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Herbert A. Davidson's *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect*: A Critical Review

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This is a rich work on the complex and difficult problem of the intellect in the three major thinkers of the Medieval Islamic philosophical tradition.1 Its focus is the intellect, and in particular the efforts of philosophers of the Medieval Islamic, Christian or Jewish traditions to understand both Aristotle and the nature of intellect. Nothing of comparable breadth or depth and quality of analysis and argument exists on this topic today. In a careful and measured way it exposes arguments and complicated texts. It also contains valuable resumes and summaries of its findings. This is very welcome in a book which, because of its subject matter, demands much of the reader.

Davidson's years of thoughtful reflection on his topic are clearly evident as he systematically determines which Greek, Arabic, Hebrew and Latin texts are required for a comprehensive treatment of intellect in the Medieval Islamic philosophical tradition. After a brief introduction, he moves directly into the sources of the Greek and Arabic traditions. Central interpretive notions and terms in Aristotle, Theophrastus, Alexander, Themistius. and Plotinus are spelled out with a view to the pivotal roles they will later be seen to play in the development of Islamic thought. Al-Kindi's philosophy and some central texts of the *Plotiniana Arabica* (particularly the pseudo-Aristotelian *Theology of Aristotle),* as well as the Arabic treatise on the soul attributed to Porphyry, are also discussed as elements which influenced later developments.

The chapter on al-Farabi lucidly exposes three different positions on intellect taken in different works. *Al-Madfîna al-Fâ∂ila* and *Al-Siyâsa al-Madaniyya,* writes Davidson, "assign the active intellect functions related solely to the actualization of the human intellect" (47) and see it as the lowest in a hierarchy of tenintelligences emanating from the First Cause. It is the intellect proximate to the sublunar realm which, by way of emanations of principles, assists the human mind as it moves from material (passive) intellect, to actual intellect, and then to acquired intellect. At the highest human stage, the acquired intellect can attain happiness and immortality by conjunction with the active intellect. When the two are conjoined, prophecy can come about thanks to the influence of the active intellect upon the human imaginative faculty: a person of low intellectual understanding comes to have in "the imagination knowledge of present and future events and figurative depiction of theoretical truths," while a person of acquired intellect has a perfected intellect and is a philosopher-prophet. "When a philosopher-prophet possesses certain gifts of leadership, he becomes a philosopher-king as well" (63). In *The Philosophy of Aristotle,* Davidson notes, al-Farabi provides less detail on the nature and role of the active intellect but clearly provides it with a dual role: it prompts human intellectual development with intelligibles principles for both the theoretical and practical intellectual powers; and it is the final cause for human perfection which is achieved only "when the human intellect arrives 'as close as possible to' the active intellect" (64). What is clearly different, however, concerns the transcendent source of the sublunar species . In his *Risâla fî al-*fi*Aql,* al-Farabi takes a different position, holding not only that the active intellect emanates "the natural forms of individual sub lunar objects" but also that it continues to play a role in human intellectual development, now by moving potential *concepts* to actuality for human grasp. Finally, Davidson examines the reports of al-Farabi's lost *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* in which he purportedly abandoned the position that the active intellect could conjoin with human beings and also abandoned belief in immortality. Davidson neatly sketches the differing positions of al-Farabi. Positions from which Avicenna and others will draw in the formulation of their own views on these matters.

Chapter 4 presents the arguments and positions of Avicenna. His work came to dominate much of the philosophical discussion in Medieval Islam and its influence is still manifest in philosophical and theological thinking in modern Iranian schools. In cosmology Avicenna follows the lead of al-Farabi in adhering to an emanative hierarchy but with the difference that the procession of intelligences is taken to involve the engendering of an intellect, a body and a soul at each level down to the active intellect, which itself has causal responsibility for the sublunar realm. Davidson correctly remarks that al-Farabi was not the only likely source for Avicenna who had studied the Plotinian *Theology of Aristotle:* "Avicenna could have arrived at his account of the active intellect's functions by combining in the active intellect functions that Plotinus distributed between the Neoplatonic cosmic Intellect and cosmic Soul" (82). He also reminds his readers that, "Although Avicenna's universe may strike a modern reader as even more bizarre than Aristotle's, it is, like Aristotle's, a carefully argued scientific hypothesis for explaining observed phenomena" (83). But what is perhaps most valuable is Davidson's discussion of active intellect and human thought: the active intellect is now held to be the source of both concepts and primary propositions of human thought or science. Davidson valuably explicates the terminology of Avicenna on the levels of human intellectual development and shows how far his arguments have moved from Aristotle's understanding of the role of imagination and mind in grasping things of the sensible realm. For Avicenna, "Language to the effect that man abstracts thought or that the light of the active intellect transforms potential thoughts into actual thoughts is ... not to be taken literally, for the actual thoughts in fact come from the emanation of the active intellect" (94). Such thoughts come about in the human rational soul by way of human cogitative efforts at self-preparation (i.e., study) by the application of differentiating imaginative powers to the emanations of the separate active intellect. The rational and immortal soul must be simple, self-subsistent, incorporeal and intelligible insofar as it is receptive of indivisible intelligible thoughts. (In this Avicenna seems to be influenced by arguments from Proclus.) While it can attain conjunction with the active intellect in three ways, in "quotidian conjunction with the active intellect, in permanent conjunction with the active intellect, and in thought having the active intellect itself or other incorporeal beings as an object," nevertheless "Avicenna-like Alfarabi in his account of conjunction-envisages no genuinely mystical or ecstatic experience" (105). Conjunction which results in prophecy is intellectual (involving *ads,* insight), or imaginative, or both. The first "consists in receiving the emanation of the active intellect without recourse to the cogitative faculty, the faculty identical with the compositive imagination," while "the man endowed with both categories of prophecy utilizes his figurative recasting of theoretical truths to instruct the masses" (120). With respect to eschatology, immortal souls determine for themselves what awaits them in the afterlife by their intellectual achievements or lack thereof in the sublunar realm. An intellectual wealth is the earned reward of those of intellectual achievement in bodily life, but a dull emptiness awaits those with no awareness of intellectual life while in the body.

Chapter 5 is entitled, "Reverberations of the Theories of Alfarabi and Avicenna," and deals with al-Ghazali, Ibn Baja, lbn Tufail, Abu'l-Barakat and Suhrawardi of the Islamic tradition, Judah Hallevi, Abraham lbn Daud and Moses Maimonides of the Jewish tradition, and also Latin Scholastic thought. The analyses are brief but lucid and valuable accounts of the doctrines of these thinkers. But what deserves special mention is Davidson's critical exposition of the thought of al-Ghazali as a follower of Avicenna (inaccord with remarks to that effect by Averroes). After a lengthy analysis of the *Mishkât al-Anwar,* and especially the meaning of its symbolism. Davidson concludes that,"Although Ghazali had. at one stage, drawn up a thoroughgoing critique of Avicenna's philosophy, his *Mishkât al-Anwar* reproduces much of Avicenna's system, disguised in allusive language" (218). This surprising view has also been argued by Richard M. Frank in his 1992 monograph, *Creation and the Cosmic System: al-Ghazali and Avicenna.* Frank concludes with the remark:

It has long been recognized that while al-Ghazali rejected some major theses of the Avicennian system he appropriated others. What we have seen on a closer examination of what he has to say concerning God's relation to the cosmos as its creator, however, reveals that from a theological standpoint most of the theses which he rejected are relatively tame and inconsequential compared to some of those in which he follows the philosopher.2

The implications of this research for understanding the nature of Islam as a religion in the thought of al-Ghazali. arguably Islam's greatest theologian, are of more than passing academic interest. If al-Ghazali did indeed come to adopt the cosmological views of Avicenna, it may well follow in a consistent way that he also covertly gave serious consideration to adopting the controversial understanding of the nature of religion commonly found in the philosophers. Further research on this topic may well point to an implicit but surprising and unexpectedly deep affinity between al-Ghazali and Averroes on religion and its role in society and in the life of the individual. The topic needs to be explored in its own right in a comprehensive study, something which might well prove to have serious implications for the understanding of contemporary Islamic religious thought and its historical foundations in the theology of al-Ghazali.

Chapters 6-8 are devoted to Averroes and his evolving understanding of the nature and activities of the active intellect and the material intellect. Davidson first outlines the historical development of the thought of Averroes from his being a follower of Avicenna to the construction of his own philosophy as an attempt to recapture the truth in Aristotle. Averroës moves from dependence on Avicenna to dependence upon the Greek commentators or lbn Baja until the complexity of the problems he must address leads him back to Aristotle himself. It is there that he tries to find the keys to unlock *aporiai,* some as old as Aristotle, others generated in the Greek Aristotelian tradition or in the tradition of Islamic Aristotelians. Davidson moves carefully through the various recensions of the *Epitome of the Metaphysics* and finds interpolation there to be doctrinally consonant with the *Middle* and *Long Commentaries on the Metaphysics* as well as the *Tahâfut al-Tahâfut.* Abandoning the emanative (or creative) scheme of al-Farabi and Avicenna, Averroës takes refuge in a conception of the First Cause as final cause to a considerable degree analogous to the One's finality in Plotinus. For Averroës, "each intelligence possesses a stratum of existence in its own right," a stratum different but not altogether unlike that of emanated Intellect in its first moment as Being in the philosophy of Plotinus. Even more in accord with the account of Plotinus, each intelligence in its "underlying stratum eternally turns its mental gaze upon the unitary First Cause, and the conception of the First Cause which each thereby receives endows it with the measure of perfection befitting its rank in the cosmic hierarchy" (256). For the mature Averroës, the First Cause-"the intelligence moving the outermost sphere" -is not an efficient or active emanative cause of these intelligences except equivocally. Rather, it is a final and formal cause of the form and actuality in the being of the intelligences through those intelligences' self-determination: "The intelligence thus receives its form and its full measure of existence through its concept of the First Cause" (354). As for the active intellect in its relation to the origination of natural forms in the world. it "plays no role, and its function accordingly shrinks back to what Aristotle established in the *De Anima,* to the actualization of the potential human intellect'' (257).

Devoted to the material intellect and to the active intellect in human thought, chapters 7 and 8 describe in detail the different positions Averroës took and how he finally "moved not toward what the consensus of modern scholarship would take to be the historically correct interpretation of Aristotle [ on the material intellect] but in the opposite direction" (298). In setting forth Averroës' views on the topic, Davidson draws on seven important works of Averroës including his three commentaries on the *De Anima* (epitome, middle, and long), the *Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction,* two short works, and sections of his commentary on Alexander's *De lntellectu.* According to Davidson, the *Middle Commentary on the De Anima* contains an excursus from a later period, a thesis which he admits lacks manuscript evidence (276) (such evidence is available in the case of the *Epitome of the De Anima)* and which is in direct opposition to the views of Alfred Ivry, editor of the recently published critical edition of Averroës' work. Ivry argues for his position in the introduction to his edition of the Arabic text3 and also in " Averroës' Middle and Long Commentaries on the *De anima.* "4 Davidson's attractive thesis solves a number of interpretive problems and allows one to see a line of development in Averroës' thought. Ivry, in working to make coherent sense of the same texts, argues for the unorthodox thesis that the *Middle Commentary* is posterior to the *Long Commentary.* Both theses are controversial, difficult to establish definitively, and currently being argued in the literature. Still, Ivry and Davidson do agree in seeing the *Long Commentary* as containing Averroës' most comprehensive account of the material intellect. For Davidson, Averroës takes this separate intellectual substance as what all human beings share although, in virtue of the particular cogitative powers in each person, "each still owns his personal, individual actual thoughts, and thoughts are not shared" (290). But Davidson should have strongly emphasized thatthe term 'thought' is equivocal. For Averroës, the intelligibles-each of which is unique-cannot exist in individuals without becoming particularized and losing their ability to be the referents of individual 'thought' or cogitation; so it must be the case that what exist in individuals are images which refer to the intelligibles in the material intellect. Rather than follow Avicenna, for whom worldly perceptions and images are only accidentally related to knowledge of concepts and principles, Averroës follows Aristotle more closely by insisting that our knowledge be of things in the world in some significant sense. For Averroës the cogitative power functions much as it does in Avicenna, namely as a discriminating power actively composing images from sense prior to the grasp of intelligibles and actively utilizing intelligibles received from the intellect in the formation of propositions. The human imaginative faculty, characterized as rational or intellectual, is the cogitative power. But for Averroës, in contrast to Avicenna, this power presents images to the material intellect and the agent intellect, and "the active intellect illuminates both the material intellect and images in the imaginative faculty of the soul; and the result is actual human abstract thought, that is, concepts" (319). Of course, abstract thoughts and concepts, the intelligibles, cannot exist as such in the individual human soul (a 'this') without being particularized. Rather. what exist in the bodily rational power are images, the referents of which are in the separate material intellect as required epistemologically by the unity of science. This ability to summon the agent to action and knowledge in ourselves is a function of our use and exercise of this faculty. The cogitative power of individual human beings is also the source of will and voluntary action on the part of the individual (cf. 320). In discussing this, Davidson writes: "The question that cries out for an answer, namely, how a transient human soul can induce the eternal active intellect and eternal material intellect to do its bidding, is never addressed." This is an important point, but the answer is already implicit in the Aristotelian thought of Averroës. At *Posterior Analytics* 2. 19. 100a14 Aristotle remarks that the soul is constituted to be able to do this. That is, given the Aristotelian tradition's commitment to epistemological realism and essentialism, little more can be said on this question other than that there is a natural connection between the bodily human rational power and the separate material and agent intellects, a connection which enables human beings to know. By way of the human power of imagination, that connection makes rationality and thought actual in human individuals thanks to their cogitative powers, even if thought and intelligence can only be equivocally predicated of particular humans and the separate material and agent intellects. As a consequence, human thought itself is equivocal: "Arguments showing human thought to be eternal have in view human thought belonging to the material intellect, whereas arguments showing it to be generated-destructible and individual have in view human thought insofar as it belongs to the imaginative faculty of an individual man" (292).

Davidson rightly connects with this Averroës' doctrine of the hierarchy of separate intellects which are responsible for the movement of the heavens. However, he does not emphasize how pleased Averroës was to be able to make the connection. In the *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle*5and in his *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*6Averroës himself claims that the doctrine of the separate material intellect establishes key principles, principles which are the foundation for the science of metaphysics and essential to understanding the hierarchy of separate intellects leading up to the First Form, God. According to Averroës, it is this discovery of a non-material kind of potentiality in the science of the soul which makes it possible to understand the hierarchy and diversity of separate intelligences or celestial intellects. That is to say, philosophical psychology's epistemological argument for the unity of science proves the necessity of the existence of the non-corporeal material intellect as intellect and as potency; it thereby makes possible the science of metaphysics; and consequently it aids in the understanding of the plurality and hierarchy of separate intellects.

Given Averroës' doctrine of the unity of human thought in the material intellect, there are obvious implications for his mature understanding of the role of the active intellect. of the possibility of personal immortality, and of the nature of prophecy. The possibility of some sort of conjunction of human beings with the active intellect was dear to his philosophical tradition and dear to Averroës. But, as Davidson notes, Averroës' mature doctrine of the material intellect allows for "only a very attenuated conjunction of the active intellect with the human soul" (334). The actual rationality of a particular human soul is due to its intimate connection, with the separate material intellect; the actuality of the separate material intellect as intellect is due to its being affected and actualized by the separated active intellect; hence, human bodily thinking and rationality are due to a mediated conjunction with the active intellect. While Averroës expresses his understanding of this conjunction with apparent enthusiasm, Davidson is right to observe that "the Long Commentary . . . does not, and could not, ever expressly say that the active intellect becomes the direct object of human consciousness" (335). Moreover, given his views on the nature of particular human beings and particular human powers, and given the merely equivocal way in which, according to Averroës, rationality can be predicated of humans in whom images of intelligibles and not intelligibles themselves can exist, it is obvious that for Averroës the human self is a particular material composite which is a 'this .' That the human soul is immortal is true, but this should not be understood as pertaining to the particular human individual. Rather, what is immortal is human soul as species.7

These intertwined doctrines lead to views which are almost inevitable, given the developmental path of intellectualist and necessitarian elements in the history of the Aristotelian philosophical tradition in Islamic lands. Davidson clearly points out the impact on the doctrine of prophecy which is consequent upon the naturalistic account of perishable particular human souls given by Averroës.

He is asserting that the phenomena we are considering, including revelation and prophecy, give no reliable information about matters belonging to the domain of science, not even by furnishing the uneducated with a figurative representation of theoretical truths. . . . Revelation as well as the written record of revealed knowledge thus contribute nothing to the soul's well-being. (344)

Knowledge and truth essentially concern scientific matters, demonstration, and the intellect, while in their essence theological dialectic and emotive rhetoric concern lower matters and lower parts of the soul. The 'truth' of these latter two consists in the value they have in contributing to human well-being and to the development of human perfection and happiness. But real perfection and happiness involve the development of the intellect to the extent that this is possible in this life. Consequently, the 'truth' or value of religion is practical, pragmatic, and derivative in that religion contributes to human moral and political formation. The implication. then, is that religion, 'revelation,' and other things arising from the imaginative powers such as dreams, have no truth or value in their own right and are not necessarily a proper guide to human happiness. Davidson does not draw out all the implications of such an understanding of Averroës and the tradition reaching back to al-Ghazali and Avicenna. but he quite properly addresses the discrepancy between Averroës' philosophical accounts and his accounts in popular works such as the *Tahâfut al-tahâfut.* For the philosopher, he writes, "The term prophet would . . . mean nothing more than the human author of Scripture; and the term revelation would mean a high level of philosophic knowledge" (351). If this is the correct way to read Averroës, and it does seem to be that, then recent attempts to place Averroës in the vanguard of 'enlightenment' thinkers in Islamic nations8 amount to little more than attempting to send a wolf in sheep's clothing into the flock. While Averroës is admirable for his commitment to truth and rationality, his work carries deep inside it a complete disavowal of the truth of the proposition which believing Muslims claim to be the essence of their faith in Islam: the *shahâda*9as a statement of truth and not mere emotion or rhetoric. This is not to say that Averroës was anti-religious, for he held that religious guidance is appropriate for the sake of moral and intellectual character formation for certain classes of people and, certainly, for each person in growing from child to adult. In a sense, he was no more and no less atheist or theist than were the Greek Stoics, for he did hold to the existence of a First Cause of the existence of all things (albeit by final and formal causality, not efficient causality). Nevertheless, Thomas Aquinas-with his view that some truths of faith transcend the intellect and are revealed by a *personal* deity who acts on the world and gives grace to human souls through efficient causality-is vastly more sympathetic to religion as a source of truth and real wisdom. Averroës' thought is ultimately deeply anti-Islamic in its denial of the literal truth of religious propositions expressing the essence of Islam.10

There is nothing disappointing in Davidson's insightful tome, although it can be argued that he is not quite on the mark when he writes that

in order to reapproach Aristotle, Averroës should have dropped the experimental position [i.e., that found in the portion of the *Middle Commentary on the De Anima* which Davidson postulates as an excursus to the main text], returned to his original naturalistic construction of the material intellect, and incorporated the original construction into his new, hard-won naturalistic account of biological processes. He should have maintained that human souls with their disposition for thought, called material intellect, are latent in the matter of the sublunar world and are drawn forth from matter by soul-heat. (355)

Such a position, however, is precluded by the requirements of Aristotelian epistemology and metaphysics. Averroes insists that intelligibles cannot exist as such in individuals. Individuals are 'thises' or particulars. There is only one intelligible of each species and only one intelligible would be particularized by the material and corporeal subject into which it would be received.11 That is, for there to be knowledge-the grasp of the intelligible which is not a 'this' or a particular-it is necessary that this intelligible exist in a single and separate immaterial intellect which does not have the nature of a corporeal particular, according to Averroes.

Although Davidson's book is an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the doctrine of the intellect in Medieval thought-both because it provides a large picture and because it provides details-work remains to be done in a number of areas. One worthy of brief mention is the question of the doctrine of cogitation which is an essential part of Averroes' mature understanding of the human mind. The doctrine of the bodily human cogitative faculty is spelled out more clearly in his *Long Commentary on the De Anima* than in any of his other works. There the term *cogitatio* and related forms such as *cogitare, virtus cogitativa, cogitabile, cogitans,* and the like, appear at least seventeen times in the primary Arabic text of Aristotle's *De Anima* used by Averroes as we have that text in Latin. These terms, however, correspond to a wide variety of original Greek terms, among them *logistikos, logismos,* and related forms, *dianoeomai* and related forms *doxa, bouleutikos,* and related forms, and *dianoia.* The primary Arabic translation of the *De Anima* used by Averroes in his *Long Commentary on the De Anima* is no longer extant, but scholarship on the Medieval translations of the lost Arabic *De Anima* from Arabic into Latin and into Hebrew12 seems to indicate that the version selected for use by Averroes was different from its original Arabic translation. His preferred version appears to have been corrupt in ways that suggest systematic and intentional contamination by the substitution of the vocabulary of cogitation for an originally wider array of Arabic terms which were more in accord with the original Greek. Thus, the doctrine of cogitation in the *De Anima* found in Averroes' *Long Commentary on the De Anima-that* is, the grouping together of many human rational activities under a single set of terms from the same etymological root, rational activities which take place in the body by means of discursive thinking-was not found as such in Aristotle or in the original Arabic translations.13

In sum, Davidson's excellent contribution to the study of the understanding of intellect in the Middle Ages belongs not only in every research library but also in the personal libraries of all serious students of Medieval philosophical and religious thought. No more reliable and insightful book-length study of the philosophy of mind in al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes and their influence on philosophical thought in the Islamic. Christian, and Jewish intellectual traditions is available today.14

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# Notes

1Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). $55.00.

2*Creation and the Cosmic System: Al-Ghazali and Avicenna* (Heidelberg, 1992), p . 86. It is beyond the bounds of this article to examine in detail the evidence and the theses put forward by Davidson and Frank, but the latter's work is critically reviewed by M . E. Marmura in "Ghazalian Causes and Intermediaries," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 115 (1995): 89-100.

3*Averroes' Middle Commentary on Aristotle's de Anima* (Cairo, 1994), English pp. 10-11.

4*Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 5 (1995): 75-92. Also see "Averroes ' Middle Commentary on the *De Anima,"* in *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy: Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.l.E.P.M.),* ed. Reijo Tyorinoja et alii (Helsinki, 1990), vol. 3, pp. 79- 86.

5*Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libras,* ed. F. Stuart Crawford (Cambridge, 1953) p. 5 and also p. 410 where he writes, "If it were not for this genus of beings which we know in the science of the soul, we could not understand multiplicity in separate things, to the extent that, unless we know here the nature of the intellect, we cannot know that the separate moving powers ought to be intellects" (my translation).

6*Tafsîr fî mâ bafid at-Tabîfia,* ed. M. Bouyges, S.J., 2d ed., (Beirut, 1973), vol. 3, pp. 1593-94, 1600, 1612-13.

7*Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libras,* ed. F. Stuart Crawford, pp. 408-9. Also see, Richard C. Taylor, '"The Future Life' and Averroes's *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle,"* pp .272-73 and 277, in *Averroes and the Enlightenment,* ed. Mourad Wahba and Mona Abousenna (Buffalo , N. Y. , 1996), pp. 263-77 .

8This seems to be the purpose behind many (but not all) of the essays in *Averroes and the Enlightenment* cited in the previous note. For a study of the ways in which the thought of Averroes has been interpreted and used in modern times, see Anke von Kiigelgen, *Averroes und die arabische Moderne: Ansiitze zu einer Neubegrundung des Rationalismus im Islam* (Leiden, New York, Cologne, 1994).

9"There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His messenger." This is the first of the Five Pillars of Islam. "The *shahâda* is essential . . . and without it no-one can consider himself a Muslim in any sense." Cyril Glassé, *The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam* (San Francisco and London, 1989) p. 132A.

10For a brief comparison of these thinkers as well as al-Ghazali and Augustine, see Richard C. Taylor, "Faith and Reason, Religion and Philosophy: Four Views from Medieval Islam and Christianity" in *Philosophy and the God of Abraham: In Memory of James A. Weisheipl, O.P.,* ed. R. James Long (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1991), pp . 217-3 3.

11"The reason why that nature is something which discerns and knows while prime matter neither knows nor discerns, is because prime matter receives different forms. namely individual and particular forms, while this [nature] receives universal forms. From this it is apparent that this nature is not a this nor a body nor a power in a body. " *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros,* ed. F. Stuart Crawford, p. 388 (my translation). See pp. 385-89 and also pp. 393 and 402-3.

12*Aristotle 's 'De Anima' Translated into Hebrew by Zerahyah Ben Isaac Ben Shealtiel Hen: A Critical Edition with an Introduction and Index,* ed. Gerrit Bos (Leiden, New York, and Cologne, 1994).

13The corresponding Arabic texts can be show to have *ftkr* and related terms from the same root. This was discussed in my paper "Remarks on *Cogitatio* in Averroes' *Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libras,* " presented at the fourth Symposium Averroicum at Cologne on September 8, 1996. This will be published in the forthcoming Proceedings of that symposium.

14 I benefited from valuable stylistic suggestions on this piece from my colleague Michael Wreen for which I am grateful.