elements are more qualities of existence than essences and are simultaneously in us as nourishment and exterior to us as other. In a similar manner, “in enjoyment the things are not absorbed in the technical finality that organizes them into a system.” Like elements, enjoyable things precede rational ways of thinking like intentionality. Hence, what Levinas is trying to demonstrate with the body and nature is that the self and its enjoyment elude certain “conception[s] of knowledge.” One way I gain knowledge is through the senses, but for Levinas, sensibility does not give knowledge.

Sensibility “is the mode of enjoyment,” that is, sensibility is what allows me to have a relationship of pleasure with the elements. Instead of providing knowledge, sensibility is a feeling before anything else. I feel myself affected by things before I conceptualize them. Levinas gives the examples of “the green of these leaves, the red of this sunset.” As I live I sense them as enjoyable, I absorb them, and they become part of me. Sensibility’s function is not to constitute representation (or its possibility), but “the instance of enjoyment.” It needs not tools or anything readily usable, except the

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241 Peperzak, *To the Other*, 155.
243 Levinas, 130.
244 Peperzak, *To the Other*, 155.
246 Levinas, 135.
247 Levinas, 136
body. Through the body, enjoyment is pre-reflective—it exists before thought. Unlike thoughts and their objects, which come and go and are discarded on a whim, in sensibility the self “hold[s] onto [a thing’s] exteriority.” The thing exists in the world as it is, and the self leaves them as they are felt because, as they are elemental, I cannot possess them in thought. Because the elements are not “possessable” in thought, and they exist before I am conscious of them, they precede thought and are “are not to be ascribed to the totality to which it is closed [off].” Sensibility is outside totality because it does not have anything to do with concepts or projects, and these have a certainty stability about them—they stay the same whether I am thinking of them or not. Sensible objects, as they come out of the elements, are unstable. I cannot guarantee, for example, that the sun will not always burn me, or the seawater toss me about, nor the “elements” of university life always give me what I desire. I am happy in one moment and fighting for survival the next. The world is enjoyable, but dangerous, and so I labor (alter the natural world) myself a home, a dwelling place where I can mark off my possessions and territory to protect myself from the uncertainty of the outside world. But then the Other comes onto the scene.

At the university, again, this Other is the student because the student is passing through. The teacher “remains” in the university seeing generations of students come and go. It is the student who approaches the teacher to begin an encounter.

248 Levinas, 138.

249 Levinas, 127.
Levinas’s description of the self’s meeting the Other takes place in what he calls the “face-to-face encounter”. Before explaining this term further below, I will first explicate Levinas’s transition from the sensible to the Other via metaphysical desire, the face, and infinity. Through sensible and representational knowledge, I know the world in a way reducible to Husserlian intentionality or Heideggerian disposedness. When individual objects come to me, I experience a kind of wholeness about them. The qualities (e.g., color, size) are not separated, but integrated with the object. Representational knowledge is found, again, in the metaphor of light and disposedness is found in utility and projects. From the perspective of those epistemologies, sensibility is deficient for acquiring knowledge about the world. Yet, each time the light “shines” insight onto something, it is within a metaphysical void Levinas calls *il y a*, or, “there is”. For Heidegger, there is a kind of horror in the anxiety of knowing I will die. Against him, Levinas uses this term to refer to the horror of existence itself and the fear that nothingness is all there is for me. The *il y a* incorporates an inescapability of myself from myself as I take recourse in knowledge to fill the supposed epistemological emptiness of satisfaction in enjoyment. In this way, Levinas is expanding on the notion of a “horror” of existence in order to counter that “enjoyment…characterizes all sensations whose representational content dissolves into their affective content.”[250] The emptiness of satisfaction in enjoyment is a misnomer. Sensibility is not about representation, so of course it is “inadequate” for acquiring knowledge. Rather, it is about affectivity—the

feeling I get when I find something enjoyable, and this feeling as a form of contentment delivers me from the horror of the *il y a*. The world is the self’s for the taking, and it is taken as enjoyment, something previous phenomenologies failed to articulate. As a solitary self, the I relates to everything “other,” or exterior, to it—elements, tools for labor, dwellings—as reducible to sameness. Relationship happens when I go out from myself and my projects towards the Other. What makes this movement exceptional, Levinas says, is that it is characterized by “Desire” or “metaphysical desire”.

It is an insatiable, unsatisfiable urge and longing for the Other. It is not the same as a “need,” a corporal desire for something I consume, like a piece of bread. I have bodily needs like these, and there is an interesting feature to all of these needs: their satisfaction does not bring me peace. Satisfaction drives me to more needs. For instance, I eat bread and I want more. I fill my belly, and I want to sleep. I wake up, and I want more bread. Eventually, I realize that satisfying my needs is not enough. I look for more things to consume, and whatever they are does not matter. For needs, more will never be enough. With needs, I am recovering something lost, “a longing for return” to what I previously had, namely, satisfaction.

Metaphysical desire, however, does not want satisfaction “because it does not call for food,” nor does it want return because it wants to go outside itself. In this

251 Levinas, 191.

252 Ibid., 34. Desire is stylized with a capital D to signify its difference with ordinary, everyday desire. Levinas uses the word “metaphysical” to reference relationship because, for him, relationship is the structure (read: metaphysics) of the universe.

253 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 33.

movement it has a peculiar characteristic, Levinas says: “[metaphysical desire] desires beyond everything that can simply complete it. It is like goodness—the Desired does not fulfill it, but deepens it.” In other words, contra need, metaphysical desire is not fulfilled or satisfied by the object of its desire. Unlike a need satisfied, Desire is hollowed out: it is structured such that no matter how much I strive to fulfill it, the more it intensifies. The striving is done by moving towards the Other, and the fulfillment the attempted “grasping” of the Other. In moving towards the Other, what Levinas has in mind here is service, which I will touch on and relate to Desire when discussing the student-teacher relationship. What is important here is the Other escapes this reducibility to the sameness of enjoyment and satisfaction of need by virtue of what Levinas calls “the face”.

The “face” is a complicated term for Levinas, but unlike most philosophical words, it is not a technical one. Technical terms change very little, or at all, over the course of a philosopher’s work. The meaning of “face” does not change, but it is neither something completely fluid. The “face” is but one dimension of the relationship with the Other. Ordinarily, a face is a visage: the literal look on a human countenance. For Levinas, “face” is his term for the vulnerable, impoverished, exposed humanity of the concrete other (the human being) irreducible to any representational or utilitarian

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255 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 34.

256 Whereas with a need, the desire may return (e.g., I want more bread), but the desire is always satisfiable.

257 As I explicate further, I will explain why for Levinas grasping the Other is not possible.
knowledge. The face, the humanity of someone, is that aspect of the person that no idea can encapsulate and no project can grasp. It “refus[es] to be contained…it cannot be comprehended, that is, encompassed” and is “inadequate” to any idea I can conceive. When physically looking at someone’s countenance, I can tell whether they are joyous, upset, or something else. I can describe what I perceive with any number of words and phrases, but that is not what Levinas means. People are more than their physical features. In this way, “face” separates me from the Other. It is what makes the Other other. Yet, the Other is not me only in a comparative sense. For example, your hair is long and mine is short. It is not simply a question of matter or accident. Both of these ways of thinking about the face and the Other puts us under totality because the face, unlike concepts, is not “equal” to anything else. Hence, the “face” is a metaphor, referring to one’s humanity as it is “invisible,” or unseen by the light of vision in representation, utility, and totality.

This way of speaking may be odd, but we are speaking in relational logic. It is not formulaic. We are not speaking in propositions. Yes, these sentences can be broken down according to propositional logic. There is no denying that, but Levinas is talking about an aspect of human beings—their very humanity—that exceeds encapsulation by a logical operator. This excess is what Levinas calls “infinity”.

258 Having ideas of a person in my mind (representation) and their helping me do things (utility) is not an issue for Levinas. The issue is the reduction to those things, which for him Husserl and Heidegger espouse. See Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existsents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1978), 39-41.

259 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 194.

260 Levinas might be going overboard here, but he is trying to get at what makes each person unique.

261 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 34.
Before I expound infinity, it must be noted this concept is the reason for the constant renewal of the student-teacher relationship. As with pleasure, I can get bored with the same features over and over again. Teachers might feel the same about, say, teaching the same material year after year, but each new set of students provides a new encounter because of the absolute uniqueness of each student, which infinity begins to layout.

Infinity is the idea of conceptual unlimitedness. Now, Levinas’s source for his notion of infinity comes from Descartes\textsuperscript{262} whose description of infinity and its formal structure (not the content) matches Levinas’s use in his description of the Other. Because Descartes is periphery to my study here, I will simply note his influence but focus on Levinas. In his search for certainty, Descartes takes an inventory of everything contained in his mind and finds that there is nothing there that he could not have come up with by himself.\textsuperscript{263} He concludes that he can only think of finite things, concepts, etc. because, as a human being, he is a finite creature. There is one idea, however, that is not finite: infinity. As a finite human being, Descartes has less “reality” than someone or something that is infinite (i.e., God). Accordingly, he states “from this very fact [of being finite] I know most clearly that I depend upon some being other than myself [for the concept of infinity].”\textsuperscript{264} From this observation, he concludes an infinite idea (or a notion of infinity) must come from outside himself on the basis that his own finitude could not produce it.

\textsuperscript{262} René Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy” in \textit{Philosophical Essays and Correspondence}, ed. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2000), 113-122 (Meditation Three).

\textsuperscript{263} Descartes, \textit{Meditations}, 118. In other words, he does not need his senses to think of a “horse” when the concepts making up a horse are already there (e.g., shapes).

\textsuperscript{264} Descartes, 120.
Infinity is not “contained” in him, but it comes to him from without. Infinity must have been put in him somehow, and he needs an other to put it there. That other is God because infinity originates with God, the infinite being. Given that infinity is put in me by God, and God exists before I do, infinity thus precedes my existence. In preceding me, in a strange logic, infinity cannot be false “for the nature of the infinite is such that it is not comprehended by a being such as I, who am finite.” Something that exists, yet is incomprehensible is not false or illusory given that, as before, I cannot comprehend it being a finite creature. Now, Levinas does not conclude Descartes’s classical theism, but keeps the basic structure of Descartes’s thought on infinity, namely, it comes from outside me, precedes me, is uncontainable, and is incomprehensible.

What makes the idea of infinity quite remarkable in philosophy is that “its ideatum surpasses its idea.” An “ideatum” is the actual manifestation of an idea in concretion. For instance, in Husserl, I have the idea of a baseball in my mind and the actual baseball in my hands. Try doing that with infinity. Whatever manifests is, by definition, incommensurable to the mental image I have of it. Levinas calls it “distance”: “The intentionality that animates the idea of infinity is not comparable [is distant] with any other; it aims at what it cannot embrace.” Anytime I try to conceptually grasp infinity, I fail because “the I…thinks more than it thinks.” It overflows. In other words, while I have been referring to infinity as an idea, to say infinity is an idea is not

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265 Descartes, *Meditations*, 120.

266 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 49.


268 Levinas, 54, author’s emphasis.
really all that true because an idea is something mentally containable. Same with the face. The face of the Other is Other as “the infinite is the radically, absolutely, other.” They are the same, but not in the sense of sameness. Sameness, again, refers to the self making all things like itself. The way Levinas uses “face” and “infinity” is to discuss the same thing—humanity—in different ways. One might say he peels back the layers of human experience, but these “layers” are not a question of negation.

The question of negation is a question of reality. To negate something is to say it does not exist. It is a non-reality. But the face exists. It “has being,” but it does not have being in a classical sense. Like infinity, it is “reality without reality” because, like infinity, it has something I can point to conceptually, but by its very nature it erupts over that pointing by constantly reinventing itself. In other words, there is no concept I can use to adequately explain what I am experiencing because the “thing,” the reality, by nature escapes all concepts. Like Descartes, I cannot assume that I always had this notion in me because I myself am a finite creature. Something, someone outside of me had to put it there. For Descartes, it is God. For Levinas, it is the Other. Yet therein lies a problem: how can the Other, just as human as I, “put” infinity in me when the Other is just as finite? The answer lies in the “production” of infinity.

One example of the production of infinity is the student-teacher relationship wherein students freshly challenge teachers with new interpretations on previously taught texts. I am reminded these are living texts, so to speak, with ever new insights I have:

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270 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 212.

271 I can conceive of humanity.
blinded myself to in my day-to-day living. Because relationships involve exchange, in short, infinity is produced with a constant dialogue, a social relationship the student offers the teacher in return.

The Relation to the Other

When Levinas says “the idea of infinity is the social relationship”272 he means that infinity is “produced,” or “brought about” in relationship with the Other. How is this possible? The self does not know infinity through understanding, rather, it knows it relationally. Yes, Descartes can argue infinity comes to me from without, but as was just stated, infinity is constantly overflowing itself in manifestation. The “idea” is not adequate to the reality on a one-to-one basis. Because infinity comes from the Other outside me, my relationship “consists in approaching an absolutely exterior being”273 as metaphysical desire approaches the Other. Infinity (and the face) is “produced” because I do not experience it, or have the opportunity to experience it, unless the Other is actually there. I cannot experience something unless I am present to it. The Other, the personal other, is neither like the impersonal things I find in enjoyment, nor a set within a given category of the world (e.g., hobbies, pleasureful things), nor a tool I manipulate to aid me in completing projects part of a totality. When I meet the Other as Other, outside of all preconceptions and utility, I meet the Other in what Levinas calls the face-to-face encounter.


273 Ibid., my emphasis.
The face-to-face encounter is an event whereby I interact with the Other on a one-to-one basis. No two interactions are exactly alike. Like infinity’s unlimitedness, the face reveals itself differently each time, and not just one’s physical countenance: “the whole body—a hand or a curve of the shoulder—can express as the face.” Recall the face is a metaphor for the Other’s humanity, and Levinas adds that the parts of the body can be an instantiation of the face. Why choose “face” over all other metaphors when the body could suffice? Because, like a soldier or innocent civilian the victim of war, “face” expresses the vulnerability of humanity and of self-Other interaction. Going back to Totality and Infinity’s preface, Levinas discusses war as literal combat and as philosophies offering theories of dominance and competing with each other. Using literal war for a moment, consider the body. A soldier can brandish weapons with his hands to kill his enemies. He has legs that can run towards them to fight or take flight to survive. He has a chest to puff in intimidation or a display of dominance. The face, countenance, does not. He might paint it, wear a protective mask, or make a grimace to frighten an enemy, but the expression of the enemy’s face stops him. The enemy is cornered, and the soldier raises a sword, a gun, a knife. He threatens to take the enemy’s life, and he is defenseless against him. The only “appeal” for the enemy’s has for his life is his presence before the soldier, and so the soldier is faced with the choice of murder. The enemy is vulnerable to death, fully exposed to violence, impoverished of any security, and waits for the soldier’s response. Each encounter is not as dramatic or imminently

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274 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 262.
life-threatening, but the same poverty is present. As the encounter is the foundation of any meeting between me and another, be it peaceful, violent, or something different, so the face expresses the Other’s vulnerable humanity in a special way. The face qua Other is one who “looks at me and speaks to me. In contrast with objects, the [the self] does not assign the face its meaning.” The face presents its own meaning to me as irreducible to any psychological, cultural, or ontological concept in its very infinitude. In speech, we are able to see that it is language which links the self to the Other in the form of discourse.

The face “having the idea of infinity, is discourse, specified as an ethical relation.” “Discourse” is another term for conversation, a back-and-forth exchange between self and Other. It serves as the link that connects me to the Other without totalizing our relation, and it is of upmost importance that the “language” of discourse does not refer to literal words. Literal words imply the concepts they gesture towards in one’s mind. For example, “Jew” implies, or may imply, a certain set of stereotypes that one may find offensive and thereby deserving of destruction. But “Jew” is also a human being, and so “the formal structure of language [discourse] thereby announces the ethical inviolability of the Other…” I cannot “murder,” that is, deny the Other’s right to exist by refusing to respond to his/her face, without simultaneously acknowledging that the

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275 In the sense of biological life.


277 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 80.

278 Levinas, 195.
Other is in-fact vulnerable to destruction before me. Structurally, then, discourse affirms the existence of the Other, else there would be no one to speak to in conversation. I would be alone talking to myself. Here, discourse is the complete opposite of enjoyment’s structure whereby I do everything in my power to grow, provide, and please myself. Language, words, begins inverting that process towards the Other. As words, it points us to concepts, but concepts encompass and totalize. It can also describe the Other, but I can never fully describe her in words, so I cannot encompass her there either. In that respect, I am not free to do with the face, the Other, as I please. I cannot subsume the face into my world for whatever sense of enjoyment or use I feel like. I cannot, for example, speak to my student in any way I please because it may not be conducive to fulfilling the kinds of needs they have. I ought not consider my student a piece of clay to mold into my likeness with words suggestive they ought not have their own ideas about texts, the world, etc. Language forbids it and is something else.

Against Husserl’s (over)use of vision as metaphorical to how we obtain knowledge, Levinas appeals to a hearing metaphor in relation to the face. Unlike “sight,” which for Levinas implies a kind of domination, language (speech, discourse) keeps the self and Other separate because it does not imply a power struggle. Language works through the face in that, unlike vision, I do not “see” the face, but rather I hear it speaking. Without words. One might say language is the face because speech is one aspect of the face. A face “speaks” to me, not as a text or a work of art, but as something else. Language is the aspect of the face, similar to the grammatical form of the an

279 When I see you, I know you, and I can thereby break you down into parts of a whole.
imperative, that forbids me from doing as I please. It “resists” my attempt to assimilate it to my understanding. Take the wounded, enemy soldier. He has lost all his weapons and armor. He is helpless. His enemy approaches him ready to shoot, and they make eye contact.  The enemy cannot pull the trigger. He experiences something. Yes, infinity. Infinity is there, but it comes with something. It comes with “epiphany,” a manifestation, or revelation.

Similar to the ideatum as the manifestation of an idea, what manifests on the face of the Other is epiphany. Epiphany is the concrete, vulnerable “thing” I encounter that causes me to not stay in my current understanding of something, but it has the function of a command not to murder, of letting another exist. For example, the soldier assumes his enemy must be destroyed because he wears his country’s colors, but the blood flowing from the latter’s body strikes former, and the soldier moves from something aggressive to something ethical. Instead of (literal) murder, the soldier wants to get him aid. In the sense of self above, I am living from things in enjoyment. All the things that nourish me and that I use as tools through my labor, dwelling, and primitivity of the element (nature) are now put at the feet of the Other. But with the epiphany, what I have is not mine, but also his. Anytime I act, use, or mentally represent things I actually responding to the Other because there were conditions for acting, using, and representing

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280. The face-to-face encounter, again, need not be between two literal faces. I am using this example to extrapolate how Levinas’s thinking works and to clarify why he uses the term “face” over others.

that were not present before our encounter. The epiphany as command can only speak through me because, as a separate self, the face cannot speak to itself.

I am still going to own concrete things like books, tables, and chairs, but the epiphany of the command gives me another approach to things. They are now what I share, or could possibly share, with the Other through language because I realize in all I do my original enjoyment is not really mine. Because this Other exists in the world, what I do to and for myself affects him/her, too, because how I live impacts how I “welcome” or respond to the face. Welcoming is the passive response to the “speech” of the face. It is a kind of “listening” to hear what the face “says” to me. Like the epiphany, when I encounter and welcome the face it “speaks” to me, and what it says has the function of the grammatical imperative—a verb that expresses a command. The face “commands” something of me in its speech, which again, is not material words. What it commands of me is not to murder.

The I has the freedom to do as it pleases, including murder, but the Other “calls [it] into question,”282 that is, it causes the self to consider whether it should use its own resources and choices for itself or for the Other. Another way of putting it is the whether concepts and such the self uses to possess the world ought to be renounced in response to the face-to-face encounter. The face speaks “do not murder me,” that is, allow me to exist as I am in the world without your, the self’s, reduction into sameness. What I could do with myself in making a dwelling, enjoying the sun, using a hammer to build a house, all of that is questioned by the presence of the Other. Do I really have the right to do as I

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282 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 43.
please? Is my existence really the most important? Are my needs my primary concern?

The self is now, as mentioned in Levinas’s opening, at war with itself. It must choose to either respond to the face or renounce the face (murder)\(^{283}\) and go back to possessing the world. It is the enduring power struggle characteristic of all being and philosophy. “To expose myself to the vulnerability of the face is to put my ontological right to existence into question.”\(^{284}\) In this way, the Other is not “given to me as…things are”\(^{285}\) because things cannot testify that I might misuse my freedom. They do not call me into question. “In ethics, the Other’s right to exist has primacy over my own.”\(^{286}\) Consider the enemy soldier example. When the enemy soldier is lying on the battlefield without any means of defense, the only “thing” that speaks is the face.

Now, “murder” is like language in that it is not material. “Do not murder” is the epiphany the face expresses. Take the enemy soldier. His vulnerability (face), his very defenselessness as revealed in the epiphany of for instance, his wounds, expresses a command not to murder—let me exist, let me live as I am. In the moment one is about to squeeze the trigger, it occurs to the shooter, maybe, that he has a life like his. We raise families, build houses, and play baseball. His life is mine and mine his. On the basis of infinity brought about in the face-to-face encounter, to murder the Other is in some sense

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\(^{283}\) One might contend that a non-response to the face is “letting it be,” but Levinas would respond that in the face-to-face encounter, the self is—opposite Heidegger’s anxiety—concerned for the Other’s death (literal or metaphorical), not its own. “Letting the Other be” could result in the Other’s death (e.g., a bleeding soldier, a student asking a question), so the response is the appropriate action necessary to sustain the Other’s life.


to murder the self. To murder the student is to murder the teacher. As explained above in relation to Descartes, infinity precedes all cognition and comes to me from without. It occurs to me that when infinity is brought about in relation to the Other, and infinity is “put” in me, I “[contain] in [my]self what [I] can neither contain nor receive solely by virtue of [my] own identity.”

I “contain” (for lack of better words) in me the same infinity as he. Since he is Other for me, I am Other for him. And in this relationship, we are responsible for each other. The student and teacher are responsible towards each other for the formal learning event. The ethical relation is a relation of responsibility.

Responsibility and the Third Party

Responsibility is the idea that in the face’s need I respond to it in whatever way I can. I am response-able (able to respond). A response can take any material form: a cup of cool water, a loaf of bread, clothing, tending wounds, giving my company for five minutes. It can also take the form of prepping lessons, holding a door, or training myself to have a certain kind of character to benefit another. In all these cases, responsibility is an overall concern for the well-being of the Other in whatever way I

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287 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 27.


289 “It is a matter, eventually, of nourishing him, of clothing him. It is exactly the biblical assertion: Feed the hungry, clothe the naked, give drink to the thirsty, give shelter to the shelterless” in Emmanuel Levinas, *Is it Righteous to Be?: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas*, ed. Jill Robbins (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 52.

290 E.g., gaining patience to tolerate one’s mother-in-law.
encounter him. I do not have a choice in the matter: the Other concerns me whether I like it or not. As Levinas explains

I do not believe that [not hearing the call of the Other] is truly possible. It is a matter here of our first experience, the very one that constitutes us, and which is as if the ground of our existence. However indifferent one might claim to be, it is not possible to pass a face by without greeting it, or without saying to oneself, “What will he ask of me?” Not only our personal life, but also all of civilization is founded upon this.\(^{291}\) (Emphasis added.)

In this sense, responsibility is an obligation. I am obliged to respond no matter the circumstance, even with the openness of what the Other may ask of me. Yet, this response is neither a categorical nor universal response, that is, I do not respond to one Other the same way I do to another. Every situation is different and each one has his own needs. The tricky part to understanding how responsibility works for Levinas is that, like his entire corpus (especially Totality and Infinity), he switches between meaning something metaphorically and something literally. Contrasted with above, responsibility “stands behind practical morality; about the extraordinary relation between a man and his neighbour [sic], a relation that continues to exist even when it is severely damaged.”\(^{292}\) Responsibility is hence the fundamental, structural orientation towards the Other that, while taking certain concrete forms, never ceases for I am never not in the ethical relation. Levinas says, “Responsibility in fact is not a simple attribute of [being a self], as if the latter already existed in itself, before the ethical relationship. [Selfhood] is not for itself; it is, once again, initially for another.”\(^{293}\)

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\(^{291}\) Levinas, \textit{Is it Righteous to Be?}, 184.


\(^{293}\) Levinas, \textit{Ethics and Infinity}, 96.
that—outside all enjoyment, representation, and utility—what makes me me is the Other’s calling me to responsibility. My selfhood is formed by the Other and my response to the Other because it is these I cannot assimilate into sameness. Because the Other exists and presents him/herself to me, and I have no choice in whether I respond I ought to respond to him or not, Levinas posits our relationship is asymmetrical: responsibility lies solely with me—I am to give everything of myself to the Other.

This part of Levinas’s philosophy is constantly under scrutiny. Giving everything of oneself is construed as slavery—I am a slave to the Other. Not quite because Levinas’s language is extreme to get the reader’s attention and to probe the depths of this giving-of-onself. His message, his ethic, is straightforward in that he’s describing compassion, not some highfalutin charade. Showing compassion is the root of giving oneself and the core meaning of giving oneself. I can be kind, charitable, devoted, even obsessed to giving my all to my furthest capabilities for the Other, but it is all compassion—a suffering with the Other and the attempt to alleviate that suffering. The Other cannot relieve his/her own suffering, so it falls on me, hence the asymmetry.

When I respond to the Other, I respond with my whole being because in a given moment, I am hearing only the call of one Other. This notion of giving my whole self is called “asymmetry”. To be asymmetrical is to be fundamentally oriented towards the Other in such a way that I am ready to give the Other everything (in response) and receive nothing in return because the Other might need everything I can give.294

294 When asked by Philippe Nemo whether the Other carries the same responsibility for me, Levinas responded, “Perhaps, but that is his affair…I am responsible for the Other without waiting for reciprocity, were I to die for it. Reciprocity is his affair.” Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 98, emphasis in original.
Consider a teacher helping a student one-on-one. The teacher may have other things on his mind, but in helping the student (the Other), all time and attention (as examples of response and resource) is directed to him. The teacher does not focus on himself. I give everything to the Other and expect nothing in return. Yet, there is something troublesome here. Say I were to have a line of students outside my door who all need my time and attention. I cannot possibly give the same amount to all, should they have need of it. My resources to respond are unlimited, Levinas claims, because they are formed in my egoistic enjoyment. All the things (skills, etc.) built up inside me are now about the feet of the Other, waiting for his command. But the “unlimitedness” is there in theory, in the background. It is the notion that all I have is for the Other. Concretely, I am only able to stay in my office for so long before I must sleep and my attention span wearies. Not only these, but other Others have need of me. These “other Others” are what Levinas calls the “third party”—all the rest of society. In university life, the third party may be other faculty, administration, staff, or anyone who sets foot on a university campus.

The third party is not the singular Other of the face-to-face encounter, but all others outside of it. The third party is society, or as Levinas says, “the whole of [humankind]”. It is named as such because, while it does stand in direct relation to the first-person me, the self, it is not the second-person “you” of the Other. The third party is “third” because it has the grammatical function, not of a personal one-on-one “you,” but a personal plural “you”. A “you all”. As Levinas puts it, “the third party is other than the

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295 “These resources are infinite.” Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 246.

296 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 213.
neighbor, but also another neighbor.” The third party is not an impersonal crowd as a bundle of others whose randomness interferes with my responsibility for the Other. Instead, “the relationship between the neighbor [the Other] and the third party cannot be indifferent to me” because I experience the third party as just as much in need as the Other. In other words, the third party’s needs are just as important to me as are the Other’s needs, and because of this, my responsibility is now extended beyond the singular Other into the others of the third party. I am responsible for both such that my responsibility is now, like a resource, shared. Yet, because I cannot share my resources with all, I must decide to whom and how much I share. Hence the third party’s main concern is the carrying out of justice. Justice is social responsibility: the concern for the well-being of all others. These others are the third party because its concern is with the relationship between more than two people, but is just as personal as the singular Other. When discussing Levinas, one must keep in mind these levels of relationship because they often intertwine and refer back to one another much like they do in the section of Totality and Infinity “The Other and the Others” which I will now consider.

Levinas begins this section with a word on language. Language, analyzed above as what connects me to the Other in our separation, is here posited as “the presence of the face”. The “presence” of the face is the fact that the Other is in-person with me in the

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298 Levinas, 16.

299 It is physically impossible.

300 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 213.
face-to-face encounter. Just as I speak to the face of the Other in responding to its needs, so too, does the face’s presence speak back to me. The face speaks a reminder, though, that there are other people in need of solidarity, suggesting that a potential problem with the face-to-face encounter is forgetting the rest of the world. I can become so absorbed in the one-on-one relationship that I forget other people exist, but the face reminds me that this is not so, for Levinas declares “the third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other”. Like the language which breaks through the the Other’s changeable qualities (e.g., hair color), the face of the Other “speaking” to me brings to mind all the others in the world also in need of my response. It is not as though the Other comes to me—or I to the Other—we have our encounter, then go our separate ways. Rather, the third party is always lurking amidst our encounter, and I am reminded that there are those others excluded from this one-on-one relationship. I owe them something parallel to the moral responsibility called for by the singular Other. When I share a resource with the Other this offer inadvertently extends to all others as the third party because, difficult or not, I can make that same offering to all people. That offering, which parallels moral responsibility, is justice as it comes in the form of language.

As Levinas says, “language is justice,” meaning what I speak to the Other is what I give and owe to the Other by virtue of my being a self moving towards him/her in Desire. As it applies to all others, justice takes place in institutions because only

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301 Levinas, 213.

302 For example, I could donate sandwiches to anyone in the world personally or through something like an NGO.

303 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 213.
institutions—like the third party—can stand outside the self/Other relationship.

Institutions, at a societal-legal level, determine what I owe the Other. Notice the connection to “need” in the first chapter. I discussed the idea that students needed something from their professors. Universities, too, needed to provide a situation in which students could learn about their faith in a way conducive to either character development or theological academics. Both were at the center of the Augustinian/Thomistic debate. The deeper level of that debate was how students and teachers are to relate. Are they to relate as citizens in training or scholars in training? When one manages to determine what they need, one has the answer. The problem here is students as people have many needs, sometimes outside of what teachers can provide (e.g., mental health). And so universities began to offer clinics, recreation centers, and so forth in an attempt to appeal to student well-being. What teachers owe is different.

Similar to the State, universities are institutions that determine what teachers “owe” their students in the form of conduct codes, policies, and procedures. Such laws shape responses, but at the personal level, the face-to-face encounter engendered by compassion is the first event influencing my response. When the student comes onto the scene as Other, I am drawn to him/her in a fundamental way. I feel a responsibility for his/her existence, and this responsibility is shaped by poverty.

*The Student as Poor-Other and the Teacher’s Response*

It happens that the student, much like a beggar, cannot presumably help herself as per learning. As the poor one, she needs me to help her. We can discuss two types of...

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poverty: material and spiritual. Worthy of their own longer treatments, I will provide
basic definitions for our purposes here. Material poverty is generally the consistent lack
or access to basic needs: food, shelter, work, and clothing. These needs bridge me to
the Other because they are the concrete basis on which I connect and share resources.
Material poverty takes on a different meaning in the classroom. Colleges refer to texts
and such in the classroom as “materials,” but that is a mere coincidence. Material
poverty here does not mean for us that a student lacks the literal text in the classroom (but
it could), rather, it means that the material studied in the classroom gives something to the
student that the student would otherwise lack, and the teacher is the one who helps
provide it. What is being given will be discussed some in this chapter, but mostly in later
chapters of this dissertation. The importance for our discussion is that without the
concrete reality of learning in the classroom, there would be no institutional relationship
between student and teacher and thereby no opportunity for responsibility to arise in the
face-to-face encounter. Responsibility as assistance to another’s need is not necessarily
material in either sense of the word, yet needing assistance seems a kind of poverty. In
this broader sense of poverty, the fact that the Other (here, the student) needs help at all
suggests a second kind of poverty, namely, spiritual poverty.

Spiritual poverty is a need of assistance at the spiritual level. Specifically, it is a
state of dependence on another person for the incorporeal necessities of life (e.g.,
community, knowledge) in such a way that one cannot provide these necessities for

Mellen Press, 1990). Jones discusses the ways material poverty is understood by numerous third parties.
The formulation above is the most basic.
oneself. Something spiritual is incorporeal—it cannot be touched with human hands. I cannot touch the spiritual resource I have with a beggar (e.g., fraternity) when I share a material resource. In a similar way, I cannot touch the bond between myself and the Other, nor can the teacher touch the community one forms with one’s students. For both cases, what I share with the Other is now twofold. Economically, I share a material resource with the Other for the survival of the body, which in turn generates sharing a spiritual resource for the survival of our concrete relationship. In education, the “material” of the text or the classroom experience generates the spiritual resources of knowledge and learning community.306

One must always be ready to relate to the Other and thereby always be ready to give something on the basis of responsibility. This readiness to give implies that my relation to the Other will “always be an offering and a gift” which in turn breeds community.307 This gift, the sharing or giving of a resource as noted above, is the primary means of relating to one’s neighbor as moral responsibility for the Other, which is how Levinas understands poverty. Because the Other, who simultaneously reveals his/her surplus (infinity) in the face-to-face encounter, reveals the poverty of needing a response.308 The teacher’s responsibility for the students as poor-Others, and responsibility is embodied in conversation, or, language.

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306 This list can be added to many times, but these are the essential ones for our discussion.


308 Many philosophers struggle how to understand that the Other can reveal, or present me with a surplus, and be impoverished. One can think of it in relation Levinas’s rejection of Husserlian intentionality: the Other is “invisible” to the “sight” of knowledge. There is something “beyond” about the Other that I cannot grasp intellectually (her humanity), but I can only sense (similar to Plato’s Good beyond Being). Yet, being human, the Other is finite, and so impoverished.
Section one, subsection five of Totality and Infinity, “Discourse and Ethics,” is where Levinas discusses the relation with the Other as conversation. To review, conversation is the link to the Other in face-to-face encounter while the Other remains separate from the self according to the Other’s alterity. Language originates as the first moral response to the Other because it is the Other’s voice originally calling to me. With that being said, language is (again) not necessarily words, but an imperative commanding me to respond. My response to the Other is concrete—the sharing of a material good, time, company, or instruction. When I share my resources, I am “speaking” directly to the Other that I do not meet her empty-handed. As the face is a metaphor for the Other’s humanity, “speaking” is a metaphor for communication of what is inside of me. In “speaking” to the Other, language is an expression of my interiority, for when I speak, I become exterior—my language conveys what is inside of me immediately to the Other and the outside world. Given that verbal language is the usual means of communication between academic students and teachers, it is only fitting that it is the primary way of responding to students.

Henceforth, I use the term “academic” for students because what makes Levinas tricky to understand about teaching is that he thinks any Other is a teacher and any self is a student. A businessman, for instance, notices an elderly woman struggling to cross the street. His daily routine is interrupted, and he offers to help her. In the process of walking together, they make brief conversation and whatever is said, he learns

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309 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 72-76.

310 They could also refrain from verbal speech and her face, her vulnerability, would still “speak” to him the same.
something from her about himself, herself, and maybe the world. He is taught by her. She was the one in need, but it was really he who learned something. Similarly, the Other, here the academic student as the poor-one, is in need of assistance from the teacher. One kind of assistance, like a street beggar, is a monetary donation. But teachers are not inclined to give their students financial assistance, whether they have money or not. Rather, they are inclined to “walk” with their students through the ups and downs of their time together. Much like the businessman literally walking with the struggling woman, teachers guide their students through any number of crises. Nothing happens to a student that a teacher cannot in some way respond. In this way, the self-Other relationship parallels the student-teacher relationship, except that the academic student is the Other because he/she is receiving something from the teacher as the self in the university setting. And like the responsibility for the Other on the basis of infinity, the responsibility the teacher has for a student is as infinite as the command to respond to the Other.

As Levinas has said “[thou shalt] not leave the Other alone,” the teacher is unable to unbind him/herself from the relation with the student. Once the relationship is established in the concrete, it never dissolves. After their courses have ended and classroom interactions ceased, the relation maintains a constant over time. Students long after graduation refer to their professors as “Doctor,” though they may be “equal” as established adults. Teachers still offer whatever bits of knowledge they can to their

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(former) students’ inquiring minds after years of not speaking.\textsuperscript{312} Perhaps it is in their nature, perhaps not, but the student is clearly in need of something by virtue of his/her asking the teacher, and the teacher responds. The relationship of need demands that the teacher fill that need with a response. Similar to a beggar asking for sustenance, the response does not really matter whether it is the equivalent of a cup of water or a wedding feast. The point is to respond, to give something to another. Oftentimes the student’s concrete need is just to be heard, and the encounter with the teacher provides the opportunity.

Yet, the teacher cannot take care to notice the features of the student (hair color, etc.).\textsuperscript{313} This statement may be controversial in a post-modern age, but Levinas’s sentiment is egalitarian. Allow me to explain. Much like the anonymity of the Other in Totality and Infinity, the concrete Other remains “anonymous” in the sense that it can be anyone. Perhaps the content of my response changes according the uniqueness of the encounter, but the act does not. For instance, a teacher does not offer less words on the same subject to one student simply because the student is short, or disabled, or what have you. The same “content” is given regardless of who the Other is because the response is given according to what the teacher can give. Some students need more assistance than others, but a teacher—like the self approaching the Other—ought never come to a student

\textsuperscript{312} Mitch Albom, \textit{Tuesdays with Morrie: An Old Man, a Young Man, and Life's Greatest Lesson} (New York: Broadway Books, 2007). Albom lost touch with his professor, Morrie Schwartz, until he Providentially saw him on a \textit{Nightline} broadcast prompting him to reinitiate contact.

\textsuperscript{313} “You turn yourself toward the Other as toward an object when you see a nose, eyes, a forehead, a chin, and you can describe them. The best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes! When one observes the color of the eyes one is not in social relationship with the Other” in Levinas, \textit{Ethics and Infinity}, 85.
empty-handed. Because knowledge is most often communicated, it is not incredulous to claim ordinary conversation is where the student and teacher “speak,” both literally and metaphorically, but “a teacher should not only prioritize…intellectual development, but also must pay attention to the personal, [that is], spiritual development of [one’s] students.”314 Not unlike Catholic higher education’s emphasis on mission and identity as Catholic, the goal is for all students to get what they need insofar as an educational institution and its teacher can provide it. The problem then becomes one of accessibility: how can a single teacher make oneself available to all student needs? Levinas’s answer is it may not be possible, and he frames it in reference to the third party explained in the previous section.

All my attention and resources are oriented towards a singular academic student. Unless that student is receiving private lessons, the academic teacher is responsible for a whole host of students in the classroom. As the third party “looks” at me through the the eyes of the Other, the single student reminds me of all the other students I am responsible for. My resources now must be split between them. I am concerned for the well-being of all my students. For Levinas, this shift from the Other to the third party marks the foundation of the State, or for our purposes, the institution of the university:

In the measure that the face of the Other relates us with the third party, the metaphysical relation of the I with the Other moves into the form of the We, aspires to a State, institutions, laws, which are the source of universality.315


315 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 300.
Notice the face-to-face encounter makes the State possible. It founds it, underlies it. States are built of relations, though they become impersonal and contain impersonal elements (e.g., bureaucracies) in order to assure meeting the needs of all its citizens. The parallel in universities is similar. Without institutional processes to speed up the life of the university, nothing would ever get done. Imagine, for instance, analyzing every last detail of the thousands of admission applications. Impossible. The infinity of the Other must be “compromised” to deal with the need of getting on with university life. One might say a kind of violence is done to the Other (e.g., academic student) being ignored of all his/her attributes because anytime I relate a singular Other to a whole or an institution, the uniqueness is lost in the group by a “comparison between incomparables.” The complete uniqueness of one Other is incomparable to anyone else, yet it is compared with another Other when deciding who and how to respond. Applied to the university, how do I decide which student to respond to first? What best helps this student? Note the teacher’s relationship with the student gives rise to the institution of the university in the sense that without that relationship, there would not be a university at all. Comparing Others is true even for Catholic universities, as noted by Pope St. John Paul II in the previous chapter, whose underlying metaphysic is tied to the dignity of the human person: all people (here, students) must be respected as made in God’s image. The problem Levinas faces is just that—how to respect all of God’s children in the classroom and the university at large. Given the overlap between he and

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316 Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 16.

317 There is a similar idea when Levinas refers to the Other as coming from “on high” (*Totality and Infinity*, 203, 239, 291).
the Catholic Church, it is only appropriate to incorporate a Catholic philosopher for application of his ideas. Jacques Maritain’s philosophy of education works with Levinas’s ethic to provide a concrete application of what is necessary to return Catholic universities to their roots.

Maritain is a neo-Thomist, a philosopher using the metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas to answer philosophical problems. He develops a philosophy of education based on his Thomism and the liberal arts humanism of St. John Henry Newman wherein classics and literature are generally prioritized over technical, specialized texts because these latter ones generally do not contribute to the students’ knowledge of salvation, nor the building up of character and good citizenship. Note the discrepancy with the philosophy of Fr. Hesburgh. Levinas, too, does not have the detail in his ethic necessary to put flesh on a curriculum or the classroom situation, but he does provide the structure. To be faithful to the message of Catholic higher education, it behooves me to use a Catholic philosopher. Maritain also lays out more systematically the student-teacher interaction in a way appropriate to my argument.
IV. JACQUES MARITAIN’S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Maritain wrote his *magnum opus* on education, *Education at the Crossroads*,\(^{318}\) during WWII as the Yale Terry Lectures. His thoughts on education are written about European culture, but presented as equally relevant to American culture in describing human nature, the ends of education, and the ideal university.\(^{319}\) It is not comprehensive in laying out every detail of university or educational life, but it is a workable outline with several key elaborations on important concepts for educational philosophy. Maritain wants to argue for classical liberal arts education in the university because of its anti-totalitarian nature.\(^{320}\) In this chapter, I will lay out his basic position on education and human nature and describe what he calls the “seven misconceptions of education”. I will then explain the norms for students, teachers, and their relationship. Next, I will further clarify and elaborate on his educational philosophy via two of his articles on education, and conclude with some thoughts on his vision of the ideal university.

Maritain subscribes to liberal arts education whose “highest aim…is to make youth possess the foundations of wisdom.”\(^{321}\) Philosophy and theology are the highest of such an education. Philosophy frees students from their own ignorance in awakening them to


\(^{319}\) Catholic or secular.

\(^{320}\) There are no restrictions on what one can learn. The State does not demand one conform oneself to its image of the ideal person only for its sake.

\(^{321}\) Maritain, *Crossroads*, 71. There are two senses of “liberal”: freedom in the sense of social class (the upper class is free from manual labor to pursue the life of the intellect) and freedom of the human spirit. David Lutz clarifies “he does not offer an explicit criterion for distinguishing the liberal arts from other arts. He is more concerned with expanding the scope of the liberal arts and with extending liberal education to all students, including students of business.” “Integrating the Liberal and Practical Arts,” *Catholic Social Science Review* 23 (2018): 82.
reason, and theology is a “rational wisdom…rooted in faith,” standing higher than reason because it is supernatural knowledge of- or involving God Himself. I mention these ideas because this dissertation is about Catholic universities, where philosophy and theology tend to be regarded as the most important of all fields. But Maritain is, like Fr. Hesburgh initially, talking about all universities as such, not Catholic ones. Yet, Maritain admits his faith influences his philosophy of education, so one can assuredly understand his thinking in these texts to be “naturally” Catholic. One understanding of Catholic education is, of course, an education in the humanities.

It is important to note that Maritain has in mind children, or the student, when referring to the “who” of education. Typically philosophers of education leave that explanation out to the detriment of their readers, but Maritain is quick to explain that “the job of education is not to shape the Platonist man-in-himself, but to shape a particular child belonging to a given nation, a given social environment, a given historical age,” but before one is a member of any community, one is first human. One’s humanity precedes all possible qualities about a person in concrete existence, and the goal (telos) of education for Maritain is to become human.

“…Nothing is more important for

322 Maritain, 73.

323 “An educational theory systematically built upon the principles of St. Thomas and drawing its inspiration from his store of wisdom will be able to give real scientific consistency to Catholic thought and practice in the field of education” in Jacques Maritain, “Philosophy and Education,” in The Education of Man: The Educational Philosophy of Jacques Maritain Edited, with an Introduction, by Donald and Idella Gallagher, ed. Donald A. Gallagher and Idella J. Gallagher (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 42.

324 Maritain, Crossroads, 1. It is understandable how Maritain relates that thought to the then unknown outcome of Europe. Such a thought does not exclude the United States, or any place, because shaping students to a given nation happens all over. I also find that the philosophy argued here applies to students of all kinds, so I will ignore the use of “child” in Maritain’s writing.

325 He explains what he means by becoming human later in the work. Note the similarity to Levinas.
each of us to become a man [sic].” And so, this principle of becoming human guides all of Maritain’s thinking about education since it is education that “shape[s] and guide[s]” our own personal evolution. His definition of “human” is the Greek, Jewish, and Christian idea of man…an animal endowed with reason, whose supreme dignity is in the intellect; and man as a free individual in personal relation with God, whose supreme righteousness consists in voluntarily obeying the law of God; a man as a sinful and wounded creature called to divine life and to the freedom of grace, whose supreme perfection consists of love.

To begin reaching this perfection, one must embrace one’s education.

Maritain defines education in three ways. First, it is “any process whatsoever by means of which man is shaped and led toward fulfillment (education in the broadest sense).” Second, “the task of formation which adults intentionally undertake with regard to youth.” Third, “in the strictest sense, to the special task of schools and universities.” Where one finds oneself, one is always learning because human beings are “endowed with a knowing power, which is unlimited [and one can only learn with help] by collective experience previously accumulated and preserved.” In other words, the potential for self-determination (freedom), knowledge, and doing good is locked inside each person and cannot be unlocked without human interaction, “discipline, and

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326 Maritain, *Crossroads*, 1, author’s emphasis. I will adopt Maritain’s original language.

327 Maritain, 1.


329 Maritain, 2. He means all things are educational in that they teach us something about God, ourselves, or the world.

330 Maritain, 2.

331 Maritain, 2.

332 Maritain, 2.
Because he is discussing human nature, Maritain adopts the first definition above because it applies to all people, not only those in the university and youth. His aim here is to discuss the goal of education, becoming human, which he does by way of explaining seven misconceptions of education. The misconceptions skew the reception and teaching of students in life and universities.

**Seven Misconceptions of Education**

The first misconception is a disregard for ends, that is, the purpose of education. Education is about human growth in “knowledge and wisdom, good will, and love,” thereby freeing the spirit to pursue perfection (sanctity). For Maritain, modernity lost its way when its education replaced those ends for something else. He gives the example of a doctor who examines a patient so thoroughly, he forgets the cure. The means of treating the patient matter more than the treatment itself. People become consumed with the means by which they get to their goal that they forget the goal. For Maritain, modern education has neglected the supernatural goal of shaping Christian citizens, thereby making the gospel real on earth. The means of education then exist for their own sake instead of the sake of those higher things.

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333 Maritain, 2.

334 It needs to be noted that he switches between all three without warning throughout the text. I find that his discussion applies all three, somehow, at the same moment, yet with different emphasis one or the another.

335 Intertwined with these misconceptions is further clarification of Maritain’s philosophical anthropology.

For the student-teacher relationship, it means the teacher will be more inclined and encouraged to focus solely on helping students pass courses to “help” them get to the next stage before graduation. I do not mean that teachers do not have their students’ best interest at heart, only that their interest in helping them meet the need of obtaining credits for their courses, for instance, is overemphasized against their desire to shape them as people and take something positive for themselves from the coursework. Maybe some teachers are okay with this setup, but the Catholic university teacher ought not be because of the inherently moral situation of the student-teacher relationship. A soul is at stake, and the teacher who neglects his/her duties towards students is committing an injustice, not unlike the second misconception.

The second misconception is “false ideas concerning the end”. The disregard for ends misuses the means of education, this one misuses the goal of education. It is based on a misunderstanding of man’s nature. Maritain has in mind the scientific idea of humanity, the positivism of the Vienna Circle—philosophers who deny everything that is not sensory. Here, man is reduced to the principles of scientism: anything that does not pass through the scientific method is rejected. He contrasts scientific man with the philosophical-religious man, someone who is able to answer and entertain questions about God, morality, and free will. Unlike scientism, its main reference is not the scientific method but metaphysics. And because it encompasses more than sensory data, it can tell us more about our humanity. That is to say, because the scientific ignores, or

337 These responsibilities are covered below in the section “guidelines for the teacher”.

better cannot answer, the deeper parts of our humanity qua creatures of God (since scientific methodology lacks access), a scientific pedagogy alone is impoverished of a deeper philosophical anthropology, neglecting the entirety (integral unity) of the human person.

Students are not machines capable of absorbing only what their senses give them. They are spiritual creatures in direct relationship with the divine. The curriculum and pedagogy need to reflect these, else the students are neglected in crucial developmental areas. It is the teacher’s responsibility (recall the end of chapter two) to provide such opportunities for growth. A scientific mindset does not afford students solely the kind of “nutrition” they need to grow. I am not saying “trying something new” in the classroom is an issue. We all must experiment with new lessons and lectures, but to say only one pedagogical method is acceptable is to betray our students because different temperaments requires different approaches.

For Maritain, philosophy must consider the human “ontological mystery” to have any chance of helping the student through one’s education.\textsuperscript{339} One cannot “build education on the single pattern of the scientific idea of man” because it would “warp” all the inaccessible areas of our humanity.\textsuperscript{340} One might think there are no possible answers to unscientific questions. A strict scientific base to education “loses all human sense or becomes the training of an animal for the utility of the state.”\textsuperscript{341} Maritain concludes,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{339} Maritain, \textit{Crossroads}, 5.
\item \textsuperscript{340} Maritain, 5.
\item \textsuperscript{341} Maritain, 6.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
because philosophical anthropology “is the prerequisite” education (one needs a grasp of what man is before educating), and man is more than matter, what guides education is a philosophical-religious idea of man.\textsuperscript{342} Philosophical because we are concerned with essence/nature, religious because we are related to God as His creatures.

The human being is a person, more than matter. He has intellect, will, and “spiritual superexistence [sic] through knowledge and love.”\textsuperscript{343} Only through love can one give oneself to another, a crucial concept for the teacher later on and the student upon taking his/her place in the world. The foundation of love is the immortal soul, “the root of personality,” and in which exists man’s freedom.\textsuperscript{344} This freedom separates him from the rest of creation as a being greater than his parts. “A person possesses absolute dignity because he is in direct relationship with…God,” and only this relationship fulfills him.\textsuperscript{345} It is his true end. Hence any humanistic education must respect this dignity, freedom, and individuality. Having explained the nature of education, Maritain then continues to explain the aims of education.

The third misconception is pragmatism, which Maritain jabs all through \textit{Education at the Crossroads}. His issue with pragmatism is it is all about action, which is fine because “life consists of action,” but action has an end or purpose: “contemplation and self-perfection”.\textsuperscript{346} Pragmatism, for Maritain, treats the human being like an automaton

\textsuperscript{342} Maritain, 6.
\textsuperscript{343} Maritain, 8.
\textsuperscript{344} Maritain, \textit{Crossroads}, 8.
\textsuperscript{345} Maritain, 8.
\textsuperscript{346} Maritain, 12.
responding to stimuli, and in the process, it must admit it cannot appreciate knowledge for its own sake since there is no proof of any truth except that something is useful. Pragmatism makes man into “an organ of response to the actual stimuli and situations of the environment, that is to say…animal knowledge and reaction.” He has in mind John Dewey whose philosophy of education is rooted in evolution—students evolve over time as they learn more about the world and build on their previous experience. The problem is people are reduced to mechanical parts and pieces, and pragmatism’s rejection of metaphysics also negates for Maritain the dignity of the human person, which he interludes into the discussion.

Much like technological feats, students are treated as though all they can do is respond to their senses without any recourse to higher things. I would add they are degraded, undignified, because their inner lives are not respected as ends in themselves. Rather, it is simply a question of “insert and eject”: put information into the student and have them spit it out (e.g., exams) because it is useful for absorbing necessary information. There is no way for the student to master anything except what the teacher deems appropriate. For example, a literature course would only support the student as responding to words on a page with the proper answers to an exam question, instead of permitting a playful interaction wherein the student is free to explore the various themes of a novel. There is no freedom, and without freedom, creativity dies.

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347 Maritain, 12.

348 I do not know whether Dewey actually holds such a position, but the example above is the spirit of what Maritain means by response to stimuli.
A short section, “the social potentialities of the person,” is a break to situate freedom’s purpose in education. The point of education is internal freedom (self-determination), but it takes a second form in external freedom: social life. The individual human is a proper social animal because one requires community to reach one’s full potential. Society is a mass of people living together in their individual freedoms subordinated to the common good, but these freedoms come back to him in civil rights and the cultivation of his mind. Society thus prepares one to “play his [sic] part in it.” That preparation, like the secondary form of freedom, is the secondary aim of education. The primary aim “concerns the human person in his personal life and spiritual progress, not in his relationship to the social environment,” which leads Maritain into the next misconception.

Sociologism is an acceptance of the promise of social conditioning for education. For Maritain, however, education is not a read-and-respond, or read-and-react activity. It is a process fully endeavored to bringing out the highest possible good in man. Education is not concerned with adapting a man to social conditions, but in “making a man, and by this very fact in preparing a citizen.” People are formed in social relations, so any person’s education for oneself is thereby educated for the State and others. Yet education is not about “bookish individualism,” rather the “inner center” where conscience lives is

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350 Maritain, 15.
the core around which education and the liberally-formed citizen rotates.\textsuperscript{352} Being a free person is to feed that inner center with material worthy of developing the individual into a good citizen. Social conditioning cannot do that because it has a preconceived notion of freedom—environment, which functions as a kind of determinism—to which everyone must submit. There is no room for uniqueness. Maritain seemingly shifts here from general education to school education, but school education as it impacts the student as man, not university lessons. Social conditioning used as a recourse to fitting students into their surroundings is a cop out and irresponsible. The student is an individual within a larger community of learners. There will be common ground and separation between them. Some learn alike, etc. Still, the teacher must attend to all students to whom one is in charge.\textsuperscript{353} Even when students choose to go along with what society (people as a whole) dictate is worth pursuing, what is wrong, etc., they do it of their own accord.

When something like the student-teacher relationship encourages this mindset in its own ways, a grave mistake is made in the Catholic university. The misconception associated with universities themselves is the next one, intellectualism.

One might say it is the “bookish individualism” to sociologism. There are two forms:

\begin{quote}
\ldots A certain form of intellectualism seeks the supreme achievements of education in sheer dialectical or rhetorical skill—such was the case of classical pedagogy\ldots another form of intellectualism, a modern one, gives up universal values and insists upon the working and experiential functions of intelligence.\textsuperscript{354}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{352} Maritain, 16.

\textsuperscript{353} And how one does that is the subject of the final section of chapter two.

\textsuperscript{354} Maritain, \textit{Crossroads}, 18.
Maritain does not elaborate on the first form because he assumes it is inherent—intellectuals know how to use big words. He elaborates a great deal on the latter. The modern form, exemplified by science and technology, forces students to develop premature specialization. Such specialization is necessary for advancing through life and one’s career, but when such things inhibit one to make even generalized judgments about things, something has gone wrong.\(^{355}\) Students cease to become people and live their lives. There is no longer any semblance of the human, but only of a robotic appendage in the workforce. Religion and leisure are then reduced to mere side-exercises that take up our labor because the overemphasis on technical training eliminates the exploration of higher things.

The American 1940s had not yet set up an educational system where that was taking place *per se*, but the student demand for more job training was certainly present. Democratic government is dependent on liberal education precisely because it offers the kind of freedom democracy needs to flourish: only free citizens can elect a free government. Maritain’s major concern with intellectualism is that it breeds an overly technical, an overly specialized kind of citizen who cannot reflect on life’s many issues in order to gain the best life possible. He says, “how could the common man be capable of judging about the good of the people if he felt able to pass judgment only in the field of his own specialized vocational competence?”\(^{356}\) What really matters for the average citizen is the ability to adapt to life changes since overly-specialized education prevents

\(^{355}\) He adds onto this idea in the first form of the sixth misconception, voluntarism.

people from “adapting themselves to new circumstances and mastering them.”

Maritain is not suggesting we do not need chemists, engineers, and electrical line workers. Rather, he is concerned that too much focus on one thing inhibits the broadmindedness necessary for promoting freedom.

These forms of intellectualism are today in our students’ obsession with social media and streaming services. Instead of pursuing character-building activities, or deeper pursuits, students are relegating their time to “recovery” from work with mindless entertainment. Not quite intellectualism, but the connection here is they are focused only on their specializations in school or work. Nothing else happens. This reality is a devastating blow in the student-teacher relationship because it assume teachers are only good for one thing: job training. But teachers, like anyone, have lives outside of work. They are not automatons focusing solely on one aspect of human life, nor are students, because life is larger than labor. When this mindset sets into Catholic higher education, the spiritual damage done to both parties could be tragic. Opposite intellectualism, there is another misconception that carries weight to the opposite purpose.

Voluntarism also has two forms corresponding to each form of intellectualism. The first form emphasizes the will over the intellect in the form of the practical over the abstract. That’s well and fine considering the object of education is to make man moral, but when it lapses into “making intelligence subservient to the will [via] the virtue

357 Ibid., 20.

358 It corresponds because the first form of intellectualism is a kind of sophistry, an overemphasis on abstraction insofar as one could win arguments without any reference to Truth.
of irrational forces [passion]” disaster can ensue. Maritain gives the example of “Nazi training, schools, and youth organizations, in smashing all sense of truth in human minds…making the intellect only an organ of technical equipment of the state [sic].” The will is not meant to serve technocracy, and again, we return to technical specialization, here as the second form of voluntarism. As the second form of intellectualism over-emphasizes the intellect to the detriment of the will (by which Maritain means moral education), the second form of voluntarism does the opposite: will (moral education) over intellect (intellectual education). The trouble with this form of voluntarism is that it shapes the will according to feeling, or sentimentality. All that matters is the “will to believe” and not the actual content of belief. The will is warped or misinformed according to the feeling the State or school wants to instill in its students, not any kind of universal values.

The connections to the student-teacher relationship are more explicit here than in the other forms, namely, because Maritain addresses schools in the first form. What matters more than moral intelligence is a will to power. So long as my will directs me to my ends, what does it matter what my ends are? Without the ability to engage in thought, students’ passions will carry them away. Teachers may be forced to instruct students in ways contrary to faith, hope, love, and truth, thereby risking the spiritual and moral health of themselves and their students.

359 Maritain, Crossroads, 20.
360 Maritain, 21.
361 Maritain, 21.
Maritain then makes an odd move for his emphasis on the intellect. On the one hand, he lauds intelligence over the will because “its activity is more immaterial and universal,” but he also lauds the will over the intellect for “it is better to will and love the good than simply to know it.” As is the case with Aristotelian ethics, between these kinds of voluntarism and the other misconceptions, education is a question of balance. Not too much will, not too much intellect. Maritain even says, “the upbringing of the human being must lead both intelligence and will toward achievement, and the shaping of the will is throughout more important to man than the shaping of the intellect,” because man is a social animal. Accordingly, the student needs as much of an all-encompassing education as possible, we are met with a dilemma, the seventh misconception—the notion that everything can be learned in the form of two paradoxes.

Maritain writes, “what is most important in education is not the job of education, and still less that of learning.” Students ought not expect life skills to be taught in universities because that’s not their job; the job of the Catholic university is to prepare their minds to face the world’s challenges. Virtue cannot be taught any more than how to approach a woman for marriage. Morality is crucial for student development, but taken as prudentia (practical wisdom) the classroom cannot properly teach it because it is “an inner vital power of judgment developed in the mind and backed up by well-directed will,

362 Maritain, Crossroads, 22.
363 Maritain, 22.
364 Maritain, 22.
cannot be replaced by any [intellectual] learning whatsoever.” Only experience can “teach” prudence, and experience often involves suffering, memories, and choices. What matters most in life is “intuition and love,” the things that give the deepest meaning to human existence. Neither of these can be taught proper, but again, the first paradox of education is that, for all its structure, education itself needs be concerned with these two above all.

The second paradox is the relationship between what Maritain calls the educational- and extra educational spheres. By “educational,” he means those immediate institutions that actively shape youth into properly functioning human beings, “namely the family, the school, the state, and the Church.” The irony is that the family emotionally wounds- and schools overwork us. He does not provide examples of the State and Church, but one need only use one’s imagination. Really, man is set against the world to survive in harsh conditions using “energy, love, and good will [to] quicken his heart.” The extra-educational sphere are the informal institutional, or non-institutional, activities that educate. Relationships, work, pain, laws, “the inspiring radiance of art and poetry,” and the cultural coloring of things with liturgy. This list is not exhaustive, but one can see

365 Maritain, 23.

366 Maritain, Crossroads, 23. What Maritain means by “intuition” is the ability to grasp that one is understanding being.

367 Maritain, 24.

368 This wounding is related to the violation of dignity in chapter one. Discussion of these topics will appear in chapters four and five.

369 Maritain, Crossroads, 25.

370 Maritain, 25.
how seemingly all things are educational. Extra-educational reality gives, Maritain thinks, man the opportunity to pursue the transcendent “call of the hero” which goes beyond “social habits and moral regulations…toward the infinite Love which is the source of being.”\textsuperscript{371} The teacher is the impetus for this hero’s journey, which Maritain takes up in the student-teacher relationship.

The deepest, most important things in life are not things that education (schooling) can teach. Education is there to prepare us to receive them, and sometimes receiving them means one must first recognize them. The teacher instructs the student in such a way that the soul is shaped to know when these things happen. Study is proper when oriented to these ends. It is quite a mysterious process, one Maritain does not explain. I would venture that living life is the ultimate education, to never stop learning, growing, expanding, and filling up with things only a fully-formed person can know and love.

Maritain clarifies in no uncertain language that university schooling is only a partial education, “the beginnings and the completed preparation of the upbringing of man [sic],” and it is not the university’s job to shape all of one’s humanity because, as demonstrated in the seventh misconception, that’s impossible.\textsuperscript{372} Students are not fully formed coming out of college, they are only partially formed in the—ideally—acquisition of universal values. “Our education goes on until our death,” and it is schooling-education that is concerned with “knowledge and intelligence.”\textsuperscript{373} The teacher is the

\textsuperscript{371} Maritain, \textit{Crossroads}, 25.

\textsuperscript{372} Maritain, 25.

\textsuperscript{373} Maritain, 26. The chapter on Levinas is placed before Maritain because Levinas’s ethic comes first in the order of logic.
great communicant of knowledge and formation of the intellect. Maritain actually mentions children here, whom education and pedagogy is properly directed, but the principles he uses I find are rather universal. For instance, truth is at the root of teaching. We do not preach lies, willfully, nor do we tolerate prejudice. Students are at the mercy of the teacher whose authority they accept without question. Because students do not have yet the ability to completely judge for themselves, the teacher has the utmost obligation—out of a sense of love—to “respect in the [student] the dignity of the mind” and prepare the student to think for herself with basic building blocks. It is the university instructor’s job to shape the students’ minds as much as the elementary school teacher’s the child.

The shaping happens through the “instrumentality of truth,” a phrasing that one initially balks at out of fear for one’s dignity, but which Maritain clarifies to mean purifying “the powers of desire, will, and love” in order to “gain control of [one’s] tendential dynamism.” Dynamism is the ability to act, the active principle in a living thing. “Tendential” refers to the tendency to move towards ends. In other words, people move in given directions from desire, will, and love, but truth rightly orders one’s pursuits. It is the teacher’s job to shape those pursuits in students. What matters most here is moral education, but not the way voluntarism has it in the will. By “moral

\[\text{374 Maritain, } \textit{Crossroads,} \text{ 26.}\]

\[\text{375 Maritain,} \text{ 26. Gerald Gutek’s words reflect well Maritain’s concerns: “Although I value [John Dewey’s] emphasis on instrumental thinking, especially in science and the social studies, I found that there are also other modes of thought not covered by the empirical mode of involvement in a problematic situation. I found that along with instrumental thinking, there are times when we can be speculative, poetical, or contemplative” in “Jacques Maritain and John Dewey on Education: A Reconsideration,” } \textit{Educational Horizons} \text{ 83, no. 4 (Summer 2005): 262.}\]
education,” Maritain means *prudentia*, living well. As stated above, the schooling system cannot provide prudential wisdom, but it can shape the way prudential wisdom is received.

This shaping has gone astray in the time since the *Land O’Lakes Statement*. It was replaced primarily with a utilitarian mindset that preferred to treat students as current- and future consumers towards education. It also encouraged an independence of learning on the polar opposite end of sociologism. Instead of the social environment controlling pedagogy (and being the pedagogy), the inner life of the student has full reign without any reference from without. The learning is almost completely self-directed in the sense that Catholic universities went with the flow of American culture instead of against it, meaning the slow decrease in a belief in absolute truth, rightness and wrongness, and moral boundaries. Students are left to themselves to figure these things out. Teachers act more as gatekeepers for grades and promotions rather than guideposts in sorting through one’s life. Granted those are tall orders for anyone, but teaching here is understood as a vocation, a calling, and not another job to pay the bills. The student-teacher relationship requires some kind of learning beyond the classroom.

On this note, for the sake of teaching, teachers ought to know something about a student’s psychology in order to “avoid deforming or wounding them”. Maritain goes on to say that students need instruction in matters that make social life function in order to better equip the intellect for thought. And so, the paradox of man’s education between educational and extra-educational spheres is, for Maritain, resolved. Concerning the first

\[376\] Maritain, *Crossroads*, 27.
definition, the process by which one is shaped and led toward fulfillment, education wants “the uprightness of the will and the attainment of spiritual freedom, [and] the achievement of a sound relationship with society.” These things are dependent on the four institutions above and bear directly on moral education (the will). The intellect and knowledge, however, are the responsibility of the university and only indirectly affect the will insofar as they shape moral education and its reception.

Maritain’s overarching concern with the seven misconceptions is that technology is slowly taking over all things educational in all three of his definitions. One cannot go through life without encountering a technological feat that does not somehow influence one’s actions. This feature is not necessarily a bad thing. I think Maritain would agree vaccinations and open heart surgeries are good things. The point is how technology infects the human soul. Technology makes things easier for us to the point we become entirely dependent on it for everything, including happiness. It isn’t balanced out with anything else, it just finds its place in life and stays there. When we want it out, we find it hard to quit. Cell phone addiction is one example. Another pertinent problem is the lack of creativity in day to day life.

Technology has done a great deal of good for humanity and permitted creative endeavors in all fields (e.g., photography) to blossom into respectable arts. That’s not the kind of technology we are referring to in pedagogy. As described above via sociologism, et al., technology is the kind of thing inhibiting students from tapping into their potential. Why bother breaking down a complex novel’s plot when you can just view a video? Or

377 Maritain, 26-27.
why bother learning something for fun when you can make money with minimal technical effort? The technology is more anti-human than it is actual aid to the world (e.g., anesthetics). Teachers do not have the opportunity to influence students when they are pushed away from classical liberal arts sources, among others, and even when they are not, teachers are pressured for research reasons not to devote the time and energy to student development. The current state of the Catholic university must come undone and rebuild itself on this student-teacher relationship in order to regain its integrity, faith, and morals to better influence Church relations and be an influential source of hope in society. The student is embedded in all of these things from the beginning, but has an intimate, special relationship to the teacher: the teacher has the strongest influence and directs the affects of the student’s will.

The Student-Teacher Relationship

Maritain breaks up the student-teacher relationship into three sections. First, the “dynamic,” or causal-interactal factors in the relationship. Second, the “basic dispositions” to be cultivated in the student. Last, guidelines for the teacher in fostering those dispositions.\(^{378}\)

1. Plato, the Dynamic, and Personhood

Before broaching the student-teacher dynamic, one must first deal with Plato’s Phaedo, wherein he argues that all knowledge exists in the soul, the soul having contemplated the divine Forms before birth. Having a body, and therefore passions, one is not freely able to contemplate the Forms at whim, but must encounter a teacher to re-

\(^{378}\) Maritain, Crossroads, 29.
awaken this knowledge within. The teacher, however, does not actually teach anything. Rather, “the teacher only awakens the attention of the student to those things which he already knows, so that to learn is nothing else than to remember.” And for those souls that have never contemplated the Forms, the teacher then becomes a strict authoritative figure whom the student must completely depend to have any sense of anything.

Instead, Maritain adopts Aristotle’s tabula rasa, the notion that the soul is a blank slate at birth. In order to form the soul, the teacher must exert him/herself on the student to cause transformation. “Teaching is an art; the teacher is an artist,” but not a sculptor per se for the student is not “inanimate clay”. Rather, the teacher as an educator is like a medical doctor practicing the art of medicine. As medicine deals with a living body and a doctor “exert[ing] real causality in healing a sick man,” so education deals with a living soul and teacher exerting a causality in healing a sickness of the soul. Maritain does not elaborate on the nature of this sickness. Given his tendency for emphasizing freedom and intellectual knowledge, one might reasonably believe it is the dual sickness of enslavement (not thinking for oneself) and ignorance. And as a medical doctor assists nature with attaining equilibrium by healing the body with natural remedies (e.g., herbs and diet), the educator is a “minister” and education the “art of ministering, an art subservient to nature.”

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379 Maritain, 29.
380 Maritain, Crossroads, 30.
381 Maritain, 30.
382 Maritain, 30.
Unlike Plato who thought knowledge pre-existed in the soul, the soul has a “vital and active principle of knowledge”. Knowledge is not ready-made, but ready-discovered by the “inner seeing power of intelligence”. Maritain never defines this inner seeing power, suffice it to say one might call it the *logos*. Yet, the *logos* is also in Plato’s epistemology, so it is difficult to say what Maritain means considering his strong disagreement on the origin of knowledge. Given his later ideas in the text, what is actually being educated is that mysterious “internal vital principle” which one might call the mind or the soul, occasionally the intellect. Maritain overlaps Levinas here with the rejection of Platonic/Socratic remembrance as knowledge. Knowledge is something other and only comes to me from without, just as the Other comes to the I from outside itself. Now the student-teacher dynamic can begin.

What matters to Maritain is “from the very start [the inner power] perceives through sense-experience the primary notions on which all knowledge depends,” and can then move forward “from what it already knows to what it does not yet know.” This aspect, this “inner vital principle,” of the student is what "the teacher must respect above all". The medical doctor’s imitation of nature in treating a patient now reflects onto the teacher’s imitation of nature in one’s instruction. The teacher is meant to propose ideas, both familiar and unfamiliar to the student’s mind, for his/her

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383 Maritain, 31.
384 Maritain, 31.
385 Maritain, *Crossroads*, 31
386 Maritain, 31.
consideration. In the latter situation, the teacher is offering material to the student whose “minds is perhaps not strong enough to establish” on its own. Hence Maritain’s statement of moving forward from what the mind knows to what it does not. His point is that the intellect, like the body, has a natural way of doing things. For the intellect, its activity is growth in knowledge and experience (i.e., education), but it needs guidance from a mature source. The teacher is that mature source necessary to this growth, albeit secondary, propelling it upward to the heights of prudence. It happens in one of two forms of education.

The classical education of punishment and strict rules damages a student’s inner life. Of course, it paradoxically shapes some souls to be even more spontaneous in seeking the truth because their inner rebel rebels against the injustice against it. All things made docile, though, work to no end because it makes things too easy for the student. There must be a friction between students and teachers. Not too light, not too heavy.

Progressive education actually respects the integrity of the student. “Pestalozzi, Rousseau, and Kant” all recognize that the “principal agent” of education is not the teacher, but the “inner principle of activity, the inner dynamism of nature and of the mind” of the student. Of course, progressive education in this vein is too rationalistic and does not give way to the forces of life within, nor to the point that the teacher is “a real cause and agent”. A secondary one, for the teacher cooperates with nature, being a

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387 Maritain, *Crossroads*, 32.

388 Maritain, 33.
“real giver whose own dynamism, moral authority, and positive guidance are indispensable.”\(^389\) It is for this reason that the teacher is essential in any setting, classroom or not. The teacher provides direction the student could not otherwise obtain, especially as per using one's spontaneity.

Contemporary Catholic higher education tends to permit the student to follow one’s own instincts on what one wants to learn and how one thinks about the presented issues therein. I do not see anything in principle wrong with this approach. Each person has a unique way of learning and things they are genuinely interested in. There needs to be some leeway in how students ascertain certain issues if the Catholic university does not want to be accused of “living in the dark ages” and similar rebuttals. But the trouble, as with the *Land O’Lakes Statement* (LOL), is the freedom goes too far. Students are almost permitted to think anything they want at the behest of the teacher. My elaboration above on the “independent student” coming out of LOL is an embodiment of this kind of excess freedom. Of course, teachers process and challenge what students say, and it is here the direction is provided. The issue is this freedom is encouraged—believe what you want so long as you do no harm—by the broader culture, and the Catholic university does not usually push back. Levinas would add that the student pushes back against what the teacher offers in the exchange (discourse), but ultimately resolves the tension in working towards community in a shared world. In this situation, the student exercises her freedom.

The freedom (spontaneity) of the student is not animalistic instinct. It is “the spontaneity of a human and rational nature” without a pre-determined end save for where reason directs it.\textsuperscript{390} The fragility of freedom is its misuse, and students are mostly unaware of how best to use their reason and for which ends to aim. The student cannot develop his/her own capacity for using freedom responsibly without the teacher’s aid. That is to say, students without a teacher are left to their own instincts. They are no better than animals foraging for food. For that reason, the student’s right to be educated comes with the moral authority of the teacher—“the duty of the adult to the freedom of the youth.”\textsuperscript{391}

To really get at what Maritain means here one needs his distinction between “person” and “individual,” which ordinary language confuses for the same thing. “Personhood” refers to the spiritual existence in the soul of a human being and is the aspect of oneself that directly relates to God. “Individuality” in Maritain’s Aristotelian sense refers to the matter that makes up one’s body, thereby allowing for differentiation between members of the same species. Maritain says that each of these is distinct because they require different kinds of development. The personality is developed through “mastery and independence of [one’s] spiritual self,” individuality developed “toward the letting loose of the tendencies which are present in me by virtue of matter and heredity.”\textsuperscript{392} It is easy to confuse the education of these. Because “personality

\textsuperscript{390} Maritain, \textit{Crossroads}, 33.

\textsuperscript{391} Maritain, 33.

\textsuperscript{392} Maritain, \textit{Crossroads}, 34.
means interiority to oneself” it grows larger the more reason and freedom overcome passion and instinct.\textsuperscript{393} In contrast, individuality is the “material ego,” the aspect of oneself that tends towards the irrational, the passions. When the ego becomes the center of the universe, it is “in reality scattered among cheap desires or overwhelming passions,” unfree to come and go as it pleases.\textsuperscript{394}

Maritain reminds us that education is centered on the “development and liberation of the individual person”.\textsuperscript{395} This emphasis is in direct contrast to those who would falsely reduce education to the “freeing of the material ego,” what he calls the “anarchical” conception of education.\textsuperscript{396} The problem with the latter freedom is that it dispenses all necessary self-sacrifice, denial, and asceticism towards perfection, by which Maritain means love. The more loving one is, the more fully human. Becoming human, embodying one’s humanity, is a lifetime endeavor. Placing the material ahead of the personal is to change students into animals, leaving them to the sway of their instincts.\textsuperscript{397}

Then there are those educators who confuse personality and individuality thinking they are separate. Unlike the anarchical conception of education, the despotic conception is the opposite—it wishes to destroy the individual and make copies of one personality for all, a kind of dictatorial control. The student is made into a product. Again, one sees the totalitarian theme running through this work. Supposing nature, the principle on

\textsuperscript{393} Maritain, 34.

\textsuperscript{394} Maritain, 34.

\textsuperscript{395} Maritain, 34.

\textsuperscript{396} Maritain, 35.

\textsuperscript{397} This position is akin to Heidegger’s self living out its projects.
which education rests, is to be followed out, then all of education as an art (*technē*)

“consists in inspiring, schooling and pruning, teaching and enlightening” such that the
ego is de-centered and the personality’s “spiritual generosity” and ascent to higher things
—especially love—increases.\textsuperscript{398} Having explained how students and teachers are to
relate, Maritain now moves to discuss the dispositions to be cultivated in the student.

2. Student Dispositions

Knowing that the student is a creature of spirit and matter, to become human is to
become perfected “by knowledge and by love, and [being] capable of giving [one]self” to
another and to God.\textsuperscript{399} The freedom at root of the educational project is only
accomplished with a teacher who can instill discipline and knowledge. Coming out of
this spiritual nature, “the principal agent” of education, Maritain then lays out what he
sees to be the five essential dispositions for the student’s proper development.\textsuperscript{400} Like the
seven misconceptions of education above, these dispositions can be distorted and must be
carefully cultivated.\textsuperscript{401}

\textsuperscript{398} Maritain, *Crossroads*, 34.

\textsuperscript{399} Maritain, 36.

\textsuperscript{400} Maritain, *Crossroads*, 36.

\textsuperscript{401} Maritain’s philosophy here is why Levinas will not suffice, for he does not give concrete explanation on
what the student and teacher are to actually do in the classroom. There are numerous descriptions of the
relationship, even a normative mode in the sense of a value response to the student, but nothing with flesh.
Maritain also incorporates the spiritual into his philosophy of education, something Levinas is open to, but
does not articulate. On the other hand, Maritain makes many (understandable) assumptions about the
structure of the student-teacher relationship a la his Aristotelian-Thomism. Levinas, I argue, gets to the
core with the I-Other structure. The two unite to give us a workable philosophy of education in the
Catholic university.
The first and second regard truth and justice. “The love of truth...is the primary tendency of any intellectual nature.”

By “intellectual nature,” Maritain does not mean the intellectual vocation of the philosopher or theologian. Rather, human nature as rational—humans are of the intellectual nature, like angels, and so have a preference for truth over other animals. “Second, the love of good and justice, and even the love of heroic feats, and this too is natural to the children of man [sic].”

Maritain does not elaborate; given his emphasis on moral education, it is understandable. Note that the love of truth is primary and justice secondary, matching his preference for contemplation, freedom, and self-perfection (all intellectual by nature) as the first goal of education, and citizenship (justice) the secondary goal of education.

I must note that a synonym for the “face” in Levinas is “truth”. The Other is “truth” to the effect that the Other makes possible knowledge. The Other is also thought of as being “true” because I am in the service of the Other, just as Maritain sets up the student-teacher relationship to be one of service (the teacher aiding the student towards love and knowledge). Recall, too, the notion of justice as language for Levinas. What I owe the Other is how and what I speak, and speech is part and parcel of being a teacher speaking to students. The student-teacher relationship is thus characterized by justice working in the background and in the foreground as one of the concrete goals of education.

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402 Maritain, Crossroads, 36.

403 Maritain, 37.

404 I would not know something as truth, for Levinas, without the Other presenting, teaching it to me.
Third, in regard to existence. What is the fundamental orientation of the student towards his/her own existence? Maritain answers “simplicity and openness”. It is a joyous, humble life whereby one accepts the “natural limitations of existence” and is happy to be alive. The enemies of this openness are pride, egotism, and “unhappy experiences” wherein one’s philosophy of life is colored by bad memories. Maritain gives the example of a student “with a damaged ego, who was forced at least to wonder why he was living” because of things that prevent him from letting things happen (openness) and living without inhibitions (simplicity). Maritain clarifies these sorts of inhibitions as inferiority complexes “bad beginnings in education” that seriously block the full maturation of the student.

Fourth, regarding work. After the fundamental stance towards existence, “the sense of a job well done” occupies the student’s psychic life. One must not mistake Maritain for suggesting a hard work ethic. That’s important. Rather, he is “speaking of something deeper and more human, a respect for the job to be done, a feeling faithfulness and responsibility regarding it.” A kind of obligation towards one’s work being done in an excellent manner. It is not simply showing up and doing one’s job, but of caring enough to put the right effort and craft into one’s work activities. Instead of writing a book report

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405 Maritain, *Crossroads*, 37.
406 Maritain, 37.
407 Maritain, 37.
408 Maritain, 37.
409 Maritain, 37.
in a haphazard manner just to turn it in, writing a thoughtful analysis to benefit one’s own mind and the reader is much more healthy and instills the satisfaction of good work.\footnote{411} It builds up the kind of discipline necessary at the beginning of this discussion. Last, Maritain writes “the fifth fundamental disposition is the sense of cooperation, which is as natural in us, and as thwarted too, as the tendency to social and political life.”\footnote{412} He gives no other explanation presumably as it summarizes his concerns about justice above. Levinas also has social cooperation as the basis for social responsibility and politics. Having explained the inner makeup of the student, Maritain now discusses the appropriate behavior in the teacher.

3. Norms for the Teacher

Following the dispositions above, the student’s inner life will be freed to pursue its own just ends. Thus, the first rule for the teacher is to free the student from his/her “bad energies” in order to make use of “[one’s] own measures” for doing good.\footnote{413} Bad energies are things that frustrate one from obtaining a desired end. In other words, the passions are at war with reason and virtue. The teacher must sift through these both to reach the student’s natural talents, encourage their building up, and then release them upon the world in the form of instruction and the creative production therefrom. It is better to pursue and do good rather than only avoid evil because “the real art [technē] is

\footnote{411} “Given the right dispositions of students, intellectual transcendence can occur when the mind engages the most important, broadest realities. Such an experience lifts up and liberates.” Brian Hughes, “Maritain and Newman--Theology, Intellectual Freedom, and Human Transcendence in University Education,” in The Human Person and a Culture of Freedom, ed. Peter A. Pagan Aguiar and Terese Auer (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2009), 9.

\footnote{412} Maritain, Crossroads, 38.

\footnote{413} Maritain, 39.
to make the [student] heedful of his [sic] own resources and potentialities for the beauty of well-doing.”\textsuperscript{414} Note again that Maritain emphasizes the practical, moral outcome of education (any definition), not the intellectual.

The second rule is to awaken the spiritual within the student. “Spiritual” in Maritain’s philosophy refers to the intellect and will. These are the “preconscious spiritual dynamism” of the person.\textsuperscript{415} Something that is preconscious is something that is hiding beneath consciousness, the aspect of the psyche beneath conscious activity.

Maritain does not use “subconscious” to avoid confusing the reader with Freud. Freud’s subconscious is animalistic and irrational. It prefers “instincts, latent images, affective impulses, and sensual tendencies” to the former things above.\textsuperscript{416} Instead of training man to live from his vitality, his inner nature, psychoanalysis trains men to take seriously the “wildness and automatism” that motivates brutes and beasts.\textsuperscript{417} In so doing, man becomes one, but this way of life is—like the subconscious—beneath man’s dignity. He was called to something higher. That something, in this part of the conversation, is the intellect and the will.

The intellect and will are not, for Maritain, something one is immediately conscious of during the day. I go about my life matter-of-factly and do not always have readymade answers to questions. Underneath consciousness, the intellect is putting pieces of

\textsuperscript{414} Maritain, \textit{Crossroads}, 39.

\textsuperscript{415} Maritain, 39. Maritain treats the spiritual preconscious more thoroughly in his \textit{Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry} (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953), 90-95. For our purposes, a basic definition will suffice as it is a medium to express Maritain’s educational philosophy.

\textsuperscript{416} Maritain, 40.

\textsuperscript{417} Maritain, 41.
information together and the will is deciding what to do with it all. That is not to say one is not in control of one’s actions, nor that intellect and will do only these things. Only that these things happen without my awareness. Maritain is pointing out that this dynamic relationship between consciousness, will, and intellect is the entrance to the soul where “knowledge and poetry…love and truly human desires” lives.\(^{418}\) It is the teacher’s job to tap into that spiritual center and elevate it to the student’s consciousness against the technique of Freudian psychoanalysis.

The intellect and psychoanalysis involve exploring the depths of oneself, yet the disorder of Freud’s psychology is that it makes the personal impersonal. The student is a human being, not a mass of atoms and passions. There is personhood, there is spirituality, a sensitive spirituality needing formed into a whole man or woman for the sake of oneself and society. The best way to influence the student, Maritain says, is to “[keep] personal contact with [him/her]” for it brings “the comforting assurance of being in some way recognized by a human personal gaze, inexpressible either in concepts or words.”\(^{419}\) That is to say, the student remains a person, not an object for merciless violence.

Focusing on a training of the Freudian subconscious with techniques of manipulation and suggestion would damage the student’s inner psyche. It would focus on rote memorization of words, concepts, and methods rather than creativity, imagination, and sheer love of learning. Again, the “preconscious of the spirit” and the liberation of its

\(^{418}\) Maritain, *Crossroads*, 41.

\(^{419}\) Maritain, 41.
resources is what any pedagogy ought to do.\textsuperscript{420} Instead of “pressuring” the student to be someone he/she is not via the implied specialization of Freudianism, the teacher ought better to focus on the “aspirations of spiritual nature” in the student, the things the student longs for and the logos within longing for expression.\textsuperscript{421}

Although Maritain and Levinas take issue with the subconscious,\textsuperscript{422} control is the main issue they have with it, not the existence of the subconscious itself. The subconscious plays a role in virtually every human exchange, but it does not control every exchange. Oftentimes the subconscious is activated when triggering mental-emotional wounds, which surface in defense mechanisms. A teacher, for example, whose methods are questioned by a colleague may lash out and project false opinions about said colleague to defend oneself against “attack”. Really, no attack was present, and it was an honest assessment given for the teacher’s benefit. When teaching, the teacher may be reminded of said remarks and triggered all over again. The teacher needs enough self-control to put his/her issues aside when dealing with students, not just for the sake of one’s integrity, but because responsibility demands it. Recall the discussion of asymmetry in chapter two. Even triggers can be ignored or suppressed in this classroom example with use of the free will, and that is precisely the point: the teacher, the I, is not the center of the educational universe, and my freedom to do as I please is called into question. The dynamic between I and Other, student and teacher, is

\textsuperscript{420} Maritain, \textit{Crossroads}, 42.

\textsuperscript{421} Maritain, 42.

\textsuperscript{422} Levinas thinks to accept the subconscious is to accept irresponsibility towards the Other because it predetermines my actions in such a way that I am never open to the Other’s call, only my own needs as suppression demands.
the center of the educational universe. I have a responsibility to “be there” for students and the subconscious gets in the way, but it does not control my actions.

Nor are the best equipment, facilities, scholarship, and information relevant. What matters is the “awakening of the inner resources and creativity”. Anyone can have a fancy learning environment, but devoid of personality, it is meaningless. Teachers are the ones caring for the souls of the student. They nurture the students’ inner impulses for the questions and topics that concern them without prejudice. It is not the teacher’s job to scold or isolate students for their interests. Rather, the interest tells the teacher something about the student’s inner life. There are no wrong answers here. All avenues of thought are acceptable because they liberate the mind. “What matters most in the life of reason is intellectual insight or intuition.” “Intuition” is a complicated term for Maritain, suffice it to say it means the mind’s ability to grasp and know it is grasping being. It is a conscious awareness that I am grasping something intelligible.

It is an insight the teacher cannot teach, but what the teacher can do is focus his/her energies on bringing out that intelligence buried within the preconscious spirit. The student is grasping something about the world in his/her own way. But it needs cultivation, like a field of crops, to properly sprout and bring forth fruit. Instead of rain and sunshine, the teacher listens and coaxes the student to risk vulnerability “to those

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423 Maritain, Crossroads, 43. This model of education contrasts with the outcomes model, which I will discuss in chapter four.

424 Maritain, 43.
spontaneous poetic or noetic impulses” because these are the kinds of things one's peers do not often support.\textsuperscript{425}

Maritain emphasizes sense-perception here in the acquisition of knowledge and the freeing of intuition. Once I pick up something in the world via my senses, my intellect then does something mysterious—Maritain himself claims he knows not—to it through “imagination and a kind of spiritual feeling” in order to grasp it.\textsuperscript{426} Students typically do not understand what it is that is going on in the world, nor themselves, so liberating the intuitive power is accustoming students to understanding both. An example is found in literature. Students are not given random bits of facts and opinions. They are given a text whereby they are required to engage the mind of another person. Memorization and such will not help. They are literally picking something up in the text they are not fully conscious of, but their spiritual unconscious is. Much like the world, this literary text is also coming to them from the outside, and it offers problems they must deal with. It is the job of the teacher for sorting through this mess and helping the students bring forth what is growing inside them. Thus the third rule.

Maritain’s third rule for teachers is fostering the unity of mind, body, and spirit.\textsuperscript{427} Mind and spirit have been spoken of regularly up to this point. He emphasizes the body now with reference to manual labor. Workshops are places where the body works so the mind relaxes. Intelligence is not limited to the mind and spirit, “but in [one’s] fingers, 

\textsuperscript{425} Maritain, 43.

\textsuperscript{426} Maritain, \textit{Crossroads}, 44.

too”. Man’s rationality and physical labor are congruent. One need not choose between them.

Something peculiar about Maritain’s approach in adding physical labor is actually part of a larger curriculum plan associated with Mortimer Adler and the Great Books program. It would begin with students learning college material around fourteen with those desiring master’s degrees obtaining them around twenty. Physical labor, really handwork (e.g., carpentry), is added to distract the mind from intellectual things in a healthy way by keeping it preoccupied in non-academic ways. These things are part of a whole curriculum dedicated to educating the entire human person.

The plausibility of this aspect of the curriculum is untenable. For one, it is not something students typically need as they find other ways to be active (e.g., club sports). Second, the kinds of skills offered in such a class can be found all over the internet. Any Google search will yield enough webpages for students to find what they are looking for. Maritain had no way of knowing about the internet, but the point is still sound. Physical labor is also not quite the kind of job college teachers do, and secondary school teachers already offer such things in their specialities (e.g., home economics). University teachers would be better to put their energy elsewhere. Nevertheless, the fullness of education resides in engaging the body the same as mind and spirit, but “education and teaching must start with experience”. It is this latter point Maritain underscores.

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Experience is the source of knowledge and “modern methods” in education are wont to disregard rational impulses due to a despising of logic and concepts. Maritain differentiates his philosophy of education because he embraces reason and abstraction, the primary ways of reaching higher truths. Recalling the seven misconceptions for a moment, all of those ideas were unbalanced in some way. Too much to the left or right. Maritain’s point here is that you need both. The teacher must always start from experience because reason, at least its ways, may be foreign to students coming to certain material for the first time. They may not understand the workings of reason (e.g., logic), but they do trust what their senses give them. We begin with experience and end with reason, and “education must inspire eagerness for [both]”.

What this unity ultimates means is the educational process needs to remember unity is at its core. Unity of mind, body, and spirit results in the freedom Maritain argues is at the core of education. It is the teacher’s job to encourage the student to bring these three together so as to “overcom[e] the inner multiplicity of [one’s] drives”. Note the word “multiplicity”. As humans, we have many desires, instincts, thoughts, passions, etc. that compete in us for our assent. “Unity” implies “oneness,” so for Maritain when the three aspects of man’s nature are united, there is no internal conflict. One is freed from irrational tendencies and able to do what one pleases. It is an extremely difficult task requiring “tears, sweat, and blood,” and the atomization of modern life, evidenced in our

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430 Maritain, 46. He means the pedagogies in the seven misconceptions mentioned above.

431 Maritain, Crossroads, 46.

432 Maritain, 47.
Maritain uses modern science with its emphasis on specialization as his example. Rather, one needs a solid epistemology to bring order to one’s teaching, but more importantly a vision for how to help students obtain wisdom.

Wisdom is “above any field of specialization” because it is universal and speaks to man’s heart his desires. A vision for leading students to wisdom is necessary for education and teaching to work together with all their other constituent parts. Without it, man is unfit to enter society as a prepped citizen. The liberal arts education Maritain is arguing for is meant to prepare students for the real wisdom (prudentia) to be found in adulthood, that is, with life experience. The preparation happens with “a universal and articulate comprehension of human achievements in science and culture,” the kinds of things a generally educated person ought to know. Once more, Maritain is not against technical training in the workforce—he advocates for it in this section and elsewhere.

What he is against is the notion that technical training is all there is or is the highest kind of training in education for life or school. To say that is to completely ignore the very core of human nature and never be freed enough to take one’s place in society because one never learned how to think.

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433 Maritain, 47.

434 Maritain, 48.

435 Maritain, Crossroads, 48.

436 “Whatever [one’s] particular vocation may be, and whatever special training his vocation may requires, every human being is entitled to receive such a properly human and humanistic education” in “Thomist Views on Education,” in The Education of Man: The Educational Philosophy of Jacques Maritain Edited, with an Introduction, by Donald and Idella Gallagher, ed. Donald A. Gallagher and Idella J. Gallagher (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 69.
The fourth rule is perhaps the most straightforward given the previous rules’ layout. It states that teaching ought result in the pupil’s “mastery of reason over the things learned”. In other words, mastery of material by assimilating it into one’s soul. “What is learned should never passively or mechanically received, as dead information which weight down and dulls the mind.” Learning is active, learning is dynamic between student and teacher. The teacher presents ideas for the student to consider, and the student grapples with it for his/her own benefit. Teachers need be aware that they do not lead students into a pit without giving them a shovel: “…to raise clever doubts, to prefer searching to finding, and to pose problems without ever solving them are the great enemies of education.” Students do not have the wherewithal to escape from metaphysical knots without the proper knowledge, and the teacher’s job is to provide them paths to answers so they can find them on their own accord, essentially “digging” their own way out. This liberation of the mind is more about building up one’s mental powers than any kind of trained specialization.

What matters most is what one is building up. Liberal education, the freeing of the mind, is less about possessing knowledge and more about “the development of the strength, skill, and accuracy of man’s mental powers.” In order to build that power up, the material one uses matters, namely, “those things which are the richest in truth and

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437 Maritain, *Crossroads*, 49.

438 Maritain, 50.


440 Maritain, 51.
The latest fad philosophy text will not do. It requires something that has made a profound impact on the human race. Maritain compares material that provides “knowledge-value” discussed here now and “training-value” for the mind.

Training-value is more about rhetoric, holding conversations (think small talk), and knowing various facts and opinions. “Information” about the world. It prefers a mind that is “quick, clever, ready to see pros and cons, eager to discuss, and to discuss anything…regardless of what is thought about, what is discussed, and how important the matter is.” Maritain is not attacking people who possess such things. Certainly the more one reads the more readily one might understand where a discussion is going.

Rather, Maritain is thinking of shallow-mindedness here. It is the “talkativeness” of such people he abhors because there is not any real knowledge attached to their words, just empty syllables. These people cannot hold a conversation to save their lives because their education has not prepared them in things of “inner value,” only things useful to their professions. They are dilettantes.

It is a shame that many a modern professor falls into this category. More often than not professional interaction, while courteous, is vapid and lifeless. People hold their true thoughts back so as not to offend or “push too hard” and the conversation dies from lack

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441 Maritain, 51. Said material can only be taught by faculty who believe “the unity of truth [is] the goal of inquiry” and is “an indispensable purpose for all faculty members at such institutions.” Gavin T. Colvert, “Maritain and the Idea of a Catholic University,” in Truth Matters: Essays in Honor of Jacques Maritain, ed. John G. Trapani (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 64.

442 Maritain, 51.

443 Maritain, 53.

444 Maritain, Crossroads, 53.
of interest. Honesty is not appreciated at the expense of political correctness. Whatever is worthy of discussion is avoided because it might make someone uncomfortable. These attitudes are the opposite of knowledge-value and only further attest to the dropping rate of literacy even among undergraduates. Maritain quotes Yale University president, Robert Hutchins, as saying “our university graduates have far more information and far less understanding than in the colonial period.” Whether that is true or not is not the point. Hutchins’s words ring true to the spirit of his times and ours, that is, students are not grasping material the way they ought. They only memorize what they need to pass exams, get grades, and get on with their lives. There is hardly any consideration for the inner life or the life hereafter. What matters is the fragmented interaction is now ordered and random learning is put into a coherent system with enough openness for variation in teaching method, lesson prep, and student creativity. For example, students do not necessarily know what is expected of them, nor do teachers always inform. Maritain lays out what is required of each party so they converse without pedagogical interruption.

Teachers get caught up in institutional expectations (e.g., fulfilling outcome requirements) forgetting they are there to “heal” their students of what pedagogically ails them. With these in mind, Catholic higher education today implicitly assumes teachers will “do their jobs,” but not necessarily serve students in their vocations because of the increase in research. It is, however, a calling to serve students in the manner above. Not anyone can do it. Anyone could teach a theory of justice and truth, it is quite another embody it. Here, teachers go a step further than the average citizen as moral exemplars, a

\[445\] Maritain, 54.
description found in *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, where students are learners of more than just
material: they are learners of lifestyle.

To summarize, Maritain’s first rule is freedom for the student via use of one’s
insights for doing good. The second rule is to awaken the intuitive, spiritual powers
(reason and the will) within. The third rule is promotion of unity between mind, body,
and spirit and the teacher’s vision for wisdom. The fourth rule is the mastery of material
through reason. With these dispositions and rules in mind, I will now explain several
more key features of Maritain’s philosophy of education before moving onto his vision of
the university.

*Thomistic Principles and Education in the Humanities*

Maritain’s Thomist Views on Education was written for the National Society for the
Study of Education, and his Education and the Humanities446 for the centenary lecture of
St. Michael’s College in Toronto. Their inclusion is to further clarify his views on
progressive education, student-teacher relationships, and “the implied hierarchy of
values” present in education to make the succeeding chapters clearer.447

Values matter to Maritain because they give order to the inner universe of man.
Charity is the highest of all virtue (moral action) because it “love[s] God and embraces
all men [sic],”448 and wisdom is the highest of all theory because it “knows things eternal

446 Jacques Maritain, “Education and the Humanities,” in *The Education of Man: The Educational
Philosophy of Jacques Maritain Edited, with an Introduction, by Donald and Idella Gallagher*, ed.

diss., Fordham University, 2009), 82.

and creates order and unity in the mind.” Maritain has a notion called “infravalent goods”. These are things which we are allowed (in Maritain’s Thomism) to pursue as ends-in-themselves because they help us attain higher, or “supravalent” goods. For example, artists are permitted to pursue paints and paintings because they are necessary for them on the way to transcendent truth, say, exemplified in an icon or holy work of art. The painting is an end in itself for a higher end, a lower good for a higher good.

Applying the same notion to contemplation, a key notion for education at all levels, Maritain distinguishes between pagan and Christian love. Aristotle’s contemplation is “purely intellectual and theoretical” according to Maritain, but Christian contemplation “superabounds in action” because it is founded on charity.

The value of contemplation in education is that it inspires action. The education process, for Maritain, is structured such that I move from lower things to higher things, more base things to more complex ones. He overlaps with progressive educators like John Dewey on this point, for he does not reject pragmatic approaches to education, but pragmatism itself (especially scientism) rejecting metaphysics. Moving towards higher things—that is, greater forms of knowledge (philosophy, etc.)—inspires deeper forms of contemplation, resulting in greater deeds for the good of society. Contemplation inspires action, but it is a contemplation rooted in “God and the deepest realities in man

449 Maritain, 54.
450 Maritain, Thomist Principles, 54.
451 Maritain, 44.
452 “…He who believes in Me, the works that I do, he will do also; and greater works than these he will do.” John 14:12 (NASB)
and the world,” not a random set of “highly developed and specialized, but chaotic, instruction.”\(^{453}\) And so the action is rooted in love and not, say, political gain. The mark of contemplation and the best educational process, according to Maritain, encourages contemplation in the sense of “both critical activity and a kind of thirst and anguish whose reward will be the very joy of perceiving truth,”\(^{454}\) but that joy only comes about in the student-teacher relationship, hence Maritain’s elaboration.

The notion that students ought to be co-creators with their professors in the classroom, as per the Kinshasa Statement’s recommendation, is crucial to the unfolding of contemplation. Contemplation is not something done solely on one’s own but as part of an academic, intellectual community. Even scientists need lab assistants, and philosophers need interlocutors. I do not suspect these notions are absent in other philosophies of education, but what makes it special is it leads to citizens who are more capable of heroic acts. When motivated by love, the human soul expands. It is no longer focused on the egoistic concerns of a Heideggerian self or the intentionality of Husserlian consciousness, nor is it worried about appearing lofty to one’s peers in research. Instead, the soul (the student) wants or is more inclined to serve and the student is first motivated through the encounter with the teacher.

Teachers respect their students first with love, the genuine care for their well-being and highest good. Second, with authority, by which Maritain means “not arbitrary

\(^{453}\) Maritain, *Thomist Principles*, 55. Also related to action and contemplation is the Jesuit’s “Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm,” which I will briefly treat in chapter four.

\(^{454}\) Maritain, 58. It is an unfortunate consequence of contemporary educational structures students often do not find joy in learning.
power” (do as I say!), but “intellectual authority to teach and moral authority to be respected and listen to.”

The relationship is such that students recognize the right of the teacher to speak and be heard concerning the necessary communication of knowledge, and the teacher recognizes the right of the student to question such lessons for the higher good of knowing truth. Like Socrates, the teacher does not have the final, ultimate say, but defers to God and all goodness. The learning process is more of a journey on rocky ground than a train ride through the countryside: the teacher is acknowledged as the expert leader, but students find things not even the teacher knows.

It is here that teaching has for itself the most general of purposes in “teaching how to think,” which ultimately means contemplation. Maritain relates that thinking to the concept of good citizenship in preparing the way for democracy. It is in democracy that thinking for oneself is encouraged as an expression of the free world and man’s freedom in the cosmos. Institutionally, only with a proper upbringing in the classroom can students see the value of contemplation in relation to the outside world: education is neither “a stronghold of the established order nor…a weapon to change society.” The point of contemplation leading to knowledge is vetera novis augere, or, expanding the old

455 Maritain, Thomist Principles, 58.

456 Maritain, 59.

457 Maritain, Thomist Principles, 59. I do not think Maritain would deny that unschooled people cannot learn, especially with all the facilities (e.g., public libraries, MOOCs) available today. He notes in Education at the Crossroads that young people wanting to go to college, but must work for a living, can take evening classes (83). His concern is that teachers mold students in a manner similar to God, and with God’s help, as in Isaiah 64: “We are the clay, and You our potter; And all of us are the work of Your hand.” (NASB). The molding is not the same as an actual “imprint” for the teacher does not leave his/her mark in the sense of branding a bull, but gently guides the student down the (morally upright) paths according to the students’ own spirits. For example, a student wanting to learn more about biology ought to learn about how to sustain life instead of manipulating it.
by means of the new. Education is not a quest to destroy, except perhaps ignorance, but to grow and nurture seeking truth in all ways. Most necessary, however, is the teachers’ oneness of mind, by which Maritain means mastery of knowledge. Teachers are no more effective when they do not know what they are speaking of than when they are unprepared for a lesson. How can one expect an orderly soul in the students when not in the teachers? Granted, these specific issues warrant more individual speculation than I can give here, and even the best teachers have days where lessons are winged than carefully planned. Maritain’s point is that the universe is orderly, knowledge is orderly, and the soul is to mirror them, but it can only begin the process with a guide who also has some semblance of inner unity. He admits this process would be easier were departments to have more interdisciplinary ventures, but that the current educational institution makes it impossible. “[Teachers are] faced with overburdened schedules and a much too heavy number of teaching hours…It is preposterous to ask people who lead an enslaved life to perform a task of liberation, which the educational task is by essence.”

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458 “No one puts new wine into old wineskins; otherwise the wine will burst the skins, and the wine is lost and the skins as well; but one puts new wine into fresh wineskins.” Mark 2:22 (NASB)

459 The blind cannot lead the blind. “And if a blind man guides a blind man, both will fall into a pit.” Matthew 15:14 (NASB)

460 Maritain, *Thomist Principles*, 60. Now we shift to the *Education and the Humanities* article. It does not help teachers “in an era of adequate yearly progress, bureaucratic overload, political malfeasance, teacher bashing, student apathy, parental hostility, and professorial despair, for which future teachers are given little but ‘problem solving’ formulae and instructional ‘bags of tricks’ with which to cope,” that they are then also expected—without any second thought—to perform at an above-average level in such liberation, without any external support.

But as Maritain has said before, education is a lifetime endeavor. Schooling “is only a partial and inchoate agency with respect to this task.”\textsuperscript{461} That does not mean one ought forego it. The humanities are a major institutional means by which students become more human because they incorporate non-technical (non-training) knowledge. Students are not reduced to their utility. They are respected as beings who are able to know things “which are are worth being known for their own sake,” Maritain citing truth and beauty.\textsuperscript{462} Such things shaped Western civilization.\textsuperscript{463} Paradoxically, it is not the material itself that shapes one’s humanity,\textsuperscript{464} but the process one moves through because of it. Maritain has his own curriculum,\textsuperscript{465} and the content does matter (e.g., classics over a contemporary bestseller list), but what matters more is how it is utilized. It is better to read, for instance, one of Dante’s cantos with precision rather than all of Paradiso for the sake saying one read Dante. One canto, or a series of them, can contain more wisdom (or potential) than a great deal of skimming and summarizing one might encounter in another pedagogical approach.

\textsuperscript{461} Maritain, \textit{Humanities}, 83.

\textsuperscript{462} Maritain, 84.

\textsuperscript{463} Without them, one would “assume the persona put upon [one] by the current fashions and pressures, which in the present age will most often mean reduction to economic man.” John M. Rist, \textit{Real Ethics: Reconsidering the Foundations of Morality} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 251.

\textsuperscript{464} Maritain gives the example of “composing Latin verses, sitting down in a cozy study lined with bookshelves” of what he does not mean. Maritain, \textit{Humanities}, 84.

One still needs the material, however, as the process cannot take place without it. The schooling-educational process shapes the student, but it is the material that initiates and shapes the student. Course material can just as easily be used for propaganda as it can for character formation, technical training as for training in citizenship. The student cannot become part of something without some kind of handy guide. The thing about liberal arts education is the guide, aside from the teacher, is the content of the coursework. What I teach my students is going to influence them down certain paths directly or indirectly, or maybe not at all, but the material is now lodged in the subconscious. I am not in charge of how students interpret material insofar as I cannot control their freedom, but I do use the material to point out to them certain facts and figures about the world, God, and their relationship to both. The process matters, but I think the material matters as much. It is dangerous business choosing texts—the soul depends on it.

It is used to be that liberal education was to prepare young upperclass people for State rule. Now it is preparation for life. Democratic societies permit more socioeconomic inclusion than ever before, and Maritain has no problem with that because it represents the superiority of the free world over against tyranny. “[Liberal education] must henceforth be made available to all…in the very measure in which democratic civilization is to survive.” This survival can only come about when its citizens have the opportunity to thrive, and thriving comes about when people reach the

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467 Maritain, Humanities, 89.
core of their humanity (love and truth) in studying humanistic texts. The promotion of humanism is the promotion of democracy, for Maritain, hence citizenship being the most important secondary aim of liberal education. Citizenship is undermined by two opposite, yet equally bad treatments of its young people.

First, the university student is crammed with the “entire universe of knowledge which no individual adult can master.” Slowly, students absorb small bits of information over time without any connection to anything else. Maritain calls it “encyclopedic inculcation.” Students are neither masters of any material, nor of themselves. They are a “reduced simulacrum,” a copy of something else and not a person. The consequence is over-development, and thus a kind of indoctrination ensues.

There is, however, a tension in this mistreatment. While liberal arts education points out it is better to, for example, study one canto of Dante in-depth than studying all of his corpus or even a single book with shallow appreciation, there is a sense in which the entire universe of knowledge is desirable. It comes out in curriculums like the Great Books program of which Maritain was an advocate. These kinds of study programs are meant to expose students to as much of the human race’s contributions to knowledge as possible. The only reasonable way to get through it all is to cram. Only a special kind of student, however, can keep up with the pace because the material, while deep, is also

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468 Maritain, *Humanities*, 95.

469 Maritain, 95.

470 Maritain, 95.
covered at a fast rate. So, to argue that it is good for all people to be educated in this way is to assume they can follow Dante on fast forward. It may be that students are simply ill-equipped to handle college, but universities admit them anyway because they need tuition money to remain open. These issues are related to my dissertation, albeit I am not at liberty to comment. I am pointing out liberal arts education schools need to take into consideration how they expect students and teachers to interact with these concerns in mind.

Second, the student is thought to be wholly other from the adult, and so is treated as a delicate flower incapable of wrestling with difficult matters. Stimulation, not instruction, is preferred to active engagement, much like Montessorian pedagogy.\textsuperscript{471} Maritain calls it “nursery accommodation”.\textsuperscript{472} Teachers and students do not exchange ideas, but converse in a manner consistent with an Epicurean salon (“oh, how delightful!”) without any confrontation. The mind is never formed, and the student is merely a mockery of a person.\textsuperscript{473} The consequence is sheer absence of character, and thus education never really begins, personal or professional.

Liberal education is not made for specialists because not all students move on to upper level scholarship. Most students will learn the basics and take their place in society like an ordinary person with strengthened natural intelligence courtesy of the intellectual virtues, the qualities of character that allow one to think for oneself. Their formation

\textsuperscript{471} Montessorian pedagogy believes that adults ought to interfere the least amount possible with young people in their development, lest one trespass on a natural (biological) process. Note this treatment of the student is alike the fourth misconception of education, sociologism.

\textsuperscript{472} Maritain, \textit{Humanities}, 95.

\textsuperscript{473} Maritain, 96.
begins in institutional learning, but the application happens over one’s life. Enjoyment of “truth or beauty through the natural powers” is the goal of the formed citizen, and this enjoyment comes about through mastery of the material. The student is the “principal agent in the educational process” because the student is the one learning, and without proper instruction, the student would lead oneself astray of truth. Students would trip over themselves unable to differentiate between passion and reason, unable to think a coherent thought, “a pre-required condition...for genuine citizenship” in any free state.

Education teaches one how to think, and main problem with contemporary democratic education is sociologism (the fourth misconception), the notion that students are sensory beings who respond to stimuli and drives. It treats man like homo economus, a notion I will discuss in the succeeding chapter, a being who is made for production.

Labor is not the summation of human existence. It is a necessary component because it aids man in pursuit of perfection, but it is not his ultimate end. Leisure is the main activity by which man “can be within himself and listen to God within himself.” It is the freedom to pursue one’s own personal interests that expand the mind and its powers. With the onset of workaholism, leisure has significantly decreased. I will take that topic up in chapter five, but for now I will simply note Maritain’s conclusion that “human wisdom is in jeopardy if it does not tend to a higher wisdom, that God gives in

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474 Maritain, *Thomist Principles*, 61, author’s emphasis.


476 Maritain, 101.
love, and which alone can truly set man free.”

With wisdom in mind, I will turn to the final portion of this chapter, Maritain’s ideal university.

_Maritain on the Ideal University_

University (college) education differs from high school in that it offers specialization and a concrete hierarchy of courses from the lowest in “spiritual universality” to the highest. Maritain gives us a sketch of his curriculum in what he calls “orders”. The first order is “the realm of useful arts and applied sciences” (e.g., engineering, commerce), the second order “practical science” by which he means those which require art (technē) or ethics (e.g., law, medicine). These courses and fields are at the bottom because they contain the least universality to the human race. Not everyone can be a lawyer, engineer, or medical doctor, but they must be included in the curriculum because they are still part of the collective body of human knowledge. They are apt to make the most money, yet “everything would be warped if the aim, incentive, and dominating concern of the teaching were directed towards success in the experiences of life and in money-making.” The university does not revolve around training for wealth or income. Rather, it revolves around the goals of the third and fourth orders.

The third order, “the realm of the speculative sciences and fine arts,” is essentially the liberal arts. It details all of the knowledge we have of man and his achievements in

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477 Maritain, 102.

478 Maritain, _Crossroads_, 77.

479 Maritain, 77.

480 Maritain, 77.

481 Maritain, 78.
human history. Fields like psychology, language, mathematics, et al. These, Maritain says, are “the very core of the life of the university and the very treasure of the civilized heritage.”\textsuperscript{482} They prepare us immediately for the final order, that of philosophy.

Maritain emphasizes that this order is the highest because it contains the most universal knowledge, namely, all the fields of philosophy (metaphysics, ethics, social philosophy, etc.). As a result, it is “the highest animating center in the architecture of teaching” because without it none of the other fields are possible.\textsuperscript{483}

For teaching, he thinks of these orders as “cities” (polis), miniature communities that serve the larger “State” of the university. The first order concerns itself with “practical domination and utilization of matter”.\textsuperscript{484} The second order the “maintenance and improvement” of human life.\textsuperscript{485} The third order “pure knowledge concerned with the intellectual ends of human life.”\textsuperscript{486} The final order with “intellectual ends of human life which are reached by grasping the trans-sensible realm of Being, Spirit, and Divine Reality, and the ethical realm of the aims conditions, and rational ordering of human freedom and conduct.”\textsuperscript{487}

Maritain continues his philosophy of the curriculum asking how can students actually acquire the intellectual virtues of their specific fields. Essentially, he answers

\textsuperscript{482} Maritain, 78.
\textsuperscript{483} Maritain, \textit{Crossroads}, 78.
\textsuperscript{484} Maritain, 78.
\textsuperscript{485} Maritain, 78.
\textsuperscript{486} Maritain, 79.
\textsuperscript{487} Maritain, 79.
that each of the cities have to work together to support each other’s goals. All fields aim for knowledge of some kind, and all fields need some consideration of ethics for proper action. Without either, they lack integrity. His solution is core classes, albeit he does not say that outright. Rather, he has in mind putting together specific committees of professors in each city to help students recognize connections between their own course of study (specialization) with the universal fields.

Interestingly, Maritain does not think theology courses are mandatory because one cannot force religion on another. Theology ought to be in the university, however, because it is a science, and no university worth its name would exclude theology on this basis. Maritain is, of course, referring to secular universities, but even religious universities ought to instill religious teaching “distinct from the one given in religious seminaries, and be adapted to the intellectual needs of laymen,” the position advocated by Fr. Phelan noted in chapter one.

Teaching is the core of the university for Maritain, contrary to modern educational philosophy’s belief that it is research. “In the nature of things, the object of universities is the teaching of youth and not producing books and articles and endless contributions, or making some scientific, philosophical, or artistic discovery.” Research belongs in separate institutes, similar to think tanks without political agendas. It cannot be entirely


489 Maritain, Crossroads, 83.

490 Maritain, 84.
avoided. Professors produce original thoughts in their lectures and conversations with students and peers, but that is not the core of their vocation. Forming souls is the call of the university professor. Writing articles and books is a wonderful thing; its impact on the student body is felt when students cannot receive the complete attention they need to master material. State universities today encourage professors to phone-in their teaching in favor of research articles, articles which will receive probably less than a handful of glances. Teachers are already taxed from other avenues (faculty committees, etc.), and research adds an unnecessary dimension to their work, for the student’s soul is molded or destroyed by the (in)attentive professor. Because the teacher’s task is to first care for the student’s learning, and therefore the inner life, universities must respect the dignity of the human person, both faculty and student. Their bodily and intellectual health depends on it, but universities cannot provide everything for the person.

To provide growth in the spiritual life, the religious life here, Maritain advocates for “centers of spiritual enlightenment, or schools of wisdom,” where in laity may attend retreats and seek spiritual refreshment. Masters of various Catholic schools of spirituality (e.g., Jesuits) would provide rest and instruction in spiritual matters. Maritain thinks these places complement research institutes. He does not say how, nor whether they are or should be connected with any universities, but one can see that these centers focus on one’s relationship with God and research institutes intellectual labor, which like anything, can wear the soul down.

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491 Maritain, *Crossroads*, 85.
With the brief consideration of spiritual centers, Maritain concludes his thoughts on the university and liberal arts education. His concern through this ordeal of laying out the whole of education is “the needs, exigencies, and rights of youth.”\[^{492}\] Young people need the utmost care of their souls in navigating a complex and uncertain future. The teacher is that care, but can only serve students when university structure supports it.

Maritain noted that students “appear close to the goodness of nature as [Jean-Jacques] Rousseau dreamed of it.”\[^{493}\] Quite a feat to overcome, for supposing Rousseau is correct (people are good by nature but corrupted by society), education would have the task of (re)edifying the goodness of the human spirit. It is what Maritain argued all along. I will now argue such a task as per the student-teacher relationship.

Such argumentation has not been done before. Levinas has not been brought to bear on any conversation concerning the Catholic university. St. John Paul II and Maritain are used constantly in the battle for liberal arts, but not in this way to this extent. I am essentially arguing through them that a relationship makes the university possible, albeit a specific dynamic in the student-teacher relationship. When university stakeholders (administrations and boards of trustees) do not respect this dynamic, the university begins to whither from the inside out. It must be reformulated. Here, I bring together all the elements in this dissertation into a coherent line of thought arguing for a new approach to the Catholic university, making use of older wisdom by means of the new.

\[^{492}\] Maritain, 86

\[^{493}\] Maritain, 86.
V. THE STUDENT-TEACHER RELATIONSHIP IN THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY

Both thinkers have a pre-cognitive approach to human depths: Maritain with the spiritual preconscious, Levinas with the affective turn. Each converge on human responsibility for the Other with emphasis on the student-teacher relationship. Levinas’s epistemology, for instance, is bound with his ethics. The Other and our relationship makes all knowledge possible. Consider the science professor illuminating the students’ intellects with knowledge of chemical interaction. They only know of such things because of the professor’s presenting it to them. For this reason, Levinas does not have an explicit epistemology because he thinks it is already bound up with the Other. Even then, Levinas does not deny that being (ontology) is a thing, only that it is secondary in importance to the ethical relation. Levinas points out something about humanity beyond mere data and words on a page, something mission statements cannot quite capture in the face of the Other. Maritain, paradoxically, has the same notion, except he finds it in a Thomistic metaphysic that allows for Levinas’s infinity in what he calls dignity—being made in God’s image and likeness. In essence, Levinas provides the groundwork for relationship (ethics), most basically as self-Other between any two people, yet in Maritain it is the concrete application of this ethic in the university via students and teachers.

Their philosophies of religion understandably have their differences. Levinas’s orthodox Judaism remits anything of the mysteries of Christianity, whilst Maritain’s Catholicism builds off Judaism’s textual traditions. Whereas Levinas’s philosophy is open to God in the self-Other relationship (God is between us in the response), Maritain’s
educational philosophy is moving towards knowledge of God outright. The response to the Other and the response to the course material are both free choices, that is, spiritual acts. One is not encumbered by external force in choosing how or whether to respond. Both philosophers are moving in the same direction of spiritual responsibility for the Other, oneself, and the third party. These notions are embedded in their respective religious philosophies, and so cannot be ignored.

Part of what it means for a university to be Catholic is to adopt the Church’s philosophical anthropology, that is, what it means to be human. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, to be a human being is to have dignity. This dignity presupposes a certain ethical relationship which manifests in Levinas’s philosophy and takes form in Maritain’s philosophy of education. The ethical relationship consists of a self and a singular human Other having an encounter wherein each other’s needs and desires are simultaneously recognized and responded to. This same ethical relationship founds all others, including institutional ones, because it is from this one-on-one relationship that any relationship is possible. For example, the student and the teacher are only known as such because of the institution of the university, and the university only exists because of the simpler self-Other relationship. A would-be learner without a teacher is just a would-be learner, and a teacher without a student is a guild master. Granted, Levinas and Maritain are correct to say we are all “students and teachers” of each other in life, for instance, the elderly woman teaching the businessman something as they cross the street in chapter two. When the Catholic university goes astray of this base self-Other relationship, more specific ones are necessarily affected because when the self
is abused, the Other is abused, and their relationship is abused. There is no dignity to be found here except in research and power, the wounding mentioned in chapter three. Thus, the necessity of restoring the Catholic university to its philosophical-relational roots.

The modern Catholic university has an egocentric orientation much like Heidegger’s ontology. Dasein is oriented towards itself and only when threatened does it appeal to the Other for its survival. A similar move is made in Catholic higher education. The appeal to service may be a genuine desire to help others, but it is often for the notoriety of the school—competing for more volunteer hours to appear more marketable, turning charity into profit. Nowhere greater is this attitude found than in the business model of the university which contains a Heideggerian spirit. I am not arguing there is an explicit Heideggerian influence in university life, rather, that the Heideggerian spirit of the self pervades the university structure in its “intentionalities” about its own existence, which I will discuss as this chapter progresses. In order to address the proposed remedies for the Catholic university at the end of this chapter, I want to explain how Husserl and Heidegger fit into this larger conversation about Catholic higher education, not just as preludes to Levinas, via an analogy.

The collective mentality of the Catholic university is its consciousness. Consciousness is directed towards objects, intentionality. The Catholic university’s “intentionality” is what it is about, or what it is directed towards, which makes the university’s “life” meaningful. Like anyone, the university has ends and ideas and personality. How it constitutes itself is part of its uniqueness, but like a person mirroring
humanity, a university is still a learning institution. Yet, institutions also have identities. Much like someone who loses her identity (or aspects of it), the Catholic university loses its identity when it loses certain intentional states, rather, certain kinds of intentional states. The debate in the first chapter about the concrete direction of the curriculum (Augustinian/Thomistic) reflects such intentional states: should the Catholic university be directed towards character formation, academic success, or something different? It mirrors an individual person’s consciousness in shifting her life focus from one vocation to another.

Moving ahead to Vatican II and the student crisis in demanding more material than (neo) Thomism, when the Catholic university focuses on non-faith based or non-faith inspired outcomes it “swings and misses” its ultimate goals, in a manner of speaking, much like the baseball player example in chapter one. The “sight” the university sets its “eyes” on is towards an end not Catholic in nature, thus understanding itself as friends of secular universities because they seek the same things: power, prestige, and pleasure, which I will elaborate on later. The Catholic university’s “sight” is adequate to its intentional objects because its interaction with the world has prompted a radical shift in its self-image, hence its lost identity. Just as Heidegger picks up Husserl’s notion of phenomenology and builds on it, so does Fr. Hesburgh pick up the times, the spirit of the Church in Vatican II, and the status of American Catholic higher education to transform it into something else. Heidegger’s main thrust, again, is generating personal meaning for oneself through projects, the same notion Hesburgh expresses when he says the student and teacher are autonomous entities free to make up their own minds about things.
concerning Church faith, morals, and values. I can apply this Heideggerian mentality to the Catholic university.

The American Catholic university becomes aware of itself as a potentially autonomous agent in the world against all authority (*Dasein*) to actualize its goals as concerns its concrete existence (care), much like the single individual actualizing his/her goals. In breaking free from authority, as in the *Land O’Lakes Statement* (LOL), the Catholic university—because of its separation from the Vatican—becomes aware of the possibility of its own non-existence (anxiety) through the possibility of bad choices (e.g., finances). There’s a self-consciousness about itself that the Catholic university “knows” it can cease to exist because, like a human life, it is finite. Instead of waiting for things to happen, the Catholic university opens itself to new possibilities in its freedom (projection) and finds things meaningful when interacting with new “friends” in secular schools and State resources (understanding). Still, the Catholic university knows it is put into a world not of its choosing (thrownness)—it did not choose to be in America at that specific time in its special circumstances of the revolutionary 1960s. It was able, however, to receive the things it needed for its use (disposedness) such as donors for endowments. Here, the American Catholic university thought it was discovering its authentic self in “doing what it had wanted,” no longer disconnected from its true self (fallenness) in autonomy. The “Old World” mentality of the traditional Catholic Church in Pope Leo XIII had “caused” the Catholic university to lose its identity before it even realized what that identity was, and the reason for this loss was it misunderstood how to receive the world (mood) in the projects which allow the university to inhabit the world
in a meaningful way (totalities). In other words, the post-Vatican II openness of the Church is what Fr. Hesburgh, et al., had wanted for their schools all along because of the freedom it permitted its scholars to adopt in their studies and teaching. It also allowed, officially, schools to pursue things other than strictly character-driven ends, like social justice. Consider the Augustinian/Thomistic debate in the first chapter.

The Augustinian-Bonaventurian model is predicated on character and faith formation as it accords with a pastoral understanding of theology. Students are shaped as a potter molds clay in instructing on how to best live as Christians. It fits the model of a traditional liberal arts education with the student being an apprentice and the teacher an exemplar. The Thomistic model, however, pushes systematic knowledge of theology understood as an academic discipline. The student is an apprentice of a kind, but more in the lines of a worker. The teacher is a master from whom the student learns a professional technique. This latter approach is more akin to Heidegger/Hesburgh because it turns the world and the university into something for which I can succumb to my will, similar to the spoils of war. Recalling Levinas’s distinction between literal war and ideological war, I also apply it to American Catholic higher education. After Vatican II, in the wake of LOL, there is a “war” over how much and to what extent orthodoxy or liberalism has priority. It takes the shape of pluralism and restorationism as established near the end of chapter one.

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494 Of course one can have an Augustinian model with academic rigor, and a Thomistic model with teachers who care for their students. The point is one of emphasis because it guides the goals and intentionalities of the universities and their choices.

495 Anyone can “use” the university to get something to help oneself, e.g., credentials. The spirit I am referring to is a kind of abuse seen, for example, in administrators coming to Catholic universities only to radically change something and leave for a better career elsewhere.
Having explained the philosophical relationship between phenomenology and the history of American Catholic higher education, I will now explain these positions. Then, as promised in chapter one, I will offer a new approach between restorationism and pluralism called “neo-restorationism” to give shape to the kind of university I am proposing an argument.

*Restorationism and Pluralism*

Peninsulas are strips of land jutting out into open water with a thin piece of land connecting it to the rest of the continent. The Catholic university is treated as such by restorationists. It “juts” out into the water to send off its ships (people) to go to all corners of the world affecting it, for example, with its research and robust teaching. They make exchanges of scholars and graduate students who promote their ideas. Numerous citizens may also well come from all over to heed a university’s mission and message, and to that end, restorationists understand the relationship of the university to the Church as an evangelizing agent. Evangelization is the spreading of the gospel message. Universities have great potential to influence society with the Christian message, they need only restore their ties to the Vatican as a branch of the Church, not remain a separate entity. This restoration provides better access the Catholic intellectual tradition and humanities, which in turn motivates society to change its ways with a good example. For Maritain, the change happens in active citizenship, and in this way, restorationism is a call to a kind of orthodox Catholicism.

Numerous campuses today (Franciscan University of Steubenville, Christendom College, Aquinas College, et al.) have an Old World feel to them in their loyalty to
Church teaching. I am not in any way arguing against Church teaching, but these schools have a kind of “unquestioned excellence” feel to them. One feels like there is only a single “Catholic” way to do everything, and in a sense there is to the extent Catholic theology covers all of creation. For example, one could have a “Catholic candy bar” when arguing about the “being” of the candy ultimately coming from God, but that’s hardly necessary. What is necessary, among other things, is whether there is not a Catholic way of teaching or researching. Restorationism ultimately says “yes,” arguing the Church, having access to the fount and fullness of truth in Jesus Christ, supplements all inquiry in uniting all fields under faith and reason.\textsuperscript{496}

Teaching would have a “Catholic” feel to it when that teaching comes from the spirit, the mood or motivation behind it. The “spirit” of what is being taught is just as important as the content. For example, a secular humanist teaching chemistry is not necessarily the same as a Roman Catholic teaching chemistry. One would argue chemicals are here to give us life, or take it, and the other would argue chemicals combine to give us life because a loving God created it so. Same content, different teacher and different spirit. In this way, there can be a “Catholic chemistry,” and so anything could presumably be classified, rather “restored,” as “Catholic”.

On this note, the number of subjects in restorationism is markedly broad, albeit an emphasis on the humanities. A classical liberal arts curriculum is preferred because of its universal appeal (subjects which apply to all people) and cultural tradition. Teachers are taught to be available to students as much as possible, no matter their academic situation.

\textsuperscript{496} I will discuss Maritain’s position as the chapter goes on.
In this way, they embody the exemplar status of the teacher as one whom to imitate in service towards others. But more importantly, from a pedagogical standpoint, teachers teach from the Catholic intellectual tradition, the collection of texts by and about Catholic philosophy, theology, and all fields. Teaching serves to inculcate the intellectual tradition in its students, who then carry it on to the world and their own families. Still, restorationism has its weaknesses. For what’s been said about its value, there is an opposing standpoint in pluralism.

If restorationism is a peninsula jutting into the ocean, pluralism is a peninsula whose land has been flooded over by said ocean creating an island. The island has ships (people) going out into the world, but also the mainland (the Church) as though the mainland were foreign to it. Pluralism is the idea that the Catholic university ought to dialogue with the world in such a way that the world is welcomed into the university with all its cultures, ideas, and ways. The Catholic university for pluralism is a kind of playground where Catholicism is bounced around as a guiding idea, yet open to other traditions’ inputs. I say “guiding idea” because, unlike restorationism, the Catholic university is not an evangelizing agent for pluralism. Rather, it is an opportunity to be part of the world stage with the research grants, prestige, and power amongst other universities. Students may come from all over the world, not to hear the message or receive the mission, but to partake in something worthwhile for gaining experience and employment. Pluralism fully embraces the laicization of Catholic schools laid out in chapter one, citing it is necessary for schools’ survival to have laity in charge of budgets. Accordingly, it also embraces the secularization of schools with the idea that “open
borders” (island example) are the future in the globalized world. Pluralists hold the university is for research and topping rankings lists. Citizenship is understood as being tolerant, “globally minded,” and generally engaging with ideas not one’s own for the purposes of assimilation of other (non-Catholic) cultural values. The Catholic university ought to be “pluralized” in order to adapt to society. In this way, the Catholic university becomes one university among many because its mission is identical to that of secular schools.

Many Catholic campuses now (Creighton University, Duquesne University, et al.) have a “modern” feel to them. Not just the technology which all schools have, but the architecture, art, and “presence” of the campus. There is almost a kind of trendy feel to it, a doing of what (other?) top-ranked schools are doing to fit in like the new kid on the playground. One does not sense Catholicism, apart from maybe the campus chapel. It is not so much a situation of “nothing is sacred,” as it is “where is the sacred?” The kind of “openness” to which pluralism subscribes makes it seem like there is nothing Catholic about anything except one’s personal faith. The question of whether there are Catholic teaching methods and research is left up to each Order to decide for themselves. To universally assert a Catholic appreciation or approach to either, including things like art, would undermine the kind of open-mindedness pluralism embraces.

For pluralism, teaching only has a Catholic flavor insofar as it serves a pattern. Catholics “say” and “do” certain things, so anything thereof is considered Catholic, and thereby acceptable to anyone looking on (e.g., going to Mass). The name “Catholic” would cover a number of teaching approaches, including both the secular and expressly
Catholic conviction towards chemistry as above. Because said knowledge is religiously “neutral,” it does not matter how one approaches it. What matters is that the material is taught at all. On this note, pluralism embraces a wider range of coursework and colleges because it accepts the student demand for more professional training. Liberal arts are included for general education requirements, with the appropriate majors, but are surpassed in importance by the professional schools, demonstrated by the amount of funding received (or not) and the usual budget cuts coming to humanities departments. When liberal arts are around, there is usually a dearth of non-Catholic texts well outside the Catholic intellectual tradition, not for the enlightenment of the students per se, but for the larger mission of education for global citizenship. Pluralism holds that to engage the world is to make students ready for it, but to the extent teachers are willing themselves to engage the student. Research is prioritized over teaching because research promotes greater affluence for the university, in order to build its prestige. Teachers are thought more of as generic employees who fill a void in teaching gaps or a prestigious researcher who can bring funding and notoriety to the school than a person to whom the student should emulate. The only “tradition” passed on is the one the student chooses to adopt. There is not any reason to prefer one over the other. And so one can conclude pluralism and restorationism have their own set of problems.

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497 I am not saying a Catholic teacher or school cannot or ought not teach non-Catholic texts. Certainly there is edification to be found there. I am saying an overload of non- or anti-Catholic literature is discussed in favor of the Catholic intellectual tradition.

498 One can see the business model (Heideggerian spirit) at work here.
The latter has a kind of isolationism that makes it vulnerable to “attack” from the outside world, namely, a lack of engagement with non-Catholic sources breeds weakness because one method (e.g., one kind of philosophy or theology) cannot necessarily handle every threat to the faith or Catholic education. Even the Church Fathers read the Greeks. On the other hand, pluralism’s breadth is so wide it is practically meaningless. What is the point of describing oneself as Catholic if/when Catholic morals, values, and theology are constantly undermined by the very same institution? One side is too small, the other too large. Again, these have their strengths, but it would take too long to pick apart each and every one. One quick method is to remind the audience of Pope Leo XIII.

I established in chapter one Leo, in his *Longinqua*, has a major concern that the American Catholic Church is substituting democratic principles for religious ones as the sole foundation of morality. In his follow-up tract, *Testem Benevolentiae*, Leo lays out his worries over Fr. Isaac Hecker’s liberalism laying ground for clergy to make their own decisions within their orders. The same spirit is prominent in Hesburgh’s wish for more freedom to make choices about his own university. The pope’s concerns mirror the second kind of war Levinas discusses in the battle between two or more rationalistic systems of philosophy until there is one thing left: sameness. Granted, Leo probably did not want “sameness” in the sense of war, but there is something of a desire for Otherness in that the Church needs to remind herself she is not of this world. The same mindset applies to the American Catholic university.

The paradox is “pluralism,” in the sense of permitting multiple worldviews in a respectful academic atmosphere, is actually sameness in disguise because it tends to shun
the very view it claims for its basis (Roman Catholicism) and reduces all things to non-
Catholicism (e.g., economic values). Because pluralism holds Catholicism is open to
many different kinds of religious expression in the world,\(^499\) all expressions are permitted
in a kind of hob glob of grayness—everyone blends so as to be unable to tell each other
apart, hence sameness. Meanwhile “restorationism,” in the sense of maintaining,
respecting, and restoring the moral and religious authority of the magisterium, is actually
Otherness in that it rightfully deviates the boundaries necessary for sameness and
Otherness to exist. That is to say, “X is Catholicism, Y is not.” Restorationism allows
Catholicism because, as just stated, Catholics are not of the world and need to protect
their dignity. When something non-Catholic is “permitted” on campus and in the
classroom, it is done for obvious pedagogical reasons (compared to, say, a political
agenda). In a way, both positions are and are not allowing Catholic and non-Catholic
things on our campuses, it simply depends on the intention of the ism. Pluralism,
however, is a post-Vatican II version of the adoption of Protestant values in the way LOL
goes about its rejection of “authority of whatever kind”.\(^500\) In this way, the road is paved
for the Catholic university to behave as a business.

Fr. Hesburgh revealed his plans for the Catholic university in his speech on the
university as a corporation. One characteristic of businesses is to seek to maximize
profits and reduce losses. This mindset gets transferred into the quest for power as an

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\(^{499}\) Vatican II document *Nostra Aetate* acknowledges truth in other religions, and so pluralism takes
dialogue to a logical extreme.

\(^{500}\) Protestants also reject the Magisterium of the Catholic Church. Rejection of the Magisterium in the
university is not any different than in ordinary life because the consequences are the same: freedom to do
as one pleases.
elite university. One way it behaves as a business is to treat the person as *homo economicus* (economic man, or, person), an idea developed by philosopher Gary Eberle. He contends that a university treats its students like customers where “everything and every person becomes monetized, and human beings are of value to one another only insofar as they may financially benefit one another.”\(^{501}\) The higher educational community witnessed the economic value of students amidst the coronavirus pandemic as schools were shutting down or eliminating entire departments due to loss of income from student tuition and room and board. No students equals no pay. In particular, liberal arts programs were hit the hardest because their market value is perceived less than their professional counterparts (e.g., nursing). One way to counter this trend is to argue that liberal arts offer “soft skills” professional programs only dream of, but that only maintains the conversation in professional language. There must be a third way of talking about theocentric humanistic education and the structure of the Catholic university.

On this note, having explained these two positions, I will explain and concretely apply the student-teacher relationship in what I call “neo-restorationism” to American Catholic higher education as a stepping stone to rehabilitating the modern Catholic university.

*Neo-Restorationism and Application*

If restorationism seeks to restore faithful obedience to Vatican decrees, and pluralism is an openness to outside influence and self-autonomy, then neo-restorationism

\(^{501}\) Eberle, *Dominican Liberal Arts*, 38.
is the faithful observation of magisterial teaching whilst engaging the world (i.e., non-Catholic sources), seeking the fullness of truth. It does not exclude texts on the basis of their being controversial, nor does it exclude classics because they are old or possibly boring. Like pluralism, neo-restorationism is open to truth wherever it is found, except unlike pluralism it does not abandon its history and tradition for a (con)temporary trend. Like restorationism, it adopts orthodox theology understanding the university as a branch of the Church, but unlike it neo-restorationism is willing to consider new insights to the throwing away of old.

For example, modern scientific discovery has eliminated the need for many a speculation about the orbiting of the planets, and so our relationship with God is still the same on the one hand (e.g., we need a Savior), and different on another (e.g., we are not the center of creation). Granted, this example is by now an accepted law, it was not always the case, nor is it the case now that many Catholics are up on contemporary scientific study. Neuroscience, robotics, and technology are all pushing the limits of traditional philosophy and theology. Thomistic metaphysics is hard pressed to offer solutions to increasingly difficult problems, such as the question of whether sentient artificial intelligence would warrant personhood. Neo-restorationism has no problem, for instance, accepting machine-personhood when there is evidence for it. The Lord’s creation is a wondrous, mysterious thing ever-saturated with His presence, and we are called to complete it through our labor. Restorationism, given its traditionalist leanings, would hesitate to accept or probe such claims. Pluralism would heartily accept it, albeit a

502 Agreement with the Magisterium on important theological and doctrinal matters.
bit quickly because of its vast openness. Neo-restorationism slowly contemplates, digests, and discerns the truth as a philosopher does, yet is as a child on her father’s lap awaiting a story or instruction. Curriculum design serves as a fuller explanation of the kind of attitude I am describing.

Certain sectors of the Catholic higher education scene have a preoccupation with the Great Books program, a curriculum designed to take students through the history of Western thought with texts that have withstood the test of time. In other words, they are worth reading today because they teach invaluable lessons, can be read over and over with new insights, and contain ideas which thinking people generally consider. I am in favor of the Great Books because they encourage our students to lead moral lives, live good citizenship, and have faith. The problem is these same sectors are advocating Great Books at the expense of good, or great, contemporary ones. They are fearful of an ideological takeover should anything outside this aspect of the Western canon be taught. What’s more interesting is there are any number of texts in complete disagreement with basic Catholic theology, a point necessary to make considering the majority of Great Books advocates are practicing Catholics. One need not be a member of any belief system to appreciate good literature, the nub is whether the text serves to build character. Essentially, as long as the book is edifying, it is permissible.


504 There are exceptions in the University of Chicago and St. John’s College (secular school) curriculums. These schools understand the Great Books to be “great” for the same reasons as Catholics and value liberal arts education just the same.
The irony here is the only way for texts to be determined “great” is for time to pass and people to read them. It does not account for potential greatness here and now. There is also an increased paranoia recently about non-Catholic texts because of the “culture wars” brought about in recent decades for fear anti-Catholic bias, sentiment, and agendas seeped into Catholic universities. I do not deny the seriousness of this issue, but I want to focus on the course material in relationship to Catholic identity and hence the university. Typically, the Great Books reflect Catholic identity because, given their age, they have shaped it over the centuries. To read these texts is to read what the great philosophers and theologians read; it is to think as they have thought. Of course, in their day, any number of these texts were also “new,” so they had no way of knowing whether or not succeeding generations would take these texts seriously. Not only these, but they wrote and conversed just the same. How can a Catholic like St. Thomas Aquinas read his contemporary heretical counterparts, or the pagan Aristotle, and not be afraid of losing his faith? The situation then is not really any different now. I am not advocating a delving into just any text for its own sake, but these philosopher-saints (among others) were reading pagans and heathens while correcting and adapting their positions to the Catholic faith. A contemporary example is found in a controversy at Franciscan University of Steubenville.

Any Catholic professor will teach, or can teach, any material from a theologically orthodox stance. Consider English professor Stephen Lewis at Franciscan University of Steubenville (FUS). In January 2019, Lewis was set to teach *The Kingdom* by Emmanuel
Carrère, a blasphemous text in “an advanced English seminar”.  He had taught it previously without controversy, but a school donor got wind of his course and immediately threatened to cease all donations, prompting the administration to strip Lewis of his Chair and chance to teach his course. The Catholic higher education internet was awash with cries for his reinstatement because, on top of being an affront to academic freedom of speech, one would think a Catholic university is the place where one ought to study something blasphemous with fellow Catholic teachers and peers so as to know how to go about addressing it outside the university. As Aquinas read and appropriated philosophies, we, too, carry on the Catholic intellectual tradition by reading those same “forbidden” sources and appropriating them as such.

What Lewis represents is the kind of position I’m supporting here: be Catholic and teach what you like because any truly faithful Catholic professor will never willingly teach something without charity. It reminds us of the Catholic University in the Modern World’s principle to “[confront students] with values which, reaching beyond man’s mortal limitations, challenge a more restricted view of reality.” It is not an excuse to do what one likes in the sense of unlimited freedom. Rather, it is a call to responsibility for oneself as an educator and responsibility for one’s students as spiritually impoverished beings. Pluralism says to teach whatever one wants however one wants, that is, in whatever spirit one prefers. Restorationism says teach classics (e.g., Great


506 Modern World, 47.
Books) in a spirit of charity to the exclusion of everything else. In the context of neo-
restorationism, teach what you want because faithful Catholicism is a presupposition.
It combines the unlimited choice of texts in pluralism with the heartfelt compassion of
Christian charity in restorationism. The student is the one we are to serve, not an
administration or third party, but I can still see some difficulties in justifying material like
Lewis’s course. One difficulty is the Catholic university’s right to determine its own
curriculum on the basis of self-autonomy, albeit not in a Hesburghian mode, which I will
touch upon in a moment. First, I want to discuss the third party’s role in the student-
teacher relationship.

The third party, to remind the audience, is not the individual Other opposite the self
in the face-to-face encounter. The third party is the “plural you,” the “everyone else”
outside of the personal relationship, albeit the third party is not impersonal because it is
comprised of all the other personal yous in the world. As I am responsible to the
individual Other, I also have responsibility to the third party because it is as in need
(impoverished) as the Other. My material resources are strained because I only have so
much to give to any one person or party. My main spiritual resource, however, is
responsible, the justice I owe the Other and third party in my response to their needs.
Justice takes the form of language, namely speech, because it reaches out to the Other as

507 I provide an example in the following section, basically amounting to an acceptance of critical yet basic
Catholic theology no matter from which theoretical perspective one approaches it.

508 One difficulty involves different types of Catholics (e.g., traditional, progressive) having different
understandings of what being Catholic means. These differences are reflected in most aspects of university
life, and a course on blasphemy, for instance, does not seem too out of place when taught with the right
intention. The student service aspect is found in relaying knowledge about the secular world in a context
where it is appropriate to express one’s theology or faith without fear of reprimand in order to understand
who, why, and how blasphemy is expressed and what could be done about it.
a bridge (and thereby as a resource in shared communication) without reducing the Other to sameness. The self and Other remain separate (remain themselves) while in communication, and this speech is justice because I minimally acknowledge the Other’s existence (what I owe the Other) when my material resources are dried up. The same situation applies to FUS in the curriculum debate.

Throughout this dissertation I am using the student as the Other challenging the professor’s sense of sameness. They encounter each other in the classroom with the course material as their “bridge,” their language or means of communication. Everyone else—administrators, donors, etc.—is outside their relationship. A serious dilemma arises when debts owed to multiple parties are in contradiction. For example, teachers are responsible to their students, but also responsible to administrators for fulfilling their contracts (e.g., courses are in accords with university standards). In the case of Lewis and FUS, administrators owe something to their donors, which causes a potential rupture in the student-teacher relationship because both demands (teachers and donors) cannot respected. It then becomes a question of priority.

The administration’s (third party) role is to keep the primary student-teacher relationship in check so as to maintain the integrity of the university, but recall the third party is present in the eyes of the Other: the teacher is reminded of all the outside obligations to the student when gazing at the student because the student would not be in the classroom without staff, administrators, etc. The teacher is aware there is something going on beyond the classroom when teaching in the classroom. That there are forces present making concrete learning possible. The university is founded on the student-
teacher relationship, but it is also larger than it, and these third parties are not impersonal. Like the Other, they have a right to recognition, but they are recognized in the institution of the university. Outside the institution, they are pretty much useless. Recognition, however, is predicated on language.

The third party is bound by the same standards as I am. The language I speak, what I communicate, is reflective of the kind of institution it is. A language of religion and ethics reflects a Catholic university compared to a language of hatred and violence as in the Nazi-training schools Maritain references. Language also reflects relation: how I speak is indicative of my responding to another’s needs. My demeanor in not giving a snake to someone who asks for a fish “speaks” to my character. With this idea in mind, administrations are caught between a rock and a hard place: they promise to uphold donor wishes and the dignity of the university. When these promises collide, a choice in priority is made. Neo-restorationism, being about orthodox theology and charitable teaching, is applied here by reminding the third party (administrations, etc.) why the university exists at all. They gave a snake to Lewis (really, all the faculty) and a fish to the donors. These kinds of choices favoring third parties are all too common as faculty consistently face budget, curricular, and departmental cuts. The language being “spoken” here is that faculty and students are second-class citizens to the desires of the administrations. How can universities prioritize themselves over the parties they service? The tension here is more than this dissertation can handle, but I only wish to touch upon it on the grounds it can aide our ascent back to authentic Catholicity.

I do not deny the complexity of the donor situation behind the scenes. I am speaking to the state of Catholic higher education and the Catholic university.
So, there is a paradox here. The Catholic university is simultaneously free to determine some aspects of her being, and unfree to decide others. It is similar to marriage. When practiced rightly, spouses are in a freely giving, loving relationship of their own choosing. They choose to be with each other and none else, but they also have individual lives. They are not joined at the hip and must still take responsibility for their individual actions. The Catholic university is in a similar situation.

Having explained neo-restorationism and its application, I will now move onto discussing the ways in which teachers and students are independent in the pluralist Catholic university to further explicate neo-restorationism’s proposals.

On Independent Teachers

Student and teachers are autonomous. There’s an aspect in which this is true outside of LOL even without its official position. Students and teachers must be free to make up their own minds on things in order to truly live. The point of restorationism’s Vatican authority model is that we are not free to violate the moral law in life (and expect to be good people) as we are not free to violate certain conditions for belonging to a group and expect to be called a member (e.g., the Catholic Church). Authority is part and parcel of being Catholic as it is anything else. One must accept the rules of baseball if one wants to play and practice if one wants to play well. One must accept the laws of a given state if one wants to stay out of prison, etc. For teachers to teach what they want when they want (within the parameters above) at a Catholic university, there is no violation of academic freedom because, again, as marriage places limiters on what one can and cannot do inside and outside the relationship, the Catholic Church has a different
understanding of academic freedom. Academic freedom is not the freedom to teach, believe, promulgate, etc., anything one wants, but to teach, etc., what one believes is the truth in light of the Church’s understanding of theology and ethics. I will explain what I mean.

It is possible to be a Kantian and be Catholic. Typically Catholics follow some brand of Aristotelian-Thomism because it is built into the Church’s catechism. Yet, a Kantian has as much of a claim to be Catholic as another. The faith within the Kantian burns with the same truth and light, albeit in a different way. Instead of relying on Aristotle for metaphysics, et al., the Kantian relies—among other things—on formal logic. Coming to the same conclusions about theology, again in a different way, there is no reason for exclusion from the Catholic faith no matter how atypical a Kantian may be. It is the same Faith, or as St. Paul says in reference to gifts, many parts but the same body. So the issue also applies to authority and the Catholic Church.

The Church does not say that a professor need be a card carrying Aristotelian-Thomist, only that one conform to the standards of the Catholic Church’s morality and theology. Again, this form takes many shapes as the body has parts. The complaints over against Vatican authority are exaggerated because people do not understand how Vatican authority works, including over its schools. It’s not unlike running a “tight ship” in one’s home when everyone is scurrying about living their lives. Imagine the lives of the students running about in a school. The students, like the teachers, are free to accept or reject whatever they please, but they do so at their own peril. The Church, as ECE points out, cannot force anyone to do or believe anything one does not want to do or believe,
else one is not acting freely and therefore lovingly. Yet, things like Kantianism offer a different route to the same conclusions: Church authority is the same, individual learning is the same, the moral teaching is the same. We do not shun philosophies because they are different or philosophers because they are eccentric. The Church has always welcomed wisdom wherever it is found. It can be found in many places, and there is wisdom in having an overarching authority.

LOL’s issue with authority is like a child throwing a temper tantrum because she cannot have her own way: “I want my freedom and I want it now.” Given my own humanity, I completely understand Hesburgh, et al.’s complaint: one should not have to wait for a higher up to approve every move one wants to make. One must be able to live, but wanting to buy a lawnmower is not the same as jettisoning 2,000 years of apostolic succession. Arguing students are autonomous in LOL means, once again, not that they are free to agree or disagree with Church teaching (they are), but free to decide for themselves what is right and wrong. Again, the Levinasian “war” makes an appearance in the form of the Levinasian self.

The self organizes the world in economy (resource management). Goods are higher and lower according to how well they benefit me. I reduce them to their usefulness and claim them my own. I am the emperor to my world, and my inner life, psychism, is reducible to all things pleasurable. I take in pleasures from my use of things and my living from them. Knowledge can be pleasurable in this way, reading books and writing articles for the sheer joy of pursuing wisdom. My soul is nourished by all the spiritual nutrients, so to speak, absorbed in intellectual work. The contemporary vision of the
Catholic university, however manipulates this pleasure for the good of the university’s image.

The university, in organizing the world, reduces the professor to his/her research with teaching a secondary consideration. The “resource” of teaching is a secondary consideration because it does not add to the market value perceived by ranking reports, the kinds of things which promote schools to the wider public. Higher ranks means more attention, which in turn brings about more applications, more admissions, more students, and more money, and more money means more power because money influences one’s ability to do things (make choices, etc.) in higher education. Teaching is treated as a necessary evil to the upkeep of the school because students literally need educated in the sense of Maritain’s third definition of education and schools need tuition to pay their debts. Teaching surveys at the end of courses are offered to maintain standards and keep considerations for promotion legitimate. Research produced and conferences attended are also tallied for promotion with top journals also noted. All measurements are quantitative and any subjective measurement is held strictly in abeyance for the purposes of objectivity, eliminating any kind of debate on quality of research, teaching, or potential upholding of the school’s mission.

Many universities support a teacher-scholar model to that end: teaching and research are competing for the attention (the mood, attitude, consciousness) of the teacher to the point something has to give, and it is usually teaching because research does not write itself. There are many methods for “teaching without teaching” or without

510 Except for class sizes.
instruction, such as group work, flipped classroom, and numerous in-class projects. It is
done so the teacher-scholar can dedicate more time to research publications. It does not
mean the teaching is actually “bad” or that the students do not take anything positive
from such lessons. Here, however, we see the teacher-scholar’s inner life characterized,
not by love and pursuit of wisdom, but by the “love” and pursuit of publication. Levinas
tells us, “enjoyment is the ultimate consciousness of all the contents that fill my life,”
and when the contents of one’s inner life are all research-oriented (as far as university
life), the pleasure of being a teacher dies and becomes *homo economicus*—economic man
(person)—noted at the end of the two previous sections.

Economic man is dedicated to all things productive. His (her) life is characterized
by a constant increase of work and product to the pleasure of one’s employer (think
overtime) and the detriment of one’s well-being. People work themselves to death to
keep their jobs, or make the money necessary to pay their bills, or both. The joys of
teaching and learning have been replaced by the “joy” of survival. Here, I am only as
good as what I produce, and what I produce is not for myself or my students, but for the
greater good of university image as it is demanded of me. Because I am pushed to my
limit, I no longer enjoy the process of being creative and forming young lives. The very
thing supposed to give teachers dignity is the very thing used to dehumanize them. The
independence LOL affords students and teachers has returned to haunt them. Because
they are free to do as they please, administrations are as well, and they have no reason to
treat students and teachers with dignity as per the Heideggerian spirit.

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511 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 111.
Notice how Levinas’s concept of need is also manipulated. Need is not mere lack, but something that requires filling within me. For example, I need the sun to nourish my skin, which in turn nourishes (fills) my inner life in pleasure. Teachers no longer need to publish because they have something important to say to their peers (they need to share it), but they publish to stay alive. They are required to publish material to keep said jobs, and their labor is no longer a source of happiness but of necessity.\textsuperscript{512} Paradoxically, pleasure is still taken in the satisfaction of the need. A successful class or published article is just as enjoyable as any, required or not required for one’s job security. These instances of success contribute to the sense of oneself as a teacher-scholar, and since selfhood is formed in enjoyment and labor for Levinas, it is formed in a manner outside ipseity.

“Ipseity” is, again, his term for absolute uniqueness. I am not merely the “individuation of a concept,”\textsuperscript{513} but existing wholly in myself, and for Levinas it is in enjoyment. My being is characterized by pleasure such that pleasure “equals” me, and because the pleasure is mine alone, my self is formed. One might consider one’s research belonging only to one in the sense one labors alone. My article is my publication. In order to get pleasure, however, I must welcome the world into myself. Welcoming is receptivity to things in the world, and the world contains “elements” (nature). Elements immerse us in their presence and being, so too, the teacher-scholar is immersed in his/her work (labor) in the concrete environment of the university. Before I even reach

\textsuperscript{512} In the sense of “I must do this task for survival” compared to “I need to do this task for my own good”.

\textsuperscript{513} Levinas, \textit{Totality and Infinity}, 118.
intentionality, these things are in place. It maneuvers around Husserlian intentionality by undercutting it—absorption of- and being in one’s environment does not place my consciousness in any intentional relationship. Things are just there and I enjoy them in sensibility, my mode of enjoyment which allows me to enjoy. Sensibility is the manner in which I feel things. When I enjoy things in a variety of ways, I am not thinking, and these things are not objects of thought (hence they are without intentionality), but teachers are engaged in thought whether or not it is pleasurable. Both are immersed in something, and the point is the “elements” of the university do not always give me pleasure the way they ought. Something happened to how I relate to them, and I am arguing it is the changing of the student-teacher relationship.

These changes to the selfhood of the professor as a teacher-scholar are not new to the university landscape, but a pluralist Catholic university takes advantage of them in a special way, again, as towards advancing the university’s “intentionality” and projects, or, totalities. These totalities encapsulate the ipseity of the teacher in the grandiose schema of the university’s mission, except, unlike marriage with the freedom to be oneself, the schema of the pluralist school is to use the teacher as a scholar for the strict advancement of the university’s desire for elitism. Freedom is twisted from responding to another’s need to responding to an impersonal demand.

What LOL forgets in the midst of laying out independent students and teachers is that the people make up the university, not the prestige, power, and labor, etc. Marriage, for instance, is an institution and itself is a relationship, not a building or physical construct. It is constituted by people as is the university with the exception of the
authority (charter) to grant legitimate degrees. Specifically, it is the student and teacher
who make the university, again, because without them the university ceases to exist.
Anyone can “grant” a degree—all one must do is print one off of a computer—but not
anyone can earn the degree. The earning comes through the labor, and the labor is the
classroom experience exemplified by Maritain.

Having explained how teachers and students are independent in a pluralist Catholic
university, I will now explain the proper relationship between them in Maritain’s
classroom as an example of neo-restorationism in the university.

*Identity Crisis and Dignity*

Again, the existential situation of Catholic universities mirrors Husserl’s and
Heidegger’s philosophies. Note the tension with university interests. Christianity
worships Jesus Christ, and He teaches us to serve our neighbor. The corporate “interests”
of the university may not align with this love of neighbor, and so the university must
decide between God and mammon. Universities, as pointed out in chapter one by Alice
Gallin, often choose things because their existence is on the line. Building a new sports
complex or making some kind of deal with a local sports team often engenders some kind
of financial reward necessary for the university to survive. One could call it “existential
anxiety,” so the university projects itself into the future in risky endeavors. Once settled
in the world, Catholic schools cannot help which markets they are “thrown” into, but they
can help how they use things for own purposes. Once more, note the tension. To follow
Jesus is not to use in a selfish way, but to share in a community. Of course, Catholic
schools must make “use” of things to get along in the world like anyone, but the spirit of Heidegger’s philosophy is to abuse rather than assist.

Perhaps the most pressing issue for Catholic universities is identity. Noted by many a Catholic scholar, Catholic schools do not know who they are and what they are about. Mission statements only go so far in helping schools figure out who they are because, to live up to their potential (whichever way one understands it), they must take action and put their ideas into the world. And action breeds character. Not living up to their identities puts them in a state of fallenness, inauthenticity. The universities are not living a Christian life so to speak when they are distracted by the allure of power, prestige, and pleasure. More on these in a moment.

In becoming fascinated with such things, schools tend to associate themselves with projects having nothing to do with their missions. The school’s mood is how it understands what it is doing. In buying land, for example, the university may understand itself as fulfilling its mission somehow or it may understand itself as a corporation. All of these examples are of the Heideggerian means by which Catholic universities construct themselves. When combined, schools enter into projects of totality, neglecting their most essential components: the students and teachers. Hence, Levinas and Maritain are necessary to correct the path Catholic universities are walking, beginning with a turn towards liberal arts again and a de-centering of technical training.

Researchers have projects set up in the world for themselves and for the benefit of others. The complexity of why and how these two interact is a bit too psychological for this dissertation, but I want to establish there is some component of otherness present. A
study, for instance, on alternative cancer treatments could benefit potentially millions of
people. Yes, the fame and (academic) fortune of the study for the researchers could be
profound, but they do not do it solely, or at all, for those reasons. They do it for the
benefit of others. The fame, etc., is only secondary. This example is the kind healthy for
researchers in labs and in libraries because it keeps the ego (self) in check. The Other
and the third party (all others) are “present” by being the focal point of the study.

Levinas, of course, is much more radical. I do not think he would have a problem
with cancer treatment studies, but he gives us exaggerated language in his late work
describing the self as a “hostage” to the Other.\textsuperscript{514} His notion of education therein is the
absolute discipleship of the self to the Other. I think it is only fair to criticize Levinas on
this point, at least for formal academic education, because the student as Other must be
free to respond to me, the teacher, in order for a real relationship to take place, one not
predicated on fear or humiliation. When teaching, I agree with Maritain who coincides
with Levinas, that the professor is at the call of the student. Schools are not places of
indoctrination or intolerance, but neither where anything goes. There has to be concrete
instruction with an actual authority figure in the classroom. The intersubjective
relationship underlies formal teaching, but making the teacher a hostage of the student
does not make sense.

Herzing University is one example of a university with student-teacher relational
principles of this kind without the spirit of Catholicism. It is a career university focusing
on training students for careers in IT, computers, business, and nursing. They also offer

\textsuperscript{514} Levinas, \textit{Otherwise than Being}, 11.
general education courses in the humanities to demonstrate basic proficiency in aspects essential to a well-functioning student (writing, etc.). Herzing features a software program known as “Beacon,” a student-retention system focused on reporting student-teacher interactions for the sake of the wider academic community. Its purpose is to keep tabs on misbehaving students and potential academic troublemakers. Whenever a student consistently does not participate or turns in substandard work, the teacher alerts the Beacon program which then alerts the necessary campus parties (e.g., academic advisors) of the student’s performance. This process is meant to clarify and hold accountable the students and teachers for their actions. It provides the university with grounds for disciplinary action while documenting the teachers’ efforts to engage the students.

The above are reasons for why this retention software is in principle a good idea, but what makes this program inefficient is the overt handholding mechanism. Students who need that kind of attention to that extent are questionably ready for college. It is not to say students who need the occasional “boost” are unworthy of an academic education; it is to say it slows down the educational process in that teachers have to take an extra step in their work. Instead of emailing said student(s), possibly informing the department chair, and moving on, they now must log their interactions. Perhaps it is the age of legal action motivating such behavior, but students too immature or bothered to learn ought not be pushed into maturation when they are not ready. Granted students who refuse to work cannot be themselves forced to work. My point is the Levinasian ethic needs help—the “Catholic” part of applying Maritain’s philosophy—because the teacher, in responding to
the spiritual poverty of the student, cannot force him/herself on the student and do the work for her.

The student cannot demand a new lesson because she dislikes the content. An understanding, open ear on behalf of the teacher is welcome, but outright takeover is not the same thing. Levinas means of course I am “captured” by the face, the vulnerability of the Other in becoming a substitute for her, or, putting myself in her place to the point of my own annihilation. Such empathy, while heroic in some ways, is unnecessary. Notice I am not advocating we turn away from Levinas’s base ethic, only his more extreme versions. In the classroom, the teacher cannot efface him/herself to the point of non-recognition. In theory, students can teach themselves any number of things, but that raises the question why have a university at all. What’s at stake, really, is dignity. How can the teacher respond to the students’ needs and maintain one’s dignity? Businesslike universities do not help the question because they are responsible for the destruction of said dignity in undermining the student-teacher relationship. An answer might be found in family life.

Take a man out of work, and his family almost succumbs to debtor’s prison. Being sorrowful he could not provide for his family, one could describe him as “undignified”. Work somehow made him a man and shaped his humanity. When he finds an open position before his savings runs out, he suddenly becomes a new person. His dignity is restored, returned to him. How does this happen? It is not this dissertation’s place to

\[515\] There are numerous examples of students expressing disgust over course material, sometimes even resulting in a teacher’s resignation. I’m referring to situations where students complain that course material is “hard” or somnambulant.
assert how in great detail. I will suggest that dignity is Imago Dei (being made in God’s image and likeness) and also respect for the Other. The difficulty is how the self “gets” dignity, and because Levinas structures the self according to its relationship to the Other, one might say dignity is found in intersubjectivity. Recall the shared world of the beggar in chapter two. Here, the man “found” his self-worth, or dignity, with the Other’s offer of a job, a shared world. His dignity was bestowed on him by the “teacher” of his employer with he being the “student” in the educational structure of the self-Other encounter. This dynamic occurs in the concrete classroom in the form of dialogue.

Having explained how the identity crisis in Catholic higher education leads to an infantilizing and undignified student-teacher relationship, I will move onto the three intentionalities of the Catholic university uprooting said dignity, which hold the Catholic university back from its rehabilitation.

*Intentionalities: Prestige, Pleasure, Power*

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Husserl’s intentionality enters the conversation as per educational institutions’ “experiences” in their directedness towards objects, manifesting as Heidegger’s life-intentionality of the ego. One might even recommend the specific “consciousness” of a Catholic university to be the mission statement, the object towards which it orients itself and what “fills” itself. Yet, intentions and intentionality are not the same thing. Catholic universities have good faith in expressing their concerns, goals, and oaths in written form, but the choices they make and how they fulfill those promises do not always match. In light of the Land O’Lakes statement, consider how
they manifest in contemporary Catholic higher education as aiming towards power, prestige, and pleasure, not faith, hope, and love of neighbor.

The main concern in all of these intentionalities is pluralism’s freedom to determine its own ends. The intentionality of power combines prestige and pleasure in a way that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, so I will explain those first. Prestige culture is predicated on high university rankings, not money as most reflections would have it. Money makes the university go around because it keeps it “in business,” but were it not for prestige, the conversation about the perils of contemporary Catholic higher education would not exist. University rankings, such as the U.S. News & World Report, promote the university to as many parties as possible making it more readily available to the general public. The more people know about a school, the more likely the school is to attract students, thus causing the ranking to increase even more in various categories.

Prestige is hotly predicated on rank, but also publications. Academic journals are known for being gateways into high-level academic circles and jobs. One example is “the Nature effect”: a single publication in the extremely prestigious journal Nature would give a natural scientist more clout than ten articles in any other journal. The reason for this phenomenon, on top of high article rejection rates, is that journals give attention to one’s paper and work. The more prestigious and widely read the journal, the more widely known the researcher. It is the equivalent of “signaling” in actual nature wherein one animal will gesture to another that it is more physically fit (e.g., by jumping high) than another. The same situation happens in the university: without a prestigious publication,

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516 Small Catholic colleges exist without controversy.
no one will see your work, and so your publication is basically useless in the market and
costless to the school. Thus, the intentionality of prestige—the consciousness of the
university—is to make it appear that one school has better ideas, better faculty, and is
better overall than others according to where they publish and how often. These
indicators give schools the freedom to move through the market as they please, but these
markets are complex as seen with the intentionality of pleasure.

The intentionality of pleasure is most often reflected in sports, a “pleasurable”
activity. American universities spend hundreds of millions of dollars per year on college
athletics with only twenty-four in the entire nation raising a profit. The obsession with
sports leads one to question what the purpose of a university is without the learning. One
might venture to say it is to use sports as a minor league system for the regular
professional levels, yet why would universities keep them when so few are earning
revenue? The reasons vary too much for this dissertation, but among others is the
pleasure and freedom one gets in having a prestigious team. With a popular and well-
formed team, the university once again signals to other schools that it can promulgate its
will by attracting the best athletes in the country. Winning games and championships
further proves the school’s dominance, attracting more resources (grant money, etc.) and
donors. Therein, the belief that one is contributing to a winning team boosts one’s ego to
the point sports take priority over academic matters. Like animals, it is another signal to
schools of a university’s ability to freely determine its own ends, except—unlike the

517 Brian Burnsed, “Athletics Departments That Make More Than They Spend Still a Minority,”
NCAA.org, last modified September 18, 2015, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/
athletics-departments-make-more-they-spend-still-minority.
professoriate who make use of research facilities on campus and gain their own fame—there is a strange notion of “success by association”. One actively gets pleasure from victories earned by one’s respective team, except one does not actually earn said victories. It's a kind of piggy-backing off the team’s energy, as if to say, because I root for them I’m somehow connected to them and thereby deserve their success and use it for bragging rights. For example, every year the NCAA March Madness tournament results in a vicarious victory for fans resulting in an increased level of prestige for the school for its basketball program. What it has to do with academics is pretty much nothing.

Without sports, one might say a team’s followers enter a kind of Levinasian *il y a* from chapter two, where they believe or fear there is nothing outside of sports and its community in university life. That there is a horror to the existence of the school itself outside of sports and pleasure. An odd phenomenon given collegiate sports are only popular in the United States and plenty of universities exist without them. So, sports exist for the intentionality of pleasure in the school’s creation of its own ego.

These intentionalities lead to and combine to form the third and final intentionality of power. Power here concerns control more than anything else, and with power comes responsibility. To lead a school “beyond boundaries,” to uncharted educational waters, requires a certain amount of maturity and discernment. The amount of choices one can make with power is immense and cannot be exhausted here. For our purposes, I want to briefly touch on power and the ability to choose one’s destiny, or autonomy. As stated above and many times in this dissertation, autonomy is a key issue in the development of American Catholic universities in the twentieth century exemplified by Fr. Hesburgh and
the Land O’Lakes Statement (LOL). Autonomy (power) manifests in a resistance to Vatican suggestion or recommendation for more orthodox theology and a heeding of moral principles to spread or at least maintain the Christian message. The idea of choosing one’s own path is very appealing because it is human nature to want more leeway in how to make use of one’s resources and express oneself as one desires.

Making use again of the marriage image, a Vatican connection limits what one can do: I cannot use my paycheck and such for anything I want because I must use of it for my spouse and children. When single, however, I can spend my money as I want; when universities are not “about” anything, they are “single,” and free to do as they please. Modern Catholic universities like this idea because it means they can leave the nest, a normal human trait if but universities were human. Being composed by people, however, they can make “human choices” and insist faculties, students, and missions be oriented towards certain ends rather than others.

For example, faculty are no longer forming citizens, they are researchers who happen to teach for a paycheck. Students no longer take pleasure in learning and becoming whole people (as whole as possible) but in leisurely activities elevated to the level of godlike status. And so with power, the point of the Catholic university is no longer being a beacon of Christ’s light in the world, but a harbinger of secular values and goods. It’s a competition on the university playground of “anything you can do I can do better”. Catholic universities lose their identities because they try to become “like the other kids,” their peers, in order to fit in and have a say in higher education’s affairs. Instead of embracing their own identities (e.g., Jesuitism), though, nothing is influenced
because they’re exactly the same: How can a Catholic university be in relationship with “other” schools when the name “Catholic” has nothing, or almost nothing, to do with its original meaning? There is no Otherness. As the student-teacher relationship produces infinity in constant dialogue, there is not any production of infinity here (chapter two) because Catholic schools merely imitate others rather than express their uniquenesses. For instance, Jesuit schools do not promote the Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm, a model for classroom pedagogy, rather, they permit their faculty members to make up their own methods. Insofar as there exists multiple ways of teaching and learning, it is not really a problem. The problem is the spirit of the root cause, which is again the thirst for autonomy: to make one’s way in the world. Prestige and pleasure contribute to power as the fulcrum around which power rotates. The ability to choose one’s place in the sun is founded on the ego’s desire for self-preservation, the same situation Catholic schools found themselves in post-WWII. In order to attract more students, as noted in chapter one, schools adjusted to and embraced secular values (e.g., professionalism) negating their own Catholic identities. Thus, Catholic education needs a stepping stone, an intermediary to help it reclaim its roots. Maritain’s philosophy of education begins this reconstruction since it represents the Catholic pedagogical application of Levinas’s intersubjective ethic.

Having explained how the three major intentionalities work to push Catholic universities away from themselves, I will now further explicate how these intentionalities form under Maritain’s sociologism misconception with reference to outcomes-based education and are challenged by holistic education.
Of all the misconceptions of education, sociologism is revisited by Maritain more than any other. Rooted in a philosophy of behaviorism, again, sociologism treats the person as a mechanistic command-and-response vessel. One is merely a stimuli to be given impulses to memorize and act on command. The human being is nothing more than a machine that does what I want when I say. One is a complete product of one’s environment, predetermined by all environmental factors. How these environmental factors come about is not discussed, nor is it of any interest to Levinas or Maritain. The point is the exterior, in this case the environment, educates me, and in this education my selfhood is formed by others.

Specifically for Levinas, environment is anything exterior to the self be it rocks, food, or a house. The option to consume such things—whether literally in the mouth as food, or as a skipping stone for my pleasure, or adopting a house for shelter—is always present to things “not me”. Another person, however, is the exception because of the face-to-face encounter as explained in chapter two. Once more, the encounter is a unique happening whereby I interact with another person in her humanity and vulnerability. This humanity is sacred, and so I cannot just do as I please as I do with everything else (houses, etc.). In other words, she calls my freedom into question, that is, my ability to choose is checked with relational boundaries. I cannot “murder” her, that is, prevent her from existing as she is, and so her humanity is respected in welcoming (receiving) her existence in discourse. Discourse, or, conversation is the main content of our interaction. The language (literal words, also gestures) of discourse reaches out like a bridge to the
Other such that she remains herself and I remain myself. Although she is exterior to me, I have access to her world through discourse and so new possibilities for knowledge come about. She shares things with me of which I previously had no understanding, thus, with Maritain’s pedagogical support, I grow and become more fully human.

Similarly for Maritain, environment is learning environment: the exterior that admits of all the people, places, and things I encounter. In the context of his third definition of education as formal schooling, we begin to see once more how the layers of life itself and university learning parallel and influence each other. Like Levinas, he holds life is a learning endeavor because of all the things one encounters and learns through experiences. To say I am a strict product of this learning environment, however, would be to say I am the same as my experiences. Surely one is not the same after any number of both unique and ubiquitous experiences, but Maritain’s point is that one is not bound by anything external to oneself in choosing how to respond to these experiences. I may have responded to the face a thousand times, but one day I choose not to for any number of reasons.

Unlike sociologism, students have a will that permits them to choose how they will respond to their situations (inwardly or outwardly) without any pretense or coercive influence. Students are not free when they are at the mercy of their environment, as though their environment has control over every aspect of their inner lives. It does not. The will is a mysterious part of the human person in Maritain’s philosophy that is the core of freedom where choices are made and which can never be fully corrupted to the point of no return. Maybe some moral philosophers would debate this point, but what
matters is freedom and the will are the base principles of action because with freedom I can choose my activities (*energeia*) and direct them with the will. Maritain does not attempt to explain how this process works, instead he takes it for granted in the process of explaining the student-teacher relationship. His philosophy, then, is a reflection of what happens when the seven misconceptions of education, or violations of human dignity, are removed from the learning situation. What follows is a respect for the dignity of the student, teacher, and student-teacher relationship as it would play out in non-totalitarian learning environment.

As previously mentioned, sociologism aligns with the *homo economicus* philosophy of the modern Catholic university in treating people as products. The theological educators of chapter one understood this problem, but they lacked the fundamental approach to the student and language. Should American Catholic higher education return once more to the question of what is best for the student, and not best for the administration, it would have the same problems Phelan, O'Connell, and Murray were articulating in their arguments for college and university level theology within the current frameworks for how to think of Catholic higher education. Hence why Levinas is a necessary addition to the conversation, but he alone is not sufficient to guarantee the Catholicity of any Catholic university. It needs Catholic theological underpinnings, both ethical and intellectual, hence Maritain.

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518 One could argue I am being too strict here as the teachers were looking out for their students’ best interest. I’m focusing on the fact that the university relationship is predicated on the fundamental pedagogical relationship before any outside influence, be it curriculum or mission, even though these have their place, too, as previously discussed.
Before commenting on him to close this chapter with remedies for the Catholic university, I will comment briefly on the outcomes model as promised in chapter three, and the Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm as promised in chapter four. The outcomes model of learning matches the spirit of sociologism and the modern Catholic university. Outcomes are goals assigned at the beginning of a course or program for the learner to obtain by its end. For example, “applying ethical theories to business analysis” is one possible outcome of a course on business ethics. As the means of obtaining this end are near infinite, there is no one style of teaching in outcomes-based education (OBE). So long as a mere attempt is made, the outcomes could be conceivably achieved. Because achievement is predicated on quantitative analysis (e.g., exam scores), students are more easily compared to others and classified according to grading scales. The question is not “did the student grow?,” rather, “did the student reach a certain score?” which implies the student now has knowledge. The results are proof for the administration, teacher, etc., that learning took place whatever tole the teacher played. OBE sees the teacher as more of an overseer, one who need not have input in the learning process should one not wish it. Researchers who would prefer, opposite those above, to do nothing but research and not teach have the option of sitting back and allowing students to pursue knowledge at their benefit or peril. Granted there are benefits to this approach, namely, forcing students to take responsibility for their learning and consequently their lives. The OBE model often utilizes skills, as mentioned above, to “secure” the goodness of education,

519 Outcomes-based education is an example of the open-ended nature of pluralism gone awry, whilst the Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm is an example of Catholic education in accords with a Levinasian-Maritainian philosophy.
but to not learn in an OBE setting is to put one’s job potential and future on the line. Interpersonal, professional, and life skills are part and parcel of OBE’s desire to measure everything. One obtains a skill when one is able to demonstrate it in a concrete capacity for the course or program. Achieving the outcome obtains the desired results, and the results are usually these skills in order to go out and make a living. These skills and their attainment are not entirely opposed to the holistic education of something like the Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm, except the latter is more about making a life.

The Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm (IPP) is an open-ended learning model consisting of five steps ultimately leading students to faithful citizenry. The first step is context or where students existentially find themselves. Learning is more than just rote memorization or the conquest of a goal. It is an encounter with an external source to oneself and exchanging resources in discourse. Students are not always ready for said discourse due to personal and intellectual holdups, so teachers are aware of needs, concerns, and obstacles to learning. Often these inner struggles are rooted in the second step, experience, which is an interior feel for someone or something. Experience in the IPP is more than just something which happens to me. It’s a grasping of what I encounter —how does it affect me? how does it affect others? why does it affect us in these ways? Affect plays a major role in the encounter, and this question of affect is key to the third step: reflection. Ignatian spirituality is predicated in large part on the dialectic of good and bad spirit. Without going into too much detail, good and bad spirit are akin to angels and demons. St. Ignatius believes they guide us behind the scenes (the spirit of things) towards God or evil. Reflection is the main way we tap into experiences, be they
intimately personal or academic, by going over how such experiences make us feel. How one feels or responds to something indicates one’s inner reality. When dissected, experience and feeling give way to deeper insights, such as personal and universal sources of meaning. When answering questions, for example, students realize they are implicated in the answers, and so the meaning changes according to how deep they are willing to descend. Once an answer is settled on, the fourth step begins.

“Action” is the interior change brought about by a considered encounter with an outside source. It can be as simple as a change in attitude to a lifestyle alteration. There is not any limit to what one can or cannot do, the point is the student walks away changed. Thus, the final step in evaluation, the process of asking how the rest of the process went. It goes beyond intellectual recollection and contribution because evaluation considers the whole person, not only one or two outcomes. Students ask how well they learned and how the process can or could be better executed. This evaluation incorporates mind, body, and spirit, hence the IPP’s classification as a form of holistic education, much like Maritain’s pedagogy. Yet, what makes the IPP particularly suitable for dialogue with Maritain is the notion of *docta pietas*, that is, learned devotion.

Learned devotion combines faith and study, another way of speaking about faith and reason in *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, orienting the student towards God. It is not opposed to pastoral concerns at the expense of a rigorous academic education for it is in academic studies believers obtain the necessary credentials to change the world. It unites the Augustinian/Thomistic debacle in chapter one by putting into practice the argument favoring neo-restorationism. OBE, however, need not apply a convivial care for one’s
students so long as there is demonstrable proof of knowledge. The IPP adds an extra but necessary step for Catholic education by including the intersubjective element because Catholicism naturally concerns itself with charity. Educational practices as these are very much in favor of a rigorous academic upbringing clearly not opposed to pastoral theology even building it into the curriculum. Fr. Claude Pavur, too, has argued in his book In the Spirit of St. Ignatius that authentic Jesuit education (*docta pietas*) is the 16th century’s version of “best practices” ordered with philosophy and theology at the head of the curriculum.

In accord with the IPP, theology is knowledge of one’s Creator, and philosophy is the handmaiden helping one attain it. Without these “captains” to guide the ship of Catholic education through rough pedagogical seas, she would sink in a hapless Charybdis beneath the waves of secularism.

At the relational level, classical liberal arts education is trying to prevent spiritual alienation from oneself, others, and the world. The IPP puts the student into dialogue with all these things, and the teacher is the guide who must in-turn respect the process and the student him/herself. The gospel, aside from containing the message of faith, prohibits mistreatment of the neighbor. Surely the student is our neighbor, the one in need established in chapter two, and we teachers the stewards of their care. It is the teacher to whom the student comes with problems, complaints, and questions. What makes Levinas and Maritain cooperate is their conviction that the Other is my neighbor and my teacher. In the university, the classroom teacher is the agent whereby the student “encounters” oneself, experiences oneself as Other, and works out one’s relationship to

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520 Fr. Claude Pavur, *In the School of Ignatius: Studious Zeal and Devoted Learning* (Chestnut Hill, MA: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2019). Remember Maritain also places philosophy and theology at the top.
oneself and one’s place in the world. On the one hand, dynamism is the power within
the student to direct oneself towards ends of one’s own choosing. The student could
choose to abandon any sense of service or building up of one’s locality for one’s own
purposes. Here the student is potentially ignorant of the best ends for oneself, or refuses
to pursue them.

On the other hand, in being open to change (formation), the self-encounter is like a
mirror where one sees one’s virtues and flaws and reflects how to best begin overcoming
them. In the university, this process does not happen without any contact between a
student and classroom material at the behest of the teacher. Teachers force students,
usually through the threat of poor grades, to read texts and write papers they normally
would not think or care to read and write. Yet, most often students find themselves better
for having “suffered” through difficult material. Recall the discussion of the production
of infinity in chapter two. The student’s Otherness challenges the teacher’s own
interpretations and teachings in dialogue, a giving and receiving of information between
sameness and Otherness, except here it is within the student’s own psyche. The student is
having a conversation with him/herself through the material, the author of the texts, and
the teacher. In this exchange the real work of formation begins.

It is important to note that I am, again, marking the teacher as sameness because the
teacher is a “fully-formed self” so to speak. The teacher went through the process of
learning how to think and act as a responsible citizen in the Christian faith. The student
is in formation and also an arrival who disrupts this selfhood via said dialogue. It is easy

521 Or could be. Maritain’s dynamism is flexible here.
to speak this way philosophically, but in the classroom, it is not that simple, and here we see why Levinas needs Maritain: the roles reverse. The teacher is Other to the student, too, challenging the student’s own thoughts whilst building up their knowledge base.\footnote{522} The vantage point is different, but the situation the same. The student and teacher learn from each other.\footnote{523} Students and teachers are interacting in such a way that there is a discourse whereby a learning community in the classroom is created. It is not the Heideggerian/Hesburghian/Thomistic model’s version of learning how to be a professional in some capacity. Rather, it is akin to the face-to-face encounter, a stepping stone away from OBE, related pedagogies, and their institutional structures.

Having discussed examples of what’s wrong in outcomes-based education, what’s right about the Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm, and dignity in the student self-encounter, I will now turn to Maritain in applying his pedagogy to rehabilitate the Catholic university.

*Maritain and the Medicine for Catholic Universities*

In essence, the rehabilitation of Catholic higher education has at least five components, which I will briefly elaborate below.\footnote{524} First, the re-situation of dignity in students and teachers through their personhood, not *homo economicus*. Maritain’s philosophy pits the care of learning against the external interests of the university (prestige, etc.), and so doing resituates the understanding of what it means to be a

\footnote{522} Levinas makes it clear he is only considering the encounter from the self’s vantage point and what I owe the Other, not what the Other owes me.

\footnote{523} I am using the teacher as focal point because, as I will clarify in chapter five, it is the faculty member whom (aside from God) the Catholic university ought to revolve.

\footnote{524} Objections will be responded to in the final chapter.
university. Second, the non-totalitarian nature of education by which we mean the freedom to be oneself, albeit in a Christian context. Totalitarian education prohibits the becoming fully human requisite of a theocentric-humanistic education. To become human, an exemplar in the teacher is an utmost necessity to aid the student’s lived understanding of faithful citizenship, which can only happen when teachers are free to be Catholic in a Catholic university. Third, theology at the heart of the university. While “more theology” is not the only aspect of education, it is certainly the core of a Catholic one supported through the strange agreement between Fr. Hesburgh and Pope St. John Paul II. Fourth, intellectual labor and growth go together. Labor is not simply a matter of technical skill, but interior development. The more character, or close to character one has, the more adaptable one is to the changing marketplace and world. One is not dependent on a certain skill that may be outdated or underused with the creation of new technology. Last, learning itself takes precedence over all other activities. There is a place for sport, high academic achievement (to the point of fame), and a university “living its own life,” but not to the point of heresy or a theological double life. One cannot profess Catholicism and make institutional choices antithetical to it without compromising one’s identity, ethic, and faith. Helping professors help students as they are in themselves is the only way up and out of contemporary Catholic higher education’s obsession with itself. It was made for God and neighbor, not the ego.

Skilled-based education is, again, not something Maritain is opposed to when appropriate. I remind the audience he does not despise Dewey’s pragmatism when it

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525 Which is not to say specialization is not needed, only that one need not be a specialist to make a living for oneself or one’s family.
genuinely helps education (e.g., encouraging action), what he despises is scientism because it limits spiritual insight or rejects it. Outcomes and skills-based education do the same thing at a relational level: they give students the concrete knowhow they actually need, except they can develop these skills any time in life, but students may not be able to pursue projects of personal interest in the same way. One example is, of course, his notion of contemplation. Going inward to consider deeper truths about existence and oneself necessarily leads the student to greater insight about God as both are God’s creation. This insight (similar to the reflection pillar of the Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm) lifts one to creative heights in becoming a person for the Other, one who always responds to the plight of the Other. In the Catholic university, the root of action and response is charity, which the teacher first demonstrates for students in giving of his/her resources. Of course, even the teacher is limited in knowledge, but there is a respect for him/her as the expert and authority. It is questionable how much respect is shown teachers today given their apparent secondary status in the university. As I said before, universities expect and prefer research over teaching, yet the Catholic philosophical-anthropological principle (being made in God’s image and likeness—dignity) overrides any kind of disrespect shown towards teachers. A Catholic university could prioritize research, except we are back to the problems of *homo economicus* which Maritain outright avoids. Instead of reducing the teacher to a publication machine, and

\[526\] Employers prefer on-the-job training so their workers know how to do their jobs right.

\[527\] Reminding us of the Jesuit maxim to be a man (woman) for others.
the student to a necessary evil for employment, proper respect phases into contemplation
around democracy.

Historically, the Catholic Church has not always supported democracies. It was not
until Vatican II and the rise of Western autocracies that the Church “conceded” that self-
rule is not a bad thing. Maritain anticipates such a position in his education lectures.

Freedom for Maritain, as outlined in chapter three, is self-determination—not the
freedom to do as one pleases, but the freedom to do what is right of one’s own accord.
Thus Maritain’s association of liberal arts and democracy. The essence of liberal arts is
to promote freedom (the free man), and freedom is promoted in democracy, which in turn
promotes the free citizen. It is not to say one is not “free” under monarchy, etc., but that
there is a certain inner movement present when the two align. Liberal arts education has
a goal of inner freedom, democracy of exterior freedom. One can freely elect one’s
officials, impeach them if necessary, and challenge unjust laws. There’s a freedom
present to do as one wishes within the limits of moral and civil law. The same is true for
Maritain's theocentric humanism: freedom to think as one likes when one likes. There
are, however, dangers to both. The election of unsuited officials to public office and the
election of poor ideas to guide one’s life. Both result in totalitarianisms of government
and spirit, hence the revolving of university education around wisdom (philosophy and
theology) mentioned in chapter three. The goal, of course, is to become fully human, and
for the Catholic university humanity is fully embodied in Jesus Christ. The remedy
Maritain brings is to unite all three streams of education from chapter one into one

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528 Education as any process by which I learn, the shaping of youth, and university instruction.
whole by putting the faculty in charge of pedagogy.\textsuperscript{529} Recall Pope St. John Paul II’s words from \textit{Ex Corde Ecclesiae}: “Christians among the teachers are called to be witnesses and educators of authentic Christian life” (§22). When the university supports such endeavors, the faculty have all the more joy living their vocations similar to leisure. When not, we phase back into \textit{homo economicus} abusing both student and faculty.

The problem is whether university education teaches (trains?) students to seek truth and right or a utilitarian end. No question there is some utility. Any major can be used for any number of jobs given the right combination of student personality and third party skillset (e.g., internships), but then the utility is not the goal, rather, it is the labor market. The issues with liberal education are actually issues with the global market economy. If the market was structured in such a way that American student loans were not worth $1.2 trillion crippling student confidence in living a healthy life, then the liberal arts would not need defending. They would just be part of life, and that is Maritain’s point. Liberal education’s end is leisure because leisure does not simply mean “freedom from labor”\textsuperscript{530}. It means freedom from economic collapse, freedom to self-develop at one’s pace, not the pace of the economy. Granted anyone could lose work at any time, but that kind of anxiety cannot breed a free citizen because fear is never free.\textsuperscript{531} Catholic universities add

\begin{quote} \textsuperscript{529} Compared to numerous administrations’ conglomeration of businessmen and women without any experience in higher education aside from having been to college. \textsuperscript{530} The problem is life gets in the way (careers, families, etc.) and students could conceivably not have a chance to focus their energies in this way with university resources. The proper acclimation towards life is more than labor for its own sake, it is personal cultivation. Given a globalized atmosphere, most universities prefer to “teach” students how to survive by making themselves marketable rather than good people (generally) with a set of universal morals and flexible skills. \textsuperscript{531} “There is no fear in love, but perfect love drives out fear.” 1 John 4:18 (NASB) \end{quote}
to the anxiety when they lack faith in the liberal arts’s power to breed truth for we know it is the truth that sets us free. To actively enjoy and take pleasure in truth (alongside my obligation to others) is the gold standard of the free citizen. The Church always defends the theological truth against heresy, and when this material is not communicated in any meaningful way, \textsuperscript{532} citizenship is impeded either through encyclopedic inculcation or nursery accommodation. \textsuperscript{533} Simply knowing facts is not enough to warrant thought, and the lack of information does not produce mastery of material, hence the student is not free. In lacking the “meat” to chew, Catholic universities nurture students for survival instead of self-propelled learning and adaptation. Their role as the principle agent of learning is shrunk. The remedy, then, is to concretely teach not only Catholic theology (and all arts) at a deeper level, but in a manner consistent with the dignity of the person—neither \textit{homo economicus}, nor totalitarianism both of which uproot dignity.

The dignity of the student begins in his/her personhood. As per Maritain’s mention of Plato, the student is not a representation of some abstract ideal in my mind or the realm of the Forms. The student is a concrete being, a person, immediately in front of me making a moral command on some aspect of my being. In the classroom, it is my attention and full effort to communicate a lesson. Until the student’s inner life is touched, learning generally does not happen except on a surface memorization level. And then, fear of punishment over not “learning” damages potential for contemplation on the matters at hand. Education is about freedom, the spontaneity to grow at whim according

\textsuperscript{532} For example, Marquette University offers only one mandatory theology course to undergraduates.

\textsuperscript{533} As with chapter three, the former is a lack of depth from too much information (random facts), the latter a lack of depth from a lack of information (no material).
to one’s interests and the demands of the teacher for the course, a delicate balance between person (spirit) and individual (matter)—what one wants to learn and what one needs to learn. Upsetting this balance are the extremes of anarchical education and despotic education mentioned in chapter three. Anarchical education focuses solely on the individual’s ego similar to Heidegger. It eliminates any notion of sacrifice and denial of oneself to benefit others or one’s education. Despotic education is the opposite, negating the individual in making all like copies similar Heidegger’s sameness (as called by Levinas). Student docility towards love of truth, justice, and good are completely destroyed following a philosophy of *homo economicus*. Doing work exceptionally well for its own sake or for one’s personal development is a foreign concept as labor means only, or almost only, the profits necessary for survival. Charity (compassion) for the Other is wiped out, negating the teacher’s very existence.

Without charity, humanistic teaching and learning are not possible because personhood matters is intertwined with the course material and relationship. Teachers often present material from the heart, offering their truest thoughts on sensitive, controversial matters not to hurt students, but to help them grow. Confrontation with difficult subject matter can aid students in dealing with many of life’s inner blows (e.g., setbacks) as far as character development is concerned. Students need the charity of the professor to help them understand, as much as possible, “how life works” outside the classroom, that there is more to life than earning a paycheck. It is the freeing of bad energy necessary to awaken the spiritual within. As with the Ignatian Pedagogical

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534 There is some room for meaningful work, albeit a rather low level.
Paradigm, Maritainian pedagogy fosters unity of mind, body, and spirit, the core of any holistic education. Pope St. John Paul II puts it as “combin[ing] excellence in humanistic and cultural development with specialized professional training” (§23). Specialized training is not the enemy, again, except when it is the center of attention. Marquette University, for example, in nearly eliminating all of its core classes in the humanities to take a professionalized approach is an affront to holism, not the inclusion of some “skills courses” or business majors. The latter can certainly benefit from a humanistic education helping young businesspeople understand the value of human life, placing it above even the desire to make as much profit as one can. Pluralistic positions, however, imbalance holistic Catholic higher education to despotism or anarchy in the quest for prestige, power, and pleasure, the opposites of mind, body, and spirit. These latter traits provide the foundations for the Catholic university in three ways: 1) a collective body of knowledge is grown and propagated in accords with the Catholic intellectual tradition, 2) there are tiers of knowledge with philosophy and theology at the top, 3) teaching is the core of the university because of its responsibility for the students’ faith and citizenship.

Having laid out the basic return to orthodox Catholic higher education via Maritain, I will conclude with a response to objections and cleaning up of loose ends in my argument.
VI. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSION

In a sentence, Catholic education is the ethical relation of the student and teacher in a mode of faith in accords with the teaching authority of the Holy See. Its primary purposes are to form morally upright citizens in the Catholic faith with an eye to their personal development as pertains their private and communal pursuits. I want to conclude this dissertation with responses to common objections to my position and thereby clean up argumentation. First, I will summarize the argument. Then, I will explain what this Catholic university looks like. Next, I will respond to major objections and dialogue with several other fields whilst clarifying my argument. Finally, I will survey where this research takes us.

Summary

Chapter one was a brief summary of the major players, documents, and theological controversies surrounding the nature of the Catholic university with emphasis on the American university. The documents discussed therein were, of course, written for all Catholic schools, and apply to the United States. Longinqua and Testem Benevolenciae respectively considered Pope Leo XIII’s concerns about democratic principles replacing morality and theological liberalism. These issues are tied to the Augustinian/Thomist debate on the purpose of the Catholic university and theology’s place in the curriculum. Augustinianism argues theology ought to be more of an apologetic to help the faithful defend and live the Catholic faith, whereas Thomism argues theology ought to be more of an intellectual enterprise. This debate arose in part
because of increased lay interest in deeper theological matters. The laity’s needs were not being met in course material, nor were many teachers prepared to offer new lessons. This turn of thought lead to a pre-cursor to the Land O’Lakes Statement in Fr. John Tracy Ellis’s Catholics and the Intellectual Life, which spurned material poverty and “ghetto mentality” as the root causes of Catholic laziness in pursuing academic greatness.

Coupled with it are neo-Thomism’s unsatisfactory record with lay desires for serious consideration of affectivity and experience in their studies, and secularization (later laicization) of Catholic schools to the detriment of Vatican relations.

The actual Land O’Lakes Statement (LOL) is the major milestone in separation from the Vatican. Its very first sentence declares the full modernity of the Catholic university with the following sentence absolving itself from any and all authority outside academic community. Even philosophy is described as “imperialism” and ought not interfere with the goings-on of other fields. The student-teacher relationship is brought to the fore in describing students as autonomous in a way akin to the authority-free Catholic university, free to decide for themselves what is right and how. Students will think what they want anyway, but teachers are given free rein so as to teach anything they like without reference to Catholic faith, morals, or values. LOL represents the broader definition of Fr. Hesburgh’s vision of the Catholic university. He takes it a step further arguing for a state charter whereby the Catholic university is separate from the Vatican as a corporation. Professionalization (academic excellence leading to research production) is the heart of faculty activity. Teachers are teacher-scholars whose job is to output high
amounts of scholarship, not instruct youth in how best to live and learn. The documents following LOL, though, disagree with him in several key ways.

The Kinshasa Statement holds the same basic positions as LOL, except it affirms Church authority. The Rome Statement mentions the student-teacher relationship founded on three principles: trust, students as co-creators of knowledge, and the application therein as creating charity. Nowhere in LOL is charity mentioned. The Catholic Church in the Modern World supports academic excellence, but drops the “modern” aspect of the university. Last, apostolic constitution Ex Corde Ecclesiae lays out the basic structure of the Catholic university as concerns academic excellence, its mission, the student-teacher relationship, and the purpose of Catholic education. In particular, students are “apprentices” to the moral exemplars of the teachers who are understood to be more than mere instructors in their fields. They are bastions of virtue who lead and guide students along the ways of life, not only academic knowhow. It significantly contrasts with LOL’s take on teachers as independent from the mission and integrity of the school, teaching absolutely anything at any time, with students being as autonomous, free to guide themselves along whichever path they see fit.

Thus, we conclude the first chapter with reference to restorationism and pluralism. Restorationism hearkens us back to a pre-Vatican II relationship with the Holy See on matters of doctrinal and moral authority, maintaining the Catholic university is part of the Church. (I used the image of a peninsula to illustrate my point.) Franciscan University of Steubenville most keenly represents this position. Pluralism, however, represents an interpretation of post-Vatican II relations with the Holy See, holding the
university is entirely separate from the Church, doing whatever it pleases when it pleases it in a spirit of complete independence. (I used the image of an island.) Any number of schools are pluralistic, Duquesne University referenced as one example. These distinctions in orientation towards the Vatican end our historical chapter and lead us into the philosophies used to argue in favor of the student-teacher relationship at the foundation of the Catholic university. I will be briefer in my treatment of these here.

Chapter two introduces Emmanuel Levinas’s self-Other relationship. Edmund Husserl’s creation of phenomenological method is predicated on his concept of intentionality, the idea that conscious experience is directed towards objects in the world. His student, Martin Heidegger, picks up this idea and applies it to human existence (the experience of being alive on earth) as concerns the self’s making its way in the world. Levinas, then, studies with both and strongly disagrees with the place of Husserl’s intentionality in the experience of the human encounter and with Heidegger’s overall project to reduce other people to nodes in my quest for self-fulfillment in the “totalities” of my life projects. In particular, Levinas notices both Husserl and Heidegger forget to discuss the role of pleasure. Levinas’s organization of the self, without reference to others, is thus predicated on enjoyment of life and “finding one’s place in the sun”. The problem with this layout, however, is that other people exist. For Levinas, the encounter with the Other (the one who is not me) tosses this organization of my world up in the air because I am now forced to make room for her.

The essential ideas flowing from this encounter are metaphysical desire, the face, and infinity. Desire is the longing for relationship with the Other. Once encountered, I
have an insatiable longing for the Other such that I want to be associated with her for reasons Levinas does not fully explain, partly because it is connected to his idea of the face. The face, for Levinas, is the vulnerable, bare, impoverished humanity of another person irreducible to representational knowledge. It is what I encounter when my daily tasks are interrupted by a person in need (e.g., a beggar catches me off guard). This need, however, is infinite in nature because my needs are constantly overflowing from one moment to the next, and I am never satisfied. I fill my stomach, but I later become hungry, etc. At a relational level, the Other is in constant need of response to fulfill her needs, both material and spiritual, however they manifest. My obligation, then, is to ever respond and be ready to respond to the Other in any way I can. What complicates this encounter is the “third party” or everyone else outside this one-on-one relationship between self and Other. The third party can also be considered society. All are privy to the relationship insofar as they are readily available to receive anything I have to offer. I can easily choose to provide anyone else what I am offering to the individual other. The question of sharing resources is a question of justice—who deserves what? How do I decide? These questions directly connect to- and impact the student-teacher relationship.

The student is conceived as a kind of beggar, one who is at the mercy of the teacher responding to her needs. It may sound like a power dynamic: the teacher has the “power” to do as she pleases over the student. That is true at a certain level, but ethics being what it is—a check on power—the teacher will not be inclined to respond in some

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535 One could imagine it is because she completes me in some fashion.
ways over others.\textsuperscript{536} Given what the teacher provides is knowledge, or a means to knowledge, the primary response is to the student’s spiritual poverty.\textsuperscript{537} The student has some immaterial need requiring fulfillment—skills (vocational) training, thirst for knowledge, or some life goal education can be the means to accomplish—and the teacher responds to that need in the classroom and outside it in things like office hours. These settings provide the opportunity for conversation (the bridge between my sameness and the student’s Otherness) and relationship to take place. If not, teachers and the universities risk “starving” the students of wisdom. Hence, a liberal arts education is the best means to obtain such an endeavor.

Jacques Maritain, in chapter three, champions the liberal arts education cause arguing it is the best means by which to combat political- and pedagogical totalitarianism. In short, education itself has three definitions and is at root about shaping citizens, obtaining wisdom, and becoming human. The first definition is any (lifelong) process by which I learn. Second, the shaping of young people, specifically as it applies to the family. Last, formal schooling. The definitions intertwine in our analysis and in life, but all are susceptible to what Maritain calls the seven misconceptions of education. I will not rehash their meanings, only provide the names: disregard of ends, false ideas concerning the end, pragmatism, sociologism, intellectualism (two forms), voluntarism

\textsuperscript{536} Ethics is more than a check on power, but that is how it is working here: I cannot do what I please when I please because other people matter.

\textsuperscript{537} There is also the material poverty of the student in the inability to afford school supplies, but this matter more often concerns primary- and secondary school teachers as university professors can rely on loans to pay for such things. Student homelessness and food insecurity as such are, unfortunately, outside the professor’s purview. Levinas may argue I have an infinite responsibility to the Other, he also argues the third party checks that responsibility.
(two forms), and the idea that everything can be learned. These misconceptions inhibit learning and prevent human development because they damage the inner life of the student, preventing its growth. Right education frees the student in spirit to pursue ends of her own choosing as pertains to love of truth, justice, and good. The guidelines for the teacher’s behavior and interior disposition are found in freeing the student from bad energy (frustrations) and helping them make good use of their talents. The teacher awakens the spiritual, of which Maritain means the intellect and will, by fostering unity of mind, body, and spirit.

This internal unity inspires in the student a deep contemplation about the world resulting in action, doing good for the neighbor according to one’s abilities. A respect for proper authority engenders preparation for democracy, the best form of government for liberal art learning because both champion the freedom of the individual. Education, thereby, nurtures both seeking truth and preparation for life as one adapts to new situations over one’s life with the base love of knowledge one gains in liberal learning. In turn, these motivate good citizenship, that is, participation in society in morally and legally acceptable ways (e.g., voting). Adding the Catholic university into the conversation, good citizenship embodies faithful citizenship whereby students are educated in the morals, values, and faith of Catholicism. Two inhibitions to citizenship are encyclopedic inculcation (no depth of soul from too much information) and nursery accommodation (no depth of soul from lack of information) because students are not

538 Not freedom in a Libertarian sense, rather, freedom in the sense that I can explore my talents and become what I am meant to be within a Catholic philosophical anthropology.

539 Including the good, of course.
trained in enjoyment of truth and thereby becoming agents of their own learning. How can students learn when presented with overwhelming or underwhelming amounts of information? The goal of this process is leisure because when able to pursue one’s own interests, culture is created, and culture on a sociological level founds civilization. And it all starts with the student-teacher relationship or students would not learn in such a way so as to take their place being productive in society. They learn the beginnings of a productive life in the Catholic university. Maritain’s ideal university is the collective body of human knowledge coming together to serve the human person for the above reasons. Teaching is the core of the university because it shapes student character, which in turn breeds good citizenship, but research is reserved for special institutes.

Branching off his idea of the university, chapter four reintroduces the concepts of restorationism and pluralism with an eye to resolving their dispute in neo-restorationism, the idea that a Catholic university can maintain its ties to the Vatican (and thus remain Catholic) by hiring for mission such that teachers can teach what they want since they will do it in a spirit of Christian charity. This discussion leads us to consider the idea that teachers are “independent” in the sense that they have dignity as persons existing outside the university. Once members, however, this dignity has gone aside in that harder and harder demands are made on them for purposes of production, etc. to the point of burnout. This situation in turn creates a crisis of identity: Are Catholic universities places of research, teaching, both, or something else? There is a tension in the student-teacher relationship for how much the teacher is to respond, thus reminding us of the tension in the Levinasian third party and the question of justice. This question prompts
us to look at the (unjust) intentionalities of the Catholic university in prestige, pleasure, and power. Catholic universities have for many decades now focused on higher national rankings from sports teams to research article output to the detriment of teaching, learning, and the health of its professoriate and student body. It filters into a return discussion on sociologism, the most pernicious of the misconceptions because it reduces the student to a biological organism reacting to its environment. As the goal of any creature is survival, Catholic education adopted an outcomes-based assessment strategy pitting heartfelt learning against checking off boxes in a businesslike pedagogy. Ignatian pedagogy and the notion of self-encounter were offered in opposition, reclaiming the student-teacher relationship as a personal-spiritual encounter. We concluded with the proposed “medicine” for the Catholic university in a return to said relationship, theocentric-humanistic education with theology at the heart of the university, the coupling of intellectual labor and personal growth, and finally learning first among all university activities. With this summary complete, I will now respond to objections.

On the Way to the Ideal Catholic University

One might ask how much I, or anyone, can reasonably do about today’s major educational issues. I do not deny the seriousness of this objection. It is common for teachers to reach out multiple times to students in an attempt to engage them and the student simply does not respond. There is a realistic limit here for responsibility. When I say “infinite responsibility,” I mean classroom responsibility. The learning, the teaching, the interaction. For example, entire classroom lesson preps can fall apart when a student asks a question related to course material catching the teacher off guard. Typically we
want to structure our courses, our days, our years according to a schedule. But life has a way of happening that it all falls apart, or can fall apart. The teacher is not responsible for the students’ behavior, but the teacher no question influences it. Classroom control is a thing, but structurally it comes back to the I-Other relation and how these subjects integrate.

The essence is that teaching is not a day job, something you can take off like a coat at the end of a long day. It follows you. You answer emails, phone calls, write recommendations, grade papers all after hours. You can pay the bills, yes, but not with as much comfort (usually) as many other fields. You are responsible for others even after you put your office hours in. Notice the interaction between the concrete and abstract. I am speaking about a broader relationship (I-Other) in the context of a real student and teacher using concrete examples. Here presented is another reason why Levinas and Maritain must be able to work together to get Catholic higher education back on track.

It may be argued against me that a question bearing directly on my use of Maritain and Levinas is that it is a superfluous step in the process of reimagining, reexamining, and restructuring the Catholic university. What is needed is, after all, a return to the way things were without “bringing the pope” back into the schools so that the faculty are free to think what they think and students to believe what they believe. We are not “in the Dark Ages” after all. We must continue to drive forward the process of progress for the benefit of all.

To this objection I reply it is exactly what Fr. Hesburgh and his party was arguing from the beginning. They say schools are only good when they are “free” from
authoritative strictures, and these strictures put on them by the Vatican deplete their energy stores such that they cannot but explode in defiance of their being placed in theological “boxes” so to speak. As I dissected section 8 of the Land O’Lakes Statement (LOL), the student-teacher relationship is not Catholic there because it does not uphold Catholic morals, values, and theology. These are essential for a university to call itself Catholic because it is what is taught, and what is taught is predicated on a relationship because without relationship teaching does not occur. The Catholic university was only in the “Dark Ages” when it lost its identity as a result of such rambunctious testimony of false leaders to the power and freedom over one’s own conscience. No doubt it was Protestant in its roots, but I related it Husserl and Heidegger because of the phenomenological manifestation of greed in the quest for prestige, power, and the pleasure of being admired by one’s peers. “Bringing the pope” into the Catholic university isn’t any different than making room for the moral authority one claims by default in professing Catholicism. It is not like the pope is ruling with an iron fist. Pope St. John Paul makes this clear in Ex Corde Ecclesiae.

The notes on Canon Law which he quotes are not saying one cannot have non-Catholics, only non-Catholics of poor lifestyle choices and Catholic theologians who do not support Church teaching. The latter is their mirroring the concern of the 19th century American bishops in commanding Catholic parishes to erect Catholic schools to negate any Protestant and therefore salvific quandaries. Recall Pope Leo XIII worry over theological liberalism. It all comes true in the American 1960s. Progress came to a screeching halt because the inverse became reality: being Catholic at a Catholic school
was no longer relevant or tolerable because “orthodox” or “traditional” Catholic theology (even on basic matters) meant a “closed mind” to all other points of view, the erectors of LOL believed was against the spirit of Vatican II’s openness to dialogue with modernity. What Levinas and Maritain can help us do is redirect those old energies into renewal by establishing what the problem was all along: the ethical relationship in the student-teacher relationship to effect the university would not exist without it and that these parties are universally affected and effected by every decision made by administrations and their boards. Adjust to the student-teacher relationship and you are indirectly fixing the entire institution because no decision affecting it is without notice, similar to how changes in water quality can be detected by even a single drop.

In this way, Levinas and Maritain are a mediating step in the process because they directly affect and effect the social and institutional structures making the university possible at all levels—student, faculty, staff, administrative. As pointed out in chapter two, Levinas’s I-Other relationship is abstract, yet takes place in concrete socio-cultural settings as Maritain’s philosophy establishes. One might wonder why would I exclude English residential colleges or German research universities from my study, aside from want of space. The answer is because the student-teacher relationship is universal. Misconduct at an American university would be misconduct at any university, and we Catholics do believe in absolute morality. For example, slapping a student for missing a question is wrong in any culture, and totalitarianism in the classroom (e.g., propaganda) is unacceptable wherever there are learners. These socio-cultural settings—England and Germany—may also be Western, but surely no one would agree that violence of the
mind, body, or spirit is morally upright against a student anywhere at anytime. Moreover the violation of the student’s soul, an offense of dignity, is more apt at Catholic schools because they take the soul seriously. One example of a violation against the student’s dignity is, again, LOL for reasons described above.

LOL continues to have a powerful influence on American Catholic higher education. Its authors knew precisely what they were doing in articulating their vision of Catholic higher education. There may be some innocence as per their interpretation of authentically living out the decrees of Vatican II, but as chapter one has shown, there were all sorts of educational rifts bubbling to the surface. Vatican II seems more of an excuse than anything else to implement said document. Proof of this claim is Fr. Hesburgh’s presence at the International Federation of Catholic Universities (IFCU) on behalf of the United States. His ideas were eventually rejected given the documents (the ones analyzed in chapter one) coming out of the IFCU’s congresses. LOL may not be a comprehensive document, but that does not make it any less important.

*Actions*

On this note, one may object to my “mediating step” by asking what actions can actually be taken to ensure, as much as possible, the Catholic university embodies neo-restorationism? Or, how do we get it on the horizon to the reality of 21st century education? Short of reaching into the souls of administrators and actually changing their wills, I will offer seven suggestions. They proceed from the least likely, yet logically possible, to the most realistically possible.

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540 In 2017, St. Louis University hosted conference titled “A Distinctive Vision? Catholic Higher Education 50 Years after Land O’Lakes”.
First, whether separate or in combination, administrations and university presidents simply fire everyone impeding the Catholic mission. The extremism of this position is merited only by its possibility. Presidents cannot really “fire” anyone without due process, that is, a serious investigation into the perceived wrongdoing of a faculty or administrator. Nor can administrators outright fire each other without the same process and a vote. Rather, firing is more of a dramatic institutional reset akin to the mental meltdowns students face at the end of the semester. The problems arising here are numerous: Who would fire themselves? Why would they do it when no one can stop them staying? Perhaps the reasons why are akin to the second suggestion in repentance.

Instead of plain leaving, one might recommend administrators repent of their ways. Acknowledgement that faculty play a crucial role in making the university work as a university (as an institution of learning and training in life) would provide the faculty with more power to do things, such as hiring whom they want to hire without needing administrative approval.\textsuperscript{541} One might even consider, in conjunction or instead of the aforementioned suggestion, removing some administrative positions altogether with the phenomenon of administrative bloat. What happens here, in this case, is the faculty would not so much receive more power or freedom, but the administrators would behave. Again, little or no interference with departmental goings-on.

The third suggestion follows the Shimer College model. Shimer was a small, four-year liberal arts school north of Chicago and has since been combined with North Central College. It was famous, in part, due to the workings of its internal government—the

\textsuperscript{541} There may be good reason why such approval is necessary, but I am referring to the trust that the administration needs for the faculty to police themselves.
faculty and students had a vote approving or disproving administrative decisions.\textsuperscript{542} It actually worked in saving the school from initially being sold before its eventual financial breakdown. The point is faculty and students can shape the school according to the Catholic mission in ways higher-ups cannot. The distinction between this suggestion and the previous one is a difference in relationship: the second puts the responsibility on the administrators, the third on the faculty and students.

The fourth suggestion offers a third way for neo-restorationism to take shape. Over time, influence of the religious Orders and their charisms have waned. Instead of strictly giving faculty and maybe students more say in university affairs, turning the tide over to the Orders themselves will set the Catholic university on sure path to academic and spiritual success. Rather than emphasizing secular values, religious Orders by default flourish in spiritual atmospheres. The introduction of spiritual practices and their benefits has a spiritual effect on the whole school. There is a presence about Catholic schools who embrace authentic Catholic spiritual practice different from their nominal counterparts. And this idea of praxis is in accords with Catholicism’s understanding of the spiritual life as per lifestyles. People with religious personalities “feel” different than those without. And so, with the universities returning to their charisms’ roots, religious Orders and faculty could work together in shaping a curriculum in accords with Catholic faith, morals, and values.

The fifth suggestion, instead of requiring religious Orders to participate, simply desires to mold the curriculum into something Catholic compatible. I return to the

\textsuperscript{542} The Shimer model is evidence that administrations are necessary in contemporary university life, but that their role need not be as prominent as it is.
Stephen Lewis situation at Franciscan University. A faithfully Catholic professor like himself is capable of filtering blasphemies in the classroom completely out or in an edifying spirit. One example is modeling how to read “bad” literature in a charitable spirit. The teacher exemplifies how to approach a text in such a way as to maximize one’s time spent and the content received. It is not always possible to do these things effectively in a curriculum designed to promote a political agenda or something other than the faithful building up of character and religious knowledge. The desire for controversial or contemporary material reflects, however, the desire for curricular change in the 1950s and 1960s as evidenced in chapter one by students demanding more humanities courses.

Supposing the students and faculty are unhappy with any of the suggestions above or the problems underlying them, a sixth alternative is a mass faculty strike. I am not sure how it would work at a larger school given the size of the endowments, but smaller colleges might fare better given their faculty size. As we see with the coronavirus pandemic, no students equals no money. Accordingly, no faculty equals no class. If the coronavirus can severely mitigate the future of many lower and middle-sized universities, imagine what faculty united under the cause of any and all things mission and identity can accomplish. Granted there would need to be serious planning and such, but the principle idea has promise even with anything and everything receiving a protest these days.

The final and perhaps most obvious of ways to apply neo-restorationism is to practice the “pre-neo” hiring of Catholic faculty. They know the faith, they practice the
faith, and they teach the faith. These are men and women striving to follow Jesus Christ in all ways in accords with Church teaching. Who better to model the pursuit of wisdom over one’s life than people living it? They respect the magisterium as per normal day-to-day activities and would never intentionally lead a student away from an unfaithful, unhealthy lifestyle. Ordinary disagreement is part of human life, and Catholic faculty have an inherent boundary (if practiced correctly) to respect where others begin and end. Students are free to make up their own minds as accords human nature and freedom, but need to respect the Catholicity of the faculty and school. What’s going on here is a constant cycling and recycling of relationship, of consistent dialogue over time about matters of universal concern to all people. The Church and her faculty take a position on these matters to the benefit of the students, guiding them along their own paths in the spirit of faith, hope, and charity.

*The Culmination of the Student-Teacher Relationship*

The student precedes the teacher in all ways in the university, not in life. Teachers have lives outside of school, but in school, the student precedes the self of the teacher. The student is the vulnerable one, exposed to the expertise of the teacher, whose mercy the student is at. This includes research and grant writing, even proposals from administrators to work on external projects. Practical considerations must be considered in the life of the teacher. Certainly spouses, children, and some external circumstances will carry more weight than the student in a given moment, but there is a special bond between student and teacher not easily found elsewhere. The student follows the teacher

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543 The question of the Other preceding the self in life is a question dealt with in chapter two to explain Levinas’s ethics, but will not be dealt with here as I wish to focus on the pedagogical relationship.
after class. Words said, thoughts expressed, emails exchanged. Letters of recommendation need written, questions need answered, and tests need taken. But the best way to go about preserving the pedagogical relationship is up for debate. The pastoral concerns of the Church filtered into the schools, and the reason the bishops forced parents to send their children to Catholic schools (on penalty of mortal sin) was on the basis of getting those souls prepared for Heaven for the sake of the Kingdom with good catechesis.

On this note, the Catholic intellectual tradition is necessary, but not sufficient. Any secular school could base itself on the material because heretofore it has shaped Western civilization. It is treated like any other set of books, except with more emphasis. The institutional Church is necessary to sustain Catholic university identity because it is necessary to have exterior authority to form a stable identity. Something outside the self (Husserl, Heidegger) offers a jumping off point, a rock to base oneself. Having oneself for a counselor is unwise as is one’s own authority. What happens when that authority is challenged? Or circumvented? One could crumble under the weight of one’s wonton inborn ignorance. I am referring to people like Thrasymachus who look only to themselves for truth, not the average citizen with surety of him/herself on a daily basis.

The Church itself believes she will never perish because she has God’s promise. The university may go under for reasons unrelated to spirituality and religion, but not the Church, and being a branch of the Church the university ties itself to that spiritual reality such that its identity and the Church’s identity are the same: Jesus Christ. Given my argument above, a Catholic university could theoretically not teach any explicitly
Catholic authors as long as the teachers instructed the students in authentic Catholic values, morals, and conduct. Realistically, I would not recommend it on a regular basis, but Stephen Lewis’s situation at Franciscan University of Steubenville is one example of how non-Catholic material can be edifying in a competent Catholic teacher’s hands.

Lewis is not one to stray from the path of Catholic intellectualism. Both endeavor to reach young people, and what we concretely teach Catholic values: individuality, humility, trust. The student gains these values by participating with the professor in classroom and office hour endeavors, as well as with one’s peers. Conversations, debates, and all kinds of exchanges exemplify the kind of person the Catholic educator is and who he/she wants the student to become. The content, the material, is the means by which such values are communicated and student character is built. Students get more out of the course and overall classroom experience the more they put into it, and so, the values are all the more reinforced. Their individuality is shaped in pursuing their own interests. Humility is forged in recognizing how much knowledge there is and the impossibility of knowing it all. Trust is engendered in being dependable—not refusing help when it is asked. These aspects are what students want more than anything.

The evidence thereof is students most often remember us as we are. Multiple times I received an end-of-semester email thanking me for my personality and what I offered. Teachers have a tendency to go beyond obligation in care for students, offering help outside of office hours in the hopes their students might benefit. The curriculum matters, albeit not in the way we think it does. It matters because the personality of teacher comes on, out, and about in the teaching. Teachers who cannot teach what they are passionate
about—within reason of the Catholic intellectual tradition (CIT)—are in a worse position than secular professors who just want to teach because they need work. The “layers” of CIT and ethics are a simplified version of what Catholic universities have complicated in the years since the *Land O’Lakes Statement*. These measures were there to make teaching easier, not more difficult, by offering a parameter to work within according to one’s specialization. For example, a philosopher working in 20th century philosophy with a choice of whom to teach in any course need not choose Maritain because he is a Thomist when choosing Levinas because of his compatibility with Catholicism works just as well. There are lessons to be had anywhere. The difference between a Catholic and non-Catholic (other Christian or secular) teacher is the spirit in which they teach.

To clarify, on the question of Catholic identity, I am siding with Pope St. John Paul II in saying the situation of non-Catholic teachers at Catholic universities is not inherently problematic. What’s problematic is what is sacrificed in the process. Oftentimes secular teachers are offered work because of their research abilities going hand-in-hand with the universities’ desires for power and prestige. Now, there are non-Catholic teachers who go above and beyond their teaching duties for the reasons laid out above, the same as Catholic teachers. They are invaluable resources insofar as they fulfill Maritain’s regimen of the moral exemplar, except that’s the problem: being a moral exemplar at a Catholic school means one presumably ought to be Catholic in order to exemplify Catholic faith, morals, and values. In light of this predicament, the awkwardness of the Holy Father’s position is made up for by the ecumenism of all the

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544 I will elaborating a problematic aspect later on.
major documents treated in chapter one of which he is privy. Each one specifies ecumenism as a pillar to the Catholic university. Whether that ecumenism includes secularism I doubt because the latter does not concern Christian unity. All the more reason for controversy—what is the secular professor’s place in Catholic schools? The Catholic professor teaches with an eye to the students’ inner development, which is not at all unethical or undesirable for the secular professor. Many a secular professor care for students as any Catholic. The issue, again, is the professor’s character and faith because course material, important in its own way, can be taught in Ignatian “bad spirit”.

Catholic teachers move past the ethical sphere into the religious. Kierkegaard argues throughout his corpus Christianity is not reducible to the ethical, but elevates us into religious life (a direct one-on-one personal relationship with God). If all teachers need to be are ethical, then most anyone will do at fulfilling any open job. Except what Catholic teachers do is not a “job,” but a vocation, a personal calling from on high that can only be responded to and fulfilled with the cooperation of grace. Teaching is more than earning a paycheck, it is a lifestyle. When that lifestyle is to represent a model for how to live in general (ECE), it takes more than “being good” to teach at a Catholic school.

To elaborate on an example in chapter four, a Catholic professor would be inclined to teach the chemical elements in a spirit of purpose—they are given us by God for our use. We glorify His creation when we use His chemicals, etc. for His glory in building and amassing goods for His people. A secular professor, in a similar lesson, might be inclined to say the universe is random, without purpose, and without meaning. Why
bother creating goods except for your pleasure? Maybe some form of Otherness or Other can benefit from it, but really, everyone is going to die and rot so why bother? A Catholic professor, again in similar situations, might gesture to how creation is a lover’s paradise because God’s presence permeates His physical creation, which is actually made up of materials knowns as chemical elements. I think the reader can understand the point I am making—Catholic professors have an inherently different take on how to approach course material and a confidence to teach it with grandeur. Of course, water molecules are always “H2O” and neither type of professor will teach any differently. But the spirit in which it is taught matters greatly, whether the teacher is strict, “mean,” or otherwise difficult to get along with. Meanness is not a prerequisite to holiness. An upright will in a spirit of compassion is.

The outline of the problem in chapter one reveals an ongoing dilemma in how to approach Catholic higher education’s evolution, whether as primarily pastoral or academic, carrying into the post-Vatican II debates surrounding the Land O’Lakes Statement, its successors, and the Church’s official decree in Ex Corde Ecclesiae. As it applies to this dissertation, Levinas gives us the base structure necessary to make personal- and institutional relationships work. Maritain puts content into the relationship to make it real. The crucial overlap is how they characterize the student-teacher relationship, both describing it as responsibility. As I laid out in chapter two, Levinas’s self-Other relationship is too bare to stand on its own, and Maritain’s philosophy provides said content whilst being compatible with Catholic theology, philosophy, and

Moral exemplarity is a prerequisite. For instance, St. Jerome was not known for being nice.
anthropology. In combining them, we see the student does not have a relationship with “the university” per se. What does it matter that the university is nominally Catholic? The student still has individual relationships with professors, and even then only a certain kind of student will flourish.

The kind of student who is docile enough to receive instruction whilst pursuing one’s own interests and remaining open to offering assistance to one’s neighbor. This student is not the Hesburghian self in the Land O’ Lakes Statement, rather the Wojtylian self of Ex Corde Ecclesiae and Levinas. One major difference between them is the manner in which this student relates to others.

The autonomous self in Heidegger, and to a lesser extent Husserl, does not engage in the kind of “letting exist” that Levinas encourages. These facts are important because they are same philosophies present in contemporary Catholic higher education today. Husserl and Heidegger parallel the early debates and Fr. Hesburgh quite well, while Levinas pairs with St. John Paul II and, as I will later show, Jacques Maritain. Husserl and Heidegger are needed not only to explain Levinas, or help to explain Levinas, but also to give ground for my argumentation as to the history and elaboration of Catholic higher education. Their phenomenologies are present in the history of Catholic education and philosophies of Catholic educators and institutions without full consciousness because these philosophies are used indiscriminately. They underlie what Catholic institutions of higher learning are trying to do, and I argue it is inherently selfish like the Heideggerian self. Levinas offers a reclamation of the self in recognition of the Other.

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546 Pope St. John Paul II’s actual name is “Karol Wojtyła,” hence the demonym “Wojtylian”.
similar to the student-teacher relationship, but he needs help because the I-Other relationship by itself is not developed enough in his work to stand alone in institutional education. Hence my inclusion of Maritain. On this note, this dissertation was borne of years of observation and struggle to understand why Catholic education is increasingly anti- and not Catholic at all. Personal experience plays a major role, but it is subjugated to the facts of history. Catholic education has (d)eveloped to the point of embracing the ethics, vocabulary, and practices of consumerist business. Even business discuss wanting to serve the customer, but the person is more than a customer, and are students are definitely people.

The problem, however, with a well-rounded person argument for education with the understanding that we are talking about universals—things that apply to all people, in all places, and at all times—is that people do not understand what that means. Minimally it means they are embedded in something bigger than themselves. There is something universal about being human, and the liberal arts are directed at forming that person. The theory of music, for example, is applicable to everyone. Why do we listen to music? How does it work? These kinds of questions aim to shape the whole person, and the primary means of doing that in the university is through independent thought.

_All Roads Lead to Rome_

Young people have to learn how to think for themselves. The problem is, to do that well one needs many humanities courses. In learning how to think, one learns how to making a living. All the emphasis on courses designed to help students form a career places an extreme limitation on their ability to creatively pursue solutions to real world
problems, something St. Ignatius espoused in his principle “contemplatives in action”.

Here, people find God in their day-to-day activities, noticing that the Lord speaks to- and interacts with us in ordinary activities, thus dignifying us and them in the process.

Students focusing only on the “outcome” of [take Noe’s research and use it for my own] their college careers for longevity in another are missing the point of what it means to be human. We are not made just to work or even mostly to work, though work is part and parcel of human existence. We are made to worship God and live in as much peaceable happiness as we can with our neighbor. Career-prep schools, of which many Catholic universities already are, do nothing but add to the already cut-and-paste niche of higher education, and the dignity of Catholic higher education is anything but copycat when its professoriate are, essentially, the Good Samaritan for their students and their peers.

What makes the Good Samaritan good is not just that he went through the motions, but his interior disposition was that of compassion. A perfectly average college or university can respect its students in ways identical or akin to the ethics presented here and still not be Catholic for the same reasons as the Catholic intellectual tradition discussion above—the relationship to the Church matters. The Incarnation, philosophical anthropology, matters. The act of mercy only goes “halfway” when done for the wrong reasons. The intention behind it matters because it shows the disposition of the heart, and the heart of the Church is Jesus Christ.

We now begin to see why St. John Paul II places such a strong emphasis on the student-teacher relationship. Not just for reasons of exemplarity, but because it is an imitation of Jesus Himself. The compassion the teacher demonstrates both in and outside
the classroom is akin to the Good Samaritan: the latter responds indiscriminately to the material poverty of the beggar, the former to the spiritual poverty of the beggar-student. The teacher concretely lives the Christian life in being the Good Samaritan for the student (the Other), which includes the possibility of—as we have discussed—teaching “forbidden” texts.

But the responsibility the teacher has for the student has its limits. The teacher is not responsible for the quality of work, plagiarism, or lateness. Students have, as demonstrated with Maritain, their own business to tend to, and the teacher is the model. These kinds of distinctions blur and grow further apart in graduate education because students are expected to be more independent, but the principle is the same: teachers provide the “food” for the soul necessary to sustain a healthy pedagogical relationship, and that includes assistance at the professional as well as the personal levels where appropriate.\footnote{There is a level of subjectivity here depending on how comfortable professors are with discussing private matters. Students no doubt come to us with personal problems, so there is a blurred line between the personal and professional to some degree. These are true outside of Catholic education, but due to Catholic philosophical anthropology, Catholic professors give more than the average professor.} Again, “forbidden” texts might cause some discomfort students want to discuss outside of class.

Returning to St. John Paul II, his point is that to be religiously free one must not be forced into faith. It would be freely chosen or not chosen at all. He draws that kind of freedom out into academic freedom: who can say an academic institution is truly free unless it is free to make its own choices outside external authority? The problem here is that to call oneself religious implies a surrender of freedom. When one converts, one gives oneself over to the religious belief in the sense that it is adopted it as one’s own.
Freedom itself isn’t lost completely because one can always choose again, but in surrender I am obligated to follow specific norms, else there is no difference between my previous and current ways of life. Academic freedom mirrors religious freedom in the same way. Both freedoms are a surrendering to the truth, one personal, one institutional. The confession of faith in an academic institution mirrors religious freedom in the sense that one will not condone or confess anything contrary to the truth one professes. Religious freedom would not want anything against the truth, so why would academic freedom have a problem with “limiting” academic speech on a Catholic campus? It is religious freedom’s right to establish boundary lines because, while freedom itself may be libertarian, academic freedom certainly would not say there is unlimited action. Even secular schools teach ethics, albeit a usually very faint one. Religious schools all the more whether adopting secular notions of freedom and morals or not. One idea that tests the notion of freedom is the Index Librorum Prohibitorum.

The Index was a list of banned books to safeguard the faithful from error in faith and morals. Pope St. Paul VI eliminated it during Vatican II to the trust of the faithful judging for themselves right from wrong. The spirit of the matter was the faithful ought not be “forced” to follow the faith, especially out of fear, but to follow it freely and out of love. Hence, they ought to be able to decide how and whether something was or was not appropriate to heed for themselves or their children. The problem was people were not as well educated as they ought to have been in order to discern such things. The then newly founded Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s job was to “safeguard doctrine on
faith and morals in the whole Catholic world.” Its purpose is to officially discern what is true Catholic teaching and what is not to help the faithful lead Christian lives. The more educated people became, however, the more complicated matters arose in Church teaching. For instance, contraceptive use. Lay people incorporated their own ideas and experiences (as evidenced by the rejection of neo-Thomism laid out in chapter one) to understand, explain, and critique Church doctrine. The times were no longer the case where the laity adopted whatever the Church said. A much more dialogical character was formed in the Church herself.

Pope Paul even permits said authors the right to defend themselves before possible condemnation of their views. The elimination of the Index is not an “anything goes” relativism, but an opportunity for authors to explain themselves. There may be specific reasons why the authors wrote what they did beyond simple nose-thumbing or hatred of the faith. Of course, such authors would presumably not be Catholic and in need of a hearing, but the point is there is a greater spread in how and what parents, teachers, and now universities can teach.

The material, again, is constantly changing insofar the Catholic intellectual tradition is not consistently adopted. The contemporary university is a business model throughout, but as stated above customers are people, too. They have a humanity beneath the role they play as consumer. That’s the humanity I want to reach through Levinas who—in his

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549 Paul VI, Integrae Servandae.
ethical phenomenology—treats the Other (the one who is not me) as a human in her vulnerability to violence. We do a violence to our students when we don’t care for their souls. When we give them what they want, not what they need, they suffer from want of knowledge and spiritual nourishment. The job of the faculty is to train students to become good citizens contributing to the common good. No better place do faculty have the ability and opportunity to do this than at Jesuit schools which are made for social justice.

If universities really want to entertain business models, they would reorganize their entire administrative staffs. The essence of a university is instructing students—it only needs faculty and students. Everything else is optional, including dorms, dining halls, and counseling centers. Dining halls are (always?) outsourced: another company comes in to provide the needed resource for the university so it can focus its energy elsewhere. Suppose that logic was applied to everything except faculty, students, and those things essential for academic success (e.g., libraries and research centers). All the niceties would go away and a university dedicated solely to the build-up of knowledge would proceed.

In this way, administrators would relate to faculty in new ways. Instead of understanding them as grant machines or fillers for necessary courses, they become people with families and interesting ideas shaping a campus community towards

550 Though the two are not at odds.

551 A principle of Catholic social thought.

flourishing and moral responsibility. Money would not matter the way it did before. These are people with livelihoods needing a support system, and given their current power, administrators are in a unique position to provide a chunk of that support as per university employment. With such support, faculty are less anxious and can thereby focus more energy on their courses and students. Whether researching or not, there is a kind of peace knowing one has one’s ducks in order. Lesson plans flow (hopefully!), and grading takes up time, yet has a certain calm about it. The effects of the above are more behind-the-scenes, but students notice how we are in the classroom, and how such things effect our delivery and content.

Speaking of content, I did not deal with *Gravissimum educationis* and similar documents because, short of space, they do not deal directly with the American Catholic university. There is a line of thought, a genealogy if one will, in *Rome, Kinshasa*, and *Catholic University in the Modern World* because all directly lead into *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* (ECE), which is a direct response from the Vatican to the *Land O’Lakes Statement* (LOL), an American Catholic document.

On whether schools follow ECE or LOL, the major difference between schools already doing what I am arguing (or are close) and the ones not is that the latter are predicated on economic models of the university, not ethical ones. Franciscan University of Steubenville (FUS) is not perfect, nor do I think any university could be. Yet, FUS has an ethical spirit: it respects student individuality, encourages humility, and is known for having dependable professors. It is the most important and basic necessity for anything considered in this dissertation. Many other universities, no question, have similar setups
and faculty, except they aren’t necessarily Catholic. The Catholic spirit matters because it is an ethical-religious one embodying all the Truth of the Gospel coupled with all the morally-upright secular values (e.g., justice) of the Academy. But Catholic universities need to be themselves.

Duquesne will never be Harvard. Or the University of California. Or Stanford, Yale, Princeton, or any of the other major American universities. It is like a lynx trying to be a lion. The lynx is not the king of the jungle, nor can it be. But like a lynx, Duquesne can hold its own in its own place and part of the jungle. Because of its size, it can contribute to things larger “animals” may not be equipped because of size and need “in the jungle” for other things. When keeping to its business, the lynx is a force to reckoned with, even for a lion. Duquesne merely needs to do what it does best in whatever it wants to recognize itself within the boundaries of what is laid out here, which certainly includes educating the whole person.

The problem, however, is education refers to more than just people. When we discuss educating the “whole person” we are really referring to making the university a half academic, half monastery institution. The University of Paris, where St. Thomas Aquinas taught, did not permit him and his Dominican brothers to develop their spirituality. Rather, it afforded them the opportunity to express themselves academically in the teaching and proliferation of the Scholastic method. They did proofs and worked out logic, something any secular person can do. They neither instructed the students nor themselves in the religious life. That was reserved for the monastery, the “proper place” for religious life. Students today are expected to combine both into one. But how can
they manage the effort to find a Catholic education at institutions where such an
education should be taken for granted and perform at a level to maintain high academic
standards? Students are only human and something has to give. Many times it is
personality.

One might say a kind of violence is done to the student in being ignored of all her
attributes in her quest for both of the above and the individual attention often required for
students at numerous points in their academic careers. Anytime I relate an individual
student to a whole or an institution, the uniqueness is lost in the group by a “comparison
between incomparables.” The complete uniqueness of one student is incomparable to any
other, yet they are compared with each other in situations where one can only help one
student at a time (e.g., this email before that one). More specifically, how do I decide
which student to respond to first? What best helps this student? And comparing Others
is true even for Catholic universities whose underlying metaphysic is tied to the dignity
of the human person: All people (here, students) must be respected as made in God’s
image. The problem presented to us is just that—how to respect all of God’s children in
the classroom and the university at large. It requires a certain kind of “revolution” in
university structures.

Vatican II was the Church’s own “revolution” amidst the turmoil of the 1960s—
racial tension, Vietnam, and assassinations in America reinforced LOL’s message. The
revolutionary spirit was attempting to overturn long established institutions and positions
in American politics and abroad, including Catholic universities. These are places for all
these disparate voices to find a voice because Catholic schools care for the humanities
and human person without regard to class, race, or sex. Such things are at the forefront of radical left agendaism, so these forces find a “home” in Catholic schools because the social justice (really, ethics) of the Catholic university has serious overlap with its interests. I will not be going into detail about such things as they are about topics outside this dissertation, but LOL is the educational pretense for such action.

Noted in chapter one, Pope Leo XIII was worried about Catholic schools becoming too Protestant in the adoption of American values. He feared the intermingling of such forces would water down Catholic teaching into a kind of liberalism that undid years of Catholic doctrine. In the coming years, the warning signals he observed would come to fruition in the form of a document expressing a complete break with Vatican authority: the Land O’Lakes Statement (LOL). With its desired freedom to do as it pleased, there were no limits for its implementation however one wanted to interpret it. It was only until Ex Corde Ecclesiae comes about does the Vatican have a solid “answer” to LOL. American bishops today, however, have an air of “don’t touch our schools” towards the Vatican because they are “ours” not yours, and they tend not to obey or take seriously Ex Corde Ecclesiae because it is too conservative for their taste. That attitude is extremely problematic for the following reason.

Suppose there is a Catholic who wants to get in touch with his faith after being away from it for a while. He looks to church pamphlets, spiritual writers, and Vatican documents (papal encyclicals, et al.) for inspiration. He finds contradictions on important theological matters and wants to understand why this is the case. Did he

553 Or apparent ones making it difficult to discern the truth.
misunderstand? Was there a translation error? Maybe something was misprinted.

Whatever the reason, he begins to dig into more material to sort things out. He then considers American Catholic scholars for guidance, but finds there are few at Catholic universities. Finding out it is the bishopric who dismisses them, he becomes disgusted and leaves once more. I want to apply this same spirit to a final thought experiment explaining Catholic university hiring processes, the seventh suggestion in applying neo-restorationism.

Let us say there is a university “Immanuel Kant State” (IKS). All of the departments teach a commitment to Kantian positions and ideals in all of their known and logically probable forms. Every single professor, department head, staff member, and administrator is a Kantian in all ways, observing their own categorical imperatives day-in and day-out as they go about their lives and jobs. They do not think lowly of anyone else, but they are firm in their beliefs and welcome anyone who wants to debate them in an intelligent, respectable manner. All of their hires are educated by the local Liberal Arts University (LAU) in various doctoral and master’s programs. While disagreeing on minutiae, they hold the core tenets of Kantianism to the bone. A recent lapse in output of Kantians from LAU has forced the IKS to hire, for the first time in their 120-year history, a non-Kantian. After some deliberation, they decide it is best to hire an Aristotelian, for at least they have responses to all things Aristotle, they conclude.

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554 This example is not entirely unfounded as there are many Catholics who do not have (many) issues with Church theology itself, rather, they take issue with the inner workings and political decision-making of its leaders.
The Aristotelian begins her tenure as a temporary hire, teaching three classes a semester and attending various faculty events at the risk of social suicide. Our Kantians do not ridicule our Aristotelian friend, nor do they hold any grudges. They simply just want one of their own. It comes to pass, however, that some Kantians warm up to the Aristotelian. They actually like her personality and find some of her positions on Aristotle fresh and worthy of consideration. She even backs several of them up at faculty events on touchy subjects. When put to a vote, the Aristotelian is granted tenure track, and a few years later heads the department much to the dismay of the old-school Kantians. The new department head goes so far as to hire other non-Kantians—Platonists, Thomists, and Heideggerians, all with varying degrees of disgust for Kant. The positive response from the public moves the administration to turn around their policies. From now on, anyone can insult Kant without question at anytime, and those who challenge such insults are sent to the local magistrate to pay a fine. Or they are simply fired. Kantianism’s mission is displayed proudly on the university’s grounds, but its message is lost in all meaningful interaction.

The old Kantians do not understand what happened to their school. Everyone was performing their duties. Everything was in order. The moral law was in them, and the starry skies above. Everything was as it was supposed to be. Until the Aristotelian came along. What are the Kantians supposed to do? And why would an Aristotelian be chosen to lead a university department so antithetical to her beliefs?

The thought experiment shows, by analogy, what happens to Catholic universities that do not take Catholic identity and mission seriously. Over time, they slowly begin to
break down—it is rarely anything noticeable until it is too late. IKS is the Catholic university, the Kantians the faithful Catholics, and the insulting of Kant the disrespect of any and all things Catholic. The lapse in Kantians from LAU is the lack of religious fidelity in Catholic higher education around the 1960s, and the hiring an Aristotelian to a prominent position representative of a change in institutions of Catholic higher learning towards non-Catholics and leadership.

The loyal Kantians (the faithful Catholics) are slowly outnumbered and their views dismissed as out of touch with reality and the times. “No one believes that deontology anymore!” it is said. And so with Catholics, their faith is put to the test and challenged in ways it otherwise would not be. It is not to say that faith should go unquestioned or unthought, but it does suggest that Catholic universities have some special role in cultivating it, engaging it seriously, much like education in general and not unlike our IKS faculty who instruct their students in Kantian ways.

To carry the analogy further, how an Aristotelian can directly contribute to a Kantian mission is puzzling. Aristotelians actively dislike Kant because he systematically destroyed Aristotelian science. Why would an Aristotelian seek employment at a Kantian school? Granted there are more to people than their philosophical positions, but when philosophy is built into your job description, it matters for one’s own sake, the integrity of the department, and that of university. And like Kantians, Aristotelians have to eat, so the reasons may be financial. I do not have any

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555 I am not going discuss the reasons why or debate the validity or soundness thereof. I am simply laying out the comparison for further explication.
problem with this situation. But Kantians need and have a right to their identity, and so the promotion of an Aristotelian philosophy seems counterproductive.

We are now seeing how this analogy plays out: Non-Catholics without any respect for the Church seek employment at her institutions, possibly to simply make a living. Yet, the very nature of the position requires some kind of readily available reason why that person should be hired over a committed Catholic. Catholic universities and departments have a mission that Catholics can best fill and promote—not unlike Kantians at a Kantian university. An Aristotelian may function well in an office, but that does not mean it is the Aristotelian’s telos to be in the office. Likewise non-Catholics can serve in the same positions as Catholics, just as well and even better, but the uniqueness of the vocation (telos) Catholic universities have requires Catholics to be preferred in hiring for mission. I am not suggesting non-Catholics do not have a place at Catholic universities, nor am I suggesting non-Catholics are not welcome. I am saying that, like the Kantians at IKS promoting and defending the Kantian mission, Catholic universities have an obligation to fulfill their missions to the Church, the faithful, the students and faculty, and above all to God to the effect that too many non-Catholics interfere with the cultivation of faith and responsible citizenship in the eyes of the Church. When people

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556 An ability to perform the demands of a job is not based on one’s faith.

557 Ex Corde Ecclesiae makes this point abundantly clear.

558 Whatever that might actually look like.

559 Parents and grandparents pay their (grand)children’s tuition expecting them to gain a Catholic education, which is a related issued taken up somewhat in chapter four during the discussion of curriculum and intentionalities.
in power who decide the future of the university in small ways abuse their positions, over
time the mission, identity, and faith start to erode. It is our children who pay the penalty.

Conclusion

We have traversed the major history of 20th century American Catholic higher
education into an ethical metaphysics (Levinas) forming the basis of a deeper philosophy
of education prioritizing the student-teacher relationship (Maritain). I combined these
philosophies with the teaching of apostolic constitution *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* over-against
the impersonal Heideggerianism of the *Land O’Lakes Statement*. These conclusions lead
me to forming a new approach to Catholic higher education in neo-restorationism,
whereby one can successfully combine the (controversial) insights of secular culture with
the theological-intellectual orthodoxy of the Catholic intellectual tradition. Amidst these
discussions was the primary aim of the dissertation to argue for the foundation of the
student-teacher relationship as forming the basis of all major institutional decision-
making both inside- and outside the classroom. The final analysis analyzed some
common objections and my responses, placing my project in the larger schema of all
higher education. I concluded with an analogy explaining that should we not deal with
this problem now, our future—our children—will suffer the consequences.


Peperzak, Adriaan T. To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1993.


