11-1-2008

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Irish Theological Quarterly 2008; 73; 227
DOI: 10.1177/0021140008095436

The online version of this article can be found at:
http://itq.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/73/3-4/227
Being in Love with God: A Source of Analogies for Theological Understanding

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The article seeks a psychological analogy for the divine processions that is found within the order of grace itself. Hints from Lonergan’s later writings are developed to yield an analogy that begins with the dynamic state of being in love with God. The analogy is compared with earlier variants of the psychological analogy, and suggestions are made as to how it can be developed. St Ignatius’s times of election are appealed to in order to show how the earlier analogies are compatible with the one being suggested here.

KEYWORDS: analogy of grace, Bernard Lonergan, psychological analogy, St Ignatius Loyola

The article has four sections. In the first, I describe the issue that I wish to address, namely, how analogies from grace as well as from nature can provide helpful clues to the meaning of some of the mysteries of faith. In the second, I interpret a late statement of Bernard Lonergan (already mentioned in part I) in which he suggests the possibility of such an analogy for understanding the divine processions. In the third, I contrast this analogy with the more familiar psychological analogies found in Aquinas and the early Lonergan, and I do so by appealing to St Ignatius Loyola’s three times or moments of election and relating these to Lonergan’s two accounts of responsible decision. And in the fourth, I attempt to unpack a bit more fully the process experienced in what I am calling the analogy of grace.

I. The Issue

The First Vatican Council speaks of theological understanding in the following manner: ‘Reason illumined by faith, when it inquires diligently, reverently, and judiciously, with God’s help attains some understanding of the mysteries, and that a highly fruitful one, both from the analogy of what it naturally knows and from the interconnection of the mysteries.
with one another and with our last end' (DB 1796, DS 3016, ND 132). This statement of the Council is appealed to repeatedly by Bernard Lonergan in his various attempts to explain what the systematic part of theology is all about. This is the case both before and after he reached the highly differentiated account of theological operations that constitutes his notion of functional specialization. Thus, in the 1957 *Divinarum personarum conceptio analogica*¹ and its 1964 revision *De Deo trino: Pars systematica*,² the teaching of the Council frames Lonergan’s view of what he is doing as he works out a systematic understanding of the Church’s trinitarian dogmas. These writings appeared before Lonergan made the great methodological breakthrough to the notion of functional specialization, where systematics becomes but one of eight differentiated sets of theological operations. Despite that breakthrough, though, the principal task of systematics remains what it was before Lonergan arrived at the notion of functional specialization, namely, the promotion of precisely the kind of understanding of the mysteries that is spoken of in the conciliar document.³

Now, in a very late statement regarding the nature of an analogy to assist us in gaining some imperfect but highly fruitful understanding of the mystery of the divine processions, the divine relations, and the divine persons, Lonergan at least potentially opens the possibility of a different kind of analogy from that emphasized by the Council, an analogy not based on natural knowledge, at least not proximately, but grounded in the supernatural life of grace, a certain kind of analogy of faith, if you wish, or better, an analogy of grace. The Council spoke of understanding the mysteries of faith not only by analogy with what reason knows naturally but also through the interconnection of the mysteries with one another. But the statement to which I am referring goes beyond both of these avenues to theological understanding, in that it evokes the possibility of an analogy between various mysteries of faith. It is the possibility of such an analogy that I wish to explore in this article.

The late statement of Lonergan’s to which I refer appears in his 1975 lecture at Laval University in Quebec City, ‘Christology Today: Methodological Reflections.’ Lonergan asks one of the same questions he posed in *De Deo trino*, namely, ‘Can one speak intelligibly of three distinct and conscious subjects of divine consciousness?’ And his answer is, ‘I believe that one can, but to do so one must take the psychological analogy of the Trinitarian processions seriously, one must be able to follow the

reasoning from processions to relations and from relations to persons, and one has to think analogously of consciousness.\textsuperscript{4} Thus far there is no difference from the position expressed in his earlier works on the systematics of the Trinity. The difference appears when he unfolds the nature of the psychological analogy. The analogy that he presents in ‘Christology Today’ differs in some very significant ways from the analogy that he employed in \textit{De Deo trino: Pars systematica}, even though there are obvious correspondences. This is what he writes in ‘Christology Today’:

The psychological analogy … has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.\textsuperscript{5}

How does this ‘analogy found in the creature’ provide some dim glimpse of the divine processions, relations, and persons? Lonergan continues:

Now in God the origin is the Father, in the New Testament named \textit{ho Theos}, who is identified with \textit{agapē} (1 John 4.8, 16). Such love expresses itself in its Word, its Logos, its \textit{verbum spirans amorem}, which is a judgment of value. The judgment of value is sincere, and so it grounds the Proceeding Love that is identified with the Holy Spirit.

There are then two processions that may be conceived in God; they are not unconscious processes but intellectually, rationally, morally conscious, as are judgments of value based on the evidence perceived by a lover, and the acts of loving grounded on judgments of value. The two processions ground four real relations of which three are really distinct from one another; and these three are not just relations as relations, and so modes of being, but also subsistent, and so not just paternity and filiation [and passive spiration] but also Father and Son [and Holy Spirit]. Finally, Father and Son and Spirit are eternal; their consciousness is not in time but timeless; their subjectivity is not becoming but ever itself; and each in his own distinct manner is subject of the infinite act that God is, the Father as originating love, the Son as judgment of value expressing that love, and the Spirit as originated loving.\textsuperscript{6}

I am fastening here on the statement that ‘the psychological analogy … has its starting point in … the dynamic state of being in love.’ This alone differentiates this position from the earlier one, where the starting point


\textsuperscript{5} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., 93–94.
was a cognitional grasp of the sufficiency of evidence to ground a judgment of value regarding the subject’s existential self-constitution, some such judgment as ‘This is what it would be good for me to be.’ I wish to argue that the new starting point renders possible a new dimension of analogical understanding, one that begins not in the natural but in the supernatural, graced order. We may contrast this starting point with the starting point of Lonergan’s earlier expression of the psychological analogy as well as with the corresponding starting point in the *Summa theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas. But we must also suggest what the process is within the order of grace from the gift of God’s love through judgments of value grounded in that gift to acts of loving and a habit of charity.

II. The Analogy of Grace

The starting point of the analogy is claimed to be ‘the dynamic state of being in love.’ How does Lonergan understand that dynamic state? For an answer to this question, I turn to *Method in Theology*, where being in love is affective self-transcendence, as distinguished from intellectual and moral self-transcendence. One is self-transcendent affectively when one falls in love, ‘when the isolation of the individual [is] broken and he spontaneously functions not just for himself but for others as well.’7 Lonergan distinguishes three forms of such love: ‘the love of intimacy, of husband and wife, of parents and children; the love of mankind devoted to the pursuit of human welfare locally or nationally or globally; and the love that [is] other-worldly because it [admits] no conditions or qualifications or restrictions or reservations.’ This other-worldly love—and Lonergan is using the term ‘other-worldly’ to correspond to what was meant in the medieval theorem of the supernatural—when considered ‘not as this or that act, not as a series of acts, but as a dynamic state whence proceed the acts’ is extremely significant from a theological point of view. For, says Lonergan, in what seemed at the time to be a very bold claim, it ‘constitutes in a methodical theology what in a theoretical theology is named sanctifying grace.’8 As sanctifying grace is for Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical or theoretical theology an entitative habit rooted in the essence of the soul, so for Lonergan the dynamic state of being in love without qualifications or reservations or conditions is an elevation of ‘central form’ that is, an elevation of that by which a human being is constituted as intelligibly one unity-identity-whole, and so in effect an elevation of the person in his or her conscious and unconscious totality. The elevation is to participation in trinitarian life.9 In another and earlier

8. Ibid.
9. I wish to acknowledge at this point the breakthrough contribution of Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer, ‘Sanctifying Grace in a “Methodical Theology,”’ *Theological Studies* 68 (2007): 52–76. I am dependent at this point on Jacobs-Vandegeer for my own articulation. We will see more of his contribution later in this article.
writing, *De Deo trino: Pars systematica*, this participation in trinitarian life known as sanctifying grace is further differentiated by Lonergan as a created share in the active spiration that is Father and Son breathing the eternal Spirit of Love, while the habit of charity that cumulatively proceeds from such other-worldly being in love is a created share in the passive spiration that is the Holy Spirit.\(^{10}\)

Now it is true that Lonergan’s sketch of a trinitarian analogy that begins with the dynamic state of being in love does not necessarily imply a supernatural analogy, an analogy from the order of grace, the analogy of created participations in active and passive spiration, since there are these other forms of being in love besides the other-worldly love that is sanctifying grace. But neither does it exclude the possibility of such an analogy, and this possibility is what I propose to pursue here. Any of the three kinds of love may function in an analogy that starts from the dynamic state of being in love. In the case of the first two kinds of being in love, the analogy is from nature. In the case of the third, the analogy is from grace. In all three instances, being in love gives rise to judgments of value that one would not utter were one not in love, and these judgments ‘spirate’ commitment, habitual loving. But it is the third kind of love, precisely as providing a trinitarian analogy, that I wish to pursue in the present context. That analogy, again, moves from the dynamic state of being in love without conditions, qualifications, restrictions, reservations, to the judgments of value that proceed from such love, and from these considered together to the acts of loving that cumulatively coalesce into the habit of charity. The dynamic state of being in love without conditions is the graced analogue for the divine Father, the judgments of value that proceed from that state of being in love without conditions constitute the graced analogue for the divine Word, and these two considered together function in graced consciousness as active spiration functions in divine consciousness, and they do so precisely because they are a created participation in the divine Father and Son together breathing the Holy Spirit. As from being in love and its judgments of value there proceeds the coalescence of acts of loving into a habit of charity, so from divine paternity and filiation together there proceeds the Love that is the Holy Spirit. Such is the analogy of grace suggested by Lonergan when he shifts the significance of the psychological analogy from what it had been in the tradition to a new level of exposition and relevance.

### III. The Earlier Analogy

What, then, is the difference between this position and the analogy found in Thomas’s *Summa theologiae*, *Prima pars*, questions 27 through 43, and in Lonergan’s earlier systematics of the Trinity? The difference between

the two analogies is basically the difference between Lonergan’s earlier and later accounts of judgments of value and decision: the earlier analogy corresponds to the earlier account of these realities, the account found in *Insight*, while the later analogy corresponds to the later account, which is presented in *Method in Theology*.

There are, then, two quite distinct treatments of judgments of value and decision in Lonergan’s writings. In *Insight*, in Lonergan’s own words, the good is ‘the intelligent and reasonable.’ A good decision is a decision that is consistent with what one *knows* to be true and good. The decision-making process is very similar to the cognitional process, adding only the further element of free choice. Decision is simply an extension of intelligence and reason into action. In the process one assembles the data, one has a practical insight into what is to be done, one grasps that the evidence supports the practical insight, one judges that this is to be done, one freely chooses to do it. Again, the good is the intelligent and reasonable. There is no explicit mention of a fourth level of consciousness beyond the three cognitional levels of experience, understanding, and judgment, but if in fact there is a fourth level, it lies only in the free choice and consequent action.

In *Method in Theology*, on the other hand, the good is, as Lonergan says, a notion distinct from the intelligent and reasonable. This does not mean, obviously, that the good is the stupid and silly, but that it is intended in a kind of question that is distinct from the question for intelligence, What is it? and the question for judgment, Is it so? The question that intends the good is rather something like, Is this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? Is it better than such and such an alternative way of proceeding? The good is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. Possible values are apprehended in feelings. The judgment of value that knows the good proceeds from a discernment of these feelings in which possible values are apprehended, in order to determine which are the possible values that are apprehended by love and which are ambiguous or not at all to be acknowledged from the standpoint of performative self-transcendence or personal authenticity. Such discernment is a very precarious affair. We are subject to illusion and deception. Still, when these judgments of value are made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience, or even better by a person in love in an unqualified fashion, by one who is in the dynamic state of being in love with God, what is good is clearly known. The good is brought about by deciding and living up to one’s decisions. And all of this, from the intending all the way up to and through fidelity, belongs to a fourth level of consciousness, a level beyond the three levels constitutive of cognitional process, that is, experience, understanding, and judgment of fact. Thus, there are significant differences between the two presentations of decision. The second account offers a much fuller expansion of consciousness, especially at the fourth level.

Now it is often thought that the treatment in *Method in Theology* represents an alternative position to the treatment in *Insight*, and so that the
presentation in *Insight* should be discarded in favour of that which appears in *Method*. I have long resisted this position, even if Lonergan himself may have held it (and there is some evidence that he did).\(^{11}\) Each of Lonergan’s articulations of the dynamics of decision has its own limited validity. The two articulations complement each other. The first is not overshadowed by the second. Rather, they mark distinct times of making decisions, where the times are a function of the disposition of the existential subject. They are both permeated by love and grace. And the criteria of both accounts must be satisfied in every decision that we make.

The basis for my position is found not in Lonergan, but in St Ignatius Loyola. I have argued elsewhere that Lonergan’s two approaches to decision-making present the general form of two of the three times of election in the Ignatian *Spiritual Exercises*.\(^{12}\) The account in *Insight* presents the general form of St Ignatius’s third time of election, and the account in *Method in Theology* the general form of the second time. In the second time, ‘much light and knowledge is obtained by experiencing consolations and desolations, and by experience of the discernment of various spirits,’ whereas ‘the third time is one of tranquillity: when one considers, first, for what one is born, that is, to praise God our Lord, and to save one’s soul; and when, desiring this, one chooses as the means to this end a kind or state of life within the bounds of the Church, in order that one may thereby be helped to serve God our Lord, and to save one’s soul. I said a time of tranquillity; that is, when the soul is not agitated by divers spirits, but enjoys the use of its natural powers freely and quietly.’\(^{13}\) As there is a complementarity between the second and third times in St Ignatius, so there is a complementarity between the two presentations of decision in Lonergan. That is, the judgment of value and the decision that one arrives at in Ignatius’s second time, by discerning affective pulls and counterpulls (divers spirits), must be able to be adjudicated as well by the criteria of intelligence, reason, and responsibility that are explicitly appealed to in the third time. Conversely, the judgments of value and decisions that are arrived at in the third time must produce the same ‘peace of a good conscience’ on the part of a virtuous person that would result from the proper discernment of affective pulls and counterpulls in the second time. So too, the decisions that one arrives at by employing intelligence and reason as outlined in *Insight* must be confirmed by the peace of a good conscience, whereas the decisions that one reaches by the discernment of affective pulls and counterpulls, as in the account in *Method in Theology*, must be able to be adjudicated by the

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criteria of intelligence and reasonableness, however much these may be modified by the life of grace, where what seems foolishness to the wise of this world may be really the wisdom of God.

The account of decision in *Insight* explicitly prescinds from any discussion of affective involvement, and so it at least implicitly presupposes that the person making a decision is not agitated in such a way that one is prevented from employing his or her natural powers of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. In this account one’s decisions are good decisions if in fact they are harmonious with what one knows to be true and good. Moral integrity is a matter of *generating decisions and consequent actions that are consistent with what one knows*, that is, that are consistent with the inner words of judgments of fact and judgments of value that one has sufficient reason to hold to be true. And if this is the case, then Lonergan’s account in *Insight* remains as permanently valid as St Ignatius’s account of the third time of election. It just is not the only account, because it names only one of the times of making a good decision.

In contrast, in the presentation that is found in *Method in Theology* it is self-transcendent affectivity, affectivity that matches the unrestricted reach of the transcendental notion of value, the affectivity of a person in love, in the limit the affectivity of a person in love in an unqualified fashion, with God’s own love poured out in one’s heart through the Holy Spirit that has been given one (Romans 5: 5), that provides the criteria for the decision. Which course of action reflects, embodies, incarnates the self-transcendent love that matches the reach of the transcendental notion of value, especially as that unrestricted intention reaches fulfillment in God’s gift of God’s own love as embodied in the incarnate Word of God, in his life, death, and resurrection from the dead? The answer to that question gives the indication as to the direction in which one is to go as one heads towards a judgment of value and a consequent decision. This presentation, again, corresponds to St Ignatius’s second time of election.

Now these two accounts of decision provide, respectively, the elements also of Lonergan’s two distinct but complementary approaches to a psychological analogy for a systematic understanding of the divine processes and relations. At this point the trinitarian mysticism of Lonergan joins and—if I may be so bold as to suggest it—advances the trinitarian mysticism of St Ignatius. If I am right about the correspondence of Lonergan and Ignatius on times of decision, then we can say that Lonergan relates the Trinity to St Ignatius’s moments for making decisions that proceed from authentic judgments of value.

In the first psychological analogy found in Lonergan’s work, which is presented in intricate detail in the systematic part of his work *De Deo trino* (*The Triune God: Systematics*), the analogue in the creature is found in those moments of existential self-constitution in which we grasp the sufficiency of evidence regarding what it would be good for one to be, utter the judgment of value, ‘This is good,’ and proceed to decisions commensurate
with that grasp of evidence and judgment of value. From the act of grasping the evidence there proceeds the act of judging value, and from the two together there proceeds the love that embraces the good and carries it out. The analogy follows completely the account of decision presented in *Insight*: from grasp of evidence to judgment of value, and from grasp of evidence and judgment of value together to good decision.\(^\text{14}\) So too in divine self-constitution, from the Father’s grasp of the grounds for affirming the goodness of all that the Father is and knows (including the divine economy of our salvation), there proceeds the eternal Word of the Father saying Yes to it all, and from the Father and the Word together there proceeds the eternal Love that is the Holy Spirit. This theology of God’s own self-constitution in knowledge, word, and love is informed by an analogy with human rational self-consciousness as Lonergan has understood it in *Insight*. One’s self-appropriation of one’s rational self-consciousness in the form in which it is presented in *Insight*, or again as it functions without technical self-appropriation in St Ignatius’s third time of election, will ultimately entail a recognition of those processes, those processions, as constituting an image of the trinitarian processions themselves, the *imago Dei*. And of course we must emphasize with the Fourth Lateran Council that ‘one cannot note any similarity between Creator and creature—however great—that would obviate the need always to note an ever greater dissimilarity.’ In this instance, the ever greater dissimilarity is shown in the fact that the human analogue is constituted by the procession of act from act. The judgment of value is an act distinct from the act of grasping evidence, and the act of loving decision is an act distinct from both the act of grasping evidence and the act of judgment of value. But in God there are not really distinct acts but really distinct relations within the one infinite act that God is.

Now in his later work Lonergan proposes or at least suggests the distinct psychological analogy for the Trinity that I have already cited. This analogy is more closely related to the account of decision in *Method in Theology* and so to St Ignatius’s second time of election. As moral integrity, according to the presentation in *Method in Theology*, entails generating the judgments of value of a person who is in love, and as religious integrity entails generating the judgments of value of a person who is in love in an unqualified way, without reservations or conditions, and as those judgments of value are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving, so the Father now is infinite and eternal being-in-love, an *agape* that generates a Word, the

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\(^\text{14}\) To be precise, I should indicate that Lonergan does not use the expression ‘judgment of value’ in this context in *Insight*. He speaks rather of judgments following practical reflection. In *Divinarum personarum*, he says ‘iudicium practicum seu iudicium valoris (a practical judgment or judgment of value).’ In *De Deo trino: Pars systematica*, ‘iudicium practicum’ is dropped to leave only ‘iudicium valoris.’ Judgments of value are spoken of in *Insight* only in chapter 20, in the analysis of belief. There is needed a study of the development of Lonergan’s language on this matter.
eternal Yes that is the Son, a Word that breathes love, a Yes that grounds the Proceeding Love that is breathed forth from agapē and from its manifestation in such a Word.

In De Deo trino, where the earlier analogy is developed more extensively perhaps than at any other point in the entire history of theology, Lonergan repeats over and over again the affirmation of the First Vatican Council that we are able to attain an imperfect, analogical, developing, and most fruitful understanding of the divine mysteries by proceeding from analogies with what we know by natural knowledge. It is clear from this constant repetition of the Council’s statement that he intends the analogy that he is presenting in De Deo trino to be an analogy from nature. Commentators on the two analogies that Lonergan offers, the earlier and the later, have remarked that, while the earlier analogy proceeds from below upwards in human consciousness, the later analogy proceeds from above downwards. But there is a much more important difference. Each of the analogies is an analogy found in the creature, but the earlier analogy is found in our natural powers of understanding uttering a word of assent and of love proceeding from understanding and word, while the created analogue in the second analogy allows for the possibility of a basis in the supernatural order, in the experienced gift of God’s own love. To my knowledge, this has yet to be emphasized or even recognized in the literature around Lonergan’s trinitarian theology. As I said earlier, the dynamic state of being in love in an unqualified way is what theology has traditionally called sanctifying grace, and in Lonergan’s theology sanctifying grace is a created participation in, and imitation of, the active spiration of Father and Word lovingly breathing the Holy Spirit, while the habit of charity that flows from sanctifying grace is a created participation in, and imitation of, the passive spiration, the divine Proceeding Love, that is the Holy Spirit. More concretely for Christians, I think, sanctifying grace is a created participation in, and imitation of, the Incarnate Word, whose humanity is itself a participation in, and imitation of, the one he called ‘Abba, Father.’ And what is this ‘Father’? What would it be to participate in and to imitate the Incarnate Son, who himself is an imitation of ‘Abba’? What is it to be in love without qualifications or conditions or reservations or restrictions? ‘Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you; in this way you will be children of your Father in heaven, for he causes his sun to rise on the bad as well as the good, and his rain to fall on honest and dishonest alike’ (Matthew 5: 44–45). That is being in love in an unqualified fashion. As the Holy Spirit proceeds from the agapē that is the Father and from the Word that the Father utters in saying Yes to God’s own goodness, so the habit of charity—a love that extends to enemies and that gives sunshine and rain to all alike—flows from our created participation in, and imitation of, that active spiration, that is, from the entitative change that is the grace that makes us not only pleasing to God, gratia gratum faciens, but somehow imitative of the divine goodness because participants in it. ‘You
must therefore be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect’ (Matthew 5: 48). In this participation and imitation, this mimesis of God, if you will, we are moved beyond the otherwise endless cycle of violence, recrimination, judgment, blame, accusation, murder, hate, and false religion. So this habit of grace in individuals sets up a state of grace in the community, even as it is conditioned by the state of grace. In what is truly a groundbreaking transformation of traditional language, Lonergan says that the state of grace is a social situation, a set of intersubjective relationships, where the founding subjects are the three divine subjects, and where grace prevails because they have come to dwell in us and with us.

In the first, natural analogy, the analogy that recognizes in human nature an image of the trinitarian processions, love flows from knowledge and word, as Lonergan emphasizes over and over again in De Deo trino. In the second, supernatural analogy, the analogy that recognizes that grace makes us not only images of but also participants in the trinitarian relations, the dynamic state of being in love precedes our knowledge, and it gives rise to the knowledge that is known as faith, where faith is understood as the knowledge born of being in love with God: more precisely, the grasp of evidence that is possible only for such a lover and the judgments of value that proceed from that grasp, the grasp of evidence for nonviolent resistance to hatred and evil rather than for violent return of evil for evil, and the judgments of value that proceed from that grasp. But more radically, it must be said, here too love flows from knowledge, but not from our knowledge. It flows, rather, from the Verbum spirans Amorem, the Word breathing Love, that is the image of the eternal Father, the Word who himself proceeds from eternity as the Father’s judgment of value pronouncing an infinite Yes to God’s own goodness, to the goodness of one who makes his sun to rise on the bad as well as the good, and his rain to fall on honest and dishonest alike. And in this case the psychological analogue for the trinitarian processions, while it is still a created analogue, is no longer a natural analogue. For the dynamic state of being in love that is the analogue for the divine Father is itself the supernatural created habitual grace that we have known as sanctifying grace. And so the psychological analogy now objectifies, not simply an image of the trinitarian processions, but a participation in them and an imitation, a mimesis, of them. And we can say this even as we remember once again the strictures of the Fourth Lateran Council: ‘one cannot note any similarity between Creator and creature—however great—that would obviate the need always to note an ever greater dissimilarity.’ In this instance the dissimilarity is obvious. Who of us can honestly claim that he or she is spontaneously always ready to conform to the evangelical injunction to imitate the divine Father in allowing sun and rain to be given to those who hate us as well as to those who love us?

To return for a moment to St Ignatius’s times of election: (1) in the third time, we employ our natural powers of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding to arrive at good decisions, and in so doing we are
embodying the natural analogue for the divine processions, where we are images of the Trinity; Lonergan’s account of decision in *Insight* provides the general form of such a set of operations; (2) in the second time, we are discerning the pulls and counterpulls of affective resonances, so as to arrive at decisions that will promote in us not just an image of the Trinity but participants in the divine being-in-love uttering the eternal Yes and with that Yes breathing the eternal Proceeding Love, and so that will enable us to be not only images of but also participants in the divine processions; Lonergan’s account in *Method in Theology* begins to present the general form of this quite distinct process of decision, although more precision is required; and (3) in St Ignatius’s first time, of which I have not yet spoken, that dynamic state of being in love and its word of value judgment are so dominant that the loving decisions and actions flow spontaneously forth from them in a way that admits no doubt as to where they come from or whose life is being reflected in them: ‘I live, now not I, but Christ lives in me.’ This corresponds to Lonergan’s adoption of the Augustinian maxim, ‘Ama Deum et fac quod vis, Love God and do what you will.’ In these instances, the apprehension of values in loving affectivity stands to judgments of value, not as direct insight, which may be right or wrong, but rather as reflective insights, grasping the fulfilment of conditions, stand to judgments of fact. Whereas in the second time the apprehension of values in feelings is an apprehension of possible values, in the first time there are no further questions, and one knows that this is the case.

**IV. The Process from Grace to Grace**

There remains the need to specify more closely the interior dynamics of the later analogy. What is needed, of course, is a phenomenology of grace. I am not prepared to offer that, but I hope I may be able to suggest some elements of such an account.

The issue may be approached by commenting on the following remarkable statement from *Method in Theology*: ‘the basic terms and relations of systematic theology will be not metaphysical, as in medieval theology, but psychological … General basic terms name conscious and intentional operations. General basic relations name elements in the dynamic structure linking operations and generating states. Special basic terms name God’s gift of his love and Christian witness. Derived terms and relations name the objects known in operations and correlative to states … For every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness.’

Lonergan speaks here of general basic terms, general basic relations, and special basic terms. *What of special basic relations?* I have suggested elsewhere that special basic relations might be framed in terms of the relations

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between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity when these are conceived in the terms that I have been employing in this article. Let me explain.

Sanctifying grace has been called an entitative habit, rooted in the essence of the soul. But what difference does this habit make in consciousness? How is the orientation of consciousness different because God’s love has been poured out in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us?

Before I offer my own suggestions in response to this question, I wish to credit the extremely illuminating clarifications expressed by Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer in an article already mentioned that appeared in the March 2007 issue of Theological Studies. Jacobs-Vandegeer insists that the key to the transposition from the metaphysical talk of sanctifying grace as an entitative habit radicated in the essence of the soul to the psychological talk of being in love with God in an unqualified fashion lies in clarifying the relationship between the ‘essence of the soul’ or, in Lonergan’s language, ‘central form,’ and consciousness. While Lonergan always conceives of consciousness as the self-presence to be found in intentional operations and in both intentional and nonintentional states, and so in accidental or conjugate occurrences, still these diverse conjugate occurrences are the acts of an identity on the side of the subject, an identity that links the occurrences together into one unified process of conscious cognitive and existential unfolding. Jacobs-Vandegeer cites Lonergan’s claim that ‘consciousness is much more obviously of this unity in diverse acts than of the diverse acts, for it is within the unity that the acts are found and distinguished, and it is to the unity that we appeal when we talk about a single field of consciousness.’ To quote Jacobs-Vandegeer, ‘consciousness reveals a unity-identity-whole as the performative center of diverse operations.’ The intelligible component in this comprehensive unity Lonergan calls central form. The unity of consciousness reveals this concrete intelligible form of the whole person. ‘The essence of the soul manifests itself interiorly as the unified field of consciousness, the principle of unity in the dynamic performative diversity of existential subjectivity. Since this interior awareness reveals the soul, it pertains to the infusion of [sanctifying] grace.’ Thus, says Jacobs-Vandegeer, the dynamic state of being in love with God has to do with the unity of consciousness as that unity reflects an entitative habit radicated in the essence of the soul and manifested in diverse acts of faith, hope, and love, as well as in other operations and states. The dynamic state is a radical enrichment of the unity of consciousness that accompanies the acts of the

theological virtues (and other acts) while remaining interiorly distinct from them.

What, though, is this radical enrichment of the unity of consciousness? In what does it consist? How does the elevation of central form manifest itself in consciousness? I wish to suggest a movement from the gift of God’s love to a knowledge and orientation (let us call it a horizon) born of that love, and a movement from the gift and the horizon together to acts of loving that coalesce into a habit of charity. In traditional terms, the gift of God’s love is sanctifying grace, the horizon born of that love consists of faith and hope, and the habit that proceeds from the gift and the horizon together constitutes charity. The gift of God’s love and the horizon born of it are the created graced analogue of active spiration, and so of Father and Son, and the habit of charity that proceeds from them is the created graced analogue of passive spiration, and so of the Holy Spirit. From the gift of God’s love to faith and hope, and from these together to love; from the Father to the Word, and from Father and Word together to the Proceeding Love that is the Holy Spirit.

In terms of consciousness it is easier to speak of the horizon born of the gift of God’s love than it is of that gift itself. I believe there is a graced, elementally global, and for the most part tacit orientation of a human subject’s cognitive openness, a disposition that favours evidence for affirming the goodness of being in the face of all contrary evidence rather than acquiescing to the contrary evidence itself. Such an orientation issues in an affirmation of value, a yes, that as cognitive is faith and as oriented into ever greater mystery and awaiting yet further discovery of that mystery is hope. From the gift of God’s love and the faith and hope born of it there proceed acts of loving that cumulatively coalesce into an ever firmer habit of charity.

As for that gift itself, as entitative, as affecting the whole person, as elevating central form, it communicates a being-in love, a being-in-love with God’s own love. But despite some changes that I would now make to other things that I said in my earliest publication on this matter, I will continue to affirm that this entitative change includes something that may be objectified as resting in being on the receiving end of unqualified love. This being-in-love is conscious at first and in many lives for a long time in an extremely elemental and tacit fashion. Its first relatively clear manifestation, I am suggesting, lies in the orientation to grasp evidence for saying ‘yes’ to the rest of being. But this orientation is given precisely because we have had an elemental experience that may be objectified in some such fashion as ‘being has said “yes” to us.’ It is not too much to suggest that a mother’s smile welcoming her infant into this world mediates

such a global awareness. From the gift, again, there flows the conscious horizon orienting one to affirmation, and from these together there proceed the acts of love that coalesce into the habit of charity, the antecedent universal willingness that is most manifest in non-violent, non-retaliatory response to injury.

It is in these directions, then, that I think we must turn if we are to specify the conscious difference that the entitative habit makes. We must search for some conscious participation in the relationship in the triune God between the notionaliter diligere ('proper' loving) of Father and Son and the amor procedens (proceeding love) that is the Holy Spirit, between active and passive spiration. And that conscious participation will be found, I suggest, in the relation between, on the one hand, the gift of being in love along with a loving orientation to the grasp of evidence and to a consequent yes, both of which are not our own work, and, on the other hand, the habit of charity, the universal willingness proceeding from the dynamic state of being in love and from the knowledge born of love and giving rise to the schemes of recurrence of self-transcendent living. Such would constitute ‘special basic relations’ as part of the ground of special categories in theology, the categories peculiar to theology as contrasted with those that theology shares with other disciplines. And such would constitute the trinitarian psychological analogy based not on natural knowledge but on the supernatural life of divine grace, the dynamic state of being in love with God.

In conclusion, though, we must ask the question, What are we to do with the affirmation of the First Vatican Council on which Lonergan relies so heavily in presenting his earlier analogy, namely, that ‘reason illumined by faith, when it inquires diligently, reverently, and judiciously, with God’s help attains some understanding of the mysteries, and that a highly fruitful one, both from the analogy of what it naturally knows and from the interconnection of the mysteries with one another and with our last end?’ Clearly, I am suggesting a further analogy, an analogy from what we know only in faith. But even this supernatural analogy is differentiated into its various elements by appealing to the natural process of moving from loving grasp of evidence to judgment of value and from these together to decision, a process that we can know by employing our natural powers of intelligence and reason. The analogy of being has to be implicit in any analogy of faith or of grace, because the order of salvation presupposes the order of creation. Conversely, however, we may say with Hans Urs von Balthasar that our natural cognitive powers always operate


either under the positive sign of faith or under the negative sign of unbelief. There are here no neutral points. The Christian option will acknowledge and accept the indelible presence of grace at the heart of concrete philosophical thinking.²²

Furthermore, the supernatural analogy to which I am appealing is an analogy that reveals precisely the interconnection of the mysteries with one another and with our last end, as the First Vatican Council wished for all theological understanding. This will become even more obvious when we appeal, as I believe we may, to the same realities to ground an understanding of the interrelation of the divine and human consciousnesses of the incarnate Word, and when the incarnation, the habitation of the Holy Spirit, and the beatific vision are all related to one another in the explication of Lonergan’s magnificent systematic vision. Let me close with his most succinct statement of that vision.

There are four real divine relations, really identical with the divine substance, and therefore there are four very special modes that ground the external imitation of the divine substance. Next, there are four absolutely supernatural realities, which are never found uninformed, namely, the secondary act of existence of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory. It would not be inappropriate, therefore, to say that the secondary act of existence of the incarnation is a created participation of paternity, and so has a special relation to the Son; that sanctifying grace is a participation of active spiration, and so has a special relation to the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity is a participation of passive spiration, and so has a special relation to the Father and the Son; and that the light of glory is a participation of sonship, and so in a most perfect way brings the children of adoption back to the Father.²³