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A Reconstruction of Bernard Lonergan's 1947-48 Course On Grace, Part 1

*Reconstruction by Robert* M. *Doran, working from notes taken by Frederick Crowe and William Stewart*

# Editor's Introduction

The notes we have from Bernard Lonergan on the website www.bemardlonergan.com for his 1947-48 course on grace at the Jesuit Seminary in Toronto (now Regis College) are in two sets. They appear at 16000DTL040 and 16200DTL040. Translations by Michael Shields, with extensive editorial work by H. Daniel Monsour, are also available on the website, at 16000DTE040 and 16200DTE040. It is difficult, and in fact probably impossible without further external guidance, to put the two sets of notes in order and to relate them to each other. Fortunately, that guidance is available in the form of notes taken by Frederick Crowe and William Stewart, who were Jesuit students in the course. Their notes, preserved by Crowe, give a very clear indication regarding the order of the course. They enable us to reconstruct the course, something that would not be possible even in piecemeal fashion if we were working only from the archival data.

The course is important in Lonergan's development. It represents in several respects an intermediate position between his 1946 systematic treatise "De ente supernaturali"1 and his contributions to a course on grace in 1951- 52, again at the Jesuit Seminary.2 In the latter contribution he introduced material that would come to be known as his "four-point hypothesis" relating the four divine relations to four created terms

What follows is the first installment on a reconstruction of the 1947- 48 course, working from the notes of Crowe and Stewart. References to "Boyer" are to Charles Boyer, *Tractatus de gratia divina* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1946). This text was used as something of a basis for the course, though Lonergan relied mostly on his own notes.

This initial installment will be followed by several more articles. The entire course is worth making available, especially since we have such carefully written notes left us by Crowe and Stewart.

# 1. Six Introductory Points3

* 1. The word "grace" means favor or benevolence, the benevolence of someone toward someone else, as in "to find favor with someone." It means also a gift given out of benevolence, as well as recompense for the gift, as in having a grateful spirit and giving thanks. Finally, it means appearance, comeliness, beauty, even deceptive attractiveness and vain beauty.
  2. The reality itself that we are concerned with in a course on grace is the life of Christ communicated to us gratuitously. John 6:56-57: "Those who eat my flesh and drink my blood abide in me, and I in them. Just as the living Father sent me, and I live because of the Father, so whoever eats me will live because of me." John 15:1-5: "I am the true vine, and my Father is the vinegrower. He removes every branch in me that bears no fruit. Every branch that bears fruit he prunes to make it bear more fruit. You have already been cleansed by the word that I have spoken to you. Abide in me as I abide in you. Just as the branch cannot bear fruit by itself unless it abides in the vine, neither can you unless you abide in me. I am the vine, you are the branches. Those who abide in me and I in them bear much fruit, because apart from me you can do nothing."

These texts treat the life of Christ communicated to us. It is a gratuitous gift. The gratuity of this gift appears in Ephesians 2:1-10: "You were dead through the trespasses and sins in which you once lived, following the course of this world, following the ruler of the power of the air, the spirit that is now at work among those who are disobedient. All of us once lived among them in the passions of our flesh, following the desires of flesh and senses, and we were by nature children of wrath, like everyone else. But God, who is rich in mercy, out of the great love with which he loved us even when we were dead through our trespasses, made us alive together with Christ- by grace you have been saved - and raised us up with him and seated us with him in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus, so that in the ages to come he might show the immeasurable riches of his grace in kindness toward us in Christ Jesus. For by grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God - not the result of works, so that no one may boast. For we are what he has made us, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand to be our way of life." Similarly, throughout most of the New Testament there is talk of the life of Christ that exists in us.

This life of Christ in us is the object of this treatise.

* 1. What sort of thing is this life of Christ? Is it merely human life? No, since the life of Christ is simultaneously human and divine. We are speaking of the life of Christ, who is simultaneously man and God. His life in us consists in the love of friendship toward God in this life and beatific vision in the future life. Because Christ is God he has the beatific vision so that he knows himself as God, and he has the charity by which he loves himself as God. Thus, this life of Christ in us is a participation in the divine nature: charity on earth, vision in heaven. 2 Peter 1:4: "he has given us, through these things, his precious and very great promises, so that through them you may ... become participants of the divine nature."
  2. Thus we participate in theandric life. This life is above our nature, since it is the life of a man not as just a man but as a man who also is God. Thus faith is above reason, charity above the natural love of God, deeds meritorious of eternal life above the natural merits of man, the beatific vision above the limbo of the unbaptized infants. This is the distinction between supernatural and natural life. This man Jesus Christ is God through the hypostatic union. And the Christian as a member of the mystical body of Christ participates in the theandric life of Christ through sanctifying grace, from which flow faith, charity, and merits unto beatific vision.
  3. This life is grace, a gift given out of benevolence. It is a gratuitous gift for two reasons.
     1. It is a gratuitous gift because we are sinners: recall Ephesians 2:1-3. The life of Christ is not owed to sinners. The sinner loses all right to eternal life. Therefore, it is a gift given out of benevolence, not out of justice.
     2. But it would be a gratuitous gift even if we were not sinners. We have everything required for our natural life, everything that follows upon human nature or is needed by human nature, which is complete in itself. Grace is something beyond human nature, beyond the proportion of our nature, whether constitutively - I am a man without this life - or by consequence - I can operate as a human being without this life - or by way of exigence - this life is not owed to a mere human being, but to that one alone who is not only man but also God.

1. There is thus a twofold effect of grace. It is simultaneously healing and elevating. It is healing because it revives fallen nature by taking away the darkness of our mind, the weakness of our will, the tendency of the flesh to sin; it is elevating insofar as it confers the life of Christ that is communicated to us and participated in by us. It gives supernatural life, merits that lead to beatific vision.

# 2. The Various Senses of the Word "Grace"4

Since everything that God has conferred upon us is given to us *gratis,* it is well to distinguish the various meanings of the word "grace." So we distinguish:

uncreated: God himself

created:finite, contingent

in a broad sense: natural things

in a strict sense: in the order of vision, charity, merit, faith given gratuitously *(gratis data):* for the good of the church (prophecy, miracles, discernment)

making pleasing *(gratum faciens):* for the sanctification of the individual

as healing: by acting against the effects of original and personal sin

as elevating: by bestowing the life of Christ, participation in the divine nature

habitual: the root of elevation, sanctifying grace

the consequences of elevation, infused virtues, gifts of the Holy Spirit

actual: regarding proximately the acts themselves

internal: the illumination of the intellect, the inspiration of the will

external: preaching, education, etc.5

# 3. The Importance of This Treatise6

## The Importance of this Treatise

### From the end of our Society:

Summary of the Constitutions, Rule 2: "The end of this Society is not only to devote ourselves to the salvation and perfection of our own souls With God's grace, but with the same to devote ourselves earnestly to the salvation and perfection of others.”

One who has the life of Christ is saved; and the more one possesses this life, the greater is one's perfection. Accordingly, it is in order that you may know the end of your vocation as the salvation and perfection of yourselves and that of others that this treatise on grace is being presented.

### From the principal means:

As above: "with God's grace," "with the same."

Summary of the Constitutions, Rule 16: "Let all who belong to this Society devote themselves to the pursuit of solid and perfect virtues and spiritual things, and let them consider these to be of greater importance than learning or other natural human gifts; for the former are those interior things from which efficacy must flow to external things for the end proposed to us." From the priesthood which you desire and are preparing for: A priest, an *alter Christus,* who puts on Christ for his personal sanctification and offers Christ in the name of Christ and of the Church for the living and the dead.

# 4. Methodological Points7

There is a twofold order of knowledge. In terms of the principle, there is natural reason, and there is divine faith. In terms of the object, there are those things to which natural reason can attain, and there are mysteries hidden in God. In theology, the principle is reason illumined by faith and inquiring earnestly, devoutly, seriously and the object is the intelligible ordering of the mysteries in response to understanding, whether from their connections with one another or from analogy with the natural order. Thus, natural reason is to the object of science or philosophy as God is to the mysteries. This intelligible ordering is imperfect. Theology is a science, not purely and simply but with some qualifications.

What is the analogy of nature?8 First, it is religious psychology.9 A science that asks about life is psychology; here the issue is our life in Christ, and so we are involved in religious psychology. The soul in general is the first act of an organic body. The soul more specifically is known from objects, acts, potencies, and the diversity of potency to different kinds of soul and different perfections of potencies. Similarly, we can proceed from sanctifying grace, the virtues, the gifts, actual grace, the illumination of the intellect, the inspiration of the will.

Second, there arise questions about divine providence and governance, about the distribution of grace, about God operating in the operations of nature, and about the relation of grace to freedom.

# 5. The Mode of Proceeding10

* 1. As in every science, so also in theology there are two questions that have to be dealt with concerning each individual matter, namely, “Is it?" and ''What is it?"
  2. But since theology is a science unlike others, since its principle is not natural reason but reason illumined by faith, these questions are answered differently in theology from the way they are in the other sciences.
  3. In a natural science and in philosophy the question "Is it?" is answered either by appealing to the witness of the senses, to experience, to internal consciousness, or by reference to principles that are self-explanatory.

In theology, however, the question "Is it?" is answered by reference to the documents of the faith.

Take, for example, the question whether we participate in the life of Christ. We do not go to our interior religious experience for an answer. True, one may say with St Paul, "It is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me" [Galatians 2:20]; but someone else may say that he never had such an interior experience.

Rather, we address this question from the documents of the faith; that is:

* + 1. from the revealed word of God, written or by tradition; thus "reason illumined by faith;"
    2. interpreted according to the mind of the church, which is the guardian and interpreter of the deposit of the faith, from whose authority the church Fathers and theologians have their authority since they appeal not to their own ideas but to those sources that express the mind of the church;
    3. according to how this revealed word of God is understood by the Fathers;
    4. according to the consensus among theologians.11

1. There is a prior difficulty concerning the question "What is it?" The question 'What is it?" is twofold. First it is answered by a nominal definition, from experience, and subsequently by the essential definition, from understanding.

An essential definition proceeds from an act of understanding. "To understand" is an act that is frequently found in bright people but rarely in the slow-witted.

Science *[scientia]* is first act with respect to understanding. That is, it is the habit whereby one understands promptly, easily, and with delight; it is that which is deficient in a learner, for a learner understands slowly and with difficulty and considerable effort.

Do not confuse such knowledge with the object of knowledge (the known, Science) or with the signs of knowledge, such as demonstration, certitude, etc. These signs can be quite deceptive, since they are demonstrations "that" and not ''because of" - thus, we can argue that God exists, and still not understand God- and empirical certitudes derived from the senses or from faith. One can study philosophy, biology, chemistry, physics without understanding anything. One can know about many things but know nothing, and repeat words, like a parrot.

1. In theology is there science in the true sense of the word?
   * 1. There is some fruitful understanding (DB 1796 [OS 3016, ND 132]). One arrives at an intelligible ordering of the revealed truths both from their connection with one another and from the analogy with nature.

This is a most fruitful ordering. It remains throughout life Scriptural texts, the writings of the Fathers, the councils, the statements of theologians easily slip out of one's memory; but understanding of revealed truth remains; it is a habit, a second nature, as it were.

* + 1. This understanding is not transformative but penetrative, explicative.

It is not transformative: see DB 1800 [OS 3020, ND 136].

The reason for this is that [the natural] sciences proceed from sensible data that are first understood in one way and then in another way: Ptolemy, Newton, Einstein. Transformations occur because sensible data as sensible are not things but rather are as the material element of things. Through understanding we come to know forms, and in this way understanding grows. Judgment follows the act of understanding. Theology, on the other hand, proceeds not from experiential data but from truths, from what are already constituted by matter and form or by form alone. The truth comes first, and then it is explained. The act of understanding follows judgment. The coherence of truths with one another is exhibited. The truths are defended. Thus, in progressing and increasing, theological understanding does not change the truth itself but penetrates more deeply into the understanding of the truth, its intelligible ordering, and its implications. The same dogma, in the same sense, remains. The truths do not depend on our understanding.

* + 1. This penetration is not perfect and complete but imperfect and incomplete. DB 1796 [OS 3016, ND 132].

The reason is that the principal object of theology is God. We do not know what God is, what he is in himself, and so our theological understanding is deficient in respect to its principal and central concern. Our act of understanding is always with respect to sensible data. God is not a sensible intelligibility, and so we cannot understand God. We know the signs, we know truths that are connected with God, we know their connections, and so on, but we do not understand God. To know what God is, of course, is to understand God as he is in himself, and that is the beatific vision. This vision is not granted to us in this life. The analogical understanding that is attained, though, is very fruitful. There is progress in the understanding of a doc trine that always remains the same. And this understanding is obscure, not perfectly clear. We see intelligible connections, relations, but we never succeed in answering the question "What is God?"

Both Crowe and Stewart add a comment that does not appear in 16200DTL040.12 As Stewart expresses it "Existit analogia inter psychologiam naturalem et psychologiam supematuralem," "There exists an analogy between natural and supernatural psychology." Crowe writes, "Analogia ex psychol accepta adiuvat ad bene intelligendum . . . Etiam ex nat. theol. - de concursu," "An analogy received from psychology helps us understand ... Also from natural theology, on concursus."

# 6. A Comment on the Order13

*Commentary on Boyer's Tractatus de Gratia Divina, Prooemium, § 1, I,3*14

Theological knowledge is an intellectual habit whereby one understands in first act and therefore can clearly, distinctly, coherently, and in an orderly way expound truths revealed by God, considered both in themselves and in their connection with natural truths.

# [Terminology]

*habit:* a relatively stable quality

*intellectual:* existing in a human intellect

Beware of the modem way of speaking of Science with a capital S [see above, 10]. A science is something in someone's mind; it is that act by which we can tell the difference between bright and slow-witted people.

*in first act:* one who knows a science does not always understand his science in second act. He is different, however, from a learner in that he can promptly, easily, and with delight understand in second act, whereas a learner understands in second act slowly, with difficulty and considerable effort.

The eye is to eyesight is to seeing as the intellect is to science is to understanding.

There is this difference, that eyesight is produced naturally, while science is obtained from a teacher and principally from the light belonging to the agent intellect.

Just as nature, with the help of a physician, produces health, so the light of the intellect, with the help of a teacher, produces scientific knowledge [Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate,* q. 11, aa. 1-4].

Therefore, one can first speak an inner word and then an outer word, and does so because one understands. I can define and order and judge insofar as I understand; otherwise I am a parrot.

To µunderstand and to speak: it is an illusion to believe that one understands yet cannot speak; it is a deceptive but specious beclouding of the mind, not science.

*revealed truths,* etc.: an improper expression: for science is defined not through an immanent object (truth) but through a transcendent object (the real).

To avoid difficulties, namely, those that appear concerning the act of faith, which in some way excludes and in some way admits understanding, see DB 1795, 1796 [DS 3015, 3016; ND 131-132],

the sense is: the purpose of theology is to understand scripture and tradition, i.e., to be able to embrace and view in one intelligible grasp all that 18 to be found in that twofold source.

All phenomena are to physical sciences as all of revelation is to theology.

# Conclusion:

Theology, like any other science, is acquired only by protracted study.

Acquiring it is like going up a circular staircase: attaining it is like being high up, and the Intellectual view from there must take in everything in order to understand any part correctly.

Basically, then, it matters little where one begins.

# 7. The States of Nature15

"State" means the plan *[ratio],* possible or actual, of divine providence according to which human nature considered concretely is directed to a determined end under determined conditions.16

*ratio:* conception, plan, design, blueprint [Stewart];

*possible or actual:* some states are merely hypothetical, others actual and historical;

*human nature considered concretely:* not universal, but *all* particulars; all human beings

*end:* that for the sake of which something is or is being done [Stewart: that for the sake of which someone acts or something is done]

*end of the operator:* the apprehended good moves the appetite; the efficient cause

*end of the work:* the good to which is directed what is or is being done; the final cause

*natural end:* in accordance with the proportion of a nature, that which human nature is able to attain in itself

*supernatural end:* beyond the proportion of nature, that which is beyond the power of nature, what human nature in itself cannot attain; in the concrete case, the beatific vision

*absolutely supernatural:* exceeding the proportion of any nature whatsoever

*relatively supernatural:* exceeding the proportion of a given substance or nature

*under determined conditions:* before or after original sin; with or without the perfect submission of the sensitive to the rational; with or without the gifts of pure nature [Stewart].

Thus we come to the division of the states of nature.

## [Handwritten in Lonergan's typescript:]

We pose the question about the states of nature at this point because grace is defined as a gift unowed to *anyone.* Grace: a gift conferred out of benevolence.

*grace in the broad sense:* a gift absolutely unowed, but owed on the supposition of a nature.

*grace in the strict sense:* a gift unowed both absolutely and on the supposition of a nature: it does not belong to the constituents, the consequences, or the exigencies of a nature *in the present state of nature* [prout natura nunc est].

*grace as elevating:* leading to the vision.

*grace as healing:* counteracting the ills of fallen nature.

*For a natural end:*

[the state] *of pure n ture:* nature with all that follow from it;

[the state] *of integral nature:* with the addition of spontaneous submission of the sentient part to the rational part [Boyer: this state does not include the supernatural "quoad substantiam"];

*For a supernatural end:*

[the state] *of original justice (or innocence):* grace, perfect submission, other gifts; [Boyer quotes Thomas: reason is submissive to God, the lower powers to reason, the body to the soul; he adds that all this is a result of sanctifying grace, freedom from concupiscence, ignorance, and error, immunity from sadness, disease, death; by reason of sanctifying grace, this state was supernatural "quoad substantiam"];

[the state] *of fallen [and unrepaired] nature:* sin and the rebellion of sense; [Boyer: the sole end of man remains supernatural, but we are destitute of grace, without which the end cannot be attained; the other gifts that in the astte of innocence flowed from sanctifying grace are lost];

[the state] *of repaired nature:* grace and the rebellion of sense; [Boyer: through Christ's redemption there is restored with sanctifying grace some supernatural subjection or reason to God and an ordering to our ultimate end but there remains the rebellion of lower appetite against the higher, i.e., concupiscence, even though we can resist it; this state pertains more to the person than to nature, for it is persons that are repaired, not nature itself].17

# 8. Boyer Part 1: The Necessity of Grace18

*Summa theologiae,* 1-2, q. 109 & sqq.19

Definition: Grace is a gift given out of benevolence: an unowed gift both absolutely speaking and on the supposition of a nature. "Grace" is understood in this way throughout this section. Thus, grace does not pertain to or follow upon human nature (fallen) constitutively, or as a con sequence, or by way of a demand or requirement; and this is understood with respect to human nature concretely understood, as human nature now is.

Authors begin to speak of habitual grace only after about 1250, and Thomas was the first to speak of actual grace [though without using this term].

The Stewart and Crowe notes proceed to discuss Boyer's "articulus primus:" ''Utrum homo sine gratia aliquod verum cognoscere possit," "whether without grace we are able to know anything true." The question corresponds to *Summa theologiae,* 1-2, q. 109, a. 1.

After several pages on the "Status quaestionis" Boyer proceeds to thesis l, the response to the "article" or question. It would seem from the Crowe and Stewart notes that Lonergan moved there immediately.

## 8.1 Whether Without Grace We Are Able to Know Any Truth

*Thesis* 1: whether without grace we are able to know any truth; q. 109, a. l. [This is found in Boyer starting on 27]. Can we know anything without grace in the fallen state that we could have known without grace in the state of pure nature?

Boyer's thesis reads, in translation: ''Man does not need grace or a new illumination added to the natural illumination in order to know those things that do not exceed the nature of the human intellect. But for the human race taken collectively to know the necessary truths of the moral and religious order, it is in need of some special divine assistance."

Protestants and others in the seventeenth century, including Jansenius, denied the very ability of the intellect to know any truth of the natural order. Why? Because they did not distinguish between the natural and the supernatural orders. Scripture insists on the necessity of grace to know certain truths. Protestants extend this necessity to all tru ths. Others proceed on the basis of skepticism, including Kant and Descartes.

DB 1806 and 2145 are appealed to. 1806 (from Vatican I) has to do with the natural knowledge of God; 2145 is the Oath against Modernism, which repeats the doctrine of 1806.

By "man" as the word is used in this thesis is meant actual human beings, as Boyer says (27). By "new illumination" is meant something beyond what is delivered through agent intellect, phantasm, and divine concursus. "The human race taken collectively" refers to people in general. And "verum" means the correspondence of the mind to the real.

The notes of Crowe and Stewart follow Boyer in appealing to Romans 1.18-23: "For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and wickedness of those who by their wickedness suppress the truth. For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made. So they are without excuse; for though they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking, and their senseless minds were darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools; and they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling a mortal human being or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles." Paul expressly says that sinners can know God; but he does not *expressly* say they can do this without grace. The Greek text would seem to indicate that if we understand those things that have been made, we understand God himself in these things that have been made. Paul argues from effects to cause. Therefore, natural man can know God without special assistance. We do this in a natural way; at least this is implied.

Romans 2:14 is also commented on (and is also mentioned by Boyer): "When Gentiles, who do not possess the law, do instinctively [sic NRSV for ] what the law requires, these, though not having the law, are a law to themselves." As the notes of Crowe and Stewart comment, there is a dispute over the meaning of the word , and so the meaning is not entirely certain. But for the thesis it suffices as a confirmation of the preceding text. Boyer also cites Wisdom 13 and Acts 17:28. Boyer adds that in the texts cited it is claimed that people deprived of the grace of Christ were able to know God and their moral duties toward God, nor are they judged because they did not know these things but because, knowing them, they were unwilling to fulfill them.

Stewart's notes have nothing regarding the argument from the Fathers (see Boyer 28). As for the argument from reason (Boyer 28-29), Stewart's notes state it is an argument from *convenientia* rather than a demonstration; that is, it shows how all things come together into one, how the truths we know are reconciled with one another.

There is no indication in the notes of either Stewart or Crowe that Lonergan commented any further on this first thesis. Boyer's text for this thesis extends to p. 32 and includes an argument for the second part as well. Nothing on the second part appears in the notes of Stewart or Crowe.

## 8.2 Whether Fallen Man Can without Grace Fulfill the Law

Boyer's second article (32) treats the question "Utrum homo lapsus possit sine gratia legem implere," "Can fallen man without grace fulfill the law?"

After an introduction that treats Pelagianism and the state of the question, Boyer's second thesis is stated (41): "Homo lapsus sine gratia non potest diu observare omnia mandata legis naturalis, etiam quoad substantiam operum," "Fallen man cannot for long keep all the precepts of the natural law without grace, even as regards the substance of the works."

Crowe and Stewart mention a theological note based on the consensus of theologians. The thesis is at least *theologice certa,* if not *de fide definita.*

There occurs next in the notes a clarification of the state of the question: is our doing good grounded in our good will alone, or is there required grace for us to act morally, at least with reference to fulfilling the whole law? The notes distinguish on "observare mandata" between "quoad substantiam" (the material law) and "quoad modum" (observing the law in a salutary way, a way conducive to eternal life). Lonergan indicates that "diu" means "for some months" and adds "certainly not some years."

Boyer on p. 41 offers an argument from Romans 7. Lonergan says the argument is problematic because of the diversity of interpretations of this text. And so he proposes another argument:

The condition of man restored is better than that of fallen man.

But not even the just (restored) person is able to observe the whole of the natural law *quoad substantiam* for a long time without grace.

Therefore, even less fallen man.

Major: Romans 7:5-6; "While we were living in the flesh, our sinful passions, aroused by the law, were at work in our members to bear fruit for death. But now we are discharged from the law, dead to that which held us captive, so that we are slaves not under the old written code but in the new life of the Spirit." Ephesians 2:1-10 (see above, 1). Titus 3:3-7: "For we ourselves were once foolish, disobedient, led astray, slaves to various passions and pleasures, passing our days in malice and envy, despicable, hating one another. But when the goodness and loving kindness of God our Savior appeared, he saved us, not because of any works of righteousness that we had done, but according to his mercy, through the water of rebirth and renewal by the Holy Spirit. This Spirit he poured out on us richly through Jesus Christ our Savior, so that, having been justified by his grace, we might become heirs according to the hope of eternal life."

Minor: Matthew 26:41: "Stay awake and pray that you may not come into the time of trial; the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak." Thus, the help is not owed to us, otherwise it would be demanded, not implored.

1 Peter 5:8: "Discipline yourselves, keep alert. Like a roaring lion your adversary the devil prowls around, looking for someone to devour."

Ephesians 6:10 ff.: (1) Paul puts divine grace under the metaphor "the whole armor of God." (2) We should assume these instruments so that we *might be able* to resist. See v. 16. Therefore, the need regards this very possibility (respicit necessitas ipsam possibilitatem).

How then can we remain free? How can this *fact* of the need of grace be reconciled with human freedom? The same problem recurs in other places in this treatise, with regard to the grace of perseverance and the problem of avoiding venial sins.

So something should be said about the will.

A fully indifferent will exists only in an infant. In us there exist habits and dispositions (willingness) in the will. We do almost everything we do from these habits and dispositions. But these habits and dispositions do not take away our freedom. We are able to act against them. But they render action or the reception of a certain "operable" easier, more prompt, more pleasant. We do not act against them promptly, but with difficulty and sadness. Such habitual orientations are necessary for us and our living. We are not able always to reflect; we would break our heads. Habits are necessary.

With these reflections we are discussing *moral im potence .* Moral impotence is distinguished into "in actu prim o" (with respects to habits) and "in actu secundo" (with respect to operations).

*In actu primo,* moral impotence consists in the deficiency of our habits and dispositions. We are born with intellect and will in potency for acquiring dispositions. We cannot act as we should without good habits. But we do not acquire a good habit unless we do the good. Is this a vicious circle? Do we have virtues through our acts? And there can also be a positive inclination to evil. Then our condition is even worse. But the deficiency of our inclination to the good is sufficient for moral impotence.

*In actu secundo,* moral impotence consists in the fact that we acknowledge this impotence either clearly and distinctly or obscurely and confusedly. We know that our efforts are futile - not in single instances, but we know we cannot continually act well, reflect, deliberate. Habits and dispositions are therefore necessary. We know this. Still, an error arises here. It consists in the fact that we suppose it is entirely useless to resist. But this is because we think it all depends on our strength. Therefore "we will sin." Still, we sin freely, because we can reflect, posit motives, and so on, in single acts. In a long series, in all instances taken together, however, we cannot always resist, because we cannot always reflect, posit motives, etc. Moral impotence affects the *series* of actions. Cf. *De veritate,* q. 24, a. 12; *Sent.,* I, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4.

Attention turns to the "ratio theologica" in Boyer, p. 44. This is more accurate and analytical. The will itself is divided between the universal good that is God and the particular good that perhaps is against God. The will is not always ordered to God in individual cases. Romans 7:15ff. ("I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate." Etc.)

Lange explains differently. Moral impotence is not antecedent. It regards only the act, not the potency. Lonergan on the contrary holds that moral impotence is antecedent, affecting the potency itself. Scripture teaches this. Romans 7 and "ut possitis stare" (Ephesians 6:11).

Lonergan comments on three notes on p. 45 in Boyer.

Note 1: the necessity is internal because the will itself is divided. It wills hut it does not will well. The difficulty is in the will itself, and it is radical.

Note 2: Beraza holds that divine assistance is gratuitous not because it is not owed to man but because it is given in a supernatural way. Healing grace is owed to fallen man, and so it is not gratuitous insofar as it is grace but Insofar as it is elevating. Lonergan agrees with Boyer that Beraza is wrong.

Note 3: the question of grave temptations is raised. Lonergan proposes that the gravity is not on the side of the object but on the side of the subject. Antecedent impotence has not to do with individual grave temptations but with a series of them. Otherwise freedom would indeed be removed. So Boyer is really in the no te not treating the antecedent impotence that he stresses in the thesis itself.

Lonergan does not treat the objections to the thesis mentioned in Boyer (46-48) but he does treat one from Lange, for whom our impotence is the same as that of the typesetter, who is not morally able to set all letters without error. So it is in single acts of sin. For true sin there are required grave matter, full advertence, full consent, full liberty. But in single cases these are present. And so there is sin.

Lonergan denies the parity of the cases. In either case there is a statistical law. But in the case of the typesetter, the difficulty is from the nature of the *object,* whereas in the case of sin the difficulty is on the side of the subject, in the will in itself and divided against itself. Also, mortal sin does not enter the picture for the typesetter. Even if he prays, he makes mistakes. Again, it is not a question of salvation. And finally, if the parity were perfect then the sinner could not avoid sin, prayer would do him nothing, he would be operating by himself alone, etc.

Attention seems to turn next to an assertion on p. 50 in Boyer, in a scholion "De necessitate gratiae habitua lis." The assertion reads: "Hominem sine gratia habituali exsistentem, hominem scilicet in statu peccati mortalis, non posse diu abstinere a novo peccato mortali," "A person existing without habitual grace, that is, one in the state of mortal sin, cannot long avoid committing a new mortal sin." For Lonergan two things are asserted here in a way that confuses them. (1) Man without habitual grace cannot for any length of time abstain from mortal sin. This truth from the thesis remains true in this assertion. Man has moral impotence. (2) But if man in the state of sin neglects the means and ordinary helps known to all, he renders himself unworthy to obtain the help of actual grace. His condition then is in some way different from what is asserted in the thesis. So Lonergan's response is that man cannot without habitual grace long abstain from mortal sin (1) unless he accepts actual grace (2) for which, however, he makes himself unworthy by neglecting the ordinary means for regaining the state of sanctifying grace.

## 8.3 Whether Fallen Man Can without Grace Do Any Good Work

Attention turns next to Boyer 's "articulus tertius," namely, whether fallen man can without grace do any good work. After reviewing the views of Baius, Luther, Jansenius, the Augustinians, Ripalda, Vasquez, and the documents of the church, Lonergan defends Boyer's thesis 3 (58): "Non omnia opera peccatorum et infidelium sunt peccata; immo homo lapsus sine gratia aliquod opus moraliter bonum peragere valet," "Not all the acts of sinners and unbelievers are sins; indeed, fallen man without grace is able to do some morally good works."

The argument is from the common opinion of the Fathers and the tendency of the church to support this view. Lonergan draws attention to the distinction on p. 64 in Boyer between a salutary act and a meritorious act. And he interprets Augustine's calling "sin" even a good act that does not lead to salvation.

## 8.4 Whether We Can Love God above All Things without Grace, from Our Natural Capacities Alone

Next Lonergan turns to Boyer's "articulus quartus" and thesis 4. It corresponds to *Summa theologiae,* q. 109, a. 3. Boyer's article (66): "Utrum homo possit diligere Deum super omnia ex soils naturalibus sine gratia," and the thesis (68): "Homo lapsus non potest diligere Deum super omnia actu sine gratia elicito," "Fallen man cannot love God above all things in act without elicited grace."

Lonergan adds another argument to those offered by Boyer. One who cannot long observe all the commandments cannot order all the inclinations and dispositions of his or her will, and one who cannot order all the inclinations and dispositions of one's will cannot love God above all things. To the extent there remains an inclination to evil, in that respect one does not have an ordered will. And if one does not have an ordered will, one cannot love God above all things. For love's tendency is to a habitual stable and permanent condition, which is not reconciled with inclinations in other directions.

This ends the treatment of what is contained in Boyer's chapter 1 (De necessitate gratiae sanantis, on the necessity of healing grace), pars prima (De gratia divina secundum se), quaestio prima (De necessitate gratiae), sectio prirria (De necessitate gratiae ad reparationem hominis lapsi).

## 8.5 Whether Man Can Merit Eternal Life without Elevating Grace

Boyer's chapter 2 (under the same part, question, and section) has to do with the necessity of *elevating* grace. And article 5 (73) asks "Utrum homo possit mereri vitam aeternam sine gratia elevante," whether man can merit eternal life without elevating grace. Boyer's fifth thesis (75) reads, “Actus meritorii vitae aeternae elici non possunt sine gratia elevante," Acts meriting eternal life cannot be elicited without elevating grace." This corresponds to *Summa theologiae,* 1-2, q. 109, a. 5.20

The notes of Crowe and Stewart distinguish an act that is "mere salutaris" (before justification) from one that is "salutaris et meritorius" (after justification and leading to eternal life). A meritorious act is one by which a person acquires a strict right to reward (meri tum de condigno). Grace as healing does not exceed the proportion of pure nature, just of fallen nature, but grace as elevating exceeds the proportion of any nature, whether pure, innocent, or fallen.

After giving Denzinger references (812, 105, 180, 1516) the notes of Crowe and Stewart proceed to the argument, in two parts: the necessity of grace, and the necessity of grace precisely as elevating (see also 16200DTL040, 9).

There are two presuppositions. First, eternal life is a reward for our good works. Second, what is given as a reward for meritorious works cannot directly and immediately be grace. Romans 11:6: "But if it is by grace,it is no longer on the basis of works, otherwise grace would no longer be grace." Still it can be grace if the works themselves are from grace.21

The basic argument for part 1 (the necessity of grace for eternal life) is: If eternal life is grace, either this life is given apart from our merits, or if it is given because of our merits, our good works, the works themselves are "ex gratia," from grace. But eternal life is grace, and it is not given apart from our works. Therefore, the meritorious works themselves come from grace. Scripture passages are mentioned: that eternal life is grace, Romans 6:23 (especially in the context that begins with Romans 5:12 and ends at the end of Romans 6): "For the wages of sin is death, but the free gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord." John 15:1ff. is also mentioned.

Lonergan adds that the necessity is physical, absolute, and antecedent. Reference is made in his own notes to John 15:5 and DB 812. The necessity is antecedent: we are unable; absolute: we are absolutely unable; physical: it respects individual acts, not a series of acts.

As for the second part of the argument, that the necessary grace is precisely elevating, Lonergan's own notes speak "de supernaturalitate gratiae qua ponimus opera meritoria," about the supernatural character of the grace by which we posit meritorious works. Appeal is made again to scripture: Romans 5:5 regarding the gift of the Holy Spirit, 8:9-11, 8:15-17, 9 passim and esp. 9:16, "not on human will or exertion but on God who shows mercy," 2 Corinthians 5:15-17, "a new creation," 2 Peter 1:4, partakers of the divine nature.

And an argument is offered: What nature lacks physically, absolutely, and antecedently is beyond nature. But nature lacks physically, absolutely, and antecedently with respect to meritorious works. And so, meritorious works or elevating grace are beyond human nature.

## 8.6 Whether Acts That Are Elicited with Elevating Grace Are Entitatively or Essentially Supernatural22

Attention turns next to Boyer's sixth article (Utrum actus cum gratia elevante eliciti sint supermiturales entitative seu essentialiter) and sixth thesis (Actus cum gratia elevante eliciti sunt supernaturales essentialiter seu entitative, ita ut differant quoad speciem ab actibus naturalius eiusdem generis; yes, they are, in such a manner that they differ specifically from natural acts of the same genus.)

A good deal of attention is given to complications arising from terminological diversity. The supernatural is that which exceeds the proportion of a nature. Negatively put, it is that which does not pertain to a nature constitutively or by way of consequence of by way of required conditions.

The supernatural is divided, first, into uncreated and created. The uncreated supernatural is God, as God is given to us as a gift. Lonergan makes reference to Romans 5:5. God transcends the order of any other nature in that there is not given in God the real distinction of essence and existence.

The created or contingent supernatural can be either absolutely or relatively supernatural. The absolutely supernatural is what exceeds the proportion of *any* created nature, including any that God *could* create. It is necessarily in the accidental order. The relatively supernatural is what exceeds the proportion of a given nature. Life exceeds the proportion of minerals, etc.

*Gratia sanans* simply insofar as it is healing is relatively supernatural. *Gratia elevans* simply insofar as it exceeds the proportion of integral nature is also relatively supernatural.

But there is another division pertinent to either the absolutely or the relatively supernatural, namely, extrinsic and intrinsic. The extrinsic supernatural is placed in the supernatural order due to some external characteristic - e.g., while completely natural in itself, it is an instrument of grace - while the intrinsic supernatural is due to the internal quality or property of what is deemed supernatural. The latter can be either "quoad modum" or "quoad substantiam." It is supernatural "quoad modum" due to intensity or length of time or ease or delight, etc., and "quoad substantiam" because of its essential character. In Aquinas (2-2, q. 171, a. 2, ad 3) supernaturale quoad substantiam = su pernaturale *increatum;* supernaturale *quoad modum* = supernaturale *creatum.* Positivists will speak of the supernatural *quoad substantiam* as possessing some ontologicalperfection that is in itself unknowable. But, says Lonergan, according to Crowe and Stewart, if nothing is asserted, it is because nothing is understood. Pay no attention to this position. Boyer does not intend to enter this controversy. His thesis means simply that *acts elicited by elevating grace are intrinsically and quoad substantiam supernatural.* Lonergan omits discussion of genus and species here, finding it fruitless, and simply says that acts elicited with elevating grace are *entitatively* supernatural. "Entitatively" denies "extrinsci supernatural" and "quoad modum" and regards what pertains to the act by reason of its own being. What is meant is the relatively superna tural, even vis-a-vis integral human nature.

Three arguments are given:

* 1. From the proportion between cause and effect: unless these acts were intrinsically supernatural, elevating grace would not be antecedently and absolutely required (for meritorious acts) with physical necessity. But it is. Therefore.
  2. Again from the proportion between cause and effect: if meritorious acts are proportioned to eternal life, which consists in teh supernatural beatific vision, they are entitatively supernatural. Atqui. Ergo. Maior: The beatific vision is entitatively supernatural. Any act proportioned to what is entitatively supernatural is itself entitatively supernatural. This argument is more stringent than the first, and goes beyond what is relatively supernatural to what is absolutely supernatural.
  3. An act is of the same proportion as the potency in which it is received. But the infused habits stand to meritorious acts as potency to act, and these habits are entitatively supernatural. Therefore, the acts elicited in them are entitatively supernatural. (The major is true in the case of first and second act, not in the case of prime matter and a spiritual soul.)

Most of this can be found in Lonergan's own notes in 16200DTL040, p. 10. What follows is Michael Shield's translation of that material. Acts elicited with elevating grace are entitatively supernatural.

*supernatural:* exceeding the proportion of human nature, even integral nature.

*entitatively:* not only extrinsically, from circumstances or from the end alone; nor only in its manner; but by reason of its ontological perfection.

*elevating grace:* exceeding the proportion of human nature, even integral nature. That habitual grace is intrinsically supernatural is theologically certain.23

This opinion is at least the common opinion, perhaps theologically certain.

Proof: (a) From the proportion between cause and effect - relatively supernatural. If the acts were not entitatively supernatural, elevating grace would not be physically, absolutely, and antecedently necessary; but it is; therefore *:* . .

(b) From the same - absolutely supernatural. Meritorious acts are proportionate to eternal life, which consists in the supernatural beatific vision; therefore ...

There is proportion, so that there may be true justice.

. (c) Being is divided into act and potency; that is, potency is posited in the same species as that of the corresponding act, and vice versa; [e.g.] eyesight and seeing. But infused habits are to meritorious acts as potency is to act; therefore since infused habits are entitatively supernatural, so also are the acts.

[They are so] relatively or absolutely, according to the teaching about habits. But to say, "The supernatural and natural differ by reason of their entitative perfection" is to say nothing and not know that one is saying nothing. It is pure verbalism.

And they are specified by their formal object.

## 8.7 Whether Supernatural Acts Are Specified by Their Formal Objects

As for article 7 and thesis 7 in Boyer, Stewart has no treatment and Crowe only a few lines. The article (84) is "Utrum actus supernaturalis specificetur ab obiecto formali," whether a supernatural act is specified by its formal object, and the thesis (85) is "Actus supernaturales specificantur necessario ab obiecto formali," supernatural acts are necessarily specified by their formal object.

Crowe's comments: The analogy of nature provides a most fruitful understanding of the mysteries (DB 1796). But in the realm of nature, essence is known from potencies, potencies from acts, and acts from objects. Therefore, so too in the supernatural order.

But Lonergan in 16200DTL040, p. 10, has more: They are specified by their formal object. That is, this entitative supernatural perfection is not unknowable but corresponds to the perfection of the formal object that is knowable per se. Just as a sentient act and an intellectual act and a volitional act correspond to their formal object, so also does a supernatural act. Suarez is quite right on this point. Aristotle, Aquinas: essence is known through potencies, potencies through acts, acts through objects.

Proof:

1. To say that they differ because of entitative perfection is to utter empty words.
2. According to Vatican I the analogy of the natural contributes toa fruitful understanding of the mysteries.

If there is an analogy of nature, then an act is specified by its formal object, and this is a fruitful understanding.

If an act is not specified by its object, it is unknowable to us; there is no analogy of nature, and absolutely every avenue to any understanding, even minimal, is blocked.

## 8.8 Whether We Can Prepare Ourselves for Grace without the Exterior Help of Grace

Article 8 in Boyer reads "Utrum homo possit se ipsum ad gratiam praeparare absque exteriore auxilio gratiae," and thesis 8 reads "Ad ipsam gratiam recipiendam homo non potest per actus sine gratia elicitos positive praeparari, ac proinde ad ipsum initium fidei absolute necessaria est gratia," 'We are incapable of being prepared for the reception of grace through acts elicited without grace, and so grace is absolutely necessary for the very beginning of faith."

This corresponds to *Summa theologiae,* 1-2, q. 109, a. 6. According to Crowe's notes, Lonergan may have indicated that a better expression of the thesis might be, "Ad omnem actum salutarem etiam ad initium fidei gratia interna est absolute necessaria," "For every salutary act and even for the beginning of faith, internal grace is absolutely necessary."

Here, of course, we get right to the heart of Thomas's advance on actual grace as operative. The grace referred to is received in the intellect and the will. It is an illumination and inspiration from the Holy Spirit. Lonergan emphasized that it is not enough to say that it is in the intellect; the will must be included. Relevant here is Lonergan's thesis on actual grace in "De ente supernaturali," though there is no indication in the notes that Lonergan referred to it.

Arguments are offered from scripture, Denzinger, and the Fathers. The arguments scripture make reference to:

John 15:5: " ... apart from me you can do nothing;"

John 6:54-59: "Those who eat my flesh and drink my blood have eternal life, and I will raise them up on the last day; for my flesh is true food and my blood is true drink. Those who eat my flesh and drink my blood abide in me, and I in them. Just as the living Father sent me, and I live because of the Father, so whoever eats me will live because of me. This is the bread that came down from heaven, not like that which your ancestors ate, and they died. But the one who eats this bread will live forever;"

Ephesians 2:1-5: "You were dead through the trespasses and sins in which you once lived, following the course of this world, following the ruler the power of the air, the spirit that is now at work among those who are disobedient. All of us once lived among them in the passions of our flesh, following the desires of flesh and senses, and we were by nature children of wrath, like everyone else. But God, who is rich in mercy, out of the great love with which he loved us even when we were dead through our trespasses made us alive together with Christ- by grace you have been saved . . . "

The necessity in question is absolute, antecedent, and universal. It is a question of a positive internal "influx," or what Lonergan calls a *motio.* It regards the very beginning of faith.

Stewart's notes emphasize more than Crowe's that Lonergan pointed to the problem of Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism here. And the necessity is with regard to any act that leads to eternal life, and so is broader than the meritorious act of someone who is already in the state of sanctifying grace.

There do not seem to be any treatments of this precise question in the two sets of Lonergan's notes pertinent to this course.

## 8.9 Whether the Grace Needed for One to Prepare Oneself for Grace is Elevating Grace

Article 9 in Boyer reads "Utrum gratia necessaria ad hoc ut quis ad gratiam se praeparet, sit gratia elevans." And thesis 9 reads "Actus omnes qui positive praeparant ad gratiam recipiendam eliciuntur cum gratia elevante et sunt entitative supernaturales," "all the acts that positively prepare for the reception of grace are elicited with elevating grace and are entitatively supernatural." Crowe emphasizes that the mind of Thomas on this is uncertain, and probably will never be determined. Lonergan stresses the same thing in *Grace and Freedom,* though he tips his hand obliquely in the direction defended in this thesis. Obviously in teaching the course Lonergan did not take exception with Boyer's thesis. Crowe and Stewart provide the same argument from Lonergan: "Ad actus salutares etiam ad initium fidei requiritur gratia interna, absoluta, antecedens, physica, necessaria. Atqui haec necessitas abs. phys. intelligi non posset nisi ipsi actus salutares essent entitative supernaturales. Ergo sunt entitative supernaturales. Min: ex thesi ant. Maj: Quomodo res aliter explicari potest." "For salutary acts having to do even with the beginning of faith there is required an internal grace, with an absolute, antecedent, physical necessity. But this necessity cannot be understood unless these salutary acts are entitatively supernatrual. Therefore . . . " Stewart adds that Boyer's corollary assertion "Homo nullo modo potest a peccato resurgere sine auxilio gratiae ," "man is in no way able to rise from sin without the help of grace," is *de fide definita.*

Again, there does not seem to be any explicit treatment of this question in the two sets of Lonergan's notes relevant to this course.

# 9. Transition

Lonergan did not treat at this point the materials in the next section of the part on the necessity of grace, Boyer's articles and theses 10-12 (corresponding to *Summa theologiae,* 1-2, q. 109, aa. 8-10). Rather, he moved immediately to a second question, De essentia gratiae, the essence of grace. Stewart's notes indicate why he made this move. Before treating the need of grace *in homine lapso sed reparato et iusto,* it is best to inquire into justification itself. What is a justified person? What is grace?

While Boyer's article 1 in this question (and his thesis 13) have some correspondence to 1-2, q. 110, a. 1, *utrum gratia ponit aliquid in anima,* whether grace posits something in the soul, nonetheless the context for the question has to do with the Reformation. Article 1 in Boyer reads "Utrum gratia habitualis sit aliquid animae inhaerens," whether habitual grace is something inhering in the soul (147), and his thesis 13 reads "Gratia habitualis non est merus favor extrinsecus Dei, sed est donum animae inhaerens et in ipsa physice permanens," "habitual grace is not the mere extrinsic favor of God but is rather a gift inhering in the soul and remaining there physically." For the Reformers the grace of God was the favor of God. Hence it resided in God, not in us. The Reformers also distinguished dogmatic faith from fiducial faith. Fiducial faith is affective, not intellectual. The influence of nominalism is emphasized by Lonergan here. Thesis 13 in its first part (Gratia non est merus extrinsecus favor Dei, sed ponit aliquid animae inhaerens) is *de fide definita.* In its second part (Gratia est donum physice permanens praeter actus singulos) it is at least *theologice certa.* The argument for the first part is ta enfrom scripture, which talks about a new life. If we find the properties of this new life we must acknowledge the principle of the new life, a principle proportionate to the properties.

Boyer moves to article 2, but *at this point Lonergan takes off on his own.* Boyer’s article 2 reads "Utrum Deus per gratiam habitualem in iustis inhabitet," whether God dwells in the just through habitual grace. Beginning at this point Lonergan presents his own "propositions." The material here is all his, with only occasional references to Boyer's text. The second installment on this attempt to reconstruct Lonergan's course will move directly to 16000DTL040 for Lonergan's material.

# Notes

1 Now available with English translation ("The Supernatural Order'') in Bernard Lonergan, *Early* *Latin Theology,* vol. 19 of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, trans. Michael G. Shields and ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011),52-255.

2 Notes for the latter course are available as "Supplementary Notes on Sanctifying Grace," *Early* *Latin Theology,* 562-665.

3 See 16200DTL040, 1; 16200DTE040, 1-2.

4 See 16200oTL040, 2; 16200DTE040, 2-3. From the notes of Crowe and Stewart it seems that Lonergan simply referred his students to page 8 in Boyer, *Tractatus,* where these various meanings are presented. Lonergan' s notes repeat in outline form most of the distinctions found in Boyer. But this material does not appear in the Crowe and Stewart notes. Stewart has simply "Cf. auct. p. 8."

Boyer's treatment contains a few more items than are found in Lonergan’s summary statement of it. It speaks also of (1) a distinction between the grace of God and the grace of Christ, and (2) a distinction between efficacious grace and sufficient grace in the order of habitual grace, and between *gratia excitans* and *gratia adiuvans* in the order of actual grace.

5 Boyer indicates that there are various interpretations of the distinction between *gratum faciens* and *gratis data. Gratia gratum faciens* for Boyer is either habitual or actual, but his distinction is expressed in terms of "permanent" and "transient," and he does not explicitly specify "actual grace" as a subcategory of "elevating" grace, which Lonergan's schematic list seems to do. Preaching, education, and so forth, however, do not qualify as actual grace in Lonergan's definition, but fit more under the category of "gratia gratis data."

6 At this point 16200DTL040 and 16200DTE040 contain a section that is not found in the notes of Crowe and Stewart. It is addressed to Lonergan's students precisely as Jesuits. Lonergan may not have used it, since the notes have no mention of it. But we provide here Michael Shields's translation of this section.

7 See 16200DTL040, 4; 16200DTE040, 4-5.

8 These next two paragraph are not reflected in the notes of either Stewart or Crowe. The appear, however, at this point in 16200DTL040, 4, and 16200DTE040, 5. It may be that Lonergan did not raise this issue in his class presentation. But see the next note, and the comment at note 12.

9 The next several lines in this section support the interpretation provided by. Monsour in 16200DTE040, 5, note 4, that this reference to "religious psychology" in connection with the analogy of nature refers to the use that medieval theologians made of Aristotle’s metaphysical psychology in the theology of grace.

10 See 16200DTL040, 5-6; 16200DTE040, 6-8.

11 ln 16200DTL040, Lonergan's original ordering was what here are (a), (c), (d) and (b). He indicated by hand that the order should be changed.

12 But see above, 8, note 8. It may be that the present comment reflects what is presented there on "religious psychology."

13 16200DTL040 has one page (8) headed "Commentarius in librum manualem P. Boyer.” While its contents do not appear as such in the notes of Crowe or Stewart, it does repeat a few things we have just seen; and Lonergan does in fact move next to comments on Boyer's manual, so we reproduce the page here, in Michael Shields's translation.

14 The reference is to Boyer, *Tractatus de gratia divina* 5-6. Lonergan quotes Boyer: “The objective connection of things favors St Thomas's order [in the *Summa*]*."* In fact, Boyer follows that order quite closely. But Lonergan adds: "One wonders whether the order of exposition matters much." We will see Lonergan following Boyer's order only briefly and then taking off on his own. This page of "Commentary" addresses primarily this issue and so is probably setting up his eventual departure from Boyer's order.

15 See 16200DTL040, 8. Lonergan has there a handwritten reference "Boyer P· 14·" The section in Boyer's *Tractatus de Gratia Divina* devoted to the states of human nature is located on 14-19. Another handwritten reference in 16200DTL040 is to "Garrigou p· 18." Stewart has "P. Garrigou-Lagrange P. 18 & sqq." It is not clear which book of Garrigou-Lagrange’s he is referring to. (He also has "P. Lange," which does not appear in Lonergan's notes).

16 Boyer, 14, quoting Suarez, "the condition or mode of being of human nature in its totality in relation to its ultimate end, according to the order of divine providence" ("condicionem seu modum se habendi totius humanae naturae in ordine ad suum ultimum finem, secundum divinae providentiae ordinem").

17 These five states are simply listed in Stewart's notes, not divided into their reference to a natural or supernatural end. Thus: "(1) the state of pure nature; (2) the state of integral nature: that state de facto never existed; (3) the state of original justice (or innocence); (4) the state of fallen and unrepaired nature: de facto it never existed (or perhaps for a few hours) because of the promise of the Redeemer and the future merits of Christ; (5) the state of repaired nature."

Boyer's first assertion regarding these matters, following these notions of the states, is to the effect that de facto, human nature has existed in only two states: the state of original justice, and the state of fallen and repaired nature. His second assertion is to the effect that original justice is not adequately but only inadequately distinguished from sanctifying and elevating grace. That is, sanctifying grace is the chief element of original justice. A third assertion states that the state of pure nature would have included, besides the essential principles of the human and the faculties requisite for us to have the physical power to attain a natural end, special divine aids that are altogether necessary for us to have the moral power to attain our end. And a fourth assertion states that in the state of original justice assistance against the weakness of nature was had from the gift of integrity, which followed upon sanctifying grace; this would have been lost in the state of fallen and unrepaired nature, and the aids that would have helped us in the state of pure nature would also have been absent; finally in the state of fallen and repaired nature, despite the permanence of disordered lower appetites, the pursuit of the ultimate supernatural end is morally possible through the lavishing of supernatural assistance that we call grace. Boyer adds a corollary to the effect that, had fallen man not been aided by grace, his condition would have been worse than that of man in the state of pure nature. These matters, while not spelled out in Lonergan's notes or in those of Crowe and Stewart nonetheless figured in Lonergan's remarks, as is clear from jottings particularly m Crowe notes.

18 At this point the order in 16200DTL040 no longer reflects that found in the Crowe and Stewart notes. We are presenting the latter order here.

19 Boyer's first paragraph after the title "Pars Prima: De Gratia Divina Secundum Se (21) quotes Thomas, q. 109, to the effect that there is here a tripartite consideration: the necessity of grace, the essence of grace, and the division of grace. When Lonergan adds " & sqq.” he is indicating that both Boyer and he are following the order of the *Prima Secundae's* treatment of grace. Lonergan will stay with Boyer's order to a point and then go off on his own. There is nothing in either set of Lonergan's notes that reflects the present material, and so it is likely the notes of Crowe and Stewart are transcribing Lonergan's commentary on Boyer.

20 Here there is something in Lonergan's own notes (16200DTL040, 9) that indicates he did more than simply comment on Boyer. But not everything contained in the notes of Stewart and Crowe can be found on the relevant page in Lonergan's notes.

21 16200DTL040, 9, expands: "What is given as a reward for our good works although it is directly comparable to those works, is not grace ...; nevertheless absolutely speaking it can be grace, that is, if those works are done out of grace. For the cause of a cause is a cause of that which is caused. And whatever causes something to have a certain quality possesses that quality itself and to a greater degree. Eternal life is the reward for deeds done; but these deeds are meritorious because of grace; hence absolutely speaking eternal life is grace."

22 Here again there is material in 16200DTL040, at 10. Again, not everything contained in the Notes of Crowe and Stewart is found in Lonergan's notes. At some points he is simply repeating what can be found in Boyer.

23 See Boyer, Tractatus de gratia, Thesis XIII, part 1 (152-61). The first part of the thesis reads, “Gratia habitualis non est merus favor extrinsecus Dei, sed est donum animae inhaerens et in ipsa physice permanens.”