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ARMING THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: AMERICA’S CATHOLIC BISHOPS
CONFRONT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, 1980-1983

By
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ABSTRACT

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Marquette University, 2024

This dissertation examines 1983 pastoral on war and peace, The Challenge of Peace, from the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB). It analyzes in-depth the process of the ad hoc committee of the NCCB that wrote the pastoral alongside the simultaneous debates within the American Catholic community and the Reagan administration surrounding the pastoral. Special attention is given here to the interactions of the Reagan administration with the ad hoc committee, led by Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, and the role of American Catholic lay critics Michael Novak, Philip Lawler, and George Weigel. It also explicates the intrapersonal aspect of drafting process, focusing especially on the perspective of committee member Bishop (later cardinal archbishop of New York) John O’Connor. I argue that The Challenge of Peace was the first American episcopal document after the Second Vatican Council showcasing the American Catholic Church attempting to establish itself as a major player in mainstream political life. It provided specific parameters, though not specific policies, through which American Catholics may navigate issues of war and peace. The Challenge of Peace had a modest effect on American nuclear policy, but it expanded the field of what counted as religious advocacy in public policy matters.

This project features materials from The Catholic University of America, the Joseph Cardinal Bernardin Papers at the Joseph Cardinal Bernardin Archives and Records Center of the Archdiocese of Chicago, the Thomas Gumbleton Papers at the University of Notre Dame, and numerous collections at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. It also draws from a personal interview conducted via telephone with Father J. Bryan Hehir, the editor of the finished pastoral. This dissertation contributes to the historiography surrounding the American Catholic Church and political policy in the 1980s and the religious aspects of political conservatism of the same period. It contextualizes the pastoral in a unique manner that prioritizes the role of the Second Vatican Council in forming the theological background of the discussions behind the pastoral. It takes seriously the critiques of conservative critics of The Challenge of Peace who have been previously underrepresented in narratives surrounding the pastoral.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Brooke Tranten

All glory be to God for the completion of this work. I made the remarkable mistake of continuing on uninterrupted in post-secondary education since I entered the College of the Holy Cross in the fall of 2017 with its culmination in this degree in the spring of 2024. Perhaps the greater self-inflicted misfortune is that I am now the graduate of not one, but two Jesuit colleges/universities. It is finished.

I would like to first thank my dissertation committee—Father Steven Avella, Dr. Kirsten Foster and Dr. Michael Donoghue. Drs. Foster and Donoghue deserve especial thanks for agreeing to read my work in an area well outside their areas of specialty. Their comments were the most insightful for the prose and style of my dissertation, which will be especially useful when I decide to turn this work into a book. Thank you.

I also thank my professors and friends at Marquette University. Drs. Bryan Rindfleisch, Alison Efford, and Laura Matthews were always available with a kind word and understanding for my plight. Dr. Timothy McMahon made sure I was always aware of my abilities and the quality of my work. He talked me off the edge more than once and was instrumental in getting me through the writing and revision process. Adam Petersen and his wife Cori remained a source of support and as ever-patient sounding boards when the life of a doctoral student got overwhelming and bleak. Adam and Cori give their time and occasionally part of their home to me as I embarked on this project. Thank you.

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While I am receiving this degree in the field of American History, an incredible part of my intellectual formation that made this degree possible was my time in the Master of Theological Studies program at the University of Notre Dame. There I enjoyed a world-class theological education that I would never give ever for anything, even a history degree. Dr. Timothy Matovina encouraged my love for American Catholic history even as chair of the theology department. Dr. Francesca Murphy was immensely kind with her time and her hospitality as I went through the soul-crushing Ph.D. application process. Dr. Kathleen Sprows Cummings graciously employed me at the Cushwa Center for American Catholicism and read multiple Ph.D. essays. Dr. Peter Cajka was immensely kind in commiserating with me about both applications and programs.

My friends helped keep me human during this degree. Thank you all for listening to me vent, rant, and play with your children. You helped me understand that there’s a
life, and a very good one, outside of the books and career choices. Thank you, Deandra, Daniel, Isaac, Julia, Matthew, Eric, Claude, Elinor, Paul, Gabriella, Sam, Katherine, Christian, Francesca, Dominic, and Sammy. The children are too numerous to mention here, save my goddaughter Margaret. My other Notre Dame friends are also too numerous, but be assured that I am grateful to all of you. Notre Dame people are different and I am blessed to have such a circle of deeply faithful and devoted friends.

My research would have been severely hampered without the guidance and wisdom of my friend, Father Wilson D. Miscamble, C.S.C. Father Bill, a renowned American foreign policy scholar in his own right, literally donated part of his personal library for my research. He has also been encouraging, kind, and generous in his praise and celebration of my accomplishments. I am proud to call him my friend and feel entirely unworthy of his company. Thank you, Father Bill.

My dissertation was produced in tandem with a new job at the de Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture at the University of Notre Dame. Most of my trusted mentors said I would not be able to finish my degree within five years and they would have been right had it not been for the unbelievable support of my colleagues and friends at the de Nicola Center. Thank you to Professor Carter Snead, Laura Gonsiorek, Margaret Cabaniss, Ken Hallenius, Petra Farrell, Dave Younger, Phil Tran, Jacob Imus, Father John Paul Kimes, Tracy Westlake, and Justin Petrisek. Your grace, kindness, and friendship made it possible for me to get my dissertation done on time. Friend of the Center Father Kevin Flannery, S.J., quite unknowingly helped me clarify issues related to the moral theology of Vatican II and gamely talked Jesuit inside baseball with me when he would much rather talk the Cleveland Guardians. Thank you.
My mother, Deborah, has been my biggest supporter of all my academic endeavors. She may not have the clearest idea of what I study or exactly what degrees I hold, but she loves me completely and is proud of me. I thank her for all the time, energy, and money she has invested in me in an academic path that has little promise of monetary success. She has even had the grace to not question the worthwhile of studying a nearly-forgotten NCCB pastoral on nuclear weapons. She has let me grow and thrive in the Midwest when she has spent her entire life in New England and would much prefer to have me closer to home. Thank you, Mom, I love you.

I truly see my work in this dissertation as a service to Jesus Christ and His Holy Catholic Church. The most notable servant of the Church I have ever known is Father John Gavin, S.J.. Father Gavin was the single most important person in my personal and academic path to this doctorate. One of the most brilliant Jesuits of his generation, I am still startled by his incredible erudition and savvy. Father Gavin guided through my reception into the Catholic Church in 2014 and helped me navigate friendships, campus politics, and post-graduation plans. While I was nowhere near the most brilliant of his students, he saw where my talents were and had me develop accordingly. He encouraged me to study theology at a place 1,000 miles from home when we were both unsure what time zone it was in. He continued to encourage me when I wanted nothing more to quit and always made time to speak with me about my plans and life changes, even when his own calendar is always full at least a year out. Father Gavin has been nothing but steady and rational when I needed him to be and supportive when I needed him to be. His advice has never once been wrong. While his major blindspot might be that he seems immune to the allure of the University of Notre Dame, even during football season, he is a dear
friend and mentor. I am unworthy of and am eminently grateful for his friendship. The proudest moment of my post-defense celebration was when Father Gavin told me that I will do great things for the Church. Thank you.

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“Aren’t we really talking about rationalizing insanity?” Bishop John O’Connor queried Jimmy Carter’s secretary of defense Harold Brown about American nuclear policy in a hotel conference room in Washington in the fall of 1982. A group of American Catholic bishops had decided to write a pastoral letter about war and peace after the nuclear bomb, addressed to all the Catholic faithful and people of goodwill of the United States. In the drafting process of the pastoral, the ad hoc committee that wrote the document consulted over a dozen policymakers current and past about American nuclear tactics and strategy. While they spoke to individuals from as far back as the Nixon administration, they were most concerned with hearing from new president Ronald Reagan’s officials. If Brown was somewhat taken aback, so too were Bishop O’Connor’s brother bishops. Archbishop Joseph Bernardin chaired the committee and was known to be a master manager of personnel with an especial talent for forging consensus. The contrarian Bishop O’Connor had been a bishop for not yet three years in 1982, having spent the previous twenty-seven as a chaplain in the United States Navy. Another member of the committee, Bishop Thomas Gumbleton of Detroit, was a pacifist and president of the American iteration of the peace organization Pax Christi. Neither side of the table was prepared for O’Connor’s blunt assessment of Brown’s presentation of American nuclear policy. Brown responded gently but without apology, “Yes.”

The document that these American bishops produced was *The Challenge of Peace*, published to popular acclaim in both the American Catholic Church and mass media in May of 1983. The pastoral directly confronted the Reagan administration’s foreign and nuclear policy and developed a new theology of peace and just war theory. It

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was the first time that Catholic bishops systematically attempted to incorporate the postwar reality of nuclear weapons into millennia-old Catholic reflection on war and moral theology. The bishops responded to the exhortations of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) to encounter the modern world on its own terms through joint episcopal action, referred to by the theological term “collegiality.” They encountered the arms race and Cold War politics on nuclear war in The Challenge of Peace. As the 1980s began, Americans once again became frightened by the prospect of nuclear annihilation as the Soviet Union and the United States’ relations devolved into their worst state since the Cuban Missile Crisis. American Catholics were no exceptions. In the previous decade, Catholics had formed an important minority in the anti-war movements at the same time they rallied around the American war effort with their bishops. The bishops, changed by the council, changed their minds about Vietnam, declaring it an unjust war. A decade later the bishops condemned large portions of U.S. nuclear and foreign policy according to the millennia-old prescriptions of Catholic moral theology and recent papal teaching. Patriotism had historically been an important initiation into American civic life for Roman Catholics. By 1981, however, Catholics were firmly assimilated into mainstream American life and their bishops were unafraid to publicly confront the Reagan administration for its defense polices.

Not all Catholics considered The Challenge of Peace to be a viable exercise in the teaching authority of the Catholic Church. The competency of the bishops to speak

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4 Morgan. 124.
authoritatively, meaning morally binding on the consciences of Catholics, on matters of faith and morals was acknowledged even if vast swaths of the faithful disagreed with their conclusions. The moral prohibition against birth control is an apt example.⁶ Speaking about matters of U.S. military policy was a much harder sell when it came to the exercise of teaching authority, known as the magisterium in ecclesiological nomenclature. Often referred to as the teaching office of the Church, the name derives from the Latin word for “teacher.” The bishops in communion with the pope and never without the pope constitute the teaching office as the standard of official Catholic belief. The Catholic Church considers the magisterium as theologically inerrant and thus it commands the obedience of the Catholic faithful, clergy and laity, under pain of sin. Catholics believe that the bishops and pope do not determine the content of the magisterium but ensure its correct expression in doctrinal formulation. Thus, authenticity of teaching and its correct expression is determined by the hierarchy of the Church. The role of the magisterium is to discern what doctrines are being expressed in practice among both laity and clergy at a particular time and if they are being expressed in a manner in accord with the rest of Catholic belief.⁷ Catholics believe that the doctrines of the Church have always been present in the history of the Church but may not fully express themselves in the life of the Church at a given time in history, a theological concept known as the development of doctrine. The magisterium thus functions as a clearing house for the hierarchy to determine what is and what is not official Catholic teaching. The issue of whether the bishops’ teaching on nuclear conflict in *The Challenge*

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of Peace may constitute an act of the magisterium was the dominant issue surrounding The Challenge of Peace.

The five bishops of the ad hoc committee and their staffs had to contend with backlash and sometimes outright subterfuge from the U.S. government and their own faithful. Moreover, not every bishop was enthused by the ad hoc committee’s project. Some of the more pacifist bishops, like Bishop Gumbleton and others, believed that the pastoral did not go far enough in discouraging the use or even the existence of nuclear weapons. Bishop O’Connor, Terence Cardinal Cooke of New York, and others believed that the letter was too political in orientation and that Catholic just war theory did not forbid the use of limited use of tactical nuclear weapons. Bishop O’Connor was a dogged critic of much of the ad hoc committee’s line of thought on just war and put considerable time and energy in attempting to sway his brother bishops to his point of view in committee.

As if the matrix of the NCCB and the Reagan administration were not enough for the ad hoc committee, Rome was also a dictating factor in the writing of The Challenge of Peace. National pastorals cannot be issued or have any binding authority without the permission of the Vatican by rule. As the Cold War seemed to intensify with Soviet action in Europe and martial law in Poland, the new pope John Paul II watched the Americans closely as they formulated their opinions about the legitimacy of nuclear war. He did so through the Apostolic Delegate, the Holy See’s diplomatic representative, Archbishop Pio Laghi in Washington. The ad hoc committee, through its chairman Archbishop Bernardin and bishops’ conference president Archbishop John Roach, were expected to correspond frequently with Archbishop Laghi. The committee was also
expected to send its drafts to the Pontifical Council of Justice and Peace of the Roman Curia, known by its Latin name Iustitia et Pax. The ad hoc group had three separate bodies around which to write their pastoral. Archbishop Bernardin and his committee were even summoned to Rome in January of 1983 for an in-person meeting with representatives of the Holy See and Iustitia et Pax. The Cardinal Secretary of State Agostino Casaroli and the Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, the second and third in command at the Holy See respectively, conducted the consultation, with Casaroli reading a sometimes highly critical precis of the second draft of the pastoral. More than any other group, the ad hoc committee was beholden to the recommendations given to them by Rome. This was due in part to the hierarchical nature of the Church and the bishops’ unwillingness to contradict the Holy See. Rome’s watchfulness reflected the importance with which the pope held the pastoral as well as his willingness to allow the American bishops to criticize their own nation’s nuclear policy.

The bishops achieved their objective to offer guidance on the nuclear question, but they also accomplished an even riskier objective. They sought to reestablish themselves as a moral voice in the post-conciliar public square and they did so, with all of the attendant political consequences implied. *The Challenge of Peace* proved to President Reagan that his administration could both pursue aggressive nuclear policy and still maintain Catholic support for his reelection campaign. However, the bishops did not resolve a crucial question, one that had plagued them since Vatican II. In the context of war and peace after the bomb, *The Challenge of Peace* still signified the major struggles the episcopate experienced in maintaining doctrinal clarity and unity for the American
Catholic laity. They faced considerable conservative backlash that would only grow in the future. To this day, the American Catholic hierarchy still finds their various exercises of moral authority to be nearly impossible to explicate or enforce.

The war and peace pastoral stands as a sign of contradiction in the latter part of the Cold War, one that shows how complicated moral persuasion has become amid the cacophony of constituents in modern American political life. Richard John Neuhaus, neoconservative and friend of *The Challenge of Peace* critics Michael Novak and George Weigel, explained the zeitgeist of American society that the bishops sought so strongly to address in his evocative metaphor that titled his most famous book, *The Naked Public Square*. Neuhaus was at the time a Lutheran pastor in the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, a grouping of progressive Lutheran ecclesial communities. He was also active in the Evangelical Catholic movement that encouraged close collaboration with Catholics and avowedly Catholic elements in liturgical stylings. Neuhaus participated in the civil rights movement and was supportive of liberal political initiatives in general until 1973’s *Roe v. Wade*. The Democratic Party’s embrace of abortion sparked Neuhaus’ gradual movement into conservative causes. At the time of the publication of *The Naked Public Square*, Neuhaus was director of the Center for Religion and Society at the conservative think-tank Rockford Institute.\(^8\)

Years of secularism, imposed by political liberals as much as political conservatives, had left civic life naked, meaning that politics was the only means of engagement in public life. Neuhaus considered this state of affairs a further impoverishment of the value of moral language and values that he argued were always

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religiously coded. Christianity was thus publicly irrelevant in the United States. Neuhaus’ extended metaphor was not jingoistic, but instead emphasized the need for the expression of religious values in public life to assure healthy cultural and political life. He wanted to carve out a place for religion as major player in civic life and conversation. The emergence of the Christian Right in the 1970s and 1980s empowered conservative religious groups who advocated moral causes to take political action. Neuhaus, though, was tepid at best about the use of political action at this stage. While a conservative Lutheran at this time, he was also not a traditionalist in the style of Moral Majority evangelicalism who advocated for resurrecting old forms of gender roles or forbidding aspects of modern consumer culture, among other goals. As a solution, Neuhaus argued for the reinvigoration of Christian intellectual public engagement. *The Naked Public Square* was the intellectual neo-conservative solution to the problem of secularism and the lack of productive moral language in the public square. Catholics, Neuhaus observed, would likely be at the forefront of this new public Christianity. It paralleled some of the Moral Majority’s admonitions for the reinvigoration of religious values in American life, such as Jerry Falwell’s traditionalistic “family values.” Neuhaus’ book was avowedly non-sectarian and emphasized the importance of Catholics and other Christian denominations in recasting the secular civic sphere. Though they would not have used Neuhaus’ intentionally provocative language, the American bishops were trying to address the problem of the naked public square that had left the nuclear issue mired in

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10 Neuhaus, 8.


12 Neuhaus, *The Naked Public Square*, 262.
fear, shouting voices on either side, and realpolitik. The restoration of moral language would give rational voice to public concern and facilitate real policy change. The bishops promoted a public Christianity that did not align itself with a political party or movement by focusing on the nuclear issue in *The Challenge of Peace*. *The Challenge of Peace* was their attempt to shroud the naked public square and endow American public life with a common language through with to speak about the moral issues implicit in the nuclear debates.

**American Reaction to the Bomb**

Hiroshima and Nagasaki introduced a new and horrifying element into warfare, an atomic bomb that could destroy the world as all knew it and was only getting deadlier as technology advanced into thermonuclear weapons. The American reaction to news of the atom bomb was mixed but tended toward the laudatory. The bloody war in the Pacific was over and the Japanese neutralized for the foreseeable future, thanks to American ingenuity and decisive action. Public perception of the war took on increasingly stark shades of black and white as time went on, even among American Catholics. Victory Masses popped up around the nation after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 4,000 Catholics packed St. Patrick’s Cathedral in New York after Japan surrendered. The emotional high of victory wore off after it became clear what awesome capacity for destruction nuclear weapons contained. The moral debate began as scholars and pundits turned to the question of whether or not it was morally justified to drop such bombs. This self-reflection did not last long, however, as the Cold War took hold of international

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The increasing fear of the Soviets caused a general reevaluation of nuclear conflict and deterrence. Deterrence became the status quo after the worst-case scenario became reality: The Soviets developed an atomic bomb in 1949. Mutual assured destruction (MAD) became the cornerstone of American and Soviet foreign policy. Strategy and policy centered around who had more and better nuclear weapons. The embrace of such a framework was not a proactive strategic outlook, but rather a reactive one that depended upon ascertaining the other side’s nuclear capacity and then striving to outpace the enemy. Nuclear weapons were the most fear-inspiring armament ever developed but their existence seemed necessary to ensure international peace.

Fear surrounding nuclear weapons was solidified in the 1950s with the Korean War, the rise of McCarthyism, and several nuclear scares. While munitions accidents were common parts of military life, the idea that a nuclear weapon could accidentally detonate was uniquely terrible given their destructive capacity. News of the hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll in 1954 horrified many as the devastating and long-lasting consequences of nuclear fallout on human life became clear and the environment. Lesser-known scares involved the military systems that were entrusted with curating the U.S.’ nuclear weapons. A computer system malfunction in 1960 sent NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) into a panic. Less than a year later, a faulty computer switch cut off communications between NORAD and SAC (Strategic Air

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Command), leading the latter to fear a nuclear attack had commenced. While these scares were closely guarded secrets within the military apparatus, the prospect of technical malfunctions and human error reached popular imagination in films like *Dr. Strangelove* and *Fail-Safe*. All of these incidents took place before the most famous of nuclear close-calls, the Cuban Missile Crisis. Nuclear weapons remained a persistent fear in the American psyche, occasionally coming to the forefront with news of the latest test or accident in a mental attitude the psychologist Robert Jay Lifton called “physic numbing.” The “brinksmanship” strategy advocated by fiercely anticommunist Secretary of State John Foster Dulles during the Eisenhower administration of threatening nuclear strikes against the Soviets and Red Chinese for any aggressive acts on their parts, only added to these tensions. The American bishops intuited the subliminal fear and resignation that characterized nuclear foreign policy and sought to contradict it by appealing to Catholic just war theory and the teachings of the popes about modern warfare.

**State of the Question**

*The Challenge of Peace* has been largely forgotten over the past two decades. In the years immediately after its publication, the pastoral inspired some academic study in the form of journal articles and some edited volumes. Some scholars have written about different aspects of the pastoral, such as its use in Catholic education and moral

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18 Henriksen, *Dr. Strangelove’s America*. 318, 331.
None, however, studied the pastoral in the historical and political context of
the Reagan administration, much less within the vortex of its foreign policy. Archival
material related to the pastoral has only just become available within the past three years
from the episcopal conference, the archives of which are located at The Catholic
University of America. Even then, most documents related to the pastoral sit
uncategorized and unsorted. Joseph Cardinal Bernardin’s papers have only just become
available for public use and most of the material related to them have also not been
sorted. The journalist Jim Castelli published *The Bishops and the Bomb* in 1984 as a
chronicle of the drafting process of *The Challenge of Peace*. Castelli was a longtime
freelance journalist in Catholic media and news wire services, and so he had extensive
experience with the episcopal conference and its various personalities. He had access to
Archbishop Bernardin’s and Bishop O’Connor’s notes. Even in the middle of the second
draft, Castelli wrote almost down to the day on the drafting process through phone calls
and correspondence with members of the ad hoc committee and other bishops, including
conference president Archbishop John Roach. Castelli remains the only record currently
available to researchers on many aspects of the pastoral’s formulation.

Castelli does not offer much insight into the Reagan administration’s foreign and
nuclear policies. In what little analysis he can offer given his proximity to the events,
Castelli was unduly harsh on some of the players involved in the drafting process,
offering little consideration to Bishop O’Connor and the bishops more skeptical of

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‘The Challenge of Peace’” (Ph.D., Pittsburgh, PA, Duquesne University, 1989). Gregory Leonard Cooney,
of Peace’” (Th.D., Rome, Pontifical Gregorian University, 1990).
nuclear pacifism. Castelli wrote as a journalist and included no footnotes or sources in his text. As a result, his work is difficult to cross-reference with archival sources. Despite his access, he was only given the notes and information that the ad hoc committee wanted him to have. The episcopal conference is a notoriously secretive organization despite its official transparency. The minutes of the individual conference-wide meetings of the NCCB only provide a record of who spoke when, since not every word uttered on the conference floor was recorded electronically or longhand. Castelli also lacked the chronological distance and archival records to construct an academic-level historical study. Castelli is the most important source for the drafting process of the pastoral, but his record has limitations.

Henry Maar’s recent book *Freeze!* is the latest scholarly work that analyzes *The Challenge of Peace* at any length. Maar’s focus is the Nuclear Freeze Movement, a grassroots effort of various activist groups lobbying the Reagan administration for the immediate freeze of the development, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons. Maar considered the pastoral as a part of the Freeze Movement. It certainly shared some of the Freeze’s objectives but Maar did not touch upon any of the theological and ecclesiological background that made the pastoral so important for Catholics. Maar also failed to take in account the various dynamics at play within the NCCB and the Church in his analysis of the bishops. He also falsely posits Bishops O’Connor and Gumbleton as polar opposites in conflict on the committee, not realizing that such an adversarial stance

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was not held by the ad hoc committee or the two bishops themselves. However, Maar provides an astute read of the Reagan administration’s efforts to undermine the bishops’ pastoral. That is, the administration tried to take on the pastoral’s nuclear skepticism and overtures toward disarmament when its own ends and policies were different from those of the bishops. The ad hoc committee and Archbishop Bernardin saw through this strategy and sought to counteract it, which Maar describes adequately, if superficially.

*The Challenge of Peace* was not the focus of Maar’s text, nor was the dissertation on which it was based, so Maar necessarily had to describe the drafting process of the pastoral as broadly as possible. Even so, *Freeze!* is the most important, latest book that attempts to contextualize *The Challenge of Peace* in terms of the political context of the early Reagan administration.

Movement conservatism in the 1980s was also expanding, with important implications for Catholics. Neo-conservatism emerged as mainstream liberalism became increasingly leftist in orientation. These libertarian-leaning disenchanted liberals looked to reinvigorate the conservative movement by advocating for strong, interventionist foreign policy alongside a distaste for radicalism in all its forms. Neo-conservatism lent itself to socially conservative Jews and Catholics who felt left behind by the Democratic Party’s embrace of counterculture. Neo-conservative Catholics, in particular Michael Novak and George Weigel, were the most engaged lay intellectual group in the drafting of *The Challenge of Peace*. While liberal Catholics found themselves comfortably in the

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24 Maar III. 93.
25 Maar III. 71.
26 Maar III. 94.
mainstream of the American episcopate’s opinions on the nuclear questions, the neo-conservatives prioritized the aggressive tendencies of American foreign policy while grappling with the bishops’ and popes’ disapproval of the nuclear arms race.

The historical narrative of religion and politics centers during the Reagan years on conservative Protestants, but Catholics have started making appearances in the scholarship. Reagan’s appeal among the Christian Right has always been a popular topic in Reagan studies, but Catholics have not become a constitutive part of the story until recently. Patrick Allitt’s 1993 *Catholic Intellectuals and Conservative Politics in America* was the early work that broke the trend. Allitt describes how Catholics were always important in the resurgence of political conservatism after the Second World War, despite their reputation for voting Democrat. In general, American conservatism is historically premised on the rejection of New Deal legislation and government activism in social policy. The major exception would be in defense, where most conservatives press for interventionist foreign policy, inspired by Cold War anti-Communism. Ideological anti-Communism also led conservatives toward supporting strongman authoritarian governments, in particular in Latin America, as long as American interests were protected. Allitt’s second insight is that conservative Catholic intellectuals, despite their small numbers, always insisted on their distinctiveness as a group when the traditional narrative has it that Reagan-era fusionism tended to overshadow any philosophical conflicts in the name of organizing against the liberals and keeping a Republican Congress. Allitt’s work is an intellectual history and so his analysis of

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Catholic intellectuals and the Reagan administration is not vigorous. His book, while providing an invaluable history of the changes in Catholic conservatism over time in the United States, does not devote much space to the Reagan years.

Among Reagan’s most caricatured cheerleaders were fundamentalist and conservative Christians and their respective churches. The common narrative labeled the Religious Right and Christian conservatism, often collapsing the terms, as unreflective but media-savvy propaganda outlets, cultivated by a grateful administration. The common cast of characters include the televangelists, Jerry Falwell, Phyllis Schlafly, and the Moral Majority. Study of 20th century religion and politics has hyper-fixated on Christian conservatism in this time period. However, caricature and lampoon in the media made Christian conservatism seem unserious or gauche. A new generation of scholars has been more willing to seriously study Christian conservatism in the new millennium. The first full political history of the rise of the Christian Right came in Daniel Williams’ *God’s Own Party* in 2012. Williams later took up the even more politically-fraught work of writing a history of the right-to-life movement prior to *Roe v. Wade* in 2016’s *Defenders of the Unborn*. Eric Crouse’s 2013 *The Cross and Reaganomics* took a careful look at the fault lines around Reagan’s economic policy in the new Christian Right.

Catholics are documented in studies of the Reagan’s Christian Right, but only anecdotally or as another denomination among many.

Catholics provide a fascinating case study for the contours of the Christian and New Right of the Reagan years. Support from Catholics for Reagan was not guaranteed by a national governing or hierarchical body like it was for so many Baptists and

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Evangelicals. The Southern Baptist Convention, the largest of the Protestant churches in America, was wary of formally endorsing Reagan, but functionally did so through its leadership’s consistent public support. Catholics also did not find a comfortable home in the Moral Majority, the flagship base of support for Reaganite Christians. The American Catholic bishops could not endorse political candidates on paper, even if they might approve or condemn certain policies. Official involvement of Catholics in politics was incredibly contentious. In contrast to any other major church or ecclesial community, Catholic clerics were forbidden from holding public political office, though this discipline was only formalized by Pope John Paul II in 1980. Catholics were also racially and economically pluralistic. They were historic Democratic voters. Reagan, the divorced former actor, took fifty-one percent of the Catholic vote. The hierarchy had to deal with a president who often said all the right things on family life and morality but had limited means of putting those ideals into practice.

Todd Scribner’s 2015 *A Partisan Church* was the first full-length academic work to ascertain the contours of Catholic neoconservatism. Scribner sees Catholic neoconservatism as arising specifically out of disillusionment with liberal politics and liberal Catholicism. It was a part of postwar trends in religion that broadened and polarized religious subgroups, “…religious identity in the United States was marked by a decline in the importance of denominationalism and ascendance of political ideology as an increasingly significant marker in public religion.” Scribner’s argument takes

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seriously the arguments forwarded by Michael Novak, George Weigel, and Richard John Neuhaus in their work as Catholic public intellectuals. His concern for denominationalism is overdrawn but his trajectory is correct in that Catholic public activity came to associated with political markers. In the upheaval of Vatican II, conservative Catholics felt they could not align themselves with members of their own church. *The Challenge of Peace* compelled three prominent laymen to publicly contest their bishops’ guidelines on nuclear weapons. The ex-seminarian William Clark made his choice as a National Security Advisor when he published an open letter to the bishops against the second draft of their pastoral in July of 1982.\(^{35}\) Scribner’s work was the first academic work to take seriously the point of view of the Catholic neoconservatives, but his book is too short to provide anything but a surface-level analysis of the thought of Novak, Weigel, and Neuhaus. He also fails to appreciate the invigoration that the election of Reagan caused among the Christian Right. In his pondering of the roots of political polarization, he undersells the importance of *Roe v. Wade* for galvanizing identity politics, especially for Catholics. However, *The Challenge of Peace* proves that conservatives could dissent just as well as liberals, albeit on different issues.

A placid understanding of Catholic conservatives only runs so far in the scholarship. D.G. Hart’s *American Catholic: The Politics of Faith During the Cold War* takes seriously the disillusionment that post-war Catholic conservatives felt during the rise of political liberalism into the Cold War period., Hart shares with Allitt the argument that conservatism in all its forms became an important standard of Catholic praxis in the United States. Contrary to the common narrative, Catholics were often some of the

most important political conservatives of the postwar period, even if their intellectual might did not translate to electoral victories. They were rallied by the threat of Communism into mainstream conservatism. Hart tends to emphasize the American patriotism of these movement conservatives, the most important of which was William F. Buckley, Jr.\textsuperscript{36} Hart’s argument is important for understanding the political fault lines that characterized Catholic public engagement even before the council and for his willingness to question the movement conservatives’ willingness to defend American political ideals even at the expense of Church teaching.\textsuperscript{37} He attempts to unravel where political ideas end and Catholic teaching begins. It is a crucial work as Catholic historians begin to unpack American Catholic anti-Communism. Still, his work suffered from oversimplification. He draws too stark of a line between official, magisterial teaching and what conservative Catholics were pursuing. The debate over \textit{The Challenge of Peace} demonstrates that it was not one side or the other whose version of Catholicism was tainted by American civic ideology. Both so-called liberals and conservatives tended toward the assumptions of the American political project. Allitt, Scribner, and Hart’s stories are fine intellectual histories, but the image of conservative Catholics that they portray is incomplete. Politics and foreign policy provided the context and area of operation for Catholic conservatives and their bishops during Reagan’s first term.

**The Ecclesiastical Context**

The historical literature surrounding \textit{The Challenge of Peace} also contains a major blind spot: The Second Vatican Council. \textit{The Challenge of Peace}, and the bishops’


\textsuperscript{37} Hart. 7.
conference that produced it, would have been impossible without the theological innovations of Vatican II. The council was responsible for the wholesale reworking of Catholic moral theology in its academic and pastoral iterations. Moral theology began to emphasize the role of individual conscience and was less concerned with moral prescription and prohibition. The council provided an opening for full Catholic engagement in the peace movements, especially the anti-nuclear movement. It also did not contradict the traditional standards of doctrine for moral truth and error. Even more important for *The Challenge of Peace*, it enabled and encouraged national episcopal conferences to dialogue with public authorities about political issues that touched upon Catholic moral and ethical teachings. The council wanted to discourage the insularity that had infiltrated much Catholic public engagement around the globe and encourage bishops and lay people to confront their own societies to live up to the standards of life proclaimed by the Church. The council, in its documents *Christus Dominus* and *Lumen Gentium*, specifically encouraged the then-underutilized episcopal conference system as the primary means by which the bishops could engage with the modern world.

Bishops were an important part of the new vision of public engagement, though the focus was generally on the laity. The council offered a renewed theology of the episcopate that reaffirmed the bishops’ authority qua their consecration as bishops and their participation in the magisterium. Bishops had previously been seen and saw themselves as little more than branch managers of the Roman Church, a severe theological error that dampened the vitality of Catholicism prior to the council.\(^{38}\) Change had already begun during and after the council on the global stage, however. The bishops

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worked in language groups broken down by country at the council itself. The Latin American bishops showed how episcopal conferences could pivot toward social justice in applying the directives of the council to a particular nation’s circumstances at Medellín, Colombia in 1968. In the case of Latin America, the situation was poverty and authoritarianism both left and right.  

For the U.S. environment, the Americans established themselves as the foremost episcopal conference of the global Church in terms of professionalization, organization, and sheer influence. Archbishop Bernardin was an architect of the revamped bishops’ conference and used his knowledge of the conference and its procedures to his advantage in the drafting process. The council’s purpose was to open up the Church to the modern world, with all of the turmoil and fresh air that this implied.

Magisterial teaching surrounding war and peace underwent a palpable evolution since the council. Successive popes commented on nuclear weapons. Of note were the teachings of Popes John XXIII and Paul VI. *Pacem in Terris*, written by Pope John amid the Cuban Missile Crisis, was the first papal encyclical to confront nuclear weapons. Pope John was highly skeptical of the backdoor diplomacy that characterized international relations at the time and questioned the arms race that it implied. *Pacem in Terris* contained the line, “Nuclear weapons must be banned,” still the clearest papal condemnation of nuclear weapons and one that few churchmen would contradict, even those most friendly to nuclear deterrence. The bishops’ grudging acceptance of deterrence, spurred by the wishes of Pope John Paul II, must be seen in this context.

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Openness to the modern world after the council also included the acknowledgement that the Church had speak out on what it saw as immoral political and social trends. Papal documents like these, which are expressions of the official teaching office of the Church by their status as encyclicals, revealed that the Church would not be silent about defense policy and the understanding of the human person that such strategies entailed. Paul VI’s *Ostpolitik* diplomatic strategy encouraged detente between national churches and the Communist governments in the Eastern Bloc, though its actual results were much more complicated. All of this set the stage for future episcopal engagement with defense policy into the 1970s, especially as the Vietnam War and other conflicts were met with much popular discontent and skepticism about the purity of the United States’ motives.

As much as *The Challenge of Peace* was a product of the council, it was also a product of the post-Vatican II period in the Catholic Church. The council reenergized the laity by its emphasis on the nobility of baptism. A part of this exalted position of baptism is the universal priesthood. This is a theological concept that affirmed that all the baptized participate in all the priestly roles of Jesus Christ, which includes prayer, sacrifice, and mediation of grace.⁴¹ Laity were given pride of place in the renewal of Christian life in the reshaping of the Church. This took place at the same time of an incredible authority vacuum in the Church. After the close of the council in 1965, the priesthood and religious life across the Western world collapsed as thousands of priests and religious sisters left ministry. The most memorable experience for many, however, was that the Mass could now be said in vernacular languages, instead of Latin. The springtime of Roman Catholicism that many expected after the council did not come to

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fruition and many were disappointed when Pope Paul reaffirmed the Church’s longstanding moral prohibition of artificial birth control in 1968’s *Humanae Vitae*.

The supermajority of American Catholic laity did not accept the Church’s teaching on birth control, much less consider it morally binding under pain of sin. However, most lay Catholics did not mourn for the lack of authority. They celebrated having a sense of moral autonomy when it came to birth control and many of their priests agreed. There is no tangible method of enforcement in the prohibition of birth control and so most Catholics planned their families as they saw fit. Dissent from authoritative Catholic teaching was normalized with birth control. This attitude fed into the discussion of *The Challenge of Peace* when self-identified conservative Catholics, who prided themselves on their orthodox adherence to moral issues like birth control and especially abortion, refused to accept their bishops’ teaching on the morality of nuclear deterrence.

The bishops discerned that their faithful had erroneous and incomplete understandings of conscience and the authority of the magisterium. Thus, they rallied around *Humanae Vitae* in their national pastoral *Human Life in Our Day* (1968). Not all bishops agreed. Many publicly expressed hope that Catholic doctrine would change on birth control. Their basis for so doing was that Vatican II had shown that Catholic teaching could evolve and therefore birth control could as well. While acknowledging the positivity of all Vatican II’s exhortations for respecting the role of the laity in the Church, the bishops also had to affirm the Church’s teaching on birth control, abortion,

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and the moral authority of the Church in general. *Human Life in Our Day* demonstrated that the bishops detected a problem with the understanding of authority in the Church and responded accordingly. This proved crucial for the later construction of their argument against nuclear deterrence in *The Challenge of Peace*.

The nuclear age had introduced a paradigm shift in warfare and the Catholic Church had a consistent tradition of skepticism about the morality of war. They got closer to war and peace issues in their 1972 pastoral *To Live in Christ Jesus*. In fact, the pastoral was the first official document of the American Church to treat nuclear weapons with more than a couple sentences. It was more assertive about the Church’s role in the public square, insofar as it took for granted that the Church must be formator of culture and conscience and not the other way around. It moved toward the further development of a theology of peace with its brief comments on nuclear deterrence.\(^4\) The bishops were looking to rediscover their role in the life of the post-conciliar Church and sought to do so without compromising on the new charisms of the laity. This proved easier said than done, and many bishops expressed discomfort with the reassertion of their own authority. The trends in the papal teaching and the U.S. Church, however, made a document on nuclear weapons more and more likely as the 1970s went on.

As authority both governmental and moral was questioned as the 1960s waned, activism for liberal causes flourished in the American Church. One of the most popular cases for Catholics were the various anti-war movements. The 1970s saw the emergence of the American chapter of Pax Christi, an international Catholic organization dedicated to anti-war initiatives. The president of Pax Christi, Bishop Thomas Gumbleton,

eventually found himself as a drafting member on the ad hoc committee for *The Challenge of Peace*. While the Church and its bishops did not condone the radicalism of the Berrigan brothers and violent anti-war protests, they lent themselves to pacifist causes. The peace movement merged nicely with the nuclear freeze movement that exploded upon Reagan’s election, supported by a sizeable minority of bishops. The political implications that alignment with such causes implied alarmed many Catholics who tended toward conservative politics or who were disillusioned with the protest movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many bishops would not align themselves to political causes of the center-left until *The Challenge of Peace*, and even then, they absolutely insisted on their political independence. Laypeople, however, were the primary audience for and embracers of the pacifist and non-violent ethic forwarded by Pax Christi and others. These activists were natural supporters of the freeze movement, covered holistically by Henry Maar in *Freeze!*\(^46\) Lay activism after the Council did not end with liberal causes, however.

**The Pastoral’s Lay Critics**

*The Challenge of Peace* had a fair number of Catholic conservative critics who strenuously objected to the bishops’ guidelines in *The Challenge of Peace*. Previous studies of the pastoral tended to dismiss these critics as mere pundits.\(^47\) In reality, the critics often had intelligent, constructive critiques of the pastoral based on their knowledge of American foreign policy and of the dignity of the laity following Vatican II. They were the most formidable foes of the ad hoc committee insofar as they could

\(^{46}\) Maar III, *Freeze!* 34.

combine political and military critiques with a deep knowledge of Catholic theology. They brought their arguments in favor of nuclear deterrence to the heart of the bishops’ concern for Catholic teaching about war and Vatican II’s prioritization of independent lay initiatives. William Clark, while a devout Catholic, could not speak to those issues as National Security Advisor.

Michael Novak, a well-known neo-conservative Catholic public intellectual, was the leader of the critics, with Philip Lawler and George Weigel closely following. Lawler was then a scholar in residence at the conservative think-tank The Heritage Foundation with no expertise in war and peace. President Reagan adopted whole segments of Heritage’s policy proposals, which were funded by conservative business activists Joseph Coors, Paul Weyrich, and Edwin Feulner. Lawler was a journalist by training. Novak wrote what is infamously known as the “counterpastoral,” Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age. Novak’s criticism of the bishops’ project bordered on disdain toward them and especially Archbishop Bernardin. Weigel corresponded with Bernardin and critiqued the pastoral’s understanding of American nuclear policy and diplomacy. Lawler preferred to question the second draft’s understanding of then-current American deterrence policy. The public questioning of the ad hoc committee’s project showed that the dissent of the faithful manifested in diverse forms after Vatican II, even among self-identified conservatives whose public identity was based in part on agreement with the Church on even contentious matters of faith and morals. The existence of the conservative Catholic

49 Robert R. Reilly and Philip Lawler, Justice and War in the Nuclear Age (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1983).
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critique also bleeds into the political conservative ascendancy that marked that Reagan era.

Michael Novak, Philip Lawler and George Weigel were the most articulate lay conservative critics of the bishops’ project. All three were conservative scholars at right-of-center think-tanks. Novak, who once wore peace beads in protests against the Vietnam War, led the charge against the pastoral, waged a very public and sometimes nasty battle against the bishops. Lawler led the American Catholic Committee, a recently-formed collective of conservative Catholic intellectual organizations. In October of 1982, the Committee organized an anti-Freeze conference in Washington. Former national security advisor Richard Allen and Bishop O’Connor were featured speakers.50 Weigel was a fellow at the ironically named World Without War Council, a neo-conservative think-tank dedicated to advocating NGOs involvement in preventing international conflict. He also wrote and edited for the new journal Catholicism in Crisis, founded by Novak and by Notre Dame philosophy professor Ralph McInerny. The journal dedicated considerable space in its pages to issues of war and peace, always on the opposite side of the ad hoc committee.51 All three men had personal correspondence about the war and peace pastoral with Archbishop Bernardin. Both Novak and Weigel had been liberals in their youth and switched allegiance in the decade before Reagan, dating them in the first generation of religious neo-conservatives.52 These three men, who knew each other socially and collaborated on other projects, formed the lay Catholic intellectual response

51 Catholicism in Crisis, Vol. 2, No. 4 (March 1984), Box 3, OA 11675, Bruce Chapman Papers, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (herein RRL), Simi Valley, CA.
52 Scribner, A Partisan Church, viii.
to the ad hoc committee. Jim Castelli took a rather dim view of Novak and Lawler, viewing them as little more than cranks.\(^{53}\) As a result, the depth of argument and the sustained engagement of these three laymen in the drafting process of *The Challenge of Peace* has been largely overlooked. This lacuna also shares in the broader oversight of historians in studying Christian conservatives during the Reagan years.

Lest the triple effort of Lawler, Novak, and Weigel against the pastoral be considered a niche criticism among the broader tapestry of American conservatives, their point of view had an important booster outside Catholic media. William F. Buckley, Jr., a Catholic and America’s most well-known conservative intellectual, gave Novak an entire issue of his *National Review* for excerpts of his short book against the bishops’ pastoral, *Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age*. Buckley himself, in his familiar flippant style, wrote against the pastoral, with some of the articles showing up at the National Security Council offices.\(^{54}\) The constellation of political conservatism, post-Vatican II Catholicism, and Cold War politics set up an intricate paradox. Dissent was the rule instead of the exception when it came to the laity’s reception of various reiterations of Catholic doctrine on the part of the bishops after Vatican II. Vast swaths of the laity dissented on abortion, birth control, episcopal authority, among other issues.

Novak, Lawler, and Weigel intentionally cultivated their identities as Catholics who still believed what the Church taught, even on moral issues that had broken the gravitas of episcopal authority in the American Church. They held themselves up as Catholics who believed in both the letter and the law of Catholic dogma and doctrine. On

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\(^{53}\) Castelli, *The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age*. 108, 149.

\(^{54}\) William F. Buckley, Jr., “Bishops’ Pastoral Letter: Over and Out?” *Latin America Daily Post*, December 1, 1982, Box 1, Folder 5, William Clark Papers, RRL.
paper, they would be aligned with the bishops, who were charged theologically and institutionally with being the guardians of Catholic belief in their given domains. While the bishops ultimately sidestepped their critiques, they had had to engage with them as they wrote the pastoral with an eye on its reception by the American Catholic laity. These laymen broke with their bishops on war and peace. Even so, the Lawler, Novak, and Weigel correspondence with the ad hoc committee exposed a paradoxical situation within the American Church. This time, it was the conservatives who refused to go along with the bishops. With the critics of *The Challenge of Peace*, self-styled orthodox Catholic laymen vocally disagreed with the bishops over a highly contested issue.

**Aims of Project**

What follows is an analysis of *The Challenge of Peace*, the internal debates that accompanied its drafting process, and the role of the Reagan administration in both. Roman Catholicism depends theologically and institutionally on continuity and development over time. As a result, more introductory material and contextualization is necessary before *The Challenge of Peace* can be discussed in earnest. The first chapter will feature an analysis of magisterial papal statements on war and peace after the Second World War as well as those of the American bishops. The second chapter features an overview of episcopal and papal authority and their specific theological underpinnings to ensure a holistic understanding of just what the magisterium means and what bishops and popes can and cannot say with authority. The theological backings for episcopal authority changed over time and in a particular way after Vatican II. The council also had much to say about war and peace and so it also makes up a fundamental part of the trajectory toward *The Challenge of Peace*. The second chapter seeks to emphasize the role of the
council itself in this process. The pastoral would have been impossible without the
council. Previous study of the pastoral, even Castelli’s book, does not feature such
theological background.

The drafting process is covered here to elucidate the problems, especially the
intrapersonal ones that emerged as the committee debated among itself. Chapter 3
introduces the ad hoc committee and lays out the issues that emerged during the first
draft. Such a breakdown of the drafting process is necessary to demonstrate the change in
content over time alongside the evolving political and ecclesiastical context. The fifth
chapter emphasizes the narrative of the drafting second and third drafts. It also explains
the content and circumstances of the Holy See’s 1983 intervention, demonstrating the
conflicting priorities in the war and peace debate between Rome and the American
bishops. The three drafts of the pastoral were extremely different from one another except
for the second and third and the timing of their changes are also an important part of this
study’s argumentation. This study covers administration involvement in Chapter 4,
focusing on National Security Advisor William Clark’s years-long crusade against the
bishops’ project. Chapter 4 also establishes why the administration worried so much over
the bishops’ opinion on nuclear weapons, grounded in the administration’s consistent
cultivation of conservative religious bodies. An in-depth analysis of The Challenge of
Peace follows in Chapter 6. Michael Novak’s response to the bishops, in the form of a
pamphlet called Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age, is also summarized in Chapter 6. The
Challenge of Peace was a carefully constructed national pastoral that ran afoul of the
nuclear pretensions of the Reagan administration. It made the administration realize that
the support of conservative religious groups did not depend only on social policy,
especially one representing millions of voters like the Catholic Church. While not the only factor, *The Challenge of Peace* influenced President Reagan into reworking his nuclear policy. On the other hand, moving hearts in the public square was easy enough for the bishops, but moving minds was more difficult. The naked public square would not be clothed so easily.
Chapter 1: American Nuclear Policy and the Church

Foreign Policy and Nuclear Weapons

Before *The Challenge of Peace* can be analyzed, context is necessary for framing the political and ecclesiastical sphere in which it emerged. The dropping of two atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945 added a new and unspeakably destructive factor into foreign policy considerations. The bombed-out remains of the two cities appeared to be as a dress rehearsal of the apocalypse. However, even most supporters of the decision to drop the bomb agreed that the weapon should never be used again based on the sheer destruction witnessed in Japan. The potential for nuclear accidents also became paramount as technology progressed. Proliferation was a consistent concern. Both the Soviet Union and the United States suspended nuclear tests from 1958 to 1961. In 1959, the American public began to realize the environmental effects of nuclear testing within and without the confines of the continental United States after scientific studies showed radioactive deposits present in milk and wheat in Utah and Nevada.55 The Limited Test Ban Treaty (LBT) was only formally signed in 1963 after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Underground explosive tests were still permitted under the condition that fallout would not occur beyond the national borders of the testing nation.56 While a step in the direction of non-proliferation, such policies left its signatories with little incentive for disarmament. Underground testing was intended to respect then-

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current arsenals and increase verifiability but had the effect of worsening transparency in all areas.

In his brief papacy, John XXIII saw the Cold War at its most volatile point, when nuclear warfare leading to massive global destruction was a real possibility in Cuba. Nuclear technology had progressed along with proliferation. The Holy See acted as an intermediary between the Kremlin and Washington. Before his election, the pope had been a career Vatican diplomat with stints in Turkey, Bulgaria, and France. John’s most important contribution came when President Kennedy set the blockade around Cuba and Khrushchev gave orders to the Soviet field commanders to launch the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles on the island if the Americans invaded. Khrushchev was also under pressure to mollify Castro, who wanted the Americans to stop meddling in Cuban affairs permanently. After the aborted American invasion at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, Castro embraced the Soviets for their promises of protection so that he could make further progress in his revolution. Newer scholarship has also shown that at one point Robert Kennedy pressured the president to invade and accept the nuclear consequences.

An overlooked aspect of the fear surrounding the Cuban situation was technological. The Soviet ballistic missiles featured new delivery vehicles that could either be ground or cruise launched. They also had two-stage capability that allowed payloads to be deployed into a low Earth orbit, which would concentrate the effects of

radiation over a target area.\textsuperscript{61} The pope saw that the rapidly-escalating crisis was occurring outside of the traditional just war categories that would have offered guidance in a less technologically advanced time. For example, the standoff took place outside a state of war and the lines between offensive and defensive attack could not be clearly established. Pope John’s priority was to prevent the further nuclear escalation of the conflict. The pope urged goodwill of both sides in a radio address, reminding them that, “…promoting, favoring, accepting conversations, at all levels and in any time, is a rule of wisdom and prudence which attracts the blessings of heaven and earth.”\textsuperscript{62} Pope John was able to provide Khrushchev with a safety valve. In abiding by the pope’s exhortation, Khrushchev could be seen as peacemaker in the international community instead of viewed as weak for backing down to the Americans. The crisis was over two days later, thanks in part to Pope John’s deft intervention.\textsuperscript{63}

For a time, Cuba served as a grave warning of what nuclear confrontation and proliferation meant for foreign policy. It had a more notable effect of altering the trajectory of American and Soviet nuclear approaches. De-escalation and reduction in nuclear arsenals were the goals, but so too was deterrence to assure parity.\textsuperscript{64} Deterrence—often referred to as Mutually Assured Destruction or MAD—became the main policy point of contention. Progress continued in disarmament. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty banned nuclear weapons from being launched from space in the midst of the Space Race.

\textsuperscript{62} Hebblethwaite, \textit{John XXIII: Pope of the Century}. 231.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (1965) was opened to additional signatories in 1968. The 1960s saw real gains in arms control but lacked compliance standards and expectations of mutual variability, making the public jettisoning of arms control standards by the NATO powers and the Soviets alike the standard of affairs. The war in Vietnam also provided a convenient public distraction and political excuse for non-compliance.

Richard Nixon (1969-1974) and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sought to rework the status quo between the United States and USSR by implementing a policy of détente, a large part of which were arms control initiatives. The lesson of Cuba was that arms control was necessary but also that the other side could not be trusted. As a result, both the United States and USSR maintained an arsenal of select weapons to assure defense and strategic advantage. Deterrence, then, was the matrix through which arms control worked. Détente was marketed as the United States and Soviet Union normalizing their relationship, stepping back from hair trigger brinksmanship. Diplomacy would replace conflict in Vietnam and other regional hotspots. In practice, détente was characterized by secret negotiations and backdoor deals that did not inspire trust from either party. Even so, it did achieve some victories. Nixon established relations with China in 1972. Kissinger and Nixon won a major arms control victory with the USSR in the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I). Signed in 1972, SALT froze the current levels of strategic ballistic missile launchers (SBMLs) and permitted the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) only after older ICBMs, such as the first Minuteman missile launchers, were dismantled. The treaty encouraged

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65 Cameron. 65.

parity and disarmament. For example, it limited SLBM-capable submarines to fifty for
the United States. If the United States decided to increase the number, the Soviets could
increase the same amount of their own. SALT assured mutual disarmament and arms
control by mandating a tactical disadvantage if one side or the other attempted to build
more than they were allowed. SALT was realistic and conservative in its aims, but it did
refocus arms control discussions on potentially destabilizing weapons systems. An
accompanying 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty forbade the use of smaller
missiles to shoot down larger, nuclear ones except for one site in each nation. This
measure further strengthened deterrence and MAD.

Détente dovetailed with Vietnamization and calming nuclear threat. Nixon and
Kissinger agreed upon a system that had as its aims the restoration of American military
might abroad through a redistribution of political and military action on a more localized
basis. Thus, the administration could solve the Vietnam problem by gradual American
withdrawal with greater independence in tactics and policy for the South Vietnamese.

The historian Jeremi Suri notes that Kissinger still had to fall back on old-school nuclear
threats as the Chinese and Soviet influence in North Vietnam reached its peak. Worse
still, Nixon’s persistent fear of Sino-Soviet collusion in the North tended to filter
discussion through the lens of American anti-Communist policies of twenty years prior
despite the change in such a ferocious declaratory policy. Kissinger and Nixon often

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played loose with nuclear rhetoric by suggesting that nuclear weapons could be a viable option if Vietnamization did not go according to plan. Nixon’s infamous madman theory depended upon the nuclear threat, that Nixon was so intent on ending the war and was personally unstable enough to order a nuclear strike. Kissinger also used madman theory as a constitutive part of his backchannel diplomacy at peace talks with North Vietnam in Paris in 1971 and 1972. He successfully convinced the Arabs to demur Soviet support in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War by raising the nuclear option. The greatest success of Nixon’s détente with the Soviets was SALT I and the opening to China, but détente was also woven into foreign policy strategies that undermined disarmament at the same time they encouraged arms control. In diplomatic negotiations, the Nixon administration was happy to use nuclear weapons as bargaining chips.

Ronald Reagan was elected to the American presidency on a platform that promised to restore American military might after a decade of reduced defense spending due to the winding down of the Vietnam War and U.S. withdrawal. The public humiliation of Nixon’s resignation in 1974 and the fall of Saigon in 1975 inspired a drive to regain America’s national prestige. American self-confidence, often connected with the might of the nation’s armed forces, seemed in jeopardy at the end of the 1970s. Moderate Democrat Jimmy Carter combined détente-centered reconciliation initiatives with a hawkish suspicion of Soviet intentions. A struggle soon unfolded between Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzeziński, and Secretary of State Cyrus

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71 Suri, 80.
Vance. Some in the media caricatured the Polish-born Brzeziński as an anti-Soviet hawk and the patrician Vance as a centrist statesman. Carter scored some major diplomatic accomplishments with the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty and the 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. Carter’s other major victory was the Brzeziński-engineered visit of Chinese premier Deng Xiaoping to America in 1977. He also welcomed Pope John Paul to America in 1979, where Brzezinski reconnected with his old acquaintance in the Polish pope. After 1977, Carter began quietly to increase defense spending, including updating the nuclear stockpile. His efforts were dashed with the Iranian hostage crisis effectively ending his chances for reelection. In his place came Ronald Reagan, who promised that America was finished with embarrassments like Vietnam and Iran.

Reagan’s Nuclear Policy

Reagan’s resurrection of the nuclear issue proved alarming. The new president had no problem offering reasons for why the stockpile should be increased and raising the possibility of developing the neutron bomb. The neutron bomb (ERW, enhanced radiation weapon) was a low-yield thermonuclear weapon that prioritized lethal radiation over explosive capacity, making it perfect for tactical deployment. However, it was also designed to maximize human causalities while leaving materiel and physical structures intact. On the campaign trail, Reagan attacked détente to popular acclaim. The president assembled a foreign and defense policy team that had in common a lack of foreign policy

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78 Auten. 188-189.
experience. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, a Catholic, was a career army officer and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger had worked for Governor Reagan in California. Reagan had difficulty with his National Security Advisors in his first term. Richard Allen lasted hardly a year and so too did William Clark. The National Security Council (NSC) was plagued by in-fighting and Haig’s propensity to play loosely with nuclear rhetoric. Haig testified publicly that a nuclear attack on the United States could be perfectly survivable with only a few hundred thousand casualties. Haig’s private bluster found its way to the press as well. In a 1981 cabinet meeting about Soviet military maneuvers in Cuba, Haig said to Reagan, “Give me the word and I’ll make that island a fucking parking lot.” Even more confident was T.K. Jones, undersecretary of defense for research, strategic, and theater nuclear forces. He told a reporter, “…everybody's going to make it if there are enough shovels to go around. Dig a hole, cover it with a few doors, and then throw three feet of dirt on top. It's the dirt that does it.” Reagan lacked the political awareness to understand that he and his administration were stoking the fears of Americans by discussing the nuclear issue so cavalierly. Gil Troy notes that Reagan’s belligerence toward the Soviets played up his supporters’ expectations for a confrontation

83 Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role Of A Lifetime (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 163.
that the administration could not hope to fulfil.\textsuperscript{85} Reagan was a master rhetorician, but the problem came when the media and millions of Americans believed his rhetoric.

The new president was also a devoted anti-Communist who could not see past the image of the soulless Soviet monolith through most of his first term. Like many American Catholics of the early Cold War period, Reagan was convinced of the evil of the Soviet system and not much else. This, combined with his lack of foreign policy experience and a hostile press, only worsened the climate of fear surrounding his nuclear policy.\textsuperscript{86} Reagan had a superficial understanding at best of American nuclear strategy, especially détente.\textsuperscript{87} Some historians short-change Reagan’s commitment to ideological anti-Communism, but William Knoblauch makes a compelling case for its authenticity, though his evaluation is negative.\textsuperscript{88} Still, popular consensus had declared détente dead, leaving a vacuum in foreign policy that Reagan and his advisors moved quickly to fill. The time was right, in their estimation, to confront the Soviet Union aggressively. This sparked a climate of fear surrounding arms control or lack thereof. Eugene Rostow, Reagan’s first director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was a Democrat who distrusted détente and asserted that the United States could survive a nuclear attack without catastrophic trouble, based on the example of Japan’s rebound after the war.\textsuperscript{89} Repackaging nuclear war as survivable and an option for America’s defense was not received well by the majority of Americans and the nation’s Catholic bishops.

\textsuperscript{88} Knoblauch, \textit{Nuclear Freeze in a Cold War: The Reagan Administration, Cultural Activism, and the End of the Arms Race}. 79.
While most foreign policy experts agreed that the status quo of Soviet engagement needed to change, Reagan’s first term posturing was aggressive and irresponsible when it came to nuclear weapons. Members of the administration queried openly if the Soviets could be held to their previous diplomatic agreements and were unwilling to negotiate them citing a lack of trust. Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Eugene Rostow felt SALT II to be a severe undercutting of America’s military readiness and did not trust the Soviets to disarm accordingly. Public outcry especially erupted following the administration’s deployment of the Pershing II missiles to West Germany in the fall of 1981 as a part of the zero-option proposal. While hailed by some as finally playing the sort of hardball that the Soviets could understand, many saw zero-option as an unfulfillable proposition. The Soviets would never dream of ceasing their own deployment of their SS-20 missiles. John Lewis Gaddis maintains that Reagan’s nuclear buildup forced the Soviets to tread lightly and that the peace through strength pretension was effective in helping end the Cold War. However, the cost of peace through strength was years of deficit spending to the extent that the national debt tripled by the time Reagan left office and a climate of fear that empowered critics of the administration.

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93 Donaghy, *The Second Cold War*, 139-140.
The Defense Buildup

Reagan’s speeches and policies during his first term confirmed his distrust of the Soviets. Two months after he entered office, he announced the largest peacetime defense buildup in the nation’s history. Reagan announced his massive 43% defense increase as America’s economy was just starting to recover after the inflation and oil troubles of the 1970s. The first year of the military buildup was earmarked for some 300 billion dollars, with the lion’s share of the funds going to modernizing technology and personnel operations in the armed forces. The buildup further confirmed his critics’ view of him as a warmonger, but more recent historians have noted that America’s military had indeed fallen into decay. The armed forces had contracted to the lowest amount of men in uniform since the 1930s, plagued by poor pay and poor family benefits. American aircraft, most of it dating from the Korean and Vietnam Wars, was rotting, as well as its seacraft. America’s nuclear warheads dated from Vietnam and before, at a time when the Soviets were spending billions to achieve nuclear parity. Supporters of the buildup often cited dubious statistics that the Soviets had in fact reached supremacy in payload by the 1980s, though the opening of the Soviet archives has proven that false. These archives have also revealed the Soviets were in serious trouble in their own defense and economic posture.

The U.S. increases focused on improvements in major weaponry systems and personnel in the armed forces and defense industries. The tagline was “Peace through strength,” repeated with gusto by the president and Secretary of Defense Weinberger. Of note for the nuclear issue was the resuming of the B-1 bomber program, which had been shelved by Carter. The B-1 was a lighter, faster attack aircraft that combined stealth and bomber technology. It was specifically designed for carrying nuclear payloads in multiple types of delivery vehicles.\(^{100}\) While the B-2 was already in development, the B-1 program was resumed to bridge the gap between the B-52 and much more advanced B-2.\(^{101}\) In October of 1981, Reagan announced that the Department of Defense had ordered one hundred B-1s from Rockwell.\(^{102}\) This stop-gap measure was characteristic of the defense buildup. Reagan’s Department of Defense merely greenlit the B-1’s production. Still, the one hundred B-1s cost $26.5 billion.\(^{103}\) Weaponry also saw a substantial upgrade. The MX missile, nicknamed “the Peacemaker” designed to carry the latest in nuclear warheads, was the centerpiece. The buildup centered on reestablishing America’s military supremacy, not just its readiness. Nuclear weapons were a primary means of achieving this end. As such, it was an initiative that was alien to the document the bishops were developing.

The Pershing IIs were the crown jewels of Reagan’s defense buildup. They were state-of-the-art nuclear weapons at the time and allowed missiles with multiple warheads to be launched from the interior of NATO territory. They had a top range of just under

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\(^{100}\) Donaghy, *The Second Cold War*. 55.

\(^{101}\) Auten, *Carter’s Conversion*. 131.


one thousand miles. As a ballistic missile, the Pershing II did not require high grade launchers and utilized the latest radar technology to pinpoint its target and prevent unnecessary fallout. Unlike the Pershing, the Soviets’ SS-20s, 4s and 5s prioritized payload and had limited cruise capability but were intermediate range.104 The range of the missiles in question especially raised the fears of the public. Nowhere in Europe was safe from a nuclear strike.105 The west coast of the United States would be vulnerable as well. Missiles could now be launched without much problem from deep within a combatant’s territory, limiting the capability of an enemy to launch a counterstrike. They were a worst-case scenario for the bishops.

With billions being spread around the armed forces and defense apparatuses, waste was considerable. The buildup gave contractors and defense outlets free rein with their new largesse, leading to substantial increases in build cost. Various scandals flared up with the military purchasing hammers and toilet seats for hundreds of dollars per unit.106 The administration also bypassed any oversight bodies that might have prevented such price fixing. Another initiative was addressing America’s sorely lacking sealift. New aircraft carriers would cost the taxpayer billions and Reagan solved the problem through another cost-effective measure.107 He began a program that aimed to reuse World War II-era Iowa-class battleship to avoid building new seacraft. Elements of the media largely lampooned. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman defended the project by claiming

105 Maar III, Freeze! 118.
that such ships were in working order, having been floated as reserves in case of war.⁹⁸ These ships needed major upgrades in fuel storage and weapons capacity. They needed refitting in order to carry new Tomahawk and LAM (land attack missiles) projectiles.⁹⁹ This combination, massive spending with questionable cost-saving measures, mirrored the new administration’s economic policy.

Reagan halted the generous welfare spending of the previous decade. The 1970s saw high unemployment as the post-war manufacturing boom ended, inspiring a strengthening of Lyndon Johnson’s reimagined Great Society anti-poverty initiatives. On the campaign trail, Reagan had jeered what he termed “welfare queens” and delivered on his promises to cut social services.¹⁰¹ Stagflation plagued the 1970s and continued into Reagan’s first term.¹⁰² Reagan’s solution was to deregulate price controls, notably in crude oil, and slash social safety net benefits. In his 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act, Reagan lowered the top tax bracket from 70% to 50% and the lowest bracket from 14% to 11%.¹⁰³ However, such extreme changes were not sustained. The percentages were rolled back every year, stopping just two percentage points below their pre-1981 levels by the time Reagan left office.¹⁰⁴ Wages either stagnated or declined, but household wealth increased, including some historic gains by low-income Black households. GDP increased by an average of 3.5% from 1982 on.¹⁰⁵ The deep recession that marked

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¹⁰⁵ Gil Troy, Morning in America: How Ronald Reagan Invented the 1980s. 91.
Reagan’s first term also introduced cuts that effected the poor and working-class. Among the programs effected were Medicaid, Medicare, and EBT. Between 1981 and 1982, $22 billion was eliminated from social spending.\textsuperscript{115} Reaganomics had modest but real gains in economic mobility, but the rest of the reforms went straight into defense and nuclear readiness. Among the strongest critics of the arms build-up combined with Reagan’s social program cuts were those in the Nuclear Freeze movement.

The Administration and the Nuclear Freeze

The Nuclear Freeze movement stands one of the largest protest movements of the twentieth century and put the administration on notice that their nuclear policies generated widespread ill-will. Henry Maar in his \textit{Freeze!} emphasizes the grassroots origins of the movement, which had its roots in the late 1970s and had numerous professional activists behind it such as the Australian physician Helen Caldicott and her Physicians for Social Responsibility.\textsuperscript{116} The Freeze movement, in which various activist groups were loosely united under the banner of freezing any and all nuclear deployment, testing, and programming, gained public cache quickly and the administration realized it faced a serious opposition problem.\textsuperscript{117} Many Democrats who had voted for Reagan were uncomfortable with the administration’s aggressive nuclear posturing. This group included Catholics, the largest religious denomination in the country that had previously been a reliable blue vote. Reagan had just barely won a majority of Catholics.\textsuperscript{118} The Freeze movement attracted a range of groups. Anti-nuclear feeling bled out of activist

\textsuperscript{116} Maar III, \textit{Freeze!} 62.
\textsuperscript{117} Memo, Joanna Bistany to David Gergen, April 5, 1982, “Subject: Anti-Nuclear Movement,” OA 7886, Nuclear Policy/Churches, David Gergen Files, RRL.
\textsuperscript{118} Maar III, \textit{Freeze!} 72.
circles and went mainstream, reaching a wider Democratic base. Maar describes the broadening of the movement as when the administration took notice, toward the end of Reagan’s first year in office.\textsuperscript{119} \textit{The Challenge of Peace} must be viewed in this context of popular hostility at Reagan’s nuclear bellicosity. Robert McFarlane, then William Clark’s deputy in the NSC, realized the implications the freeze could have for midterms and had staffers traveling around the country monitoring its activities.\textsuperscript{120} The Freeze gained traction throughout 1982 and even the president understood that some of his more aggressive nuclear posturing had to be curtailed.

In addition to the Freeze advocates, the Reagan administration had to contend with a reenergized Catholic peace movement. Pax Christi emerged as the main peace group after Vatican II and had the most direct input in drafting \textit{The Challenge of Peace}. After Vatican II, lay Catholic social activities skewed liberal on issues such as poverty, even though Catholics themselves, especially in their Italian and Polish subgroups, were among the most socially conservative groups in American politics.\textsuperscript{121} Originally founded in France in 1945 after the Second World War, Pax Christi’s public profile skyrocketed when Pope Pius XII formally endorsed it as the flagship Catholic international peace organization in 1952. It found a second life in the founding of its American chapter in 1972. Among its founders were Bishop Thomas Gumbleton and the MIT sociologist Gordon Zahn.\textsuperscript{122} Zahn was a consultant to the ad hoc committee. University chapters sprang up rapidly in the 1970s. While Pax Christi was active in anti-Vietnam protests, it

\textsuperscript{119} Maar III. 56-57.
\textsuperscript{120} Maar III. 65-66.
was committed to non-violent pacifism and therefore was insulated from the most radical Catholic and Christian peace movement groups.\textsuperscript{123} Zahn and Gumbleton could cite approvingly the radical pacifist activism of the Berrigan brothers, both of whom were priests, but were not directly involved in activities like burning draft cards in the Catonsville 9 incident.\textsuperscript{124}

Pax Christi occupied a space for Catholic peace activists who advocated non-violence but still prioritized institutional affiliation. Membership in Pax Christi greatly increased following Reagan’s election in 1980. Bishop James Lyke claimed during a meeting of the NCCB that he managed to get 25 bishops to join in 1981.\textsuperscript{125} Over 100 bishops would join Pax Christi in the early 1980s, representing approximately forty percent of the United States’ 260 bishops.\textsuperscript{126} Pax also had notable voices in the hierarchy aside from its president Bishop Gumbleton, such as Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen of Seattle and Bishop P. Francis Murphy, auxiliary bishop of Baltimore.\textsuperscript{127} Despite Pax Christi’s sizeable episcopal membership in the early Reagan years, the organization was lay-dominated and directed.\textsuperscript{128} While they were also at the forefront of Catholic peace issues, hundreds of other smaller peace groups and New Left-leaning Catholic


\textsuperscript{127} Notes, Father J. Bryan Hehir, November 18, 1981, “Discussion of Archbishop Bernardin’s Report.”

organizations also flourished in the post-conciliar years. Bishops felt emboldened to officially endorse pacifism, thereby publicly questioning American foreign policy.

As a result of all this pressure, President Reagan reevaluated his nuclear policy. While foreign policy was a jumbled mess at the beginning of his first term, with lack of consistency and personnel problems plaguing the cabinet, Reagan learned from his mistakes. More recent Reagan scholarship has reevaluated the role of the president himself in nuclear policy formation. As public backlash mounted and some of his advisors advocated moderation, Reagan began to look at the specifics of what nuclear war would actually mean for the nation and became increasingly horrified at the prospect. Lawrence Witmer demonstrated that Reagan had previously been a nuclear skeptic, going all the way back to his Democrat days in Hollywood. The First Lady also had a hand in convincing him that nuclear skepticism was more advantageous politically than nuclear belligerence. By April 1982, he seemed a changed man, “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” He even told the freeze activists, “I am with you.” Reagan’s cabinet was in turmoil over the president’s softer line, especially his Secretary of State Haig. But by July 1982, Haig had resigned and was replaced with George Shultz, who would serve for the rest of the presidency. Shultz reinforced Reagan’s newfound appreciation for the danger of irresponsible nuclear policy. Reagan still maintained his personal revulsion for the Soviets but was able to separate his nuclear policy from it. Maar reads Reagan’s more restrained public posture as the administration’s attempt to co-

130 Coleman and Longley, *Reagan in the World*. 15
opt the freeze movement while working against it behind the scenes.\footnote{Maar III, \textit{Freeze!} 214.} The progressive strengthening of the nation’s nuclear capacity and first-strike weaponry proves him correct to an extent. Reagan became progressively more anti-nuclear over time but also monitored and challenged his anti-nuclear critics.

**SALT II and John Cardinal Krol**

The U.S. Catholic bishops closely watched the military buildup and arms control initiatives that began under Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s. John Cardinal Krol was Archbishop of Philadelphia and a stalwart conservative in the NCCB. He was also an unabashed liberal when it came to the nuclear question, going as far to support unilateral nuclear disarmament. Cardinal Krol was strategically chosen by the NCCB to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations committee in support of SALT II. Begun in 1972, this second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty was intended to be the centerpiece of Carter’s arms reduction efforts but faced a difficult road in Congress. SALT II was the first nuclear treaty that mandated reductions in both delivery vehicles and payload in all categories. New missile programs were to be banned as well, along with any payload increases (5\% and above the then-current missiles).\footnote{Dan Caldwell, \textit{The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate} (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 180.} By this time, United States Catholic Conference (USCC) staffers were regular pundits before the various Senate committees. Father Bryan Hehir recalled that he testified before Congress “at least twice” by 1985.\footnote{Hehir, Father J. Bryan, Brooke Tranten Interview with Father J. Bryan Hehir, interview by Brooke Tranten, Telephone, June 29, 2022.} However, cardinals were not ordinary witnesses, especially one who had been a recent president of the NCCB. The journalist Jim Castelli read the choice of Krol as a
move to “…defuse conservative criticism of the treaty.” Krol was never known as a dove in his outlook on the Soviet Union, with his deep familial connections to his parents’ homeland in Poland. He was, however, convinced of the danger of deterrence strategy along the lines of more liberal bishops like Francis Murphy or Archbishop Hunthausen.

Krol’s testimony emphasized the bishops’ priorities in the nuclear issues. He said that his comments arose from moral and religious principles rather than any political considerations. The principles from which Krol argued were traditional just war categories and the Vatican II document *Gaudium et Spes*’ comments on just war. Krol gave the episcopate’s rubber stamp on progressive moral theology on war in the nuclear age: “In a nuclear age, the moral sanctions against war have taken on a *qualitatively new character.*” The nuclear age had changed the nature of warfare and national security as the world had previously known it and a plurality (at least 2/3 of the bishops based on the voting rules of the NCCB) believed that. By testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the bishops made their opinions very public. Nuclear deterrence had to be considered alongside this *“qualitatively new character.”* Krol’s testimony anticipated the general cast of *The Challenge of Peace* but was also characteristic of Krol’s general conservatism and that of many like-minded bishops’ understanding of nuclear issues.

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Strong language against mutual assured destruction and deterrence persisted in Krol’s testimony. The United States not possessing any nuclear weapons at all would be preferable, but living a nuclear age implied some reservations on disarmament. Any use of strategic nuclear weapons, whatever their definition, was not permissible, nor were first strikes, “Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself.”

Krol and the bishops’ considerations were in the first place preventing the use of nuclear weapons and only then limiting their destructive capability. Even prior to those considerations, however, the bishops called for preventing such conflicts and arbitrating national disputes according to the principles of Catholic social teaching. The U.S. national security apparatus’ first principles in contrast rested on assuring national security and warding off threats that they perceived as perilous to the United States. These two orientations were incompatible from the start.

Months after Krol’s testimony, nuclear issues emerged still at the forefront of the NCCB’s concerns. President Reagan had campaigned against SALT II, promising a more muscular foreign policy to boost America’s fortunes abroad after Carter’s humiliation in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A constitutive part of Reagan’s campaign promises was renewed attention to America’s rapidly-aging nuclear stockpile. The fall 1980 annual meeting of the NCCB indicates the concern of the bishops. As a matter of routine business, Bishop Thomas Kelly, O.P., the general secretary of the NCCB, sent

139 Krol.
140 Memo, David Gergen to Administration Spokesmen, August 6, 1982, “Speech Material on Arms Control,” OA11222, Michael Baroody Files, RRL.
each member a letter to solicit what new members of the conference might wish to see discussed during their annual meeting. The *varia* (from the Latin *varium*, an intervention on the conference floor) indicated the worries of the activist bishops and moderates alike. Bishop P. Francis Murphy, joined by Walter Sullivan of Richmond and Edward O’Rourke of Peoria among others forwarded varia on nuclear issues. All were members of Pax Christi, the largest and most influential of the postwar Catholic peace organizations. Cardinal Krol also submitted a varium.142 Jim Castelli goes so far to say that Murphy caucused with these bishops, which Murphy denied.143 Vocal minorities generally do not carry the day at the NCCB, given that the conference’s bylaws were constructed precisely to avoid such partisanship. Most bishops do not intervene during the conference discussions in any case.144 Murphy, however, specifically called for the bishops to study intently the nuclear question.145 President of the conference, Archbishop John Roach of St. Paul-Minneapolis, witnessed enough support on the conference floor to inspire him to form an ad hoc committee to study the question.146

This chapter tracks the political history of arms control initiatives after 1945 with an introduction on how the Catholic Church reacted to them. While emphases on arms control have ebbed and flowed over time according to the geopolitical environment, such as with Vietnamization and the failure of détente, the trend in American policy pointed toward arms control but not disarmament. Meanwhile, the Catholic Church consistently pushed toward disarmament as the ideal. The Reagan administration represented a

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142 Notes, Father J. Bryan Hehir, “Discussion of Archbishop Bernardin’s Report” (ACHRC).
143 Castelli, *The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age*, 15.
146 Hehir, Father J. Bryan, Interview with Father Hehir.
recalibration of this trend as the disorganized staff and policy choices of the first term only increased fears of nuclear conflict. Reagan also had to grapple with the Freeze movement and a Catholic peace movement that critiqued his expensive defense initiatives. The American bishops found a critical voice on arms control in these years, as seen in Cardinal Krol’s SALT II testimony. All these factors provide context for the governmental and episcopal maneuvers that characterized the drafting process of *The Challenge of Peace*. 
Chapter 2: The Nuclear Issue, Authority, and the Episcopal Conference

Roman Catholic thought on war and peace has historically been a balancing act between holding peace as one of the highest Christian social ideals while acknowledging that war is endemic to the human condition. Christian teaching on war has been consistently negative and presents it as both a social and moral evil. The historical development of just war theory was intended to minimize the evils of warfare, though peace was the standard of reference. Many Christian theologians prior to the fifth century, such as Origen (185-254) and Tertullian (c. 160-c. 220), were pacifists even within this framework. The Mennonite moral theologian John Howard Yoder argued that the pre-Constantinian church was pacifist, though this is a debated historical question.147

Aside from Scripture, St. Augustine of Hippo (354-480) stated the earliest, most complete criteria for acceptable conditions of war in *City of God* (426). Writing at the end of the Roman empire, Augustine was searching for political and theological stability as the empire was under physical threat from Germanic tribes of the East. War was sometimes necessary to address an evil, but it needed to be conducted by proper authority, have a just cause, and have the correct intention (i.e., bringing about the end of the evil). Augustine also defined *ius ad bellum* (justice toward war) and *ius in bello* (justice in war), which describe the moral criteria for starting a war and proper conduct in its commission.148 The Roman Church by and large adopted Augustine’s approach.149

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149 St. Augustine of Hippo, *The City of God (De Civitate Dei), Part II*, 370.
St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) systematized Augustine’s three criteria in the thirteenth century, creating a set of conditions that went largely untouched until the atomic bomb was dropped. Aquinas was a part of the High Middle Ages’ effort to systematize Western theology. At the time, Christian kings’ war-making and conquest raised questions about what were permissible motivations for commencing war. Aquinas expanded upon Augustine’s concern for social order by establishing peace as a constitutive part of justice, not only of healthy social and political life, since justice also demanded the remedy of evil. While war was an evil, it was sometimes necessary, but it had to include tactical safeguards to assure its just outcome. Aquinas expanded Augustine’s three criteria to seven in the *Summa Theologiae*. For a war to be just, it must include:

1. Last resort
2. Legitimate authority
3. Just cause
4. Probability of success
5. Right intention
6. Proportionality
7. Consideration of civilian casualties.\(^{150}\)

Especially influential for *The Challenge of Peace* was Aquinas’ consideration of proportionality and civilian casualties. Military force was only to be used in proportion to the causalities suffered and only to the extent of stopping the evil that caused the conflict in the first place. Both Aquinas and Augustine were cognizant of and deeply troubled by the moral evils and societal destruction of war even within their just war considerations. Despite his insistence on war as last resort, Aquinas also posited that war could be offensive if its purpose was to rectify an evil. The authority to make such a prudential

judgement rested with civil authorities, a point also stressed by Augustine. The morality of an offensive war and weapons designed for an offensive purpose would become foundational in the American bishops’ misgivings about tactical nuclear weapons. The intentional targeting of civilians was also forbidden. Opponents of nuclear weapons pointed to these two criteria in their arguments for the nuclear freeze and disarmament. Both the episcopal nuclear pacifists and those willing to consider the moral use of nuclear weapons agreed that targeting civilians was immoral. They were also under no illusions as to how negatively their own tradition considered war even if they were in favor of deterrence. Aquinas’ just war precepts inspired centuries of theological reflection and use by Catholic kings in their conduct of warfare.

American Catholic Thought on the Bomb Before 1950

American Catholic thought on the bomb was mixed. The Catholic Association for International Peace published a pamphlet in 1947, “The Ethics of Atomic War.” Chaired by the theologian Wilfred Parsons, S.J., the drafters included Monsignor Fulton J. Sheen and John Courtney Murray, S.J. The committee concluded that the atomic bomb was immoral as it violated proportionality and discrimination. Parsons and his group refused to categorically condemn all uses of nuclear weapons, leaving an opening for defensive use. The magazine Catholic World, one of the oldest American Catholic periodicals and published by the Paulist Fathers, was anti-bomb in 1945 but their position shifted a year

151 Reichberg. 130, 224.
152 Letter, Father J. Bryan Hehir to Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace and Consultants, January 6, 1982, Box 1, USCC: Departmental Committee: Social Development and World Peace: Ad hoc Committee on War and Peace, 1/1/1980-12/31/1985. United States Catholic Conference (USCC)- Office of the General Secretary, Folder 4, ACHRC.
later when they published an article from Francis X. Murphy, Catholic chaplain of the United States Naval Academy, that defended the bomb.154 Francis Connell, C.S.s.R., of The Catholic University of America introduced intention into the proportionality discussion. The moral validity of launching a nuclear weapon is whether the military advantage is greater than the non-combatant casualties. If use is intended to incite fear or target civilians, it is not morally licit.155 Connell wanted more limitations on the use of nuclear weapons than the Parsons committee.156

Consequentialism reigned in the thought of the most pro-bomb opinions of American clerics under the guise of just war theory. James Macelwane, S.J., professor of geology at Saint Louis University, put it plainly, “Provided the war is a just war, the choice of weapon is immaterial as far as morality is concerned. The quicker an attacking enemy is brought to his knees and forced to surrender, the better it is for all concerned.”157 Consequentialism describes holds that rightness or wrongness of an action in large part based on the consequences of that action. If the effect or result is judged to be good, whether or not the action that caused the effect is good or not is irrelevant. The specter of consequentialism hung over the discussions of the ad hoc committee as they sought to confront real-world defense issues and longstanding principles of Catholic social justice.158 Monsignor Fulton J. Sheen, the most prominent Catholic priest in American media, condemned the bomb as a violation of just war theory based on its lack

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156 “The Atom Bomb...Is It Lawful?,” *The Catholic Standard and Times*, February 27, 1953. 11.
157 “Atomic Bomb Morality Hotly Debated by Theologians.”
of discrimination. Sheen’s colleague at The Catholic University of America Fr. John K. Ryan, a specialist in patristic philosophy and translator of St. Augustine, agreed.

However, the nuclear skeptics became less critical as the Cold War intensified fear of the Soviets and dissent was viewed as disloyalty in the era of McCarthyism. Both sides of the debate now used just war theory to criticize or allow employing nuclear weapons.

Papal Thought on the Bomb

The Vatican’s reaction to the atomic bomb was immediate and visceral. Pope Pius XII (r. 1939-1958) warned as early as 1943 in an address to the Pontifical Academy for Sciences that nuclear technology should not be allowed to progress to weaponized use. The Vatican newspaper L’Osservatore Romano published an editorial on August 6, 1945 that decried the bomb. In its characteristic stilted understatement, it said, “The use of atomic bombs in Japan has created an unfavorable impression on the Vatican.” The editorial was structured as a meditation on the destructive capacity of humankind and the necessity of a Christian worldview to restrain such impulses. The newspaper, widely viewed as the pope’s official media outlet, grasped how the bomb would change warfare and international relations forever. However, the pope soon walked back the L’Osservatore Romano statement on August 9, clarifying that the editorial was not necessarily the position of the Holy See.

162 “VATICAN DEPLORES USE OF ATOM BOMB.”
Pius XII’s future actions were indicative of his deep misgivings toward nuclear conflict. Before his papacy, Eugenio Pacelli was a career diplomat. His longest posting was as nuncio to Bavaria from 1917 to 1930 and he maintained a love for Germany for the rest of his life.\textsuperscript{164} He negotiated the Reichskonkordat with Germany in 1933 shortly after Hitler came to power.\textsuperscript{165} Pius’ humanitarian record during the Second World War remains his most enduring legacy. While many begged the pope to condemn Nazi atrocities, he would only do so in heavily veiled terms. His unbending commitment to Vatican neutrality exasperated the Allied and Axis powers alike.\textsuperscript{166} Pius refrained from criticizing American military action due to his close relationship with American prelates and military protection of the Holy See during the war. Privately, the pope was incensed by the Allied bombing of non-strategic Italian cities, including Rome.\textsuperscript{167} Pius’ dismay at the Allies’ indiscriminate strategic bombing was a clue to his later misgivings about nuclear weapons.

The historical record has been kinder to Pius in more recent scholarship, especially as the opening of the Vatican archives has shown that the pope worked behind the scenes to alleviate the worst abuses in the occupied countries. He used his diplomatic corps to gather information on the deportations and work camps that dotted occupied Europe.\textsuperscript{168} Pius also had to contend with the reality that the belligerent nations were

\textsuperscript{165} Michael Phayer, \textit{Pius XII, the Holocaust, and the Cold War} (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008). 52, 159.
Catholic and often had the overt approval of the Church to mistreat those considered enemies of the state. The pope took a softer approach with these governments during wartime, leading some historians to conclude that he valued Catholic teaching about the secular state and the Church over the moral good of speaking out against totalitarianism.\textsuperscript{169} David Kertzer’s latest book views Pius’ wartime record as evidence of his overriding concern to preserve the Church in Europe.\textsuperscript{170} On the other hand, he smuggled information to the Allies and even gave quiet acceptance to a plot to assassinate Hitler.\textsuperscript{171}

Pius XII’s opinion on nuclear conflict was always negative. He followed closely the Pontifical Academy of Sciences’ monitoring of the development of nuclear technology, using the German physicist Max Planck as his primary contact.\textsuperscript{172} Pius called the American military to account. He had a private audience with Generals Eisenhower and Mark Clark, the latter a frequent interlocutor with the Holy See, days after Nagasaki. The pope reminded the two that the defeated Japanese should be handled with Christian charity, especially after the devastation of the bomb.\textsuperscript{173} In a 1948 address, Pius supported a ban on nuclear weapons though he expressed hope that nuclear energy could be used in pursuit of peace.\textsuperscript{174} Pius doubted the moral use of nuclear weapons for defense. He

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\item[\textsuperscript{170}] David I. Kertzer, \textit{The Pope at War: The Secret History of Pius XII, Mussolini, and Hitler} (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2023). 36.
\item[\textsuperscript{173}] Peter C. Kent, \textit{Lonely Cold War of Pope Pius XII: The Roman Catholic Church and the Division of Europe, 1943-1950} (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press - MQUP, 2002).89.
\item[\textsuperscript{174}] “Pope for Ban on Atom Bomb As ‘Most Terrible’ Weapon; Address to Pontifical Academy of Sciences Expresses Hope That Newly Harnessed Energy Will Help Civilization in Peace,” \textit{The New York Times}, February 9, 1948.
\end{itemize}
maintained that nuclear weapons had only destruction as their end. In a 1954 address, he forwarded scientific arguments against nuclear weapons. Nuclear fallout ensured that people and places around the globe would experience the adverse effects of nuclear conflict. Pius’ statement came months after the Castle Bravo weapons tests at Bikini Atoll. The moral component was secondary in his thought. Pius never connected the need for self-defense with justifying the massive obliteration of non-combatants that nuclear weapons made possible. The scientific aspect was omitted in future papal and episcopal reflection. Papal opinion on nuclear conflict was morally disapproving as soon as the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and provided the earliest parameters from which the American bishops could form their own critiques of nuclear weapons.

Pope John XXIII and *Pacem in Terris*

Pope John XXIII (r. 1958-1963) was not so reticent to analyze the moral implications of possession and use of nuclear weapons in his encyclical *Pacem in Terris*. John appealed to many Catholics and the secular press for his approachability and open personality, in contrast to the gentle but regal Pius XII. *Pacem in Terris* (1963) came to define post-Vatican II Catholic discussions of nuclear issues. John inherited the papacy during a time of relative stability in the Cold War. Stalin had died in 1953 and there was still hope that Khrushchev would prove less ruthless in his dealings with internal dissent and the satellite states when John was elected in 1958. The invasions of East Germany and Hungary stabilized Central Europe in uneasy and highly repressive crackdowns

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175 Wittner, *Confronting the Bomb*. 52.
176 Pius XII, “Address of His Holiness Pius XII to Participants in the 8th Congress of the World Medical Association,” September 30, 1954.
against democratizing efforts in 1953 and 1956 respectively.\textsuperscript{179} Khrushchev announced a policy change of peaceful coexistence vis à vis the West, as opposed to Stalin’s sedate but obvious bellicosity.\textsuperscript{180} Regime change following the Poznań June of 1956 raised the possibility of a gentler and more independent form of Communism in Poland.\textsuperscript{181} The United States was but a few years removed from McCarthyism and the Korea War even as the recession of 1958 called into question postwar prosperity.\textsuperscript{182}

The authorship of \textit{Pacem in Terris} itself signaled that change was afoot in the Catholic Church. The main author was the Italian priest, Pietro Pavan. Pavan was a professor at the Pontifical Lateran University and held a doctorate in sociology. His contributions to \textit{Pacem in Terris} centered on the idea of human dignity and the “signs of the times.” Pavan’s version of human dignity centered on the existential reality of the human person. In this understanding, a human person is valued based on their status as a human person, not due to the moral content of their actions.\textsuperscript{183} Pavan enumerated the “signs of the time” in as specific terms as workers’ rights and decolonization.\textsuperscript{184} Pope John’s use of Pavan as an author of \textit{Pacem in Terris} has been overshadowed in favor of what John said about the nuclear question. Pavan’s input in the writing process demonstrated that Pope John himself was internalizing the already-present impetus toward change in the Church’s engagement with the modern world.

\textsuperscript{181} Weigel, \textit{Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul II}, 281.
\textsuperscript{184} Biffi. 106.
John XXIII rejected a pragmatic ideal of peace in the arms race. The constant refrain from the United States during this time was that the arms race was necessary to continue developing and stockpiling nuclear weapons to counter the Soviets. The Soviets behaved in a similar manner.\textsuperscript{185} The Soviets had the bomb by 1949 and the United Kingdom three years later.\textsuperscript{186} One of the most frightening realities of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the hundreds of other missiles the Soviets could have deployed in addition to the handful of SS-4 and SS-5s that were launch-ready.\textsuperscript{187} Not just the aggressive Soviet stance to defend Cuba but also the enormous payloads that Soviet missiles could deliver convinced the United States to build even more nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{188} The Soviets saw themselves as parrying American aggression based on the precedent of the American-backed Bay of Pigs invasion.\textsuperscript{189} \textit{Pacem in Terris} rejected the idea of nuclear parity being a practical solution to assure national security. The last clause of the passage is more unclear, however. “Equal in destructive force” could refer to either the “others” producing the weapons or the weapons themselves.\textsuperscript{190} The Latin original is helpful for clarifying this point, showing the “others” as the antecedent.\textsuperscript{191} While a semantic point, it matters for John’s overall argument. The real problem was that nations were competing to have the ability to destroy each other. Given the

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\begin{itemize}
\item[^{186}] Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, \textit{Nuclear Politics} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 476.
\item[^{188}] John Lewis Gaddis, \textit{Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945}, Oxford EBA (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 123.
\item[^{191}] John XXIII. “Ac si qua natio in atomicis belli instrumentis parata est, hoc \textit{alii} nationibus causam praebeat, cur id genus arma, pari \textit{delendi} vi praeedita, sibi parare contendant.”
\end{itemize}
destruction wrought in Japan, Pope John was more willing to question just war theory in
the age of nuclear weaponry.

In the next passage, John not only advocated for a freeze and ban on nuclear
weapons, but also a system of mutual verification that assures that all the nuclear powers
would follow through with disarmament. Peace based on nuclear capability was not
peace at all, according to the pope. This geopolitical situation ran contrary to human
flourishing and threatened the survival of the planet in general. Section 112 makes the
pope’s position clear:

The stock-piles of armaments which have been built up in
various countries must be reduced all round and
simultaneously by the parties concerned. Nuclear weapons
must be banned. A general agreement must be reached on a
suitable disarmament program, with an effective system of
mutual control.192

John said nothing about testing bans but his conclusion was evident with, “nuclear
weapons must be banned.”193 The same could also be said for deployment. If they cannot
be stockpiled, then they cannot be deployed. Mutual verification was a common item in
the various nuclear treaties of the 1970s but was never incorporated into a ratified treaty
by the United States until 1987.194 Pope John also considered stockpiling to be simple
possession, whereas most nuclear negotiations at the time allowed possession but
objected to stockpiling.195 This quantitative aspect of arms negotiations was lost on John.
Stockpiling was one of the United States’ main issues with the Soviets placing missiles in
Cuba, though the actual missiles numbered no more than 40 and Washington was

192 John XXIII. Sec. 40.
193 John XXIII.
194 Ronald E. Powaski, Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981-1999
195 Memo, David Gergen to Administration Spokesmen, August 6, 1982, “Speech Material on Arms
Control,” OA11222, Michael Baroody Files, RRL.
accustomed to Soviet stockpiling. John hoped that an international body, such as the United Nations, would take the lead in mutual verification. A neutral third party could provide a basis of trust in mutual verification. What the international system of Cold War geopolitics lacked first and foremost was trust and John XXIII was unafraid to demand a reconfiguration of this system.

_Pacem in Terris_ was hailed nearly universally in the Catholic Church by those enthused with the then on-going Vatican II reforms as a new model of papal outlook on the world. It would come to epitomize the modern papal encyclical, an exhortative, morally-binding document of the papal magisterium that called non-Catholics and Catholics alike to work toward the common good. Pope John died of stomach cancer a month after it was promulgated. As the international community reeled from the Cuban Missile Crisis, _Pacem in Terris_ made nuclear war a non-sectarian moral issue. It did not consider nuclear war in the context of the just war tradition. John did not portray the Church as just another political actor. The pope placed the Church as the moral voice of reason in the debate over nuclear weapons above the squabbles of the superpowers.

**The Second Vatican Council and War and Peace**

A historical analysis of the evolution of papal thought on war, peace, and nuclear weapons might portray the Roman Catholic Church as reactionary in the historical narrative of the twentieth century. The missing piece in this outlook is the Second

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Vatican Council (1962-1965), the first ecumenical council since the First Vatican Council (1869-1870) and the largest since Trent (1545-1563).\textsuperscript{200} John XXIII’s calling of the council forced the Catholic world to understand that Catholicism in practice and theology had to be renewed to meet the challenges of modernity.\textsuperscript{201} John used the untranslatable Italian word \textit{aggiornamento}, alluding to updating or modernization. Vatican II issued no anathemas (official condemnations) of individuals or ideas, a novelty in the history of the Church’s ecumenical councils.\textsuperscript{202} This alone pointed to the change that was coming in Catholic theology and governance. This opening also exposed the Church to conversations it had not engaged in seriously before, such as on issues of national defense.

Pope John saw an urgent need to creatively discern methods of evangelization that could make the case for Christianity in a secularizing world. Planning the council took three years and John presided over the first session in 1962. Over 2,000 bishops participated in the council, and hundreds more \textit{periti} (Latin plural for \textit{peritus}, experts, generally clerics, invited to the council by the member bishops) and the press.\textsuperscript{203} All sessions took place in St. Peter’s Basilica and were presided over by the pope. All interventions by the council fathers (participating bishops) were made in Latin.\textsuperscript{204} When it comes to \textit{The Challenge of Peace}, the most cited document from the council is the Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World, \textit{Gaudium et Spes}.

\textsuperscript{201} Hebblethwaite, \textit{John XXIII: Pope of the Century}. 142.
\textsuperscript{202} O’Malley, S.J., \textit{What Happened at Vatican II}. 37, 44.
\textsuperscript{203} O’Malley, S.J. 93, 317.
\textsuperscript{204} O’Malley, S.J. 160.
Pope John stated that one of the primary intentions of the council was to reorient the Church to read and learn from the signs of the times. The Church had to understand the goodness in the created world as it currently presented itself.\(^{205}\) *Gaudium et Spes* used John’s “signs” imagery and gave its own hermeneutic. “Signs of the times” were the data by which the Church could glean insights for cultural engagement.\(^{206}\) Much had changed from one hundred years before when Pope Pius IX’s *Syllabus of Errors* and Pope St. Pius X’s *Lamentabili sine exitu* forbade certain aspects of political democracy and Biblical criticism respectively.\(^{207}\) By the time of the council, much of what these two documents had condemned the Church outright embraced. *Gaudium et Spes* extolled the benefits of political democracy, *Dei Verbum* the new historical-critical method in Biblical scholarship.\(^{208}\) Pope John and the Second Vatican Council called on the Church to not be afraid of the modern world, but to see Christ’s continuous action in current reality.

But part of the signs of the times were massive improvements in technology that made war more destructive. *Gaudium et Spes* preferred to leave its observations on nuclear weapons vague, however. The official English translation of *Gaudium et Spes* has “scientific weapons” as virtually indistinguishable from nuclear weapons and is a literal translation from the Latin original.\(^{209}\) The document did not mandate pacifism, but instead foregrounded defensive military action as the standard by which nuclear weapons could

\(^{206}\) *Gaudium et Spes*, Sec. 4 in Vatican Council II, *Vatican II: The Essential Texts*.
ever be deployed, as would be the case for conventional weapons. Launching nuclear weapons would put into motion a domino effect in which one side attempts to obliterate the other, thus leading to a global catastrophe. This was a common talking point for the critics of American nuclear policy on both the ad hoc committee and the experts they consulted.\textsuperscript{210} \textit{Gaudium et Spes} was written during a time of relative calm in the arms race before Cuba and nuclear peace looked like a real possibility. The document was formulated on the council floor and was therefore one of the last to be promulgated. In late 1962, Pope John, unhappy with the progress of the council, declared all prepared documents scrapped and charged Leo Cardinal Suenens of Brussels with creating new topics for discussion at the council. Suenens put together the new agenda with the assistance of non-Curial prelates and cardinals, intending to reorder the council toward the concerns of the lived experience of the Church alongside authentic theological development.\textsuperscript{211} Suenens counted on the help of Archbishop Achille Liénart of Lille, France, and Josef Cardinal Frings of Cologne, both of whom had doctorates in Scripture, in striking this balance.\textsuperscript{212}

The Council voiced strong skepticism of any potential moral use of nuclear weapons. Another of Suenens’ loosely organized group, Bernardus Cardinal Alfrink of Utrecht, gave especially learned interventions on the nuclear question during the floor

\textsuperscript{210} Memo, Father J. Bryan Hehir to Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace, January 6, 1982, “Testimony Prepared for the Bishops’ Committee on War and Peace from Dr. Zahn,” Box 1, Folder 4, National Conference of Catholic Bishops, ACHRC.

\textsuperscript{211} O’Malley, S.J., \textit{What Happened at Vatican II}. 157-158. Cardinal Frings’ theological consultant was then-Father Joseph Ratzinger, the future prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and Pope Benedict XVI.

debate on *Gaudium et Spes*.\(^{213}\) Paragraph 81 of *Gaudium et Spes* makes a distinction between possession and use of nuclear weapons:\(^{214}\)

To be sure, scientific weapons are not amassed solely for use in war. Since the defensive strength of any nation is considered to be dependent upon its capacity for immediate retaliation, this accumulation of arms, which increases each year, likewise serves, in a way heretofore unknown, as deterrent to possible enemy attack. Many regard this procedure as the most effective way by which peace of a sort can be maintained between nations at the present time.\(^{215}\)

Pope John made no such distinction in *Pacem in Terris*. The Council Fathers also connected defensive capability with capacity for retaliation. No room was left for any consideration of limited nuclear strikes.\(^{216}\) *Gaudium et Spes* portrayed the arms race in a negative manner, but here it seemed to be highlighting the barest of advantages, that stockpiling weapons leaves each side less likely to attack the other. This conciliar document was non-committal about the prospects of nuclear deterrence and the arms race. America maintained nuclear superiority and a nuclear test ban had been in force since 1958, though the Soviets continued their ICBM program.\(^{217}\) It was along these lines that opinion was divided in the ad hoc committee working on *The Challenge of Peace* and among the bishops themselves.

Vatican II generated massive efforts toward lay participation in the life of the Church that made an episcopal document on the bomb possible. In the United States, lay activities that went far beyond the bounds of the parish mushroomed as the 1960s

\(^{213}\) Rynne. 380.  
\(^{214}\) John XXIII, *Pacem in Terris*. Sec. 111.  
\(^{216}\) Memo, David Gergen to Administration Spokesmen, August 6, 1982, “Speech Material on Arms Control,” OA11222, Michael Baroody Files, RRL.  
proceeded. The familiar parish sodalites and ethnic affiliation societies collapsed and in their place came lay Catholic initiatives that focused on social issues from abortion to pacifism.\footnote{Joseph P. Chinnici, O.F.M., American Catholicism Transformed: From the Cold War through the Council (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021). 215.} Collegiality was often connected to lay activity as a reflection of the common mission of Christian discipleship conferred through baptism. All Catholics were equal in dignity through baptism, from bishop to lay person, even though the bishop and the lay person had different means of living out their baptism. Inside the parishes, laypeople were incorporated into the authority structure, most notably in the parish council system.\footnote{Chinnici, O.F.M. 217.} Vatican II also encouraged simplification in proclaiming the Scriptural message of salvation. The Greek term “kerygma” (“proclamation”) became the term for such a simplification. The kerygma entails an emphasis on the basics of the Gospel message, namely salvation through belief in Jesus Christ.\footnote{Brian Pedraza, Catechesis for the New Evangelization: Vatican II, John Paul II, and the Unity of Revelation and Experience (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2020). 83.} Theological education was secondary and personal relationship with God was primary. Activity in devotional practices was an outgrowth of the trends in liturgical reform. The Benedictine monks of St. John’s Abbey in Minnesota published the liturgical review \textit{Orate Fratres}, bringing the Liturgical Movement from Belgium to America in the 1920s. The review included such novelties as recommending praying the Liturgy of the Hours, previously the singular domain of clergy. In a monumental step toward the council’s liturgical reforms, \textit{Orate Fratres} encouraged participation in the Mass by inviting its readers to pray aloud parts of the Mass in Latin along with the priest in dialogue.\footnote{Jerome M. Hall, “Intelligent and Active Participation: The Liturgical Press,” \textit{U.S. Catholic Historian} 21, no. 3 (2003): 37–56. 38. The Liturgy of the Hours, or Divine Office, is a book of Latin (generally read in vernacular translation since Vatican II) prayers corresponding to canonical hours throughout the day.} The American Church was already
making the turn toward the modern world in the interconnectedness of Catholic spiritual and social life that Vatican II would make official.

**John Paul II on War and Peace**

Pope John Paul II, the first non-Italian pope in 400 years, made the Holy See’s guidance on nuclear weapons more complicated than his predecessor Pope John. John Paul redefined the contours of the papacy by expanding its role on the global stage. As a Pole, he had also suffered under Soviet occupation for decades and had a more acute awareness of East-West competition and tensions in the ongoing Cold War than most previous Italian popes had. Whereas Popes John and Paul had traveled sparingly, John Paul II made the papacy an event thanks to his relative youth, charisma, and activism.²²² Elected pope in October of 1978 at the age of 58, he made his first pastoral visits by January of the next year. He became the first pope to visit the White House in October of 1979, where he was received by President Carter.²²³ Like Paul VI before him, John Paul addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York. From the Polish pope’s perspective, weapons stockpiling must be done with an intention or end goal in mind, which he presumed to be at minimum willingness to conduct war.²²⁴ The nuclear policy of both the United States and the Soviet Union was predicated upon stockpiling and the modernization of current arsenals.

The new pope’s thoughts on nuclear weapons did not leave room for moral acceptability of nuclear conflict. He visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki in February of 1981

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and reminded those present that peace was a constructive process. Having lived through
the Second World War in Poland, the pope was appalled that even those who had
experienced the war would discount the nuclear threat or embrace using nuclear weapons.
He had a dim view of those who relied on massive increases in nuclear weapons as a
pillar of their foreign policy, “Others might wish to regard nuclear capacity as an
unavoidable means of maintaining a balance of power through a balance of terror. But
there is no justification for not raising the question of the responsibility of each nation
and everyone in the face of possible wars and of the nuclear threat.” In contrast to John
Paul’s views, a reenergized nuclear policy had been a major theme for President Reagan
on the campaign trail.

In an address to scientists at Hiroshima, the pope noted that the temptation
implicit in stockpiling was technological innovation for its own sake. There was no
mechanism in deterrence that cancelled out this impulse. Weapons would just keep
getting more sophisticated and more destructive just because the technology was
available. The pope saw this relentless drive for innovation and ever higher numbers of
weapons as fueling economic injustice as well. The nuclear arms race was a part of a
continuum of social justice infractions that hindered rather than bolstered national
defense security which according to John Paul and other peace activists meant more than
simply immunity from foreign military attack.

https://www.atomicbombmuseum.org/6_5.shtml.
226 Busch, Reagan’s Victory. 176.
227 John Paul II, “Meeting with Scientists and Representatives of the United Nations University in
quality of life in a society and its efforts to minimize poverty and provide opportunity—not how many tanks, warships, and nuclear weapons a country possessed. He also raised the possibility of accidental or unauthorized dispatch of weapons, especially nuclear ones. Nuclear mishaps or systems failure was uppermost in the minds of Americans at the time. The powerplant meltdown at Three Mile Island occurred two years before the pope’s UN message.\(^{228}\) The new pope was as uncomfortable with nations maintaining vast arsenals in readiness for war, as any of his predecessors had been.

A year into President Reagan’s first term, John Paul II again addressed the United Nations, this time at the 1982 Special Session on Disarmament. The message was delivered in New York by Agostino Cardinal Casaroli, the Holy See’s Secretary of State and de facto number-two at the Vatican, second only to the pope. The ad hoc committee was then writing the second draft of *The Challenge of Peace*. The pope was displeased that global expenditures on arms had increased.\(^{229}\) The numbers from the Reagan administration’s defense buildup corroborate this.\(^{230}\) This statement came months before Reagan’s announcement of the MX nuclear modernization program. The pope intuited that containment of inevitable future conflict seemed to be the aim of the major powers.\(^{231}\) National Security Advisor William Clark all but admitted that this was the

\(^{228}\) Busch, *Reagan’s Victory*. 11.


\(^{231}\) John Paul II, “Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II to the General Assembly of the United Nations.” Sec. 2.
general philosophy of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{232} Many other non-nuclear powers in Europe and around the world disagreed with Clark’s sentiment that downplayed the bellicosity of Reagan’s massive defense increases. John Paul II refused to be held to this paradigm even as he recognized the necessity of nations to provide for the safety of their citizens from military aggression.

John Paul II was unabashedly negative about deterrence in his UN message, but he still considered it conditionally acceptable from the point of view of Catholic moral theology. This statement constituted one of the largest issues which the ad hoc committee confronted. In a section after one in which he expressed approval of peace movements, the pope reluctantly admitted the conditional moral permissibility of nuclear deterrence:

\begin{quote}
In current conditions "deterrence" based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable. Nonetheless in order to ensure peace, it is indispensable not to be satisfied with this minimum which is always susceptible to the real danger of explosion. What then can be done? In the absence of a supranational authority of the type Pope John XXIII sought in his Encyclical \textit{Pacem in Terris}, one which one would have hoped to find in the United Nations Organization, the only realistic response to the threat of war still is negotiation.\textsuperscript{233}
\end{quote}

Much consternation among the ad hoc committee and other NCCB staff members resulted from the first sentence. John Paul II recognized that geopolitical circumstances made deterrence, based on parity in nuclear weapons, the first step to disarmament. Despite having seen the destruction at Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the pope still insisted on

\textsuperscript{233} John Paul II, “Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II to the General Assembly of the United Nations.” Sec. 8.
the permissibility of nuclear deterrence. The pope had years of direct engagement with the Communist authorities in Poland and this endowed him with a more complex understanding of the deterrence issues than seen with his predecessors. He had firsthand experience of the Soviet threat and recognized the necessity to contain it. Under the longstanding strictures of moral theology, a thing that is evil can never be morally permissible under any but the most pressing of circumstances. Deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence, is evil but was permissible as a step toward disarmament in the geopolitical context of 1982. The pope understood the dangers both moral and physical that maintaining arsenals of nuclear weapons entailed. Immediate unilateral disarmament was off the table for the Polish pope, likely because the Soviet Union would not disarm in a similar fashion. However, deterrence is classified at the “…the minimum” step toward true peace. The pope’s message thus put the ad hoc committee on notice and forced them to consider the nuances of the deterrence question, as the pope himself would insist.

Episcopal Ministry, Authority and Vatican II

The immediate post-Vatican II period featured a rethinking of episcopal ministry that greatly influenced The Challenge of Peace and found its immediate routes in the First Vatican Council. The historical development of collegiality cannot be understood without reference to the previous definition of papal infallibility by the First Vatican

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235 Letter, Germain Grisez to Archbishop John Roach, November 1, 1982, EXEC/C0620/254, General-Peace Pastoral Expert Response to Draft 2, Peace Pastoral Papers, AAC. This presupposes that the thing in question is not intrinsically morally evil, i.e., evil in its very nature in any circumstance.
Collegiality, a technical theological term that implies the fraternal communion of bishops with each other and the pope, was the salient experience of Vatican II for many bishops. Collegiality was built upon an understanding of the interdependent relationship of the authority of bishops and the pope. However, Vatican I’s most famous document Pastor Aeternus defined papal infallibility: Catholics believe that the pope is unable to teach error in doctrinal matters of faith and morals. Infallibility does not mean that every public statement of the Pope is free of error. It is a heavily circumscribed power specific to the office of the papacy, not of the bishops. Infallibility is the highest form of authority of the papal office, and one that most theologians considered a major expression of the papal office’s distinctiveness. Pastor Aeternus was the capstone of a period of papal centralization that concentrated governance (papal primacy) and theological definition in the office of the pope instead of the local churches and their bishops.

The major unintended effect of Pastor Aeternus was that the teaching office of the Church, known as the magisterium, became identified with the person of the pope and remained so into the twentieth century through Vatican II. The magisterium refers to the power to define and enforce doctrine that is specific to all bishops but is fixated upon the pope. Papal teaching is part of the magisterium but is not its entirety.

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239 Pius IX, Pastor Aeternus, the Holy See, July 18, 1870. https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/creeds2.v.ii.i.html Chapter 3. Technically, infallibility refers to the office of the papacy, not of the individual man who holds the papal office at a given time.
240 O’Malley, S.J., Vatican I: The Council and the Making of the Ultramontane Church, 221.
that the magisterium, like all its doctrine, is formed by both Scripture and the tradition of the Church. The magisterium is meant to apply or develop Catholic teaching to the needs of a given time. Scripture and tradition assist the bishops in making such teaching decisions. Teachings are not authoritative if they do not reflect the _sensus fidelium_ ("sense of the faithful"), meaning that they are assented to by the entirety of the faithful, including the laity.\textsuperscript{242} The magisterium is also shaped by the conscious assent of the faithful. Such judgments are not made by majority vote, but the reception of a teaching is important to its authenticity.\textsuperscript{243} _The Challenge of Peace_ was the American bishops actualizing the magisterium to address the pastoral needs of their time in the nuclear question.

Moral theology had undergone a transformation since the council that enabled theological reflection on the nuclear issue. Previously, moral theology was conducted in a Thomistic fashion according to the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas following Pope Leo XIII’s revival of scholasticism in _Aeterni Patris_ (1879). Other the side, political theory and social teaching flourished with varying degrees of supervision from the Holy See.\textsuperscript{244} Intellectual life in the Church was not as stifled as many have assumed, but social teaching and moral theology were effectively cut off from one another. Vatican II changed everything. More laypeople than ever before began to attain graduate degrees in theology, effectively sweeping away the insular Thomistic tradition. The foremost moral theologian in the immediate post-Vatican II period was ironically not a layperson, but the

\begin{footnotes}
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German Redemptorist priest Bernard Häring. A peritus at the Council who worked on *Gaudium et Spes*, Häring demonstrated that the new emphasis in post-conciliar moral theology would be human freedom in responding to Jesus Christ’s redemptive love, rather than syllogism of sin and right action. Häring’s most famous works were *The Law of Christ* trilogy, published from 1955 onwards. Whereas the dictates of the Church in the moral life were the object to which individuals were subjected in previous years, Häring’s framework put the individual as the object to which moral law was subject.245 Without this shift in theology, a document like *The Challenge of Peace* would not have been possible.

While *Gaudium et Spes* focused on the Church’s orientation to the world, *Lumen Gentium* was concerned with the Church’s relationship to itself. Promulgated in November of 1964, the document is also known as the Dogmatic Constitution of the Church. *Lumen Gentium* also inaugurated the speculative approach to theological investigation that would be seen most obviously in areas like moral theology.246 It contains highly relevant sections on collegiality that guided the later decree *Christus Dominus*. Sections 22-26 filled out the theological basis for collegiality. It started by reaffirming the primacy of the pope as the spiritual and juridical head of the Church and of the College of Bishops. The bishops of the Church have no authority unless it is exercised in unity with the pope.247 Supreme authority also resides in the College of Bishops when they act as a collective, such as at an ecumenical council. Episcopal

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authority is not delegated on behalf of the pope but is proper to the episcopate itself.\textsuperscript{248}

\textit{Lumen Gentium} also gives a genealogy for how doctrinal authority can be determined for the bishops and the pope:

\begin{quote}
In matters of faith and morals, the bishops speak in the name of Christ and the faithful are to accept their teaching and adhere to it with a religious assent. This religious submission of mind and will must be shown in a special way to the authentic magisterium of the Roman Pontiff, even when he is not speaking \textit{ex cathedra}; that is, it must be shown in such a way that his supreme magisterium is acknowledged with reverence, the judgments made by him are sincerely adhered to, according to his manifest mind and will...\textsuperscript{249}
\end{quote}

This passage is important for the later conditions of what constitutes a binding (e.g., morally binding under pain of sin) teaching when an episcopal conference issues directives and documents. The passage attempted to be as clear as possible as to what judgments of the pope are binding according to “…[the pope’s] manifest mind and will.”

The theologian Richard McBrien pointed out that infallibility is not a synonym for morally-binding and is a rarely exercised tool of papal authority. The encyclical \textit{Humanae Vitae} reflected the magisterium, but it is not infallible. However, its lack of infallibility does not compromise its ability to command obedience on the consciences of Catholics or its status as morally binding.\textsuperscript{250} Authentic Catholic teaching is gauged by the measuring stick of the rest of the magisterium, Scripture and tradition, not because such teaching could be or is infallibly proclaimed by the pope. What can and cannot be considered morally-binding, authoritative teaching became the primary issue around

\textsuperscript{249} \textit{Lumen Gentium}, Sec. 25 in Vatican Council II, \textit{Vatican II: The Essential Texts}.
which arguments among the American bishops, government, and the Holy See were resolved regarding the *The Challenge of Peace*.

*Christus Dominus* (1965) attempted to clarify mistakes that arose in ideas of the episcopacy following Vatican I. It emphasized episcopal authority as a series of horizontal relationships rather than dominating relationships while reaffirming that the bishop is the focal point of the diocese and maintained immediate, ordinary authority over Catholics in his diocese.\textsuperscript{251} Collaboration and dealing with the necessary conflict that comes with such an outlook formed the new way. *Christus Dominus* also decreed specific directives for episcopal conferences. These were incorporated into the bylaws of the revamped American episcopal conference in 1966.\textsuperscript{252} *Christus Dominus* put an ecclesiastical rubber stamp on the episcopal conference system that had already been in place for decades in the United States and defined the episcopal conference as the primary means of exercising collegiality. The idea of collegiality and the importance of the episcopate in the magisterium has developed to the point that most theologians consider the episcopal conference to possess the *mandatum docendi* (“mandate/command to teach”) according to the historical practice of the early Church when bishops governed by local council. The *mandatum docendi* describes the individual bishop’s authority to teach and clarify the Church’s doctrine. Basically, it describes the character of the bishop’s magisterial authority.\textsuperscript{253} However, the question then becomes what sort of collective action of the episcopal conference implies the *mandatum docendi*, aside from matters of discipline. Some episcopal conferences might employ the *mandatum docendi*

\textsuperscript{252} “Christus Dominus.” Sec. 38.
\textsuperscript{253} McBrien, *Catholicism*. 64.
through the episcopal conference and reach a conclusion that is the opposite from other episcopal conferences in matters of moral teaching.\textsuperscript{254} The leadership of the NCCB in the early 1980s realized that the letter on nuclear policy would elicit strong reactions from the public and within the episcopate and so required a professional consensus-builder like Archbishop Bernardin to facilitate the drafting process.\textsuperscript{255} The governance and theological orientation of the Church depends upon the bishops and the exercise of their authority in councils and episcopal conferences. \textit{Christus Dominus} introduced not only a reformed theology of the episcopate, but a new model for episcopal leadership.

The new emphasis on collegiality and authority was put to the test almost immediately after the council. Pope Paul VI’s birth control encyclical, \textit{Humanae Vitae} (1968) changed the way the laity and clergy alike thought about magisterial authority in the Church. It raised a question about what authority or \textit{sensus fidelium} exists when the agreement of the faithful is absent by and large in a magisterial teaching like the prohibition of birth control.\textsuperscript{256} \textit{Humanae Vitae} reasserted strong papal authority in morals, which some saw as overreach given Vatican II’s emphasis on the primacy of conscience.\textsuperscript{257} The strong dissent that the laity voiced signaled that magisterial authority no longer had the same gravity in the Catholic world that it once had. Leslie Tentler Woodcock’s \textit{Catholics and Contraception} demonstrated how a sizeable minority of American clergy, in their capacity as confessors, quietly approved their penitents’ use of contraception.\textsuperscript{258} Bernard Häring’s transformation of moral theology, a tradition of social

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{254} McBrien. 990.  \\
\textsuperscript{255} Hehir, Father J. Bryan, Interview with Father Hehir.  \\
\textsuperscript{256} Gaillardetz, \textit{By What Authority}? 183.  \\
\textsuperscript{258} Tentler, \textit{Catholics and Contraception: An American History}. 149.}
thought being relatively unencumbered by Rome, and a culture of ecclesiastical dissent inspired by *Humanae Vitae* formed the intellectual foundation for *The Challenge of Peace*.

### The Old Episcopal Conference

Before the council, the American bishops had experience with collegial action in the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC). The earliest examples of American national episcopal documents have their roots in the nineteenth century with the Plenary Councils of Baltimore in 1852, 1866, and 1884. These plenary councils set up the bare-bones ecclesiastical administrative structures as the Church in the United States experienced exponential growth due to waves of European immigration.Originally started as the National Catholic War Council to organize Catholic humanitarian aid during the First World War, the NCWC was rebranded after the war in 1919 as a permanent fixture in the American Church with the approval of the Holy See. This version of the episcopal conference was used as a central organized body to coordinate social justice and devotional efforts. Consisting of five departments, a secretariat (coordinating body), and an Administrative Committee (leadership body limited to bishops), the NCWC also employed a small lay staff. While these efforts were crucial for the viability of the American Church, the NCWC had no standing in canon law.

Some bishops believed the NCWC intruded upon their individual authority. William Cardinal O’Connell of Boston submitted a successful petition to Rome in 1921

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to terminate the NCWC. Rome did so. The bishops appealed and won the decision, but the NCWC was forced to change the name “council” to avoid the appearance that decisions made at the organization’s meetings implied the same magisterial authority of American bishops possessed. Honoring Pope Pius XI’s requirements of reinstatement, the bishops made clear that the NCWC was a voluntary association of the American hierarchy and had no canonical power of binding legislation over its member bishops.

The NCWC enabled the bishops to work together on external-facing efforts on a national level. It issued dozens of national statements. These statements were short but were topical and focused on providing an official Catholic perspective on cultural issues and governmental policy. The bishops balanced giving their own voice to the issues of the day with more insular exhortations to the American Catholic faithful. They connected the two by continuously reminding the faithful that social transformation began first and foremost with personal religious transformation. The NCWC published a program of social reconstruction after World War I to great acclaim. Authored by the famous social justice advocate Monsignor John A. Ryan, it forwarded a comprehensive blueprint for American social policy with the goal of expanding the social safety net and the rights of workers. The document is often cited as a schema for later New Deal reforms. The Administrative Committee issued the most statements during the leadup to the Second World War and its duration (1935-1944). The 1933 letter, “Present Crisis,” examined

the causes of the Great Depression and its potential solutions. Just as Communism was an illegitimate solution to economic hardship, so too was unregulated capitalism. Legislation was necessary to assuage the Depression but so too was a reimagining of the dignity of work.\footnote{Hugh J. Nolan, \textit{Pastoral Letters of the American Hierarchy, 1792-1970} (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor, 1971). 289-292, 312.}

Aside from postwar trends, the American bishops had centuries of precedent of the Church calling government to account for policies that it deemed antithetical to Catholic belief. The nineteenth-century Church’s suspicion of democracy led it to directly challenge the secularizing tendencies of liberal European regimes in the Age of Revolution. These anticlerical liberal regimes would often accuse the Church of exceeding its boundaries and meddling in government by their protest. The hostility of the Church’s bishops, and the pope himself, thus grew unabated. The Church was accustomed to calling governments and kings alike to account for their violations of human rights and the free action of the Church in Europe. Representative democratic government was so distrusted by the Church that it appeared on Pope Pius IX’s 1864’s \textit{Syllabus of Errors}.\footnote{J. Derek Holmes, \textit{The Triumph of the Holy See: A Short History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century} (London: Burns & Oates, 1978). 145, 190.} Less than 100 years later, Catholics were embedded in the American political mainstream. Anticlericalism reemerged in the American Catholic context with the publication of the atheist journalist Paul Blanshard’s \textit{American Freedom and Catholic Power} in 1949. Blanshard accused Catholics of anti-American tendencies given the Catholic emphasis on hierarchical authority and obedience to Rome.\footnote{John T. McGreevy, \textit{Catholicism and American Freedom: A History} (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004). 22-23. 168.} In the debate on \textit{The Challenge of Peace}, Michael Nowak and Philip Lawler accused the
bishops of overstepping their boundaries into the domain of the laity with their read on
the nuclear issue. The bishops’ authority to speak out on government policy had
already been established and it had renewed theological backing after Vatican II.

The NCWC was progressive in labor and economic policy. They issued letters
called “Industrial and Social Peace” (1938) and “Economic Crisis” (1931). They were
also liberal in their defense of democracy as a tool to facilitate human flourishing in
Christian societies, outlined in their letter, “Christian Democracy” (1933). The bishops
addressed pressing issues of the day, but their statements lacked engagement with extra-
papal sources. The NCWC showed themselves to be enthusiastic supporters of Pope Pius
XII’s Five Points Peace Program. In his Christmas 1939 radio address, Pius outlined what
he believed to be the prerequisites to not only bring peace back to Europe, but to establish
a new order that would assure peace for posterity. The pope required: 1. The primary
condition of peace is the right to independence of all nations; 2. Peace requires that
nations refuse to build weapons as if in a state of perpetual war; 3. Reorganization of
international organizations should keep in mind the failure of similar bodies like the
League of Nations; 4. Ethnic minorities must be protected and respected; 5. World
leaders must take seriously international treaties and hold other leaders accountable in
their enforcement. The pope’s delicate balance of internationalism and self-
determination alike helped the bishops embrace a liberal international order as the logical
extension of their liberalism in social reform. Of importance for The Challenge of Peace

270 Letter, Michael Novak to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, November 3, 1982, EXEC/C0620/254,
Bernardin Executive Records- CBC Correspondence: General- Peace Pastoral Expert Response to Draft 2,
Peace Pastoral Papers, 1/1/1981-12/31/1983, AAC.
was the pope’s suspicion of arms stockpiling. The NCWC’s wartime statements eagerly reiterated the Five Points. In 1940, the pope repeated his support for organized labor as condition of postwar peace, resonating with the bishops’ consistent support of labor.273 While the NCWC was more accustomed to identifying with the pope’s theological and pastoral authority, the war years saw them organizing themselves around the pope based on liberal labor rights and internationalism.274

At their annual meeting in November 1941, the NCWC formed a subcommittee to study and disseminate the Five Points, headed by Samuel Cardinal Stritch of Chicago. While ad hoc and regular committees had precedent in the NCWC, the committee announced that it would issue annual statements to encourage scholarly and popular reflection on the Five Points. To reiterate the necessity of building true peace after the war, they edited a long volume establishing the continuity between popes on war and peace called Principles of Peace. The book reproduced encyclicals and statements dating back to Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903), with the bishops adding their own gloss.275 A shorter booklet outlined the Christmas messages of Pius XII on peace.276 During wartime, the episcopal conference continued to develop its own character, building upon their own voice. Stritch’s committee popularized Pius XII’s program for peace and established peace, not only just war theory, as the foremost character of papal thought on war and peace.

The war deemphasized the bishops’ zeal for a new international community built upon peace. The chairman of administrative board, Edward Cardinal Mooney of Detroit, pledged Catholic support for the war after Pearl Harbor in a letter to President Roosevelt in 1941. Support for the war was harder to ascertain after the surrender of Japan, however. “Between War and Peace,” published in November of 1945 begins, “The war is over, but there is no peace in the world.” Far from expressing relief at the end of hostilities, the bishops worried over the Communist takeover of Eastern Europe and the humanitarian crisis across the continent. This phenomenon of the American episcopal conference as political and social critic set a precedent for an even deeper engagement with political policy surrounding war and peace forty years later.

The New Episcopal Conference

The rethinking of Catholic theology after the council also applied to the reorganization of the American episcopal conference in 1966. The experience of episcopal collegiality at the council inspired Archbishop John Dearden of Detroit. Dearden was the first president of the NCCB and then-Bishop Joseph Bernardin was its first General Secretary. The episcopal conference had to adapt itself to professionalization and the streamlining of its procedures. To that end, Dearden hired the firm that later came be associated with the reorganization of the American auto industry, Booz Allen Hamilton. The conference was spilt into the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) and its public policy arm, the United States Catholic

279 Reese, S.J., A Flock of Shepherds. 41-42.
280 Reese, S.J. 41-44.
281 Reese, S.J. 81-82.
Conference (USCC). The NCCB dealt with ecclesiastical duties, such as parsing doctrine on a given issue or issuing disciplinary norms binding for all Catholics in the United States. Only bishops can be members of the NCCB and only active (not retired) bishops can vote on episcopal documents. A two-thirds majority vote and the consent of the Holy See—or the unanimous vote of all eligible bishops without the consent of the Holy See—ratified the documents. The USCC was home to the conference’s various offices that dealt with public outreach, including publishing and contact with universities and other social organizations connected to the Church. Staff was minority clerical by the early 1980s and comprised of laypeople of both genders. Leadership was always clerical, as it had been in NCWC.

No other episcopal conference had taken such a modern, technocratic approach to restructuring following the council. The NCCB/USCC became the model of the episcopal conference in the Church from then on. The NCCB was a streamlined bureaucracy with all the problems and advantages of such a system when The Challenge of Peace was being written. One of the most prominent marks of the system was the priority that the bishops placed on compromise. The bylaws of the new NCCB practically forced the bishops to come to a consensus before any conference business could be done. It also prioritized consultation with laity in its daily business and public statements. Though laudable goals, consensus and collegiality also tended to delay conference business. However, the Dearden system was all most active bishops in the NCCB had known in

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284 Reese, S.J. 226.

285 Reese, S.J. 143.
1981. A sizeable portion of the episcopal conference were named bishops after the Council and the 1966 reorganization.\textsuperscript{286} The combined NCCB/USCC wasted no time in joining the post-conciliar trends in social justice and commenting upon social issues, beginning with the 1968 pastoral \textit{Human Life in Our Day}. Vatican II compelled the bishops to speak out more on issues that affected their people through long-form national pastorals, a process that the Dearden reforms simultaneously made easier and more difficult.

\textit{Human Life in Our Day and To Live in Christ Jesus}

The new NCCB’s first pastoral was a harbinger of how the episcopal conference would interact with the post-conciliar American Church. \textit{Human Life in Our Day} (1968) is a quintessentially post-Vatican II document for its commitment to engaging with the modern world.\textsuperscript{287} It reflected wide consultation from lay people to marriage and family experts. Equal parts a defense of \textit{Humanae Vitae} and of personal conscience, \textit{Human Life in Our Day} reads as an instruction for applying the teachings of Vatican II on family life and marriage. It also places war and peace in the context of life issues.\textsuperscript{288} The right of the inviolability of conscience was a frequent basis for dissenting from \textit{Humanae Vitae}.\textsuperscript{289} \textit{Human Life in Our Day} acknowledged that no believer may be forced to act contrary to their own conscience, but the right of individual conscience can only go so far.\textsuperscript{290} It is subject to the teaching of the magisterium and doctrines of the Church first and foremost.

\textsuperscript{286} Memo, William Clark, “Memorandum for File,” January 13, 1983, Box 1, Folder 5, William Clark Files, RRL.
\textsuperscript{287} National Conference of Catholic Bishops, \textit{Human Life in Our Day}. 4.
\textsuperscript{289} Cajka, \textit{Follow Your Conscience: The Catholic Church and the Spirit of the Sixties}, 99.
\textsuperscript{290} National Conference of Catholic Bishops, \textit{Human Life in Our Day}. 25.
Dissenting from a magisterial statement of the pope can be judged to be morally licit in only in the most strenuous circumstances. The bishops cite a section from St. John Henry Cardinal Newman’s Letter to the Duke of Norfolk. Newman, a nineteenth-century Anglican convert to Catholicism and renowned writer and theologian, was a pioneer in grappling with the problems of dissent and conscience. Catholics are at all times bound to the direction of the pope and are to be loyal to him as a first reaction. Only when one “…is able to say to himself, as in the Presence of God, that he must not, and dare not, act upon the Papal injunction, he is bound to obey it and would commit a great sin in disobeying it.”

Despite these limits, the bishops gave an expansive understanding for the right of individuals to act according to their conscience, including in their own ranks. Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen of Seattle refused to pay federal income tax in protest of Reagan’s Trident missile program based in Puget Sound in 1982. His brother bishops by and large respected his right to protest the nuclear buildup. The other side of the argument was also acceptable. Even Bishop Gumbleton refused to insist that all Christians should be pacifists. The most important thing was abiding by one’s conscience. Hunthausen engaged in acts of civil disobedience to protest Reagan’s nuclear policy while Michael Novak organized a counter-pastoral against The Challenge of Peace. On the other hand, Pope John in Pacem in Terris, an obvious exercise of the magisterium, said that, “Nuclear weapons must be banned.”

291 National Conference of Catholic Bishops. 27.
293 Feuerherd, The Radical Gospel of Bishop Thomas Gumbleton. 76.
294 Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age. 28
295 John XXIII, Pacem in Terris. Sec. 40.
outright nuclear ban, or even unilateral disarmament. Nuclear politics was an issue that tested the debate on conscience among bishops no matter their opinion.

*To Live in Christ Jesus* (1974) had a more sober outlook on society and culture than *Human Life in Our Day*. The Vietnam War ended in this period in abject U.S. defeat and humiliation. Watergate simultaneously eroded much of the faith the Americans had left in their public authority figures. The bishops were devastated by 1973’s *Roe v. Wade* Supreme Court decision, which legalized abortion in the United States. Archbishop Dearden, created a cardinal in 1969, was succeeded by Archbishop John Krol of Philadelphia as NCCB president in 1971. The journalist Thomas Reese, S.J. notes that the character of the NCCB tended to derive less from the personality of the president than from his leadership style. Krol did not push the NCCB off the course set by Dearden and Bernardin. His NCCB produced *To Live in Christ Jesus*, a clear and succinct account of the state of moral questions confronting the American Church. Its comments on war and peace solidified their trajectory toward *The Challenge of Peace*. The bishops laid out their non-negotiables for nuclear weapons, which would be echoed in *The Challenge of Peace*. First, their use should be prevented in general. After that, it was wrong to use them to target civilians and to threaten their targeting. They took for granted threatened use as constitutive of deterrence strategy but give no definition of what deterrence was and how it should be enacted in policy. Concrete steps must be made toward disarmament with the end goal of eliminating nuclear weapons entirely.

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299 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, *To Live in Christ Jesus*. 34.
arena of national policy with these statements disturbed the already delicate framework for conscience, dissent, and authority.

This chapter supplies the ecclesiastical backdrop in which the American bishops wrote *The Challenge of Peace*. The bishops had the benefit of consistent anti-bomb papal statements since Pius XII. This chapter’s chronology of the recent history of Catholic understandings of hierarchical authority is necessary to lay the foundation for the hermeneutical issues that the bishops found challenging while writing *The Challenge of Peace*. Thus, it traces the routes of collegiality to the interdependency between papal infallibility and the magisterium. The Second Vatican Council’s developments in moral theology and the office of bishop itself gave the bishops a new identity that inspired them to develop independent thought on political issues. The character of the American episcopal conference and its recasting by Bishop Bernardin and Cardinal Dearden reflect this. However, the bishops also found themselves in an authority vacuum. They wanted to speak authoritatively on the nuclear issue but had lost the language to do so since *Humanae Vitae*. These more circumscribed ecclesiastical matters provide further context and dissent for *The Challenge of Peace* and make a case for its ecclesiastical importance.
Chapter 3: The Ad Hoc Committee and the First Draft

The Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace

The pastoral on war and peace faced a difficult road in committee and in the public sphere from its very genesis. Archbishop Joseph Bernardin chaired the ad hoc committee. He was a well-known figure among the hierarchy and church watchers. Born in South Carolina to Italian immigrants in 1928, Bishop Bernardin grew up in a city that was less than 2% Catholic. He was ordained to the priesthood in 1952 but was moved out of parish work and into diocesan administration after declining to go to Rome to pursue a doctorate. Bernardin’s mentor was Bishop of Charleston (later Atlanta) Paul Hallinan, a notable liberal of the pre-conciliar period who pioneered some major liturgical changes in his diocese before Vatican II. Before he turned thirty, Bernardin was Hallinan’s diocesan chancellor and personal secretary. Bernardin followed Hallinan to Atlanta as one of his auxiliary bishops, becoming the youngest bishop in the country at the age of 38 in 1962. Bernardin proved himself to be the point-man for episcopal issues in the United States. He advised closely Apostolic Delegate Archbishop Jean Jadot on appointing men eager to implement the teachings of the council to the episcopate. Bernardin was renowned for his skill in mediating diverse viewpoints. He was named Archbishop of Cincinnati in 1973 and was there throughout most of his time on the ad hoc committee. The American episcopate is a web of connections and Bishop Bernardin was one of its largest nexuses, even more so after he became Archbishop of Chicago in 1983.

Archbishop John Roach and his deputy Bishop Thomas Kelly chose the head of
the ad hoc committee intentionally. As the chair, they chose Archbishop Bernardin.
Bernardin named the other members of the group. Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, the Pax
Christi activist, was selected to represent the liberal wing of the NCCB on the nuclear
question. Bishop John O’Connor of the Military Vicarate represented the conservative
side. O’Connor was also the newest of the bishops, consecrated less than a year before.
Days after *The Challenge of Peace* was published in 1983, O’Connor was named bishop
of Scranton, Pennsylvania. The committee was rounded out by two men who were
known to not have any strong opinions about the use of nuclear weapons. Daniel Reilly
was Bishop of Norwalk, Connecticut, and George Fulcher of Columbus, Ohio. Two
representatives of religious orders were represented. Richard Warner, C.S.C., Superior of
the United States province of the Congregation of Holy Cross based at Notre Dame,
represented male religious. Sister Juliana Casey, member of the Sisters, Servants of the
Immaculate Heart of Mary of Monroe, Michigan, represented women religious. As
non-bishops, neither Casey nor Warner had voting power on the committee.

The new bishop, John O’Connor, made an immediate impression. The former rear
admiral was a native of Philadelphia. His father had been a union craftsman, instilling
within the younger O’Connor a lifetime commitment to labor rights. Like Bernardin,
O’Connor had been chosen by his bishop to study in Rome for a doctorate in theology,
the traditional route to an illustrious ecclesiastical career, but the Second World War

305 Father J. Bryan Hehir, Brooke Tranten Interview with Father J. Bryan Hehir, interview by Brooke
Tranten, Telephone, June 29, 2022.
306 George J. Marlin and Brad Miner, *Sons of Saint Patrick: A History of the Archbishops of New York,
cancelled those plans. Ordained in 1945, O'Connor worked children who had intellectual disabilities. He joined the Navy Chaplain Corps during the Korean War in 1953, serving combat tours in both Korea and Vietnam. He rarely spoke of his time with the 3rd Marine Division in Da Nang, but wrote a book defending the war effort, winning the Alfred Thayer Mahan Award for Literary Achievement from the Navy. He would later disavow the book. O'Connor’s military experience put him in close contact with the United States’ nuclear might. While he was aboard the U.S.S. Canberra (CAG-2), the cruiser lost a ballistic nuclear missile at sea. O’Connor mused that having witnessed how routinely accidents happened in the military, he was most afraid of all the bishops of the accidental detonation of nuclear weapons. After Vietnam, he was senior chaplain at the United States Naval Academy and in 1975 was named chief of chaplains, reporting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

O’Connor also had impressive academic credentials, and not in theology. He had a background in both ethics and political science, with a master’s and doctorate from Villanova and Georgetown Universities respectively. At Georgetown, O’Connor studied under Jeanne Kirkpatrick, who would later become President Reagan’s Ambassador to the United Nations. In the NCCB, O’Connor was known primarily for his military pedigree and his steadfast commitment to pro-life causes. He was also an indefatigable

309 Report of the NCCB Committee on War and Peace, July/August 1981, Box 1, USCC: Departmental Committee: Social Development and World Peace: Ad hoc Committee on War and Peace, 1/1/1980-12/31/1985, United States Catholic Conference (USCC)-Office of the General Secretary, Folder 1, ACHRC. Despite this connection to one of the most notable members of Reagan’s foreign policy apparatus, there is no indication that O’Connor ever consulted with Kirkpatrick about nuclear issues during the drafting process of The Challenge of Peace. Kirkpatrick was not named as a consultant by the ad hoc committee.
worker who closely examined all sides of an issue and was widely read, even in academic theology. He possessed considerable bonhomie and fair-mindedness, traits which probably ensured his appointment to the committee. Bernardin was clear with O’Connor that he should feel free to express himself on the nuclear issue, even if his views conflicted with the rest of the committee.310

Experts and Authority

The mandate of the ad hoc committee was daunting and logistics proved difficult. The entire ad hoc committee did not meet in person until the summer of 1981. The first meetings of the committee consisted of basic organizational matters, such as whom the consultants would be and arranging interviews with them. The committee prioritized in-person meetings with Reagan administration officials, who were responsive to the bishops’ requests and exchanged superficial but courteous correspondence with them. Scheduling proved difficult, though the bishops accommodated the Reagan staffers as much they could.311 The ad hoc committee never spent more than a week at a time working together in person. Most of the decision making and consulting was done via telephone and private correspondence. William V. Shannon, a lay ethicist at Georgetown, was asked to draft the pastoral in the winter of 1981, but declined due to his academic obligations.312 The bishops’ commitment to hearing from Reagan officials was telling.

311 Memo, Edward Doherty to Gordon Zahn, January 22, 1982. Box 1, USCC: Departmental Committee: Social Development and World Peace: Ad hoc Committee on War and Peace, 1/11980-12/31/1985, Folder 4, United States Catholic Conference (USCC)- Office of the General Secretary, ACHRC.
312 “Report of the NCCB Committee on War and Peace, July/August 1981,” Box 1, USCC: Departmental Committee: Social Development and World Peace: Ad hoc Committee on War and Peace, 1/1/1980-12/31/1985, Folder 1, United States Catholic Conference (USCC)- Office of the General Secretary, ACHRC.
Under Bernardin’s characteristic gentle persuasion, they sought to forge relationships with those who disagreed to ensure a document with Roman Catholic thought on war and peace.

The experts consulted key Reagan defense officials: Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, and the head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Eugene Rostow.\footnote{Memo, Alexander Haig to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, March 23, 1982, Box 152, 1/1/1980-12/31/1982, “NCCB: Ad hoc Committee: War and Peace Pastoral (and follow up), 1983-1984, January-May 1982, National Conference of Catholic Bishops (1966-1992), AAC.} In a meeting at the Pentagon, Gumbleton asked Weinberger directly if the United States intended to retaliate if the Soviets launched a nuclear strike. Weinberger responded in the affirmative and without qualm. Gumbleton was shocked that Weinberger would admit so readily to the nuclear option.\footnote{Feuerherd, The Radical Gospel of Bishop Thomas Gumbleton. 80.} The bishops were unable to meet with Reagan’s first Secretary of State Alexander Haig due to scheduling conflicts or more likely his reluctance to engage with them, though Haig corresponded superficially with Bernardin.\footnote{Feuerherd.} For the first time, bishops and their staff interviewed government officials at length by for a national pastoral. In 1983, the bishops contacted the National Security Advisor William Clark’s office and interviewed his deputy Robert McFarlane.\footnote{Notes, Bishop John O’Connor to Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, January 13, 1983, EXEC/C0620/252, Executive Records- CBC Correspondence: General- Peace Pastoral Congressional and Executive Response to Draft 2, AAC.} The bishops understood that they were writing about matters that had direct implications for the American government’s defense policy. They did not shy away from speaking with defense strategists but sought them out.
The democratization of the theological profession folded nicely into the conference’s new orientation and assisted the bishops immensely in their writing of pastorals, especially on such a specialized topic as *The Challenge of Peace*. Pope Paul VI famously had an entire commission made up of more than sixty theologians, doctors, ethicists, and married couples to study birth control in preparation for *Humanae Vitae*.\(^{317}\) Father J. Bryan Hehir was one such expert for the ad hoc committee. At the time of the drafting of *The Challenge of Peace*, Father Hehir was associate secretary for international justice and peace for the USCC. A forty-year-old priest of the Archdiocese of Boston, he commuted between Boston and Washington weekly and held a doctorate in theology from Harvard Divinity School. His research focused on ethics in international relations. Hehir’s expertise was invaluable to the bishops. He led their efforts in support of the 1977 Panama Canal treaty and later against the Reagan administration’s Central America policy.\(^{318}\) But the Reagan administration viewed Hehir as a potential adversary when it came to its nuclear policies.\(^{319}\) Father Hehir recalled that almost one hundred experts were consulted during the drafting of *The Challenge of Peace*.\(^{320}\) Individuals with non-theological backgrounds proved crucial.

One might question the conclusions that the bishops were reaching based on their experts’ input. This concern would be well-founded if one treated *The Challenge of Peace* as a theological treatise or piece of academic scholarship. The document was neither and is not considered so under the stipulations of the magisterium. The bishops and NCCB/UCC staff were encouraged to consult whomever they wished, but it was the


\(^{318}\) Castelli, *The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age*. 75-76.

\(^{319}\) Father J. Bryan Hehir, Interview with Father Hehir.

\(^{320}\) Hehir, Father J. Bryan.
bishops’ perspective that ultimately mattered. Plenty of periti at Vatican II wrote entire sections of *Lumen Gentium, Gaudium et Spes* and the council’s other documents. The council fathers had the last word on every document and it was their voting that made, along with the pope’s approval, the documents binding. Father Hehir recalled that *The Challenge of Peace*, especially in its first draft, was cobbled together from various authors, mostly himself and Bishops Gumbleton and O’Connor. However, Hehir saw the various authors clouded the clarity of the document. He acknowledged that he was the primary editor of the finished product and that Archbishop Bernardin asked him to do so.\(^{321}\) Some notable foreign policy figures such as Richard Allen, General Victor Krulak, and William Clark would charge that *The Challenge of Peace* was an inappropriate incursion into foreign policy debates in which the bishops had no business.\(^{322}\) Michael Novak’s critique was especially visceral. He argued that the bishops were acting against Vatican II by making specific foreign policy recommendations, therefore compromising laypeople’s competency in extra-ecclesiastical matters.\(^{323}\) In short, Novak accused the bishops of clericalism. In his private correspondence, Novak’s arguments were often aggressive and accusatory. If the competency of the bishops to give guidance on national security issues could not be established, then neither could the pastoral be called binding on the consciences and wills of American Catholics.

**Archbishop Joseph Bernardin and the Seamless Garment**

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\(^{321}\) Hehir, Father J. Bryan.  
\(^{322}\) Letter, Archbishop Philip Hannan, “COMMENTS ON SECCOND DRAFT OF PROPOSED PASTORAL LETTER ‘THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD’S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE,’” November 8, 1982, William Clark Papers, Box 1, Folder 5, RRL.  
\(^{323}\) Letter, Michael Novak to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, November 3, 1982, EXEC/C0620/254, Executive Records- CBC Correspondence: General- Peace Pastoral Expert Response to Draft 2, Peace Pastoral Papers, AAC.
Archbishop Bernardin was in the process of developing his Consistent Life Ethic while serving as chair of the ad hoc committee. Harvard-educated Father Hehir provided Bernardin with academic backing.\(^3^{24}\) Bernardin, busy with his archdiocese and episcopal conference business, was happy to allow Hehir to develop the ideas of what later became as the “Seamless Garment” ethic. This less formal epithet for the Consistent Life Ethic (CLE) was coined by Eileen Egan, a founder of Pax Christi.\(^3^{25}\) The ethic embodied an ideology that prioritizes consistency in advocating for all of what its adherents consider life issues. Life issues include but are not limited to abortion, poverty, war, nuclear weapons, euthanasia, and capital punishment. It is totalizing in that it forbids a selective outlook on the issues, prioritizing one as more important than the others. To be against one is to be against the rest.\(^3^{26}\) Bernardin spent considerable energy marketing CLE to a wider American Catholic audience.\(^3^{27}\) While post-dating the ad hoc committee, Bernardin’s speeches on CLE give insight into the public discussion surrounding *The Challenge of Peace* that influenced the bishops.

Bernardin gave the most succinct description of CLE in his 1983 Gannon Lecture. Delivered at Fordham University months after *The Challenge of Peace* was published, Bernardin explained the ethic to a popular audience. The bishops’ criticism of the nuclear arms race and of deterrence policy spoke directly to CLE’s insistence on principle before prudence, even in public policy. He claimed that the pastoral was already having an effect on public policy or at least intended to do so:

\(^{324}\) Hehir, Father J. Bryan, Interview with Father Hehir.


The principal conclusion is that the Church’s social policy role is at least as important in defining key questions in the public debate as in deciding such questions. The impact of the pastoral was due in part to its specific positions and conclusions, but it was also due to the way it brought the entire nuclear debate under scrutiny.\textsuperscript{328}

The call of the council for the Church to engage with the modern world bore fruit in this case with the Church inserting itself into America’s social and foreign policy discussions. The archbishop was clear on what he saw as the pastoral’s purpose: to influence public policy. The Church’s social teaching sought not only to guide public policy, but to raise questions that sparked debates on these policies. Thus, Bernardin magnified the influence of the Church in the political and governmental realm. He couched these purposes in the category of persuasion, not coercion. He specifically noted how the bishops were able to persuade many to question the foreign policy status quo on nuclear weapons. CLE, then, was an absolutist ethic that nearly invites conflict with the federal powers-that-be. He also acknowledged that the movement against the nuclear arms race far predated \textit{The Challenge of Peace}. It resurfged upon Reagan’s election and went mainstream in the nuclear freeze movement, though the movement petered out by 1983.\textsuperscript{329} For their part, the Reagan administration eventually learned their lesson and softened their bellicose stance. In his second term, Reagan pursued rapprochement with the Soviets and made incredible strides in disarmament with the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.\textsuperscript{330}

Consistency was the mainstay of CLE. Bernardin put it plainly, “I contend that the viability of the principle depends upon the consistency of its application.”\textsuperscript{331}

\textsuperscript{328} Bernardin, \textit{Consistent Ethic of Life}, 3.
\textsuperscript{329} Maar III, \textit{Freeze!} 155.
\textsuperscript{330} Fischer, \textit{The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War}, 48.
\textsuperscript{331} Bernardin, \textit{Consistent Ethic of Life}, 8.
Bernardin did not claim this for Catholic moral theology in general, but he did for the Consistent Life Ethic. Life must be protected across the board in all circumstances. It bears mentioning however, that while CLE is applicable to Catholic social teaching and moral theology, it is not synonymous with it. In traditional Catholic moral theology and most magisterial thought on moral issues, the truth of a given principle is not determined in the consistency of its application. The heavy focus on objective moral standards in Thomistic and magisterial moral theology does not depend on application.\textsuperscript{332} Preserving life is good and right because it is good and right in itself. This may seem a semantic distinction, but it is important to note that CLE proceeds from different foundations than that of magisterial moral theology. It is above all an ethic of application. While rooted in the Christian tradition, it does not take a particular metaphysical system or theory of virtue like Thomistic or Augustinian ethics as its root. As such, it does not demand the cultivation of personal habits and behaviors. It is also inherently policy-forward and communal. CLE addressed modern concerns for human rights in secular contexts where government is the arbiter of social policy.\textsuperscript{333} Therefore, Consistent Life Ethic was the perfect ideological context for \textit{The Challenge of Peace}.

\textbf{Starting the Work}

The bishops did not come to the ad hoc committee as \textit{tabula rasa}. The men on the committee knew each other and worked together to varying degrees. Father Hehir recalled that he knew Bernardin the best of all the bishops on the ad hoc committee, then Gumbleton, and then O’Connor. He had not met Bishops Fulcher and Reilly prior to their

time on the committee. USCC were also present. Edward Dougherty, a longtime lay staff member and former foreign service officer, expressed caution at who could potentially be an impediment to the process. Dougherty recommended to Father Hehir that the pastoral avoid “better red than dead” language, but also that “You may have to take on Rear Admiral, now Bishop, O’Connor at the start.” The conclusion of the pastoral, then, was predetermined to an extent and its conclusion would not be O’Connor’s. All the bishops on the committee other than O’Connor were suspicious of, if not downright against, deterrence. The real question from the onset was where the document would land on the limits of deterrence’s moral admissibility, not on moral admissibility itself.

Bernardin set forth the priorities of the committee in a characteristically deliberate manner. All could agree that the main imperative would be to avoid nuclear war address deterrence. The bishops were doing their research on the technical aspects of nuclear issues. Small, targeted, low-fallout weapons, known as tactical weapons, were not acceptable, even though their killing power was much lower than other higher payload warheads. They also forbade the moral use of the neutron bomb. Reagan had raised the possibility of reintroducing neutron weapons into production, following Carter’s quiet

334 Father J. Bryan Hehir, Interview with Father Hehir.
335 Letter, Edward Doherty to Father J. Bryan Hehir, June 11, 1980, Box 1, USCC: Departmental Committee: Social Development and World Peace: Ad hoc Committee on War and Peace, 1/1/1980-12/31/1985, Folder 1, United States Catholic Conference (USCC)- Office of the General Secretary, ACHRC.
337 Memo, “Notes on Beginning Agenda for Ad Hoc Committee-Memo for File,” January 22, 1981, Box 1, USCC: Departmental Committee: Social Development and World Peace: Ad hoc Committee on War and Peace, 1/1/1980-12/31/1985, Folder 1, United States Catholic Conference (USCC)- Office of the General Secretary, ACHRC.
greenlighting. The neutron bomb, which promised to cause mass casualties through a massive dose of radiation and a fireball, would leave cities intact by and large. In 1981 Reagan also announced the production of the W70 for the field artillery MGM-52 Lance TBM (tactical ballistic missile). With these weapons in development, the bishops seriously questioned whether a limited nuclear war could be conducted. The anti-nuclear leaning of the committee was a given, but so too was the strong discouragement of MAD deterrence.

With the agenda set and experts lined up, the committee’s work was underway. The committee promised that the final document would be completed by the NCCB annual fall meeting in November 1982. The bishops divided up the work among themselves. Bishop Reilly was assigned to the portion on prayer and Scripture. Gumbleton handled pacifism and conscientious objection. O’Connor worked on deterrence and Catholic military servicemembers. Bishop Fulcher handled the historical elements. Gumbleton and O’Connor had the lion’s share of the most delicate work in the pastoral. Bernardin had veto power over every drafted section.

Early on, Bishop O’Connor’s extra-committee activities related to nuclear issues drew the attention of the higher-ups in the NCCB and others. Bernardin encouraged O’Connor to be transparent about his own opinions on nuclear issues. Similarly, Father Hehir and Bishop Gumbleton did not stop giving speeches about disarmament, with

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340 “NCCB Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace Report,” November 18, 1981, Box 1, USCC: Departmental Committee: Social Development and World Peace: Ad hoc Committee on War and Peace, 1/1/1980-12/31/1985, United States Catholic Conference (USCC)-Office of the General Secretary, Folder 3, ACHRC.
Gumbleton on the more radical end while working on *The Challenge of Peace*. O’Connor wrote Archbishop Roach that he had been approached by *National Review*, the staple magazine of American intellectual conservatism, to write an article on the nuclear debate. He sent Roach a draft and offered to correct what Roach saw fit, “… I could help contribute to the kind of bridge building that it seems to me is sorely needed between and among religious leaders of diverging but sincerely held viewpoints and the other conscientiously trying to meet their terribly complex obligations.” Roach gave O’Connor his blessing, even in an avowedly partisan outlet like *National Review*. The documents indicate that O’Connor sat on the article for some time, however. Roach wrote him again toward the end of February:

> I feel there is a growing consensus among bishops and theologians that it is not morally permissible to use nuclear weapons. Your article does not concur in that view. You are perfectly free, of course, to express your opinion, which is well developed and carefully nuanced. On the assumption that you wish to proceed with its publication, I would certainly support your doing so even though it does not concur with my own view nor the consensus I detect in the Church.

One would assume that Bernardin also knew of O’Connor’s article. He was certainly aware of O’Connor’s 1980 booklet *In Defense of Life*, in which he defended a strong military and held open the possibility of nuclear weapons use in a defensive context. O’Connor was supported by Cardinal Cooke and Archbishop Joseph Ryan of the

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342 Castelli. 112-113.
Military Vicarate at the 1980 general NCCB meeting.\footnote{“Minutes of 26th General Meeting of NCCB, Nov 10-13, 1980,” Box 1, USCC: Departmental Committee: Social Development and World Peace: Ad hoc Committee on War and Peace, 1/1/1980-12/31/1985, Folder 1, United States Catholic Conference (USCC)-Office of the General Secretary, ACHRC.} The Reagan administration were avid readers of the \textit{National Review}, which generally supported all the president’s positions.\footnote{Packet, William Sims to William Clark, Robert McFarlane, and Sven Kraemer, May 2, 1983, William Clark Box 1, Folder 6, William Clark Files, RRL.} It is striking that O’Connor was given so much leeway to broadcast his opinions on the nuclear question. Doing so likely only fed into the media narrative that portrayed O’Connor the military man as the hawk and Gumbleton the activist as the dove on the committee.\footnote{Kenneth Briggs, “Bishops to Finish Atom Arms Letter: Catholics Will Meet Tomorrow on a Draft Prepared after Broad Consultations,” \textit{The New York Times}, May 1, 1983, sec. A28.} There was a glimmer of truth in the narrative, however. Bishop Gumbleton publicly endorsed Archbishop Hunthausen’s criticism of the Trident submarine program.\footnote{Feuerherd, \textit{The Radical Gospel of Bishop Thomas Gumbleton}. 84. The \textit{Ohio}-class submarines were designed in the late 1970s to deploy submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and were docked in Bangor, Washington. Trident missiles were nuclear-capable SLBMs. The first \textit{Ohio} submarines could accommodate eight independently targetable reentry vehicles, later twelve. Reagan introduced the Trident missiles to replace the aging Polaris missiles, the first nuclear SLBMs.} Bernardin and Roach’s indulgence of the committee members made for a compelling story but may have run them afoul of Vatican officials.

The Apostolic Delegate, Pio Laghi, was watching the NCCB closely. Laghi succeeded Jean Jadot as the pope’s first point of contact in the United States. Laghi, John Paul II’s first Apostolic Delegate, wrote to Bishop Thomas Kelly to let him know that he had heard of Bishop Hunthausen’s denunciation of the Trident program. Laghi gave Kelly a subtle warning by asking that Kelly keep him informed of the ad hoc committee’s activities.\footnote{Letter, Archbishop Pio Laghi to Bishop Thomas Kelly, OP, July 22, 1981, Box 152, 1980-1982, NCCB: Ad hoc Committee: War and Peace Pastoral, 1/1/1980-12/31/1983, Jan/May 1982, National Conference of Catholic Bishops, ACHRC.} Hunthausen’s protest was strident, but unsurprising due to his longstanding
Hunthausen had been a bishop since 1962 and participated in all four sessions of Vatican II, becoming one of the most enthusiastic American bishops eager to implement the teachings of the council. He also plunged into anti-war activism as bishop of Helena, Montana during Vietnam, making himself a hero of the Catholic peace activists. He was transferred to Seattle in 1975 and frequently participated in protests at the local navy yard, calling it the “Auschwitz of Puget Sound.” The archbishop’s witness was appreciated by many in the NCCB but Hunthausen was uninterested in organizing his fellow travelers in the American episcopate. Archbishop Laghi felt that Hunthausen was muddying the waters with what the NCCB wanted to say about nuclear weapons. Despite successive popes’ disapproval of nuclear conflict, including John Paul II, Laghi the career diplomat wanted the committee to represent the NCCB on the nuclear issue and Hunthausen was not on the committee. He never gave similar warnings to Bishop Kelly or Archbishop Roach about Bishops O’Connor and Gumbleton.

Heavy media attention to this controversy threatened the integrity of the process. Potential personality conflicts were the least of the ad hoc committee’s problems. Father Hehir recalled that they expected some press but were caught off guard by the sheer amount of interest in their project. Bernardin was unprepared for the leading questions thrown his way at a press conference in Washington on November 19, 1981. Edward

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355 Father J. Bryan Hehir, Interview with Father Hehir, Telephone, June 26, 2022.
Doherty, the retired foreign service officer, combed through Reagan’s November 1981 Washington Press Club speech to search for any technical questions that might stump Bernardin. The speech laid out Reagan’s famous zero-option ultimatum. The Americans would cancel the forward deployment of Pershing II intermediate range ballistic nuclear missiles (IRBM) and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM) if the Soviets would cancel the deployment of their mobile SS-20s and SS-4s and 5s. Doherty reminded Bernardin that zero option had the support of NATO. Dougherty’s read of zero option was not entirely negative. The reductions were real, but they would be reductions of weapons that were already deployed. Either way, the Russians were unlikely to budge, and the administration knew it.

While not a public relations professional, Edward Doherty focused on how he could prepare Bernardin to present the bishops’ work in the most benign manner possible vis a vis the administration. The bishops should not show their hand, but they had to make clear that they had their own independent position, “You may be asked to comment on Reagan’s rejection of unilateral disarmament, to which you should reply by saying that your committee is not committed to unilateral disarmament…but not precluded from considering independent initiatives.” The committee would not let itself be baited and

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placed itself squarely against the administration. Nor was it to be entirely pacifist, regardless of Bishop Gumbleton and Bernardin’s own thoughts on the matter. Dougherty’s last comment implied that unilateral disarmament could be an option for the future but left it intentionally vague. The bishops need not commit themselves to policies.\textsuperscript{360} As Hehir would later reflect, no one on or about the committee anticipated the hard questions they were about to encounter.\textsuperscript{361}

Father Hehir’s notes revealed increasingly probing questions that raised the normally diplomatic Bernardin’s ire during the press conference. Dougherty’s nonchalance in his memo backfired, leading Bernardin to believe that he would be handling softball questions. Hehir’s notes did not identify the reporters by name, but other press conferences featured a mixture of major secular and Catholic press. At the beginning, a reporter posited that Cardinal Krol’s SALT II speech had set the tone for the ad hoc committee on the question of deterrence. What impact would the Reagan Press Club speech have on what the bishops had to say? Bernardin admitted that he was annoyed by Reagan’s comments on zero option. The reporter continued to press. What would happen if the Soviets refused the offer? The bishops were not prepared to comment on how the Krol speech would affect the committee’s work.\textsuperscript{362} Bernardin’s exasperated responses point to what he saw as the administration’s red herring regarding the zero option, based on Doherty’s advice. The administration knew full well the Soviets would not agree to it, but Reagan’s proposal feigned momentum toward disarmament.


\textsuperscript{361} Hehir, Father J. Bryan, Interview with Father Hehir.

Moreover, the administration could point the finger at the Soviets when they inevitably rejected the deal.

Bernardin was caught off guard by the press referencing Krol as the touchstone of the new document, though he should not have been. Krol’s testimony was recent and generated much media attention. Bernardin was forced into a defensive posture. He refused to specify the number of bishops who were members of Pax Christi, though he most likely did not know the actual number. He declined to comment on Reagan’s speech, protesting that he was not a foreign policy expert, though he had admitted his disapproval. Bernardin’s commitment to maintaining the independence of the committee clashed with his eagerness to get good press. Keeping with Krol’s point of view on nuclear issues was going to be contested publicly, even though most of the coverage on the ad hoc committee was positive. Bernardin also revealed that drafts of the letter were not going to be radical in the context of disarmament. As an expression of the American episcopal conference’s magisterium, the ad hoc committee had to be mindful of the document’s tone.

The First Draft

The confidential first draft, God’s Hope in a Time of Fear, was circulated around the NCCB in June 1982. The all-caps warning on the cover page made its confidentiality clear. It also reminded the reader to consider the document as a whole, instead of cherry-picking certain sections. The document began with a section on just war that was conciliatory to nuclear conflict. Citing John Courtney Murray, it raised the question of

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competent authority in declaring war in the specific case of a revolution against a political authority. The implication was that no one other than competent political authority can make a judgment on whether a war is just, not the society affected by such a war. This off-topic assertion meandered further. Pope John allegedly condoned deterrence and the section was suspicious of the assertion seen in later drafts, that massive arms buildup for the purposes of deterrence constitutes an immoral threat. The reader was also reminded that more civilians perished due to firebombing in Dresden and Tokyo than due to the atomic bombs.

The tone shifted abruptly after page twenty-five. “We do not perceive any situation in which the deliberate initiation of nuclear warfare, on however restricted a scale, can be condoned. Non-nuclear attacks by another state must be deterred by other than nuclear means.” This section, with the underline appearing in the original, explicitly forbade first strike. However, the second sentence does not directly follow from the first. The first is most reasonably read as any use of nuclear weapons in combat is forbidden, yet the second sentence reminds that conventional attacks cannot be repelled by nuclear ones. To do so would be a violation of the just war principle of proportionality. However, if use of nuclear weapons were precluded in any case, why assert their immoral use in any situation? Either the first sentence does not imply that the use of nuclear weapons is impermissible in every situation or that the construction of the two sentences is not logically sound.

366 “First draft of pastoral letter on peace and war (CONFIDENTIAL), God’s Hope in a Time of Fear,” June 11, 1982.
367 “First draft of pastoral letter on peace and war (CONFIDENTIAL), God’s Hope in a Time of Fear,” June 11, 1982.
The second half reads like a different document. Targeting civilians with conventional or nuclear weapons is always wrong, but so too is the threat to attack them. The reason given was dubious, “Those threatened may live in fear and anxiety. Those who threaten may become too easily accustomed to using violent means to obtain their goals.”

Germain Grisez, an eminent Catholic moral theologian, wrote Archbishop Roach an extended letter about the nuclear issue, including precisely why it is impermissible from a Catholic moral perspective to use threats to achieve a desired outcome. That threats inspire fear were not one of his reasons. The conflation of threat of violence with physical violence is a collapse of categories that connected with a later section that implored Catholics who are employed in defense industries to continuously analyze their consciences to ascertain that their work is not morally contrary to Catholic teaching on war and peace. This section offered a curious discouragement of deterrence. It is impermissible because it may fail and lead to nuclear Armageddon but then a later section clarified that deterrence is conditionally morally acceptable. Any reflection on Scripture was absent from the first draft.

God’s Hope in a Time of Fear was promptly leaked to the press, leaving Archbishop Bernardin, his committee, and Father Hehir reeling. The press read it as if it reflected the bishops’ mature thought. The committee was fortunate that most outlets read

368 “First draft of pastoral letter on peace and war (CONFIDENTIAL), God’s Hope in a Time of Fear,” June 11, 1982.
369 “First draft of pastoral letter on peace and war (CONFIDENTIAL), God’s Hope in a Time of Fear,” June 11, 1982.
370 “First draft of pastoral letter on peace and war (CONFIDENTIAL), God’s Hope in a Time of Fear,” June 11, 1982.
371 “First draft of pastoral letter on peace and war (CONFIDENTIAL), God’s Hope in a Time of Fear,” June 11, 1982.
the draft in a positive manner as a direct repudiation of Reagan’s foreign policy, especially as the president’s enormous military buildup was underway and faced considerable opposition.\(^{372}\) However, the main criticism among the bishops regarding the draft was its overreliance on the just war tradition. Many felt that the draft just regurgitated just war principles without crosschecking the nuclear context and vice versa.\(^{373}\) Good press dissuaded neither Archbishop Laghi nor Father Hehir from objecting to the leak as it tipped off the administration of where the second and third drafts might land.\(^{374}\)

The potential sources of the leak were manifold. The draft went to every bishop in the country and every expert consulted. There were literally hundreds of potential leakers.\(^{375}\) Joseph Fahey, a former professor of religious studies at Manhattan College, forwarded the unsubstantiated accusation that Bishop O’Connor was a source of leaks “from drafts of the pastoral letter to Defense Department officials in violation of the confidentiality that was expected…” Fahey claimed that Edward Doherty told him so. In the same article, he mentioned that Bishop Gumbleton worked closely with Pax Christi in writing his portions of the draft.\(^{376}\) Fahey objected to O’Connor’s independent consultations, but not to Gumbleton’s. There is no evidence that O’Connor was the

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source of any leaked drafts. Fahey was also a partisan of Pax Christi and other disarmament causes. He bemoaned that Bishop Gumbleton was not awarded ecclesiastical prestige like O’Connor or Bernardin.\textsuperscript{377} Fahey’s accusation of Doherty reveals the more contested side of the ad hoc committee and its staff.

As the bishops put their heads down to work on the second draft, Archbishops Bernardin and Roach were left to correspond with the Holy See. The committee forwarded the first draft to Iustitia et Pax. Overall, the impression of the Roman curial office for justice and peace was mixed. They recognized that the draft was written before the pope’s statement to the UN’s Special Session on Disarmament, but they desired that the statement be included in the next draft. They reiterated their request two additional times in their letter. The real question was how the document could best reflect the tradition and the moral reasoning of the Church.\textsuperscript{378} Iustitia et Pax’s repeated insistence on the inclusion of the pope’s UN statement revealed their major priority. The document on war and peace was to include the very latest papal thought on war and peace. However, Laghi noted that the comments of Iustitia et Pax were not to be confused with those of the Holy See.\textsuperscript{379}

The pressure on the bishops to finish the pastoral came to a head at the meeting of the ad hoc committee in Spring Lake, New Jersey in July of 1982. The committee needed to wrap up the second draft by August 14 so it could put it for a vote before the entire NCCB at their November meeting. At this meeting, Bishop O’Connor spoke for more than an hour about his problems with the second draft. The archival record is largely

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\item[377] Fahey. 132-133.
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silent over what happened at Spring Lake on July 28-30, but Jim Castelli’s book provided some clues. Bernardin fidgeted throughout O’Connor’s discourse, alarmed at the prospect of having to restart the entire process from scratch. O’Connor, remembering himself in the wee hours of the morning, took Bernardin aside and offered to resign if Bernardin had felt he had been, “an embarrassment.” Bernardin responded, “of course not.” O’Connor later apologized to the committee. Based on the overwhelming amount of material that the committee had received from the first draft, the bishops begged Bernardin to delay the final version. Gumbleton recalled that he had personally received materials that stacked a foot high. Bernardin reported the delay in a circular letter to the NCCB on August 2. The final draft would have to wait until the spring of 1983.

Gumbleton and O’Connor Writing the Second Draft

Gumbleton and O’Connor worked painstakingly on their respective sections of the pastoral in the second draft. The archival record is filled with multiple versions, some marked up by hand. Gumbleton’s October 1982 corrections demonstrate the sophistication of his thought on war and peace. In the section of the second draft regarding civilian targets, Gumbleton penned in, “Problem for those in chain. We understand the moral dilemma of command.” Just as O’Connor was concerned with being seen as pro-war by virtue of his military experience, Gumbleton signaled that his bias toward pacifism did not mean he was ignorant of the complex moral dilemmas in

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380 Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age. 96-97.
381 Letter, Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, August 5, 1982, Thomas J. Gumbleton Papers, Box 43, Folder 4, Archives of the University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN (herein AUND).
382 Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age. 96.
383 Memo, Archbishop Joseph Bernardin to the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, August 2, 1982, Thomas J. Gumbleton Papers, Box 42, Folder 4, AUND.
384 Memo, Father J. Bryan Hehir to Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace, October 4, 1982, Thomas J. Gumbleton Papers, Box 43, Folder 2, AUND.
which military commanders faced. Gumbleton understood that the pastoral had to provide a basis for consensus should it have any hope of passing a conference-wide vote:

Moreover, we do acknowledge that there are many strong voices within our own episcopal ranks and within the Catholic community in U.S. which question the morality and the effectiveness of the strategy of deterrence as an adequate response to the arms race today. They highlight the historical evidence that deterrence has not in fact set in motion the process of disarmament. On the contrary it renders [sic] its impulse there has been unbridled acceleration in building arms by both superpowers. Moreover, there [are] persons fear that failure to condemn the [sic] deterrence in a letter such as this will be enough to reinforce the policy of arms build-up…In its stead they call us to voice a prophetic challenge to the faith community. A challenge which goes beyond deterrence…

Gumbleton’s additions were more spontaneous thoughts than the products of long reflection, but they point to the deterrence section that Gumbleton would have written had he had the chance. He was correct that deterrence had not in fact led to any gains in disarmament. More suspect was his claim that some believe the bishops’ failure to condemn the arms race would lead to a larger build-up. The Nuclear Freeze movement, which was gaining modest legislative victories in 1982, certainly noted the connection with the arms race and military buildup. Henry Maar argues that the Freeze movement welcomed the bishops’ letter as a part of the larger societal impetus toward their position. A million people protested the MX missile in Central Park in June of 1982 and the administration monitored the Freeze movement closely. The administration was surprised at the backlash its defense policies received and began to back down from the aggressive rhetoric of the buildup. The dollar numbers rose dramatically from the

385 Memo, Father J. Bryan Hehir to Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace, October 4, 1982.
386 Maar III, Freeze! 72.
387 Maar III. 69.
military buildup announced the previous year. That, combined with Reagan’s considerable tax cuts in 1981, exploded the federal deficit.\textsuperscript{388}

If Gumbleton’s alterations revealed his true, if unpolished, thoughts on deterrence, Bishop O’Connor attempted to introduce a full-scale recalibration on the theological foundations of the pastoral. In a nearly thirty-page outline dated August 5, 1982, O’Connor wrote the committee exactly what sort of theological framework he wished the pastoral to include. The outline was the longhand version of his Spring Lake intervention. To start, O’Connor wanted to foreground the pope’s magisterial writings, in particular John Paul’s first encyclical \textit{Redemptor Hominis}. The pope had been trained as a philosopher and O’Connor noted that his theology and ecclesiology found its origin in his book, \textit{The Acting Person}.\textsuperscript{389} Two major reasons stand out for his insistence. First, structuring the pastoral as close as possible to the pope’s own theological leanings would be agreeable to the Holy See. Second, O’Connor would have ingratiated himself as an enthusiast of the new pope’s magisterium even more firmly than he had before. He proposed revamping a part of the pastoral to which he had not been assigned. Bishop Bernardin had shuffled assignments and himself, Bishop Reilly and Sister Juliana Casey were to write the theological and Scriptural section of the pastoral.\textsuperscript{390}

O’Connor proposed to remedy the problem by recommending more theological experts. Castelli reported that O’Connor wanted to scrap the first half of the pastoral entirely. The group that O’Connor recommended were labelled by Castelli as

\textsuperscript{388} Niskanen, \textit{Reaganomics}. 30, 64.
\textsuperscript{389} Letter, Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, August 5, 1982, Thomas J. Gumbleton Papers, Box 43, Folder 4, AUND.
\textsuperscript{390} Memo, Father J. Bryan Hehir to Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace, “‘No First Use’ Section (p. 43-44 of Second Draft),” EXEC/C0620/252, Executive Records- CBC Correspondence: General- Peace Pastoral Congressional and Executive Response to Draft 2, Folder 3, Peace Pastoral Papers, 1/1/1981-12/31/1983, AAC.
“conservative theologians.” The label did not fit exactly, but the individuals O’Connor recommended were known as more open to nuclear deterrence, save the final two. Among others, O’Connor recommended James Schall, S.J. of Georgetown, Ronald Lawler, O.F.M. Cap., of the University of St. Thomas (Houston), and Joseph Fessio, S.J., of the University of San Francisco. Schall was a political scientist and former member of Iustitia et Pax. Fessio had studied with Cardinal Ratzinger in Germany before Ratzinger was named prefect for the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith, writing his dissertation on ecclesiology. Lawler was a bioethicist and theologian. Most of the Jesuit faculty and the Renaissance historian James Hitchcock of Saint Louis University, a center of more traditional work in moral theology, were also on the list. Two women, the physicist Sister Mary Charles Weschler of Mercyhurst College and Sister Mary Evelyn Jegen of Pax Christi, rounded out the list. The recommendations were virtually identical to those O’Connor had submitted in the beginning of the drafting process a year earlier. However, O’Connor was breaching NCCB professional conduct and standards of collegiality by proposing that the committee go back to the drawing board, knowing that the deadline was a month away and that public scrutiny was only increasing.

Father Hehir stepped in as intermediary to literally pencil in Gumbleton and O’Connor’s proposed edits. Scheduling conflicts made it impossible for the two to meet

391 Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age. 96.
394 Letter, Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, August 5, 1982, Thomas J. Gumbleton Papers, Box 43, Folder 4, AUND.
395 “NCCB Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace Report,” November 18, 1981 Box 1, USCC: Departmental Committee: Social Development and World Peace: Ad hoc Committee on War and Peace, 1/1/1980-12/31/1985, United States Catholic Conference (USCC)- Office of the General Secretary, Folder 3, ACHRC.
in person to make modifications. O’Connor was allowed to continue to work on the deterrence section, but Gumbleton submitted his own corrections to it. A short section of the deterrence section thus became both Gumbleton and O’Connor’s section. The changes came in pages 55 through 60 in the second draft, which speaks directly on Pope John Paul’s conditional acceptance of deterrence. This document, found in Bishop Gumbleton’s Notre Dame papers and dated October 4, 1982, was the earliest extant copy of the second draft that included reference to the pope’s statement to the UN. The committee would not cherry-pick the pope’s message for the single line that left an opening for deterrence, but they had to deal with it no matter what.

The pope’s public statements on nuclear war were universally negative except for the one line about deterrence. The bishops had to address that one line and incorporate into their pastoral. They also added their own commentary, which ultimately made it to the final draft. O’Connor’s gloss added in bold, “It is clear that the Pope has limited the acceptable function of deterrence precisely to the one positive value it is said to have had—preventing the use of nuclear weapons in any form. This strictly conditioned judgement yields criteria for morally assessing the elements of deterrence strategy.” O’Connor wanted it to be made clear that the pope was allowing only the barest opening to deterrence, certainly not to the extent that the Reagan administration claimed for it. He also wanted to include the MX missile as an example of an element of deterrence that was illegitimate under John Paul II’s framework.

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396 Memo, Father J. Bryan Hehir to Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace, October 4, 1982, Thomas J. Gumbleton Papers, Box 43, Folder 4, AUND.
397 Memo, Father J. Bryan Hehir to Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace, October 4, 1982.
O’Connor and Gumbleton’s changes were almost dialogical, an exchange of viewpoints that were coming from opposite perspectives but held some commonality. Both agreed that the arms race was unsustainable and had continued under deterrence policy. Gumbleton, however, considered the arms building curve to have continued almost unabated for decades. O’Connor was insistent on bilateralism to avoid any confusion in precisely what the bishops were recommending for disarmament. He was vindicated in so doing by Bernardin’s early directive. Father Hehir recalled that many of the more contested sections of the pastoral came down to line-by-line modifications. He was asked to be editor of the third and final draft of the document due to the almost myopic changes the bishops kept proposing.

The Second Draft

The most notable change between drafts of *The Challenge of Peace* was between the first and the second. The second draft was entitled *God’s Peace: His Challenge and Our Work* and was first circulated among the NCCB on October 19, 1982. The time between drafts, just four months, indicated that the second draft was underway while the first was published. The document was more fleshed out on the peace tradition of the Church and more careful about the deterrence question. Wholly absent from the first draft, Scripture figured prominently in the first section of the second draft.

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400 Hehir, Father J. Bryan, Interview with Father Hehir.
401 Memo, Father J. Bryan Hehir to Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace, “‘No First Use’ Section (p. 43-44 of Second Draft),” EXEC/C0620/252, Executive Records - CBC Correspondence: General - Peace Pastoral Congressional and Executive Response to Draft 2, Peace Pastoral Expert Response to Draft 2, Folder 3, Peace Pastoral Papers, AAC.
section treated non-violence as a part of the tradition of the Church, boldly conflating it with pacifism. This second draft made a breakthrough in squaring the circle between just war and pacifism. Ultimately, both sides wanted the same thing. The committee recognized this, including O’Connor and Gumbleton. O’Connor, despite his opinions, constantly protested that judging the military vicarate pro-war was erroneous.\textsuperscript{404} The difference between the two was that the just war tradition recognized that violence is sometimes necessary to protect the innocent and in self-defense. Pacifism and non-violence do not.

The second draft maintained that both pacifism and just war are legitimate options in accord with the Christian life. While critics like George Weigel and Bishop O’Connor would argue that just war theory was the tradition of the Church, the document is clear that both just war and non-violence run parallel throughout the history of the Church.\textsuperscript{405} In an even more conciliatory aside, page 26 of the second draft reminded the reader that both just war theory and non-violence come from the same assumption, that peace is always better than war and that war must be the absolute last resort.\textsuperscript{406} Just war theory, as well as pacifism, does not justify war but rather helps assure that armed conflict is conducted according to the most moral means possible. This development in the pastoral contradicted the narrative of O’Connor vs. Gumbleton popularized in the press. There

\textsuperscript{404} Letter, Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, August 18, 1981, Box 1, USCC: Departmental Committee: Social Development and World Peace: Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace, 1/1/1980-12/31/1985, United States Catholic Conference (USCC)- Office of the General Secretary, Folder 1, ACHRC.


were real disagreements between the two, but compromise was possible when it came to just war and non-violence.

Deterrence got a more in-depth treatment in the second draft. Based upon their conversations with the defense community, the committee took the Reagan administration at their word for what they meant by deterrence, maintaining military readiness to ward off a potential enemy attack. The document spelled out the implications, “Deterrence depends upon the assured capability and manifest will to inflict damage on the Soviet Union.” The bishops conflated possession of nuclear weapons with intent to use. However, the bishops were also under orders to add Pope John Paul’s statement to the UN Special Session. As a result, the second draft forbade first use and “using them [nuclear weapons] for aggression.” If first use is excluded, then presumably a retaliatory strike would be as well. The language around deterrence was still clunky, “…‘sufficiency’ to deter is an adequate strategy; the quest for superiority must be resisted.” Sufficiency, as a part of deterrence, was the morally acceptable policy. Sufficiency is having an adequate nuclear arsenal to deter potential attack. The bishops’ disavowal of superiority was contrary to the policy of the Reagan administration, which saw weapons superiority as the primary means by which to beat the Soviets in the arms race. This emphasis on superiority rather than parity had its roots in

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408 Lumen Gentium, Sec. 23 in Vatican Council II, Vatican II: The Essential Texts.
the Kennedy administration’s arms policy after the Cuban crisis. The bishops still had work to do in explaining exactly what was wrong with deterrence.

The use of more technical language in this draft indicated the study that the bishops had devoted to their assignment. They opposed first strike capability and hard target kills, noting that the MX missile might fit into those categories. The hard target kill (HTK) tactic relates to the Trident II fleet/submarine-launched ballistic missile (FBM/SLBM) program. HTK FBMs were a timely issue for the bishops, given Bishop Hunthausen’s protest of the program in 1981. HTK was a pillar of Reagan-era nuclear policy and refers to weapons with the capability to destroy missile silos and communication and command centers, i.e., hard targets. Many of the conservative members of the foreign policy apparatus considered HTK a step toward disarmament and preventing nuclear conflict insofar as it focused on eliminating the chain of command that would make escalation and/or retaliation possible. Reagan’s new MX missile could fit within an HTK strategy. The MX, nicknamed Peacekeeper, was an ICBM that had fleet ballistic missile capabilities. The bishops could not accept HTK, due to its insistence on either first strike or retaliation. They called out specific foreign policy tactics and weapons groups that were Reagan’s public priorities and judged them morally unacceptable.

Instead of just relying on general exhortation, the bishops tested the waters with more specific condemnations. These were extensive in the second draft, “…prevent

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412 Gaddis, *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb*. 122.
415 FitzGerald, *Way Out There in the Blue*. 189
development and deployment of destabilizing weapons systems on either side; a second requirement is to ensure that the more sophisticated control and control systems are no less open to human intervention; a third is the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the international system.”

However, ambiguity was again a problem for the committee. They never defined what they considered to be a destabilizing weapons system. They appeared to be warning about the human error factor while acknowledging that command chain technologies had advanced to protect against unauthorized nuclear strikes. The bishops may have been giving too much credit to technological innovation in this case, however. Able Archer and the Korean Airlines disasters mere months later proved that technological checks could only do so much when the humans in command ignored them.

The specificity and boldness with which the bishops forwarded their recommendations about American nuclear policies were the largest difference between the first and second drafts of The Challenge of Peace. The second version came with a dose of skepticism of current and past U.S. arms control initiatives. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, trumpeted by the Reagan administration, was a farce from their point of view. Both horizontal and vertical proliferation still took place despite the treaty. The bishops believed that previous administrations, in that case the late Johnson administration in 1968, did not take arms control seriously even amid the

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417 David Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2010), 72, 94.
Vietnam War.\footnote{Kelsey Davenport, \textit{The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty} (Williston, Vermont: Morgan & Claypool Publishers, 2019). 35.} Non-proliferation was the most obvious area of non-compliance, they said. The United States slowed the manufacture, development and deployment of nuclear weapons during the 1970s, but only eliminated classes of weapons when new ones were developed.\footnote{Thomas B. Cochran, Norris, Robert S., and Arkin, William M., “History of the Nuclear Stockpile,” \textit{Bulletin of Atomic Scientists} 41, no. 7 (1985): 106–9. 107. During this period, American scientists also explored creating nuclear incendiary bombs, which promised a nuclear blaze alongside explosive power. These proposals soon fizzled due to their scientific impossibility.} The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was similarly circumvented as nuclear powers moved their tests underground or followed the treaty and did not test at all, leading to numerous cases of improper storage or accidental nuclear contamination.\footnote{Sheehan, \textit{A Fiery Peace in a Cold War.} 57.} Real and verifiable progress needed to be made in disarmament.

The conclusions to which the bishops came in the second draft were largely foregone. The bishops could not, based on the internal and external pressure imposed upon them, recommend any nuclear arms use in combat. Even Bishop O’Connor, who had previously expressed that there might be a morally acceptable use for tactical nuclear weapons, knew that the ad hoc committee could not endorse any use.\footnote{Bishop John O’Connor, \textit{In Defense of Life} (Boston: Daughters of St. Paul, 1981). 23.} This was of little comfort to Bishop Gumbleton. He wanted unilateral disarmament, which was excluded from discussion at the onset. However, John Paul II’s message to the UN did not soothe all the bishops’ anxieties over deterrence. Quite the contrary, when it came to Edward Doherty and Father Hehir.\footnote{Letter, Edward Doherty to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, January 3, 1983, EXEC/C0620/254, Executive Records- CBC Correspondence: General- Peace Pastoral Expert Response to Draft 2, Peace Pastoral Papers, 1/1/1981-12/31/1983, AAC.} The committee, while they had reached a similar conclusion to the pope’s before his message to the UN, still had to figure out how to incorporate conditional moral acceptability into their anti-nuclear framework. They also had to
contend with the Reagan administration. The overall conclusion may have been forgone, but the committee still had much work to do to complete the *The Challenge of Peace*.

This chapter shows how the development of the pastoral was influenced by the personalities of the bishops on the committee, in particular Bernardin, O’Connor, and Gumbleton. Bernardin’s Consistent Life Ethic explains the ideology of conflict and life issues the chair of the committee brought to his work and Father Bryan Hehir’s crucial role in it. Experts, in government, theology, and beyond were central to the drafting process. Bernardin struggled in clarifying a satisfactory media narrative for his committee. The first draft was inconsistent and lacked a cohesive narrative. The second was the real start for the bishops’ understanding of American nuclear policy.
Chapter 4: “Bishops Don’t Like to Fight Bishops”

Reagan and Public Religion

The Reagan administration’s concern for the pastoral on war and peace arose out of its commitment to maintaining good relations with conservative religious bodies. President Reagan marketed himself as a defender of Christian values early and often in his presidency. In August of 1980, Reagan went to the Moral Majority’s Religious Roundtable’s National Affairs Briefing and declared himself an ally with, “I know you can’t endorse me, but I want you to know that I endorse you and what you are doing.”

However, in his first term Reagan again struggled to find equilibrium between rhetoric and delivering on policy. Daniel Williams in *God’s Own Party* maintains that Reagan skillfully ignored the Christian Right yet appealed to them when needed for political expediency. The largest blow struck to Christian conservatives devoted to the anti-abortion cause was his 1981 nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor to the Supreme Court.

O’Connor had a strong pro-abortion record as a federal judge. Reagan’s conservative Supreme Court record was redeemed in 1987 when he nominated Antonin Scalia, a darling of conservative legal culture and a solid anti-abortion vote, to the Court. Reagan’s first term was a mixture of defeats and victories for Christian conservatives. Still, in the 1984 election, he took a supermajority of white evangelicals. For the first

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425 Williams. 195.
time in decades, Catholic conservatives had a president who said all the right things about social and defense issues and publicly advocated for traditional family values.

The new administration made sure to cultivate relationships with Christian groups in its Human Services Division. Its staff shared in the chaos of the early months of the administration, only stabilizing around mid-1982. Morton Blackwell was the liaison to Protestant and later Catholic groups after the 1985 departure of Robert Reilly. Human services also featured an “ethnic European” section, which made it a de facto Catholic section since the “ethnic” category earmarked recent Eastern and Central European Catholic immigrants. Jack Burgess and later Linas Kojelis, of Lithuanian origin, handled this section. Catholics, therefore, were monitored assiduously by the administration, within and without the White House. Reagan did not prioritize the most motivated of his Christian supporters for spots in the administration. Catholics heavily outnumbered evangelicals in the administration, though some evangelicals were present in the lower levels of advisory staff.

Religious groups felt like they were a part of the moral conversation in America for the first time in two decades. Richard John Neuhaus, then a Lutheran pastor and Reagan supporter, recounted the phenomenon in his *The Naked Public Square*, written during Reagan’s second term. Neuhaus was a public intellectual who depended upon the support of Catholics, evangelicals, and other Christian conservative groups in rebuilding what he called a morally-coherent public culture in America. Decades of secularism had

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430 Williams, *God’s Own Party*. 194.
left America’s civil vocabulary naked of meaning and purpose for him. It was a small wonder then that conservative religious groups would be inspired by a president who wanted to be a part of the reinvigoration of religious culture in America. The Moral Majority believed themselves to be the vanguard of such an effort, but Neuhaus strongly disagreed. In fact, he believed that the Catholics should be the leaders of the new Christian intellectual revival. Neuhaus was proven right when it came to the war and peace issue. The Reagan years gave religious conservatives a strong sense of acceptance, even ascendancy.

Catholics, the Administration, and the Freeze

Reagan prioritized cordial relationships with conservative religious bodies as a part of invigorating and maintaining his base. But the Catholic hierarchy were among the most visible opponents of Reagan’s early warmongering. Reagan, though not a denominational believer himself, had a majority Catholic cabinet and executive branch in his first term. His first national security advisors, Richard Allen and William Clark, were practicing conservative Catholics. Clark became the point man on contact with the bishops over their pastoral, with his office devoting the most time and personnel to the issue. For Clark, the issues at play were predominantly but not simply political insofar as he was attempting to keep Reagan’s Catholic bloc united and supportive of the administration. Maar correctly labeled the contours of Clark’s strategy, which was co-

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431 Neuhaus, *The Naked Public Square*. 41. Neuhaus would later convert to Catholicism and be ordained a Catholic priest by John Cardinal O’Connor, then Archbishop of New York, in the early 1990s.

432 Neuhaus. 262.


opting the bishops’ project as the administration’s own.\textsuperscript{435} It was a clever ruse, and one that countered those who saw the administration’s social initiatives as unsophisticated and haphazard.

The Nuclear Freeze was a predominant concern in Reagan’s first term and the bishops’ pastoral shared in the Freeze controversy, but the pastoral was also a distinct and, in many ways, more troubling issue for the administration. \textit{Freeze!} considers \textit{The Challenge of Peace} as the Freeze with a Catholic pastiche, portraying the bishops as if they were simply responding to the then-ascendant Freeze movement. There were more interests at play that Maar fails to consider. The bishops had a precedent for writing on issues of war and peace, going back \textit{To Live in Christ Jesus} and centuries of theology that decried war and tactical choices that intensify armed conflicts. They already brought their concerns to government entities via Cardinal Krol’s testimony about SALT.\textsuperscript{436} It must be remembered that Bernardin forbade the ad hoc committee from writing \textit{The Challenge of Peace} to mention the Freeze and unilateralism even if he was outfront with his committee’s personal viewpoints on the issue.\textsuperscript{437} The story was more complicated than the bishops just being yet another interest group who supported the Freeze.

The administration planned to divide and conquer the Freeze advocates. They did so to “…minimize the negative impact and co-opt some of the moderates of the movement.”\textsuperscript{438} Reagan administration officials would be present at anti-nuclear public events to placate the more extreme of the disarmament advocates and hopefully win over

\textsuperscript{435} Maar III, \textit{Freeze!} 57.
\textsuperscript{437} Castelli, \textit{The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age}. 79.
\textsuperscript{438} Memo, Joanna Bistany to David Gergen, “Subject: Anti-Nuclear Movement,” April 5, 1982, OA 7886, David Gergen Files, Nuclear Policy/Churches, RRL.
The administration targeted those who were wary of nuclear weapons but also insistent on maintaining a strong defense. David Gergen, the White House communications director, had a dim view of the Freeze advocates, “It is also evident that there is a lack of understanding and some wishful thinking—i.e. They want a freeze, they want to feel safe, yet they believe the Soviet talk of reduction is propaganda…The general public does not want, understand, or care about short range missiles vs. medium range missiles.” Aside from the infantilizing language that Gergen used, he did have some insight into the movement. The emphasis was not on matters of technology or tactics, but that the public did not believe both the Soviets’ willingness to commit to reductions or the wisdom of the administration’s efforts to strengthen American defenses.

The strategy to combat the Freeze had to be twofold. The first would be to proceed with the administration’s defense initiatives by marketing them all as efforts toward peace. The second would be to convince the public that bilateral reductions could be achieved through a policy of American strength. Reagan, with his charming and soft-spoken persona, would be the touchstone of this strategy. Gergen wanted him in front of cameras with no less of a living peace activist than Mother Theresa, who would be at Georgetown University for the 1982 commencement. However, Gergen grumbled about the often-haphazard manner with which the administration used their public relations staff. One might question the applicability of this strategy. Perhaps Gergen’s office was overextending itself in revamping both the image of the president and trying to neutralize the Freeze movement. To Gergen’s exasperation, policy was not being filtered through to

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the public relations office. The policy, that of co-opting and undermining, was set by mid-1982 but Gergen seemed unaware of it.\textsuperscript{442} The implementation of any governmental policy requires collaboration across departments. Such communication was lacking when it came to the Reagan White House’s Freeze and nuclear policy.

The Clark Letter

William Clark’s opening salvo was a calculated public letter elucidating the administration’s reaction to the bishops’ second draft. The NSC had been monitoring the ad hoc committee, but Clark took it upon himself to engage the bishops directly in July of 1982. Clark was the earliest public critic of the pastoral, with his letter coming earlier than even those of the Catholic critics. Given the timing, George Weigel and Michael Novak were likely aware of Clark’s letter when they wrote Bernardin in November of 1982. Clark wrote a four-page open letter to Clare Boothe Luce, the widow of \textit{Time} magazine magnate Henry Luce and a Catholic convert and longtime donor to conservative causes. Luce was on the board of a center for the study of peace run by O’Connor’s military vicarate.\textsuperscript{443} Clark himself, while devout, did not have a background in Catholic theology beyond high school catechism and devotional reading, let alone in Catholic just war theory. Clark, as a young lawyer, had been instrumental in lobbying to end taxation of churches and parochial schools in California in the 1950s. As a result, he had bona fides among the conservative Catholic establishment on the West Coast.\textsuperscript{444} Clark copied the letter to Archbishops Laghi and Roach. As was protocol at the time, Archbishop Bernardin was not copied directly, but it was understood that he would

\textsuperscript{442} Maar III, \textit{Freeze!} 64.
\textsuperscript{443} Castelli, \textit{The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age}. 106.
\textsuperscript{444} Kengor and Doerner, \textit{The Judge}. 62.
receive the letter before it reached the public. Clark wrote his letter shortly after the circulation of *The Challenge of Peace*’s second draft to the NCCB.

Clark had two major problems with the pastoral: its misunderstanding of nuclear policy and deterrence. The letter according to him misrepresented American nuclear policy and ignored the U.S. government’s efforts to preserve world peace. Clark saw the bishops’ project as building a strawman, that American nuclear policy was immoral and its trajectory only guaranteed an increased risk of nuclear war. Clark was correct that the bishops’ critiques of American nuclear policy were often confusing in the second draft. The National Security advisor operated under the assumption that the bishops were responding to the administration’s military buildup. To the charge of first-strike capability, Clark stated, “In this light, it is important to affirm as a basis of American policy that we will never be the first to use any force, whether nuclear or conventional, except to deter and defend against aggression.” Clark discounted any possibility of first-strike, even though the weapons under development were designed in large measure for first-strike. The bishops never said directly that a retaliatory nuclear strike was out of the question, even though they excluded the possibility by the implications of their deterrence guidelines.


Clark sought to defend his government’s historical arms control agreements. Among others that would later appear in the final draft of the pastoral, Clark cited the Baruch Plan, the Marshall Plan, Open Skies, and both of the SALT agreements.\footnote{Letter and enclosure, Archbishop Pio Laghi to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, August 10, 1982.} He neglected to add that it was his own administration that suspended talks for the second SALT for the sake of standing up to the Soviets. The Marshall Plan was also in no way an arms control plan.\footnote{Fischer, \textit{The Myth of Triumphantism}, 21.} The irony was that the United States, as the only nation to ever use nuclear weapons, did indeed set the tone for the rest of the world’s thinking about nuclear weapons.\footnote{Robert C. Aldridge, \textit{First Strike!: The Pentagon’s Strategy for Nuclear War} (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1983), 21.} What Clark wanted was respect for America’s initiatives toward arms control, irrespective of the actual contribution toward disarmament of each individual program. He enclosed Reagan’s address to the United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament, which outlined the zero-option and his other arms control policies. Hence, he demanded that the Soviets also take responsibility for arms reduction. Major bilateral reductions and mutual verification were key.\footnote{Letter and enclosure, Archbishop Pio Laghi to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, August 10, 1982.} The bishops abided by the pope’s message to the UN. Clark did not comment upon this at all in his letter nor did the bishops mention Reagan’s own 1982 address to the UN in their drafts, likely as an effort to steer clear of direct conflict with the administration. In an interesting twist, Clark resurrected SALT. The cuts in the nuclear arsenal would be considerable:

… [the administration is] proposing a one-third reduction in the number of warheads on the land-and seas-based ballistic missiles and a reduction in land-based missiles to fifty percent of current U.S. levels. A second phase would reduce the destructive potential of such missiles to equal levels lower than we now have and could include other strategic systems as well. In the current negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, the
President has proposed the total elimination of such forces considered the most threatening by both sides, the land-based missile systems.\textsuperscript{453}

Deterrence was Clark’s next target. The bishops got America’s deterrence policy entirely wrong in his opinion. The bishops would have known about the administration’s arms control efforts if they had bothered to learn U.S. policies, both historical and current. As such, Clark explained the status of deterrence:

\begin{quote}
U.S. nuclear strategy is to deter Soviet attack and coercion of the U.S. and its allies. For this reason, we need strong and credible deterrent forces. But should deterrence fail, our policy is to terminate any conflict at the lowest level that would protect US and Allied vital security interests…Indeed, one of the factors that has contributed to the evolution of U.S. strategic policy is the belief that targeting cities and population was not a just or effective way to prevent war.\textsuperscript{454}
\end{quote}

\textit{Prima facie}, Clark’s aside was compatible with the bishops’ point of view, save whatever he meant by “strong and credible” deterrence. That said, the United States would respond to aggression with aggression if it had to.\textsuperscript{455} At one time, deterrence policy did indeed entail targeting civilians, but it does not do so now, said Clark. The bishops recognized this in their final draft.\textsuperscript{456} Though Clark did not say so outright, “to terminate any conflict at the lowest level” meant that the United States’ current policy forbade massive retaliation. It did not mean it excluded proportionality. The Soviets were already deploying large numbers of missiles that dwarfed those of the United States in terms of payload though not in accuracy.\textsuperscript{457} In the administration’s eyes, the development of the Pershing IIs and zero-option was proportionate. The bishops’ later exhortation to halt the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[453] Letter and enclosure, Archbishop Pio Laghi to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, August 10, 1982.
\item[454] Letter and enclosure, Archbishop Pio Laghi to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, August 10, 1982.
\item[455] Letter and enclosure, Archbishop Pio Laghi to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, August 10, 1982.
\item[456] National Conference of Catholic Bishops, \textit{The Challenge of Peace}. Sec. 149.
\item[457] Ambinder, \textit{The Brink}. 226.
\end{footnotes}
development, production, and testing of nuclear weapons disagreed. Clark was writing on the second draft, however, and stayed in lockstep with it.

One of the major components of the nuclear debate was the unknown risks of escalation and tactical control. Here Clark contributed his most insightful point in his letter. Clark saw the nuclear and the conventional as mixed. If one expanded the controllability argument to include conventional escalation, then one could also accept current American and NATO nuclear policy. Future war on the European continent foresaw both conventional and nuclear conflict but erring on one side or the other left Western Europe vulnerable. If the nuclear were strengthened, then both conventional and nuclear aggression would be deterred in Clark’s estimation. If conventional weapons alone were improved, then a strong deterrent would be lost and the outbreak of war might be more likely. Massive retaliation, a tactical choice that entails retaliating to an attack far out of proportion to the strength and duration of the first attack, was no longer a part of American strategic or tactical goals, nor was scorched earth. However, neither Clark nor Weinberger were confident that nuclear conflict could be controlled, but were sure that deterrence, in any military conflict, now depended on a nuclear deterrent.

Clark gave the best read on his president’s arms control initiatives while still defending current policy. Reagan now understood that the nuclear weapons that were in possession by both sides were more than enough to cause millions of casualties. However, what Clark told the bishops in the letter would have been told to them anyway by many administration officials that the bishops were interviewing. The National

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Security Advisor wagered that the bishops would not respond directly in the public forum. The public would judge that the bishops were bowing to administration pressure if they capitulated on their views.\textsuperscript{462} If they did not acknowledge it, the bishops would be seen as ignoring what the administration had done for arms control. The letter was a well-considered political ploy.

The Bishops Respond to Clark

The bishops scrambled for a reply. Due to the nature of protocol surrounding official messages to the NCCB and the ad hoc committee being on retreat at Spring Lake, New Jersey, it took at least three days before Archbishops Laghi and Roach could forward the letter to Bernardin. Taken by surprise, Bernardin immediately wrote Hehir and asked him to draft a response to Clark.\textsuperscript{463} The committee was deluged with media requests, but Bernardin decided to take his time in responding to the letter while Hehir’s staff deliberated on the best strategy.\textsuperscript{464} Staffer Bruce Russert was not fooled by Clark’s attempt to hijack the bishops’ project, as he wrote to Father Hehir in November. There were several ways to counteract the administration. The bishops could acknowledge Clark positively in the third draft. If so, Russert continued, “…we should re-affirm, in the strongest terms, our doubts that contemporary U.S. policy is in fact consistent with our moral strictures.”\textsuperscript{465} Lightly praising the administration would be received by different media outlets as either weakness or collaboration, depending upon political leanings. The

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\item[463] Father J. Bryan Hehir, Brooke Tranten Interview with Father J. Bryan Hehir, interview by Brooke Tranten, Telephone, June 29, 2022.
\item[464] Castelli, \textit{The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age}. 118-119.
\item[465] Letter, Bruce Russert to Father J. Bryan Hehir, November 19, 1982, EXEC/C0620/254, Executive Records- CBC Correspondence: General- Peace Pastoral Expert Response to Draft 2, Folder 1, Peace Pastoral Papers, 1/1/1981-12/31/1983, AAC.
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administration would have appreciated it, trying as they were to both court and manipulate religious groups. Immediate and harsh criticism could negate any potential gains and open the bishops to more reproach from the administration.

On the other hand, Bernardin and his committee did not want to be seen as aiding or surrendering to the administration. Archbishop Laghi probably recommended the same. Relations with the Reagan government were cordial but always at arm’s length.\textsuperscript{466} That was the only way the bishops could develop the theology of the letter and think through the niceties of American nuclear policy. It was the reason why the ad hoc committee approached the administration warily. Additionally, many of the bishops had lack of experience in dealing with the federal government, including Archbishop Bernardin. Bishop O’Connor had dealt with governmental officials, civilian and uniformed, in his time with the Navy. As Bernardin’s consistent supporter Jim Castelli noted, Bernardin was unfamiliar with the subterfuge of secular politics and stumbled notably as a result.\textsuperscript{467} Bishop O’Connor and Father Hehir’s political experience were therefore invaluable, especially as the committee engaged directly with Clark and the State Department.

Archbishop Philip Hannan and the Reagan Administration

The bishops also had to contend with a member of their own NCCB actively colluding with the Reagan administration against the pastoral on war and peace. Archbishop of New Orleans Philip Hannan was against the pastoral from the very beginning of the process. Hannan, in his late sixties during the drafting process for \textit{The


\textsuperscript{467} Castelli, \textit{The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age}. 149.
Challenge of Peace, had been Archbishop of New Orleans since 1965 and was a native of Washington, D.C. Ordained a priest on the eve of the Second World War, Hannan became a chaplain for the Army after Pearl Harbor. He ministered to the paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division and was the first chaplain to land at Normandy. Hannan returned to parish life after the war and became an auxiliary bishop of Washington, D.C. in 1956. He also became a close friend of the Kennedy family. As a bishop, Hannan participated in the Second Vatican Council and was especially vocal during the Gaudium et Spes debates about war and disarmament. He left in the middle of the second session to attend the funeral of President Kennedy in 1963 when Mrs. Kennedy asked him to preach. In New Orleans, Hannan was a popular archbishop and devoted much money and energy to reforming the archdiocesan Catholic Charities. Hannan was never a core member of the NCCB before or after its reorganization, preferring the pastoral care of his archdiocese to the more professionalized conference work.

Hannan opened with critical comments during the closed-door NCCB discussion on the first draft in November of 1981. He forwarded the dubious claim that the acronym MAD (mutual assured destruction) in fact stood for mutual assured defense. Before William Clark and the Catholic neo-conservatives could make a similar point, Hannan reminded the bishops that, “weapons of sufficient offensive uses have always been used for deterrents.” He had no problem with the use of tactical nuclear weapons, pointing

468 Archbishop Philip Hannan, Nancy Collins, and Peter Finney Jr., The Archbishop Wore Combat Boots: Memoir of an Extraordinary Life (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor, 2010), 104, 156.
469 Hannan, Collins, and Finney Jr. 11. Richard Cardinal Cushing of Boston was the primary celebrant of the Requiem Mass.
out that Thomas Murray, a founding member of the Atomic Energy Commission, said that nuclear warheads could be used on artillery pieces. He ended on a triumphalist note, “I still believe that the Declaration of Independence had some good theology in it.”

Hannan approached the nuclear issue differently from the other critics, including his brother bishop O’Connor. He was sympathetic to George Kennan’s containment strategy and a brand of American exceptionalism that considered the United States to be the policeman of democracy around the world. Hannan’s populist patriotism comported with his conviction that the motivations of American policymakers were well-meaning.

Hannan’s experience as a chaplain in the Second World War can explain his clear but often unreflective comments. If this was his criticism of the first draft, the one most friendly to Reagan’s policy, then his opposition to the third could only escalate.

Reagan’s officials knew they had a friend in the New Orleans archbishop. Red Cavaney from the public relations office wrote William McFarlane in December of 1982, “Our office has had earlier dealings with Archbishop Hannan and have found him to be very supportive of the Administration. If your public affairs group has not yet contacted him, I would recommend they consider doing so. I know we can count on his help with his peers as well.” Cavaney need not have worried, since Hannan already had written Secretary of Defense Weinberger in June of 1982. Correspondence about the ad hoc committee was one thing, but Hannan was feeding information about conference business to Clark. He had a personal meeting with Clark sometime in late December of 1982 to

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472 Memo, Red Cavaney to Robert McFarlane, December 2, 1982, Box 1, Folder 22, Robert Sims Papers, RRL.
473 Letter, Caspar Weinberger to Archbishop Philip Hannan, July 12, 1982, Box 1, Folder 23, Robert Sims Papers, RRL.
January of 1983, around the same time that Clark and State Department staffers met with the ad hoc committee at Foggy Bottom. He gave Clark a breakdown of the support for the pastoral among the NCCB. The Archdiocese of Washington, D.C. (Hannan’s home archdiocese), meaning Archbishop James Hickey and all his auxiliaries, were anti-nuclear. So too were the Executive Committee of the conference: Archbishop John Whelan of Fairbanks, Bishop Thomas Kelly, Monsignor Daniel Hoye and conference president Archbishop Roach.

Hannan pointed to the cardinals of the conference as especially important to sway opinion of the ad hoc committee, particularly Cardinal Krol. The record is unclear about the other bishops grouped with Krol. Clark’s memo reads “Mooney” and “Stritch.” Edward Cardinal Mooney had been archbishop of Detroit during the Second World War, while Samuel Cardinal Stritch was Archbishop of Chicago at the same time. Clark either misremembered, heard Hannan incorrectly, or Hannan was referring to these previous archbishops in support of his point. Clark might have also misspelled names of then current bishops, as he did later in the memo. There was also the possibility that Clark did not know that these cardinals had both died in 1958 and that Hannan’s age (69) was clouding his memory.

At this point in Clark’s memo, the tone shifted and it became unclear whether it spoke in Clark’s voice or in Hannan’s. Clark was advised that, “Bishops don’t like to fight bishops,” and so getting theologians on board would be the more constructive way to sway the committee. The memo also recommended courting certain Jesuits, most

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474 Memo, William Clark to National Security Council, January 13, 1983, Box 1, Folder 5, William Clark Papers, RRL.
of whom were experts in moral theology or ethics. The Jesuits were not known to be conservatives on most moral issues, save a few placed in universities around the country. Given Hannan’s ecclesiastical background, it is likely he knew more about Jesuits who may have been friendlier to the administration’s nuclear initiatives than Clark. He recommended Avery Dulles, S.J., a well-known theologian who would be created a cardinal by John Paul II, and Father “Landon” and Father “Schell.” These last two names reveal Clark’s lack of familiarity with the subject matter. He mistook Father “Schell” for Father James Schall, who had been recommended previously by Bishop O’Connor and spoke at Philip Lawler’s Washington conference.476 “Landon” did not exist.

Archbishop Hannan was Clark’s best asset for information about the NCCB, providing even confidential information. In an incredible breach of episcopal confidentiality, Hannan provided Clark the vote count on the second draft of the pastoral from the 1982 NCCB annual meeting. 12-15 bishops rejected the draft entirely, 70-72 had major objections, and 160-165 had only minor objections.477 Given the inexactitude of the count, it is reasonable to posit that Hannan himself kept accurate notes on the vote. Hannan could not have provided exact names and numbers, unless he himself kept a running list, since the NCCB as a rule did not and does not record names with votes.478 But Hannan labeled the entire Washington, D.C. episcopate as unfriendly to the administration’s policy. The New Orleans archbishop’s primary transgression was not handing out vote counts. Jim Castelli repeated vote counts in his book about the

476 Letter, Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, August 5, 1982, Box 43, Folder 4, Thomas J. Gumbleton Papers, AUND.
477 Memo, William Clark to National Security Council, January 13, 1983, Box 1, Folder 5, William Clark Papers, RRL.
478 Reese, S.J., A Flock of Shepherds. 360.
pastoral.\textsuperscript{479} What was egregious about Hannan’s conduct was his feeding of information to Clark directly. Based on the NSC files, Clark and his office received copies of information that only showed up from other episcopal sources, such as Gumbleton’s and Bernardin’s papers. The Clark files at the Reagan Library contain copies of the second and third pastoral drafts, both marked confidential, and a copy of Cardinal Bernardin’s report about the Rome consultation, also confidential.\textsuperscript{480} Two possibilities arise. The first is that Clark had a direct ad hoc committee source, in which case O’Connor was the likely culprit. The other possibility was Hannan or another unknown source. In any case, Hannan was actively colluding with the administration to affect the outcome of the pastoral.

Clark never met with the committee in person, but he met with their most vociferous episcopal critic. The lack of precision in reporting his meeting with Hannan indicates that the details of contravening the bishops within the episcopal conference was not a top priority for Clark. After all, he had an entire task force dedicated to the pastoral.\textsuperscript{481} Perhaps Clark believed he had the episcopal side of the issue covered by administration surveillance. He had Hannan funneling information to him and at least tepid allies in Bishop O’Connor, Cardinal Cooke, and a few others. The bishops’ pastoral was primarily a public relations issue for the administration. Clark was the administration’s fixer when it came to the bishops. He had to make sure the administration maintained good relations with them to secure the Catholic vote in 1984.

\textsuperscript{479} Castelli, \textit{The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age}. 117.
\textsuperscript{481} Memo, Robert Sims to Robert McFarlane, “Bishops,” December 8, 1982, Box 1, Folder 22, Robert Sims Papers, RRL.
Hannan could inform him about the conversations floating around the episcopal conference, but not those within the committee itself, since Hannan had been shut out from that group. Clark also gathered information for future purposes. In any case, it was too late to effect significant change on the pastoral.

**Clark’s Follow Up: Rostow, Eagleburger, and Weinberger**

Clark took the lead on the responding to the document, but his correspondence with Bernardin also revealed that he had multiple respondents assisting. In a November 16, 1982 letter to Bernardin, Clark enclosed responses to the second draft from Caspar Weinberger, Eugene Rostow, and Lawrence Eagleburger, along with his own. The three had previously met with the bishops and so it followed that they would maintain contact with the committee. Bernardin set aside the Clark letter until the fall and winter of 1982-1983 and the administration did the same. In the interim, he had mountains of feedback from the American bishops on the second draft through which to sort and had to weather Bishop O’Connor’s continued campaigning for his minority position. He previously forwarded the second draft to Clark, though the administration must have had an idea of its content, given Gumbleton’s misstep at the Catholic Theological Association in June, in which he summarized all the important points of the still in-development second draft, and his own inside sources.

Clark’s follow up began on a positive note. He agreed with the second draft that the nation’s nuclear capacity should be judged on whether it made disarmament more or less likely — and that the current U.S. nuclear arsenal was not designed to be first-strike,

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483 Castelli, *The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age*. 93.
only defensive.\textsuperscript{484} His main complaint once again was that the bishops failed to endorse the current nuclear policy. Lest Bernardin question Clark’s familiarity with the bishops’ work on nuclear problems, Clark wrote:

\begin{quote}
 deterrent posture…is judged in the Pastoral Letter as being morally defensible. It is quite clear that the judgments cited in the letter as reflecting the view of Pope John Paul II and of the Bishops’ Conference, support the continued requirement and morality of maintain effective nuclear deterrent forces. This pastoral judgment is supported because, while nuclear deterrence is considered ‘unsatisfactory,’ unilateral disarmament is rejected…\textsuperscript{485}
\end{quote}

Unfortunately for Bernardin, the pope’s message to the UN Special Session on Disarmament played into the administration’s hands. While it was unlikely that the bishops would have written a document that rejected deterrence outright, the pope’s statement forced their hand and put another factor into play for their dialogue with the administration. Predictably, Clark pounced. He was correct in factual representation. Deterrence was “unsatisfactory” for the bishops and that they also rejected unilateral disarmament. He used these realities for his own purposes to support the administration’s positions. He also left out the context of the pope’s conditional moral acceptance of deterrence by calling it “morally defensible.” It was morally defensible, but only barely and represented a concession not an endorsement. It is unclear if Clark was intentionally misreading the bishops’ formulation of the morality of nuclear deterrence or if he truly believed that the concession fit the administration’s policy. Given his insistence on deterrence, he may have held that it served his purposes to ignore the context in which the bishops considered deterrence.\textsuperscript{486} He also cited Cardinal Krol to support his point,

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{484} Letter, William Clark to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, November 16, 1982.
\textsuperscript{485} Letter, William Clark to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, November 16, 1982.
\textsuperscript{486} Kengor and Doerner, \textit{The Judge}. 192.
\end{footnotes}
indicating that he had compared what the bishops said in the draft with their older statements. 487

Clark also took the opportunity to chide the bishops for not being anti-Soviet enough. He reminded the bishops of their 1980 letter on Marxism, even quoting from it, “The fact of a Soviet threat, as well as the existence of a Soviet imperial drive for hegemony, at least in regions of major strategic interest, cannot be denied.” 488 The 1980 Marxism document had an easy journey through committee in 1980. Cardinal Krol once pointedly reminded a reporter that own his zeal for nuclear disarmament did not come under the guise of any warm feelings toward the Soviet Union. 489 Some bishops, especially the more liberal ones like Bishops Gumbleton and Hunthausen, harbored no especial ire for the Soviets, in the Eastern Bloc was common among other Catholic critics of the bishops, particularly George Weigel. 490

Lawrence Eagleburger largely reiterated Clark’s concerns though in less detail. As Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Eagleburger was especially worried about the Freeze. From his point of view, the Freeze would facilitate Soviet weapons superiority, locking in their already present advantage in land-based ICBMs and IMFs. The Soviets could not be trusted to reduce unilaterally, “They were not willing to discuss seriously the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles with us in the late 1960s until we decided to build such missiles ourselves.” 491 Eagleburger was making a point that the Freeze was the exact opposite tactic to use with the Soviets, since they historically ignored reduction

488 Kengor and Doerner, The Judge.
489 Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age. 115.
490 Weigel, Tranquillitas Ordinis. 263.
talks when they had weapons superiority. Only by a show of force and a willingness to
develop the nuclear arsenal could the Americans maintain an adequate deterrent. He also
apologized for being called away from his meeting with the bishops over the summer
twice.\footnote{Enclosure, Lawrence Eagleburger to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, in Letter, William Clark to
Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, November 16, 1982.} Eagleburger failed to call this sort of escalation what it was: an arms race, i.e. a
progressive military buildup that may eliminate some classes of weapons, only for the
cycle to repeat once technology advanced again.

Rostow, the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, surprisingly did
not demonstrate much understanding of the bishops’ perspective. He stated that most of
the principles that governed the bishops’ policy could also be found in the Charter of the
United Nations, specifically Article 2(4). In his short letter, Rostow doubled down on no-
first use. He contradicted himself shortly thereafter, “Nuclear deterrence cannot be
abandoned unless the Soviets come to share our policy of no first-use or threatened use of
any force.”\footnote{Enclosure, Eugene V. Rostow to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, in Letter, William Clark to
and Peace Pastoral, Nov-Dec 1982, National Conference of Catholic Bishops, ACHRC.} First, the deterrent capacity of the United States depended on no first-use
and now no-first use was American policy, even though Clark refused to name it as
such.\footnote{Enclosure, Eugene V. Rostow to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, in Letter, William Clark to
Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, November 16, 1982.} Rostow contradicted Clark, raising the question of why Clark would include his
letter in the first place. He likely had no choice. Even if the content was damaging to
Clark, Rostow had spent much time with the bishops face-to-face and therefore had to be
included. Rostow decided to play up the administration’s anti-Sovietism, this time at the
expense of Clark.
Of the three letters, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger had the most thoughtful response. He was equal parts congratulatory and serious about the United States’ commitment to deterrence. Weinberger appreciated the pope’s message to the UN, as well as the pastoral’s recognition of the right to legitimate self-defense in the pursuit of justice. The pastoral cited the Charter of the United Nations, specifically a part that dealt with the necessity of non-violent resolution of international disputes. Weinberger was glad that the bishops included it in the second draft. He called its violation, “…the gravest danger to peace in the world today.” His compliments ended there, however. He stressed the efficacy of deterrence very firmly to the bishops. It was their burden to prove that deterrence had not secured peace since the last World War. The bishops’ “Marginally justifiable deterrent policy…is a dangerous departure from the policies which have kept the peace.” It was not enough for him that the bishops left only the barest of openings to deterrence, given the consequences this policy had for the current nuclear stockpile.

Weinberger defended “flexible response” policy, which violated proportionality. Current nuclear policy was developed with America’s NATO allies to ensure what Weinberger called “a continuum of responses.” Weinberger refused to exclude a nuclear response to a conventional attack, given the perceived conventional arms superiority that the Warsaw Pact had in Europe at the time. Even Bishop O’Connor had insisted on proportionality in his proposed changes to the third draft. It was morally

inadmissible to respond to a conventional attack with a nuclear one.\textsuperscript{498} Weinberger spent the rest of the letter reiterating Clark’s most complex point, that not modernizing U.S. nuclear forces could embolden the Soviets toward conventional war. After all, Poland had been under martial law for almost a year.\textsuperscript{499} The Soviets were behaving badly in several trouble spots and Washington required the freedom to respond militarily to their aggression if necessary. Weinberger also chided the bishops for ignoring START and Reagan’s arms control efforts.\textsuperscript{500} To Weinberger’s credit, he did not pretend that his endorsement of flexible response and first-use were compatible with the bishops’ point of view. He argued from a military and defense vantage. Weinberger was Episcopalian and perhaps lacked the religious commitment that made Clark driven to attempt to influence the bishops. Nevertheless, he offered a thoughtful response to Bernardin in a more transparent manner than Clark. He was honest that some of the administration’s nuclear policy was not compatible with Catholic teaching based on what the bishops had written in the second draft.

The Bishops at Foggy Bottom

While the administration had decided on a strategy for dealing with the bishops, the tactics were still undecided but they had to speak to the ad hoc committee. By November 1982, however, Clark’s staff had a working group for the pastoral led by Robert McFarlane, Clark’s deputy and eventual replacement.\textsuperscript{501} Robert Sims, the NSC’s

\textsuperscript{501} Memo, Robert Sims to William McFarlane, “Bishops,” December 8, 1982, Box 1, Folder 22, Robert Sims Papers, RRL.
press secretary, recommended the following after the letter exchange with Bernardin:

“Bernardin’s response and Hoye’s offer of dates for an immediate meeting have put the ball in our court. I recommend that you limit discussion on this issue (we do not need another ‘bull session’) …”502 The bishops were forcing a confrontation in response to Clark’s challenge. Sims indicated the staff argued back and forth over how best to engage them. However, Bernardin, Father Hehir, and Monsignor Hoye were doing the same.503 Sims and Clark saw clearly that Bernardin was shifting the burden to them to respond in person, quite different from handling their disagreements through letters. Even so, the NSC staff scheduled a meeting with the ad hoc committee for January 2 or 7, 1983, before the Rome consultation. The full roster included Admiral Jonathan Howe, McFarlane, Sven Kraemer, Judy Mandell, brothers Joseph, Ronald, and Christopher Lehman, and Elliot Abrams. Bishop O’Connor, due to his prodigious memory and excellent penmanship, was appointed notetaker. His position as scribe would limit his participation in the discussion itself. He forwarded his notes to Cardinal-elect Bernardin on January 13.504 O’Connor’s record comprises the single most complete source chronicling a meeting between Reagan officials and the committee.

O’Connor’s document was exhaustive and revealed much about the content of administration—ad hoc committee interaction. Begun at 9:58 in the morning at the State Department offices at Foggy Bottom, the meeting concluded at 11:45. The topics were wide-ranging and the responses on both sides moved from prescient to irrelevant and

503 Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age. 119.
504 Notes, Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, January 2, 1983, EXEC/C0620/252, Executive Records- CBC Correspondence: General- Peace Pastoral Congressional and Executive Response to Draft 2, Peace PastoralPapers, 1/1/1981-12/31/1983, AAC. Castelli (129) says the meeting took place on January 7. This is incorrect, according to O’Connor’s notes.
everywhere in between. Bernardin, as expected, led the questions and responses, though Russert and Doherty were active participants as well. The first question Bernardin asked was about targeting policy. Admiral Howe stated, “The thing is to develop more and more flexibility. I reiterate U.S. does not target populations. We do target military targets. The smaller the weapons, the less the indirect damage or spillage.” Bernardin was not so sure, “…You have said categorically and clearly that targeting civilian populations is not policy. I interpret this to mean you don’t do this and that there has been a change from some years ago. Then you said we are prepared to rethink massive retaliation... But much as you would try not to use it the option must be open, and the Soviets must know it, and the option could be exercised.”

McFarlane and company argued that Reagan wanted peace through nuclear strength. Admiral Howe, the Senior Military Assistant to McFarlane, acknowledged that the president’s image still did not reflect his intention for peace, “The President is for strong defense, and has a ‘tough’ image, but people don’t know the other side—that with Ambassadors Rowny and Nitze he is laboring very hard to reduce the nuclear arsenals of the world. He has actually offered radical cuts....” Reagan had started laborious negotiations for one of the most notable achievements of his presidency, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. Ambassador Paul Nitze was an architect of the treaty while General Edward Rowny was the chief negotiator for START. The implicit impression was that Reagan did not realize the seriousness of the defense issues entrusted

505 Notes, Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, January 2, 1983.
506 Notes, Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, January 2, 1983.
to him. Yet as the president prepared for his reelection campaign, he was thinking about his legacy in arms control and the defense buildup. Nancy Reagan also had influence on convincing her husband to temper his nuclear policy. In fact, she blamed William Clark for Reagan’s belligerence. Reagan wanted to be responsible for nuclear reductions while he simultaneously presided over America’s largest peacetime arms buildup, an irony sometimes lost upon him—but not his critics.

Ronald Lehman, Reagan’s liaison at the Pentagon for nuclear forces and policy, was more specific about the contours of current nuclear policy. Declaratory stands were adequate in the 1960s, by which Lehman meant that the Americans openly abided by the doctrine that they purported to hold. Nixon’s Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was not a declaratory policy and was based on Kissinger’s secret negotiations. Lehman furthered that the United States now required both declaratory and implicit stands in a coordinated policy. America’s nuclear policy had to be clear, but not too clear so as to give away sensitive information to the Soviets. Reagan’s approach, in Lehman’s view, had not moved much past Carter’s controversial Presidential Directive 59. PD 59 articulated a strategic doctrine for nuclear war should deterrence fail. It called for pre-planned first-strike options alongside strike options for “military and control targets.” To popular horror, PD 59 also included a “look-shoot-look” capacity. Such a tactic would avoid a protracted conflict wherein the Americans would assess a target, launch an attack,

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509 Cannon, President Reagan. 373.
511 Notes, Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, January 2, 1983.
and look again to assess the damage made done to the enemy. The idea was to combat mobile Warsaw Pact ground forces instead of the usual SIOP (strategic integrated operations plan) that had missiles striking stationary targets as close to Moscow as possible. The plan was drawn up in secret by Zbigniew Brzeziński’s military attaché, Colonel William Odom.\textsuperscript{512}

Bernardin and Russert attempted to pin down the administration officials about civilian targeting. Lehman offered that, “In part, the policy was not to attack civilian populations, but the criterion was the amount of destruction that could be wrought. That latter policy is now reversed…”\textsuperscript{513} When Bernardin asked for clarification, Lehman responded that civilian populations would not be targeted, “per se.” Elliott Abrams attempted to explain, “Is the heart of the question: Do we reach some point of escalation at which we go for civilian populations? Is any civilian population at any point on a target list? [original underline]” Lehman answered, “No [original underline].”\textsuperscript{514} Thanks to Abrams’ assist, Ronald Lehman limited his callousness. But Bernardin would not let Lehman get away with his waffling, “Why say ‘per se’? You’re saying that you don’t target civilians, even in the most extreme circumstances.” Bernardin was tired of Lehman’s half-answers and could not see how this line of questioning was going anywhere. Abrams attempted to assist with, “...I want to go beyond ‘What is human rights policy?’ We must ask what works here…We shouldn’t ask only about the morality of intention, but of what saves lives…We are looking across the table at very evil

\textsuperscript{512} Auten, \textit{Carter’s Conversion}, 286, 302.
\textsuperscript{513} Notes, Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, January 2, 1983.
\textsuperscript{514} Notes, Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, January 2, 1983.
people.”  

In his effort to make the conversation more concrete, Abrams came off as glib.

O’Connor, who had been silent up to this point, jumped in with an assist for Abrams. Throughout the drafting progress, O’Connor used his contacts in the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the ad hoc committee’s advantage. Admiral James Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, was Admiral O’Connor’s commanding officer at his final posting as Chief of Chaplains in Washington. He was a primary source for O’Connor and later served with him on President Reagan’s AIDS Commission.  

O’Connor primed the bishops for their sit-down with the administration. The night before the meeting, he had been called away from the rest of the committee multiple times for phone calls from his Pentagon contacts, Watkins among them. Elliott Abrams, a 1980 convert from the Democrats, was Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in George Shultz’s Department of State. He would later be convicted of two misdemeanors for his role in the Iran-Contra Scandal.  

O’Connor added the aside:  

(Suggested to E.A. that he certainly did not mean to ignore the morality of intention or to espouse pure moral pragmatism—if it works, its good! O’C [O’Connor’s abbreviation for his own name] made the point that his personal association with E.A. and familiarity with E.A.’s writings assured him that E.A. is not a pragmatist, and that therefore fairness required O’C to advise E.A. of how he was coming through. E.A. agreed- disavowed pragmatism and noted that he was really trying to make the point that good intentions may not be enough….)  

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515 Notes, Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, January 2, 1983.  
517 Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age. 129.  
519 Notes, Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, January 2, 1983.
O’Connor saw the discussions spiraling into confusion and used his familiarity with Abrams to keep him from misrepresenting the administration’s actual policy. O’Connor also made it clear that he knew Abrams personally, which the committee and Father Hehir presumably knew. Abrams had written on the administration’s human rights initiatives, including on the war in El Salvador, in which he falsely denied the credibility of the massacre at El Mozote. He also was an administration advocate of the military dictatorship in El Salvador. Bernardin chimed in that Clark thought the bishops did not understand American combat discrimination policy and maintained that the policy was too ambiguous. Abrams admitted, “Of necessity, we are talking out of two sides of our mouths. We don’t want the Soviets to be too clear about that [discrimination policy] … Their system does things like putting dissidents in mental hospitals, carrying out chemical warfare against primitive peoples, etc.” If the Soviets did not play fair with their own people, then the Americans certainly could not play fair with them. From the bishops’ perspective, “Talking out of two sides of our mouths…” was not a recipe for moral and productive policy negotiation.

The end of the meeting saw an abrupt tone shift again when the Clark team suddenly became more conciliatory. Given the length of the meeting (almost three hours), the Reagan staffers may have regrouped during a break. The third Lehman brother, Joseph, claimed that the hard line the administration was taking worked with the Soviets, but that policy was evolving, “…we are moving in the direction of the papal direction…. As B.McF. [O’Connor’s shorthand for McFarlane] said, the Soviets are now saying things they wouldn’t have said before regarding cooperation. They are reacting to both

521 Notes, Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, January 2, 1983.
the carrot and the stick. Unilateralism has had very little positive impact.”522 Reagan did accomplish a massive victory in INF in his second term that fulfilled some for the bishops’ stipulations of bilateral reductions.523 Lehman may have been correct that the Soviets were indeed taken in by the “carrot and the stick,” but there was no way to judge that in 1983. The administration was trending toward the bishops and the pope in terms of arms reduction to some degree, but they certainly were not when brother Ronald Lehman maintained that the administration could not commit to discrimination. This last meeting with Clark’s staff and the State Department was successful from the standpoint of laying out the administration’s arms policies but the bishops were not able to clear up a fundamental misunderstanding about their pastoral.

The meeting was vexing and extraordinary at once. The bishops saw in person how divergent from their own project Reagan-era nuclear policy was in early 1983. The bishops demanded a more transparent policy of deterrence, but transparency was not a viable tactic for the White House at this point in the Cold War. Tempers flared on both sides. And Bishop O’Connor’s record cannot be considered unassailable. As chairman of the committee, it was only natural that Bernardin did the lion’s share of the talking. Given Bishop Gumbleton’s strong feelings about the issues, it is odd that he did not join the conversation. O’Connor was the only member of the ad hoc committee to speak aside from its chair according to the record. If the administration sought to convince the bishops that they were working toward the same goals, they failed. They needed the bishops to put a placid face on their foreign policy, but the bishops refused to supply their public relations purpose. Clark and colleagues likely realized this but did everything they

522 Notes, Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, January 2, 1983.
could to show engagement with the bishops’ pastoral even though they disagreed with key aspects of it.

This chapter narrates the keen interest with which the Reagan administration monitored and tried to influence the drafting process of *The Challenge of Peace*. As the Reagan administration sought to court religious conservatives and maintain their Catholic voters for 1984, William Clark took a risk and confronted the bishops directly. His strategy to co-opt the bishops’ project and make the pastoral more conciliatory to the administration’s nuclear policy had mixed results. His tactics were twofold, to cordially engage the bishops in person and in correspondence yet to undermine their committee’s work through Archbishop Hannan. His July 1982 letter to Bernardin helped the bishops in revising their stance on deterrence due their lack of policy knowledge, as they wrote the third draft. Clark’s assists from Caspar Weinberger, Lawrence Eagleburger, and Eugene Rostow were mixed in both quality of argument and relevance to the issues at hand. The Foggy Bottom meeting revealed the bishops were able to see how contrary the administration’s policy was to just war theory and their own argument in the second draft. However, the bishops could unable to clarify their own arguments in the pastoral against deterrence. Ultimately, Clark’s work to subvert *The Challenge of Peace* failed. The administration did not deliver a coherent policy against the freeze and tried to influence the ad hoc committee too late in the drafting process for Clark’s subversive efforts to have any lasting effect.
Chapter 5: The Roman Intervention, Deadlock, and The End of Drafting Process

Besides the intra-committee conflicts, the Holy See emerged as the next largest obstacle in the drafting process. This chapter narrates the final months of the drafting process. Within a period of seven months, from October 1982 to May 1983, the ad hoc committee went from a rough second draft to a finished pastoral. The bishops had to contend with three different audiences as they wrote their pastoral: the NCCB, the Reagan administration, and the Holy See. The Holy See was the most complex of the three. Bernardin had to balance the directives of the pope and of the curial office Iustitia et Pax. He was also facing coordinated critiques from Philip Lawler, George Weigel, and Michael Novak in November and December of 1982. The criticism from these lay conservative Catholics was the most formidable in the way they combined political and ideological concerns and theological points that the bishops could not ignore. Bishop O’Connor also forwarded another intervention that complicated but did not greatly threaten the writing of the third draft. Despite all these distractions, the bishops published a finished pastoral, The Challenge of Peace, with a supermajority of NCCB support.

Michael Novak’s Critique

Michael Novak was the most vocal critic of The Challenge of Peace. Novak epitomizes the crossroads between American Catholicism and neo-conservativism, especially given his ideological journey. Born in 1933, Novak entered the high school seminary for the Congregation of Holy Cross at the University of Notre Dame. He left seminary months before being ordained a priest, stating that religious life would not have

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allowed him to pursue his interest in politics. Novak was a convinced theological and political liberal in the 1960s, spending time as a journalist reporting on Vatican II.\textsuperscript{525} He was present for the second and third sessions in 1962 and 1963 and penned a glowing memoir of the Council, \textit{The Open Church}, in which he excavated the drafting process of \textit{Lumen Gentium}.\textsuperscript{526}

Novak’s evolution from countercultural leftist to respectable conservative public intellectual was as sudden as it was extreme. Novak was an opponent of the Vietnam War and took part in anti-war demonstrations. However, he grew uncomfortable with the mainstream Democratic Party’s embrace of liberal moral values and conciliatory foreign policy.\textsuperscript{527} Novak was a political liberal, but his working-class upbringing and Slovak-American background endowed him with a lifelong appreciation for Eastern European Catholics. New liberal America had left these “white ethnics” behind in the name of multiculturalism. Novak described the phenomenon in his 1972 book \textit{Unmeltable Ethnics}. He saw first and second generation eastern European immigrants as disillusioned with what he argued was a flattening of their cultural distinctiveness, centered on their Catholicism. WASP liberals had ignored this immigrant base while embracing Black political militancy.\textsuperscript{528} According to Novak, the culturally ascendant liberalism of the 1960s had alienated millions of Catholic immigrants. This displacement was a key factor in explaining Novak’s extreme ideological switch. Combined with Novak’s experience of

\textsuperscript{526} Novak. 171.
the council and its values of engaging culture and lay participation, it ironically led him to criticize the American bishops’ stance on defense policy.\textsuperscript{529}

Novak had previously corresponded with Bernardin about the drafts, but he grew more concerned with the ad hoc committee as the process went on. He had a recurring op-ed spot in the \textit{National Review} in which he criticized various aspects of the drafts.\textsuperscript{530} Bernardin’s papers reveal an extensive trail of correspondence from Novak, some of it virulent. Novak was attracting attention for his critical views outside of the conservative media as well. In a November 1982 letter, Novak enclosed a \textit{Washington Post} article and a \textit{Time} magazine cover story on the ad hoc committee.\textsuperscript{531} Novak was interviewed for the \textit{Time} story, as well as for another at \textit{The Wall Street Journal}. At the time, he was a Resident Scholar for Social Policy at the conservative American Enterprise Institute where he was called upon as an expert on Catholic affairs. He reiterated his worries, which echoed William Clark’s concerns about the likeness of war increasing without a modernization of the nuclear arsenal, and warned, “I believe that it [the second draft] clearly makes conventional warfare in Europe much more likely before the end of this century.”\textsuperscript{532}

Novak’s original objections were based on his understanding of ecclesiology and moral theology. The bishops had staked out a place for themselves following the council for speaking out on public issues and acting as teachers to their flocks. Novak objected.

\textsuperscript{530} Michael Novak, “Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age,” \textit{National Review} 35, no. 6 (April 1, 1983).
\textsuperscript{532} Letter, Michael Novak to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, November 3, 1982.
War and peace were the domain of laymen. The bishops purporting to speak authoritatively on the nuclear question was an overstep by the hierarchy.\textsuperscript{533} This was a point that had some overlap with the Reagan administration, but it dug even deeper, assailing the bishops’ sense of the Vatican II’s guidance about lay leadership in the Church. He was even more blunt when it came to the second draft, “It gives pacifism a free ride.”\textsuperscript{534} The bishops gave too much credence to pacifism in the Christian tradition, not subjecting it to the considerable intellectual checks to which the just war tradition had been subjected in the second draft according to Novak. His most complex critique regarded what he saw as the bishops’ faulty understanding of intent in deterrence, “Thus, to say that one can have a deterrent, but one cannot have the intention to use it or to make a threat to use it, is either to involve everybody in hypocrisy…or else to be saying that the deterrent cannot really deter.”\textsuperscript{535} The ad hoc committee had done everything it could to forbid the use of nuclear weapons. They had to keep deterrence based on the extreme unlikelihood of bilateral disarmament and the pope’s wishes, but this was not good enough for Novak.

Novak was well-read in Vatican II moral theology and saw logical inconsistencies in the bishops’ understanding of deterrence. It is unclear if Novak’s problem was with intention or with threat. Given his distinction, he did not consider them to be one and the same. If one does not have either intent or threat, one does not have deterrence and therefore it is dishonest to call it deterrence. Novak believed that deterrence, of necessity, entailed intention to use and to pretend otherwise is ridiculous.\textsuperscript{536}

\textsuperscript{533} Letter, Michael Novak to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, November 3, 1982.
\textsuperscript{534} Letter, Michael Novak to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, November 3, 1982.
\textsuperscript{535} Letter, Michael Novak to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, November 3, 1982.
\textsuperscript{536} Letter, Michael Novak to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, November 3, 1982.
of Novak’s argument, a common principle of Catholic moral theology has it that
possession of a morally objectional thing is not in itself immoral, but use of it is.537 This
was not Novak’s argument. His argument was that possession of nuclear weapons
signified intent and intent to use was a staple of what he considered to be credible and
necessary deterrence.538 Novak showed himself to be willing to engage with the bishops
philosophically and theologically, which the administration could not. Wrestling with
intention in moral theology was a difficult issue that the bishops ignored in the published
drafts but dealt with behind the scenes.539 Novak sensed the dissonance.

George Weigel’s Critique

George Weigel constructed the most theologically and historically dense
arguments against the pastoral. He wrote Bernardin in November 1982, around the same
time Novak did. Weigel’s letter also offered more context in the precise timing in the
drafting process of the critiques. Weigel was reading a copy of what would become the
third draft, given that he praises the inclusion of Cardinal Krol’s SALT testimony and
Pope John Paul’s message to the UN.540 The Holy See informed the committee to include
the pope’s message into their next draft in July 1982, which did not appear in the draft
that was circulated among the NCCB in October 1982.541 Novak did not mention the UN

537 Letter, Ronald Lawler, O.F.M. to Bishop Francis McDonald, November 9, 1982, EXEC/C0620/254,
Bernardin Executive Records- CBC Correspondence: General- Peace Pastoral Expert Response to Draft 2,
Peace Pastoral Papers, 1/1/1981-12/31/1983, AAC.
539 Letter, Bruce Russert to Father J. Bryan Hehir, November 19, 1982, EXEC/C0620/254, Executive
Records- CBC Correspondence: General- Peace Pastoral Expert Response to Draft 2, Peace Pastoral
Papers, 1/1/1981-12/31/1983, AAC.
540 Letter, George Weigel to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, November 8, 1982, EXEC/C0620/254,
Executive Records- CBC Correspondence: General- Peace Pastoral Expert Response to Draft 2, Peace Pastoral
Papers, 1/1/1981-12/31/1983, AAC.
of Catholic Bishops, ACHRC.
Weigel queried Bernardin about the policies that the bishops were recommending about deterrence alongside the thought process behind them. The bishops had given in to the zeitgeist of the late 1960s that popularized pacifism in the context of the Vietnam War. It was also a common neo-conservative trope, that the New Left had poisoned American culture with their anti-establishment and anti-traditional ideas. Weigel’s zeal for strong defense and a distrust of pacifism dovetailed with the pope’s UN statement and deepened his insistence on maintaining deterrence.

Weigel had a more nuanced understanding of pacifism and deterrence than his friend Novak. Weigel’s foreign policy and political orientation were interventionist, but he was an advocate of certain types of non-violence. Predictably based on his later work on the Polish pope, he cited Lech Wałęsa, the anti-Soviet Polish labor leader, as an example of a non-violent witness. But he was uncomfortable with the document’s conflation of non-violence and pacifism and wanted an acknowledgement of the limits of non-violent witness. Weigel then shifted the onus. The question was whether peace in Europe could be maintained, and the evidence that it had for almost forty years proved to him that deterrence had worked. Weigel found the intention argument to be irrelevant. The intention part of deterrence inspired an impulse to consider intention as a part of a logical procession in which specific types of weapons indicate different sorts of intention. Weigel made the point that neither intention nor individual weapons work that way. The Methodist moral theologian Paul Ramsey had developed a streamlined point of view on

intention in moral action by calling into question its legitimacy in determining the
morality of an action. His citation of Ramsey opened Weigel to charges of
consequentialism, that the consequences of an action have more moral weight than the
moral content of the action itself, with which the ad hoc committee wrestled endlessly.

Deterrence was not ideal, Weigel acknowledged, but provided at least some basis
from which arms negotiations could proceed. He was in favor of some of the cuts
advocated by the bishops. Eliminating first-strike capable systems was a step in the right
direction. If the National Security Advisor was to be believed, however, the premise of
deterrence was gravely weakened if the other side could deliver a knockout punch or at
least an incapacitating one that would convince its opponent that conflict was too costly.
Weigel saw deterrence as defensive. This was not reflected in either the policy or practice
of deterrence according to William Clark and Caspar Weinberger. Weigel’s
misunderstanding of deterrence policy ran against his otherwise careful concern for
history and argumentation in the nuclear debate. Even so, his style of argumentation and
concern for policy make his critique the most like William Clark’s of the three.

Weigel warned the bishops that their lack of expertise on defense issues
compromised the authoritativeness of the pastoral. Many technicalities had been lost in
the process. Even the term “initiatives” in arms control has technical applications,
specifically as a part of the psychologist Charles Osgood’s Graduated Reciprocation in

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548 Memo, Bruce Russert to Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace, June 9, 1982.
Tension reduction (GRIT) conflict resolution strategy. Osgood’s method, developed specifically for diplomats after negotiations with the Soviets got less and less fruitful from the 1960s on. GRIT recommended escalating, reciprocating concessions to break deadlocked negotiations, a quid pro quo that required neither side to swear off defensive capabilities but still make incremental steps toward détente. In contrast to Lawler and Novak, Weigel used historical and theological evidence to show why he believed the bishops’ argument about nuclear weapons was faulty. Lawler and Novak preferred to dissect the bishops’ own argumentation without sustained reference to other sources. The structured conflict resolution that GRIT represented might find a home in the bishops’ own preferred model of approaching conflict. The gentlemen’s agreement of the ad hoc committee was that bishops should engage with each other as conversation partners, not as debaters trying to score points.

Weigel also had an eye to the public perception of the pastoral. Thanks to Gumbleton’s leak in August 1982, the press had a complete copy of the second draft. Not all was lost, however, the bishops could still save themselves at their next meeting:

Let me close by saying that I consider it absolutely crucial that the media be much more carefully briefed on the November 15-18 debate…. The idea that some radical new ground had been broken was widespread (I see nothing in the current draft that was not implicit in the Krol testimony in 1979). The document was quickly politicized (vis a vis the various freeze referenda).

Weigel was incorrect about the narrative in this case. The bishops did indeed want to break new ground by developing a theology of peace based on the existence of nuclear

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553 Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age, 84.
554 Castelli, 84.
weapons. They advocated pacifism on the same plane as just war theory.\footnote{National Conference of Catholic Bishops, \textit{The Challenge of Peace}, Sec. 115.} Weigel’s citation of the Krol testimony was dubious as well. He implied that Krol was enough to cite, but in context it read that the committee said nothing that was out of step with Krol even though the media thought it had.\footnote{Letter, George Weigel to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, November 8, 1982.} Bernardin had not handled the media well, which meant that two pastorals were circulating and one of them was mostly a manufacture of the media. Weigel considered the pastoral to be a worthwhile project but had major reservations about its lack of engagement with the more technical aspects of arms control and its tone in general.

Michael Novak and Philip Lawler’s December Critique

The second draft was soon leaked to the public and Michael Novak renewed his critique of the bishops’ project. Bernardin gave a \textit{Time} magazine interview and Novak wrote to him again in December 1982 to criticize the article. According to Novak, Bernardin failed to make a distinction between the bishops’ authority in faith and morals and in what Novak called “…political judgment and action.” From the standpoint of doctrinal unity, it was unfortunate that some members of the faithful might disagree with the bishops on matters of war and peace, but they had the right to abide by the dictates of their own conscience in such matters.\footnote{Letter, Michael Novak to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, December 10, 1982, EXEC/C0620/254, Executive Records- CBC Correspondence: General- Peace Pastoral Expert Response to Draft 2, Peace Pastoral Papers, 1/1/1981-12/31/1983, AAC.} Novak had a simplistic understanding of the bishops’ guidance on the nuclear issue: either it was authoritative and binding in conscience or it was not. He laid this confusion at Bernardin’s feet and attacked him personally:
The quotation from which you which most impressed me in *Time* is the one in which you compare the role of bishops to the role of editorial writers…. Perhaps my own view of the office of the bishop is mistaken. Perhaps I will have to learn that there is a new theology of the episcopacy…Are we now to imagine the magisterium as a sort of editorial board? The bishops seem to wish to divest themselves of their episcopal authority, and to speak simply as citizens like all other citizens.558

In the interview, Bernardin described the function of the episcopacy as editors of the script of the tradition of the Church, for clarity’s sake for non-Catholics. It was perhaps an unwise analogy, but an understandable one given Bernardin’s status and engagement in the public conversation surrounding the pastoral.559 Novak was insulted by what he saw as Bernardin’s hollowing out of the Church’s theology of the episcopacy and as eschewing the mantle of the episcopal office’s authority itself. Bernardin noted that the bishops mentioned their status as citizens of the United States, like other laymen, as a part of their reasoning for speaking out on the nuclear issue in the final draft.560 Novak saw this as another example of the bishops trying to justify themselves over and against laymen. In short, Novak accused Bernardin of clericalism, of privileging the point of view of clerics (bishops) on a topic that did not warrant it. This was a charge the bishops rejected as they claimed the mantle of Vatican II for their project.

The real problem, according to Novak, was that Bernardin and the others had a faulty idea of the theology of the magisterium. He explained his view to Bernardin using a startling example. Novak, the neo-conservative Catholic, disagreed with the Church’s teaching on contraception, “It pains me that my own judgment is out of harmony with the teaching of the bishops. Yet it seems clear to me that in the matter of contraception the

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559 Walter Isaacson, Bruce Van Voorst, and J. Madeleine Nash, “A Blast from the Bishops,” *Time* (TIME USA, LLC, November 8, 1982).
bishops really are speaking with the voice of authority... Contraception is not taught with the same authority as nuclear strategy." He accused Bernardin and the committee of violating the laity’s right to make moral decisions according to their conscience. He cited his own conscience when he knew that the Church’s teaching regarding contraception was not a matter of national episcopal policy, but the longstanding and recently rearticulated doctrine of the Catholic faith based on Scripture and tradition. He accused Bernardin of having a one-dimensional idea of the bishops’ teaching office, but his could be as well.

Philip Lawler joined his friend Novak’s follow-up to Bernardin. He tackled the second draft in his December 3, 1982 letter. The letter came a month after Lawler’s American Catholic Committee conference, organized to give a forum to Catholic opinion on nuclear weapons that was the opposite of the bishops. With his position at the Heritage Foundation, Lawler stood firmly in the mainstream of intellectual conservatism that enthusiastically supported Reagan. Even so, his critique was the most theologically dense of the three. He began, “I am horrified by the phrase that ‘nuclear powers threaten the sovereignty of God over the world be brought in being.’” Lawler’s discomfort with the theology in the second draft was understandable. He saw the bishops as attempting to make an Oppenheimerian point on nuclear weapons symbolizing the death of worlds, but their rhetoric compromised proper theology. Instead, Lawler offered, the committee would be better off recommending that the faithful pray for the conversion of Russia,

recommending the devotion of the Marian apparition Our Lady of Fatima.\textsuperscript{564} Prayers for the conversion of Russia (Leonine Prayers), a part of the pre-conciliar Mass, were abolished when Pope Paul VI promulgated the new liturgical books for Mass at Vatican II.\textsuperscript{565} Lawler betrayed his preferred liturgical stylings in manner not relevant to his ultimate point. The bishops did indeed recommend prayers for peace and nuclear reduction in \textit{The Challenge of Peace}, though not for Russians specifically.\textsuperscript{566}

Not content with a solely pietist argument, Lawler tackled the specifics of deterrence in the second draft. He agreed with the bishops’ formulation of proportionality and intention in their very limited scope of a morally acceptable deterrence. But Lawler held the conclusions to be incorrect. The draft failed to consider that American nuclear policy had evolved over time:

Keeping in mind that MAD was designed with the express intention of making warfare irrational, it would seem logical to conclude that a move away from MAD would be a move toward a rational strategy. And a rational deterrent strategy would be one which, by preparing responses to every level of military threat, would minimize the chances for escalation by making such escalation strategically uninviting to all opponents.\textsuperscript{567}

Lawler’s problem was not the bishops’ actual definition of deterrence, but what he saw as their lack of historical knowledge with which they presented it. He agreed with the bishops that MAD was not a constructive strategy and was correct that the bishops believed this was still American policy according to the second draft. However, he

\textsuperscript{564} Letter, Philip Lawler to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, December 3, 1982.
\textsuperscript{565} David L. O’Connor, “‘Russia Will Be Converted’: The Blue Army of Our Lady of Fatima in Cold War America,” \textit{American Catholic Studies} 133, no. 2 (2022): 1–32. 27. Our Lady of Fatima was also a popular devotion of the pre-conciliar Church. It remains a popular devotion among American Catholics, though some radical traditionalist segments of the Church have expanded it to include apocalyptic conspiracy theories.
\textsuperscript{567} Letter, Philip Lawler to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, December 3, 1982.
wanted to keep escalation in play to maintain a rationally coherent deterrent. Escalation was precisely what the bishops were trying to avoid by keeping the barest sliver of deterrence. Lawler believed that the bishops had not adequately weighed the second part of proportionality. The devastation of war must be considered along with the consequences of defeat or surrender.\footnote{Letter, Philip Lawler to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, December 3, 1982.} Like Novak, Lawler’s main criticism was the faulty argumentation of the bishops, not their read on nuclear policy. Like Weigel, he strove to deconstruct the committee’s misunderstanding of deterrence and MAD as logical concepts. He did so when the Reagan administration had already publicly disavowed MAD.\footnote{Notes, Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, January 2, 1983, EXEC/C0620/252, Executive Records- CBC Correspondence: General- Peace Pastoral Congressional and Executive Response to Draft 2, Peace Pastoral Papers, 1/1/1981-12/31/1983, AAC.} Lawler was keeping within just war theory’s view on proportionality, and was correct that the second draft showed a limited understanding of proportionality. In the second draft, the equation amounted to the dubious idea that nuclear conflict could never be proportional due to the enormous potential for destruction that nuclear weapons entailed.\footnote{Memo, Monsignor Daniel Hoye to National Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Second Draft of the Proposed Pastoral Letter- The Challenge of God’s Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response,” October 19, 1982.} Bernardin left the critics unanswered until after his and Father Hehir’s report in Rome. Lawler, Novak, and Weigel demonstrated that there was well-articulated dissent about the nuclear issue even in the parts of the American Church that most identified themselves with the institutional hierarchy.

The Roman Intervention

The committee was scheduled to present their second draft to Cardinal Casaroli and Iustitia et Pax in Rome on January 18-19, 1983. Unlike some of the media reports
that held that Bernardin was summoned to Rome based on the Holy See’s displeasure
with the drafting process, this visit had been scheduled months in advance.\textsuperscript{571} Now
Archbishop of Chicago, Bernardin was to be created cardinal by John Paul II in February
and thus would be staying over in Rome after the consultation.\textsuperscript{572} The supervision of not
only Iustitia et Pax but Cardinal-Secretary of State Casaroli indicate the importance with
which Rome held the pastoral. Rome was also fielding questions and other statements
from Western European bishops’ conferences, who were vacillating between arms
reduction and NATO protection amidst renewed the Soviet buildup.\textsuperscript{573} Joseph Cardinal
Ratzinger, prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and a close
collaborator of the pope, moderated.\textsuperscript{574} Casaroli and Laghi were especially concerned that
the bishops were bending under pressure from the Reagan administration.\textsuperscript{575}

The Holy See’s critique of the document was as complex as the nuclear issues in
question. The meetings took place over two days. Representing the NCCB was Father
Hehir, Monsignor Hoye, and Archbishops Bernardin and Roach. The Roman
representatives included Cardinals Casaroli and Achille Silvestrini (Council for the
Public Affairs of the Church), Monsignor Jan Schotte of Iustitia et Pax and others.\textsuperscript{576}
Casaroli’s intervention indicated that the pope and his Secretary of State had been

\textsuperscript{571} Memo, Russell Shaw to Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace, “The Bishops and Nuclear Heresy,”
November, 1982, Box 152, 1/1/1980-12/31/1982, NCCB: Ad Hoc Committee: War and Peace Pastoral,
\textsuperscript{573} Memo, “Informational Consultation of NCCB with European Episcopal Conferences and
Representatives of the Holy See on the Second Draft of the Pastoral Letter,” January 25, 1983, Box 152,
Conference of Catholic Bishops, ACHRC.
\textsuperscript{574} Memo, “Informational Consultation of NCCB with European Episcopal Conferences and
\textsuperscript{576} Memo, “Informational Consultation of NCCB with European Episcopal Conferences and
devoting much thought to the nuclear question. Both the Soviet Union and the United States agreed that nuclear deterrence was a necessary part of the status quo. The pope disagreed. This is where Casaroli’s clarifications ended, however:

He [the pope] did not specify but neither did he (explicitly) exclude the nuclear deterrent (and since today this is what is being used we can deduce that this was not absent from the Holy Father’s thought.) … Naturally- and undoubtedly this was in the Holy Father’s thought- to the question of deterrence (in general and specifically to nuclear deterrence) general moral principles are applicable (and are to be applied): that they are intimately bound to those regarding the use of nuclear arms, in as much as the deterrence consists essentially in in the threat (or in the declared intention) of eventually taking up the use of nuclear arms (in one form or another….)

For all the discussion about deterrence, Casaroli drew back in the following section, tracing the levels of authority that the bishops’ guidelines could carry. Casaroli was more willing than the pope to break down the precise conceptual details of deterrence, but he agreed wholeheartedly that the authority issue was the most important element of the pastoral. He sidestepped a contextual understanding of deterrence that may have placed it in the Church’s long tradition of reflection on the horrors of war. Casaroli was a diplomat and not a theologian. He reminded the committee that it was inappropriate for the bishops to speak on specific nuclear policies or technology. The committee was willing to get into the specifics of nuclear tactics, given O’Connor’s suggestion to include the Reagan administration’s MX missile in their list of prohibitions. The Holy See was more sanguine, likely worrying that the bishops would antagonize their fellow national episcopal conferences and the Reagan administration. The Holy See had a fruitful relationship with President Reagan and did not desire a direct

confrontation. The foundation needed to be airtight so that the governments responsible for making nuclear decisions would forge right decisions, i.e. decisions that favored peace. Casaroli’s intervention aligned with the pope’s concern, though his deference to government processes betrayed his long experience as a Vatican diplomat. The pope’s choice of Casaroli to respond to the American bishops’ project indicates that the Holy See saw the ad hoc committee’s work as more of a diplomatic than a doctrinal one. Cardinal Ratzinger, the doctrinal chief of the Holy See and by extension the entire Catholic Church, participated in the meeting but did not direct it. If doctrine had been at stake, Ratzinger would have taken the lead. Ironically, the theological question was not of enormous importance to the Holy See.

The Cardinal Secretary of State’s primary concern was the authority with which the bishops could speak on the nuclear question. Casaroli also had an eye to the European bishops, who were more open to accepting first-use in a defensive context. The Americans had forbidden first-use since the first pastoral draft. The West German bishops wrote a document on the nuclear question simultaneously with the Americans and their perspective was more friendly to first use. Nuclear weapons use directly involved the Europeans as client NATO states, given that deployments of nuclear weapons were by and large in Europe. In a studied addition, Casaroli rhetorically asked the Americans, “...can, and up to what point, the Bishops’ teaching take an (authoritative)

580 Gayte. 725.
581 Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age. 131.
position?" One would expect one of the most powerful men at the Holy See to ask how the bishops could expand or maintain their “authoritative position.” Instead, he asked how the bishops might limit it. Casaroli’s point indicates that he did not see parts of the second draft of the pastoral, especially those relating to deterrence, as authoritatively binding (e.g. as a part of the magisterium) on the consciences of the faithful.

**Reporting Back to the Ad Hoc Committee**

Bernardin was candid in his report of the Roman intervention to the rest of ad hoc committee. His committee all received copies of Casaroli’s intervention and thus did not need an explanation from Bernardin, though Bernardin provided a sanitized summary to the wider NCCB. In a confidential memo dated February 9, Bernardin shared that he had a private lunch with the pope and his two secretaries. Bernardin strove to defend the necessity of the pastoral’s guidance to the pope. The bishops’ practical judgments could not contain binding authority when it came to the nuclear question, but that did not negate the importance of the bishops saying something about it, “But I said US bishops really felt like they had to give practical guidance because people were asking for it. It wasn’t enough for us to just restate principles. The Pope disagreed but agreed with my response that the distinction had to be made. He just wanted us to make sure we had our argumentation right.” Bernardin wanted to go forward with the document’s “practical guidance” despite knowing that it contained no binding authority on the consciences of the faithful. He was happy to admit as such, to the pope’s satisfaction.

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On the other hand, the pope was uncomfortable with the rift becoming obvious between the American and European episcopates on the nuclear question. The pope wanted the hierarchies united. It would be an enormous problem if they were not, because then the Holy See would have to intervene to resolve them. As ominous as the pope’s directive sounded, Bernardin added his own gloss, “It was clear that he was talking about the level of authority which would be attached to the specific points contained in the Pastoral.”

It was crucial that the committee itself write the pastoral with deliberate comment on the magisterial authority of their guidelines, or the Holy See would do it for them. The pope knew that others were using the pastoral for their own purposes, Bernardin clarified in parentheticals, “(either maintaining that the magisterium had confirmed the points with which they were in agreement or criticizing the Church for the points with which they are in disagreement).” Either way, the pope thought, the bishops had to clarify what authority their pastoral contained.

Bernardin even discussed Cold War politics with the Polish pope. The pope reminded Bernardin, “While pacifism is a legitimate personal option, nations have not only the right but the obligation to defend themselves. I told him we agreed…” John Paul was cognizant of the history of the Church and the non-pacifist strands of post-conciliar thought on war and peace. Pacifism had always existed in the history of the Church, but it was a legitimate personal option only according to the pope. The Polish

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pope, who had lived under both the Communist and Nazi regimes, was not approaching the nuclear question strictly out of deference to pacifism. He also understood the calumnies of war and the Church’s steadfast commitment to peace. Nuclear deterrence was the only, albeit imperfect, solution to provide for some nations’ right of self-defense. However, the Soviets had to be held to account as well. Bernardin agreed, noting that both drafts did not rely upon unilateralism, even though some bishops did. The second and third drafts of the pastoral held the Russians responsible for escalating the arms race, a debatable perspective that finds its home in the American exceptionalist narrative of the Cold War along the lines of John Lewis Gaddis, Raymond Aron, and some neo-conservatives. The Polish pope certainly blamed the Russians:

In this connection he said the difficulty was the Soviets do not subscribe to the same moral principles as we, so that when we speak we may have some impact on our people and our Government, but not necessarily the Soviet Union. I said the moral analysis remains the same whether or not one side or the other accepts it. But if the other side doesn’t accept it, then the other side must consider that when developing its own strategy. (It is precisely for this reason that we can defend a continuation of a deterrence strategy under present conditions, although it must also be used a means of work toward a mutual reduction in arms.)

Popes Paul and John had repeatedly emphasized the importance of maintaining a conciliatory disposition in diplomatic discussions. Their successor was less committed. Bernardin relied on the post-conciliar principle of open engagement.

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590 Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, 211.
that the pope did not ask that the pastoral be changed save the points above. The pope viewed the media scrutiny in which Bernardin was working and reminded him that he was responsible for the pastoral being understood properly. He also did not want a divided NCCB on the issue. The pope’s priority was unity between national hierarchies and a careful demarcation of the levels of authority contained within the pastoral.

Bernardin wanted to create a document that spoke to the concerns of both the Reagan administration and American Catholics on the nuclear issue. In the end, the pope allowed Bernardin to proceed how he thought best.

To Halt or To Curb: Another O’Connor Intervention

With the Holy See’s directives in hand, the committee met again after now-Cardinal Bernardin returned from Rome in February 1983 to work on the third draft. With the deadline a month away, the committee shuffled its assignments. Sister Juliana Casey worked on the Scripture section with Bishop Reilly and Father Hehir handled the magisterial authority segment. However, Gumbleton continued to work on the deterrence section when he had not been assigned to do so. So did O’Connor, who was assigned to work on the section on just war and pacifism. O’Connor completely redrafted the deterrence component. One of the most analyzed portions of the story of the ad hoc committee was O’Connor’s crusade to change the committee’s language in the draft for a “halt” on the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons to a “curb” on the

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same in the third section of the pastoral. The matter emerged when Bernardin countered that the pastoral had to mention the nuclear freeze in some way, according to Castelli, “O’Connor saw daylight in Bernardin’s response and asked if he could propose alternate wording…” If the committee was going to discard his earlier work, at least he could try to get the pastoral to soften its stance against nuclear weapons. He also knew that the draft would be brought up for debate in committee, along with Gumbleton’s draft.

O’Connor’s intervention was studied, and extensive, yet ignored the consensus against first use in the committee. He jettisoned no-first use and followed a logic that would allow strategic, defensive nuclear weapons. The retired Rear Admiral acknowledged that conventional aggression did not morally permit nuclear retaliation, but it did not follow that a nuclear first strike could not be followed by a nuclear retaliation:

The danger of escalation and the uncontrollability that goes with it clearly makes offensive nuclear warfare immoral, but it is not at all clear that such danger outlaws a nuclear defense against nuclear aggression. Or if it does, it would outlaw an effective defense with conventional weapons as well, since this would provoke a continuation of the nuclear attack, the danger of escalation, etc. The only alternative would be obligatory surrender. Besides being highly questionable, this would make papal and conciliar insistence on the right to self-defense meaningless.

O’Connor continued for forty more pages. In the memo to which his addition was attached, O’Connor noted that it was supposed to replace pages 20–60 in the second draft.

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597 Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age. 136
Instead of just sticking to his assignment, O’Connor decided to rethink deterrence as well. He noted that pacifism was considered within the field of just war teaching. The pope himself and Cardinal Ratzinger recommended this specific point in their conversations with Bernardin.\textsuperscript{599} His memo was dated February 9, as was Bernardin’s memo about the Rome intervention, and the ad hoc committee was to meet on February 17-18. O’Connor knew it would not accept his new draft, but he still submitted it days before the committee to put together the finishing touches on the final draft.

O’Connor had been emboldened by the Holy See and the pope’s misgivings about no-first use. He had not been present at the Rome meeting.\textsuperscript{600} This meant that O’Connor was working on his draft before Bernardin’s Rome memo and perhaps had some time to revise his intervention from what he had read in the Rome memo. He reread everything that had been submitted to the committee, all commentaries and feedback from government authorities. He even consulted with theologians, who reviewed his draft.\textsuperscript{601} He attributed much of his reasoning to John Connery, S.J. and Ronald Lawler, O.F.M., both of whom appeared as recommended experts in his earlier outline.\textsuperscript{602} He also acknowledged that he had bypassed the second draft’s section on just war and deterrence, “In integrity, however, I am not sure that I can deviate far from the basic position I attempt to express herein. And in honesty I must observe that I believe the format, structure, and style of the enclosure better suit the issues treated than does the section in

\textsuperscript{600} Letter, Bishop John O’Connor to Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, February 23, 1983, EXEC/C0620/252, Executive Records - CBC Correspondence: General - Peace Pastoral Congressional and Executive Response to Draft 2, Folder 4, Peace Pastoral Papers, 1/1/1981-12/31/1983, AAC.
\textsuperscript{601} Letter, Bishop John O’Connor to Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, February 9, 1983.
\textsuperscript{602} Bishop John O’Connor to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, August 5, 1982, Thomas J. Gumbleton Papers, Box 43, Folder 4, AUND.
the Second Draft as currently presented.” Staffer Bruce Russert, who had drafted large parts of the just war section, threatened to resign if the O’Connor draft was accepted.

In a surprising twist, O’Connor’s new draft was no mere repetition of his Spring Lake commentary but showed him reversing his opinion on a new weapons system. While he had previously added the line that mentioned the MX missile to the second draft, he flipped on the issue and deleted all specific policy points from the draft. The reasons for O’Connor’s change of mind became clear in his later correspondence with Bernardin. He added the MX missile example at the same time that the committee was meeting face-to-face with Reagan officials in January 1983, so it is unlikely that he was worried about administration pressure. O’Connor came to see the MX example and no-first use as distractions. He worried that any specifics in the pastoral would be immediately politicized. He was correct. Many in the media had already labelled the pastoral as the bishops’ support of the nuclear freeze, precisely what Bernardin sought to avoid. O’Connor’s unrelenting arguments for his perspective sent the committee into a tailspin. The Archbishop of Chicago told Archbishop Laghi in a February 15 secret memo, “I am having some difficulty at the moment keeping our Committee together.” Playing the role of intermediary, Archbishop Laghi could do little but encourage Bernardin to wrap up the pastoral via rapprochement with O’Connor.

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603 Bishop John O’Connor to Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, February 9, 1983.
604 Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age. 135.
605 Bishop John O’Connor to Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, February 9, 1983.
The future editor of the third draft shared Bernardin’s headaches. Father Hehir reminded Bernardin of all the good press the second draft had gotten. It was not so much the content as the reception of the drafts about which they worried. The first and second drafts gave the impression of the bishops “...being reasonable but severe moral critics of the present direction of the arms race and many of the prevailing trends in U.S. strategic policy.”

Despite the missteps the bishops had made, namely Bernardin’s regrettable November 1981 press conference, the media viewed the bishops’ project positively. Seeing the “curb” amendment, the press narrative changed. The Washington Post and other outlets now saw the bishops as bending under pressure from the Reagan White House.

From Hehir’s perspective, Bishop O’Connor’s February intervention made a significant retreat from the policy debate and was “more limited, less urgent and generally less severe on the concrete questions of the moment.” O’Connor’s intervention was a well-written rollback of what the bishops had said about deterrence since the first draft. Hehir recalled that no one on the committee expected O’Connor to write so blatantly in support of tactical nuclear weapons, opposing the committee consensus at that time.

According to several journalists and historians, O’Connor descended into semantics with his “curb” amendment to prevent the document from giving clear guidelines on deterrence. Jim Castelli described O’Connor’s ploy as another attempt to

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613 Hehir, Father J. Bryan, Interview with Father Hehir.
derail the more strident anti-nuclear weapons language in the pastoral. Henry Maar noted the subtle but key differences that terms like “halt” and “curb” implied at the time. “Halt” was understood to signal support for the Nuclear Freeze movement. Indeed, a Freeze resolution was working its way through Congress at the time. Therefore, O’Connor intentionally tried to sever the pastoral from any relationship with the wider Freeze movement, which many bishops supported, by switching the nomenclature. Maar and Castelli’s reads are compatible, but they prioritize the post-facto political debate that was remote from the committee while it struggled to produce the final draft.

Castelli and Maar also left out crucial details from the earliest meetings of the ad hoc committee. O’Connor had been consistently supportive of bilateral arms reduction measures in the two drafts. Gumbleton also wrote his own version on deterrence that sided as much on the prohibition of all nuclear weapons as O’Connor’s draft did on the uses of strategic nuclear weapons. Castelli was harsher on O’Connor than Gumbleton. The latter’s biographer portrayed him as a serene figure in the committee arguments, offering a pacific prophetic witness. The archival material shows a different Gumbleton, especially when he and O’Connor exchanged revisions with Father Hehir. A political spin can also be found in the centrist to left-leaning press. The Chicago Tribune, among other outlets, considered the second draft thoroughly Reaganized in January of 1983, as if the committee were bowing to the pressure of the White House with an assist from Bishop O’Connor. But O’Connor’s switch from “halt” to “curb” may have been

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615 Maar III, *Freeze!*. 93.
616 Castelli, *The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age*. 85.
617 Castelli. 135.
the product of his own read on the limited moral acceptability of tactical nuclear weapons than on Maar and Castelli’s opinions.

O’Connor had more insight into the media reception of the drafting processes than he has been given credit. Castelli and others read O’Connor’s insistence on the “curb” amendment as evidence of his myopia on war and peace issues owing to his military experience and contacts with the defense apparatus.620 His February 23, 1983 letter to Bernardin revealed that his motives for taking out specific arms control points in the pastoral went beyond the political differences they implied:

…we could have already published a Pastoral enthusiastically approved by an overwhelming majority of bishops and by our Catholic people. All you need do is ask what the press published instantly concerning the first draft after Bishop Gumbleton’s remarks at the theological meeting. That broke instantly on the front pages, with the rest of the document ignored. During our November conference in Washington, the 300 media people present persisted in questioning you and others almost exclusively about these same issues, ignoring 110 pages of Draft Two. Why repeat the same problem?621

O’Connor’s comments echo John Paul II’s insistence that Bernardin was responsible for the media spin on the draft. He had failed to deliver the ad hoc committee’s preferred narrative in November and the bishops now dealt with the consequences. Gumbleton played a part as well, in revealing a sizeable portion of what the second draft contained at a meeting of the Catholic Theological Society of America before the June 1982 NCCB meeting in Collegeville, Minnesota. That incident promptly found its way into the headlines.622 O’Connor saw that the pope clearly viewed Bernardin an asset to the American Church since he had created him a cardinal. It was in

620 Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age. 166
622 Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age. 93.
Bernardin’s best interest to make sure the pastoral reflected the unity of the American hierarchy as much as possible. O’Connor expressed his desire for the committee to be a rallying point for its chairman. He also consistently demonstrated his idea of unity in producing the pastoral was focused on the pope. From his point of view, unity with the pope was synonymous with the unity of the Church. Bernardin’s actions indicate that he often felt the opposite. Unity of the Church started with the bishops and then proceeded upward, a perspective rooted in pastoral attitudes following Vatican II. With such opposite working understandings of collegiality, it was no surprise that Bernardin and O’Connor clashed so much.

O’Connor also had his eye on current events. He worried that the pastoral would go down as critical commentary on fluctuating political trends, rather than as an authentic expression of the *mandatum docendi* of America’s episcopal conference. In constant contact with friends at the Pentagon, he broke down the pastoral’s current state in context with Reagan’s nuclear policy and precisely why that was dangerous for the bishops:

… it seems to me that in its current form it [the pastoral] merely invites a referendum in May on ‘nuclear freeze’ and on whether we are ‘left’ or ‘right’ regarding Administration policies, particularly deterrence. This would be gravely divisive. It is true that many bishops have signed a paper supporting a freeze. It is equally true that many have not. I cannot see reducing hundreds of years of Church teaching—or what the Church has to say to the world today—to acceptance or rejection of a freeze resolution.

In early 1983, the freeze movement was at its height. O’Connor brought up an underemphasized point in the NCCB support narrative for the pastoral. About forty percent of American bishops had signed on to a resolution backing the Nuclear Freeze.

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625 Maar III, *Freeze! 76*. 
What could account for the other sixty percent? O’Connor did not want the pastoral to be swallowed up in the Freeze craze. Then, all difficult work the committed prepared would have been for naught. He saw the difficulties of the bishops speaking to contemporary issues on one hand, and speaking in the wrong way on contemporary issues that would have the opposite effect they intended. Bishop Bernard Law of Springfield-Cape Girdeau wrote to Bernardin with similar concerns at the end of February, indicating that O’Connor was not the only bishop worried about the pastoral being hijacked for political gain. It already had, if the administration’s behavior was any indication.

Iustitia et Pax’s April Intervention

The ad hoc committee still had to contend with Rome. Iustitia et Pax’s Monsignor Schotte forwarded a confidential memo to them through the Apostolic Delegate summarizing the Rome meeting of April 1983. Archbishop Laghi and the Holy See had similar concerns as O’Connor. By then, the third draft had already been passed along to the executive committee of the NCCB. The Holy See would release the memo to all American bishops at an indeterminate time. Schotte’s memo caused the committee considerable consternation. Monsignor Schotte felt that not enough had been done to separate the specific policy recommendations of the pastoral and delineate the proper uses of the bishops’ authority. In short, the current draft did not abide by Rome’s recommendations. Schotte’s memo reiterated Casaroli’s earlier concerns but did so in a

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627 Maar III, Freeze! 80.
way that implied that the Americans had not heeded the Holy See’s requirements.

Bernardin and the committee balked, having believed that they only needed to make
minor revisions. The pope had already seen the third draft, under Father Hehir’s
editorship with Gumbleton and O’Connor’s proposed changes.

Bernardin had no choice but to go back to the committee. Jim Castelli felt that,
“…the committee was ultimately trying to have it both ways— to make the call for a
generic freeze less specific to placate O’Connor and to argue that it hadn’t changed.” Castelli’s connecting of the Schotte report with the committee’s indulgence of O’Connor
was a reasonable theory but was more correlation than cause. If Bernardin wanted the
document to move on, they would have to concede something to O’Connor because
O’Connor would not stop his interventions. The Iustitia et Pax report would only
encourage O’Connor to press for more. Moreover, Castelli’s theory does not align with
the timeline of the Schotte memo. O’Connor’s intervention was dated February 8 while
Archbishop Laghi’s confidential memo was dated April 6. The last meeting of the
committee took place on March 21 in Chicago. Bernardin called a special last minute
meeting in Washington on March 23, before the deadline of March 24. On April 13,
Bernardin told Laghi curtly that the pastoral had already been sent to the Holy See with
O’Connor’s amendments. The trouble with O’Connor’s “curb” amendment and the
Schotte memo were chronically successive problems.

Bernardin’s administrative acumen saved the committee from another potential
disaster. He had to face the reality of dozens of episcopal conference-wide votes on the

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629 Castelli, *The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age*, 140.
630 Letter, Joseph Cardinal Bernardin to Archbishop Pio Laghi, April 13, 1983, EXEC/C0620/258,
Executive Records-CBC Correspondence: General-Peace Pastoral Responses to Draft 3, Folder 7, Peace
Pastoral Papers, 1/1/1981-12/31/1983, AAC.
pastoral and the Schotte memo could put passage of the entire pastoral in jeopardy. On the morning of the committee’s final day meeting in April 1983, Bernardin created a canny strategy to soften the memo’s effect on the NCCB. He and Roach got permission from Laghi to circulate the memo among the episcopal conference, instead of waiting for the Holy See to release it. They preferred the bishops knew about the memo in April than days before the May general meeting. Bernardin knew that the memo would quickly be leaked. He wagered that the news cycle would move on by the time the NCCB voted on the final draft. He was partially correct. The press largely ignored the Schotte story and so the committee was spared that difficulty. The bishops had more time to write their own interventions in advance of the spring meeting. Having fifteen years’ experience with the episcopal conference, Bernardin correctly anticipated that a more informed episcopal conference would make business go smoother during the May votes on the document’s paragraph.

While the Schotte memo was neutralized, the O’Connor commentaries still remained. By April, the committee was beginning to rethink O’Connor’s “curb” ploy. The curb vs. halt debate had found its way to the media, leaving the committee on the defensive trying to rationalize this change in the language that only O’Connor wanted. The Reagan administration welcomed the change and was less apprehensive about the letter. Other conservative critics, such as Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois, applauded the changes. Hehir and Bernardin had bet on O’Connor’s changes

631 Castelli, *The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age*. 139.
neutralizing his own efforts, but the changes instead had the effect of placating the
bishops’ conservative critics. Whether the committee or O’Connor knew it, O’Connor’s
changes had the effect of temporarily calming conservative political and Catholic
criticism of the pastoral, allowing the bishops to finish their difficult work in a
satisfactory way to most parties. Even Michael Novak was pleased. Bernardin and
others, however, were uncomfortable with this approbation. While they did not want the
hostility of the administration and its allies, they also never sought their applause. In a
moment of candor, Bernardin said, “I’ve been defending ‘curb’ for three weeks now, and
I don’t know about you, but I’m ready to go back to ‘halt’.” So did Bishops Reilly and
Fulcher. O’Connor lost the vote four to one, but his amendment would still be presented
to the NCCB-wide vote in May and the Holy See still had the third draft with O’Connor’s
amendments.

The Final Vote: Chicago, 1983

Bernardin’s patience was stretched thin by another matter before the May 1983
meeting. Bernardin was angry with O’Connor, having heard of O’Connor’s visit to Rome
with the rest of the Military Vicarate and New York bishops in April. O’Connor
discussed the pastoral with Cardinal Casaroli and the pope himself privately. Castelli did
not speculate as to why Bernardin reacted so strongly to O’Connor’s contact with the
pope. As chairman, however, Bernardin expected that all communications with the Holy
See and the pope came through him and Archbishop Roach. Castelli did not mention

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634 Letter, Michael Novak to Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, March 3, 1983, Bernardin Executive Records-
CBC Correspondence: General- Peace Pastoral Expert Response to Draft 2, EXEC/C0620/254, Peace
Pastoral Papers, 1/1/1981-12/31/1983, AAC.
635 Castelli. The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age. 156.
636 Castelli. 156.
O’Connor’s side of the story. Cardinal Cooke insisted that O’Connor go to Rome in 1983 with the dozen other New York bishops for their *ad limina* visit to Rome. O’Connor found himself seated across from the pope at lunch, though he conceded that it was likely no accident, and the pope wanted to know about the still in-process pastoral. O’Connor recalled his embarrassment, “…because during an hour’s lunch he spent forty minutes directing questions at me.” The pope later pulled him aside from group and asked that O’Connor share his impressions of the process with Cardinal Casaroli:

…I think I gave him, as I had the Holy Father, confidence in how we were going about writing the letter. I said there were things in it that wouldn’t have been there if I had been writing the draft. But that any other committee member would have said that, too. I told him it would come out a reasonably balanced document.

From his point of view, O’Connor could not give a higher recommendation for the letter given the strenuous disagreements that he had with other committee member and the pastoral’s trajectory. This begs the question why Cooke insisted on O’Connor’s inclusion on the *ad limina* visit. O’Connor had only been consecrated bishop three years prior in May of 1979. He was one of Cooke’s auxiliary bishops (a bishop appointed specifically to assist with an archbishop’s pastoral work) and was likely included out of convenience John Paul II himself had consecrated O’Connor in St. Peter’s Basilica. O’Connor’s memory was not exact, however. Cardinal Cooke’s group met with the pope for their *ad limina* visit on April 15, 1983, nearly four years after O’Connor’s episcopal

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637 Hentoff, *John Cardinal O’Connor*. 76. *Ad limina* (Latin: “to the threshold”) visits refer to the canon law requirement that every bishop in the world is to visit the pope personally in Rome at least every five years.

638 Hentoff.

639 Hentoff. 78. The Military Vicariate had not yet been elevated to the status of an archdiocese (the Archdiocese of Military Services, USA, erected in 1986) with its own archbishop and auxiliary bishops. The Vicariate was based in New York.
ordination.\textsuperscript{640} Herein lays the explanation for O’Connor’s lack of communication with Bernardin. The ad hoc committee had already forwarded the third draft of its pastoral to the Holy See by April 15. Amendments solicited from the bishops were due to the committee on April 20. O’Connor’s comments could not have reasonably affected the Holy See’s opinion of the pastoral.

As a consummate proceduralist, Bernardin expected that O’Connor would have informed him of the pope’s questioning. When O’Connor did not do so, Bernardin perceived this as a breach of professional courtesy. He also may have been convinced that O’Connor tried to compromise the pastoral. Despite all Bernardin’s difficulties with O’Connor and Gumbleton, available archival material gives no indication that he privately or publicly complained in correspondence about the two bishops’ conduct. He was within his right to do so, but Bernardin’s institutional loyalty and commitment to collegiality was such that to criticize a brother bishop was unspeakable to him.\textsuperscript{641} O’Connor’s transgression rested on what he had done as what implications his lack of collegiality had for the committee.

That body had to go through a final round of proposed amendments and feedback from more than one hundred bishops before the pastoral would be voted on in Chicago. The group arrived in Chicago three days before the NCCB annual meeting started. O’Connor brought forty pages of proposed amendments. Gumbleton protested, asking if a committee member submitting changes through the normal amendment process was not “irregular.” Bernardin responded that it was highly unusual but not technically out of


\textsuperscript{641} Weigel, “The End of the Bernardin Era.” 19.
order. To make a point, Bernardin called for a simple vote for each of O’Connor’s proposed amendments in committee. Almost all were defeated in quick succession.\textsuperscript{642}

The May 1983 NCCB meeting started off with O’Connor and his allies attempting to salvage their position as much as possible. O’Connor’s supporters were mostly fellow New York bishops. Castelli noted that some of O’Connor’s amendments turned up verbatim in interventions on the meeting floor from Bishop Patrick Ahern, an auxiliary bishop of New York, and Archbishop Philip Hannan. The archival file of the final interventions received confirm Castelli’s assertion.\textsuperscript{643} Bishops were encouraged to talk to each other as a part of the deliberative process on drafting pastoral letters. Much of the previous amendments forwarded by bishops to the committee made identical points. The problem was that O’Connor was a member of the ad hoc committee. And some viewed this as another transgression of collegiality.\textsuperscript{644} On the second day, Cardinal Krol undercut O’Connor’s stirring speech in favor of his curb amendment was undercut. Later, O’Connor submitted an amendment to remove all the specific policy language from the pastoral. O’Connor soon brought to the floor of the NCCB almost all the points against the pastoral drafts.\textsuperscript{645} He sought to bog down conference proceedings and get as many amendments passed as he could. Cardinal Cooke was ruled out of order when he went to the microphone because he had not previously registered to speak. Castelli commented “One of the interesting aspects of the debate was that while it is usually the conservatives

\textsuperscript{642} Castelli, \textit{The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age}. 156.
\textsuperscript{643} Bernardin Executive Records-CBC Correspondence: General-Peace Pastoral Responses to Draft 3, EXEC/C0620/258, Folder 8, Peace Pastoral Responses to Draft 3, Peace Pastoral Papers, 1/1/1981-12/31/1983, AAC.
\textsuperscript{644} Castelli, \textit{The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age}. 159.
\textsuperscript{645} Castelli. 168.
who use parliamentary procedure to their advantage, this time they handled it badly, while the liberals used it well.”

One of O’Connor’s allies was the most vociferous of the episcopal critics of the pastoral’s episcopal critics, Archbishop Philip Hannan. Archbishop Hannan, after two full days of seeing amendment after amendment fail, lost his patience. He was apoplectic over the specificity of weapons systems in the pastoral and its recommendation to remove nuclear weapons from border regions. Castelli recounted that Hannan shouted at Bernardin, red-faced, “I don’t think you know what you’re talking about, not having been in war…You don’t have the faintest idea what you’re talking about.” Bishop O’Connor had to physically restrain Hannan from the microphone. Hannan’s rage made him temporarily lose his good sense as well. When a brother bishop asked whether Hannan thought O’Connor balanced out Gumbleton on the committee, the former paratrooper barked back, “No—he’s a Navy man. He never saw combat on land.” He brought to the conference floor raw emotion that compromised rather than aided the O’Connor group.

*The Challenge of Peace* was passed by the NCCB by a supermajority. With an official vote count of 238-9-41 (41 abstentions/not present), it was truly a consensus document. Most episcopal conference documents are passed with a supermajority but given the intensity of discussion surrounding war and peace in the nuclear age, it was remarkable. Based on the vote count, it is reasonable to conclude that only the most extreme of the pastoral’s opposition, both conservative and liberal, voted against the pastoral. Despite his long battle in the committee, Bishop O’Connor did not vote against

646 Castelli. 166.
647 Castelli. 167.
648 Castelli. 168.
The last day in Chicago had its comic moments. O’Connor was preparing to present one of his final speeches on the floor when he was taken aside by Archbishop Laghi. After some chitchat, Laghi embraced him and informed him that he had just been named bishop of Scranton, Pennsylvania. O’Connor recalled with some embarrassment that the news reduced him to “a blithering idiot” in his speech.650

This extended rewriting of the third draft clarifies the levels of discussion that converged around the pastoral. This chapter recounts in chronological order all the constituencies that the pastoral had to satisfy. Bernardin had to produce a document that met the standards of the Holy See, the NCCB, and the Reagan administration. He was under consistent pressure from Michael Novak and his friends. He had to admit to the pope that the pastoral’s directives on nuclear deterrence were not morally binding magisterial teachings, but were important moral guidelines nonetheless. While other narratives of the drafting process hold Iustitia et Pax’s April intervention as an important signal of the Holy See’s displeasure with the third draft, this chapter contradicts that point by showing how Bernardin easily parried Iustitia et Pax’s directives. This narrative also demonstrates, contra Castelli and Maar, that Bishop O’Connor’s February redrafts and “curb” amendment helped instead of hindered the critical and governmental reception of the third draft. Even with the lively debate on the floor of NCCB meeting in Chicago, Bernardin won the day handily with the passage of The Challenge of Peace. He managed outmaneuver the White House in the public relations battle and Iustitia et Pax’s last minute effort to derail the project. He allowed O’Connor’s curb ploy knowing well that O’Connor’s opinions were firmly in the minority in the episcopal conference. Bernardin

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649 Hentoff, John Cardinal O’Connor. 64.
650 Hentoff. 67.
got the document on the morality of nuclear conflict and deterrence that he and the majority of America’s bishops wanted.
Chapter 6: The Final Draft of The Challenge of Peace and the Counter-Pastoral

The Challenge of Peace was a sophisticated moral diagnosis of American nuclear policy and deterrence in general, but its complexity requires explanation. Finishing at over 40,000 words and sixty pages, it was the longest national pastoral ever published by the American bishops, even after edits of over 10,000 words. Comprising four sections, down from the five of the first draft, a summary was added at the beginning. The ad hoc committee had spent much of their time bemoaning the media’s lack of engagement with most of the drafts, instead focusing on the paragraphs that generated the best headlines. The summary was intended to make it easy for the media, so they would have the essence of the pastoral at their disposal according to Father Hehir.

As Casaroli and Pope John Paul repeatedly asked, the first paragraph of the summary makes clear that not all parts of the pastoral were equally morally binding on the consciences of the faithful:

In doing this we realize, and we want readers of this letter to recognize, that not all statements in this letter have the same moral authority. At times we state universally binding moral principles found in the teachings of the Church; at other times the pastoral letter makes specific applications, observations and recommendations which allow for diversity of opinion on the part of those who assess the factual data of situations differently. However, we expect Catholics to give our moral judgments serious consideration when they are forming their own views on specific problems.

The bishops specifically reference the Roman consultation a few sentences later, signaling that the pastoral was formulated with the explicit approval and input of the Holy See. The statement is clear, concise, and honest about the limitations of moral

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651 Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age, 176.
652 Castelli, 142.
applicability regarding the bishops’ guidance on nuclear policy. If the summary was meant for *The New York Times*, however, this paragraph presumed much knowledge of Catholic ecclesiology and theology. It assumed that the reader understood the Church’s various levels of authoritative teaching. Brevity was not the document’s strong suit, but the committee used bullet points instead of narrative for the rest of the summary, similar to Bernardin’s strategy in dealing with the Schotte memo. Cardinal Bernardin and Father Hehir realized the importance of controlling the narrative and facilitating the positive reception of the pastoral as much as possible, as the pope had told Bernardin in Rome. The summary was how Bernardin could assure that the press, secular and Catholic, got the pastoral right. It also provided a quick guide to the letter for catechetical purposes and for the informed reader.

The introduction prioritized Christian hope in a fearful nuclear age. The first line leaves no doubt as to what sources the bishops drew upon, first and foremost the Second Vatican Council. “‘The whole human race faces a moment of supreme crisis in its advance toward maturity.’”\(^{654}\) The bishops placed themselves in the context of *Gaudium et Spes* and its sense of crisis of the modern age, in this case the dangers of nuclear warfare. As in every official document of the Catholic Church, precedence and continuity with the Church’s magisterium was established. The bishops also treated warfare in the categories inherited from the Council. They gave a clear reason why they had to write *The Challenge of Peace* in the first place: to respond to the pastoral needs of the American Catholic people. The intent of the pastoral was to provide some guidance and hope in the face of the public’s renewed fear of nuclear conflict. Theirs was a

\(^{654}\) National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Sec. 1.
constructive project that would not dwell on popular alarm at Reagan-era nuclear policy,

“Faith does not insulate us from the challenges of life; rather, it intensifies our desire to help solve them precisely in light of the good news which has come to us in the person of Jesus, the Lord of history.”

The project was both exhortative and instructive. This twofold intention fit well within the Church’s new public orientation. It meant both restating the Church’s teaching and reframing that teaching to suit the cultural moment.

*The Challenge of Peace* addressed the authority issue early in the context of *Gaudium et Spes*. The bishops rejected that continuity with that conciliar document implied the same level of magisterial authority as *Gaudium et Spes*. However, it was difficult to see the difference. The bishops then quoted the opening of *Gaudium et Spes*, grounding their document in the council. However, *Gaudium et Spes* was not clear about what was morally binding or not. Like most conciliar documents, it presupposed theological knowledge of proper interpretation and context. For those not equipped with such tools, including most Catholics, reception and interpretation become major problems. The committee, however, did a better job at clarifying what was meant to be authoritative:

> In this pastoral letter, too, we address many concrete questions concerning the arms race, contemporary warfare, weapons systems, and negotiating strategies. We do not intend that our treatment of each of these issues carry the same moral authority as our statement of universal moral principles and formal Church teaching. Indeed, we stress here at the beginning that not every statement in this letter has the same moral authority. At times we reassert universally binding moral principles (e.g., non-combatant immunity and proportionality). At still other times we reaffirm statements of recent popes and the teaching of Vatican II. Again, at other times we apply moral principles to specific cases.

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656 National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Sec. 8.
657 National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Sec. 9.
Ratzinger and Casaroli’s worries about indentifying authority levels found their fulfilment here. The letter’s guidance on the arms race, contemporary warfare, weapons systems, and negotiation were to be respected, but did not carry full, morally-binding authoritative weight. These were the issues that O’Connor, Gumbleton, and Bernardin fought about in committee. More general stipulations, like non-combatant immunity and proportionality, were morally-binding and not in question in any serious way in committee, not even by combat veteran Bishop O’Connor. These principles are also found in traditional just war stipulations.658 No-first use was another of O’Connor’s sticking points, as well as Gumbleton’s. The pastoral, however, acknowledges that the bishops’ insistence on no-first use was a judgement not binding on the consciences of the faithful.659 Both Gumbleton and O’Connor could be partially satisfied by this admission. The committee had successfully fulfilled the guidelines of the Holy See while maintaining their anti-nuclear stance.

The third part of this section introduced content directly related to war and peace in the pastoral. It began with a quote from Gaudium et Spes, “Under the rubric, ‘curbing the savagery of war’ the council contemplates the ‘melancholy state of humanity.’ It looks at this world as it is, not simply as we would want it to be.”660 Aside from the more resigned outlook on the state of war and peace on the global scene, the word “curb” appears. In Bishop O’Connor’s fight for “curb,” he cited this passage to support his proposed change.661 Its inclusion in the final pastoral in a quote from Gaudium et Spes

would not have escaped his attention. Christian hope requires that war could one day be eradicated, but Christian morality requires contingencies to lessen the effect of war. The document stated that the Christian is morally obligated to defend peace against aggression. The pastoral held up both non-violence/pacifism and just war theory as adequate responses to defending peace against aggression:

Catholic teaching sees these two distinct moral responses as having a complementary relationship, in the sense that both seek to serve the common good. They differ in their perception of how the common good is to be defended most effectively, but both responses testify to the Christian conviction that peace must be pursued and rights defended within moral restraints and in the context of defining other basic human values.\(^{662}\)

Just war theory and pacifism were two legitimate, but different Christian responses to conflict. The bishops maintained that peace must be defended, but how it is defended can be non-violent or violent, and violent only in severely limited circumstances. One of Casaroli and Ratzinger’s points in the Rome intervention stressed that pacifism must be considered in the context of just war. The pope had been wary of the earlier drafts’ treatment of pacifism, reminding Bernardin that it was legitimate personal option only.\(^ {663}\) The final pastoral’s reflection on just war and pacifism were not contrary to the pope’s concern since this part of the pastoral did not comment on pacifism’s personal or national dimensions. Moreover, the pope’s reminder could be folded into the bishops’ existing framework. It did directly contradict Casaroli and Ratzinger’s framework, which held just war theory in first place. But the bishops maintained their independent line of thought. In the nuclear and post-\emph{Pacem in Terris}\footnote{National Conference of Catholic Bishops, \emph{The Challenge of Peace}. Sec. 74.}
age, the American bishops thought it necessary to err on the side of non-violence. This
break from the Holy See stands as one of the underemphasized aspects of *The Challenge
of Peace*.

Just war theory was still alive, however, and the bishops affirmed it and its
criteria. It was a necessary but grudging acceptance of violence to protect the innocent
and to defend oneself against an unjust attack, which followed the theology of St.
Augustine. Just war theory takes as its precondition a bias toward peace, “Just-war
teaching has evolved, however, as an effort to prevent war; only if war cannot be
rationally avoided, does the teaching then seek to restrict and reduce its horrors.”
The verb tense makes this claim somewhat ambiguous by not being clear about when just-war
teaching evolved, but its meaning is found in the next conditional statement. Just war
theory sought the mitigation of evil in war and made it incredibly difficult to determine a
war as just. The bishops repeated all of Aquinas’ conditions exactly. The more common
assertion, repeated by many of the experts and bishops who provided feedback about the
drafts, held that just war theory was moot when it came to nuclear weapons due to its
propensity toward disproportionality. Contrary to many post-Vatican II theologians and
activists, the bishops applied just war criteria to the moral evaluation of war in the
nuclear age.

The ad hoc committee did not agree that just war theory was useless in the nuclear
age. They asserted that its bias toward peace, “…makes provision for conscientious

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Carstens, “Of Conscience and Defense: A Catholic Perspective,” Box 1, USCC: Departmental Committee:
Social Development and World Peace: Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace, 1/1/1980-12/31/1985,
United States Catholic Conference (USCC)- Office of the General Secretary, Folder 1, ACHRC.
While it would be reasonable to explain this away as an aside to conscientious objection, a remarkable development in the bishops’ guidance, it is more helpful to look back at the Holy See’s admonition. This is how the bishops could say they were abiding by Casaroli’s instructions. To them, the bias toward peace within the just war theory left room for pacifism, even though they had constructed pacifism and just war theory as two separate but complementary solutions. So, the ad hoc committee avoided the ire of the Holy See, despite the Schotte memo. They could also satisfy both the bishops who preferred pacifism and the minority, like Bishop O’Connor and Cardinal Cooke, who were more comfortable with just war theory. The committee strove to maintain strict equilibrium to appeal to all their various constituencies. Their clever opening to pacifism enabled them to maintain their emphasis on pacifism in first place in the Christian tradition on that key topic.

The second section in the pastoral began the nuclear discussion in earnest. The bishops highlighted Pope John Paul’s commissioning the Pontifical Academy of Sciences to study the destructive capacity of the world’s nuclear arsenals and the physical effects on the planet and human beings that their use would cause. The bishops were direct about their doubts of controlling a nuclear conflict militarily or politically. “Today the possibilities for placing political and moral limits on nuclear war are so minimal that the moral task, like the medical, is prevention...” The bishops’ extensive contact with the Reagan administration did not increase their hopes for avoiding nuclear war or placing limitations on it. The White House was unsure how realistic limitations were in the

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667 National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Sec. 83.
668 National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Sec., 130.
669 National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Sec. 131.
The bishops worked from a framework that excluded limitation as a possibility within nuclear tactics. They took the conventional line that nuclear weapons use by its very nature meant uncontrollable escalation. Bishop O’Connor disagreed wholeheartedly. The bishops added a brief section that defended their right to speak out on nuclear policy in the first place, “…we see our role as moral teachers precisely in terms of helping to form public opinion with a clear determination to resist resort to nuclear war as an instrument of national policy.” The bishops wanted to be part of the anti-nuclear effort in public policy. In a direct affront to the Reagan administration, they rejected the sanitized language used to rationalize nuclear conflict, “There should be a clear public resistance to the rhetoric of ‘winnable’ nuclear wars, or unrealistic expectations of ‘surviving’ nuclear exchanges, and strategies of ‘protracted nuclear war.’ We oppose such rhetoric.”

The Reagan administration early and often packaged their nuclear policy with such language, hoping to assuage fears of the consequences of nuclear conflict. It had the opposite effect that they intended.

The next portion of the pastoral analyzed deterrence policy and was one of the most carefully written of the document. The bishops were prepared to discount all defenses of deterrence before the pope’s statement to the UN Special Session on Disarmament. They still were even after the UN message, if the finished text is any indication. They called deterrence “…the most dangerous dimension of the nuclear arms

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670 Memo, William Clark to Walter Annenberg, January 2, 1982, Box 1, Folder 5, William Clark Papers, RRL.
672 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace, Sec. 140.
674 “Notes on Beginning Agenda for Ad Hoc Committee-Memo for File,” January 22, 1981, Box 1, USCC: Departmental Committee: Social Development and World Peace: Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace, 1/1/1980-12/31/1985, United States Catholic Conference (USCC)-Office of the General Secretary, Folder 1, ACHRC.
race.”\textsuperscript{675} If the use of nuclear weapons was not admissible, then the possession of nuclear weapons even for the purposes of defense was dubious. The technical language was important here and the bishops used it, reflecting their deep study of the issues at hand. They also accepted a common definition of deterrence with which to analyze the issue, “dissuasion of a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict, often by the threat of unacceptable retaliatory damage.”\textsuperscript{676} The bishops had settled on a definition of deterrence. They began the process with a shaky understanding of both arms control and deterrence. They took their definition from \textit{Negotiating Security: An Arms Control Reader}, a 1979 book-length analysis of arms control from the Carnegie Center for International Peace. One of its authors, William Kincade, was a vocal opponent of Reagan’s nuclear policy and a nuclear arms control consultant to multiple liberal think-tanks.\textsuperscript{677} Bishop Gumbleton was the primary author of this section despite Bishop O’Connor’s interference. He fleshed out the implications of the above definition of deterrence, so there would be no doubt as to what exactly the bishops meant by it in 1983 in the middle of President Reagan’s first term:

Both superpowers have for many years now been able to promise a retaliatory response which can inflict “unacceptable damage.” A situation of stable deterrence depends on the ability of each side to deploy its retaliatory forces in ways that are not vulnerable to an attack (i.e., protected against a “first strike”); preserving stability requires a willingness by both sides to refrain from deploying weapons which appear to have a first strike capability.\textsuperscript{678}

\textsuperscript{675} National Conference of Catholic Bishops, \textit{The Challenge of Peace}. Sec., 162.
\textsuperscript{676} National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Sec. 163.
\textsuperscript{678} National Conference of Catholic Bishops, \textit{The Challenge of Peace}. Sec. 163.
Deterrence is based on preventing a nuclear attack by having the capacity to destroy the other side, or at least inflict enormous damage on the other side if it launched a first strike. Thus, having a credible deterrent capability prevents nuclear war since the price for starting one would be far too high for any attacker and probably lead to its own destruction. The modifier of “stable” indicates that the best that can be expected with deterrence was that the other side cannot launch an attack without fear of a strong retaliation. It depended upon first strike. It excludes the possibility of a first strike from the enemy, given that new nuclear technologies promised the ability to destroy the enemy’s deterrent force. The bishops tried to have first strike both ways, however. They forbade even the capacity for first strike weapons, but deterrence in their estimation depended upon first strike/first use and the pope permitted the conditional moral acceptance of deterrence. This was a major omission in the bishops’ thought on deterrence at this point in the document. Deterrence, conceptually and doctrinally, was not dependent on first strike. The fear surrounding Reagan’s nuclear program was centered around the new nuclear weapons technology that Reagan’s buildup introduced. Such technology seemed to threaten to render deterrence moot. New weapons like the MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) Peacekeeper missile could carry multiple warheads, thus giving them the ability to destroy an enemy’s deterrent force. With the capacity to destroy a deterrent force, the concept of deterrence becomes useless.\(^{679}\) For all of their study of deterrence, this mainstream fear of Reagan’s nuclear program making deterrence useless was lost on the bishops and did not appear in The

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Challenge of Peace. Despite their adherence to Kincade’s definition of deterrence, the bishops did their research on the historical evolution of deterrence in American policy:

…there is a significant difference between "massive retaliation" and "flexible response," and between, "mutual assured destruction" and "countervailing strategy." It is also possible to distinguish between "counterforce" and "countervalue" targeting policies; and to contrast a posture of "minimum deterrence" with "extended deterrence." These terms are well known in the technical debate on nuclear policy; they are less well known and sometimes loosely used in the wider public debate. It is important to recognize that there has been substantial continuity in U.S. action policy in spite of real changes in declaratory policy.

Bishop Gumbleton, with assists from Father Hehir, acknowledged that deterrence had undergone numerous changes in American arms control policy. However, the nuance existed largely on paper, given the distinction between declaratory and action policy. The bishops had conflated some of the terms mentioned, such as mutual assured destruction, in the earlier parts of the process.680 This section was their chance to redeem their previous limited knowledge of U.S. strategic policy, which their contact with the Reagan administration had made obvious. Their embarrassment on this end was palpable to the administration.681 However, the bishops did not mean that policy, declared or actual, had changed for the better. In fact, the possible weakening of deterrence through advanced weaponry had only further muddied the waters.

The rest of the second section of the pastoral contained the bishops’ moral analysis of deterrence. First, they contested the idea that deterrence had been a successful strategy since nuclear war had never come to pass. Based on those criteria, deterrence had

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680 Memo, Father J. Bryan Hehir to Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace, “Testimony Prepared for the Bishops’ Committee on War and Peace from Dr. Zahn,” January 6, 1982, Box 1, USCC: Departmental Committee: Social Development and World Peace: Ad hoc Committee on War and Peace, 1/1/1980-12/31/1985, United States Catholic Conference (USCC)-Office of the General Secretary, National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Folder 4, ACHRC.
been a success. Not so, pointed out the bishops, insisting that peace is not the mere absence of war, “Others contest this assessment by highlighting the risk of failure involved in continued reliance on deterrence and pointing out how politically and morally catastrophic even a single failure would be. Still others note that the absence of nuclear war is not necessarily proof that the policy of deterrence has prevented it.”

Any reader who had been following the drafting process would have heard echoes to Clark’s public letter to the bishops. One of Clark’s assertions in his letter was that deterrence was successful because nuclear conflict had never happened. The bishops strongly disagreed with him to the consternation of the administration. With this gutsy beginning to the section, one may expect the rest to follow suit.

What followed, however, was considerably more moderate, insofar as the bishops stuck with papal statements and their own previous work on the nuclear question. They reminded the reader that they had previously analyzed the nuclear issue in To Live in Christ Jesus and in Cardinal Krol’s testimony on SALT II. They restated the pope’s message to the UN special session on disarmament, conceding that deterrence was indeed conditionally morally acceptable. The real evaluation came in the bishops’ grasp of American targeting policy. They took the administration at their word that it was not American policy to target civilians in either conventional or nuclear conflicts according to the SIOP (single integrated operational plan). The administration did have over 60 targets within the confines of Moscow alone in the form of factories, arsenals, and other

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685 John Paul II, “Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II to the General Assembly of the United Nations.”
military targets. Given their locations, thousands if not millions of civilians would die in nuclear strikes on these sites. This was intolerable. The bishops’ interlocutors admitted their bottom lines, “In our consultations, administration officials readily admitted that, while they hoped any nuclear exchange could be kept limited, they were prepared to retaliate in a massive way if necessary.” The fundamental raison d’être for most governments was to physically protect its people at any cost, especially in a nuclear exchange. The bishops hardly could have expected a different response.

Indeed, the bishops doubled down on Reagan’s nuclear policy in the last section on deterrence. The administration pressed for superiority in nuclear arms, not sufficiency. The bishops say that sufficiency (number and type of weapons adequate to maintain a reasonable defense), not parity or superiority, was an adequate deterrence strategy. Superiority was rejected. Hard-target kills (HTK) were rejected as well, along with “…strategic planning which seeks a nuclear war-fighting capability that goes beyond the limited function of deterrence outlined in this letter.” Finally, the bishops forbade the development of weapons that lower the nuclear threshold and blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear. Bishop O’Connor’s hope of an opening for tactical nuclear weapons evaporated in this stipulation, given that tactical weapons smaller than a gravity bomb or cruise missiles had a lower payload to reduce fallout. However, the bishops honored O’Connor’s correction emphasized bilateralism in arms reduction. The proposed removal of short-range nuclear weapons from border or contested areas was also included. As much as the bishops criticized the administration, they expressed hope

687 National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Sec. 188.
688 National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Sec. 190.
689 National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Sec. 191.
that START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) and INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) would be conducted according to the stipulations in *The Challenge of Peace*.

While critical, the bishops gave credit where due to the administration, likely knowing that the administration’s arms control director Paul Nitze and the State Department would dismiss much of their recommendations.

The question became, then, why the bishops did not discard deterrence altogether. Beyond the fact that the pope would not accept it, they offered candidly, “That determination requires highly technical judgments about hypothetical events. Although reasons exist which move some to condemn reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence, we have not reached this conclusion for the reasons outlined in this letter.”

While they offered their own judgment on the technical aspects of nuclear strategy and tactics, they discounted those who questioned the viability of deterrence completely. They did so by pointing out that opponents of deterrence operated on questionable hypotheticals. However, they predicated much of the deterrence section on hypotheticals since the situations and policies discussed never occurred. The bishops named specific, actual U.S. nuclear policies to protect themselves from the hypotheticals charge. The bishops’ reluctant acceptance of the conditional moral permissibility of deterrence allowed them to largely disavow much of Reagan’s nuclear policy.

The Soviets did not escape the bishops’ notice. They addressed Cold War concerns by pointing to the then-recent examples of the Soviet Afghan invasion and the crackdown on Poland as evidence of Moscow’s imperial aggression. They stopped short, however, of blaming the Soviets for the nuclear arms race en toto, noting the ongoing

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690 National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Sec. 192.
691 National Conference of Catholic Bishops.
debate on who started the Cold War and whether the Soviets’ nuclear and military aims were aggressive or defensive. However, the Soviets’ behavior toward other nations spoke for itself in the latter two cases. The bishops balanced this moderate criticism with an acknowledgement of U.S. shortcomings and international meddling, including support for “tyrannical and totalitarian regimes.” The criticism of the Soviets was there, but was certainly not as strong as some factions of the NCCB would have liked, especially bishops who had roots in or considerable pastoral populations hailing from Eastern and Central Europe. The bishops instead settled on a post-revisionist view of Cold War superpower relations, or at least a centrist one. Staffer Bruce Russert, a renowned and decorated professor of political science at Yale, was the primary author of this section. The bishops cited a long quote from the pope that decried the doublespeak and propaganda which often characterized the relationship between the superpowers. The bishops wanted to encourage an authentic spirit of cooperation like Pope John had in *Pacem in Terris*. Fundamental distrust had to end for any progress in arms control to become a reality.

The final section of *The Challenge of Peace* outlined the pastoral response that the bishops’ call for peace entailed. Bishops Reilly and Fulcher were the primary authors of this section, with an assist from O’Connor on the part dealing with military servicemembers and abortion. The section began with five paragraphs about abortion. If human life was not respected in the womb, the bishops asked themselves, how would

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693 Documents, Varia from various bishops, n.d., Box 1, USCC: Departmental Committee: Social Development and World Peace: Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace, 1/1/1980-12/31/1985, United States Catholic Conference (USCC)- Office of the General Secretary, Folder 1, ACHRC.
non-combatants be considered in a time of war? Cardinal Bernardin’s Consistent Life Ethic would not allow nuclear conflict to be considered in a vacuum, hence the committee tied the nuclear issue back to the more traditional life issues such as abortion and poverty.

Bishop O’Connor, who would become the leading anti-abortion bishop in America in the 1980s, insisted on even stronger language. He proposed an amendment to change the language condemning abortion in this section to calling the practice “murder.” The bishops voted it down, likely from their concern with moderating their language in parts of the pastoral, not for lack of sympathy with the sentiment. Bishop O’Connor reminded military leaders that training and field manuals did place limits on aspects of military conduct. The former rear admiral surprised some by conceding that to disobey orders that demanded atrocities is an act of patriotism. O’Connor knew that blind faith in a superior’s orders was just as harmful to servicemen’s conduct as condemning military service as unchristian was. On the whole, this exhortative section of the pastoral lacked the urgency and specificity of the first parts of the pastoral, as well as its intellectual rigor. This weakness also exposed the fatigue that characterized the last stages of drafting the pastoral.

The final draft of *The Challenge of Peace* was a remarkable achievement, based on the difficult, and sometimes crippling, circumstances under which the ad hoc committee operated. It formed a testament to Cardinal Bernardin and Father Hehir’s patience and acumen that the pastoral ended up as cohesive as it was given the multiple

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697 Castelli, *The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age*. 146.
drafts, authors, and amendments it underwent. However, the final pastoral was too long and repetitive in some sections. The fourth section, while well-written, was largely superfluous given the committee’s focus on nuclear conflict. A question still looms, however. *The Challenge of Peace* forbade every conceivable use of nuclear weapons in combat, whether first-use, defensive, or second strike without uttering a resounding “no” to nuclear weapons. Yet, they left the door open for nuclear deterrence, following the pope’s guidance. This inclusion is vital for understanding the bishops’ stopping short of forbidding nuclear weapons altogether. Deterrence still emerged as the safest possible means for solving the nuclear problem and maintaining the peace at a time of proliferation and military buildup. The bishops felt that they could not forbid the use of nuclear weapons completely in such a context when deterrence appeared as their only viable option. Nor would the pope have allowed them to go that far.

**Michael Novak and the “Counter-Pastoral”**

Not content to harangue Bernardin in correspondence or in the pages of the publications of his friends, Michael Novak wrote a pamphlet-length book against *The Challenge of Peace*. Published as *Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age* in August of 1983, the pamphlet had a foreword by Billy Graham, then an enthusiastic member of the Moral Majority, and an introduction by William F. Buckley, Jr., the legendary conservative behind *National Review*. Novak reminded his readers the full text of the pamphlet had appeared in *Catholicism in Crisis* and earlier sections of it in the *National Review*. He even kept Bernardin abreast of its progress, mentioning that he asked Bishop O’Connor

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700 Novak. 16.
to be one of his pre-publication readers.\textsuperscript{701} Dubbed by its critics a counter-pastoral, the gestation of the \textit{Moral Clarity} tracked with that of the actual pastoral. Started in early 1982, the third draft of \textit{Moral Clarity} was distributed among the NCCB in March 1983, around the same time the third draft of \textit{The Challenge of Peace} was due to the Executive Committee of the NCCB. Novak and his supporters circulated it as a sort of petition at first with the full list of signatories included in the text. The large list of prominent signers reflected Novak’s contacts in the New Right through his position at the American Enterprise Institute. Some clergy were featured, including James Schall, S.J. Philip Lawler signed it as well, but George Weigel did not. Neither did William Clark, though his predecessor Richard Allen had.\textsuperscript{702} Weigel himself was in the process of writing a long book on war and peace in the Catholic tradition, \textit{Tranquilitas Ordinis}, published in 1986.\textsuperscript{703}

Novak sought to register his and many other Catholic conservatives’ opposition to the ideas surrounding deterrence and disarmament in the NCCB’s document. He also thought it might be useful for the bishops themselves in forming their ideas about war and peace.\textsuperscript{704} \textit{Moral Clarity} was meant as a rebuttal to the first two drafts of the ad hoc committee, not the final, published draft.\textsuperscript{705} Novak expected \textit{Moral Clarity} to face a fair amount of criticism but offered his alternative vision of a more historically and theologically-grounded theology of peace. As noble as he desired his project appears,

\textsuperscript{701} Letter, Michael Novak to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, January 5, 1983, EXEC/C0620/254, Executive Records-CBC Correspondence: General-Peace Pastoral Unsolicited Expert Response Between Draft 2 and 3, Peace Pastoral Papers, AAC.
\textsuperscript{702} Letter, Michael Novak to Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, January 5, 1983.
\textsuperscript{703} Weigel, \textit{Tranquilitas Ordinis}. ix.
\textsuperscript{704} Novak, \textit{Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age}, 1983. 24.
\textsuperscript{705} Novak.
Novak was clearly a partisan in opposition to the bishops of his own Church on these issues.

Novak’s text was consistent with the opposition that he raised in private to Cardinal Bernardin, but his comments on deterrence proved much more in-depth and discursive. As *Gaudium et Spes* was important to the bishops in formulating their argument against nuclear weapons, so it was it for Novak as he looked to establish lay competency. He also used the council’s *Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity* (*Apostolicam Actuositatem*) as a source for his work. Novak considered the two documents to be “…the most authoritative recent statements on the question of nuclear weapons and on the role of the laity.” One of the lesser known documents of the council, *Apostolicam Actuositatem* outlined the duties of the laity to participate fully in the spiritual and administrative life of the Church. *Moral Clarity* did not dwell much on either document, preferring instead to argue that, “Vatican II did not speak on nuclear weapons as such, but of ‘scientific weapons.’ We understand this more general concept to be essential…” Any serious commentor, theologian, and or bishop has understood *Gaudium et Spes* as addressing nuclear weapons when discusses scientific weapons. Novak acknowledged that scientific weapons also referred to conventional and biological weapons, but he did so to defend nuclear weapons when the opposite was intended by the Council Fathers.

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706 Novak, 29.
Novak folded non-violence into just war theory, which he defended but not in the way the bishops understood it in *The Challenge of Peace*. In so doing he could claim for his point of while taking away one of pacifism’s most legitimate moral claims,

“Deterrence itself is a form of nonviolence, a legitimate use of force, based upon legitimate authority.”

Indeed, Novak took dim view of pacifism in general. Pacifism was at least partially responsible for the last two world wars in his opinion, as widespread pacifist churches in Europe and North America helped convince Hitler and Japan that the West would not defend itself. Thus, pacifism often falls sort of the dictates of justice, which includes protecting the weak from aggression and restraining the aggressor through violent (if necessary) means. This was a common anti-pacifism argument, especially among Catholics trained in Thomism.

Novak had statistics at his disposal which he argued to show that deterrence and strong national defense had kept the peace since the Second World War. He argued that the arms race did not exist for the United States. Despite the announcement of Reagan’s 1981-1985 buildup, Novak noted that defense accounted for only 6.1 percent of GNP (gross national product) for the United States when the Soviets were in the middle part of their largest peacetime buildup since the Second World War. He pointed out that the Soviets never spent less than 11 to 13 percent GNP on their military. Thus, “…the Holy See could not reasonably be interpreted as asking the Western allies to spend much less than they are.”

Novak was weary of being accused of playing a percentage game, so he also offered the statistic that in 1982 the United States spent 51 percent of its federal

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709 Novak. 37.
710 Novak. 38.
711 Novak. 44.
budget on welfare services and 26 percent on defense. Globally, defense expenditures had decreased. The 26 percent figure was a sizeable increase from before Reagan, which Novak assigned to the alleged reality that the United States was responsible for the defense of multiple other nations due to its status as the NATO leading partner. The book’s notes show that Novak gathered the above figures from Department of Defense annual reports and Caspar Weinberger’s Congressional testimony. Superiority was not necessary, Novak maintained, but sufficiency was, to adequately deter aggression. Novak’s statistics and figures were a small part of his argument but the most compelling in terms of his argument.

Novak fleshed out the moral necessity of nuclear deterrence. Traditional categories of moral discourse like intention or threat simply did not work anymore and Novak was unafraid to redefine them, “Those who intend to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by maintaining a system of deterrence in readiness for use do intend to use such weapons, but only in order not to use them, and do threaten to use them, but only in order to deter their use.” Novak furthered such a confusing system of redefinition for threat and intention to make his main point. In reading of traditional moral theology, Novak’s meaning could not be morally permitted. It represented consequentialism, what the bishops so strongly hoped to avoid. But Novak attempted to defend himself from the charge. The syllogism was not a means to an end (i.e. evil means for a good end) to Novak but a moral act which prevented greater evil. Second, the intention of deterrence was different from intention in ordinary moral action. Intention in deterrence was to

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712 Novak. 45.  
713 Novak. 46.  
714 Novak. 56.  
715 Novak. 59.
avoid the use of the deterrent force.\textsuperscript{716} Even so, he had a point that to abandon deterrence meant that the United States would be militarily vulnerable, which would be an abrogation of justice traditionally understood by Catholic moral theology. However, The Challenge of Peace did not call for abandonment of deterrence, quite the contrary. Traditional moral theology understands human acts as having objective intentionality (actions have a set goal or outcome, regardless of what the actor intends) aside from subjective dispositions (what the actor wills the action to do). In the case of nuclear deterrence, the fundamental objective intention is to not use said weapons:

\ldots individuals add to this objective intention subjective intentions which are both fundamental—that the deterrent succeeded in never being used—and secondary—that the deterrent be held in readiness for use. To say that a nation may possess a deterrent but may not intend to use it is fulfilled by the fundamental intention. Not so by the objective intention and the secondary intention. To condemn weapons held in readiness (and the secondary intention to use them) is to frustrate deterrence and invite a host of greater evils.\textsuperscript{717}

Novak’s syllogism was an exercise in casuistry, but he was correct that the intention underlying nuclear deterrence was more complex than just willing something to make it so. It is a given that no one wants to use nuclear weapons, but to say that the intention not to use them is fundamental, meaning a priori objective and subjective, appears deceptive. The bishops wisely avoided the intention and consequentialism debates in their finished pastoral. Novak’s own explanation demonstrated logically how nuclear weapons can be held without an intention to use them. Deterrence was a moral necessity and to forsake it was to forsake the demands of Christian justice. While Weigel was open that his political commitments compelled him to defend deterrence, Moral

\textsuperscript{716} Novak. 62.
\textsuperscript{717} Novak. 64.
Clarity showed Novak’s full integration of deterrence policy and the Thomistic philosophy of action. Novak had escalated the problem by calling deterrence a moral necessity according to Catholic social teaching. In Novak’s estimation, the American bishops ignored justice and security in favor of liberal political pressure. But he did not acknowledge that he argued enthusiastically from a place of neo-conservative political ideology.

*Moral Clarity* encapsulated the nature of *The Challenge of Peace*’s conservative criticism. The ad hoc committee’s conservative Catholic critics were well-organized, had connections in both government and the private sector, and publicly registered their opposition to their bishops on war and peace. A surplus of vitriol erupted around the NCCB itself, generally supplied by the archbishop of New Orleans. *Moral Clarity* also demonstrated on a small scale the willingness of large swathes of the American Catholic faithful to contest their bishops’ authority in matters of war and peace. Novak did not disregard but instead actively argued against an episcopal document that had the clearance of the Holy See. Given Novak’s correspondence with Bernardin, the committee knew Novak’s opinions. Novak’s tactics were twofold. He attempted to influence Cardinal Bernardin in private correspondence and used his public influence to write and publish his extended thoughts about the nuclear debates. There was a positive aspect, however. His opinions had the effect of assisting the bishops in refining their arguments as the drafting process proceeded. The bishops’ critics indeed helped the bishops to form their guidance on nuclear weapons, just in the opposite manner that the critics intended.

This chapter offers a targeted exegesis on the finished product of the committee’s two years work and the three drafts it produced. This section focuses on the issues with
which the bishops struggled the most. Deterrence went from a hazy concept with no
detailed policy background to a studied and complex moral issue that bishops dissected
from both moral and policy perspectives. The committee admitted that much of the
content could not be morally binding on the consciences of American Catholics. But they
stood their ground against the Holy See’s guidance by giving non-violence priority in
their new theology of peace while keeping just war theory in play. Their discourse on
first use was less coherent but stands as an example of the committee’s attempt to satisfy
the requirements of the Holy See and the opinion of the NCCB at large. Michael Novak’s
Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age is a startling example of Catholic dissent on the nuclear
issue. Novak’s critique, while sophisticated and well-organized, did little to dissuade the
bishops from their opinions. The Challenge of Peace still stood as a cohesive document
and a thoughtful discourse on nuclear deterrence in a particularly fearful period of the
Cold War arms race.
Conclusion: Reception, Argument, and Further Areas of Study

Reception and Legacy of The Challenge of Peace

The media reaction to the pastoral was the most positive press the bishops had gotten in years. The bishops, normally regarded as establishment figures, were extolled for their brave opposition to Reagan administration pressure. Bishop O’Connor voted for the pastoral and spent considerable time raising awareness about it. While is peers repudiated O’Connor’s point of view on nuclear issues, but it cost him no friends in the episcopal conference. He collaborated with Cardinal Bernardin on other initiatives as cardinal-archbishop of New York. His foil on the committee, Bishop Gumbleton, continued his own peace activism after The Challenge of Peace. He was arrested in 1987 in Nevada while protesting a nuclear test site. Bernardin was hailed as the arbiter of the most important national pastoral of the twentieth century. It remains an important pillar in Bernardin’s Consistent Life Ethic legacy. The Reagan administration was embarrassed by the rebuff from the bishops, but continued to monitor them, especially as they began work on a pastoral on economic policy shortly afterwards.

The pastoral quickly galvanized concerned Catholics all around the country. While the formal Freeze movement continued to decrease in political influence, Catholic parishes eagerly received The Challenge of Peace. The pastoral seemed to provide an intelligent and constructive guidance for American nuclear policy. Parishes organized reading groups and began initiatives to address the nuclear threat. The peace movement

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718 Hentoff, John Cardinal O’Connor. 68.
719 Hentoff. 187.
that had sprung up among Catholic radicals in the late 1960s had finally gone mainstream. Even so, Catholics who tended toward pacifism or who supported the Nuclear Freeze were dismayed when the pastoral disavowed the Freeze and clarified that most of the directives contained therein were not morally binding on the consciences of the faithful.\textsuperscript{722} The bishops were able to thread the needle on their opinions between unilateral disarmament and deterrence, thereby satisfying a critical mass of Catholics of all ideological stripes.\textsuperscript{723} Gerald Fogarty, S.J. believed that the pastoral constituted no less than “…a marked departure from past practice of support for government policy and of silence on political issues, except those which pertained to education and family life…”\textsuperscript{724} The bishops had shown themselves to be willing to contradict the federal government when it was necessary on an issue other than abortion.

The legacy of The Challenge of Peace in the American Church is overwhelmingly positive. It inspired much academic reflection following its publication. It made a splash in theological journals, continued into a few books like William Au’s compilation book The Cross, the Flag, and the Bomb and Charles Reid’s Peace in a Nuclear Age. Some critics continued to write against it. Literature on the pastoral largely dried up after the Reagan administration. In 2004, an anonymous clerical wag wrote in Philip Lawler’s Catholic World Report, “…anyone who believes The Challenge of Peace had ‘significant impact’ on anyone outside of the bishops’ print shop is delusional, and seriously so.”\textsuperscript{725} The American Church had moved onto other topics. The fortieth anniversary of The

\textsuperscript{722} Feuerherd, The Radical Gospel of Bishop Thomas Gumbleton. 81.


\textsuperscript{725} “Can’t We All Just Get Along?,” Catholic World Report, October 9, 2004, https://www.catholicculture.org/commentary/cant-we-all-just-get-along-8206/.
Challenge of Peace passed largely unmarked by the episcopal conference and Catholic academia.

Review of Argument

This dissertation intended to show how America’s Catholic bishops carved themselves a place in the public nuclear debates through the drafting process of The Challenge of Peace and its contact with the Reagan administration. Chapters 1 and 2 explain that the papal magisterium, the Cardinal Krol testimony, and the NCCB’s previous documents led them in part to the conclusions which the bishops would later draw. The bishops left the tension over the use of nuclear weapons unresolved, of necessity. They were unwilling to take a definitive yes or no on the possession of nuclear weapons even though they clearly trended toward no use at all. Their stipulations against first use and retaliation seemingly excluded all logical options for these weapons’ use. Bishop O’Connor’s attempt to find the barest opening for the use of nuclear weapons met with strong opposition from the ad hoc committee. The question then becomes, if the bishops could not admit any morally acceptable use of nuclear weapons, why did they not just say that nuclear weapons cannot be used in any case? Political reality mattered. Nuclear weapons would remain on the international stage and even the most committed pacifist could see that unilateral disarmament was not a productive solution to the global arms race. The bishops examined centuries of Catholic theology and reflection on the horrors of war, but the Holy See filtered them through the lens of just war theory and geopolitics. The pope said that deterrence was conditionally morally acceptable and the bishops had to incorporate his judgment.
Despite all the attention given the pastoral, the question of its importance in the context of the early Reagan administration still remains. Did the White House only monitor and engage with the bishops so closely to retain the Catholic votes for 1984? Henry Maar’s work seems to signal the affirmative to both questions.\textsuperscript{726} The more apt answer lays in the details, as Chapter 1 explains. The Freeze arose in response to the administration’s defense buildup and the cavalier statements many Reagan officials made regarding it. The buildup itself was a response to what Reagan and many in the American public perceived as years of anemic defense spending after Vietnam, though the trend toward deterrence was evident as early as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The bishops could be an indirect part of the larger freeze movement, but they explicitly rejected being lumped in with it altogether. They intended to maintain their own sovereign voice on nuclear policy separate from a secular political movement like the Freeze. They were leaders of the largest religious group in the United States, an organization had held untold billions in land, social services, education, and institutional reach. The Catholic bishops mattered more than any other religious group on the nuclear issue. They were also beholden to different standards than other activist groups. Foundationally, they had to analyze the problem according to principles and teachings that pre-dated the nuclear age by centuries, as Chapter 2 explains. The Reagan administration, while they were predominantly concerned with their own political ends, sought to make in-roads with conservative religious communities to achieve those ends, and thought that they could thwart the bishops’ project. Chapter 4 shows National Security Advisor William Clark’s personal attention to the issue and demonstrates that Catholics were more than just another voting

\textsuperscript{726} Maar III, Freeze! 214.
bloc to Reagan. They were a rival authority with whom administration had to contend in the arena of public policy and would cause problems for the White House down the road.

This dissertation focuses on the importance of *The Challenge of Peace*’s drafting process in Chapters 3 and 5. The first draft was long on rhetoric and short on specifics regarding the nuclear question. It was the friendliest to Reagan’s nuclear policy, but unsatisfactory to all parties. The second draft was a vast improvement but had considerable problems on nuclear armaments questions and general argumentation. The bishops sought a way to incorporate the pope’s statement on deterrence within this draft. The general thrust of the writing process left an opening for criticizing deterrence, but the pope’s statement tied the committee’s hands when it came to adopting a more geopolitically mindful outlook on the problem. The third draft offered satisfactory solutions to all of these loose ends while simultaneously recasting war and peace in the Catholic tradition in an original way. Chapter 6 shows that the final draft became a much more technically solid document that could address the concerns of both hawks and doves within and without the American Catholic Church.

On the other hand, the administration came off as heavy-handed and inquisitorial by seeking to change the bishops’ point of view, though they took pains to be as cordial with the bishops as possible. Chapter 4 shows how the administration worked through these tensions. If they ignored the bishops, they would be accused of not being serious about their own defense policies and of shutting out a key religious community’s input entirely. They were losing the public relations battle when the bishops appeared to be winning it, even with Cardinal Bernardin’s mediocre press conferences. The administration’s own rhetoric, bellicosity, and disorganization at times hurt their cause.
significantly. Bernardin refused to allow William Clark to draw him out into a public war of letters, undercutting whatever public momentum the White House might have had. In the meeting itself, the administration confronted a group that would take them to task and argue for their own point of view. Chapter 4 demonstrates that contact with the administration, at first approached tentatively, ended up being a constructive aspect of the drafting process.

Despite the momentum of public influence that the bishops generated, Reagan officials carried on with their nuclear policy unabated. Arms control became a much higher priority in Reagan’s second term, but the change was not a complete and switch. As Reagan worked on building a relationship with Mikhail Gorbachev after 1985 and commenced INF and START in earnest, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was publicly derided as “Star Wars” and labelled another fantasy of Reagan’s that would add to his already wasteful defense spending.727 The Freeze movement had petered out even before Reagan’s reelection, as Henry Maar concedes.728 The best possible outcome for The Challenge of Peace vis a vis the administration would be that the bishops’ arguments against nuclear weapons and deterrence made the administration reexamine the morality of its nuclear strategies. They seemed to have done so, given the correspondence with the administration officials shown in Chapter 4. Even so, the buildup continued. This dissertation has shown that the moral power of the bishops was its only real means of enforcement, but that this moral power was no less tangible than the federal government’s power to formulate and carry out policy. It had an effect, even if it was only formational or persuasive.

727 FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue. 248.
728 Maar III, Freeze! 66.
The pastoral on war and peace also arose at a time when Christian conservatism was ascendant. The conservative Catholic opposition centered around Michael Novak and carried with it much momentum that coincided with the rise of the New Right and the reinvigoration of the conservative cause under Reagan, as Chapter 5 examined. For the Catholic neo-conservatives, the lines were blurred over what they supported because they were political conservatives who tended toward interventionist foreign policy. But they were Catholics who identified with believing in all the Church’s teachings. Chapter 5 elucidated that for Novak, Lawler, and Weigel their two allegiances, neo-conservatism and Catholicism, blended together in their intellectual work. The neo-conservatives rebranded Catholic just war theory to justify expanding nuclear weapons for the purposes of deterrence against what they saw as an Evil Empire in the Soviet Union. The degree to which the critics along the lines of foreign policy or just war theory varied according to the individual. George Weigel, for example, made the most technical argument based on his knowledge of past foreign policy and history, but he also expressed his concerns about the pastoral as a Catholic layman. Partisanship and just war theory coexisted and thus must be considered together. These critics played an ironic role vis a vis the ad hoc committee. They styled themselves as conservatives who would normally be in ideological and moral lockstep with their bishops but they loudly dissented against them on the nuclear issue. They became the committee’s worst nightmare because they could engage the bishops on a theological and parochial level of shared values that William Clark could not, despite Clark’s personal religiosity. For all the bishops’ zeal toward acting in accordance with Vatican II, an engaged laity springing up from that council could contravene their own projects. The critics’ arguments were often compelling.
Chapter 4 shows that political partisanship and just war theory coexisted in the points of view of the critics of *The Challenge of Peace*. They must be considered together in order to produce an honest and thorough understanding of the critics’ perspective.

The bishops squared the circle by dropping nuclear use and focusing on nuclear possession, or deterrence. The exegesis of *The Challenge of Peace* in Chapter 6 clarifies how the bishops found a way to say something meaningful about deterrence by sidelining possession. Despite having started off with limited knowledge on nuclear weapons, they knew well enough that unilateralism could not be a serious solution. They expended much effort and sacrificed the veracity of some of their arguments for pacifism, but they had to acknowledge just war theory. While the pope’s message to the Special Session on Disarmament forced their hand, they were ultimately restrained by just war tradition in accepting deterrence. When it came down to the foundations of war and peace, the bishops had to acknowledge that the basic duty of the state was to protect its people. In the nuclear age, that meant the responsible maintaining of nuclear deterrence. Following that, the bishops outlined incredibly strict guidelines for deterrence. They were constrained at every step by their own tradition, ecclesiastical leadership, and political reality.

**Further Areas of Study**

An innovation of the pastoral was its discussion of selective conscientious objection. For the first time, an official document promulgated by a national episcopal conference with the blessing of the Holy See acknowledged the legitimacy of not only conscientious objection but its selective form. Conscientious objection was already a difficult sell within the Catholic tradition, given the long legacy of just war theory that
emphasized compulsion of the fighting force as a constitutive part of the duty of a proper authority to conduct warfare.\textsuperscript{729} Only after much consternation and the rage of Francis Cardinal Spellman did the American bishops admit that conscientious objection was permissible in the context of Vietnam. Further, the bishops admitted Vietnam was not a just war.\textsuperscript{730} Even then, conscientious objection was considered in a totalizing context. One had to be opposed to all acts of war for refusal to be considered legitimate. \textit{The Challenge of Peace} disagreed. Instead of placing the standard of judgment in the domain of the nation or the bishops, the standard was now individual conscience. Just war theory considered soldiering and proper authority in a communitarian context, but \textit{The Challenge of Peace} followed a post-conciliar logic that placed responsibility on the individual conscience. In all the discussion of nuclear weapons, the bishops’ acknowledgement of selective conscientious objection was overshadowed, though it was a key innovation in Catholic moral theology on war and peace. It remains to be studied further in future analyses of the pastoral.

For all the success of the pastoral, it failed in clarifying exactly what constituted magisterial authority and prudential judgement in matters of war and peace. The Holy See absolutely insisted on this point and was disappointed with the bishops’ lack of explanation. The pastoral references levels of authority in the beginning of the pastoral and only twice says that specific guidance and policy recommendations are reflections of prudential judgment. The confusion has lasted and been taken advantage of by both sides of the argument. Many conservative or interventionist-leaning scholars might use Novak’s argument that the pastoral as a whole is not morally binding on the conscience

\textsuperscript{729} Fogarty, S.J., “Public Patriotism and Private Politics: The Tradition of American Catholicism.” 47.
\textsuperscript{730} Morgan, “A Change of Course.” 27.
of the faithful. Or the same might say that nuclear weapons are acceptable because of the bishops’ acceptance of deterrence.\textsuperscript{731} More radical peace advocates would insist the pastoral as a whole is morally binding and therefore requires a more extreme commitment to disarmament, even unilateralism.\textsuperscript{732} The part on deterrence would either disqualify the pastoral entirely, or it would be ignored. Both perspectives are false based on the content of the document and center on the refusal to take seriously the document’s guidance on deterrence. Catholic thought, even in professional theology, tends to consider the authority of a teaching document as a whole. The bishops chose a more complex path. Some of \textit{The Challenge of Peace} is morally binding and some of it is not. Vatican II had called into question totalized understandings of doctrinal teaching and episcopal authority. The American bishops were working within the spirit of the council by formulating their thoughts on American nuclear policy as both binding and non-binding. However, they failed to ask themselves if the American faithful and the public at large were prepared for such a framework. This was ultimately a theological question to be answered by theologians.

\textbf{Final Analysis}

This dissertation argues that \textit{The Challenge of Peace} had a modest effect on American nuclear policy, but it remains a point of transition in religious groups’ interaction with American government in the twilight of the twentieth century. The war and peace pastoral expanded the field of what counted as religious advocacy in public policy matters. It was not so much important that the bishops took a stand against the

\textsuperscript{731} Weigel, \textit{Tranquillitas Ordinis}, 279.
\textsuperscript{732} Feuerherd, \textit{The Radical Gospel of Bishop Thomas Gumbleton}. 86.
Reagan administration’s nuclear policy as it was that their individual level contacts made a difference in how they and the administration engaged with each other. The American Catholic Church had directly called individual public actors to account for defense policies that they considered immoral. Despite the moral and theological foundations to which the bishops were committed, they were capable of refining and in some cases changing their arguments during the drafting process. The critics, especially the neo-conservatives, raised some points that forced the ad hoc committee to rework parts of its arguments on disarmament and nuclear weapons. The renewed peace movement and following the council and the popularity of the Freeze movement made nuclear weapons criticism publicly and ecclesiologically palatable. The Challenge of Peace was a triumph for the post-Vatican II American Catholic Church that demonstrated that the Catholic Church’s hierarchy could hold its own in the naked public square.
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