Word and Faith in the Formation of Christian Existence: A Study in Gerhard Ebeling's Rejection of the Joint Declaration

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ABSTRACT

WORD AND FAITH IN THE FORMATION OF CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE: A STUDY IN GERHARD EBELING’S REJECTION OF THE

JOINT DECLARATION

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Marquette University, 2010

In 1998, the theologian Gerhard Ebeling helped to initiate a rancorous, public debate among theologians in Germany over whether the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification presents “a consensus in the basic truths of the doctrine of justification” by co-editing the famous letter of protest. Why would he want to do this? The fact that some argue he held a distinguished position in ecumenical circles during the 1950s and 1960s makes this question somewhat intriguing. Moreover, how will this opposition impact the continuation of ecumenical discussions between Lutherans and Catholics?

Through a comparison of the Joint Declaration and the letter of protest with an examination of texts relating Ebeling’s hermeneutical anthropology, which highlights how the word of God creates faith in the listener, and makes one to exist in the presence of God (i.e., the word-event), along with his understanding of the purpose of ecumenism and the church, this study argues that Ebeling refused to support the Joint Declaration for two reasons. First, the Joint Declaration allows for an understanding of justification that requires human cooperation in justification, which creates a very different picture of Christian reality in comparison to that of Ebeling, for whom one is justified purely through the action of God’s word, without a human contribution, which creates faith in the believer and changes the way that one exists. Second, the Joint Declaration’s presentation of the doctrine of justification does not produce an agreement upon the nature and function of the church, which demonstrates not only that there is no consensus on the doctrine of justification, but also that there are fundamental differences over the function of the church in the Christian life, which justifies schism.

Finally, by comparing Ebeling’s hermeneutical anthropology with the continuing objections of his students and colleagues (Drs. Mark Menacher, Gerhard Forde, and Eberhard Jüngel), this study concludes, somewhat paradoxically, that while Ebeling’s hermeneutical anthropology itself could serve as a source for deepening the consensus reached in the Joint Declaration, it may well also be the source of objections to the continuing discussions between Lutheran and Catholics for years to come.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Scott A. Celsor, B.B.A. B.A., M.A.

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1.0 Chapter 1: The Adoption and Reception Process of *The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification*

On October 31, 1999, the *Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification* (hereafter, *Joint Declaration* or JD) was signed by the Lutheran World Federation (hereafter LWF) and the Roman Catholic Church in Augsburg, Germany. The JD claims to present in paragraph 15 a consensus on the “basic truths” of the doctrine of justification:

> In faith we together hold the conviction that justification is the work of the triune God…Together we confess: By grace alone, in faith in Christ’s saving work and not because of any merit on our part, we are accepted by God and receive the Holy Spirit, who renews our hearts while equipping and calling us to good works.

Yet, the *Joint Declaration* admits that not all differences have been rectified, but it relegates them, in paragraph 40, to “…differences of language, theological elaboration, and emphasis in the understanding of justification,” and so affirms the basic truths of the agreement, because these differences “…do not destroy the consensus regarding the basic truths.” Moreover, the JD commits the dialogue partners to continue clarifying the remaining questions, so as to influence the life of the church; paragraph 43 reads:

> Our consensus in basic truths of the doctrine of justification must come to influence the life and teachings of our churches. Here it must prove itself. In this respect, questions of varying importance still need further clarification. These include, among other topics, the relationship between the Word of God and church doctrine, as well as ecclesiology… and the relation between justification and social ethics…The Lutheran churches and the Roman Catholic Church will continue to strive together to deepen this common understanding of justification and to make it bear fruit in the life and teaching of the churches.

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3 Ibid., para. 43, pp. 26-27.
The reception of the *Joint Declaration* could best be described as “uneven.” Michael Root calls it a “watershed” in the history of Lutheran ecumenism, because “…the JD represents for them an ecumenically adequate consensus on justification.”

Harding Meyer affirms it as “…a decisive step in the overcoming of the division of the churches,” although he recognizes that the JD does not mean the establishment of Lutheran-Catholic ecclesial fellowship. It has also had some success in the practicalities of bringing the two communions closer. On the fifth anniversary of the signing of the JD, the monthly *Lutheran World Information* (LWI) was dedicated to celebrating its significance. As some of its notable practical successes, it mentioned that increased cooperation and contact between the communions led to the joint construction of a church building in Australia, a joint struggle for human rights in Argentina, and the presence of a Catholic bishop in a Lutheran synod in Florida. In the tenth anniversary issue of LWI, Dr. Ishmael Noko, general secretary of the LWF, mentions that the JD has led to a new quality in Lutheran/Catholic relations; “walls of separation, isolation and imprisonment are broken down.” And it has furthered discussion among scholars and church officials on ecclesiology.

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It has also had its share of setbacks, however. In this same fifth anniversary issue of the LWI, Dr. Walter Altmann, president of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Lutheran Confession in Brazil, says that the Joint Declaration is reason to celebrate, but the recent issuance of Dominus Iesus by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (hereafter CDF), the papal encyclical Ecclesia de Eucharistia, and the issuance of indulgences for the Jubilee Year of 2000 have caused “disillusionment and confusion” within the Lutheran-Catholic relations, and so “…they seem to destroy any practical hope that the JDDJ’s signing could pave the way toward new examples of mutual acceptance.” In his judgment, “the hopes expressed in the JDDJ have still not materialized.”

And this issue’s list of practical effects at the local level is disappointing. Even though it has had its share of positive effects, they were actually quite few, and when combined with the fact that it mentions the JD has had very little effect in the lives of churches in South Africa, the Philippines, and Austria, the overall picture of the reception of the JD five years out is somewhat disappointing. And the tenth anniversary issue of LWI is “peppered” with voices of admonishment, urgency, and regret from Catholic officials over its lack of progress. For example, Roman Catholic Bishop Dr. Walter Mixa says, “To be honest, we have to admit that we still have a long way to go until all differences in faith have been worked through. Let’s get moving” (Emphasis mine).

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Ibid., 9.
Cardinal Lehmann “…expressed his regret that in some respects the JDDJ had so far not led any further, ‘because it has not been further deepened, implemented and thus made spiritually fruitful.’”

But, if the reception of the *Joint Declaration* can be described as “uneven,” its drafting and adoption process can be described as troubled or “rocky.” In his article, “Der Streit um die ‚Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre,’” Johannes Wallmann gives what is perhaps the most detailed, although not unbiased, account of the history of the rancorous German debate over the adoption of the *Joint Declaration* to be found. Wallmann’s account of this debate traces its earliest stage to the largely ignored 1991 critical analysis by the Göttingen theological faculty of the text “Lehrverurteilungen—kirchentrennend?” This, according to Wallmann’s account, along with the ongoing, clandestine negotiations between the two churches on the text of the JD, beginning in 1995, created a climate of anxiety in certain circles. This anxiety finally “ignited” in the fall of 1997 with the appearance of two works: Eberhard Jüngel’s “Um Gottes willen—Klarheit!” which critiqued the feasibility of paragraph 18 of the JD’s interpretation the doctrine of justification as “an indispensable criteria” for the guidance of the church; and Ingolf Dalferth’s especially sharp article, “Ökumene am Scheideweg,” which questions the “differentiated consensual” method of the JD and the final compatibility of Lutheran and Catholic understandings of justification. This was followed by a whole series of somewhat troubled church synods and bishop’s meetings in

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11 Ibid., 9-10.
12 Johannes Wallmann, “Der Streit um die ‚Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre,’” *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 95, Beiheft 10 (1998): 211. All German translations of this text are my own. On pages 208-209, Wallmann notes that although he was asked to write this historical account of the debate over the JD in Germany by the ZThK, he cannot meet the exacting standards of the historian for necessary distance from the topic, since he took part in the debates over the JD, and sometimes sharply.
13 Ibid., 212-214.
Germany over the language and acceptance of the JD.\textsuperscript{14} Into this fray, then, stepped the noted, aging theologian, Gerhard Ebeling.

According to Wallmann, Ebeling’s part in this debate began during a reception for him on the evening of December 10, 1997, after he had been awarded an honorary doctorate from the University of Tübingen. During the reception, Ebeling became quite insistent that “the voice of academic evangelical theology must be loud” in its rejection of the Joint Declaration.\textsuperscript{15} Eberhard Jüngel then gathered a small group around him in order to determine how Ebeling’s advice might be made effective. It was decided that a short letter listing the deficiencies of the Joint Declaration would be composed and circulated among evangelical theological faculties for signatures. Then this letter would be sent to the various synods that were still debating the acceptance of the JD. This letter was entrusted to a small circle, Albrecht Beutel, Karin Bornkamm, and Reinhard Schwarz, headed by Wallmann himself, who would draft the letter and send it to Ebeling in Zurich for final editing.\textsuperscript{16} By October, 1999, a revised form of this letter had been signed by over 250 theologians.\textsuperscript{17} This was, perhaps, the most serious attack on the Joint Declaration.

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\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 218-225.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 228; “Die Stimme der akademischen evangelischen Theologie müsse laut werden.”

\textsuperscript{16} Although there are several printed versions of this letter, I refer to the article “No Consensus on the ‘Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification.’ A Critical Evaluation by Professors of Protestant Theology,” Lutheran Quarterly 12, no. 2 (Summer, 1998): 193-196. [Hereafter, Letter of Protest]

\textsuperscript{17} According to Mark Menacher, “Gerhard Ebeling’s Lifelong Kirchenkampf as Theological Method,” Lutheran Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Spring, 2004): 19, a second letter was issued by German Protestant academics critiquing the “Official Common Statement” [hereafter, OCS], which was issued to rescue the JD from the critique of the “Official Catholic Response to the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification” [hereafter, OCR]. From here on, this second letter issued by German Protestant theologians will be referred to as the “Revised Letter of Protest.” The number of signatories to this revised letter is found in the translation of an article published in the Sueddeutsche Zeitung. “German Professors Protest JDDJ.” Translated by Mark Menacher. Downloaded from the Word Alone website, http://wordalone.org/docs/wa-german-professors.shtml, on May 17, 2004. Unfortunately, this text does not list the original date of the article. The date is verified by the article, “Lutheran Theologians Warn against Signing JDDJ,” trans. by Matthias Drobinski, downloaded from this same web site at http://wordalone.org/docs/wa-theologians-warning.shtml on February 9, 2010,
because it opened a whole new phase of the debate, a debate that grew very rancorous. Yet, what is not quite clear is why Gerhard Ebeling felt impelled to urge Evangelical theology to become collectively assertive in voicing its objections to the JD and sign the letter of protest.

1.1 Who is Gerhard Ebeling?

1.11 Biographical Overview of Gerhard Ebeling

Who is Gerhard Ebeling? Gerhard Ebeling (1912-2001) was born into a family of teachers, although ironically, according to Eberhard Jüngel, he did not wish to follow in his father’s footsteps. He began his theological studies in Marburg in 1930, where for several terms he attended the lectures of Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976) on various books of the Bible, such as Romans and Galatians. So, from the very beginning of his theological training, he was shaped by Bultmann’s hermeneutic. He would have been exposed which seems to refer to this same article in the Sueddeutsche Zeitung. The posting date of this article is October 30, 1999.

There are two primary texts for information on Ebeling’s life: Ebeling’s semi-autobiographical account of his theological career; “Mein theologischer Weg.” Hermeneutische Blätter Sonderheft (Oktober 2006): 5-67. Downloaded from www.uzh.ch/hermes/ihr_hbl_s06_ebeling.pdf on August 7, 2007; and his presentation speech for his honorary PhD at Tübingen on December 12, 1997, “Ein Leben für die Theologie—eine Theologie für das Leben.” Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 95, no.1 (March, 1998): 158-165. There are two good secondary sources for information on his life, written by people who had first hand dealings with him, like students. One is a tribute written by Eberhard Jüngel; “Doctor ecclesiae: Zum Tode des Theologen Gerhard Ebeling.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, October 2, 2001, 1-2. And there are several entries by close friends and colleagues in an issue of the Hermeneutische Blätter issued in memory of Ebeling, especially the entry by his student Albrecht Beutel; “Rechenschaft über den Glauben. Grundzug und Leitmotiv der Theologie bei Gerhard Ebeling.” Hermeneutische Blätter Sonderheft (July, 2003): 26-41. This text was downloaded from http://www.uzh.ch/hermes/dokumete/ihr_hbl_ebeling_03.pdf on December 14, 2008. There are many other secondary sources on Ebeling’s theological life which come from sources, who did not interact with Ebeling as much; they will be referred to occasionally.


Ebeling, Mein theologischer Weg, 7, documents the extent of this influence. He recounts that he attended Bultmann’s lectures on Galatians, Romans, 2 Corinthians, and the Gospel of John. He further states that he came into close personal contact, and held conversations outside of class with him, so as not to impede its progress. Ebeling even wrote; “Der gesammelte Ernst von Bultmanns Paulus-Auslegung zog mich in seinen Bann…,” which I translate as, “The thoughtful seriousness of Bultmann’s interpretation of Paul cast its spell on me ….”
to the philosophical foundations of this hermeneutic at Marburg during his studies with Gerhard Krueger (1902-1972), who introduced him to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976).\textsuperscript{21} It was also during his studies at Marburg that Ebeling was introduced to the thought of Martin Luther, through attending a proseminar by Wilhelm Maurer (1900-?) on the peasant’s revolt. This early study in Luther would direct much of his early theological training, culminating in his 1938 dissertation, \textit{Evangelische Evangelienauslegung, eine Untersuchung zu Luthers Hermeneutik}. After his studies at Marburg, he studied under Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) in Berlin for one term, and then moved on to Zurich for the winter semester of 1932-1933 to study under Emil Brunner (1889-1966), who was interested in dialogue with some of Bultmann’s students.\textsuperscript{22} He soon returned to Germany, however, due to the impending political crisis.\textsuperscript{23} He completed his theological examinations in 1935, after which, for the next year, he began the first stages of pastoral ministry.\textsuperscript{24} Ebeling studied at the Finkenwalde seminary for the winter term of 1936-1937, where Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) taught, but at Bonhoeffer’s request, he was sent to Zurich to finish his dissertation. He was ordained in the Confessing Church in the fall of 1938, resisting the “Nazified” German Christians, which meant that he was \textit{illegally} ordained, and spent the war years as a minister in a congregation of the Bekenntniskirche (Berlin-Hermsdorf) and in the medical corps.\textsuperscript{25} From the time of his involvement with the Confessing Church until the end of the war, his thought and proclamation were consumed with understanding and opposing German

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{23} Jüngel, “Doctor ecclesiae,” 1.
\textsuperscript{24} Mark Menacher, “Gerhard Ebeling in Retrospect,” \textit{Lutheran Quarterly} 21, no. 2 (Summer, 2007): 166.
Christian participation in “National Socialism’s quasi-religious, pagan self-understanding…”

Thus, it is with sufficient reason that Mark Menacher argues Ebeling’s theology was shaped by his experience of church struggle (Kirchenkampf) before and during the Second World War. This experience has to shape one’s understanding of Ebeling’s theology, because it explains why Ebeling is concerned with defending the true church and ecumenical issues.

But, there is more to his story. According to his acceptance speech for an honorary PhD given at Tübingen in December, 1997, he said that his life’s work has three phases. The second phase began after the war, when he migrated to Tübingen, where he was appointed by Hans Rückert in the summer of 1945 to the Evangelical theological faculty at Tübingen to teach church history. He understood church history as the history of the interpretation of Scripture. He was habilitated in the summer of 1946 and offered an extraordinary professorship there the next summer. In 1948, he was introduced to the hermeneut Ernst Fuchs (1903-1983), who, throughout the 1950s, led him from more historical issues to issues in the interpretation of faith. Jüngel testifies that Fuchs was an important figure in Ebeling’s career, because he stimulated Ebeling’s creativity. The two together shaped German theology for two decades. Fuchs, a student of Bultmann, was concerned to overcome subject/object dualism, which meant that instead of a human subject merely interpreting a text, there is a constant interplay between the text and

27 Menacher, “Gerhard Ebeling in Retrospect,” 165, 171.
29 Albrecht Beutel, “Rechenschaft über den Glauben,” 28; Ebeling, Mein theologischer Weg, 55.
interpreter, in which the text itself shapes the interpreter.\textsuperscript{32} In 1953, Ebeling gave a series of important lectures that culminated in the monograph \textit{Die Geschichtlichkeit der Kirche und ihrer Verkündung als theologisches Problem (The Problem of Historicity in the Church and its Proclamation)}, which foreshadowed his change in academic specialization from church history to systematics in 1954, when he assumed a chair in systematic theology vacated by Helmut Thielicke (1908-1986) at Tübingen.\textsuperscript{33} He then migrated to Zurich to assume a chair in systematic theology in 1956, possibly to fill the vacuum left by Emil Brunner’s retirement.\textsuperscript{34} Thus began the third phase of his career. Some contend that the publication of Bonhoeffer’s \textit{Widerstand und Ergebung} in 1952, which contained Bonhoeffer’s program of non-religious interpretation of the Christian faith, also contributed to this shift in emphasis, because Ebeling wanted to meet Bonhoeffer’s demand for an “…immanent interpretation of the Christian faith by means of Heideggerian existential analysis.”\textsuperscript{35} Therefore, during the 50s, hermeneutical issues began to dominate his thought. So, it is with good reason that some call his theology “hermeneutical.”\textsuperscript{36} It is just as important to understand this facet of this thought as that of \textit{Kirchenkampf}, if one wants to fully understand his theology.\textsuperscript{37}


\textsuperscript{34} Ruokanen, 31. He returned to Tübingen in 1965, but made a final return to Zurich in 1968, because the student unrest in the late 1960s at Tübingen was not conducive to completing his work; Ebeling, “Ein Leben für die Theologie,” 160.

\textsuperscript{35} Miikka Ruokanen, in his dissertation, \textit{Hermeneutics as an Ecumenical Method in the Theology of Gerhard Ebeling}, 41, is one scholar who makes this argument.


\textsuperscript{37} In fact, Albrecht Beutel, “Rechenschaft über den Glauben,” 35, contends that the three related fields of hermeneutics, doctrine, and church history were “…all the pervasive, interpenetrating means by which his whole life’s work was carried out.” The original German reads, „Hermeneutik, Dogmatik und
Some have described Ebeling’s theology as a procession from, and a return to, Luther, punctuated by several excursions in the meantime. One of the more important of these excursions was into the thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834). This claim of movement can be substantiated by noticing that his career began with questions in Luther’s hermeneutics, which led to his 1938 dissertation, *Evangelische Evangelienauslegung*, and ended with the publication of his *Lutherstudien*, which was also dedicated to questions in hermeneutics and anthropology, the final volume of which appeared in 1989, and *Luthers Seelsorge*, which appeared in 1997. The 1970s were marked by his attention to dogmatic issues. This resulted in the publication of his systematic theology, *Dogmatik des christlichens Glaubens*, which appeared in 1979, the year of his retirement. His final theological action was his opposition to the *Joint Declaration.*

### 1.12 An Overview of Ebeling’s Theology

According to Jack Brush, Ebeling’s theology takes relationality seriously. For Ebeling, reality is composed of contrasting elements, which are sometimes in harmony, sometimes in “inhibiting dissonances.” The first half of this biographical overview

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38 Jüngel, in his tribute to Ebeling, “Doctor ecclesiae,” 2, makes this claim.
39 Ruokanen, 42.
supports the truth of this contention, in that the formative years of Ebeling’s theology were consumed with the tension over the proper relationship of church to state, whether the church should support Hitler or oppose him. But for Ebeling, the most important relationship in reality, and the “key” to understanding the others, is the relation between God and humanity, which has become distorted by sin. The task of the theologian is to bring clarity to this relationship and so turn this distortion into a “viable contrast.” This task requires one to make “fundamental distinctions,” like the one between law and gospel, in order to bring clarity to this confusion.⁴¹ Menacher’s explanation goes even farther and makes this task a struggle between belief and unbelief in every aspect of life.⁴² Thus, the concept of *Kirchenkampf* informs the whole of Ebeling’s theology, according to Menacher.

This is where hermeneutics comes into play, an emphasis which is displayed in the second half of the previous biographical overview of Ebeling’s education.⁴³ In fact, some, such as Miikka Ruokanen who investigated Ebeling’s ecumenical theology in his dissertation, calls Ebeling a “hermeneutical” theologian.⁴⁴ What does it mean to call

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*Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2002), 139-145. Menacher’s is more detailed and focused, while Brush has it value in that he takes a wider scope and places Ebeling’s theology within his conception of reality. Fischer places Ebeling’s theology within the historical context of his time, more so than the other two.

⁴¹ Brush, 143-144, 147.
⁴² Menacher, “Gerhard Ebeling in Retrospect,” 185.
⁴³ Hermann Fischer, in *Protestantische Theologie im 20. Jahrhundert*, 139-145, gives the reader a good introduction to this hermeneutical theology by describing Ebeling’s theology within the context of Rudolf Bultmann and Ernst Fuchs. According to Fischer, Bultmann was influenced by the existential ontology of Martin Heidegger, who widened hermeneutics into an analysis of dasein: “…the exposure of horizons for the interpretation of the meaning of being in general” (Fischer, 140). (The original German reads: „als Freilegung des Horizontes für eine Interpretation des Sinnes von Sein überhaupt.“) For Bultmann, this meant that hermeneutics could not be limited to the clarification of the principles of interpretation for historical texts, but rather must involve the subject of understanding in reflection.

⁴⁴ Ruokanen, 30-32.
Ebeling’s theology “hermeneutical”? In his essay, “Word of God and Hermeneutics,”
Ebeling gives one the necessary perspective to answer this question.

According to this text, Ebeling does not understand hermeneutics to be limited to
the mere interpretation of texts. For Ebeling the object of hermeneutical inquiry is not a
text, but rather what he calls a “word-event.” In fact, language is constitutive of the
relationship between God and humanity. What is a “word-event”? Hermeneutics has to
do with understanding, but the object of understanding is not the word itself, but that
which word brings to the understanding; thus, “the primary phenomenon in the realm of
understanding is not understanding OF language, but understanding THROUGH lan-
guage” (Emphasis his). One can get a better understanding of what he means by referring
to another of his works, Introduction to a Theological Theory of Language, in which
the function of language is to open us up to “the presence of the hidden.” He wrote:

The function of language, therefore, is seen in a particularly impressive
way in its power of transcending the present moment. It is able to make
present what no longer exists and what does not yet exist. Without
language we would have no relationship with the past and future; we
would be imprisoned in the present moment and banished to our very
immediate environment.

In Ebeling’s theology, “…existence is existence through word and in word.” What this
means is that it is by word that one’s existence is brought about by transcending the

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Leitch (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), 318-319. The following in-line quotation is from these same
pages.

46 Brush, 146; Menacher “Gerhard Ebeling in Retrospect,” 176. In fact, Menacher, 177-179 goes
into great detail explaining how the linguistic expressions widersprechen, versprechen, and entsprechen
relate to each other, and how the word of God encounters the person in the conscience.

47 Gerhard Ebeling, Introduction to a Theological Theory of Language, trans. by R.A. Wilson

48 Ebeling, “Word of God and Hermeneutics,” 331. Ruokanen, 308-309, helps to clarify this
understanding of “existence through word and in word” when he wrote, “The relation of man to reality is a
linguistic phenomenon: he exists in the state of ‘law’ in the questionableness and anxiety of his existence,
present and establishing one in a relationship to both the past and future. Thus, understanding is not merely understanding the word itself, but making one to exist in relationship to the object that language presents to one. This is a “word-event.”

In relation to theology, the object of understanding is oriented toward the word of God. But, because Ebeling’s theology is oriented toward the word-event, and not the mere word, the word of God seeks execution, which occurs in the sermon. Of course, the sermon presupposes the exposition of historical Scripture, but the intent of the sermon is to bring the word of God into the present.

The text which has attained understanding in the exposition now helps to bring to understanding what is to attain understanding by means of the sermon—which is (we can here state it briefly) the present reality coram Deo, and that means, in its radical futurity. Thus the text by means of the sermon becomes a hermeneutic aid in the understanding of present experience. (Emphasis his)

And when the encounter with this word occurs properly, then one’s existence is in turn clarified. Humanity exists as a response to this word. Ebeling wrote:

His existence is, rightly understood, a word-event which has its origin in the Word of God and, in response to that Word, makes openings by a right and salutary use of words. Therein man is the image of God.

Ebeling goes on to say that, for Christians, this word-event occurs in the gospel, as promise, and it makes a person human by making one a believer. Thus, the appropriate response to the word of God is faith. Therefore, when one calls Ebeling’s theology “hermeneutical,” a theology which is based upon a “word-event,” one is saying that central to his theology is the preaching of the word of God, which evokes a response

or in existential certainty created by the word of the ‘gospel’ which brings about the relationship with God as the foundation of reality and which promises a certain future.”


Ibid., 331.

Ibid., 327.
of faith in the one listening, which in turn illuminates his or her existence, and changes it. To paraphrase Brush, the task of hermeneutics is to clarify the confusion between these contrasting elements of reality.⁵²

But Ebeling’s conception of hermeneutics also impacts his understanding of history, for just as hermeneutics is not concerned merely with the word, but with the word-event, with the impact of the word upon the hearer, and just as one could argue, that his understanding of human existence is not concerned merely with the fact of one’s existence, but with how the word makes one to be, so also his understanding of history. This can be seen in Ebeling’s essay, “The Question of the Historical Jesus and the Problem of Christology,” where he wrote:

…the proper question regarding the past is not: What happened? What were the facts? How are they to be explained? or something of that kind, but: What came to expression?⁵³

The significance of Ebeling’s understanding of history can be seen in his understanding of the role of the historical Jesus as the basis for the faith.

In The Question of God, Heinz Zahrnt places Ebeling’s understanding of the historical Jesus in its historical context. According to Zahrnt’s account, Bultmann thought that the mere fact of Jesus’ existence would be enough to explain the content and origin of the kerygma.⁵⁴ His student Ebeling disagreed, because if the content and basis of the kerygma is reduced to the mere fact of Jesus’ existence and has no connection with the faith of Jesus, then the origin of the kerygma must be in the early church alone. This would be the “end of Christianity,” because the church would lose the object of its

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⁵² Brush, 144.
⁵⁴ Zahrnt, The Question of God, 255.
proclamation. What happens when the church proclaims Jesus, particularly the Easter story? Ebeling himself wrote:

The point of the Easter story is, that Jesus as the witness to faith became the ground of faith and that those who thus believe are witnesses to faith as witnesses to Jesus. It can hardly be denied that the point of the appearances of the Risen Lord, which form the heart of the Easter tradition, is the rise of faith in Jesus. Nobody was granted an appearance who did not thereby become a believer, and likewise nobody who did not already know Jesus before and thus in some measure recognize him.

Thus, the proper understanding of Jesus requires the reception of Jesus Christ, which prompts the rise of faith in one. This is a “word-event,” which demonstrates that what is really important for Ebeling is what Jesus gives rise to, what comes to expression in and through Jesus, namely, faith, not the mere fact of what he said or did. And it is the occurrence of this “word-event” in the early church, the prompting, or call, to faith by Jesus in his life and his resurrection appearances that gave rise to faith in the church, which links the proclamation of the early church with the historical Jesus and provides the church with the object of proclamation. Thus, one comes to understand Jesus through the kerygma, not in spite it. In fact, Jesus Christ is where the word of God comes to impact historical human existence. Christ is truly encountered only in faith. And this

55 Ibid., 257.
57 Zahrnt, 264, supports this reading of Ebeling, where he wrote: “Faith comes to speech in Jesus not through his speaking of his own faith… but through his arousing and calling for faith in others by exercising his own faith… Where Jesus appears, he arouses faith. Nothing shows this as clearly as the stories of healings in the gospels. Something emanates from Jesus which causes the sick to come to him with the request to be healed, and he heals them by encouraging them to faith and by telling them: ‘Your faith has saved you.’ Because this faith is faith aroused by Jesus, it is faith which is related to him. But this leads us back to the authority of Jesus. For only someone who possesses authority can demand and arouse faith.”
58 Ibid., 259.
59 One might argue that this emphasis upon Christ being the point through which the word of God encounters history is an emphasis that he picked up from his colleague at Tübingen, Helmut Thielicke, That Thielicke held this position is stated by Geoffrey Bromiley, “Helmut Thielicke,” in A Handbook of
faith that arose in Jesus also gives rise to faith in the believer, because it has its source in Christ, to whom the believer clings. This is what it means to clarify one’s existence, because one now exists in relation to God, through Christ, in the “existential certainty” granted by the promise that comes by relationship to God. Thus, for Ebeling, history is not the mere facts of the matter, but what these facts bring into being, what the rise of faith in the historical Jesus means for those who cling to Christ, which is a necessary part of his hermeneutical theology.

1.13 Ebeling’s Ecumenical Theology

Miikka Ruokanen shows that Ebeling had a distinguished place in European ecumenical circles throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and into the 1970s. He was present at

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One might want to compare Ebeling’s understanding of the relation between the word of God and how it impacts humanity through the singular point of the rise of faith in Jesus with Pannenberg’s conception of God’s relation to history, in which God manifests himself throughout history, although his “manifestation” through Christ is a special, self-revelation of himself; *Revelation as History*, ed. by Wolfhart Pannenberg, in association with Rolf Rendtorff, Trutz Rendtorff, and Ulrich Wilkens, trans. by David Granskou (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), 125-131.


In support of this, Menacher, “Gerhard Ebeling in Retrospect,” 180, wrote; “When this word as law and gospel encounters the conscience (*Gewissen*), and thus encounters the person, it is experienced as the totality of reality encountering all of humanity. Whereas the encounter with the word as law paradoxically effects the certainty of one’s unbelief and thus the certainty of existential uncertainty (sin), the encounter with the word as gospel creates the certainty of faith which is the certainty of conscience which thus is the certainty of salvation.”

Ruokanen, 32-34. I will rely upon Ruokanen’s account of Ebeling’s importance to ecumenism, because his is the only overview of Ebeling’s role in it that I have found. Aside from his research into Ebeling’s texts, his argument relies upon two other texts. The first is Tuomo Mannermaa, *Preussista Leuvenbergin. Leuvenbergin konkordian teologinen metod* (*Missiologian ja Ekumeniikan Seuran julkaisuja* 29, Helsinki: 1978), 174-75, although according to his account of this text in note 37, it is not an overview of Ebeling’s role in ecumenism, but an argument Mannermaa makes concerning the role of Ebeling’s existential theology in the development of one particular ecumenical method. The second is Erich Dinkler, “Die ökumenische Bewegung und die Hermeneutik,” *Theologische Literaturzeitung* (1969): 482. In note 40, this article merely acknowledges the effect that Ebeling had on the Faith and Order meeting in Montreal in 1963. A search on the Marquette library catalog, World Cat, ATLA, and the German National Library catalogue turned up nothing more. The works listed in Ruokanen’s statement of the question all relate to either general studies into Ebeling’s hermeneutical methodology or some comparison of Ebeling’s theology with that of another. None of the texts listed dealt with Ebeling’s contribution to ecumenism itself.
the doctrinal discussions of the German Evangelical churches in 1956-1957, where he gave his celebrated presentation on the church-dividing significance of doctrinal differences. The Leuenberg Concord of 1973 was the result of ecumenical discussions beginning in the late 1960s, discussions which owe their origin, in part, according to Ruokanen, to Ebeling’s ecumenical work in the late 1950s. As a result, some argue that Ebeling had a fundamental role to play in the creation of this concord, an argument that is supported by adoption of what Ruokanen calls Ebeling’s “actualistic-hermeneutical, ecumenical method” in the Leuenberg Concord, a method that has striking similarities to Ebeling’s theological method in general. Ebeling was also a member from 1952-1963 of the European section of the Theological Commission on Tradition and Traditions, for whom he wrote a work on the principles of the Reformatory biblical interpretation. The work of this commission prepared for the 1963 meeting of the Faith and Order Commission of the World Council of Churches in Montreal. Ruokanen lists the numerous works that Ebeling has written on ecumenical matters. So, given this ecumenical pedigree, why would Ebeling seemingly turn “traitor” to the cause at the end of his life and refuse to support the Joint Declaration?

Thus, his research into Ebeling’s contribution to ecumenism is cutting edge. Yet, I find his argument credible, not only because of Ruokanen’s presentation of the facts of Ebeling’s work in ecumenical circles, but also because of some significant texts that I have found in Ebeling’s work that make significant contributions to ecumenism. Two complete works are dedicated to the topic, the most important of which is: The Word of God and Tradition. Historical Studies Interpreting the Divisions of Christianity. Translated by S.H. Hooke. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968. This text is particularly significant, because its foreword tells of his basic attitude toward ecumenism. Another complete text that relates to ecumenism is: Verstehen und Verständigung in der Begegnung der Konfessionen. Bensheimer Hefte 33. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967. The text, “The Significance of Doctrinal Differences for the Division of the Church,” in Word and Faith, trans. by James W. Leitch (London: SCM Press, 1963), 162-190, is also particularly significant, because this text states the only condition in which church schism is justified. In Ruokanen, p. 32, note 34, he adds Ebeling’s The Problem of Historicity to the list enumerated above in note 62.
1.2 Statement of the Problem and Thesis

An examination of the two letters of protest reveals few clues. The first letter, written to address the Joint Declaration itself in 1998, begins by proclaiming the importance of the doctrine of justification for Protestantism.

Justification of the sinner by faith alone establishes, according to Protestant doctrine, what is the basic reality for Christian life and the life of the church. The doctrine, structure, and practice of the church are to be determined and judged by the doctrine of justification.\(^{64}\)

It continues that a consensus on the doctrine of justification must “…make evident that the truth of justification by faith alone has not been abridged,” and that after such an agreement, the consenting churches “…mutually recognize each other as the church of Jesus Christ.”\(^{65}\) But, it continues, no consensus has been reached concerning the critical Lutheran insight that justification by grace alone is rightly proclaimed only when it is clear that God deals with sinners only through this word and by the sacraments administered according to this word and that the sinner is justified by faith alone. It also notes that no consensus has been reached on the simul and on the importance of good works for salvation, among other objections. It then closes with the claim that the JD will have no ecclesiological consequences, because Lutheran churches will still not be recognized “…as belonging to the church of Jesus Christ,” because recognition will require the integration of Protestant clergy into the Catholic hierarchy.\(^{66}\)

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\(^{65}\) Ibid., 194.

\(^{66}\) Ibid., 195.
The revised letter of protest, written to reject the OCS and signed by Ebeling, affirms what the original letter said. This letter begins by claiming in paragraph one that the OCS and “Annex” has not eliminated the objections to the Joint Declaration. In paragraph 3, it does acknowledge that the OCS includes some Lutheran terminology, such as the simul and “faith alone,” but asserts that they have been interpreted in a Catholic manner and only when they are understood in this manner will the Lutheran partner be exempt from the condemnations of Trent. In paragraph 5, it once again asserts that affirming the JDDJ is tantamount to accepting the ecumenical program of the Roman Catholic Church. And in paragraph 6, it once again affirms that agreeing to this understanding of justification by signing the OCS would not improve the lives of mixed Lutheran/Catholic families.

It is clear by this brief examination of the German letters of protest that Ebeling believes the JD has compromised the doctrine of justification in some way, that the JD has not made it clear that God deals with sinners only through word and the sacraments, administered by this word, by faith alone, and that the JD incorporates an understanding of the doctrine of justification that is not basic for the life of the church, since the signing of the JD will still not result in mutual, ecclesial recognition. But what is not clear is Ebeling’s theological intention in either co-authoring or signing these letters, because these letters are the results of class action, not individual theological work. As a result, there is nothing upon first examination in either of these letters that can be specifically linked to some

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67 The first short quotation in this paragraph is from the Revised Letter of Protest, para. 1, p. 1; the second quotation in this paragraph is from page 2.
particularity in Ebeling’s theology, as presented in the previous overview of Ebeling’s theology in section 1.12. Thus, it will take detailed study to discover his theological intention in signing them.

Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is not only to investigate how Ebeling’s theology led him to sign these letters of protest, but also what, if any, implications his objection to the Joint Declaration might have for the future of ecumenical discussions between Lutherans and Catholics and the reception of the JD. What in his theology or background could lead him to sign these protest letters? Was it some aspect of his hermeneutic, the relationship between human existence and the word of God? Was it the relationship between history and language? Or, was it his understanding of the church? And, how could Ebeling’s theology impact the reception of the Joint Declaration and the continuation of discussions between Lutherans and Catholics in the years to come?

This study will answer two questions, the first of which acts in support of the second. First, what elements in the theology of Gerhard Ebeling led him to reject the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification and to sign the German letters of protest? Chapters two through four will be dedicated to answering this question. The answer to this first question has to parts. First, due to the ambiguity of the doctrine of grace in the Joint Declaration, the JD allows for an understanding of justification that requires human cooperation in justification, which creates a very different picture of Christian reality in comparison to that of Ebeling, for whom one is justified purely through the action of God’s word, without a human contribution, which creates faith in the believer and changes the way that one exists. This is how Ebeling’s hermeneutical
theology influences his understanding of the doctrine of justification. Thus, the Joint Declaration abridges the doctrine of justification by grace alone, through faith alone.

Second, the Joint Declaration’s understanding of the doctrine of justification does not produce an agreement upon the nature and function of the church, which not only demonstrates that there is no consensus on the doctrine of justification, but also demonstrates there are fundamental differences over the function of the church in one’s life as a Christian. Is the church to proclaim that justification is the “…most excellent work of God’s love made manifest in Christ Jesus,” given through the grace of God, which enables one to cooperate in one’s justification and become sanctified through “…observing the commandments of God and of the Church”? Or, is the church to proclaim a justification by faith, without works, through the word of God in both preaching and the administration of the sacraments? This inability to agree upon the function of the church demonstrates that there is a fundamental difference in what makes the church, church, or what identifies the essence of the church, which, in Ebeling’s theology, justifies church schism.

The second, and more important, question, drawn from this study of Ebeling, the answer for which will provide the thesis for this dissertation, is: What impact could Ebeling’s hermeneutical theology have upon the reception of the Joint Declaration and the continuing ecumenical discussions between Lutherans and Catholics? What is Ebeling’s unique theological legacy to ecumenical discussions between Lutherans and Catholics?

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69 Based upon this study, this statement would accurately reflect Ebeling’s understanding of articles four and five of the Augsburg Confession.
Catholics? I will argue that Ebeling’s word-event hermeneutic could have two impacts upon Lutheran and Catholic dialogue, one positive and one negative. Positively, Ebeling’s word-event hermeneutic, with its emphasis upon relationality, could be used to deepen the agreement between Lutherans and Catholics on the doctrine of justification in allowing a deeper appreciation of how humanity total depends upon, or relates to, God, since there are multiple entry points for such dialogue in the Joint Declaration itself.

Negatively, if one insists that there is a Grunddifferenz between Lutherans and Catholics, because this word-event hermeneutic is linked with the repudiation of a theological use of substance ontology, then Ebeling’s hermeneutic will bequeath continued disputation between Ebeling’s theological descendants and supporters of the JD in future discussions.

1.3 Status of the Question

In order to demonstrate the unique contribution of this study to scholarship, it is necessary to review studies concerning the ecumenical possibilities found within the theology of Gerhard Ebeling. Major associated themes that constantly emerge from such an investigation are those of faith, history, and church. Now although one may want to argue that there are many studies on any one of these facets of Ebeling’s theology which could have an ecumenical impact, there are only four studies combining all of these facets, within the context of ecumenism, which one could use to explore the ecumenical potential of Ebeling’s theology. Only two, however, have had any real impact on this
study and only they will be mentioned below. But there are none which deal with Ebeling’s rejection of the Joint Declaration itself.\textsuperscript{70}

The most important of these, Miikka Ruokanen’s dissertation, \textit{Hermeneutics as an Ecumenical Method in the Theology of Gerhard Ebeling}, has already been introduced.

His method involves systematically analyzing the basic principles of Ebeling’s theology, 

\textsuperscript{70} There are, however, two other works that, although they meet the criteria above to be listed in this section, they have not actually had any impact upon this study, because their focus is not the same as this study’s. The first is Daniel C. Hauser. \textit{Church, Worship and History}. Catholic Systematic Theology. San Francisco: Catholic Scholars Press, 1997. He begins his study by placing recent ecumenical activity within the context of the Second Vatican Council. (pp. 1-2) He echoes the opinions of some theologians, that the first phase of ecumenism after the council was “theologically superficial,” failing the understand the relationship of doctrine and theology. Today (circa 1987), he asserts that we are in a new period of ecumenism, which is concerned with the theological issues that lie at the heart of deep, theological differences, the first step of which is for each confession to know “…the central tenants of its understanding of the Christian faith…” Hauser claims, “…the divisions between religious confessions are governed by different conceptions of the manner in which God is present to his people in fallen creation. These variations in the theology of history reflect different interpretations of the revelation and the meaning of that revelation for faith today” (p. 2).

Hauser traces out the manner in which historicity impacts faith through investigating what is fundamental to human life, that is worship, specifically, the Eucharist. (pp. 4-6) He does this by comparing the understanding of the Eucharist in the thought of several Protestant and Catholic theologians, one of whom is Gerhard Ebeling. He notes that with Ebeling, as with other Protestant theologians, “…there is a real problem with locating a concrete continuity or presence of the salvation offered by Christ in fallen history” (p. 288). Because the word has been fragmented by the fall, these Protestant theologians cannot find unambiguously the full redemption of Christ in the liturgy. Thus, any mediation of the word today cannot have a “public historical expression,” such as the Eucharist, but occurs presently only within the “individual conscience.” So, worship “…encourages the believer with the promise of future salvation at the second coming of Christ” (p. 290). Needless to say, even though Catholic theologians are no longer in agreement over the meaning of history for faith, any conception of history that places the creation totally under the power of sin, thus denying the \textit{ex opere operato} efficacy of the Eucharist and downplaying the event character of sacramental life, is extremely problematic in Catholic theology, because it denies the actual presence of the sacrificed and risen Christ in the Eucharist, thus also calling the necessity of the Church as the eschatological community into question. (pp. 290-291) In any case, Hauser concludes that “since the Christ-event is the point from which all time takes its meaning,” his study has shown the importance of the category of history in theological thought for both Protestant and Catholics alike. (p. 295)

The second is by Franz Gmainer-Pranzl. \textit{Glaube und Geschichte bei Karl Rahner und Gerhard Ebeling. Ein Vergleich transzendentaler und hermeneutischer Theologie}. Innsbrucker theologische Studien, vol. 45, ed. by Emerich Coreth, Walter Kern, and Hans Rotter. Innsbruck, Austria: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1996. In this work, Gmainer-Pranzl argues that faith and history are not irreconcilable categories in the theologies of Karl Rahner and Gerhard Ebeling. Gmainer-Pranzl draws four conclusions. (pp. 354-355) First, both Rahner and Ebeling understand a human being as a being that finds its real identity through relationship with God; God, who offers himself to humanity, and humanity, who is defined by God’s grace, belong together. Second, there is no transcendental experience in itself, unmediated by human history. So, for both Rahner and Ebeling, history is an essential part of the execution of salvation. Third, both agree that Christian theology cannot be separated from the concrete activity of faith. Rather, theology comes from faith; a neutral or timeless system of theological reflection does not exist. Finally, both agree that the method of Christian theology displays an original dependency of humanity upon God, a relationship that cannot be displayed as a subsequent theological reflection.
so as to develop his ecumenical method, and show how church unity is to be implemented. 71 Such an approach is possible, because, according to Ruokanen, Ebeling claimed in his *Dogmatik des christlichen Glaubens* that one of the primary goals of his theological work is “…to demonstrate the unity of the essence of the Christian faith…to ‘strive for a theological consensus and help it to get an expression,’” which leads to Ruokanen’s conclusion, that for Ebeling, any real theology is actually also ecumenical theology. 72 This would justify studying Ebeling as an ecumenical theologian, a task which, up until that point, had not been undertaken. His research into Ebeling’s contribution to ecumenical method was cutting edge at the time, and even today scholarship has not progressed much beyond it, since many of the newer works that deal with the ecumenism of Ebeling are comparative studies and so do not directly deal with Ebeling’s contribution to ecumenical method. Moreover, Ruokanen’s text is important to this study, because he places Ebeling’s theology within the history of ecumenism, which makes it unique. Thus, it has become one of the beginning points of this study.

According to Ruokanen’s reading of Ebeling, only differences in understanding the essence of the church can justify schism, not mere differences in tradition. 73 So, one should look for “deep-seated hermeneutical differences,” different ways of comprehending reality, God, humanity, and history. According to Ruokanen, “…the essence of the Christian faith consists of the new self-understanding of man and the realization of authentic existence in a relationship with the Creator demonstrated in its

71 Ruokanen, 36.
72 Ibid., 32. Ruokanen’s reference is to Ebeling’s *Dogmatik des christlichen Glaubens*, vol. 1 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1979), 23.
73 Ibid., 45-48.
most absolute form by the historical Jesus on the cross.”

The proclamation of Jesus’ act-event on the cross communicates its existential relevance, which encourages us to believe as he did.

Ruokanen claims that, for Ebeling, the division between Catholic and Protestant churches is “legitimate and necessary.” It is “legitimate and necessary,” because they have “…different ontological conceptions of reality and history,” which in turn leads to different understandings of the essence of the Christian faith. According to Ruokanen, while Catholics believe, based upon an old substance ontology, that God’s revelation is a sacramental reality, represented by the church, who takes over the role of word, Reformation theology, based upon a relational ontology, places primacy upon the word, which creates the church and forever critiques it. There is no need to agree upon doctrine, but only upon what the word effects (i.e., faith), which places one in relationship with God and creates life in the church. Ruokanen concludes, however, that Ebeling really does little more than replace one external factor with another, replacing unity based upon doctrinal agreement with unity based upon prior hermeneutical agreement, upon what the essence of the church is centered.

The second significant work that needs to be mentioned is John Ackley’s dissertation, completed in 1988 at Catholic University of America; The Church of the

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74 Ibid., 249-250. The quotation is taken from p. 249.
75 Ibid., 276-280, 283. The quotation is found on p. 280.
76 “Substance ontology” is a description of reality that employs Aristotelian modes of thinking and language (i.e., “substance,” “nature,” “potentiality,” “actuality,” etc.), and is concerned with the general condition of being and movement. A “relational ontology” as defined by Ruokanen and as used in this study is “…a conception of human existence, according to which man is not a substance, not an essence, but an existence determined by his relationship with outward reality. On the basis of his relational ontology Ebeling aims at demonstrating how every man is ultimately dependent on his Creator who is the sole substance of all reality. Only by having a relationship with his Creator can the existence of man be realize in an authentic way…the basic relation of man to God is his ‘substance’” (p. 308).
77 Ibid., 307-313, especially 311-312.
Word. A Comparative Study of Word, Church and Office in the Thought of Karl Rahner and Gerhard Ebeling. It was jointly directed by Avery Dulles and Francis S. Fiorenza. This work is a systematic exposition and comparison of the concepts “word of God,” “Church,” and “office” in the thought of Karl Rahner and Gerhard Ebeling, written with the intent of shedding some light upon problem of the unity of the church in current ecumenical studies, exemplified in the simple fact that the Catholic Church and the various Protestant churches “…do not recognize the legitimacy of each other’s ministerial offices.” This work is important to this study, because it calls attention to the understanding of the word of God and its relationship to the nature and function of the church.

Ackley argues that although Rahner and Ebeling agree “…the conceptual form of the Word of God consists of the ‘complete-event’ character of the divine-human dialogue which reached an unsurpassable climax in history as God’s self-offer and the answering word of humanity of Jesus Christ,” they disagree on the content of this “event,” for while Rahner conceives of it as a “…symbolic-sacramental act which takes place when the Church celebrates the Eucharist,” Ebeling sees it as the proclamation of the gospel of promise, which creates a community of faith. This comparison gives Ackley justification in claiming that their differences originate from different hermeneutical understandings of the word of God. Moreover, according to Ackley, both Rahner and Ebeling agree that “…the basic function of the church office concerns the proclamation event which makes known the reality of God’s saving presence in the world in Jesus Christ, the Church, and the sacraments,” but they disagree upon how this proclamation

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79 Ibid., xiii.
80 Ibid., 291.
comes to fulfillment, Rahner arguing it comes to fruition both in the act of communion, when the word of God is “announced and accepted by believers” in the Eucharist, and in the proclamation, and acceptance, of the word of God, Ebeling arguing that it comes to fruition as an act of communication, the proclamation of the word of God, in both word and sacrament, as the gospel of Christ, received in faith with the promise of freedom from demands of the law. For Ackley, this shows that the real point of contention is centered on how to understand the church as one and yet multiple. Rahner attempts to maintain church unity by placing it in continuity with the “apostolic Church of Peter and the apostles…” while Ebeling places true church unity upon the proclamation of the gospel, arguing that there has always been a plurality in the church.81

A final text that needs to be mentioned here doesn’t actually meet the criteria for inclusion, yet it gives one a good perspective on how Ebeling’s understanding of word is different from a Catholic view on the relation of God and humanity, and so it needs to be mentioned. The work is Oliver Franklin Williams’ “Gerhard Ebeling’s Contribution to Fundamental Theology.”82 The purpose of this study is just what the title suggests; to investigate what Ebeling can contribute to Catholic fundamental theology. In his investigations, Williams points out that there is no generally agreed upon definition of fundamental theology, yet by reviewing the literature on the topic, he concludes that the basic task of fundamental theology today is how “to link the authority of God revealing with human experience.”83 His initial thesis is that today, Catholic fundamental theology cannot meet this challenge, because it is too intellectualistic, and so cannot give an ac-

81 Ibid., 341-342.
82 Ph. D. diss, Vanderbilt University, 1974.
83 Ibid., 10-14.
count of the relationship between faith and word. His prime example is the transcendental theologian Bernard Lonergan. According to Williams, Lonergan’s explanation of the process that leads one to finding truth in judgment is too intellectual, because his understanding of word reduces it down to its disclosive function in scientific terms, while ignoring its mythic-symbolic level, whose meaning is inexhaustible. Lonergan cannot explain how word gives rise to faith in the first place, only to the “development of religious knowledge.”

As a result, Williams proposes that Ebeling’s understanding of faith as a word-event can explain how word gives rise to faith, because it ushers one into a new world, giving one’s existence certainty and opening one to the future. As a result, Williams concludes the Ebeling has given Protestantism the foundation for its own account of fundamental theology.

1.4 Method of this Dissertation

The following is an overview of the general method of this dissertation. The basic methodology of chapters two and three will consist in a systematic reconstruction of Ebeling’s hermeneutical theology, in regard to those facets of his thought that illuminate his rejection of the Joint Declaration. Chapter two will begin with an investigation into his understanding of the task of ecumenism, his understanding of the church, the role of church doctrine, and the role of the church in the creation of faith. This beginning point is suggested by the German letters of protest, both of which lodge doctrinal objections against the theological method of the Joint Declaration and its inability to have a meaningful impact upon the lives of the two churches. These letters have to provide the

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84 Ibid., 46-49.
85 Ibid., 140-148.
86 Ibid., 199.
starting point of this study, because they are the link between the *Joint Declaration* and Gerhard Ebeling, who either co-authored them or signed them. Chapter two’s investigation into Ebeling’s understanding of church and doctrine, however, will reveal the need to investigate further his hermeneutic, or how the word creates faith in one, which leads to justification, if one is to have a better appreciation of Ebeling’s hermeneutical theology and how it led to the his rejection of the JD. This will be the task of chapter three. At the beginning of each of these chapters, further justification and details for the method and specific texts that are employed will be provided.

Chapter four will then demonstrate how this hermeneutical theology led to his opposition to the *Joint Declaration* by comparing his theology, as presented in this study, with both of these letters of protest, showing how Ebeling must have understood these letters and how they conflict with certain statements in the *Joint Declaration*. This will answer the first question directing this research. Chapter five will then answer the second question by demonstrating the extent to which Ebeling’s hermeneutical theology can impact the reception of the JD and future Lutheran-Catholic dialogue, both to its detriment and benefit, by comparing his theology with that of his students and associates (Mark Menacher, Gerhard Forde, and Eberhard Jüngel), who have impacted the reception of the JD and the continuing dialogues.
2.0  Chapter 2: Ecumenism, Church, and Doctrine: The Broader Context of Ebeling’s Hermeneutical Theology

As pointed out in the previous chapter, Ebeling signed the German letters of protest, not only because he believed that the Joint Declaration compromised the doctrine of justification by faith alone, which establishes what is fundamental for the life of the church, but also because he believed that the JD would not result in ecclesial recognition of the Lutheran churches by the Roman Catholic Church. This discovery means that the proper beginning place for this study must be to investigate Ebeling’s understanding of the church and the function of church doctrine in the life of the church, since both of these issues are intimately related to his justification for refusing to support the Joint Declaration. Of course, the composition of these letters occurred within the context of ecumenical discussions between Lutherans and Catholics on the doctrine of justification. Thus, beginning with the broadest of these concepts and proceeding to the narrower, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate Gerhard Ebeling’s understanding of ecumenism, the church, and the function of church doctrine within the church, so as to establish the broader context for understanding why he rejected the Joint Declaration.

Six texts will be used as the main texts for this chapter, most of which not only focus upon ecumenism, but also were written during the height of Ebeling’s ecumenical influence in the 1950s and 1960s. Since the task of the first section of this chapter is to define the task of ecumenism, as understood by Ebeling, his monograph, The Word of God and Tradition (written in 1964, translated into English in 1968) will be the primary text for section 2.1. In the foreword, Ebeling goes into some detail describing not only how he believes ecumenical discussion should be conducted, but also why it should be conducted in that manner. This treatment of his understanding of ecumenism naturally
calls for a treatment of his understanding of the church, which is the task of sections 2.21, 2.22, and 2.23. Ebeling does not deal directly with the topic of the church in these texts that he wrote at the height of his ecumenical influence. As a result, the best place to turn for this treatment is his chapter on his understanding of the church, “§36 Die Gemeinschaft des Glaubens,” found in his *Dogmatik des christlichen Glaubens*, written in 1979 as a mature, integrated statement of his theology. In this chapter, he deals directly with his understanding of the church, both in his investigation of the church as the body of Christ and in his treatment of the four marks of the church, as found in the Nicene Creed. In the process of his treatment of the universality of the church, he makes several statements about the nature of ecumenical discussions, which will further flesh out Ebeling’s understanding of ecumenical processes begun in the previous section.

The main text for section 2.3 will be *The Problem of Historicity in the Church and its Proclamation*, which, according to the preface of the 1967 English translation of this work, briefly proceeded his epic shift from historical to systematic theology, a shift that was prompted by the duty he felt “…to accept the burden of the theological task as posed by the situation of the church and its proclamation in the present day…” In this section, the task will be to describe how the word of God is to be proclaimed to historical human beings, the problems of which are discussed in great detail in this work. Because language plays such an important role in proclamation, the 1973 translation of Ebeling’s *Introduction to a Theological Theory of Language* will occasionally be referred to in

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87 Gerhard Ebeling, “§36 Die Gemeinschaft des Glaubens,” in *Dogmatik des christlichen Glaubens*. Band III (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1979), 331-384. From now on, I will call this text “*Dogmatik*” or DCG. I want to thank Dr. Robert Jamison for preparing some of these translations.

order to develop the role that language plays in proclamation. The task of the final, textual sections of this chapter, sections 2.41 and 2.42, will then be to investigate the role that the church has in proclaiming the gospel to human beings, thus linking his ecclesiology, his understanding of the word of God, and human existence. In fulfilling this task, these sections will rely upon two essays; Ebeling’s “The Word of God and Church Doctrine,” found in *The Word of God and Tradition*, in which he describes the role that church doctrine plays in proclamation, and “The Significance of Doctrinal Differences for the Division of the Church,” in his 1960 work, *Word and Faith* (translated into English in 1963), in which he describes what kind of doctrinal differences are needed to justifiably divide the church. These texts provide the basis for understanding the ecclesial and doctrinal conditions necessary for justifying church schism, according to Ebeling, which is the first step in understanding why he refused to support the *Joint Declaration*. This study will then conclude this textual analysis with a summary on how church and doctrine relate to each other according to this reading of Ebeling’s ecumenical, hermeneutical theology, which will also serve as a starting point, suggesting how to proceed in chapter three.

2.1 The Task of Ecumenism, according to the “Foreword” in Ebeling’s *The Word of God and Tradition*

In the “Foreword” to the English translation of his text, *Wort Gottes und Tradition*, Ebeling provides one with an insight into his understanding of the task of ecumenism. Although he does not come right out and clearly write what he understands the ultimate goal of ecumenism to be, he does give some insight into how he thinks it should be conducted. Ebeling began this “Foreword” by writing:
The old style of theological controversy has in general given way to an extraordinarily eirenical readiness to understand. It is unnecessary for me to describe the change in climate, especially in regard to the relationship between Roman Catholic and Protestant theology; nor need I emphasize how gratifying this development is.\(^{89}\)

Based upon this excerpt, he is obviously appreciative of the new, ecumenical climate, but his concern within ecumenism is to promote understanding between the confessions, which, as he goes on to write, requires one to come to a clear understanding of their actual differences. Somewhat paradoxically, Ebeling proposes that reaching a proper understanding between the confessions involves "building in the oppositions" into ecumenical discussions, thus seemingly complicating the task of ecumenism, making its fulfillment more difficult. Why? Because "…Confessional differences are due to extremely complicated historical events," and so ecumenists need to use "…strict historical methods in order to defend ourselves from the inclination to define or to bridge over our differences by means of doctrinal systematization."\(^{90}\) In other words, it is not enough just to understand the doctrinal differences that divide the various communions. Their historical differences must also be understood and accounted for, since the church, apparently for Ebeling, is not divided by differences in mere church doctrine alone.\(^{91}\)


\(^{90}\) Ibid., 9-10.

\(^{91}\) This last point is further supported in his essay, "The Significance of Doctrinal Differences for the Division of the Church," in *Word and Faith*, trans. by James W. Leitch (London: SCM Press, 1963), 164-165, where he wrote: "Certainly doctrinal differences are always involved. But are they not often completely overlaid by other motives? Are they not often enough pressed into the service of very different interests? And—not to give the critical questions only a negative tone—is church history not something incomparably more alive, more full of real things and real people and therefore also richer, than is brought out by the suggestion that what really keeps it going can be reduced to questions of doctrine and is thus a matter of theological calculation? There is undoubtedly much truth in all that. Even when over-hasty judgments are toned down and corrected on more careful examination…nevertheless in view of the history of the confessions we shall hardly be able to advance as a purely descriptive statement the proposition that only doctrinal differences have divisive significance for the church."
Thus, Ebeling claims that the confessions need to be understood *holistically*, as “comprehensive entities,” to understand “the ‘essence’ of Protestantism or Catholicism” (italics mine), because even their languages reflect these differences.\(^92\) Therefore, the hermeneutical task of ecumenism is to eliminate these superficial differences and reach agreement on the deeper, essential issues, which really separate the confessions. So, we should rather make it our business to sharpen and clarify the question of truth that is concealed in these oppositions. It would be a disservice to genuine understanding within Christendom for a theologian who is pledged to the heritage of the Reformation not to affirm this heritage as decisively and clearly as possible in an encounter between the Confessions.\(^93\)

Having been introduced to the purpose and method of ecumenism in the thought of Ebeling, and the importance that he attaches to historical events in dividing the church, it is now time to turn to Ebeling’s understanding of the church and its function, and how historical events impact this function.

### 2.2 The Church and its Functions, according to Ebeling’s *Dogmatik des christlichen Glaubens*

This account of Ebeling’s understanding of the church closely follows his treatment of this topic as found in chapter 36, “Die Gemeinschaft des Glaubens,” of his *Dogmatik des christlichen Glaubens*. As a result, this study will deal with three topics.

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\(^92\) In his dissertation on Ebeling’s ecumenical method, *Hermeneutics as an Ecumenical Method in the Theology of Gerhard Ebeling*, Publications of Luther-Agricola Society B13 (Helsinki: Vammalan Kirjapaino Oy, 1982), 32, Miikka Ruokanen claims that, “…according to Ebeling, all genuine theological work is ecumenical by definition, because the task of theology is to indicate the inalienable and indivisible essence of the Christian faith.” Thus, the focus of Ebeling’s ecumenical method is the search for the essence of Christianity.

\(^93\) Ebeling, *Word of God and Tradition*, 10. This reading of Ebeling is confirmed in another of his essays, “The Word of God and Church Doctrine,” in this same book, *The Word of God and Tradition*, 161, where he wrote, “Our aim [in Confessional encounters] is not to iron out and trivialize the differences in Church doctrine, in order to produce a semblance of unity on the bare Word of God; but to make such an intensive study of the Confessional disputed issues in Church doctrine, that it may be vindicated as a witness to the Word of God…The only hope of overcoming Confessional differences lies in taking them seriously.”
First, it will deal with his understanding of the nature of the church and its foundation, and second, with his understanding of the functions of the church in Christian life. Finally, it will conclude with a treatment of Ebeling’s understanding of the basis for the unity of the church.

2.21 Ebeling’s Understanding of the Nature and Foundation of the Church

In examining chapter 36 of his *Dogmatik des christlichen Glaubens*, Ebeling primarily relies upon one biblical image in describing the church; the church as the body of Christ. Somewhat unexpectedly, however, he begins his description of the foundation of the church by describing it as a building, an image which also has strong scriptural warrant; 1 Cor. 3:9-17 (“…like a skilled master builder I laid a foundation…”), Eph. 2:20-22 (“…with Christ Jesus himself as the cornerstone.”), and Mt. 16:18 (“…your are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church…” [NRSV] ). The significance of Ebeling’s brief foray into describing the foundation of the church as a building lies in the fact that he does not see such a building as an accomplished fact, as a completed building, an organization, but as a process, which ends with God indwelling humanity. Ebeling wrote:

> The building, which is spoken of, does not represent something finished, but rather finds itself under construction. And this event of building, the act of being built, is in no way trivialized and reduced to something edifying by the fact that it does not result in the construction of a building or the assembling of an organization, but rather by the fact that men become the dwelling of God.

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95 Ibid., 358. The original German reads: „Der Bau, von dem die Rede ist, stellt nicht etwas Fertiges dar, sondern befindet sich im Bau. Und dieses Baugeschehen, das Erbautwerden, wird keineswegs dadurch ins Erbauliche verharmlost, daß es nicht um die Errichtung eines Gebäudes oder um den Aufbau einer Organisation geht, sondern darum, daß Menschen zur Behausung Gottes werden.“
So, this brief foray into describing the church as a building yields insight into Ebeling’s understanding of the nature of the church, an understanding that is not centered upon organization or institution as a finished construct, but upon the life of God within people, a relationship that is under construction. This finding is confirmed in a further description of the foundation of the church, which begins with a claim that some might find controversial, namely that, “Jesus is not the founder of the church, but rather the foundation of the church.”

Ebeling claims that the founding of the church is not based upon some “explicit directive,” which one might associate with the founding of an institution. In fact, the one place where one might argue that such a decree is found (Mt 16:18: “…you are Peter, and on this rock I will built my church…” [NRSV]) is deemed by Ebeling to be a post-Easter event. Rather, he places the rise of the church in the movement of the Spirit.

The church arises not by decree, but rather by the events of the spirit of liberation and empowerment. The memory of it is preserved in the transmission of the matter of the New Testament. And the texts also show this with all clarity: The gift of the Spirit does not have its source directly in the life of Jesus, but rather represents the consequence and correspondence of the fact that on the cross, Jesus commended his spirit into the hands of God.

Thus, based upon this examination of Ebeling, he is not focused upon some institutional understanding of the church, but upon the church as the life of God, the actualization of the life of Christ, within the lives of people.

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96 Ibid., 359. The original German reads: „Jesus ist nicht der Gründer der Kirche, sondern der Grund der Kirche."
97 Ibid., 359. The original German reads: „Kirche entsteht nicht durch Anordnung, sondern durch das Geistgeschehen der Befreiung und Bevollmächtigung. Die Erinnerung daran hat sich in der neutestamentlichen Überlieferung der Sache nach erhalten. Und auch dies zeigen die Texte mit aller Deutlichkeit an: Die Gabe des Geistes hat nicht unmittelbar im Leben Jesu ihren Ursprung, sondern stellt die Folge und Entsprechung dessen dar, daß Jesus am Kreuz seinen Geist in Gottes Hände befahl.”
2.22  Ebeling’s Understanding of the Life and Function of the Church

Having described the foundation of the church, Ebeling returns to the image of the church as the body of Christ when describing the life and functions of the church. He does not describe the life of the church as the collective lives of Christians within the context of an institutional church, but rather as the life of Christ himself unfolding within the lives of Christians, in whom “his life has become their life and determines their life together.”

This is consistent with his emphasis upon the life of the Spirit and the indwelling of God in describing the foundation of the church. Ebeling expanded upon this description of the life of the church, when he wrote:

The important thing is that Christ—or the word, the spirit and faith—is understood as the life of the church and not as something merely added, which is indeed present in the church, but something on which its existence is not dependent. The usual idea of the church sees in it an institution, which exists largely independently of how it is with the presence of Christ, the mandate of the word, the work of the spirit, [and] the reality of faith. *If the church is understood as the body of Christ, then it becomes, when that life is lost, a corpse, even though all possible spiritual lives want to carry on their essence.* What we call the church, is close to that in many ways. To maintain this signifies no exaggeration. Nevertheless, that it is still church, depends in multiple ways on secret and inconspicuous processes, in which that life occurs, making the church, the church. (Emphasis mine)

Once again, Ebeling’s penchant for deemphasizing the institutional church and emphasizing the church as the life of Christ is displayed in the fact that the church, in

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98 Ibid., 360. „...sein Leben zu ihrem Leben geworden und bestimmt ihr Zusammenleben.“
Ebeling’s perception, cannot be understood as an institution, existing independently of Christ’s activity in it. Thus, it could be argued that, for Ebeling, the institutional church is constantly dependent upon, and subordinate to, the activity of Christ within it.

The life of the church is displayed in two functions: worship and service to humanity. Ebeling is quick to emphasize, however, that the functions of the church and the being of the church cannot be separated. For example, he asserts that the church does not worship, in the sense of merely publicly displaying some liturgical celebration, but that the church is worship. This is the case, because all believers are now temple, priest, and offering, just as Christ himself was. Everything that the Christian does is worship, because in the Christian, Christ himself is active and is coming to life, reconciling humanity with God.

Does this make sense? Is this understanding of worship faulty, because it isn’t specific enough? Isn’t worship an act of offering God a gift? Based upon this reading of Ebeling, I would argue that this understanding of worship does make sense within the context of his thought on the church, because, as seen above, since the life of the church is understood as the life of Christ himself unfolding within the lives of Christians, worship, as a function of the life of the church, must also be understood as a mode of this unfolding of the life of Christ. Ebeling points out that this makes Christian worship far different than the ancient cult, in which the sacred and profane were segregated, because Christian worship is not about striking a bargain with God, about reconciling humanity with God through sacrifice, about making a gift to God from something that is one’s own. Christ’s sacrifice fulfilled this necessity once and for all. So, the ancient sense of

100 Ibid., 360-362.
reconciliation, of sanctification, is not at work in Christian worship. If it were, this would make worship “idolatry and blasphemy,” according to Ebeling, because it would be a rejection of Christ’s sacrifice. Rather, the Christian message of reconciliation allows one, to transmit and be true, in short: to believe – that is the only way that man (the human person) can still serve and honor God – in such a way then that he (man) acquiesces to the way God serves him and shares his doxa with him.

Yet, there are events in which the church gathers for specific acts of worship. These events, however, should not be understood as a relapse into the ancient cult, but as an “actualization” of worship. Specific events of worship demonstrate that “the church does not simply have its life as a possession that has becomes its own, but rather lives as the body of Christ only in the constant reception of this life from Christ.” Ebeling ties specific acts of worship to Christ’s becoming active in the lives of believers by claiming:

Right worship is now tied to the one condition, “that nothing happens there other than, that our beloved Lord speaks with us through his sacred word, and we in return speak with him through prayer and song.” On the basis of this definition of worship by Luther, one could thus say: Worship consists in the conversation between God and men. Man serves God solely by listening to God and answering him. And God serves men, in that he speaks to him and, for his part, hears him. Man must not expect only gifts from God, but rather the presence of God himself. And likewise God expects not gifts from men, but rather man himself, his heart. Thus, worship as a special event radiates in all the life functions of the church.

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101 Ibid., 362. The original German reads: „…weiterzugeben und wahr sein zu lassen, kurz: zu glauben, das ist die einzige Weise, wie der Mensch noch Gott dienen und ihm Ehre geben kann, so also, daß er es sich gefallen läßt, wie Gott ihm dient und ihm an seiner Doxa teiligt.”

102 Ibid., 362-363. This in-line quotation below is found on p. 362. It reads: „Die Kirche hat nicht einfach ihr Leben als einen ihr zu eigen gewordenen Besitz, sondern lebt als der Leib Christi nur in beständigem Empfangen dieses Lebens von Christus her.”

Thus, based upon this reading, it would seem that a specific act of Christian worship is the actualization of the life of Christ coming to fruition in the life of a believer, because what the believer expects in worship is “the presence of God himself,” and the only gift that is acceptable to God is “man himself, his heart.”

Based upon this research into Ebeling’s thought on the nature of the church, its foundation, and its life and function, what is noteworthy is the fact that Ebeling always veers away from describing the church institutionally, whose existence is predicated upon a specific mandate, and which performs certain mandated rites of worship. Instead, Ebeling constantly emphasizes the actualization of the life of Christ in the life of the believer in all aspects of his ecclesial thought. Even when Ebeling describes the life of the church as service to humanity in this text, such service is not understood as acts of what one today might call “institutionally ordained act of charity,” but are described as acts designed “to help man (the human person) in his relationship to God, by freeing him to enable his life itself to become worship.”

Worship itself is even described as service to humanity. So, based upon this reading of Ebeling, service to humanity is understood as a prerequisite for allowing the life of Christ to be actualized in the life of a person, not some act undertaken by an institution, as one might expect. Ebeling does not deny a role to the church, in that in worship God speaks to humanity, but even here the purpose of
gleichfalls nicht Gaben, sondern ihn selbst, sein Herz. Deshalb strahlt aber der Gottesdienst als besondere Veranstaltung in sämtliche Lebensfunktionen der Kirche hinein aus.”

104 Ibid., 363. The original German of this quotation reads: „Dem Menschen in seinem Gottesverhältnis zurechtzuhelfen, ihn dazu zu befreien, daß sein Leben selbst zum Gottesdienst wird…“
worship is to actualize the life of Christ in the believer. Thus, “spiritedness of a concrete ecclesial communion depends upon that which occurs in individual life.”

2.23 The Basis for the Unity of the Church, according to Ebeling

Having completed his description of the church as the body of Christ, Ebeling then turned toward explaining the existence of the church within the context of the four marks of the church; the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church. This study will limit its investigation in this section to what his explanation entails for the basis of the unity of the church and ecumenism. Ebeling began his discussion on the unity of the church by noting that no other facet of the church’s existence calls her own beliefs about herself into doubt more than the unity, or oneness, of the church. Thus, how one understands the unity of the church is a burning question that needs investigation.

According to Ebeling, “There never was unchallenged, unclouded unity in the church.” The broad expanse of church history testifies not only to the legitimate diversity within the church, but also to the unity of the church, a unity that has been disrupted many times, sometimes over how to understand the confessions and sometimes over attempts to impose uniformity over the church. He continues that the really crucial issues that divide the church appear only rarely, and then the only issues that lead to a justifiable division in the church are differences”… in the understanding of that which makes the church church,” which are also associated with issues about how to interpret the confessions. Yet, issues that do actually divide the church, even if, by

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105 Ibid., 366. „…hängt die Lebendigkeit einer kontreten kirchlichen Gemeinschaft von dem ab, was sich unvertretbar am Einzelnen vollzieht.”
106 Ibid., 371.
107 Ibid., 371. The original German reads: „In unbestrittener, ungetrübter Einheit hat es die Kirche nie gegeben.“ The in-line quotation just below in this paragraph is found on p. 372; the original German reads, „…im Verständnis dessen…was Kirche zur Kirche macht.“
implication, unjustifiably, are not limited to these issues over confessions. These issues often relate to living with one another in the church (i.e., personal rivalries) and so are issues that often threaten individual churches, if not particular congregations. Consequently, Ebeling concludes that “ultimately the problem of the unity of the church lies in this realized unity as communio and not in the host of binding institutions and organizations that connect them” [Emphasis mine].

He proposes that the ultimate basis of the unity of the church is Jesus Christ.

Even in the condition of disunity, the multiplicity of churches testifies through its, although controversially, nevertheless common relationship to the one Jesus Christ, in which the unity of church has its ultimate basis. From thence, the aspect of unity is in fact absolutely essential for the Christian faith and the dasein of church (1 Cor. 12:4-6, Eph. 4:4-6). Like Christ himself is one and indivisible (1 Cor. 1:13), so also his body is one.

This statement, of course, could be understood in several ways and accepted by most Christians in some form. Based upon this reading of the text, however, Ebeling seems to understand this claim about church unity as a present reality, not something to be striven for, which might be expected given the apparent divided state of the church today.

Moreover, none of these churches can make an exclusive claim to being the body of Christ. Ebeling wrote:

Although one indeed has become accustomed to speaking of the varied, oppositional churches, there are not several bodies of Christ. If one takes the understanding of the church as the body of Christ earnestly, then the

108 Ibid., 372. „An dieser sich als communio vollziehenden Einheit jedoch und nicht an der Menge der zusammenbindenden Institutionen und Ordnungen hängt letztlich das Problem der Einheit der Kirche.“

109 Ibid., 372-373. The original German reads: „Auch im Zustand des Zertrennteins bezeugt die Vielheit der Kirchen durch ihre, obwohl, strittige, doch eben gemeinsame Beziehung zu dem einen Jesus Christus, worin die Einheit von Kirche letztlich ihren Grund hat. Von daher ist der Gesichtspunkt der Einheit in der Tat für den christlichen Glauben und das Dasein von Kirche schlechterdings wesentlich (vgl. 1. Kor 12, 4-6 Eph 4,4-6). Wie Christus selbst einer ist und unteilbar (1. Kor 1,13), so ist auch sein Leib einer.“
exclusive identification of a particular church with it becomes impossible, which the ecumenical standing of baptism also emphasizes.\textsuperscript{110}

Given his earlier claim that there is a legitimate diversity within the church, I would argue that Ebeling seems to claim that what is needed within ecumenism is not an approach which takes the divided state of the church as a given, from which one would strive to attain church union, but rather an approach that takes as a given the already present unity of the church, from which one attempts to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate distinctions in the body of Christ, so as to come to a fuller appreciation of what it is that actually unifies the body of Christ, namely “only the word of Christ itself in its verbal and sacrament form…”\textsuperscript{111} This is the purpose of ecumenism for Ebeling, which is, of course, consistent with the findings in section 2.1 in the “foreword” of the \textit{Word of God and Tradition}. One implication drawn from this understanding of the ecumenical task would be a de-emphasis upon understanding church unity as primarily exemplified in institutional unity. This is supported by the text itself, for immediately following the above block quotation, Ebeling wrote:

But the outcome of this is such an understanding of the unity of the church, which emphatically relativizes the church-organizational view of unity to the unity of the body of Christ, which eludes organizational presentability. This unity is a reality despite all the schisms throughout the churches. The relativization does not make the question about what constitutes church communion in and between particular churches indifferent, but rather directs one’s view to the essential.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 373. „Man hat sich zwar daran gewöhnt, von verschiedenen gegensätzlichen Kirchen zu reden, aber es gibt nicht mehrere Leiber Christi. Nimmt man das Verständnis von Kirche als Leib Christi ernst, so wird die ausschließliche Identifikation einer Partikularkirche mit ihm unmöglich, was auch die ökumenische Geltung der Taufe unterstreicht.”

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 373. „…allein das Christuswort selbst in seiner verbalen und sakramentalen Gestalt…”

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 373. The original German reads: „Daraus ergibt sich aber ein solches Verständnis von Einheit der Kirche, das die kirchenorganisatorisch darstellbare Einheit nachdrücklich relativiert auf die Einheit des Leibes Christi, die sich organisatorischer Darstellbarkeit entzieht. Diese Einheit ist eine Realität trotz aller Kirchentrünnung quer durch alle Kirchen hindurch. Die Relativierung vergleichgültigt
And what would happen if one rejects Ebeling’s understanding of the present reality of the unity of the body of Christ and, instead, pushes on toward full institutional unity? He is quite clear on the consequences of such a move.

A maximalism, which wants to allow the unity to become recognized as perfectly as possible in all the manifestations of the life of the church, is in jeopardy of missing the main issue because of the unimportant, by impairing the life of the church through the establishment of a pseudo-unity and thus directly causing schism. 113

So, what does Ebeling himself have to say about the ecumenical implications for this understanding of the basis of church union?

All effort toward the unity of the church can witness at best only [to] that unity, which identifies its body by looking at Christ. Therefore it is urgent, instead of tinkering with the external symptoms, to turn to the unity of the basis of life itself. 114

Since this passage closely follows Ebeling’s warning against a maximalist understanding of church unity, this paragraph seems to say that ecumenism should not attempt to establish a maximalist understanding of the one, institutionally unified church, with common doctrine and a common polity, two characteristics of an institutional church which could legitimately be associated with his use of the phrase “external symptoms,” because, as seen above, his understanding of the church is the event of the unfolding of the life of Christ within the believer. The best that ecumenism can hope to establish is the determination of whether a particular church is indeed of the body of Christ by

113 Ibid., 373. “Ein Maximalismus, der die Einheit möglichst vollkommen an allen Lebensäußerungen der Kirche erkennbar werden lassen will, ist in Gefahr, über Nebensächlichkeiten die Hauptsache zu versäumen, durch die Herstellung von Pseudoeinheit das Leben der Kirche zu beeinträchtigen und so gerade Kirchenspaltung zu verursachen.”

114 Ibid., 374. „Alle Bemühung um die Einheit der Kirche kann bestenfalls nur diejenige Einheit bezeugen, die von Christus her dessen Leib bestimmt. Deshalb ist es vordringlich, statt an äußeren Symptomen herumzuflikken, sich der Einheit des Lebensgrundes selbst zuzuwenden.“
comparing its ecclesial life with that of Christ. This is why it is necessary to identify the basis of the Christian life itself, which, as seen above, is Christ himself. And Ebeling would seem to verify this reading, when we wrote in this same paragraph:

This attitude gives liberty to take real extremes seriously—how beneficial reflection about the catholic-evangelical difference can be—as well as accepting the legitimate differences in appreciative love, to recognize one’s limitations and at the same time to transcend it by recognizing diverse theological forms of thought and ecclesial life styles. We must not make our particular impression as the norm and impose it on others, no matter how ready we offer it to others, and may make use of the offer of others.\footnote{Ibid., 374. The original German reads: „Diese Einstellung gibt die Freiheit, echte Gegensätze ernst zu nehmen—wie förderlich kann doch das Nachdenken etwa über die katholisch-evangelische Differenz sein!—sowie die legitimen Verschiedenheiten in verständnisvoller Liebe gelten zu lassen, um die eigene Begrenztheit zu erkennen und sie zugleich zu transzendieren durch die Anerkennung verschiedener theologischer Denkstile und kirchlicher Lebensstile. Wir haben nicht die eigene Prägung zur Norm zu machen und anderen aufzunötigen, so bereitwillig wir sie als Angebot anderen darreichen und vom Angebot anderer Gebrauch machen dürfen.”}

So, what seems to be really important for Ebeling in ecumenical endeavors is that they should result in \textit{communio} between the participants, especially at the local level, where their unity in Jesus Christ should become clear, an emphasis that is consistent with his understanding of the life of the church as an unfolding of the life of Christ in the believer, as previously discovered.

A major task in reference to the unity of the church here forces itself upon the local levels; even there, where it today sometimes appears as sheer impossibility, namely to make something of the unity of the body of Christ experienced in the God-serving congregation and in this focus, to allow ecclesial existence to become clear, that they all are one in Christ Jesus (Gal 3:28). The greatness of this task shows itself there, that it reflects a fullness in the basic experience of the church.\footnote{Ibid., 374-375. „Eine Hauptaufgabe in bezug auf die Einheit der Kirche drängt sich hier auf der Gemeindeebene auf: gerade dort, wo es heute zuweilen als schier unmöglich erscheint, nämlich in der gottesdienstlichen Versammlung, etwas von der Einheit des Leibes Christi erfahrbar zu machen und an diesem Brennpunkt kirchlicher Existenz deutlich werden zu lassen, daß sie alle einer sind in Christus Jesus (Gal 3,28). Die Größe dieser Aufgabe zeigt sich daran, daß sie einen völlig auf das Grundgeschehen von Kirche zurückwirft.“}
In closing his treatment of the unity of the church, Ebeling gives his assessment of the significance of the public efforts for the unity of the church and a warning about their limits and dangers, all of which have already been discovered; Ebeling’s de-emphasis upon ecumenical declarations and agreements, his opposition to understanding the unity of the church as best exemplified in institutional union, and his concern that an emphasis upon institutional unity would cause confusion concerning the basis of church unity, or upon that which “makes the church, the church.”

In contrast, ecumenical efforts for the unity of the church, which so easily enjoy the attention of publicity, are, on the whole, of secondary importance. Their significance should not be underestimated, but their benefit is not ultimately measured by declarations and agreements, but rather by what they deliver for the basic experience of the church and what they achieve for the decisive life processes in the Christian congregations. Of course one [thing] must be rejected with all firmness: the opinion that establishing institutional church unity that culminates in a (hierarchal) peak is a consequence of the belief that the church is one. The only model that can be taken seriously for this, the papacy, proves a rebuttal at the same time. This understanding of church unity represents factually not only a utopia, but rather also causes a dangerous confusion in reference to what makes the church, the church.117

As will be seen, all of these concerns relate to Ebeling’s refusal to support the Joint Declaration.

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117 Ibid., 375. The original German reads: „Demgegenüber sind die ökumenischen Bemühungen um Einheit der Kirche im großen, die sich so leicht der Aufmerksamkeit der Öffentlichkeit erfreuen, von zweitrangiger Wichtigkeit. Ihre Bedeutung soll nicht unterschätzt werden, aber ihr Gewinn bemäßt sich letztlich nicht nach Deklarationen und Abmachungen, sondern danach, was sie für das Grundgeschehen von Kirche austragen und wie sie sich auf die entscheidenden Lebensvorgänge in den christlichen Gemeinden auswirken. Eines muß freilich mit aller Schärfe abgewiesen werden: Die Meinung, als liege die Herstellung der in einer Spitze gipfelnden institutionellen Kircheneinheit in der Konsequenz des Glaubens, daß die Kirche eine ist. Das einzig ernst zu nehmende Modell dafür, das Papsttum, liefert zugleich die Widerlegung. Dieses Verständnis von Kircheneinheit stellt nicht nur faktisch eine Utopia dar, sondern verursacht auch eine gefährliche Verwirrung in bezug auf das, was die Kirche zur Kirche macht.“
2.3 Proclamation as Interpretation, according to Ebeling’s *The Problem of Historicity in the Church and its Proclamation*

Before proceeding to an examination of the relationship between the word of God and church doctrine, which is a preliminary step to understanding the relationship between church and doctrine, a detour into Ebeling’s understanding of the relationship between the proclamation of the word of God and hermeneutics is necessary, since his understanding of doctrine is grounded in its role in making clear the proclamation of the word of God. A good way to begin this exploration of proclamation and hermeneutics is with the quotation of a paragraph found in *The Problem of Historicity* that seems to summarize the many facets of Ebeling’s thought concerning this issue. In this text, he wrote:

> The sermon must be interpretation because the word of Holy Scripture is historical, because proclamation is a historical process, and because the man to whom proclamation is addressed is historical along with the world. For the same reason interpretation must always be carried out anew and the sermon preached afresh. Therefore, theology necessarily always finds itself involved in constant change. There can be no *theologia perennis*, and even the historical reality of the church is necessarily subjected to continuous change.118

In order to understand why the sermon must be interpretation, there are two preliminary questions that must be addressed. First, why is Scripture historical? Second, why is proclamation a historical process?

So, why is Scripture historical? Ebeling explains that Holy Scripture is historical in two senses. First, Holy Scripture is historical, because both the Old and New Testaments have undergone a lengthy, complex historical process that led to their collection and canonization.119 While the Old Testament contains the literary tradition of the Jewish

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119 Ibid., 7-8.
people, the composition of which extended over centuries and whose collection was not fully completed until just after the time of Jesus, the writings of the New Testament were not completed until the latter half of the second century AD, and its collection not completed until the fourth century, AD. Moreover, what makes the Scriptures even more historically complex is the fact that the text itself often displays several strata of history. The New Testament often refers to the Old Testament, a phenomenon that displays the presence of three historical layers: the event that gave rise to the Old Testament text, the report of the event in the Old Testament, and the New Testament author’s interpretation of the Old Testament text that made it relevant for his purpose. This is not to say that Holy Scripture is a purely historical text. It is understood to be the word of God, but the process of handing it down is historical.\textsuperscript{120}

Second, the Scriptures are also historical, because they must be translated from their original language into a modern tongue.\textsuperscript{121} There are two, early crucial phases of this translation process. The first is the translation of Jesus’ original Aramaic speech and the Hebrew Old Testament into koine Greek, because “…the mode of thought of Hebrew man underwent translation into a linguistic form which was spiritually altogether different, the language of the Greek-Hellenistic man.”\textsuperscript{122} The second significant phase was the translation of the Greek Bible into the Latin Vulgate, which still influences theological debate today, because our entire theological language has been shaped by the translation of the Bible into Latin.\textsuperscript{123} These two phases of the translation of the Bible are important for Ebeling’s hermeneutical theology, because he argues that language, “…is no purely

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item [\textsuperscript{120}] Ibid., 9.
\item [\textsuperscript{121}] Ibid., 15.
\item [\textsuperscript{122}] Ibid., 16-17.
\item [\textsuperscript{123}] Ibid., 17.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
formal instrument or organ, nor is it a sort of empty vessel, which would mean that any
given content could be poured from one linguistic vessel into another.”  
Every language
has its own specific content and modes of thought, its own concepts and modes of con-
ceptualization, its own history, which is important, because all of this determine the
spiritual possibilities of its culture and shape the speaker. Thus, the mere process of
translating the Scriptures from one language to another involves the biblical message in
some sort of change and thus involves its interpretation in a host of theological
problems.

Let us return to the second question that will help clarify this introductory para-
graph. Proclamation of the word of God is historical, because proclamation is also
involved in the process of making the text intelligible to a modern hearer. Even once the
Scripture has been translated into a modern language, the text itself still needs to be
interpreted for a person hearing the word, because the translation itself remains in the
past, not only in the sense that the content of the ancient text may be foreign at times, but

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124 Ibid., 18-19. Ebeling also contends that this translation of the Greek Bible into the Latin
Vulgate fostered the schism between the Eastern and Western churches.
125 Ibid., 18-20. Ebeling gives one further insights into the difficulties of this task of interpretation
within the context of modern, enlightened, scientific thought, in his Introduction to a Theological Theory of
disturbing is not so much the question whether the task of interpretation can ever succeed, whether it is
possible for texts from a distant age and a strange context to utter their message in a new age and a new
context, whether the words frozen in a text can ever become living words again and give the power to say
something relevant at the present day. The question, in short, whether the spirit preserved in the letter can
once again become spirit through the letter, and yet in a certain sense against the letter, by creating the
presence of the spirit (for spirit by its very nature has this power of making present). The question, I
consider, is one which can straight away be answered in the affirmative, however wide-ranging and
profound the problems may be which this affirmative answer imposes…

What is disturbing is the question whether this fundamental and unquestioned affirmation of the
possibility of interpretation in at least some sense, gives any guarantee that the tradition of Christian
language in particular can survive in a changed era…Yet on principle we can subscribe to an answer to this
question which is as assured an affirmative as ever; for there are signs, incontestably present even in our
own time, that the tradition of Christian language is not only claiming but is finding the same interest as
before.”
also in the sense that language itself undergoes change; words undergo changes in meaning and concepts weaken over time, losing their capacity to express the word of God.  

I am now in a better position to explain the quotation at the beginning of this section. Proclamation of the word of God in a sermon is interpretation, not only because it involves the preacher selecting an appropriate text from the Old or New Testaments, both of which are written in ancient languages, but also because the preacher must make it intelligible for the modern hearer, whose language and conceptual world are different from that of antiquity. So, the reason why the sermon must be interpretive is the historical nature of human language. Ebeling wrote:

Man in this world of his...is historical man, caught up with the world in constant change, a man whose present life cannot be repeated, and who must therefore be addressed and confronted as the one he is now in his world. Consequently the word of the Scriptures, which was also spoken in a concrete historical setting, must be continually interpreted and translated into historical situations that are continually new. The only way in which we can say today, in a strict sense, what was said in the past it to say it today in a new and different way.

Thus, it is because of Ebeling’s understanding of humanity that he claims the sermon, proclamation, and Scripture are all historical. This is why, for Ebeling, any sermon must be continually “preached afresh” and there can be no “theologia perennis.” Moreover, a biblicism that merely reads the Scripture as proclamation, in an attempt to “…hold fast ____________

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126 Ebeling, The Problem of Historicity, 22-23. And what if someone cannot acknowledge the necessity of interpreting Christian language into modern language? In Introduction to a Theological Theory of Language, 33, Ebeling wrote of the consequences: “Most people will not acknowledge the challenge of such an attitude of conscious and reflective interpretation to the tradition of Christian language. They are not capable of the effort of making the double movement, standing aside from the tradition to examine it historically and then returning to it to interpret and recover it. They do not even see the necessity for this expenditure of energy. And even if their intellectual abilities and firm intent permit, they lack the time required to deal honestly with the problem. The consequences are catastrophic. Even those who want to be Christian and profess themselves such are seized with a profound uncertainty about the language of faith. They no longer know how to use the traditional Christian language in such a way that it can be applied honestly and effectively in our present-day context. Thus it is reduced to the level of a foreign language which is sometimes used, but only in exceptional situations.”

to the language of the Bible,” as a form of pious submission, which ignores the philosophical and political problems of the present, threatens proclamation itself, because:

…there is…a failure to take really seriously either the text of the Scriptures or the man to whom this text must be interpreted. Wherever this occurs, the task of interpretation has not been carried out.  

Now having a clearer understanding about why Ebeling considers proclamation and Scripture historical, one is in a better position to understand how he perceives the relationship between the word of God and church doctrine. But before doing so, one more observation needs to be pointed out. It has not been clearly stated so far, but it is clear from this investigation of the relationship between the word of God and hermeneutics that language is of vital importance for him. Based upon this reading of his *Introduction to a Theological Theory of Language*, there are two basic reasons. The first is displayed in the following quotation.

“The presence of the hidden” indicates what the decisive function and power of language consists of. It makes present what would not be immediately obvious. The function of language, therefore, is seen in a particularly impressive way in its power of transcending the present moment. It is able to make present what no longer exists and what does not yet exist. Without language we would have no relationship with the past and future; we would be imprisoned in the present moment and banished to our very immediate environment. The same is true of the transcendence that leads to the whole complex of circumstances in which what is immediately present to us is located, and from there to what it signifies, what is proclaimed in it and the thoughts it provokes.  

According to this quotation, language plays an important role in his theology, because it makes present that which is hidden, which, given the context of this quotation, is “God.” But it is more than that. Language reveals “the mystery of reality,” the whole

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128 Ibid., 27-28. The quotation itself is on p. 28.
transcendent context of our existence, including God as the ground of our existence, the understanding of any one part of which would require an understanding of the whole. But since, as previously seen in section 2.21 on his Dogmatik, the foundation of the church is the unfolding of the life of Christ in the believer, it would be expected that language would play a role in the unfolding of this life in the believer, since Christ is the actualization of God within the believer. This is not explicitly stated in this work, but Ebeling does allude to it when he wrote that his theological theory of language “…is ultimately intended to lead to the experience of the freedom of faith helping people to exercise love,” all of which sounds like a manifestation of the life of Christ within a believer.130

This leads to the second reason for the importance of language in his theology. He calls language a “second mother” who provides for the child’s future growth, by which “…the child’s journey out of the womb is continued. For the process by which man becomes human is by no means concluded with birth.”131 What this demonstrates is that, for Ebeling, language has an existential aspect, so that language deeply impacts the way in which a person exists, not only as a manifestation of God, but also as a human being. Perhaps they are the same. It will be another task of chapter three to see how both of these aspects of language are further developed in Ebeling’s theology.

130 Ibid., 210. This is also supported by what he wrote on page 216: “But if ever faith is nourished by its foundation, by Jesus Christ himself, it lives by the power of God’s love for man and gives way to this power. And where love flourishes, there man flourishes, there the true education of man flourishes and there too human relationships become more human.”

131 Ibid., 159.
2.4 The Church and the Role of Doctrine, according to *Word of God and Tradition* and *Word and Faith*


So now, what is the relationship between the word of God and church doctrine? Ebeling addressed this relationship in his essay, “Word of God and Church Doctrine,” by placing it within the context of the task of theology. He describes the task of theology as protecting the church from “positivism,” a claim upon God in disregard of his divinity, and a claim upon man in disregard of man’s nature, that can appear in many guises, such as “superstitution, moralism, legalism, or perversion of the truth.” Ruokanen, in *Hermeneutics as an Ecumenical Method*, 53, relates Ebeling’s desire to deny all forms of objectification of word and faith, in order to emphasize the Reformation’s understanding of the relationship of word and faith. He wrote: “In order to demonstrate the Reformatory principle of the word and faith Ebeling wishes to avoid any kind of objectification of them. He argues against all kinds of ‘significative hermeneutics’ which imply a metaphysical, objective understanding of the Christian faith. According to him, any theological method which strives for objective criteria or systems of rules promotes a ‘positivism’ that is totally alien to the Reformatory conception of the Christian faith. Ebeling sees it as his own mission in theology to overcome ‘rationalism’, ‘intellectualism’, ‘metaphysics’ and the ‘positivism of revelation’ in the interpretation of Christianity.” Why does Ebeling oppose this objectification? Ruokanen goes on to write that since the gospel becomes effective with the preaching of the word, it “…cannot be controlled by any rational means.” To do so would turn the Christian faith into law. According to Ruokanen on the next page, faith, for Ebeling, “…must be strictly distinguished from its doctrinal explications, otherwise it will have ‘a structure of pious righteousness by deeds.’”

Ebeling’s statement about protecting the Church from a positivism “…as a claim upon God in disregard of his divinity, and a claim upon man in disregard of man’s nature.” This quotation seems to relate to Ebeling’s discussion on Luther’s way of speaking about God in *Luther: An Introduction to his Thought*, trans. by R.A. Wilson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), 242-267. In this text, Ebeling argues that Luther did indeed think systematically, but his systematic abilities are not displayed in a system of doctrine that is to be believed in a “positivistic and historical sense.” It is systematic in the sense that all Christian doctrine points to the “doctrine of God.” Moreover, it is a complete misunderstanding of Luther to claim that his focus upon the doctrine of justification was an arbitrary choice. “According to Luther it [the doctrine of justification] points to the way in which God can be made God indeed in the whole of Christian doctrine. For the whole of Christian doctrine consists not of a profusion which forms a supplement to the doctrine of God itself, but of the doctrine of God and nothing more. Christian doctrine is a guide to the right way to speak of God” (pp. 247-248). And according to Ebeling, for Luther, the right way of speaking about God requires recognition of human limitations. “What must be realized is that in spite of the different ways in which it is applied, the recurrent word ‘alone’ expresses a fundamental theological
fulfills this task when it interprets the word of God, which occurs when God’s word encounters the conscience by faith. Thus, the task of theology is hermeneutical, not to present humanity with doctrine to be believed, but to meet the deepest need of humanity by pulling us from our “refusal to be contemporary,” and creating “true presence.”

Ebeling wrote:

The Word of God wishes to be grasped as the essential contemporary reality, that is, not as a temporary, passing, and partial meeting of the need, but as the abiding and all-sufficient necessity; its contemporary character deals with the need, and thereby creates true presence, since man’s deepest need arises from his refusal to be contemporary, and the deepest necessity of the Word of God is a present which creates true presence.

understanding: that whenever anything is said about God, it must be made fully evident that it is God who is being discussed. But if God is to be spoken of at all, then it is necessary for God’s sake to rely on God alone, on Christ alone, on the scripture alone, on the word alone, and on faith alone; that is, one must exclude everything which prevents God from being God, and which gives an opportunity of speaking of theological matters in an untheological or pseudo-theological way” (p. 246). In other words, when one is speaking of God, one must rely upon the experience of God in the creation of faith by the word, not relying upon some human conception, and not turn such discussion into positivistic, unchanging statements about the way God is, because doing so makes claims about the divinity that limited humans cannot make. This summary on the right way to speak about God in tacitly supported by Ebeling on p. 258 of this text, where he wrote: “Because God is being spoken of, so must man be spoken of. For self-knowledge and the knowledge of God form a unity, and the reason for this is that they are both concerned with an inseparable association which consists of something that happens. To know God means to know what God can and does do, not his power and his potentialities, but his power as it is actually at work in everything that exists, an omnipotence that is active. But if man has to know, for the sake of his salvation and his certainty, what he is capable of with regard to his salvation, then he evidently knows neither what he is capable of, nor what God is, until he knows for certain that he can do nothing toward his salvation.”

This emphasis upon sin being a refusal to come out of the past and be contemporary sounds somewhat like the position of Ebeling’s teacher, Rudolph Bultmann. And although it is beyond the scope of this study to prove any influence, it is still interesting to note the similarity. In “The Understanding of Man and the World in the New Testament and in the Greek World,” Essays, Philosophical and Theological, trans. by James C.G. Greig (London: SCM Press, 1955), 78-86, Bultmann argues that existence in New Testament thought is not attained in the realm of what happens in general, but “…in a concrete situation, in the here and now, in my individual responsibility and decision, where as I hazard myself I can gain or lose myself; that is, I stand as an individual in the presence of God” (p. 78). However, the choice of actions is not dictated by some ideal of human personality or community, as it is in Greek thought; it is revealed only by God’s command to love one’s neighbor. What the good demands is not made clear in abstract laws, but love sees what must be done in the concrete situation. Yet, one’s action is determined by one’s past, and to that extent, one is not free. But, one ought to decide as a free agent, which means that in every decision, the future calls the past into question and puts one to the decision: Will I cling to myself and refuse to come out of the past? Or, will I “surrender myself” by making “myself receptive to the future” which is making itself present to me in my present decision and which will transform me? Sin
This understanding of theology, that it leads to “true presence,” is, of course, consistent with Ebeling’s understanding of the foundation and function of the church, as found in the investigation into his *Dogmatik* in section 2.21 and 2.22, namely that the church is the life of God within people. And through interpretation, the word of God establishes itself in the person by creating faith. Thus, the task of theology is to make the word of God intelligible to the contemporary person, because, most importantly, “a Word of God which is not understood cannot be accepted as the Word of God.”

Church doctrine makes the word of God intelligible to the modern person by “setting theology in motion,” because it must respond, or witness, to the word of God. Ebeling wrote that the real task of Christianity is to meet the needs of the world, not the need of “united Confessional self-interests.”

So, even ecumenism, as popularly conceived, must take a “back-seat” to the need of proclaiming the gospel. The word of God meets the needs of the world by meeting humanity’s most pressing need, which is calling humanity forward from that which it believes to be its present necessity, which, as seen above, is really our refusal to come into the present instead of being stuck in the past, by creating faith and thus calling humanity forward into a real presence in God’s sight.

Church doctrine has an important role in fulfilling this task, but only to the extent that it serves the word of God does it serve the world, and if it does not serve the word, church

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136 Ibid., 164.
137 Ibid., 165.
doctrine can become a hindrance to the word in fulfilling this task, even orthodox doctrine.\textsuperscript{138}

Ebeling tried to make this relationship clearer by defining more precisely what church doctrine is in contrast to the word of God. Ebeling admits that the word of God is the basis for church doctrine, yet he distinguishes between them by claiming that, “…the Word of God is in itself that which is necessarily present, while Church doctrine as such is neither the absolute necessity, nor does it make the present reality contemporary.”\textsuperscript{139}

Seeing how it is the task of theology to make the word of God contemporary, which leads to “true presence,” one already gets the sense that doctrine plays only a supporting role to the word of God itself in his theology. Furthermore, Ebeling denies that the word of God is the content of church doctrine, because there is a fundamental difference in the nature of God’s word and church doctrine.\textsuperscript{140}

Ebeling admits that the distinction between the word of God and doctrine has been a long standing problem that is not easily understood. So, he attempts to clarify this distinction by comparing and contrasting Catholic and Protestant understandings of dogma. According to Ebeling,

\begin{quote}
In this usage [the Catholic understanding of “dogma”] we find expressed the conception of the stabilizing of Church doctrine from the beginning in a definite, authoritative form, guaranteed by an infallible court of appeal…In the Protestant usage of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries dogma was equated with \textit{articulus fidei}, with no suggestion of any defining or promulgating activity on the part of a representative ecclesiastical court of appeal, but, on the one hand, presupposing what is contained in Holy Scripture…and on the other hand, looking towards the liberating assurance
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 167.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., 164-166. The quotation is on p. 166.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 168.
for the conscience contained in the affirmations of the Confession of faith…141

And while a profession for a Catholic is “…the sworn adherence to a doctrinal formula put forward by the Church,” “a Confession arises for a Protestant as a responsive recognition of a fact,” the recognition of which requires personal responsibility, thus requiring theological study in order to recognize what constitutes a church.142 This distinction between profession and confession demonstrates to Ebeling that the Reformers and Catholicism have a different understanding of church doctrine, for while Catholic dogma is a stable doctrine, guaranteed by the Magisterium, for the Reformation, church doctrine is a response to a fact, an encounter with the word of God, which creates a “liberating assurance for the conscience” in the believer. Moreover, according to Ebeling, authority functions differently within each understanding, for while authority means being seized by “overwhelming authority” in faith which creates the “assurance of salvation” for a Protestant, thus “liberating the believer for service,” producing faith and love, making word and freedom essential partners in authority, for the Catholic, authority is the power to lay down the articles of belief.143 So, unless what is laid down for belief can appeal to one’s conscience, there are two different operations of authority at play here as well.

In closing this essay, Ebeling makes a few summary comments about the proper understanding of church doctrine.144 First, church doctrine not only has to be tested against the Scriptures to determine if it agrees with them, it also has to be a guide for the

141 Ibid., 174-175.
142 Ibid., 176.
143 Ibid., 177-179.
144 Ibid., 179-180.
conscience, liberating one for the service of preaching the gospel. Second, church
document should not strive to be a comprehensive summa of all articles of belief. This
would go beyond the only purpose of church doctrine, namely to identify what makes the
church, the church. Third, it should not be the aim of church doctrine to establish a
standard theology. The task of theology is to continually make God’s word intelligible to
humanity, not to identify stable doctrine. Finally, church doctrine must be understood as
a whole, because it witnesses to the [one] word of God. In reliance upon Luther, Ebeling
argues that if one article of it is given up, then the whole of it must be abandoned. In
other words, the whole doctrinal explanation of the word of God must be consistent and
so the abandonment of any one part of would entail changes in the rest of it.

2.42 The Relationship between the Church and Church Doctrine,
according to “The Significance of Doctrinal Differences for the
Division of the Church,” in Word and Faith; pp. 162-190.

Now let me go beyond the question about the relationship between the word of
God and church doctrine just a bit to a question about the relationship of church unity and
doctrine. How does doctrine impact the unity of the church? To answer this question, it
is necessary to turn to his essay, “The Significance of Doctrinal Differences for the
Division of the Church,” because it is in this essay that one can perceive further insights
into Ebeling’s understanding of the church through his discussion on true ecclesial unity,
and how doctrine functions in unifying the church. He began this explanation by
examining a passage from article VII of the Augsburg Confession.145 Ebeling wrote:

145 Article seven of the English translation of the German edition of the Augsburg Confession, as
found in The Book of Concord. The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, ed. by Robert Kolb
and Timothy J. Wengert, trans. by Charles Arand, Eric Gritsch, Robert Kolb, William Russell, James
Schaaf, Jane Strohl, and Timothy J. Wengert (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 42, reads: “It is also
taught that at all times there must be and remain one holy, Christian church. It is the assembly of all
What is the meaning of ‘vera unitas ecclesiae’? At all events not the organizational unity of an ecclesiastical body. That falls under the ‘nec necesse est’, including e.g. the apostolic succession. Since the church is in its essence one, what constitutes the unity of the church is nothing other than what makes the church its true self. What makes the church its true self, by definition makes the church una ecclesia.\textsuperscript{146}

So, what is crucial for church unity is agreement upon what makes the church “its true self.” This claim is buttressed by his reading of the \textit{Augsburg Confession}, which, according to Ebeling, does not address how to make the church one, but, instead, inquires about the essence of the Christian church, or in short, how to recognize the one church. So, once again, just as in the investigation of chapter 36 of his \textit{Dogmatik} in section 2.23, Ebeling begins with the basic unity of the church, not its present divided state. Given that article VII here, according to Ebeling, is directed against the Roman Catholic understanding of church unity, the point that the confession makes is that, “You must not make the unity of the church depend on anything else but what makes the church its true self,” an understanding of the church that must apply to the whole body of Christ, not an individual church, an interpretation he supports by the reliance upon Ephesians 4 in the confession. Ebeling once again finds problematic the Catholic notion of church unity.

With almost every question concerning the concept of the church the discussion is hopelessly encumbered by the one-sided identification of ‘church’ with an ecclesiastical body organized above congregational level—a thing which has implanted itself ineradicably in German usage but which, in spite of the difference in Greek and Latin usage, is really a

\begin{quote}
believers among whom the gospel is purely preached and the holy sacraments are administered according to the gospel.

For this is enough for the true unity of the Christian church that there the gospel is preached harmoniously according to a pure understanding and the sacraments are administered in conformity with the divine Word. It is not necessary for the true unity of the Christian church that uniform ceremonies, instituted by human beings, be observed everywhere. As Paul says in Ephesians 4[:4-5]: ‘There is one body and one Spirit, just as you were called to the one hope of your calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism.’\textsuperscript{146}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{146} Ebeling, “The Significance of Doctrinal Differences for the Division of the Church,” 181. The following in-line quotation is also found on this same page.
result of the early Catholic concept of the church and its understanding of the unity of the church. That understanding has left its mark on the phrase έκκλησία καθολική ever since its first appearance in Ignatius. I can therefore only consider it harmful and hopeless to seek to possess ourselves of the concept ‘Catholic’, ‘Catholicism’ in an evangelical sense...For the simple fact is, that the concept ‘Catholic’ involves the confusion of the vera unitas ecclesiae with the unitas of an ecclesiastical body—which means it involves the tendency to bind the holy, Christian Church ‘to place and time, to person and gesture, by means of laws and outward pomp’ (Schwabach Articles, 12).\footnote{147}

He does admit that a confession can be formative of an individual church, but not of the universal church as a whole.\footnote{148} A confession is not a church pronouncement on the word of God in doctrinal form, because that would place the church above the word, but rather, a confession always has a cause, an issue that triggers a response to the word of God by the church in which it identifies what constitutes the church’s true self. It is the word of God “coming to a new expression” in a new situation that called for the church to stand and defend itself against false doctrine. So, one cannot say that the utterance of new confessions is definitely at an end.

In conclusion, Ebeling says that any decision concerning what is necessary for church unity should not seek “…to attain the ideal of a numerically complete definition of all articles of faith,” nor should it impose “…the widest possible uniformity on theology.”\footnote{149} This is an erroneous view of how church doctrine and confession should function. Instead, it functions properly when it “…both frees us and obliges us to pursue unceasingly the theological task of identifying church doctrine.” Moreover, such a decision, such a consensus, “…must cover, but also be limited to, what makes the church its true self,” which, as he wrote earlier, is “…the preaching and the administration of the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[147] Ibid., 183-184.
\item[148] Ibid., 186-187.
\item[149] Ibid., 189.
\end{footnotes}
sacraments.”¹⁵⁰ Very significantly for ecumenism, Ebeling wrote that “only a doctrinal
difference as to what makes the church its true self can have divisive significance for the
church…” yet “the verdict on the divisive significance for the church of traditional
doctrinal differences is in principle open to revision.”¹⁵¹ He goes on to say that the
possibility of revision hangs on the question of whether the traditional doctrinal
differences are necessary to witness today to that which makes the church its true self.
This, of course, leaves open the hope that the traditional doctrinal differences between
Lutherans and Catholics on the doctrine of justification could be revised, which, on one
level, only makes Ebeling rejection of the JD more puzzling.

¹⁵⁰ This particular quotation is found on Ibid., 185.
¹⁵¹ The statement, “only a doctrinal difference as to what makes the church its true self can have
divisive significance for the church…” needs justification. Ebeling does not explicitly provide it in
summary form in this essay, yet the basis for it can be seen in three passages in this essay. First, he wrote
on p. 181, “Since the church is in its essence one, what constitutes the unity of the church is nothing other
than what makes the church its true self. What makes the church its true self, by definition makes the
church una ecclesia.” A little further down, he wrote, “…it is beyond doubt that the vera unitas ecclesiae
which is spoken of in Art. VII of the Augsburg Confession is the unity of the body of Christ…” Finally,
following the phrase “true self” down the text, he wrote on the next page, “There is no doubt that with the
event which makes the church its true self certain basic ordinances are laid down for the existence of the
church. It is obvious that in that respect special significance accrues to baptism and the Lord’s Supper. It
is only natural that out of these basic ordinances given with the act of the Word of God there arises the need
to safeguard them by forming an abundance of further church ordinances…..” Now, to construct the
justification. Begin with the phrase, “the act of the Word of God” in the previous quotation. This would
seem to refer back the speech event, introduced in section 1.12 as basic to Ebeling’s theology. In this
event, the word of God calls for faith in the hearer. As seen in the second quotation above, the true unity of
the church is the “unity of the body of Christ.” This is important, because as seen in section 2.21, Jesus
Christ is the foundation of the church, in that same word of God that gave rise to faith in Jesus by
promise, now calls for faith in the human listener through Christ. This is the act of justification, and this
same act also gives rise to the church, because the faith in this Christ, one Christ, is growing in the believer
(section 3.33), which yields one church. Thus, as said in the first quotation, “the church is in its essence
one.” And because the word of God works not only through proclamation (section 2.2), but also through
the sacraments, the basic ordinances that were laid down with the act of the word of God are baptism and the
Lord’s supper, as seen in this last quotation. Thus I would argue that, for Ebeling, to require anything
more of true church unity, such as some form of organization (p. 182), than requiring unity to be based
upon those modes through which the word of God acts (proclamation and sacraments) is to demand that
church unity be based upon law, not promise through the proclamation of the gospel and sacraments, which
humans cannot legitimately demand. Forms of organization are historically conditioned. Doctrine cannot
demand more, because the purpose of doctrine is to make the word of God intelligible, which cannot be
done if law and gospel are confused. To demand that the unity of the church be based upon some form of
organization is to not understand how the word of God acts. This, I would argue, is the justification for
claiming that “only a doctrinal difference as to what makes the church its true self can have divisive
significance for the church…”
2.5 Ecumenism, Church Doctrine, and Hermeneutics: A Summary

According to the research into the foreword to *The Word of God and Tradition* in section 2.1, the task of ecumenism for Ebeling is not to create church unity through doctrinal systematization and institutional organization, but to identify that which unites the various churches by becoming clear on that which really separates the churches. So, what is it that separates the churches? One layer of this division would have to be centered upon the various decisions about how to apply the word of God to a particular, contemporary situation, which makes it intelligible to the people living in that historical context. And because people not only live in ever changing historical contexts, but also pass on this context by an ever changing language, that which divides the church at this level would be the various interpretations of the word of God. This would be a legitimate implication of research into Ebeling’s *The Problem of Historicity* in section 2.3, which is also supported in the *Dogmatik*, where he notes that churches also divide in how to interpret the confessions. But, as Ebeling makes clear in his article “The Significance of Doctrinal Differences for the Division of the Church” in section 2.42, “only a doctrinal difference as to what makes the church its true self can have divisive significance for the church…” Thus, differences at this level, differences over the interpretation of the word of God, cannot be truly divisive for the church, unless they define the church’s “true self.” True church division over any other kind of doctrinal difference would be illegitimate.

So, what is it that *really* divides the Church? As he says in this same article, that difference would have to be that which makes the church its “true self,” or as he says in the *Dogmatik*, what makes “the church, the church.” So, what is it that constitutes the
church’s “true self”? It is “…the preaching and the administration of the sacraments.” But again, as he says in the *Dogmatik* in section 2.3, worship is nothing more than the unfolding of the life of Christ in the believer, the dwelling of God within humanity. This unfolding is what constitutes the church’s “true self”; it is what makes “the church, the church.” It is this that constitutes the foundation of the church, or as he says in the *Dogmatik* in section 2.23, it is this “…common relationship to the one Jesus Christ,” not institution or organization. This helps flesh out what Ebeling meant when he wrote in this same text, that “ultimately the problem of the unity of the church lies in this executed unity as *communio* and not in the host of binding institutions and arrangements…” In other words, Ebeling is more concerned with ecumenism at the local level, where the indwelling of God in humanity can be made clear, not in doctrinal agreements or institutional arrangements. This helps to make clear why, as Ebeling said in his *Dogmatik* in section 2.23, that the ecumenical endeavors that receive all the notoriety are of secondary importance, in comparison to their effects upon the life of the church and the local congregation.

Moreover, church unity has always existed, according to his *Dogmatik* in section 2.23 once again, although such a unity has not always been clear. This position on the present, continuing unity of the church clarifies why, for Ebeling, church unity is not something to be striven for, to be created by doctrinal consensus and common institutional organization, but rather something to be clarified and understood, recognizing legitimate from illegitimate distinctions in the body of Christ. So, I think it is reasonable to conclude that, for Ebeling, ecumenism should seek to “sharpen the differences” between the communions, in the expectation that such study would allow the
various communions to recognize that many of their divisions come from historical
decisions on how to interpret the word of God, which are not truly church dividing, but
which, in turn, would also allow the various churches to recognize their pre-existing unity
in the “one Jesus Christ” and how he comes to life in the believer. This is why it is
critical to identify the “ecclesial basic issues.” As he says in his *Dogmatik*, this is the
foundation for church unity. And if in this process it is recognized that there is a
divergence in how to understand the foundation of the church, about the church being
centered upon the unfolding of the life of Christ in the life of the believer, then
ecumenism would have recognized a true division in the church, and any attempt to push
on to doctrinal consensus beyond this divergence could, in fact, only strengthen the
divisions in the church, because they confuse people over what in fact is the basis for the
unity of the Church. This, I would argue, is Ebeling’s problem with making the papacy
and apostolic succession essential components of ecumenical discussions. They don’t
impact the unfolding of the life of Christ in the believer.

Now, what is the relationship between the task of the church and doctrine? Based
upon this study, the following picture emerges. As already established, since the
continuing unity of the church is a present fact, there is no need to seek complete
agreement on all articles of faith or uniformity in theology. Church unity is not
predicated upon institutional or doctrinal unity. According to his essay, “Word of God
and Church Doctrine” in section 2.41, doctrine is not a positive, objective statement about
divine truth to be believed, but rather is an ecclesial response to the word of God that
attempts to make that word clear to contemporary people. According to his *Dogmatik*, it
is the task of the church in its service to the world to proclaim the word of God, “to
rightly help man in his understanding of God, in addition to liberating him, that his life itself is service to God,” and according to his essay, “Word of God and Church Doctrine,” it is the task of church doctrine to make the word of God intelligible to the modern person by setting theology in motion, because “a Word of God which is not understood cannot be accepted as the Word of God.” Thus, doctrine needs to have room to be diverse, in order to allow the church to proclaim the word of God to different cultures intelligibly, translating the word of God into new languages and historical situations, so as, according to Ebeling’s *The Problem of Historicity* in section 2.3, to meet humanity’s deepest need in our refusal to become contemporary, firmly living in the past, being determined by the past, and refusing to come out and encounter God.

Once again, according to *The Problem of Historicity*, it is the task of the word of God, which itself has undergone several layers of interpretation due to its historical incarnation in Holy Scriptures, to encounter humanity in its ever changing historicity and draw us out into existence in the presence of God, creating faith and the assurance of salvation before God. But, according to his essay, “Word of God and Church Doctrine” in section 2.41, this means that the word of God cannot be enclosed in fixed, doctrinal formulas, with a fixed language, as in Catholicism, firmly attached to the past, because such formulas were created in a particular historical situation and with a particular language, both of which change and leave such doctrine unclear for subsequent generations. Such would be a positive conception of doctrine, because it would make claims upon God which are inconsistent with God’s divinity, making statements about God that historical beings ought not to make, while it would also assume a non-historical understanding of humanity, which would form the necessary condition for the existence of non-historical, positive
doctrinal statements. It is the hermeneutical task of theology to make the word of God intelligible to these generations, which means that theology has an “inexhaustible task,” forever updating church doctrine so that it may witness to the word of God in every generation. This is what Ebeling means by claiming that there can be no “perennial theology.” In other word, the formation of doctrine is a human task, a response to being encountered by the word of God. So, although such doctrine clearly witnesses to the fact that the word of God can be humanly understood, doctrine needs to be flexible enough to present the word of God to a new generation, and if it does not remain flexible and thus intelligible to these subsequent generations, even orthodox doctrine can be a positive barrier to the intelligibility of the word of God. Thus, as Ebeling wrote in his essay, “The Significance of Doctrinal Differences for the Division of the Church” in section 2.42, any attempt to place the unity of the church in an ecclesial body would bind the church “to time and place, to person and gesture,” as in Catholicism, thus making it difficult, if not impossible, for the church to fulfill its role, because it would be unable to translate God’s revelation in Jesus Christ into other languages, ages, modes of thought, and situations, thus making it impossible for humanity to understand God’s word.

This chapter has developed what one could call the broader context for understanding why Ebeling might object to the ecumenical method of the Joint Declaration and why doctrinal consensus is not necessary for church unity, the development of which will be a task for chapter four. These are important discoveries, but, the Joint Declaration is a declaration on the doctrine of justification, and this study, so far, has unearthed very little about how Ebeling understands the person to be justified before God. Based upon this study of Ebeling’s The Problem of Historicity in section 2.3, I can claim, for
Ebeling, at this point that it is the task of the word of God to encounter humanity in its ever changing historicity and draw us out to existence in the presence of God, creating faith and the assurance of salvation before God. This could be understood as a “thumb-nail” sketch of Ebeling’s understanding of justification. But not only does this does not provide any details about why he objected to the Joint Declaration’s explanation of the doctrine of justification, which, according to the German letters of protest, he most certainly did, it does not really help in understanding what it means for a person to be drawn out into the presence of God, which is the hermeneutical task of theology. What this means is that this study is incomplete at this point, since it is one of this dissertation’s tasks to explain why Ebeling objected to the Joint Declaration’s doctrine of justification.

This chapter, however, has provided clues about how to proceed. According to this study so far, it is not enough just to understand how the word of God creates faith and the unfolding of the life of Christ in the believer. It must also proceed into an investigation into the historical nature of human existence, as an effect of the word, since the understanding of the word of God in ever-changing human situations is one of the primary features of Ebeling’s hermeneutical theology. Moreover, this chapter’s brief foray into the importance of language for Ebeling suggests that language itself might play a significant role in the unfolding of the life of Christ in the believer, not to mention the other facets of human existence that it may well shape, any of which could also impact how the life of Christ is unfolded in the believer. Thus, if this study is to be complete, it must not only study Ebeling’s understanding of the doctrine of justification, it must also investigate his anthropology and how language itself makes possible one’s justification before God. This is the task of chapter three.
3.0 Chapter 3: The Doctrine of Justification, according to Gerhard Ebeling: A Study in the Hermeneutical Anthropology of Martin Luther

It is the task of this chapter to clarify how Gerhard Ebeling understands the doctrine of justification, within the context of his hermeneutic and its anthropological basis, so that I can present the theological justification for Ebeling’s rejection of the Joint Declaration, which will be the task of the next chapter. One noted Lutheran ecumenist, Dr. Michael Root, would concur with the judgment from the previous chapter on the significance of anthropology in clarifying the doctrine of justification, since he wrote in his article, “Aquinas, Merit, and Reformation Theology after the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification”:

Lutheran theology needs to spell out far more clearly the nature of the human self and its activity, not only in justification, i.e., that relation in which the self stands acceptable before God’s judgment, but throughout the Christian life, including the movement in which we are transformed from persons in whom sin rules, to be persons in whom sin is ruled over, and finally to be, in eschatological perfection, persons from whom sin is excluded.

Dr. Root lays this challenge down to Lutheran theology to define its anthropology after noting that, although the difference between Aquinas and the Apology of the Augsburg Confession concerning the doctrine of merit is small, any notion of human cooperation is intensely rejected in a modern Lutheran theology, such as that of Gerhard Forde. In this article, Dr. Root attempts to show that one of the factors that has made any Lutheran

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152 By “hermeneutical anthropology,” I mean an understanding of the human person, whose existence is created and shaped by language. At the center of this conception stands the “word-event.”
appreciation of merit in Catholic theology difficult is the disappearance of a teleological framework within which the doctrine functions in Thomistic theology.\textsuperscript{154}

Although such an approach might have its usefulness among certain circles, the problem with adopting it for this study is that it was implicitly rejected by Ebeling long before it was suggested by Dr. Root. Dr. Ebeling could not agree with the assessment that the difference between Thomas and Lutheran theology on merit is negligible. On the contrary, the difference is very significant. Thus, its utility in acceptably describing the doctrine of merit to those whose theology is similar to Ebeling’s, such as Forde, is already cast into doubt. But, why did Ebeling reject the doctrine of merit?

In his article, Dr. Root used Joseph Wawrykow’s 1995 historically focused monograph, \textit{God’s Grace and Human Action: ‘Merit’ in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas}, as his source for Thomas’ understanding of the doctrine of merit.\textsuperscript{155} Although I would have to praise the historical detail and doctrinal analysis of Dr. Wawrykow’s work, when it is compared to chapter 46 of Gerhard Ebeling’s 1979-1989 \textit{Lutherstudien}, “Verdienstliches Tun aus eigener Kraft (Th. 27),” in which Ebeling analyzed Thomas’ conception of meritorious work under one’s own power within the context of scholasticism, there is little in the broad outline of Wawrykow’s presentation of Thomas’ mature doctrine of merit that Ebeling would find revealing. First, both of them place

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 15-18.

\textsuperscript{155} I, however, would argue that Joseph P. Wawrykow’s dissertation, \textit{God’s Grace and Human Action: ‘Merit’ in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas} (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995) has a secondary ecumenical focus. In the preface, vii, he wrote, “It is hoped that a second set of readers will also find this book of interest, those concerned primarily with the Reformation and the later reception of high medieval teachings” [emphasis mine]. Given that this dissertation was directed by George Lindbeck (Acknowledgements, x), a participant in ecumenical discussions between Lutherans and Catholics, I think that it is a reasonable interpretation of the above quotation to understand that this second set of readers would be ecumenists involved in these discussions, which the reception of medieval teachings continue to impact.
Thomas’ treatment of merit within the context of God’s plan of creation and redemption, and the role of free will in the execution of this plan. In other words, both place the doctrine of merit within the context of teleology. Second, both basically agree upon the limitations of human nature and the necessity of supernatural grace for the attainment of eternal life in Thomas’ thought. And finally, and more importantly, there is basic agreement between Ebeling and Wawrykow on what, according to Thomas, can be truly merited.

156 Gerhard Ebeling, “Verdienstliches Tun aus eigener Kraft (Th. 27),” *Lutherstudien*, vol. 2, pt. 3 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1989), 298-299, noted that, for Thomas, a meritorious action requires the human person to cooperate with God in moving toward an eternal goal through free will (liberium arbitrium). Similarly, Wawrykow, 151-154, argued that, for Thomas, the concept of merit is worked out within the context of God’s goodness and wisdom, in which God created all creatures, giving them an appropriate nature, activity, and goal, which is to express the goodness of God in a manner that is appropriate to that creature. On p. 152, Wawrykow wrote: “Every creature is designed (ordained, disposed) to proclaim the divine goodness in the manner appropriate to it. By its nature, the creature recalls some aspect of the divine nature. Human nature, with its capacity for thinking and willing, for example, imitates the divine intelligence and will, although clearly falling short of the divine nature.” And since it is not a mark of providence to destroy nature, God does not treat creatures as “mere puppets,” but uses their nature to fulfill God’s plan, which, in the case of humans, means that God fulfills this goal by humans exercising their intellect and will, and so contribute to the fulfillment of God’s plan; ibid., 154-156.

157 According to Wawrykow, 156-157, God determined to call certain rational creatures to a higher life, an “immediate vision of God,” a calling which is beyond the capabilities of human nature. So, when God calls such creatures to this higher life, God gives them the grace necessary in order to make it possible for these creatures to actualize this higher goal of life with God. Moreover, not only does the attainment of this higher calling require God’s grace to elevate human nature, Wawrykow’s analysis of ST IaIIae, q.114, a.2, points out that the distance between humanity and God is not only ontological, it is also moral, because humanity has sinned and offended God; ibid., 190-193. Thus, grace must not only elevate human nature, it must also remove the sin that stands between God and humanity.

Based upon this reading of Ebeling’s enumeration of Thomas’ two strong reservations that he had in accepting the doctrine of merit in “Verdienstliches Tun,” 300, he would agree with Wawrykow that, for Thomas, because “…eternal life cannot be merited by pure nature without grace. Because this goal lies beyond was is appropriate to the creaturliness…”(emphasis mine), humanity needs supernatural grace in order to attain this goal. Moreover, because humanity lives in sin, “…it is more than ever impossible, to merit eternal life, without prior reconciliation with God through grace” (emphasis mine). The original German of the first quotation reads; „das ewige Leben könne ohne Gnade per pura naturalia nicht verdient werden. Denn dieses Ziel liegt über das hinaus, was dem Kreatürlichen…angemessen ist.” The German of the second quotation reads; „es heis erst recht unmöglich ist, das ewige Leben zu verdienen, ohne vorherige Versöhnung mit Gott durch die Gnade.” All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.

158 According to Ebeling, merit, in a general sense, truly worthy of a reward, a *meritum de condigno*, is impossible without grace. From a natural standpoint, the only type of merit that exists is *meritum de congruo*, a merit which reflects the distance between the creator and the creature. In ibid., 301, Ebeling wrote: “On the part of men (from free will ), a fully-valid merit, worthy of reward, is impossible, no *meritum de condigno*, but rather only a *meritum de congruo*, merely a distantly corresponding one. A *meritum de condigno* needs the grace of the Holy Spirit.” The original German reads: „Seitens des
Yet, given all of this commonality in reading Thomas on the doctrine of merit, Ebeling points out that Luther still rejected it as an adequate account of human action before God. Much of Ebeling’s treatment of the doctrine of merit in this article is a careful historical distinction between the doctrine of Thomas and that of the nominalists, whom he credits with the disintegration of Thomas’ carefully balanced doctrine due to their reflection upon God’s *potentia absoluta.* Yet, in Ebeling’s judgment, Luther’s rejection of the nominalist understanding of the doctrine of merit was not limited to its nominalist forms. Ebeling wrote:

> These statements, that are clearly directed against nominalist axiomatic statements, however, must not be regarded as the critical rationale for Luther’s rejection of the doctrine of meritorious work generally. Then it would be an argument only against the least problematic form of the doctrine. For Luther, rather, the thought of a meritorious work before or after the reception of grace is plainly a delusion. The *so admirably balanced doctrine* of merit by Thomas also falls under this judgment for him. The basis for it lies in Luther’s understanding of justification, about which we deal later. *Here, once again let us again make reference to the fact that the dispute is not to be pursued within the framework provided by scholasticism, but this itself rather is placed in doubt.* (Emphases mine)

Menschen (ex libero arbitrio) kann es unmöglich ein vollgültiges, des Lohnes würdiges Verdienst sein, kein meritum de condigno, sondern nur ein meritum de congruo, ein bloß von ferne entsprechendes. Ein meritum de condigno bedarf der Gnade des heiligen Geistes.”

Similarly, Wawrykow, 209-211, 219-220, argues that Thomas clearly denied that it is possible to merit first grace (*auxilium*) or the grace required for reparation after a relapse into sin. Moreover, in his analysis of ST IaIIae, q.114, a.1 concerning the possibility of merit, Wawrykow, 180-181, showed that Thomas was indeed aware of objections lodged against the claim that one can obtain a right for a reward from God, the first of which is that claiming merit before God threatens the divine transcendence, implying an equality with God that simply does not exist. According to Wawrykow, Thomas acknowledged the legitimacy of this objection, and admitted that, strictly speaking, there is no merit of people before God, because, as Thomas says, of “…the greatest inequality between God and man.” Nevertheless, according to Wawrykow, Thomas believed that it is possible to speak in a restricted sense about merit before God, because in rewarding one for good works, “God is simply being faithful to the divine ordination which lies at the basis of merit.” In other words, one can justifiably speak of merit before God merely because God declared that good works would be rewarded.

159 Ebeling, “Verdienstliches Tun,” 301-308, particularly 302.

160 Ibid., 311-312. The original German reads: „Diese Aussagen, die sich deutlich gegen nominalistische Spitzensätze richten, dürfen jedoch nicht als die ausschlaggebende Begründung für Luthers Verwerfung der Lehre vom verdienstlichen Werk überhaupt angesehen werden. Dann wäre es ein
So, ultimately, this fine distinction that Ebeling has been drawing between Thomas and the later nominalists, so as to demonstrate the range of scholastic teaching on merit and identify the real target of Luther’s rejection, is irrelevant to Luther’s rejection of the doctrine, according to Ebeling, because Luther’s problem with the doctrine of merit cannot be understood within the nature/grace framework provided by scholasticism. In fact, this scholastic framework, including Thomas’ theology itself, is part of the problem. But why, according to Ebeling, did Luther reject these forms of scholasticism? The answer to such a question will require further investigation into the distinctions between Luther’s thought and that of his understanding of scholasticism, as presented by Ebeling, which will lead into an investigation of his hermeneutical anthropology. Yet, what is clear at this point is that Ebeling could not accept Dr. Root’s judgment that the difference between Thomas and Lutheran theology over the doctrine of merit is small, even thought he could recognize the accuracy of Dr. Root’s account of Thomas’ doctrine of merit. But in order to understand why their judgments differ, an in-depth investigation into Ebeling’s study of Luther’s rejection of scholastic thought is required.

This chapter will proceed in the following manner. It will be divided into three parts, each followed with its own summary of significant findings. The first part, sections 3.111, 3.112, and 3.12, will investigate Ebeling’s rejection of scholastic theology
and anthropology. It will primarily rely upon two texts, both of which are found in
volume two, part three of his *Lutherstudien*, which is dedicated to investigating Luther’s
*Disputatio de homine*. The first is Ebeling’s study of Luther’s rejection of the scholastic
method in chapter 51 of his *Lutherstudien*, “Die Grunddifferenz zur Scholastik (Th. 31).”
The second text is more focused upon anthropology, specifically Luther’s rejection of the
scholastic understanding of sin; chapter 46 of his *Lutherstudien*, “Die menschliche Natur
nach dem Fall (Th. 26).” The second part, sections 3.21 through 3.23, will then construct
a coherent picture of Ebeling’s anthropology, which will rely upon four texts. The first
two texts are taken from volume one of his *Lutherstudien*, which is dedicated to
investigating hermeneutical and fundamental theological issues in Luther’s theology.161
Those texts are “Die Rolle der Hermeneutik in Luthers Theologie” and “Das Problem des
Natürlichen bei Luther,” both of which set the stage for understanding why hermeneutics
and anthropology are important in Luther’s theology, as read by Ebeling. The third text,
“Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis,” was written for publication in the *Zeitschrift für
Theologie und Kirche* and concerns Luther’s understanding of reality and why the
concept of “person” became so important to Luther.162 This final text used in this part
comes from volume two, part three of his *Lutherstudien*, which presents some crucial
insights into the relationship between Christ and the human person in Luther’s theology;
chapter 41, “Das Verhältnis von Christologie und Anthropologie.” The final part of this

1971), vi.
162 According to Ebeling, “Mein Theologischer Weg,” 62, he mentions, in passing, an essay that he
wrote, which was limited to Luther and appeared very late in 1993. In this text he claims that this essay
had its origins in his inaugural lecture of 1956 in Zurich on theology and reality, in which posed the
ontological question in relation to theology. Although he does not mention “Luthers Wirklichkeits-
verständnis” by name, it has all the appearances of being this essay. Thus, although this essay is a late
essay, it contains themes that Ebeling dealt with for much of his theological career and so is a significant
piece on his understanding of reality and related themes.
chapter, sections 3.31 through 3.32, will then investigate Ebeling’s understanding of the doctrine of justification, within the context of his hermeneutical anthropology. There are three basic texts for this section, all from volume two, part three of his *Lutherstudien*: chapter 55, “Rechtfertigungslehre und Anthropologie”; section 2 of chapter 56, “Bestimmung des Menschen nach allen causae (Th. 35-38): Der homo iustificandus nach den vier causae”; and chapter 62, “Cooperatores Dei,” which returns to Luther’s rejection of the doctrine of merit. Occasionally Ebeling’s monograph, *Luther: An Introduction to his Thought*, will be brought in to provide corroborating evidence. Because many of these texts are still not translated, much of this chapter is basic translation and exegesis. But, following these basically exegetical sections, this study will then summarize the findings of this chapter, which will involve developing an understanding of four issues: How does Luther understand justification, according to Ebeling? What is the role of human agency in justification? How does this doctrine of justification entail the rejection of the doctrine of merit? And finally, how does Luther’s understanding of God influence his doctrine of justification?

But, before continuing on, one additional methodological question of extreme importance to this study needs to be addressed. If this study’s concern is to clarify Ebeling’s doctrine of justification and his hermeneutical anthropology, then why concentrate upon his historical investigations into Luther’s theology, as found in his *Lutherstudien*? After all, Ebeling himself described the main point of this work in the preface to volume one to lie, “…in the historical examination of details.”\(^\text{163}\) Thus, this text would have to be considered a work in historical theology, not systematics. In fact,

\(^{163}\) Ebeling, “Vorwort,” v. The original German reads: „…in der historischen Detailuntersuchung.“
as this chapter progresses, the scope of Ebeling’s historical treatment of Luther should only confirm this. It is my contention, however, that in examining Luther’s hermeneutic, and its underlying anthropology, Ebeling found his own theological method. So, in examining what is reportedly a historical study of Luther’s hermeneutic, one is also examining the methodological basis of Ebeling’s systematic theology itself.

Toward the end of his life, Gerhard Ebeling wrote a short piece that he titled, “Mein theologischer Weg.” It is a brief account of some of the events that shaped his life as a theologian and some of the choices that he made as a result. Rarely, however, does he reflect in any real depth upon these events and choices or how his life and work affected the church and academia, and so create a coherent picture of his life’s work and its broader significance. All in all, it’s an all too brief, cursory little work. Thus, it is with good cause that he declares at the beginning, “I do not want to write an autobiography.” Nonetheless, it is a good source about Ebeling’s life, since it comes from the doctor himself.

At one point, however, Ebeling does reflect in some depth upon the growing conflict about his profession as an historical or systematic theologian that was growing at Tübingen during the late 1940s. Concerning this relationship, he wrote:

As far as my theological direction in Tübingen is concerned, the brief comparison of my Habilitation and the inaugural lecture had already raised the suspicion that my interest in history conflicted with my emphasis on systematic theology. This danger exists indeed. Exactly then for that reason I began to take this danger seriously, to recognize its substance, and to begin dealing with it correctly. Now it is two different things to examine and depict a church historical subject historically and to establish and develop a theological dogma dogmatically. But the

questions and methods can overlap. [Emphasis mine] Just as the
dogmatician is dependent in his work on tradition and has to deal with it
historically and objectively, the church historian cannot neglect to deal
with the question of what and in which respect something is part of his
scholarly work and how the theological relevancy must be understood.
Both are dealing respectively also with issues of interpretation, criticism,
and methodology. In so far the theological disciplines can only be
separated from one another in a limited way. A systematician who does
not understand anything about church history and a church historian who
has no theological judgment are both qualified only in a limited way.165

This admission that the questions and methods of each discipline overlap is important,
because in Ebeling’s thought, they cross over in interpretive and hermeneutical
methodology. In fact, his interest in hermeneutics is so strong, that, as he admits in the
next paragraph, it actually impeded his study in confessional theology and its methods.

Since the beginning of my studies Luther’s theology especially claimed
my attention. For me it had an urgency that likewise from the beginning
caught and absorbed my awakened hermeneutic interest. It became not an
accidental object of hermeneutic questions, rather the place where it
became for me especially explosive. This had already become apparent in
my dissertation and only needed new attention: not solely in regard to the
interpretation of the gospels but rather to Luther’s interpretation of
scripture and his way of thinking generally.166

165 Ibid., 55-56. „Was nun das theologische Wegstück meiner Tübinger Zeit betrifft, so hatte
bereits der kurze Vergleich von Habilitationsschrift und Probevorlesung den Verdacht geweckt, mit der
Hinwendung zum Historischen sei die Neigung zum Systematischen in Konflikt geraten. Diese Gefahr
besteht in der Tat. Eben deshalb habe ich mich ja darauf eingelassen, diese Gefahr ernst zu nehmen, ihr
Wesen zu erkennen und dazu anzuleiten, recht damit umzugehen. Nun ist es allerdings zweierlei, einen
kirchengeschichtlichen Sachverhalt historisch zu untersuchen und darzustellen oder einen theologischen
Lehrgehalt dogmatisch zu begründen und zu entfalten. Dabei könnten sich aber die Fragestellungen und
Verfahrensweisen überschneiden. Wie der Dogmatiker bei seiner Arbeit auf Überlieferetes angewiesen ist
und sich damit historisch und sachlich auseinandersetzen muß, so kommt der Kirchenhistoriker nicht daran
vorbei, sich der Frage zu stellen, was und in welcher Hinsicht etwas zu seinem Arbeitsbereich gehört und
wie dabei das theologisch Relevante zu verstehen ist. Beide haben es je in ihrer Hinsicht auch mit
interpretatorischen, sachkritischen und methodologischen Aufgaben zu tun. Insofern sind die theologischen
Disziplinen nur beschränkt voneinander zu trennen. Ein Systematiker, der nichts von Kirchengeschichte
versteht, und ein Kirchenhistoriker, der kein theologisches Urteilsvermögen hat, sind beide nur beschränkt
tauglich."

166 Ibid., 57. „...daß mich seit Beginn des Studiums in besonderem Maße die Theologie Luthers
in Anspruch genommen hat. Ihr kam für mich eine Dringlichkeit zu, die das ebenfalls von Anfang an in mir
geweckte hermeneutische Interesse auf sich zog und absorbierite. Sie wurde nicht ein zufälliges Objekt
hermeneutischer Fragestellung, vielmehr der Ort, wo diese für mich besonders brisant wurde. In meiner
A reasonable inference from this admission is that Luther is the source of his hermeneutical methodology, because Luther’s theology “absorbed” his hermeneutical interest, in a way that he described as “explosive,” an interest that seems to have existed throughout his life. This devotion to Luther is also confirmed in this same foreword to the *Lutherstudien*, where he wrote in defense of the historical character of this text:

> I am certainly not of the opinion, that the task of systematic theology can be solved by a type of Luther scholasticism, but permit me to confess gladly to the experience, to becoming taken in by no theological thought so deep in the object of theology as by Luther.

So, in examining those historical essays directly related to Luther’s hermeneutic and its anthropological foundation in his *Lutherstudien*, one of his last great investigations into what one might term “His first great love,” there is justification in claiming that I am actually studying the basis of Ebeling’s systematic methodology and conceptualization itself. Thus, it is not in vain that I am investigating this text.

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Dissertation war dies bereits zutage getreten und bedurfte nun einer neuen Zuwendung: im Hinblick nicht allein auf die Evangelienauslegung, sondern auf Luthers Schriftauslegung und Denkweise überhaupt.”

167 In the foreword to the *Lutherstudien*, vol. 1, v, Ebeling even admits to having an interdisciplinary interest in Luther.

168 Ibid., v. „Ich bin durchaus nicht der Meinung, daß die Aufgabe systematischer Theologie durch eine Art Luther-Scholastik zu lösen sei, bekenne mich aber gern zu der Erfahrung, durch keinen theologischen Denker so tief in die Sache der Theologie hineingeholt zu werden wie durch Luther.“

169 Another way to demonstrate that Ebeling’s historical study into the hermeneutics and methodology of Luther has not only deeply influenced his systematic theology, but is also the source of his hermeneutical methodology is to identify similarities between Luther’s historical position, as presented in this study, and Ebeling’s systematic position, as identified in some of his other systematic works. This concurrence will be demonstrated in footnotes whenever possible (See notes 212 and 215)
3.1 Ebeling’s Rejection of Scholastic Theology and Anthropology

3.11 Luther’s Identification of Nature and Sin, as Found in Ebeling’s Lutherstudien II.3, ch. 51, “Die Grunddifferenz zur Scholastik (Th. 31)”

3.111 Luther’s Rejection of the Scholastic Categories of Nature and Grace, and Their Replacement with Law and Gospel

One of the best places to begin this study on Ebeling’s rejection of scholastic theology is chapter 51 of his Lutherstudien II.3, “Die Grunddifferenz zur Scholastik (Th. 31),” where he deals specifically with the differences between Luther’s thought and that of scholasticism. Ebeling began the second part of this chapter by describing how scholastic theology distinguishes between, yet harmonizes, nature and grace. He notes that the coordination of nature and grace, as well as reason and revelation, in scholasticism orients the Christian life and makes theological statements and concepts understandable, such as what humanity is and does by nature, both free from and under sin, who God is, and what must be done by the person and by God to heal the damage of sin. This is not to say that scholastic theology confuses the human and divine. This coordination needs to be carefully distinguished within boundaries “set up by the Christian faith,” so that “…humanity, although sinner, still remains the creature of God and God, although almighty, nevertheless does not violate humanity.”

coordination of nature and grace requires an “ontological continuity” [German words: ontologische Kontinuität], otherwise this coordination between the creature and God, between humanity before and after the fall, and between the sinner and the graced person

171 Ibid., 377. „daß der Mensch, obwohl Sünder, dennoch Gottes Geschöpf bleibt und Gott, obwohl allmächtig, dennoch den Menschen nicht vergewaltigt.“
is threatened with fracture. The apparently neutral four-fold conception of cause, and the distinctions between *substantia* and *accidens*, *materia* and *forma*, and *qualitas* and *relatio* serve this purpose.\textsuperscript{172}

But this delicate balance between nature and grace can be easily disrupted, thus actually destroying this coordination.\textsuperscript{173} For example, natural reason could easily become authoritative in the area of theological judgment and grace could assert its primacy in the area of rational thought. But even if reason remains subordinate to grace, the purity of both is jeopardized. Moreover, nature as substance can be confused with grace, and when this happens, grace becomes an “inherent quality” of the substance. So, within the context of movement toward an eternal goal, inherent grace attains the character of an inner “…virtue, which serves more perfectly to bring out the required acts with increasing ease.”\textsuperscript{174} This has the consequence of linking thought about redemption from sin to the concept of human perfection; a supernatural goal made possible by inherent supernatural grace. Grace, thus, loses its extrinsic nature.

Yet, even given the problematic nature of this relationship, didn’t Luther actually use such categories in his own theologizing? Ebeling admits that the concepts of nature and grace are found in Luther’s works, but he argues that Luther transformed their meaning and rejected the scholastic concordance of nature and grace, because their relationship is “antithetical,” not “coordinated.” Why? He did this, because “*gratia* is oriented only to God, *natura* only to itself. *Gratia* searches for God in all things, *natura*, however, for itself alone. *Gratia* gives the heart the true alignment, making it *cor rectum*,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 378.
\item \textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 378-379.
\item \textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 379. „…einer virtus, die dazu dient, die erforderlichen Akte zunehmend leichter und vollkommener hervorzubringen.”
\end{itemize}
granting *spiritus rectus*... *Natura*, on the contrary, is distorted in itself and judges everything according to what suits it...”175 This antithesis between grace and nature is identified by its “concentration on sin,” which almost identifies nature with sin.

According to Ebeling, this antithesis is found in Luther’s *scholion* on Rom. 8:3 of 1515-16, which reads:

“In vain do some people magnify the light of nature and compare it with the light of grace, since it is actually more a shadow and something contrary to grace. Thus it is cursed by Job and Jeremiah, because it is an evil day and a foul sight, because this light came into being right after sin did, as the Scripture says, ‘Their eyes were opened’ (Gen 3:7). For grace has set before itself no other object than God toward which it is carried and toward which it is moving; it sees only Him, it seeks only Him, and it always moves toward him, and all other things which it sees between itself and God it passes by as if it had not seen them and directs itself only toward God. This is the ‘upright heart’ (Ps. 7:10) and the ‘right spirit’ (Ps. 51:10).

But nature set for itself no object but itself toward which it is borne and toward which it is directed; it sees, seeks, and works only toward itself in all matters...”176

175 Ibid., 380.
176 *Lectures on Romans*, in *Luther’s Works*, vol. 25 [hereafter LW], ed. by Hilton C. Oswald, trans. by Jacob A.O. Preus (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1972), 345-346. Occasionally, I will quote a passage from Luther in this chapter whenever Ebeling’s interpretation of him seems to be particularly important to Ebeling’s theology. The purpose is not to demonstrate that Ebeling’s interpretation of Luther’s theology coincides with that of Luther himself, which is debatable, but in order to allow the reader to see which texts Ebeling used in his interpretation of Luther. The original Latin is in *Der Brief an die Römer*, in *D. Martin Luthers Werke*, vol. 56 [hereafter, WA] (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1938), 356, line 18f. It reads: “Frustra magnificatur ab aliquibus Lumen naturę et comparatur Lumini gratię, cum potius sit tenebra et contrarium gratię. Unde et A Iob et Ieremia maledicitur, quod sit dies mala et visio pessima, quod Lumen statim post peccatum ortum est, sicut Scriptum est: ‘Et aperti sunt oculi eorum’, Genes. 3. Gratia enim sibi preter Deum nullum statuit objectum, in quod feratur et tendit; hunc solum videt, hunc solum querit et in omnibus intenditenteque omnia, quę in medio sui et Dei videt, quasi non videat, transit et in Deum pure dirigit. Hoc est ‘cor rectum’ et ‘spuritus rectus’.

Natura vero preter seipsam nullam sibi statuit objectum, in quod feratur et intendat; se solam videt, querit et in omnibus intendit...”

As further support that Luther did not understand nature and grace to be coordinated, but antithetical, Ebeling, “Die Grunddifferenz zur Scholastik,” 384, relies upon Luther’s *De servo arbitrio* of 1525, in which Luther argues that the light of grace is not a continuation and intensification of the light of nature, but a refutation of one by the other; “Yet all this, which looks so very like injustice in God [allowing the wicked to prosper and the righteous to suffer], and which has been represented as such with arguments that no human reason or light of nature can resist, is very easily dealt with in the light of the gospel and the knowledge of grace, by which we are taught that although the ungodly flourish in their
Thus, one gains insight into why Ebeling and Luther, according to his reading of Luther, rejected the scholastic framework of nature and grace. The close coordination, or “continuity” as Ebeling says, of nature and grace is really the coordination of two powers that are opposite in orientation, which cannot be reconciled. Either one is oriented toward the self, and sin, or toward God. There can be no ontological concordance between these two orders and so they cannot be reconciled. As a result, the nature and grace continuity “loses its over-all theological orientation function” in Luther’s thought, being jettisoned in favor of a law/gospel coordination.\(^\text{177}\) The route, however, by which Luther, according to Ebeling, reached such a conclusion was not by way of philosophical reflection, but by Scripture study, in which Luther noticed a permanent, inverse, competing, sinful relationship between how humanity is judged by human language and reason, \textit{coram mundo}, and by the divine word in faith, \textit{coram Deo}, bodies, they lose their souls. In fact, this whole insoluble problem finds a quick solution in one short sentence, namely, that there is a life after this life, and whatever has not been punished and rewarded here will be punished and rewarded there, since this life is nothing but an anticipation, or rather, the beginning of the life to come (\textit{The Bondage of the Will}, trans. by Philip S. Watson, in collaboration with Benjamin Drewery, LW 33, \textit{Career of the Reformer III}, ed. by Philip S. Watson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 291-292). The original Latin is found in \textit{De servo arbitrio}, 1525, WA 18 (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1908), 785, lines 12-19: “Et tamen haec iniquitas Dei vehementer probabilis et argumentis talibus traducta, quibus nulla ratio aut lumen naturae potest resistere, tollitur facillime per lucem Euangeli et cognitionem gratiae, qua docemur, impios corporaliter quidem florere, sed anima perdi. Estque totius istius quaestionis insolubilis ista brevis solutio in uno verbo, Seilicet Esse vitam post hanc vitam, in qua, quicquid hic non est punitum et remuneratum, illic punitetur et remunerabitur, cum haec vita sit nihil nisi praecursus aut initium potius futurae vitae.”

Ebeling does actually admit that sometimes Luther does sounds as if he is not rejecting the Thomistic coordination of nature and grace; Ebeling, “Die Grunddifferenz zur Scholastik,” 381-382. For example, in the Christmas \textit{postile} of 1522, Luther said, “For grace does not disrupt, neither does it yet hinder nature in its work, indeed it rightens and assists it.” („Denn die Gnade zerbricht nicht, hindert auch nicht die Natur noch ihre Werke, ja sie bessert und fördert sie.“) Ebeling argues, however, that basing such a claim on this passage is inappropriately jumping to conclusions, because a close reading of the context indicates that here Luther is not addressing the relationship of nature and grace at all. This Christmas \textit{postile} is addressing the issue of the birth of Christ, in which Luther is maintaining that the birth of Christ was a real birth, in opposition to some mariological legend, and so fighting docetistic tendencies in scholastic thought. Thus, Mary’s body performed its appointed task. Ebeling verifies the validity of his argument by supporting with a linguistic analysis of this Christmas \textit{postile}, in which Luther mentions “nature” fourteen times in this passage, while mentioning “grace” only three times. Thus, he concludes, Luther could not be addressing the relationship of nature and grace in this passage.

who deals with humanity in a way that reason cannot understand or anticipate; by way of
death, through the law, the gospel brings life by faith.¹⁷⁸ There will be more on the
linguisticality of Ebeling’s reading of Luther later.

### 3.112 The Effects of Sin upon Human Language

According to Ebeling, “The basic difference between Luther and scholasticism
turns out to be a difference in language.”¹⁷⁹ In the nature and grace framework, “non-
linguistic facts” about reality, or existence, confront each other, but in the law and gospel
framework, “linguistic facts,” or ways of judgment, confront each other. Keep in mind,
however, that in Luther, *verbum* does not exclude *res*. Rather, *verbum* constitutes “true
statements about existence.” So, to summarize Ebeling, what is at stake in this battle
between frameworks is the proper way of speaking about reality, so as to accurately
reflect the reality that is involved.

Ebeling comments that there is plenty of evidence to support this claim in the
early texts of Luther, particularly in the previously mentioned *scholion* on Rom. 8, in
which Luther notices the presence of a struggle between how Paul speaks about reality
and how the metaphysician speaks. Concerning this observation, Ebeling wrote:

> They [metaphysicians] remain in the present, in the essence and
> characteristics, movement and activities. The Apostle, on the other hand,
turns his gaze away from the things, as they are in the present, to that,
which they will be. What moves him is not what the creature is for itself,
but rather that for which it strives, thus what it is yet not.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 389-390.
¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 393. The original German for this short quotation is: „Die Grunddifferenz zwischen
Luther und der Scholastik erweist sich als Sprachdifferenz.“
¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 394. „Der Apostel spricht und denkt von den Dingen anders als die Metaphysiker. Sie
haftent am Vorfindlichen, an dessen Wesenheiten und Eigenschaften, Bewegungen und Tätigkeiten. Der
Apostel dagegen wendet seinen Blick fort von den Dingen, wie sie gegenwärtig sind, hin zu dem, was sie
So, to point out the crucial issues, while the metaphysician remains in the present, speaking of things and their movements as they presently are, their entelechies, as Ebeling later writes, the apostle turns from the present to how things will be, to their liberation from their improper, human use. In looking at things structurally, Ebeling says the metaphysician fails to see the reality of the creature in regard to its goal, and thus fails to see that, unlike Paul, what is important is the liberation of the creation from an improper use by humans.\footnote{Ibid., 394-395.} According to Ebeling, this leads Luther to speak not under the aspects of substance and quality, about what something is, which obscures the interpretation of the Bible, but of predicating relations. Thus, concerning God, one should not speak of God’s essence, but rather about the object of God’s will. Concerning Christ, one should not speak of his “\textit{privata persona},” but what he represents for others, which sounds consistent with the findings in the section 2.22 on the life and function of the church, which is the actualization of the life of Christ within the lives of people. And finally, concerning humans, “…the decisive thing about us is not what we [are] in and of us ourselves, but rather what we are before God, what is said and promised to us therein, and how we according must look at the world together with everything that happens to us in it.”\footnote{Ibid., 397.} \textit{So, the second insight into Ebeling’s rejection of the scholastic nature/grace framework, according to his reading of Luther, is that such a framework is associated with an improper, unscriptural language that focuses upon the present movements of sein werden. Nicht was die Kreatur für sich ist, bewegt ihn, sondern wonach sie sich ausstreckt, was sie also noch nicht ist.”}
things as they are, not upon the fact that humans are what they are only in the presence of God.

Radical sin has caused this confusion in human language, because humanity refuses to entrust itself to God in a “child-like” fashion. Instead, humanity creates judgments about itself, by our own reason. Such confusion causes theological statements to “vanish,” and so Luther’s distinction between law and gospel is his attempt to overcome this confusion. 183 But what does it mean to say that such confusion causes theological statements to “vanish”? This question will be answered as this chapter progresses. But at this point, it is necessary to investigate Luther’s understanding of sin, in order to go deeper into investigating Ebeling’s account of Luther’s repudiation of the scholastic nature and grace framework, and his consequent linguistic turn toward a law/gospel framework.

3.12 Luther’s Dispute with Scholasticism over the Doctrine of Original Sin, as Found in Ebeling’s Lutherstudien II.3, ch. 46, “Die menschliche Natur nach dem Fall (Th. 26)”

What is sin, in Ebeling’s understanding of Luther? This is a topic that Ebeling examines in “Die menschliche Natur nach dem Fall (Th. 26).” In examining this essay, this investigation will be confined to those portions of this text that relates to the understanding of Thomas Aquinas and Luther’s response to this understanding of sin, since this procedure has already been followed in regard to the doctrine of merit.

183 Ibid., 397.
According to Ebeling, Luther’s main difference with scholasticism lies in its assessment of sin; references to humanity’s original condition are not as important. Thomas, according to Ebeling, first speaks cautiously of sin as a *corruptio* of “a good nature.” So, the nature of humanity is not totally damaged, “but rather is damaged only in a certain respect and… in differing degrees according to the kind of the good, which is battered.” For example, although the gift of original justice is completely lost by the fall, there can be no discussion about the total loss of a good nature, since sin is anchored in human rationality, which is an “essential element of human nature.” In comparison with the gift of original justice and human reason, the human tendency toward virtue lies in between; it is not completely lost, but the potentialities of the soul are weakened with the loss of original justice. Along with concupiscence and ignorance, Thomas calls this weakened tendency toward virtue a “wounding” of human nature (*vulneratio naturae*). Moreover, through sin, the radiance of the human soul, produced by the light of reason and the light of God, is polluted (*macula*). So, for Thomas, “The material of original sin is concupiscence, the formal the lack of original justice.”

For Luther, on the other hand, human nature is totally corrupted. He could agree with Thomas that human nature can achieve good by the strength of his natural abilities, like “building and planting,” but this doesn’t mean that Luther would agree with Thomas that reason is only weakened through sin, because Luther claims that reason can

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184 Ebeling, “Die menschliche Natur nach dem Fall (Th. 26),” *Lutherstudien*, vol. 2, pt. 3, 276. „sondern nur in bestimmter Hinsicht versehrt ist und auch dies in verschiedenen Gradén je nach Art des bonum, das in Mitleidenschaft gezogen ist.”
185 Ibid., 278.
186 Ibid., 280. „Das Materiale an der Erbsünde ist die concupiscentia, das Formale das Fehlen der iustitia originalis.”
187 Ibid., 282.
do remarkable things, even “under the power of the devil.” According to Ebeling, through this understanding that human nature is totally corrupt, through this new understanding of original sin, “a kind of tectonic shift takes place, which influences the whole structure of theology.” This can be seen in several ways. First, for Luther, sin is principally the one original sin, not the plurality of actual sins, as in scholasticism. These are only the consequences of original sin. Second, the content of original sin is centered in unbelief, which means that the sinner is spiritually blind, being unable to recognize sin as being sinful. This inability is not a disposition or a quality, but rather an act or mode, with sin living in one.

The definition of content of [the] original sin with Luther—and this is a Novum—is concentrated in the unbelief, which implies spiritual blindness as such. Therefore, in a strict sense, it is a part [of] sin, that the sinner does not know it and therefore also does not disavow being a sinner. Rather, only faith leads to knowledge of sin, and thus really makes [one] in an emphatic sense into [a] sinner.

Further, the question, which mode of being is granted to original sin, is answered differently in scholasticism. Thomas calls it a disposition, Biel a quality. In no case is it understood as an act or mode. But now Luther speaks directly about original sin: “We are, live and move therein. No! Better yet, it lives, moves and rules in us.”

Finally, original sin remains as such after baptism, even if its power is “basically broken.”

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188 Ibid., 284.
189 Ibid., 285. „vollzieht sich eine Art tektonischer Veränderung, die das ganze Gefüge der Theologie beeinflußt.“
190 Ibid., 286-287. „Die inhaltliche Bestimmung des peccatum originale bei Luther—auch das ist ein Novum—konzentriert sich auf den Unglauben, der als solcher geistliche Blindheit impliziert. Deshalb gehört zur Sünde in striktem Sinne, daß der Sünder sie nicht erkennt und darum auch nicht wahrhaben will, Sünder zu sein. Vielmehr führt allein der Glaube zur Erkenntnis der Sünde und macht so erst im emphatischen Sinne zum Sünder.
Ferner: Die Frage, welche Seinsart dem peccatum originale zukommt, wird in der Scholastik verschieden beantwortet. Thomas nennt sie eine dispositio, Biel eine qualitas. Auf keinen Fall wird sie als actus oder motus verstanden. Luther spricht nun aber gerade so von dem peccatum originale: „Wir sind, leben und bewegen uns darin, nein besser: es lebt, bewegt sich und herrscht in uns.“
3.13 Summary

So, based upon this study, I would argue that Ebeling and Luther, according to Ebeling’s reading of him, rejected the scholastic nature/grace framework, because such a method yields deceptive theological judgments for the following reason. If original sin remains as such after baptism, and the content of original sin renders one spiritually blind, then any theological method that would describe the human condition in terms of substance and entelechy, of its present being and movement, and speak of God’s essence, could have no Justifiable grounds for acceptance, because the truth value of theological statements created within such a method is indeterminable. At best, original sin would make it impossible to know whether such a method is oriented toward, or ordained by, God, or merely toward what suits the self and thus sinful. Therefore the grounds for such a judgment would be inadequate. In fact, I think that Ebeling would claim that original sin would not only make such truth judgments indeterminable, it would make sinful judgments and false statements about God inevitable, because the spiritual state of the person making such judgments and statements, who is focused upon the self, has not been properly accounted for within the nature/grace framework. Moreover, it cannot be properly accounted for within this framework at all, because of Luther’s anthropology, which is another way of saying because of original sin, which is not healed by grace in baptism. Thus, due to the fall, humans cannot make statements about who God is. All one can say is how God affects us as humans.\footnote{This conclusion is also supported by Gerhard Ebeling, \textit{Luther: An Introduction to His Thought}, trans. by R.A. Wilson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), 254.} This is why anthropology is so important to understanding Ebeling’s theological method.
Now that there is some clarity concerning why Ebeling, and Luther according to Ebeling’s reading of him, rejected the scholastic nature/grace framework, the next task is to become clearer on the method that replaced it. This will require further research into Luther’s understanding, as read by Ebeling, concerning how a person is influenced by “word,” both as the word of God and the word of humanity, which will take one deeper into the relationship of anthropology and hermeneutics, and eventually, into understanding how one is justified by the word of God, according to Ebeling. Based upon this research into Ebeling, the place to begin with his investigation into Luther’s hermeneutical turn, especially since this is where Ebeling himself began his study of Luther in his *Lutherstudien*.

### 3.2 Ebeling’s Hermeneutical, Anthropological Method, according to *Lutherstudien*

#### 3.21 Luther’s Hermeneutical Turn and the Corresponding Problem of the Natural, as found in Ebeling’s *Lutherstudien I*, “Die Rolle der Hermeneutik in Luthers Theologie,” and “Das Problem des Natürlichen bei Luther”

According to Ebeling, if one wants to be right about the origin and structure of Luther’s theology, then one must realize that the question about the method of his interpretation of Scripture takes center stage. Ebeling wrote in “Die Rolle der Hermeneutik in Luthers Theologie” that:

Since the seminal article by Karl Holl, “Luther’s Relevance for Research of the Art of Interpretation,” the investigation of Luther’s hermeneutic has been furthered by numerous studies. That is reflected not only in the generally increasing interest for the hermeneutical problem, but rather it manifests itself also especially in the insight, that the question about Luther’s theology must become the question about the method of his interpretation of Scripture, if one wants to do justice to the origin and the
inner relation of his theological statements. For the method of Luther’s theological work was exegetical.\textsuperscript{192}

But this doesn’t merely mean that questions about the interpretation of Scripture itself become the focus of Luther’s attention. Ebeling takes this further, stating that, in Luther, his exegetic and systematic method became entangled, that one influenced the other.\textsuperscript{193}

How? This can be partially understood by knowing something of the history of Luther’s exegetical conversion.\textsuperscript{194} Ebeling notes that during the period from when Luther first studied the Psalms in his first lectures on the Psalms from 1513-1515 to the period of his \textit{Operationes in psalmos} of 1519, “his first great exegetical work,” Luther underwent an exegetical conversion, rejecting the four-fold sense of Scripture, because, “Luther has seen through it as a basic error, that ‘geistlich’ means ‘allegorisch’ and that 2 Cor 3:6 ‘The letter kills, the Spirit makes alive’ to be a justification for a mystical interpretation of Scripture.”\textsuperscript{195} The practical effect of this conversion is that Luther came to emphasize the literal sense of Scripture.

So, how does this new found emphasis upon the literal sense of Scripture impact Luther’s exegetical method? And what does this exegetical conversion consist of?

According to Ebeling, his exegetical conversion consists in this, that the human

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\textsuperscript{192} Gerhard Ebeling, “Die Rolle der Hermeneutik in Luthers Theologie,” in \textit{Lutherstudien}, vol. 1, 1. „Seit dem grundlegenden Aufsatz von Karl Holl über ‘Luthers Bedeutung für den Fortschritt der Auslegungskunst’ ist die Erforschung von Luthers Hermenutik durch zahlreiche Untersuchungen weiter vorangetrieben worden. Darin spiegelt sich nicht nur das allgemein anwachsende Interesse für das hermeneutische Problem, sondern es bekundet sich damit auch in besonderen die Einsicht, daß die Frage nach Luthers Theologie zur Frage nach der Methode seiner Schriftauslegung werden muß, wenn man der Entstehung und dem inneren Zusammenhang seiner theologischen Aussagen gerecht werden will. Denn die Methode der theologischen Arbeit Luthers war die Exegese.“

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 3-4.

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., 4. „Luther hat es als grundlegenden Irrtum durchschaut, daß „geistlich´, „allegorisch´ bedeute und daß 2. Kor 3,6 „Der Buchstabe tötet, der Geist macht lebendig´ eine Rechtfertigung mystischer Schriftauslegung sei.“
\end{quote}
understanding becomes passive, and texts themselves become active, so that the human person is shaped by the texts.

What understanding means in this deepest sense, namely that it amounts not only to a comprehension of the texts, but rather to a being captured, that the comprehending of the texts emanates and not from the interpreter, that the understanding is something passive and all activity lies with the text, that the text becomes the subject and the one understanding the object, the prisoner of texts, and that becomes indeed no clearer with another Christian exegete than Luther. For, *Scripture virtus est hec, quod non mutatur in eum, qui eam studet, sed transmutat suum amatorem in sese ac suas virtutes...Quia non tu me mutabis in te ..., sed tu mutaberis in me. Nec ego a te, sed tu a me denominaberis.*

Thus, I would argue that Luther, according to Ebeling, came to focus upon the literal sense of the text in this conversion, because such an emphasis allowed the text to become the active party in the creation of understanding and so shape the human understanding. This is an important methodological discovery. This approach seems to be very different from the scholastic, four-fold method of interpretation, in which the human subject actively reads a text, looking for meanings either buried within the text or given by “inspiration,” thus generating his/her own understanding of the text. This approach to exegesis becomes Luther’s approach to doing systematic theology as well, as read by Ebeling.

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196 Ibid., 3. „Was Verstehen im tiefsten Sinne bedeutet, nämlich daß es nicht nur zu einem Begreifen des Textes, sondern auch zu einem Ergriffen werden kommt, daß das comprehendere von der Schrift ausgeht und nicht vom Ausleger, daß das Verstehen etwas Passives ist und alle Aktivität beim Text liegt, daß der Text zum Subjekt und der Verstehende zum Objekt wird, zum Gefangenen des Textes, das wird wohl an kaum einem anderen christlichen Exegeten so eindrücklich wie an Luther. Denn: Scripture virtus est hec, quod non mutatur in eum, qui eam studet, sed transmutat suum amatorem in sese ac suas virtutes...Quia non tu me mutabis in te..., sed tu mutaberis in me. Nec ego a te, sed tu a me denominaberis.” The Latin quotation in this excerpt from Ebeling’s *Lutherstudien* is from Luther’s “Dictata super Psalterium. 1513-16,” *D. Martin Luthers Werke* 3, Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe) [Hereafter, WA] (1885; rept., Weimar: Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger; Graz: Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt, 1966), p. 397, lines 9-11, 15-17.
According to Ebeling’s “Das Problem des Natürlichen bei Luther,” as a result of Luther’s emphasis upon the human being as the addressee of the word of God, which is the practical result of Luther’s exegetical conversion, the theological use of “nature” and “natural” becomes problematic when a human being is its referent, especially when used in their scholastic forms, in which “nature” is understood as that “…which realizes itself in the way of emergence and production, and is to be measured by itself.”

Why does this theological use of “nature” cause problems for Luther, according to Ebeling? It causes problems, because this idea of nature, which is closely associated with the Aristotelian idea of causality, emphasizes human autonomy, even if within the context of God-created potentialities, and thus fosters an operative understanding of human existence, emphasizing the role of free will and our own activity in the actuality of our potentiality as humans. So, the human being comes to be formally defined by one’s own activity, which, according to this reading of Ebeling, creates an active understanding of humanity which is analogous to that of God, thus tending to confuse creator and creature. Of course, from the standpoint of a scholastic understanding of justification, this activity occurs within the context of God’s grace, since, as already seen in the brief examination of Thomas’ understanding of merit in section 3.0, the final goal of human existence is beyond human nature. But, according to Ebeling, the idea of nature contaminates this emphasis upon grace, because grace, being infused into the believer,

197 Gerhard Ebeling, “Das Problem des Natürlichen bei Luther,” in Lutherstudien, vol. 1, 274-275. The definition of “nature” is found on p. 280; ....das im Wege des Hervorgehens und Hervorbringens sich selbst verwirklicht und an sich selbst zu messen ist.”

198 Ibid., 280-281. This reading of this text is also supported by Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction, 198, where he wrote, “...the creation is only a mask, that is, it is not anything in itself or on its own account, but is only the veil which conceals the Creator, who speaks to us from it and through it. That is why the true recognition of reality requires a distinction between the creation as a mere mask and the word of God concealed in it, so that the house is not confused with the host, nor the creature with the creator, and honor and faith are accorded to God.”
becomes inherent in the substance, which enables the person to achieve a supernatural goal through an act of the free will. So, once again, even in soteriology, human action comes to be emphasized.\textsuperscript{199}

So, what does Luther insert in place of nature in his theological method? Ebeling wrote:

\begin{quote}
I don’t think that I am missing the mark with the thesis that with Luther the ontological relevance of the idea of nature—as far as talk about reality in respect to humanity is concerned and inseparably there from in relation to God—is limited by the role of the word.\textsuperscript{200}
\end{quote}

Word becomes the operative principle of Luther’s theology, which, according to Ebeling, required Luther to resurrect the old church idea of “person,” in place of substance and nature. So what becomes important to Luther now is to what or whom the person listens. According to Ebeling, Luther does not deny the existence of human nature, looked at from the standpoint of the object itself, but within the context of theology, the use of nature leads the human to emphasize its own activity, which places God in the scheme of law, making God an object. This makes humanity unnatural, although we don’t realize this. So, according to Ebeling, Luther rejected the use of nature and an active sense of human existence in theology, because “…causal ontology closes itself against the relevance of the word.”\textsuperscript{201} In other words, one cannot understand humanity in natural terms and emphasize the hermeneutical role of the word of God in shaping one, because while nature emphasizes the activity of humanity, hermeneutics emphasizes passively

\textsuperscript{199} Ibid., 281.
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., 282-283. „Ich glaube, nicht fehlzugehen mit der These, daß bei Luther die ontologische Relevanz des Naturbegriffs—jedenfalls was das Reden von der Wirklichkeit in Hinsicht auf den Menschen und davon untrennbar in Hinsicht auf Gott betrifft—in die Schranken gewiesen wird durch die Rolle des Wortes."
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., 283. „…die Kausalontologie sperrt sich gegen die Relevanz des Wortes.“
listening to the word of God. So, Luther began understanding human being through the idea of person, not nature, and advanced to the relevance of word. This is confirmed in the following quotation of Ebeling, who wrote:

Since the Word rules over the human existence of man, he is thus ultimately not the doer, but the hearer, because salvation is not a question about perfection, but rather about certainty and his true justice never lies in itself, but rather always lies outside one, because humanity is not to be defined as a process of development to the vision of God, but rather as a process-event of denunciation and acquittal, thus as man is to be defined as justified by faith before God; and therefore the good work is “Wordly” and thus equally wholly worldly and wholly spiritual.  

In conclusion, this section of this study has provided even more details on Luther’s rejection of the scholastic theological method, as understood by Ebeling. According to this reading of Ebeling, Luther’s rejection of scholastic theology’s understanding of the human nature as active and its resultant replacement with word and person gives one a broader perspective to understand why Dr. Root’s suggestion of inserting Thomas and his “admirably balanced doctrine of merit” into the Lutheran discussion on merit would not likely yield much fruit in theological circles that are allied with Ebeling. But now that one knows that Luther, according to Ebeling, replaced this nature/grace framework with a person/word framework, this study needs to press on to attain a better understanding of Luther’s understanding of person and how this person is influenced by the word, as read by Ebeling, in order to become clearer on why Ebeling rejected the Joint Declaration.

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202 Ibid., 284. „Weil über das Menschsein des Menschen das Wort entscheidet, er also letztlich nicht Täter, sondern Hörer ist, sein Heil eine Frage nicht der Vervollkommung, sondern der Gewißheit und seine wahre iustitia neimals in seipso, sondern stets extra se liegt, weil der Mensch also nicht als ein Entwicklungsprozeß auf die visio Dei hin, sondern als ein Prozeßgeschene von Anklage und Freispruch, also als homo iustificandus fide coram Deo, zu definieren ist, darum ist auch das gute Werk worthaft und deshalb zugleich ganz weltlich und ganz geistlich.“
3.22 The Ascendancy of Person and Word over Nature and Work, according to Ebeling’s “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis”

The best place to begin an investigation into Luther’s understanding of the human being, according to this reading of Ebeling, is with Luther’s conception of persona, because as Ebeling says of Luther, persona and conscientia now becomes “the central characterization of being human,” and one of the better texts where this relationship is developed is Ebeling’s “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis.”

According to him, an ontological usage of persona in scholasticism was originally limited to discussions on the Trinity and Christ, and conscientia, which was introduced into the New Testament through the philosophy of late antiquity, was understood in the dual sense of “consciousness” and “conscience.” In relation to humanity, persona became the “faculty of moral discernment,” which was to be applied to a particular ethical situation by the conscientia. Luther transformed their usage in order to liberate theological speech from an improper ontology. According to Ebeling:

What has led Luther to use and to transform both of these terms “persona” and “conscientia”… so that they intimately touch each other, in the regard to one’s humanity itself, and together with anthropology impress their seal? It is, in my opinion, only to be explained by the fact that, for him, it had to do with the liberation of theological speech of humanity from the predominance of an improper and falsifying ontology. In this case, a strange change in emphasis takes place. If up to there, “persona” was the point of emphasis in the doctrine of the Trinity and Christology, and if on the other hand “conscientia” was quite one-sidedly emphasized in the doctrine of the potential of the human soul, then now they both met—it could almost seem, competing with each other—and become the central characterization of being human. However, not oriented toward the understanding of humanity as substance, but rather in the effects of those ontological basic features, which we encounter under

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the aspect of coram-relations, the relationship of word and faith, as well as the relationship of distinction and union.

So, in Luther, according to Ebeling, these terms became the central characterization of human being, not in terms of Aristotelian substance ontology, but as effects of wort and glaube, which, unlike this substance ontology, gives primacy to person over work. These effects are “…part of [the] foundation of the Reformed doctrine of justification…” In this new ontology, “persona” became “the addressee of the word of God,” and “conscientia,” where Christ has his true dwelling place, came to deal with the “questionability of coram-relationships” and word and faith.

What is a coram-relationship? A coram-relationship is centered upon the relationship between a person and others, not directed toward the general condition of being and

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205 Ibid., 423. „…was zum Urgestein reformatorischer Rechtfertigungslehre gehört;”

206 Miikka Ruokanen, in Hermeneutics as an Ecumenical Method in the Theology of Gerhard Ebeling, Publications of Luther-Agricola Society B13 (Helsinki: Vammalan Kirjapaino Oy, 1982), 229, adds one additional facet about Ebeling’s understanding of conscience when he states that one is sure that one is justified when one is assured and certain of this fact in one’s conscience. Thus, having authentic faith, by which one knows that one is justified, is a function of the conscience.

What do the terms “word of God” and “faith” mean? In Ebeling’s theology, word and faith have to be understood within the context of each other, since faith is the response to the word of God. In fact, as Jack Brush, “Gerhard Ebeling,” in A New Handbook of Christian Theologians, ed. by Donald Musser and Joseph Price (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 144 says, “One should not speak about humans or God separately but rather of the relation between God and humans.” So, “by the phrase ‘Word of God’ Ebeling does not, of course, understand merely the written texts of the Old and New Testaments, but rather precisely that word—wherever and however it occurs—which is as the same time disclosing and determining for the relation between God and individuals. Depending on the way in which the word occurs, either as law or gospel, the relation takes on the fundamental character of demanding or giving”; Ibid., 146. And faith, as this response, is both trust at the center of one’s being, directed toward the word, and an existential state, since faith exists only in relation to word. This definition of faith is derived from Brush, “Gerhard Ebeling,” 146 and Mark Menacher, “Gerhard Ebeling in Retrospect,” Lutheran Quarterly 21, no. 2 (Summer, 2007): 184-185.
movement, like a traditional Aristotelian substance ontology. Unlike this ontology and its focus upon the general “condition of being” and movement, Ebeling declares that “…the whole turbulence of the situation of life breaks in,” which means that all the facets of human existence, including the historical (although not explicitly mentioned here), linguistic, and social must be considered in understanding this coram-relationship. 207 A Coram-relationship involves a question of judgment, because existing in the presence of others, who make judgments about the self, shapes one’s view of him/herself, one’s judgment about who the self is. The formation of all these judgments works in several directions, which form a very complex situation. Ebeling describes this situation as interplay of the coram hominibus (before humanity) and coram meipso (before myself) relationships, which involves how “… I look at others, as I look to them, in which view I stand with them” (Emphasis mine). 208

There is, however, a further layer of complexity, because one also exists in the presence of God; coram Deo. Although the existence of this layer of the coram-relation can be discerned through reflection upon the eschatological dimension of reality, or through the realization that human life is goal oriented, the battle between the preeminence granted to either the coram mundo or coram Deo relationship, both of which encompass the coram meipso relationship, is known in all its sharpness only through Holy Scripture, a battle that is known as sin. 209 The word of God receives its ontological relevance for human being, due to the fact that humanity exists before the judgment seat

207 Ebeling, “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis,” 416-417. The short quote here is found on p. 416. „…bricht die ganze Turbulenz der Lebensbezüge…”
208 Ibid., 417. „…wie ich die andern ansehe, wie ich vor ihnen aussehe, in welchem Ansehen ich bei ihnen stehe…”
209 Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction, 199, says that coram-mundo and coram-hominibus are used almost interchangeably, although he does caution one to observe the differences in their uses. He does not say why.
of God. So, one’s judgment about oneself, about how one exists, is given to one by external relationships, either by the world (mundo) or God, depending upon which one values the most. As a result, I would argue that an important conceptual discovery is that, according to Ebeling’s reading of Luther, personhood becomes a social construct, whose ultimate composition is in doubt. Its composition is determined by whose voice becomes the most important in one’s existence; the word of the world, coram mundo, or the word of God, coram Deo. It is this understanding of personhood that gives the word such an important role to play in Ebeling’s theology. In any case, one’s own view of him/herself is dramatically determined externally, by how others view one. This social constructivist view of personhood is confirmed in another work of Ebeling’s, Luther: An Introduction to his Thought, in which he states that the most important insight of the coram-relationship is how one exists in the sight of others.

The most important element in the situation that is implied by the preposition coram is not the way in which someone else is present before me, in my sight, but the way that I myself am before someone else and exist in the sight of someone else, so that my existential life is affected.

In the previously mentioned introduction to the thought of Luther, one finds more information about this competition between the word of God and that of the creature. Ebeling claims that, according to Luther, the believer stands before the gaze of God, submitting to judgment by the word of God, which is in competition with the word of the creature, who tries to replace the word of God with its own. No one escapes this battle, not even the believer, since the believer exists in both judgments simultaneously.

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211 Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction, 196.
212 This is one point at which Luther’s position on the opposition of the believer and unbeliever reflects the systematic theology of Ebeling. In his essay, “Faith and Unbelief in Conflict about Reality,” in
To exist before God and to exist before the world are not two possible and mutually exclusive choices, two separate realities, but an alternate relationship which is necessarily simultaneous. Someone who possesses his existence in the sight of God does not thereby cease to exist in the sight of the world. And someone who possesses his existence in the sight of the world is not thereby deprived of his existence in the sight of God. But his existence before one court of judgement becomes the contrary of his existence in the other, for what is at issue in the dispute between the two courts of judgement is the source from which man receives his being, the judgement and the word from which he lives, the judgement which provides his understanding of himself and the countenance which ultimately claims him and towards which his own face is ultimately turned, his back being turned toward the other. That is, the dispute is about what constitutes and determines his presence.

According to Ebeling’s reading of Luther, the word of God and the word of humanity affect reality differently. The word of humanity is unreliable and deceptive, and even when it comes to pass, it still needs a separate, non-verbal act to bring it to pass.

The word of God, on the other hand, is “infallibly reliable” and “creatively powerful” in itself, bringing about “creation, reconciliation, and completion.” Yet, the word of God, both as law and gospel, does not appear to be creative as such, especially since the word of God as law only commands, while as gospel merely promises. But this is only an illusion. Since God creates ex nihilo, God works in unexpected ways, bringing about new life through the gospel to those who were killed by the law. God gives Himself, as

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Word and Faith, trans. by James W. Leitch (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), 378-381, Ebeling clearly states that faith and the unbeliever are in conflict about reality, that each claims the other is “ignorant of” and “hostile to reality.” Moreover, Ebeling centers this conflict on the conscience, which identifies another point of similarity. According to Ebeling, 384, the conscience is the “place” where the being of humanity is determined. “But the conscience in the radical sense as the place where it is decided what man truly is. If he is there under the pressure and anxiety of despair [due the modern, secular world of the unbeliever], then that does not merely affect the whole of his own being, but he also finds the whole world dragged into his despair. If on the other hand his conscience is cheerful and confident, then not only the man himself is cheerful and confident, but the whole of reality also takes on a different shape for him. Whatever binds him in conscience, decides how reality as a whole concerns him. If his conscience is set free, then he is absolutely free and no power on earth can alter that. It is therefore better not to call conscience a place in man but—however surprising it may sound—the place of man. For in the conscience it is decided where man belongs, where he is and where he has his abode.”

Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction, 200-201.

word, to humanity in human words, so that as a human word, it appears weak and dying, but as divine, breaks the power of death. Faith is created in the person by this word and is fulfilled by it. So, word changes the reality of the soul by creating faith, and changes the place where one receives life, not as a qualitative, or internal, transformation of a substance, but outside of oneself, in Christ, in relation with God.215

However, the power of the word of God that touches on being itself announces itself through Law and Gospel in the most ways of perplexity of being. Like the word of the creator which calls what is not, so that it is, and the word of judgment condemns the living to eternal death, so, in a contrary series, the Law kills, while the Gospel arouses to new life. That one aims at the other in a unique process of dying of the old and resurrection of the new man. Thus, that which is in itself is what the word of God communicates itself, to whom it is pronounced: It is holy and makes holy.

215 Ebeling supports this point by citing Luther’s “In epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas Commentarius [1531] 1535,” of Gal. 4:6 in WA 40.1 (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1911), p. 589, lines 8-10, which reads: “Ideo nostra theologia est certa, quia ponit nos extra nos: non debeo niti in conscientia mea, sensuali persona, opere, sed in promissione divina, veritate, quae non potest fallere,” which is translated as, “And so our theology is certain, because it places us outside ourselves: I ought not depend on my conscience, my physical person or effort, but in the divine promise and truth, which cannot fail.”

Miikka Ruokanen, in Hermeneutics as an Ecumenical Method in the Theology of Gerhard Ebeling, 223, defines what faith is for Ebeling, which I think nicely corroborates my research here; “Faith is the sphere of ‘being together’ in which two persons, the created and the Creator encounter each other. Because faith is rather an event and a sphere of encounter than the intention or will to believe in something, the act of faith and the subject matter of faith are one and the same thing…”

This relationship between word and faith is another area of commonality between Luther’s historical position and Ebeling systematic position. In The Nature of Faith, trans. by Ronald Gregor Smith (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1961), 190, Ebeling lays out his understanding of the power of the word of God, its distinction from the weakness of the human word, its relation to faith, and its ability to affect reality. Compare this with Luther’s position as presented in the above paragraph. “The Word receives the most explicit character of a promise when the future of the one addressed is involved, and the speaker himself does not promise this or that, but himself, pledges himself and his own future for the future of the other, gives him his word in the full sense of the giving a share of himself. And here is the reason for the ultimate failure of the Word among men. For what happens when one man promises himself to the other? For the most part the Word becomes the bearer and mediator of egoism, inner emptiness, or lies. Yet even at his best man cannot promise true future, that is, salvation, to the other. Only the Word by which God comes to man, and promises himself, is able to do this. That this word has happened, and can therefore be spoken again and again, that a man can therefore promise God to another as the One who promises himself—this is the certainty of Christian faith. And this is the true and fulfilled event of the Word, when space is made among men for this promise, the Word of God.

When God speaks, the whole of reality as it concerns us enters language anew. God’s Word does not bring God into language in isolation. It is not a light which shines upon God, but a light which shines from him, illuminating the sphere of our existence. If God’s countenance shines upon us, the world has for us another look.”
Faith, which owes itself to it and in which it fulfills itself, corresponds solely to this word. How should God be honored differently and how should the first commandment be fulfilled differently, than through an affirming understanding: Amen, so it is, thus by faith alone. Therefore, Luther recognizes in word and faith a coherent event that changes everything from the ground up. The word changes the situation of the soul.

And perhaps most importantly, it is essential to have faith, not only because it changes the reality of the soul, but also because it is the only way that one can rightly honor God, which, as will be seen, becomes an important methodological theme in Ebeling’s theology.

To let God be God, that is to believe rightly, means not to make gods for oneself in any way, but above all to allow oneself to be deprived of deity and brought to nothing, so that one is hurled outside oneself and the whole creation into nothingness, and one is certain of having fallen into the hands of God. That faith and God belong together is the theology of the cross, a theology not based on human wishes, but upon the will of God.

To support this point, Ebeling relies upon Luther’s “Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen. 1520,” in WA 7 (1897; rept., Weimar: Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger; Graz: Akademische Druck—u. Verlagsanstalt, 1966), p. 24, lines 30-35, which reads: „Hierauß leychltlich zu mercken ist, warumb der glaub fö vill vormag, und das keyne gutte werck yhm gleych seyn mugen, Den keyn gut wreck hanget an dem gottlichen wort, wie der glaub, kan auch nit yn der seelen seyn, sondern alleyn das wort und glaube regiren yn der seelen. Wie das wort ist, fo wirt auch die seele von yhm, gleych als das eyssen wirt glutrodt wie das fewr auß der voreynigung mit dem fewr,” which is translated as, “From this, finally, is to be noted why faith can do so much and that no good work may be equal to it, because no good work depends on the divine word, as faith does; [a good work] can also not be in the soul, but rather only the word and faith rule in the soul. As the word is, so the soul too becomes from him, like the iron becomes red hot as the fire from the union with the fire.” I want to thank Dr. Jamison for preparing this translation.
“Faith is the creator of deity, not in person, but in us. Apart from faith, God loses his righteousness, glory, riches, etc., and there is no majesty or deity where there is no faith.” 217

This explanation on how word impacts one’s being, whether that be listening to the word of the world, *coram mundo*, in which one can turn his/her back to God, or listening to the word of God, *coram Deo*, which draws one into God’s presence, making one to exist in the presence of God by receiving faith, where one receives life, gives added details to the initial observation in section 2.3 that language impacts reality in Ebeling’s theology and thus plays a significant role in it. Moreover, I would argue that this quotation from Ebeling’s introduction to Luther also helps to explain what Ebeling meant in section 3.111, that original sin, which he defined there as the inability to trust God, allows theological statements to vanish, because without faith, without the ability to allow oneself to be “deprived a deity and bought to nothing,” without the ability to abandon the self and trust God, or fall into the hands of God as Ebeling wrote here, means that one would not be in a *coram* relationship with God. So, any theological statement made by such a person would not have as its subject God, but only that person’s understanding of God, which would be sin, and thus would not be a valid statement about God.

Now in closing this section, let me briefly return to an observation that was made at the end of Ebeling’s essay, “Die Grunddifferenz zur Scholastik,” in section 3.111 on Luther’s rejection of the scholastic categories of nature and grace, as presented by Ebeling. In that essay, Ebeling argued that the basis for this shift from nature to person and word is Luther’s reading of Scripture, which is not just different in language from 

philosophy, but different in ontology. The Bible reveals that humanity’s “conversation partner” is God. Humanity exists in the presence of God, *coram Deo*, who demands an account. This relationship is in competition with the judgment of the world, *coram mundo*, who is trying to replace the judgment of God. So, these judgments are in opposition, as Lk 16:15 says: “What is exalted among humanity, is an abomination before God.” Reason, in distinction to faith, judges the word and action of God to be absurd, but, according to Ebeling, this is how word and faith work.

**3.23 The Relationship of Christology and Anthropology, as found in Ebeling’s Lutherstudien II.3, chapter 41, “Das Verhältnis von Christologie und Anthropologie”**

As already demonstrated in this study, Luther’s rejection of scholastic theology, according to Ebeling, is based upon his understanding of sin. As a result, it should not be surprising that Luther, according to Ebeling, does not place his understanding of humanity upon the scholastic understanding of humanity, with its Aristotelian philosophical grounding, as an *animal rationale*, but upon the theological proposition that *Deus est homo*, because humanity needs deliverance from sin. Although Luther admits that Christ is truly human, he is not a human like us, or even a prelapsarian human. No, for Luther, Christ is the “unique God-man,” where humanity is joined with God, “…assumed by God, unmixed and yet inseparably united with him,” so that “…he stands on the side of sinners and carries them.” Moreover, according to Ebeling’s reading of him, Luther did not reject the Chalcedonian formulation of the hypostatic

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218 Ebeling, “Die Grunddifferenz zur Scholastik,” 388-390. The following quotation is on 390. „Was hoch ist unter den Menschen, das ist ein Greuel vor Gott”...


220 Ibid., 167. “…er sich auf die Seite des Sünders stellt und ihn trägt.”
union of two natures in the one person of Christ, but he was critical of it, because this formulation has the tendency of focusing attention upon how this union was affected in the single, private person of Jesus Christ himself. According to Ebeling, this union should be focused upon how it affects the public union, in faith, of humanity with the person of Christ. 221

This focus upon the public union of humanity with the person of Christ has two anthropological consequences. First, the public union of Christ with all humanity influences our salvation. It shows that the “Christ-event” from the Incarnation to the resurrection is not only a struggle with death and the devil,222 it also assumes the character of an exchange of properties and persons, a kind of communication of idioms, in which Christ lives as the person of all sinners, identifying with them, even to the point of accepting their sin and death, and allowing them to find their identity in him.

It [“pro nobis”] assumes the character of an exchange, not only of characteristics, be they sin and righteousness. The exchange extends, however, to the being of the person itself: Christ adopts and bears, indeed really lives [as] the person of all sinners. He identifies himself with them and allows them to find their identity in him. He, who has taken the sin of the whole world on himself and therefore carries the person of all sinners

221 Ibid., 166-169. Ebeling supports this point by quoting from Luther’s Commentary on Galatians on pp. 166-167; “With the interpretation of Gal. 3:13, ‘Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, in that he became a curse for us,’ Luther declares, ‘Everything depends upon the phrase, ‘for us’. And with this, he combines a serious theologically historical judgment; ‘That is the error of all sophists (scholastics) and church fathers, that they make Christ into a persona privata. Yet that is true, but one should not stop there, with that you do not yet have Christ, henceforth he is not called that, rather if this most innocent of all persons is given to you, in order that he becomes my king and priest, serves me, abandons holiness and wants to become a sinner (in that he says to me), I want to carry you—all there he becomes Christ.’” The original German reads, “Bei der Auslegung von Gal 3,13: ‘Christus hat uns erlöst vom Fluch des Gesetzes, indem er ward ein Fluch für uns’, stellt Luther fest: Es liege alles an der Wendung ‘für uns’. Und er verbindet damit ein schwerwiegendes theologischgeschichtliches Urteil: ‘Das ist der Fehler aller Sophisten [Scholastiker] und Väter, daß sie Christus zu einer persona privata machen. Das ist schon richtig, dabei darf man aber nicht stehen bleiben, damit hast du noch nicht Christus, daraufhin heißt er nicht so. Dann vielmehr, wenn diese allerunschuldigste Person dir gegeben wird, daß er mein König und mein Priester wird, mir dient, die Heiligkeit ablegt und Sünder sein will [indem er mir zuspricht]: Ich will dich tragen, —da geht Christus an.’”

222 Ibid., 171.
in himself, is consequently himself, although *impeccabilis et indamnabilis persona*, simultaneously *maximus peccator, peccator peccatorum*.

Second, the public union of believers with Christ through faith is an “unequal exchange of righteousness and sin,” in which Christ takes their sin upon himself, as seen earlier, and “donates the union of faith to the believer,” which makes a type of person out of one and Christ together, making his holiness effective in the believer, living in the flesh of the believer, giving one a source of life outside of him/herself.

The communication between Christ and the believers is a fully unequal exchange of righteousness and sin, whereupon in positive respect Christ alone is the giving one, humanity the receiving one….In this process, a fusion does not take place. The change pronounced by Paul in Gal 2:20 in regards to that which defines life, “Christ lives in me,” is only truly understood when the particular *ego* does not simply vanish, but rather gives room outside of himself to a different foundation and source of life. This is carried out in looking at Christ, hanging in him, indeed bonding with him (*conglutinatio*). Faith makes one person out of you and Christ, sort of (quasi). They are to be unseparated. But nevertheless, they remain distinguished, like the head and body. Indeed, we are, by baptism, “baked in Christ, his death and resurrection is in me and I in his death and resurrection”…These are all descriptions of the fact that the believer too does not have new life in himself, but rather only in the participation in the life of Christ and therefore just *sola fide*.

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223 Ibid., 173. The original German reads: „Sie nimmt den Charakter eines Tausches an, nicht allein von Eigenschaften, und seien es Sünde und Gerechtigkeit. Der Tausch erstreckt sich vielmehr auf das Personsein selbst: Christus übernimmt und trägt, ja lebt geradezu die Person aller Sünder. Er identifiziert sich mit ihnen und läßt sie in ihm ihre Identität finden. Er, der die Sünde der ganzen Welt auf sich genommen hat und deshalb die Person aller Sünder an sich trägt, ist somit selbst, obwohl impeccabili et indamnabilis persona, zugleich maximus peccator, peccator peccatorum."

Thus, in this union, the “I,” which is still distinguished from Christ, does not simply disappear, but being made one person with Christ, receives a different basis and source of life outside of the self; *coram Deo*. Thus, as seen in the above quotation, “…the believer…does not have new life in himself, but rather only in the participation in the life of Christ and therefore just *sola fide*.” This emphasis upon a public union of believers with Christ, which makes his holiness effective in the believer through this union, is consistent with the findings in the last chapter in section 2.22, in which the life and function of the church is the unfolding of the life of Christ in the believer; the church is where this new life, given by this union in baptism, unfolds.

According to Ebeling, Luther’s Christology has dramatic implications for the understanding of the “human person,” because it means that one finds God “enfolded” within persons. According to Ebeling, Luther opened up the innertrinitarian idea of person and applied it to the human person. What this means is that God is found in the human person, first and foremost in the person of the God-man, Jesus Christ, but as a result of the communication of idioms, also within the persons of those who have been incorporated into Christ.225 This Christological anthropology allows one to better understand what Ebeling is trying to say when he claims that the “I” does not disappear in its union with Christ, because just as the persons of the Trinity exist in their inner relation

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225 Ibid., 183-186.

“‘Ego vivo’ quidem sonat personaliter, quasi suam personam inspiciat; mox ergo corrigit, quod habeat gratiam: sed ‘non ego’. Quis ille ‘ego’? qui debet operari, qui est una persona distincta a Christo: pertineo ad infernum legem. Sed quod Christus sit mea forma, sicut paries informatur albedine. Sic tam proprie et inhesive, ut albedo in pariete, sic Christus manet in me et ista vita vivit in me, et vita qua vivo, est Christus.” This is translated as: “‘I live’ does sound like a personal reference, as though he considers his own person; therefore he immediately improves, as many as has grace: but ‘not I.’ Who is this ‘I’? It is the one who must act, the one who is a person distinct from Christ; I belong to a lower law. But that Christ is my form, as the wall is informed by whiteness. Thus, Christ remains in me and that life lives in me just as correctly and inherently as whiteness is in the wall; and the life by which I live is Christ.”
with each in one nature, so also the new person of the believer now exists in his/her relation with Christ, who lives together with the believer in the one human person.

In closing this investigation into the relationship between Luther’s Christology and anthropology, as understood by Ebeling, it would be appropriate to quote a citation from Ebeling that gives his appraisal of the significance of Luther’s Christology for a person’s justification, which will also serve as an introduction for the next section of this chapter on justification.

The person of the God-man is, as such, the substitutional adoption of all people. The person was not in and for him/herself, but rather what it substitutes for, for what it stands representing, allowing one to recognize what is constitutive for him/her. The *praedicamentum relationis* coincides here with the *praedicamentum substantiae*. It is imperative for Christ *non gerit personam suam*, but rather *gerit personam peccatoris et omnium peccatorum*. The Incarnation of God is this ultimate *communicatio*. It takes place only through the divinity of the person. The works of Christ, the defeat of sin and the destruction of death, are *eo ipso* God’s works. This happened in his person himself. Therefore, by it, the person is changed. So understood in this way, Christ is the gospel in person. Here…Christology and the doctrine of justification become one…

**3.24 Summary of Luther’s Anthropology, according to Gerhard Ebeling**

Now before turning to Luther’s understanding of justification, and how it relates to his anthropology, as read by Ebeling, which is the main purpose of this chapter, it would be good to summarize the relevant points of this anthropology. Based upon this study, there are two significant ontological points that need to be highlighted which relate

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226 Ibid., 191-192. „Die Person des Gottmenschen ist als solche die stellvertretende Annahme aller Personen. Nicht was die Person an und für sich ist, sondern was sie vertritt, wofür sie stellvertretend steht, läßt erkennen, was für sie konstitutiv ist. Das praedicamentum relationis fällt hier in eins mit dem praedicamentum substantiae. Von Christus gilt: non gerit personam suam, vielmehr: gerit personam peccatoris et omnium peccatorum. Die Menschwerdung Gottes ist dieses Äußerste an communicatio. Es vollzieht sich allein kraft der divinitas der Person. Die Werke Christi: Besiegung der Sünde und Zerstörung des Todes, sind eo ipso göttliche Werke. In seiner Person selbst ist dies geschehen. Deshalb ist dadurch die Person aller verändert. So verstanden, ist Christus das Evangelium in Person…Christologie und Rechtfertigungslehre werden hier eins.“
not only to Luther’s anthropology, but also to that of Ebeling, since Ebeling has taken his methodological cues from Luther. First, and most basic, as seen in Ebeling’s essay, “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis” in section 3.22, Luther turned from an ontology that is directed toward the general condition of being, from the language of substance and nature and movement, toward an ontology which considers the human person in his/her relatedness toward others and toward God. Second, as a result of this shift in ontology, Ebeling argues in his essays, “Die Rolle der Hermeneutik in Luthers Theologie” and “Das Problem des Natürlichen bei Luther“ in section 3.21, that Luther began understanding human being through the idea of person, not nature, as was the case in scholasticism, and advanced to the relevance of word, before which one is passive, because as the addressee of the word of God, the human being, is shaped by this word; “…the text becomes the subject and the one understanding the object…”227 Thus, “person” and “word” become the main operative categories in Ebeling’s theology, not “nature” and “grace.”

Now, having summarily sketched this ontological shift, how do both Ebeling and Luther, according to Ebeling’s reading of him, conceive of this relatedness toward others and God informing personhood? There are four relevant points. First, according to Ebeling’s essay, “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis” in section 3.22, “person” comes to be understood in terms of coram-relationships. There are two basic relationships: coram Deo, in which the person is judged by the word of God, and the multi-faceted coram mundo, in which the person is judged by the words of various institutions in society. Thus, I would argue, personhood is a social construct in the thought of Ebeling, since

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227 Ebeling, “Die Rolle der Hermeneutik,” 3. The original German is found in note 196, page 90 in this dissertation.
one’s view of the self is conditioned by how others perceive the self, whether it be society or God. Second, based upon this same essay in section 3.22, since the person is now understood as the addressee of the word and not as a faculty of discernment, as it was in scholasticism, issues about the questionability of relationships, which Ebeling labeled as coram-relationships, and the power of word and faith come to the forefront, because the word effects one’s being as a person. According to Ebeling’s essay, “Das Problem des Natürlichen bei Luther” in section 3.21, the use of nature in the scholastic discussion of person became problematic for Luther because nature emphasizes human autonomy and human action, which makes the human being into his/her own operative principle, like God. Thus, the human person comes to be understood as a passive recipient of the word, which shapes the person, and not as an active force directing his/her development.

Third, once again according to Ebeling’s essay, “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis” in section 3.22, faith is created by the word of God in the conscience of the person and is fulfilled by it. This faith changes the reality of the soul, because it changes the place where one receives life, not empowered in the existing self, but outside of oneself, in Christ, in relation with God, coram Deo. It is this association of reality with Christ that leads to the fourth implication of relationality for personhood. According to Ebeling’s essay, “Das Verhältnis von Christologie und Anthropologie” in section 3.23, Luther does not understand human personhood from the standpoint of being a rational animal, but from the standpoint of the Incarnation. For Luther, according to Ebeling, Christ is the unique “God-man,” where the human being is united with God, which assumes the character of an exchange of properties and persons, a kind of communication
of idioms. Thus, Christ lives as the person of all sinners, taking his/her sin upon himself, identifying with one, and allowing one to find his/her identity in him by giving one faith, which functions a source of life outside of the self. The “I” does not disappear, but its identity is given to it by its relationship to Christ, who co-exists with the ego in one person, just like the persons of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit co-exist with each other in one nature; “Faith makes one person out of you and Christ, sort of (quasi).” It should also be noted that this final implication of relationality for personhood is already encroaching upon the topic of justification, to which this study will now turn.

3.3 Ebeling’s Understanding of the Doctrine of Justification, according to his Lutherstudien

3.31 The Relationship of Justification and Anthropology, according to Ebeling’s Lutherstudien, II.3, chapter 55, “Rechtfertigungslehre und Anthropologie,” and chapter 56.2, “Der homo iustificandus nach den vier causae”

This section is the focus of this chapter; to understand Ebeling’s conception of the doctrine of justification, so as to understand why he rejected the Joint Declaration. It has already been clearly demonstrated that Luther’s rejection of scholasticism began with his understanding of sin. And as a result, it would only be natural to begin this section on Luther’s understanding of justification, as read by Ebeling, with a brief introduction on how Luther’s understanding of sin impacts his understanding of justification.

According to Ebeling, Luther denied that an individual person could ever exist purely for him/herself, a being who is determined purely by his/her choices in life, or as Ebeling puts it, “…a blank slate stepping into dasein (being), in order then to be specified

228 Ebeling, “Christologie und Anthropology,” 176. The original German is in note 224, pages 104-105 of this dissertation.
in the course of life.”229 One is not only born into certain historical conditions, unasked, but also born into a complex condition of disorder before God, known as original sin, to which the individual cannot bring order, all of which impacts the person. Since original sin is also understood as radical sin, as unbelief, humanity under original sin cannot recognize itself as an abnormality, as a deficiency in body and soul. This condition is revealed to the believer only in the recovery of relationship with God, although sin still adheres to the Christian until death. The complexity of the situation of the believer shows how deep sin is part of the human condition, a condition that cannot be changed without God. So, “not belief, but unbelief is natural in humanity, not peace with God, but rather rebellion against him…”230

Since unbelief is basic for humanity, a human being cannot believe by him/herself; “…true belief in God is brought about only by God here.”231 In contrast to Luther, Ebeling points out that, in scholasticism, Scripture speaks of the acquisition of faith in various manners, and sets about arranging it under a variety of distinctions, which demonstrates that faith alone is not decisive for humanity. One can speak of an acquired faith, in which faith is acquired by the human act of hearing or learning, or as a theological virtue, infused by grace.232 Strictly speaking, Ebeling admits that Luther was not totally against the idea of infused faith, since it is miraculous. But, the problem that Luther had with this conception is the way in which this faith inheres in the person, just

230 Ibid., 438-441. The run-in quotation is on p. 440. „Nicht der Glaube, sondern der Unglaube ist dem Menschen angeboren, nicht der Friede mit Gott, sondern die Auflehnung gegen ihn…“
231 Ibid., 441. “Wahrer Glaube an Gott kommt nur von Gott her zustande.“
232 Ibid., 442.
like an acquired faith. It is not given as a possession, “inhering” in the person, but needs constant, external support from God.\textsuperscript{233} So ultimately, Luther turned against both.\textsuperscript{234}

Ebeling gives another reason for the rejection of acquired faith. According to him, Luther admits it would be possible in and of itself to speak of faith as a personal work, since it is “I” who believes, but according to Scripture, “‘It is the concern of God alone, to give faith against nature and then also to believe against reason. It is God’s work alone that I love God.’” \textsuperscript{235} So, if one uses “work” as an “anthropologically neutral category,” as does scholasticism in making the acquisition of faith a human work, then one would also tend to use “faith” as an anthropologically neutral category, which would render the object of faith, the word of God, useless. In either case, the acquisition of faith would come to be emphasized as a human work. Thus, Luther abandons this scholastic language and speaks of faith as a gift of the Holy Spirit, which is not understood as a human action at all. According to Ebeling, what is important for Luther is what happens to the person from the outside, as a “continuing event of communication,” in which the believer is “pure receiver.”\textsuperscript{235}

In contrast to scholasticism, Ebeling argues that everything in Luther’s thought is oriented toward Christ, faith, and word.\textsuperscript{236} Although there is a strong concentration upon the development of Christology within scholasticism, the relationship between Christ and faith is given a low priority. Peter Lombard set the precedent. He came to emphasize how the merits of Christ are given to us by grace, which set the stage for a transition to an

\textsuperscript{233} Ibid., 443-445.
\textsuperscript{234} Ibid., 444-445.
\textsuperscript{235} Ibid., 445-446. The quote in this paragraph is found on p. 445. The original German reads: „Es ist allein Gottes Sache, den Glauben zu geben entgegen der Natur [und dann] gegen die Vernunft auch zu glauben. Es ist das Werk allein Gottes, daß ich Gott liebe.”
\textsuperscript{236} Ibid., 447.
emphasis upon the acquisition of theological virtues, like acquired faith, which, in-turn, had the effect of deemphasizing the role of Christ in human existence.\textsuperscript{237} In contrast, for Luther, faith grasps Christ and clings to him, “in union with him.” According to Ebeling, Luther sees faith as “…conjugally united with Christ as the Word of God,” because faith is word-oriented, not specifically toward the word of law, but especially toward the promise, otherwise known as the gospel.\textsuperscript{238} This association of word and faith has the effect of separating the Pauline expression of “faith from hearing” from the category of \textit{fides acquisita} and designating faith as a gift of the Holy Spirit. Faith loses its association with the potentialities of the soul, and becomes a mode of being. Faith becomes concentrated in a person and forms the way that a person is viewed, because, one might add, that person comes to exist in the presence of God’s judgment, \textit{coram Deo}. As Ebeling says of Luther’s view of faith:

\begin{quote}
Humanity is thus grasped as a hearer [auditor] and therefore—to make it memorable in a pun—is not subsequently judged [by] what belongs to him, but rather according to whom he belongs, whereto he belongs.\textsuperscript{239}
\end{quote}

Somewhat unexpectedly, although Luther rejected Aristotelian ontology, he still has recourse to the four-fold causation paradigm of Aristotle in explaining the causes of justification. Ebeling points out, however, that although Luther has recourse to such a paradigm, he does not refer to the efficient and final causes as some type of passive origin, in opposition to an emphasis upon one’s own intended activity. According to

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{237} Ibid., 448-449.
\item \textsuperscript{238} Ibid., 450-452. The small run-in quotation is found on p. 451. „...mit Christus als dem Worte Gottes ehelich verbunden...“
\item \textsuperscript{239} Ibid., 453. „So ist der Mensch als Hörer erfaßt und deshalb—um es durch ein Wortspiel einprägsam zu machen—nicht danach beurteilt, was ihm gehört, sondern danach, wem er gehört, wohin er gehört.“ There is a play on words in this quotation. “Hören” means “to hear,” while “gehören” means “to belong to,” but both have same past participle. So, “gehört” could mean “to belong to” or “to hear.” I want to thank Dr. Robert Jamison for this insight into the grammar.
\end{itemize}
Ebeling’s reading of Luther, humanity is only the *matter* of an event of formation, which is overwhelmed by causes beyond our control, in which one is “only passively involved.” According to this reading of Ebeling, in Luther’s employment of Aristotle’s four-fold causation paradigm, justification constitutes the “*being* of humanity itself” [emphasis mine] (“das Sein des Menschen selbst”), an event in which humanity is purely matter, which culminates in a life beyond death, not some “auxiliary event,” unnecessary to the existence of a substance composed of matter and form, which ends in death. The first three causes (material, efficient, and final) are relatively straightforward, but the last, the formal, is somewhat involved and so it will need special attention.

According to Ebeling, Luther understood the material cause of justification to be the humanity of this life. Luther found the basis for this in his reading of Is 26:12 (“You work all of our works in us, Lord.”) and Ps 18:26 (“With the holy, you are holy and with the pious, you are pious, and with the pure, you are pure and with the perverse, you are perverse.”), which goes all the way back to Luther’s first lecture on the Psalms. How? In these passages, according to Ebeling, Luther finds biblical evidence of a “radical distinction” between God and humanity.

What is stated about God (and his essence), denotes what he is doing in us, and vice versa, what is stated about humanity, denotes God’s action in him. The motive is not perhaps a speculation about identity, but rather a strong biblical concern to capture the radical distinction between God and humanity in the context in which their communication takes place. Somewhat later, perhaps in 1516, this inner related event is echoed in two glosses on Tauler’s sermons—if I understand them right, although inspired by them but not simply taken from it—now decisively conceived in the

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relation of *material* and *forma*: The divine must be, on our part, more [of] an object of enduring than a doing.\textsuperscript{241}

This reading of humanity as being the pure matter of God’s activity is confirmed, according to Ebeling, in his understanding of Luther’s comments on Gal 4:9 in his commentary on Galatians of 1519; “‘Our action consists in enduring the action of God in us,’ like a tool being used is in more of [a] passive than in an active state.” And Ebeling noted that Paul carries this observation of the passivity of humanity before God into the doctrine of justification when he condemned those who ‘…want to anticipate God’s own justice, with the particular righteousness of God, in order to present their justice to him, instead of receiving it from him.’\textsuperscript{242}

Finally, Ebeling comments that by the 1530s, this understanding of the passivity of the human being in one’s justification made its way into Lutheran worship and piety, because if one makes him/herself active in justification, then that person encroaches upon the “majesty of God” and places him/herself in God’s place as an idol. So, the person is indeed involved in his/her justification, but only as the material, which does not contribute to what one eventually becomes. Ebeling is willing to admit that material can be

\textsuperscript{241} Ibid., 486. „Was über Gott (und sein Wesen) ausgesagt ist, bedeutet, was er an uns tut, und umgekehrt: Was vom Menschen ausgesagt ist, meint Gottes Handeln an ihm. Das Motiv dabei ist nicht etwa eine Identitätspekulation, sondern das streng biblische Bemühen, den radikalen Unterschied zwischen Gott und Mensch im Geschehenszusammenhang ihrer Kommunikation zu erfassen. Etwas später, wohl im Jahre 1516, findet sich in zwei Randbemerkungen zu Tauler-Predigten—wenn ich recht sehe, von dort her zwar angeregt und doch nicht einfach dauraus entnommen—wieder dieser Geschehenszusammenhang, nun entschieden gefaßt in das Verhältnis von materia und forma: Das Göttliche müsse unsererseits mehr ein Gegenstand des Erleidens denn des Tuns sein."

\textsuperscript{242} Ibid., 486-487. The original German of this quotation from Luther’s commentary on Galatians, found on p. 487, reads: „Unser Tun besteht im Erleiden des Handelns Gottes in uns‘, wie ein Werkzeug im Gebrauch sich mehr im passiven als im aktiven Zustand befindet.” The German from the second quotation is: „...die mit Eigengerechtigkeit Gott zuvorkommen wollen, um ihm Gerechtigkeit darzubringen, statt sie von ihm zu empfangen.“
prepared for the reception of the gospel and the Holy Spirit by the law, but “Matter remains matter, unless Christ has accepted, shaped, justified, and pardoned him.”

The efficient cause of justification is God. Ebeling began his exposition of God as the efficient cause of justification by citing a long quotation from Luther:

> The nature of God is, that he makes something from nothing. Therefore, [he] who is not yet nothing, from him God can thus make nothing. But humans make something different from [something]. But that is vain, unprofitable work. Therefore, God does not receive for [the sake of] the forsaken, does not make health for the sick, does not make vision for the blind, does not make life for the dead, does not make piety for the sinner, does not make wisdom for the foolish, in short, does not take pity for the miserable and does not give grace for the those who are in disgrace. Therefore, no proud saint can become the wise or righteous material of God and gain God’s work in himself, but rather remains in his own work and makes a fictitious, apparent, false, tainted saint from he himself, who is a hypocrite.

Of course, according to the Christian tradition, the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* applies to the origin of the world, in which Luther will not tolerate any discussion about prime matter. But for Luther, according to Ebeling, creation *ex nihilo* also means that God creates everything daily, so that God does and works everything in one all the time; “…I am also to be a piece in the world and his creation…that does not stand in my own

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243 Ibid., 487-488. The original Latin of this quotation, on p. 488, reads, “Materia manet materia, nisi Christus eam acceperit, formaverit, iustificaverit et clarificaverit.”

244 Ibid., 489-490. The original German reads: „Gott es Natur ist, daß er aus nichts etwas macht. Darum, wer noch nicht nichts ist, aus dem kann Gott auch nichts machen. Die Menschen aber machen aus etwas ein anderes. Das ist aber eitel unnütz Werk. Darum nimmt Gott nicht auf denn die Verlassenen, macht nicht gesund denn die Kranken, macht nicht sehend denn die Blinden, macht nicht lebend denn die Toten, macht nicht fromm denn die Sünder, macht nicht weise denn die Unweisen, kurz, erbarmt sich nicht denn der Elenden und gibt nicht Gnade denn denen, die in Ungnade sind. Deshalb kann kein hoffärtiger Heiliger, Weiser oder Gerechter Gottes Materie werden und Gottes Werk in sich erlangen, sondern bleibt in seinem eigenen Werk und macht einen erdichteten, scheinenden, falschen, gefärbten Heiligen aus sich selber, das ist einen Heuchler.” This is a quotation from Luther’s “Die sieben Bußpsalmen 1517,” in WA 1 (1883; rept., Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger; Graz: Akademische Druck—u. Verlagsanstalt, 1966), p. 183, line 38 – p. 184, line 10.
power, to move a hand, but rather that God does and works everything in me alone."

Thus, it should not be surprising that, according to Ebeling, Luther extended the application of creation *ex nihilo* from the creation of the world to statements of faith. For example, Ebeling cites the *Magnificat* as an example of creation *ex nihilo* being applied to statements of faith, because in the *Magnificat*, God lifts Mary far above Eve, since Mary bears the child who will destroy death and bring life. Did Mary deserve such an exultation? No, she did not, because nothing was found in her that would make her worthy of such an elevation, which demonstrates the way that God works. And, according to Ebeling, God works in a similar fashion in the act of justification. In justification, God abolishes the old form of the sinful person and introduces a new one. The Holy Spirit brings it about that the old person is “purely passive,” although the old person opposes God’s work and wants to form the self by him/herself, constantly objecting against the work of God, like a piece of wood might object to the work of the artist who perceives a form in the material: “Stop it! Stop it! You are deforming me!”

The final cause of justification relates to what humanity should become, which Ebeling calls the *futura forma*. The *futura forma* is available only when it has fully formed the matter, and not before, although one could say that even in the present, it is in the process of formation. So, what is the *futura forma* of humanity? It is the *Imago Dei*. Thus, the final cause of justification is the *Imago Dei*. In humanity’s sinful state, humanity is not the *imago Dei*, but should become it. Luther collapsed the Catholic

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245 Ebeling, “Der homo justificandus nach den vier causae,” 490. „daß ich auch ein Stück von der Welt und seiner Schöpfung sei…daß in meiner Macht nicht steht, eine Hand zu regen, sondern allein, daß Gott alles in mir tut und wirkt.”

246 Ibid., 490-491.

247 Ibid., 492-494. The quotation is found on pp. 493-494; „„Hör auf, hör auf, du verdirbst mich!“

248 Ibid., 494.
distinction between the *imago Dei* that remained after the fall and the rehabilitatable *similitudo Dei*. The lingering, remaining *imago Dei* in the sinful person is not animal reason “endowed with spiritual faculties,” but is only a “deformed, estranged, and misused form.” And merely accepting that the *imago Dei* which remains after the fall to be the image of God actually reflects the image of the devil in such a person.249

So, what is the *imago Dei*? The *imago Dei* is “the real reflection of holiness, righteousness, and truth of God.” The *imago Dei* is recovered in Christ, as the word of God; “‘As you hear me on Earth in the word, so is my image formed *majestate*, so I am disposed and have such a heart.’”250 Faith is the beginning of the image in one, which Luther compares to a fetus growing in its mother in faith, and the completion of its growth orients the Christian toward the future. Christ did not appear and die for us in this life, but for the future; the Christian is not baptized for this life. So, the Christian must die and leave this life.251

Ebeling’s attempt to deal with the formal cause of justification is not easy to follow, because, being in the center of the Reformation debate on the doctrine of justification, it is tied up with his attempt to clarify Luther’s position on several scholastic errors. Moreover, according to Ebeling, one can find several statements from Luther about the formal cause of justification. First of all, according to Ebeling, one can find several statements in Luther that the formal cause of justification is God, but Ebeling cautions against accepting these as Luther’s final word on the matter, since such a

249 Ibid., 495.
250 Ibid., 496. „Wie du mich hörst auf Erden im Wort, so ist in maiestate mein Bild gestaltet, so bin ich gesinnt und habe ein solches Herz.”
251 Ibid., 496-499. The original German of the first quotation in this paragraph, found on p. 496, is: „die reine Widerspiegung der Heiligkeit, Gerechtigkeit und Wahrheit Gottes.” The second, found on this same page, is: „Wie du mich hörst auf Erden im Wort, so ist in maiestate mein Bild gestaltet, so bin ich gesinnt und habe ein solches Herz.”
conception would mean that justification would be a formal union between the human and divine, just like the Incarnation. Anyway, Ebeling finds too many statements about faith as the formal cause to find this description of Luther compelling. Moreover, according to Ebeling, in order to make it clear that Luther has repudiated the scholastic understanding of the formal cause of justification as some infused grace which shapes matter, Luther will occasionally claim that the formal cause of justification is really the mercy of God, not some infused, justifying grace that shapes certain qualities of the soul. Finally, in order to avoid the notion that faith must be formed by love in order to be justifying, Luther made it clear that Christ himself is the form of faith, as the “principle of life.” Thus, Ebeling wrote:

The being of the Christian can also be thus described, that Christ enduringly takes form in him and the Christian is being shaped according to the image of Christ; “Formatur…Christus in nobis continue, et nos formamur ad imaginem ipsius, dum hic vivimus.”

In the end, Ebeling argues that the formal cause of justification, for Luther, is the faith of Christ. But, how does one get from “Christ,” who shapes one, to the “faith of Christ” as being the formal cause? Isn’t this some sort of confusion between efficient and formal causation? Ebeling’s explanation becomes clearer when he discusses Luther’s reading of Romans 3:4. In this passage, Ebeling notes that Luther concentrated upon Paul’s quotation of the Psalms here in Romans, that “you become justified in your words,” which, according to Ebeling, Luther interpreted as meaning that one becomes justified when one is “endowed with his word.” In his word, we are “made”

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\[ \text{252} \quad \text{Ibid., 500-502.} \]

\[ \text{253} \quad \text{Ibid., 503. “…kann auch das Sein des Christen so beschrieben werden, daß fortdauernd Christus in ihm Gestalt gewinnt und der Christ nach dem Bilde Christi gestaltet wird: Formatur…Christus in nobis continue, et nos formamur ad imaginem ipsius, dum hic vivimus.”} \]

\[ \text{254} \quad \text{Ibid., 504. The following quotation is found on this same page. „Gott macht uns aber dann zu solchen, wie sein Wort ist, wenn wir glauben, daß sein Wort ein solches sei, nämlich gerecht und wahr.”} \]
lawful, true, and wise. In short, we are changed by his word, which, as noted in section 3.6, affects our being. “But then God makes us to be such, as his Word is, when we believe, that his Word is one such, namely lawful and true.” He goes on to describe the soul as being absorbed by God’s word, sharing in God’s power. According to Ebeling, this conception of faith, a “conformity with the Word and not as a virtus animae,” demonstrates clearly that faith is not some quality adhering in a person, needing to be animated by love, but rather forms the person, shaping one’s response, which comprises one’s truth, or being, as noted in this section. So, in the end, one is not determined by what one can do, but by what happens to a person from the outside, “in judgment and in the ground of life-giving confidence,” which comes from the reception of the word of God through Christ.

This is how Ebeling gets from “Christ” to the “faith of Christ” as the formal cause of justification. It is the reception of God’s word through Christ that creates faith in one, which leads one to believe in the truth of God’s word. This reception leads to Christ being formed in the believer, which is, as seen above, “the being of the Christian.” This, of course, gives us a clearer picture of what Ebeling meant when we examined “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis” in section 3.22, when he noted that word changes the reality of the soul by creating faith, and changes the place where one receives life. *The word changes the reality of the soul*, because it changes a sinner into a believer, which makes them to exist *coram Deo, and it changes the place where one receives life*, because it leads to Christ, who is now the source of life, not the self, being formed in the believer. Thus, finally, there is some clarity about what Ebeling wrote of Luther at the beginning of this essay, when he claimed that justification is “being of humanity itself.”
In conclusion, Ebeling summarizes the various facets of Luther’s understanding of the faith of Christ as the formal cause of justification, by writing:

Faith so conceived—Luther calls it an *ens positivum*—is not anything in humanity, but rather becomes, already in this life, the source of eternal life, arising out of the heart and conscience. Thus, faith as the work of God on humanity causes the *homo huius vitae* to *consent* to thereby to be *pura materia Dei ad futurae formae suae vitam*. [Emphasis mine]  

### 3.32 The Relationship of Divine Faith and Human Action, according to Ebeling’s *Lutherstudien*, II.3, chapter 62, “Cooperatores Dei”

An investigation into chapter 62, “Cooperatores Dei,” reveals Luther’s understanding on how human works relate to faith, or God’s work in us. This gives one further insight into why Luther rejected Thomas’ doctrine of merit, which was left incomplete at the end of the analysis of chapter 47, “Verdienstliches Tun aus eigener Kraft (Th. 27)” in section 3.0. (The application of these findings will be developed in the summary following this section.) According to Ebeling in “Cooperatores Dei,” humanity is merely passive in comparison with God, nothing but the recipient, the pure matter, with which God works. Ebeling describes Luther’s understanding of this passivity in the following manner:

The character of this passivity can be variously identified. The basic form is the sole efficacy of God for our salvation. Humanity can contribute no work of their own to it. For the regeneration of old men to the new, it is necessary, *Hic homo mere passiva…sees habet, nec facit quippiam, sed fit totus homo*. Human works themselves are, in view of justification, *mere passiva et patiuntur se iustificare*. Then that comes strongly to

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255 Ibid., 506-507. „...ist der so verstandene Glaube—Luther nennt ihn ein ens positivum—nicht irgendetwas am Menschen, sondern wird von Herz ung Gewissen her zur Quelle ewigen Lebens schon in diesem Leben. So bringt der Glaube als das Werk Gottes am Menschen den homo huius vitae zum Einverständniss damit, pura material Dei zu sein ad futurae formae suae vitam.”
expression, that humanity itself here behaves passively as in reference to birth. We become children and heirs of God *nascendo, non operando.* And if one makes him/herself active in justification, then that person is taking the place of the creator. Moreover, according to Ebeling, Luther extended this teaching about the passivity of humanity in justification to all human actions, based upon his reading of Is 26:12 (omnia opera nostra tu operatus es, Domine.). Based upon this passage, I would argue that, in Catholic language, this would mean that humanity is passive, even in the state of sanctification. This is verified in Ebeling’s use of Luther’s discussion on Ps 127:2 concerning the pious person, who is presumably already justified; “The pious one sleeps not only at night, but also during the whole lifetime, lets it happen, as God makes it…And by doing everything, he does nothing, and by doing nothing, he does everything.” There is more to come on this issue.

According to Ebeling, faith, for Luther, is a divine work in one, which changes the person. This was noticed several times in the previous section. Faith is an active force that must produce good works. But good works do not make one good. Rather, they follow from already being good. Behind this is an implicit rejection of Aristotelian

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256 Gerhard Ebeling, “Cooperatores Dei,” in *Lutherstudien*, vol. 2, pt. 3, 588. „Der Charakter dieses Passiven kann verschieden gekennzeichnet werden. Die Grundform ist die Alleinwirksamkeit Gottes zu unserem Heil. Der Mensch kann kein eigenes Werk dazu beisteuern. Für die Erneuerung des alten Menschen zum neuen gilt: Hic homo mere passiv…esse habet, nec facit quippiam, sed fit totus homo. Die menschlichen opera selbst sind in Hinsicht auf die Rechtfertigung mere passiva et patiuntur se justificari. Das kommt sodann dadurch verstärkt zum Ausdruck, daß sich der Mensch hier wie im Vorgang der Geburt passiv verhält. Zu Kindern und Erben Gottes werden wir nascendo, non operando.” Ebeling supports this point, in part, by relying upon Luther’s Commentary on Galatians, WA 40.1, p. 41, lines 2-5: "...justicia quae ex nobis fit, non est Christiana iusticia, non fimus per eam probi. Christiana iusticia est mere contraria, passiva, quam tantum recipimus, ubi nihil operamur sed patimur alium operari in nobis scilicet deum.”

257 Ibid., 588-591.

258 Ibid., 592. The original Latin of the passage from Isaiah reads, “omnia opera nostra tu operatus es, Domine.” The original German of Luther’s use of the passage from the Psalms reads: „Der Fromme schläft nicht nur bei Nacht, sondern während der ganzen Lebenszeit, läßt es gehen, wie Gott es macht…Und indem er alles tut, tut er nichts, und indem er nichts tut, tut er alles.“
ethics in that Luther argued that one is not made better by good works, but that because one is already good, good works follow. Thus, according to Ebeling, Luther claimed:

“As the fruit never makes the tree [the allusion to the reproduction of tree by the seeds of its fruits must not for example detract from the metaphor as an objection], so works never make one good man. Rather the contrary, the tree is there, then the fruit necessarily follows. Thus, first man must be made good, then good works follow, not in order to make him good, but rather they attest that he is good. Therefore, what hints about good works in Scripture, is to be understood thus, that by them, humanity does not become good, but rather is judged, known, proven, and shown that he is already good.”

This belief clearly displays a continuity between faith and work, but works, which are a fruit of the Holy Spirit, spring from faith, which is a gift of the Spirit. The Holy Spirit, however, should not be understood as another source of power, alongside Christ. No, in Christ, the Christian has everything that one should want from God, because in faith, “…the Christian is lord over sin, death, and hell,” and to desire more displays a misunderstanding of the Christian life. So, Ebeling summarized the relationship of faith and works thusly.

By Christ residing in the conscience through faith, the Christian is free to pass on to the next, what he has received from God. Love springs spontaneously from the certainty of faith, which does nothing different than to relay the received love. What takes place in works is nevertheless not for the sake of accomplishing good in them, but rather due to faith alone, in which the person abandons him/herself together with their deeds—mere passive—for what is promised to them in Christ.

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259 Ibid., 592-594. This quotation itself is on p. 594. „Wie die Früchte neimals den Baum machen [der Hinweis auf die Fortpflanzung des Baumes durch die Samen seiner Früchte darf nicht etwa als Einwand das Bildwort stören!], so machen die Werke niemals einen guten Menschen. Vielmehr umgekehrt: Ist der Baum da, dann folgen notwendig Früchte. So muß erst der Mensch gut gemacht sein, dann folgen gute Werke, nicht um ihn gut zu machen, sondern damit sie bezeugen, daß er gut ist. Dassalb, was in der Schrift über gute Werke anklingt, ist so zu verstehen, daß durch sie der Mensch nicht gut wird, vielmehr geurteilt, erkannt, bewährt und bezeugt wird, daß er bereits gut ist.“

260 Ibid., 594-595. Both quotations in this paragraph are on p. 595. The original German of this run-in quotation is: „…der Christ Herr über Sünde, Tod und Hölle.“ The original German of the block quotation is: „Indem Christus durch den Glauben im Gewissen wohnt, ist der Christ frei dazu, an den Nächsten weiterzugeben, was er von Gott empfangen hat. Aus der Glaubensgewißheit entspringt spontan
This fruit, these works, however, should not be understood as superfluous to faith, because if the works do not follow from faith, then faith is not real. So, since the person that Ebeling is talking about here is already “good,” already living in faith, it would seem that, to use Catholic language, even in the state of sanctification, one does not contribute to good works, but merely passes them on from God to their neighbor.

Faith can be spoken of absolutely, *sola fides*, or in concrete form, *fides incarnata*, by works, but phrases like “Do that, so that you will live,” do not point to the works themselves, but rather point back to *fides incarnate*, being nothing more than concrete instances of that which is really important, *sola fides*. Concrete speech can be seductive, leading one to emphasize the aspect of works. So, according to Ebeling, Luther judged human works grimly, calling them “evil and defective,” having no efficacy for justification before God. But, thanks to God, works are considered good. Works of the law are good for maintaining peace, while works of the believer, under grace:

…share in this down-to-earth determination of a *iusititia civilis*. But because they arise from faith and refer to the fulfillment of the law through Christ, these *opera gratiae* are suitable not merely for the necessity of the *iusititia civilis*. Rather, they attest beyond *iusititia fidei* and make us secure in our calling in this beginning of the new creation.

In this life, the law is fulfilled only by faith, but through love in the future life, when humans will be “pure and new creatures.”

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261 Ebeling, “Cooperatores Dei,” 596-598. The block quotation is found on p. 597; „….haben an dieser nüchternen Bestimmung einer iustitia civilis teil. Aber weil sie aus dem Glauben hervorgehen und auf die Erfüllung des Gesetzes durch Christus verweisen, eignet diesen opera gratiae nicht bloß die Notwendigkeit der iustitia civilis. Vielmehr bezeugen sie darüber hinaus die iustitia fidei und machen uns in diesem Anfangsstadium der neuen Kreatur unserer Berufung gewiß.“
3.33 Summary of Luther’s Understanding of the Relationship between Anthropology and Justification, according to Gerhard Ebeling

So now, before turning to why Gerhard Ebeling rejected the *Joint Declaration*, this study needs to summarize the findings about how Ebeling read Luther on the doctrine of justification, so as to be clear on what led to Ebeling’s rejection of the JD.

So, how does Luther, according to Ebeling’s reading of him, understand a person to be justified by God? According to this reading, I would argue that Luther, according to Ebeling, emphasizes that a person is *made* righteous in justification, which is in tension with the traditional emphasis in Lutheran doctrine, in which a person is *merely* declared, or reckoned, righteous by God.\(^{262}\) In my research, I did not find any reference to justification *merely* being a declaration in Ebeling’s reading of Luther. Evidence for this claim can be found throughout this study. First, this is supported by Ebeling’s essay, “Der homo iustificandus nach den vier causae” in section 3.31, where Ebeling argues that, for Luther, a person is *made* lawful, true, and just in justification, when one is “endowed with his word.” Second, it is also supported in his essay, “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis” in section 3.22, where it was noted that God’s word changes

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\(^{262}\) This can be found in “The Formula of Concord, Solid Declaration,” article 3, in *The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*, ed. by Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert, trans. by Charles Arand, Eric Gritsch, Robert Kolb, William Russell, James Schaaf, Jane Strohl, and Timothy J. Wengert (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2000), p. 565, lines 22-30, which reads: “…when we teach that through the activity of the Holy Spirit we are born anew and become righteous, this does not mean that after rebirth unrighteousness no longer clings to the essence and life of the justified and reborn. Instead, it means that with his perfect obedience Christ has covered all their sins, which inhere in human nature during this life. These sins are not taken into account; instead, even though the justified and reborn are and remain sinners to the grave because of their corrupted nature, they are regarded as upright and are pronounced righteous through faith, because of this obedience of Christ…” It can also be verified by reading the doctrine page, “On Justification,” under “Belief and Practice,” on the official Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod web page. Here, it says, “Scripture teaches that God has already declared the whole world to be righteous in Christ…He justifies, that is, accounts as righteous, all those who believe, accept, and rely on, the fact that for Christ’s sake their sins are forgiven.” This was downloaded on January 7, 2010 from http://www.lcms.org/pages/internal.asp?NavID=570.
the reality of one’s soul by creating faith, which allows one to exist in the presence of
god, coram Deo. Faith itself is a mode of existence. Third, according to Ebeling’s
eSSay, “Das Verhältnis von Christologie und Anthropologie” in section 3.23, Ebeling
wrote that the works of God in Christ, which defeat sin, change a person. Finally, I
would argue that one can also find tacit proof for this reading of Ebeling on justification
in the fact that, as once again noted in section 3.22 in “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis,”
Ebeling calls God’s word “creatively powerful.” Why would someone emphasize this
aspect of God’s word if it does nothing but declare one righteous? To be “creatively
powerful,” it should also effect what it declares, which means that it must make one
righteous.

This understanding of being made righteous, however, cannot be understood in a
traditionally Catholic sense, such as that found in Trent, where justification is understood
as “…the sanctification and renewal of the interior person through the voluntary
reception of grace…” because Ebeling has steadfastly denied that a human person can be
described as a substance having a nature that is influence by grace as an infused
“power.”263 So how is “being made righteous” understood by Ebeling? I would argue
that, for Ebeling, to be made righteous means that one now exists in a relation with God
in Christ, or perhaps better, that Christ is coming to life in one, exchanging one’s sin for
Christ’s righteousness, receiving new life in an external relationship with Christ. This is
found in Ebeling’s essay, “Das Verhältnis von Christologie und Anthropologie,” found in
section 3.23. This would also be different from Catholic teaching, because, as found in

263 “The General Council of Trent, Sixth Session: Decree on Justification (1547),” in The Christian
Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church, sixth revised and enlarged edition, ed. by J.
this same essay, the “believer too does not have new life in himself, but rather only in the participation in the life of Christ.” As found in Ebeling’s essay, “Der homo iustificandus nach den vier causae,” in section 3.31, the imago Dei, the final cause of one’s justification, is recovered in Christ, through this exchange, by the reception of the word of God, which creates faith in one, and thus forms the being of the Christian. This is what is unique about Ebeling’s view of justification; it is an existential interpretation of the act of justification. Yet, this image is not completely formed in the believer in this life, but grows in one, like a fetus. So, in this life, the believer coexists as righteous and sinful, since the believer remains in original sin even after baptism. In this fashion, Ebeling is affirming that the believer exists as both righteous in Christ and yet sinful in his/her relation to the world, which is the essence of the doctrine of the simul iustus et peccator.

In this description of what it means to be made righteous for Ebeling, one also finds evidence for the presence of a human agent, or person, in justification, which brings one to the next question: What is the role of the person in one’s justification? Based upon this research, I would argue that there is clearly no role for human works in one’s justification in Ebeling’s understanding of Luther. One finds this supported in several 

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264 Miikka Ruokanen, in Hermeneutics as an Ecumenical Method in the Theology of Gerhard Ebeling, 213-214, makes the following observation concerning Ebeling’s reinterpretation of the doctrine of justification. “In the event of justification man is transferred from the state of non-existence (Nichtsein) to the state of authentic existence (Sein). Man himself is in no way changed—that would not even be possible, because he is not a substance. What happens in justification is ‘a fundamental change of the situation’ in which the Creator calls man into being, from the deadly state of non-existence to authentic existence. Man, who has so far ‘turned his back’ on his Creator and, as a result, lived in a state of anxiety and uncertainty, now ‘turns his face’ towards God and thus acquires the foundation of his existence from his Creator in a relationship with him.” Ruokanen is basically correct here, in that one is not changed or transformed in the act of justification in the sense that one’s substance is changed, but I would also argue that one could rightly claim that justification does change or transform one in the sense that in the act of justification, the word of God calls for faith, which itself is a transformation in one’s existence.
places. First, in his essay “Rechtfertigungslehre und Anthropologie” in section 3.31, Ebeling notes that Luther abandoned scholastic theology, because it had the tendency to emphasize the creation of faith as a human work, which goes against Scripture, which declares it is the work of God alone to give faith. This, of course, is consistent with what this study has noted throughout, particularly in his essay “Das Problem des Natürlichen bei Luther,” in section 3.21, namely that, according to Ebeling, Luther rejected scholastic theology, and its coordination of nature and grace, because it fosters human autonomy and an active understanding of the human person, all of which are necessary ontological positions if one believes in human cooperation with God in one’s justification. Second, in Ebeling’s essay, “Der homo iustificandus nach den vier causae,” in section 3.31, he declares, for Luther, that the material cause of one’s justification is the human person. So, the human person is involved in his/her justification, but only is a purely passive way. And to think otherwise would make an idol of the self, putting the self in God’s place.

Yet, having denied that humans can cooperate in one’s justification, Ebeling still admits that the human person does have a role to play in one’s justification, a role that might seemingly mitigate against his statements that humans are purely passive in response to God’s work of justification, but only in the smallest degree. Although he denies humans an active role in one’s justification, Ebeling, in his reading of Luther, does admit in “Der homo iustificandus nach den vier causae,” that one does consent to the work of God in one. 265 Thus, God does not make one righteous without at least the bare acknowledgement, and approval, of such work. Thus, there must still be some place for the presence of what one might even dare call “substance,” or something analogous to a

“substance,” in Ebeling’s relational ontology, even if its role in one’s justification is accorded the smallest place. This was also indicated in his essay, “Das Verhältnis von Christologie und Anthropologie,” in section 3.23, where Ebeling argued on behalf of Luther that the “I” is not swallowed up in Christ. Of course, if one thinks about it, there must be some conception of a human person, analogous to a substance, in Ebeling’s theology; otherwise it makes no sense to talk about coram-relations, which would require the presence of at least two “substances.”

I cannot claim to have fully investigated Ebeling’s understanding of human personhood in this study, since this was not my explicit purpose. A little more can be said, though. First, human personhood has been radically affected by sin, as revealed in Ebeling’s essay, “Die menschliche Natur nach dem Fall (Th. 26)” in section 3.12, so that, being spiritually blind, unbelief is its “natural” condition. Second, human personhood is radically affected by all facets of human existence, including the historical, and it is understood as the addressee of the word, whose existence is put into dispute by the struggle between the word of the world (coram mundo) and God (coram Deo). Thus, it is socially constructed outside of the self. These points were all discovered in his essay, “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis” in section 3.22. Third, according to Ebeling, Luther does speak of the law of nature, which has been given over to human control.266 Thus, the human person is active in this realm. It should be kept in mind, however, that human existence is not decisively determined by this realm, but only in relation to God and humanity, through word. This is the difference between an Aristotelian substance ontology and a relational ontology. And finally, the human person is both radically

266 Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction, 128-129.
distinct from God, in whose presence the human person is passive, and is the place where
the imago Dei grows once one has received the word of God, all of which was discovered
in Ebeling’s essay, “Der homo iustificandus nach den vier causae.” Yet, the one thing
that most certainly cannot be said of it in Ebeling’s reading of Luther is that “person” can
be truly conceived of as a substance, possessing a nature and the power necessary to
achieve its natural telos, and which has been healed and elevated by God’s grace.

So now, having a clearer understanding of Ebeling’s conception of the human
person and its limitations in one’s own justification, why did Ebeling reject the doctrine
of merit? It was noted earlier, back in section 3.0, that Luther, according to Ebeling,
rejected the doctrine of merit, because it was not consistent with his doctrine of
justification. According to this study, Luther, according to Ebeling, rejected the doctrine
of merit, not only because it required an ontology which tends to emphasize human
autonomy, as seen in his essay, “Das Problem des Natürlichen bei Luther” in section
3.21, but also because it has no role to play in the granting of justification, since humans
are nothing but the material cause of one’s justification, as seen in “Der homo
iustificandus nach den vier causae” in section 3.31. So, Dr. Root’s attempt to display
merit’s role within a teleological framework and its very limited use in Aquinas’
understanding of justification, as presented by Dr. Wawrykow, cannot work in
theological circles dominated by those like Ebeling, because of teleology’s substance
ontological context.

But, I would argue that Ebeling’s rejection of the doctrine of merit goes even
farther, because of his understanding of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. This topic leads
into the fourth and final issue. As seen in Ebeling’s essays, “Luthers Wirklichkeits-
verständnis” in section 3.22 and “Der homo iustificandus nach den vier causae” in section 3.31, Ebeling argues that Luther applies the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* not only to the creation, but also God’s work as the efficient cause of our justification. This explains why Luther relegates humanity to being nothing more than the mere matter of our justification, which has no active role in our justification; to give a person an active role in our justification, would be the same as denying that God works our justification *ex nihilo*. Thus, as Ebeling says in his essay “Cooperatores Dei” in section 3.32, good works do not make one good, even though faith must do good works. These good works come from the fact that faith is already active in the believer, that makes one secure in his/her calling, which I understand to mean that these works lets one know that saving faith is indeed present in that person. Thus, to use Catholic language, because God is so heavily emphasized as the doer of these work, even in the state of sanctification, the good works that one does cannot contribute to growth in any thing, because they do not come from the human person at all. One merely gives his/her consent to them, passing along the love that God has shown him or her.

But why is there such an emphasis upon God’s work in justification? In reading between the lines, I would argue that there is a heavy emphasis upon upholding the transcendence, dignity, and majesty of God. I can see this in many of the essays that I have examined in this section. For example, in his essay “Die Grunddifferenz zur Scholastik (Th. 31)” in section 3.111, Ebeling argues that Luther rejected the coordination of nature and grace, because the properties of grace had a tendency to rub off onto nature, making grace an “inherent” property of the substance, which, of course, blursthe *distinction* between the human and the divine. In “Das Problem des Natürlichen
bei Luther” in section 3.21, Ebeling argues that the use of “nature” fostered an active understanding of humanity, which was too much like God. In Ebeling’s book *Luther: An Introduction to his Thought* in section 3.22, he argues that, for Luther, if one has true faith, then one will “let God be God,” not making the self into an idol and allowing oneself to be without an idol and thus “fall into the hands of God.” In “Der homo justificandus nach den vier causae” in 3.31, Ebeling argues that, for Luther, the whole point of designating humanity as the material cause of justification is to maintain a radical distinction between God and humanity, which is in accord with the Scripture. And if one makes him/herself active in justification, then one encroaches upon the “majesty of God,” or as he says in “Cooperatores Dei” in section 3.32, if one makes him/herself active in justification, then one takes the place of the creator. Thus, throughout many of the texts that I have investigated in the section, texts that relate to Luther’s rejection of the scholastic method, scholastic anthropology, the nature of faith, of justification, and even good works, the same theme seems to run throughout; an emphasis upon protecting the transcendence and majesty of God. So, it would seem that, in Ebeling’s reading of Luther, if God’s transcendence and majesty are to be protected, then human agency must be de-emphasized and kept radically distinct from divine action.

In closing, this study in Luther’s hermeneutical anthropology has been beneficial, because it is necessary to understand Ebeling’s view of human agency in order to understand why he rejected the scholastic method and how he understands a person to be justified. The purpose of the next chapter is to take this understanding of Ebeling on justification and the doctrine of merit and understand how it led to his rejection of the *Joint Declaration.*
Chapter 4: The Hermeneutical Justification for Gerhard Ebeling’s Rejection of The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification

Now that I have investigated Ebeling’s understanding of the task of ecumenism, the foundation and function of the church, the relationship of word and faith, his anthropology, and his understanding of the doctrine of justification, I am now in a better position to explain why he rejected the Joint Declaration. The main text that will be used in explaining why he rejected the Joint Declaration is a translation of the first letter of protest against the JD that was published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on January 29, 1998. This is a good text to begin with, because it clearly states the basic facts of what he, as a signatory of this letter, was in disagreement within the JD. For supplementary evidence, occasionally a translation of the revised letter of protest, published in the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, will be referred to. This revised letter responds to the emendations made by the “Annex to the Official Common Statement” to the Joint Declaration after its somewhat negative evaluation by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Since this study has been limited to those facets of Ebeling’s theology that were mentioned above, only paragraphs one, two, three, and five of this letter of protest, which deal with those facets, will be dealt with. The basic method that will be used is one of commentary on this letter, in which the points of contention as presented in this letter will be clarified through a close reading of it, identifying Ebeling’s theological justification for each particular point of contention by referring to this study of him, and, finally, showing how and where it leads to disagreement with the text of the Joint Declaration.

267 For clarification, I will refer to the first letter of protest, published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on January 29, 1998, merely as “the letter of protest.” When referring to the second letter of protest, published in the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, I will clearly refer to it as the “revised letter of protest.”
4.1 Paragraph 1—The Expectations for the *Joint Declaration*

Paragraph 1 of the letter of protest against the *Joint Declaration* lays out the basic requirements for what the signatories expect to find, if the declaration is be acceptable to them. This paragraph reads:

> Justification of the sinner by faith alone establishes, according to Protestant doctrine, what is the basic reality for Christian life and the life of the church. The doctrine, structure, and practice of the church are to be determined and judged by the doctrine of justification…Consensus on the doctrine of justification, therefore, must 1) make evident that the truth of justification by faith alone has not been abridged, and 2) immediately affect the relationship between the consenting churches, so that they mutually recognize each other as the church of Jesus Christ…

In examining this first paragraph, two basic structural points of disagreement with the drafters and signatories of the *Joint Declaration* have already been laid out, both of which would be especially significant to Ebeling: What is the nature of Christian reality, or the conceptual scheme within which the doctrine of justification should be discussed? And, what is the life and function of the church?

4.11 The Essence of Christian Reality

In the above block quotation, this letter of protest states that justification establishes what is “the basic reality for Christian life.” The phrase “basic reality” should immediately remind one of two of Ebeling’s essays; “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis,” which is translated as “Luther’s Understanding of Reality,” and “Die Grunddifferenz zur Scholastik,” which is translated as “The Basic Difference with Scholasticism.” Thus, having the proper understanding of reality, of discovering basic differences between

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Protestants and Catholics, was an important theme throughout Ebeling’s theology. Therefore, when this phrase “basic reality” is found in the introductory paragraph to this protest letter, I argue that it must have had special resonance with Ebeling. So, it is important to become clear on what is “the basic reality for Christian life,” according to Ebeling.

As was noticed in chapter 3, Ebeling’s conception of personhood was developed in his essay, “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis.” This essay, however, does more than just develop this conception; it is also a brief account of Ebeling on Luther’s rejection of Aristotelian ontology, its union with theology in scholasticism, and its replacement by a type of personal, relationalism. Thus, this essay deserves a more thorough examination, in order to determine just how Luther, according to Ebeling, reached the conclusion that such a shift was necessary.

As noted in the investigation into Ebeling’s essay, “Die Rolle der Hermeneutik in Luthers Theologie” in section 3.21, Luther’s study of the Bible was an important formative event in the shift of his hermeneutical method, according to Ebeling. This observation is confirmed in “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis,” where Ebeling wrote:

The observation, that the Bible speaks differently of things than philosophy and therefore also differently than scholastic theology, becomes for him already very early a methodological directive of biblical exegesis and through it is made the sole, theologically-controlling discipline.  

In this text, however, Ebeling adds some other details about how Luther’s reading of the Bible forces him to shift his understanding of reality. For example, Ebeling notes

269 Gerhard Ebeling, “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis,” Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 90, no. 4 (December, 1993): 411-412. The original German reads; „Die Beobachtung, daß die Bibel anders von den Dingen redet als die Philosophie und deshalb auch anders als die scholastische Theologie, wird für ihn schon sehr früh zur methodischen Direktive biblischer Exegese und macht sie dadurch zur theologisch allein maßgebenden Disziplin.“
that the Bible speaks of “substantia” differently than Aristotle. In the Bible, “substantia” is not a “permanent inner essence, the essence of the thing,” but rather that which gives life, its basis, which one relies upon for his/her existence. Moreover, the Bible does not speak about the intellect as a fixed potency of the soul, but rather as a human concern for an object, which changes one’s being and judgment. A substantive, such as the virtus Dei, is not understood as a power in God, but rather comes to be interpreted verbally, as a power that benefits one in some way. The iustitia Dei is not understood as some quality in a person, as “a tangible state of affairs,” but rather comes to be understood as an external “word of God’s judgment.” And finally, based upon his reading of Rom 8:19, a creature comes to be understood as that which it should become, not that which it presently is, its “quidditates” and “qualitates.”

Luther shifted his ontology, because, according to Ebeling’s reading of him, ontology is, “…about the adequate inclusion of the biblical understanding of reality.” This does not allow one to argue abstractly, which is in tension to the general trend of Aristotelian ontology. The biblical understanding of reality is more focused upon the human person and his or her concerns; “…the biblical understanding of reality lodges a claim, in the face of death itself, to liberating truth and therefore ultimately to certainty creating assurance.” The believer struggles with the unbeliever over the nature of reality itself, because everything is distorted when the situation of the person making the claim about reality is not taken into account. The presence of this claim of distortion is

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[270] Ibid., 411-415.
[271] Ibid., 415-416. Both quotations are found on p. 415. The first German quotation reads as follows: „Ihm geht es dabei um die angemessene Erfassung des biblischen Wirklichkeitsverständnisses.“ The second is a follows: „...das biblische Wirklichkeitsverständnis erhebt selbst angesichts des Todes den Anspruch befreiender Wahrheit und deshalb letztgültig gewißmachender Gewißheit.“
confirmed by the investigation in sections 3.112, and 3.12, in which it was argued that one of the reasons Luther, according to Ebeling, rejected the scholastic nature and grace distinction is because of a difference over the understanding of sin, which not only distorts language, it also turns sin into the natural condition of the human person, who always seeks the self and does not believe God. Thus, according to Ebeling’s reading of Luther, Luther rejected scholastic theology, because the situation of the person making the theological claim must be taken into account; abstract, theological claims, as found in scholastic theology, cannot accurately depict reality.

This then leads into a discussion of Luther’s understanding of reality, which has four components, according to Ebeling’s understanding of it. The first pushes aside the scholastic emphasis upon making abstract judgments, which is concerned with the general condition of being and movement, of substances and potencies, and replaces them with an emphasis upon the judgment of the person and his/her connection with others, which is known as a “coram-relation”; this was one of the topics of investigation in section 3.22. As seen in that section, the primary point of emphasis is upon how one exists in the presence of others, both before other people, known as the coram mundo relationship, and before God, the coram Deo relationship. The second component pushes aside the scholastic understanding of “grace” and replaces it with an emphasis upon “word” and “faith”; this was the topic of discussion in section 3.21. As seen in that section’s investigation of Ebeling’s essay, “Das Problem des Natürlichen bei Luther,” and supplemented here by his “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis,” what becomes emphasized is how God addresses a person by word, both through law and gospel, which

272 Ibid., 416-417.
273 Ibid., 418-420.
creates faith that changes the situation of the soul, where it receives life, no longer in itself as an internal transformation, but outside of itself, in Christ.

The third component pushes aside the scholastic emphasis upon the use of logic to harmonize contradictions, and replaces it with an emphasis upon a mutual heightening of both union and distinction. According to Ebeling, this shift in emphasis is especially seen in how each deals with the union of Christ and the believer. Scholasticism emphasizes the union of Christ and the human through grace, thus leaving the union of the human and divine natures in Christ with only an indirect relationship to the union with the believer. Luther, on the other hand, makes the union of the human and divine natures in Christ the source of the union of Christ and the believer, transferring the communication of idioms from the union of the human and divine in Christ to the union of the believer and Christ, which creates a violent, tension-filled meeting between sin and righteousness. The final component pushes the scholastic emphasis upon nature aside and replaces it with an emphasis upon person and conscience; this was another topic of discussion in section 3.22. As seen in that section, what becomes emphasized is an emphasis upon person, not work, in the doctrine of justification, and conscience becomes the “place” where Christ resides in the person.

Thus, based upon this analysis of Ebeling’s “Luther’s Wirklichkeitsverständnis,” I would argue that the appearance of the phrase “…the basic reality for Christian life…” in the letter of protest would signal that, for Ebeling, if the Joint Declaration is to adequately describe and defend a Reformation understanding of the doctrine of justification, which he most certainly wishes to defend, as discovered in section 2.1 in the

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274 Ibid., 420-421.
275 Ibid., 421-423.
foreword to his book *The Word of God and Tradition*, then the JD must de-emphasize a scholastic use of “nature” and “grace,” which cannot adequately portray Christian reality, due to its dual emphasis upon regeneration as an internal transformation of a substance, and its subsequent works, and must correspondingly emphasize “person,” “word,” and “faith,” which adequately describes the Christian life as one in which Christ is coming to life in the believer.

### 4.12 The Life and Function of the Church

Following this reference to a “basic reality for Christian life” in this opening paragraph, this letter of protest lays out two specific criteria which the consensus on the doctrine of justification in the *Joint Declaration* must meet, if it is to win Ebeling’s approval. First, it has to make it clear that “…the truth of justification by faith alone has not been abridged,” and second, the signatory churches have to “…mutually recognize each other as the church of Jesus Christ and mutually recognize each other’s ministerial office of publicly proclaiming justification.”

This first criterion is fairly clear, although it would be good to know more precisely what kind of accommodation, or as his calls it “abridgment,” is unacceptable, but paragraph two of this protest letter shows how the truth of the doctrine of justification by faith alone has been abridged in the JD. Thus, this criterion will be dealt with paragraph two. The second criterion, however, needs immediate comment, because in Ebeling’s theology, it directly relates to what justifies church schism and thus goes straight to the issue about what the *Joint Declaration* must display if it is to be a valid consensus on the doctrine of justification, since the JD itself is an attempt to heal church schism.

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276 “No Consensus,” 194.
In Ebeling’s essay, “The Significance of Doctrinal Differences for the Division of the Church” in section 2.42, it was discovered that “only a doctrinal difference as to what makes the church its true self can have divisive significance for the church,” which is, according to this same essay, “the preaching and the administration of the sacraments.” These, of course, are functions of Christian worship, which, according to Ebeling’s *Dogmatik* in section 2.22, is nothing more than the unfolding of the life of Christ in the believer, the dwelling of God within humanity. This unfolding is what constitutes the church’s “true self,” or as he says in his *Dogmatik*, this is what makes “the church, the church.” Therefore, in this reading of Ebeling, the only legitimate justification for division in the church is a doctrinal difference over what constitutes the real function of the life of the church, which is to foster the growth, or unfolding, of the life of Christ in the believer. This is why the *Joint Declaration* must lead to the mutual recognition of each other’s ministerial proclamation of justification, which leads to the growth in the believer of the life of Christ, who is the fundamental basis for the unity of the church in Ebeling’s theology, as discovered in his *Dogmatik* in section 2.23. And the demand for anything more, such as common institutions or doctrinal agreements, what he calls “maximalism” in his *Dogmatik*, could well bind the church “to time and place, to person and gesture,” as once again discovered in his essay, “The Significance of Doctrinal Differences for the Division of the Church” in section 2.42. This would hinder the function of the church, which, according to his monograph *The Problem of Historicity* in section 2.3, is to preach the word in a way that is intelligible to ever changing humanity, and so bring Christ to life in those whom this word creates faith.

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Thus, according to Ebeling, it is necessary and sufficient that the Joint Declaration bring forth the recognition of church unity by mutually recognizing “…each other’s ministerial office of publicly proclaiming justification” and its effect of bringing Christ to life in the believer, and nothing more. And if either party should refuse to recognize the other as truly being the church of Jesus Christ or refuse to mutually recognize each other’s office of proclamation once they claim to agree on the doctrine of justification, then I would argue that, for Ebeling, this would be a sign of the ultimate failure of the Joint Declaration to heal the schism between Lutherans and Catholics, because it would clearly indicate that there are still differences over what constitutes the church’s “true self,” which would be truly church dividing. This, I would argue, is a condition that the Joint Declaration must meet if it is to be acceptable to Ebeling.

4.2 Paragraphs 2 and 3—Justification by Faith, through Grace

Paragraph two of this letter of protest lays out seven, basic doctrinal disputes that the signatories of this letter have with the Joint Declaration. Those that directly relate to this study concerns justification by faith and through grace, the assurance of salvation, the sinful nature of the justified, and the role of good works for salvation. Unfortunately, neither letter of protest gives any details about why the framers of these letters disagree with the consensus reached in the JD concerning the last three issues. Thus, any conclusion that I could reach about why Ebeling would disagree with the consensus reached by the JD concerning the doctrine of merit or simul iustus et peccator would be pure speculation on my part. As a result, I will confine sections 4.21 and 4.22 to dealing

278 “No Consensus,” 194.
with why the framers of these letters reject the *Joint Declaration*’s handling of justification by faith through grace, about which these letters have a great deal to say.

### 4.21 Analysis of the Texts

The first letter of protest denies that Lutherans and Catholics have reached a consensus in the “basic truths of the doctrine of justification” in the JD, in part, because,

No consensus has been reached concerning the theological insight, decisive for Lutheran church, that justification by grace alone is rightly proclaimed only when it is made clear that 1) the God who deals with the sinner by grace alone justifies the sinner only through this Word and through sacraments administered according to his Word (Augsburg Confession 7), and 2) the sinner is justified by faith alone.\(^{279}\)

This letter is clearly targeting section 3.0 of the *Joint Declaration* on the common understanding of justification and section 4.3 on justification by faith and through grace, where this issue is explicitly treated. The common confession of justification in paragraph 15, section 3.0, reads:

> By grace alone, in faith in Christ’s saving work and not because of any merit on our part, we are accepted by God and receive the Holy Spirit, who renews our hearts while equipping and calling us to good works.\(^{280}\)

The common confession of what it means to be justified by faith, through grace, in paragraph 25, section 4.3 reads:

> We confess together that sinners are justified by faith in the saving action of God in Christ. By the action of the Holy Spirit in baptism, they are granted the gift of salvation, which lays the basis for the whole Christian life. They place their trust in God’s gracious promise by justifying faith, which includes hope in God and love for him. Such a faith is active in love, and thus the Christian cannot and should not remain

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\(^{279}\) Ibid., 194.

\(^{280}\) The Lutheran World Federation and the Roman Catholic Church, *Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000), 15. This version of the *Joint Declaration* that I refer to also contains the “Official Common Statement,” as well as the “Annex to the Official Common Statement.” When I refer to these texts in this work, I will make it clear that I am referring to them alone.
without works. But whatever in the justified precedes or follows the free gift of faith is neither the basis of justification nor merits it.\textsuperscript{281}

Upon an initial reading, one could legitimately ask what Ebeling could have against such formulations. When these paragraphs of the \textit{Joint Declaration} are compared with the letter of protest, I would argue that the stated problem in the protest letter seems to be adequately addressed by the JD. The letter of protest claims that the JD does not represent a consensus on the theological insight that justification by grace alone is rightly proclaimed only when it is clear that God deals with sinners by God’s word and sacraments, rightly administered by this word. Yet, when one goes to paragraph 25, section 4.3 of the JD, it concedes that the gift of salvation is granted by that action of the Holy Spirit \textit{through baptism}. Moreover, when one turns to paragraph 27 of section 4.3, the Catholic interpretation of this common confession even admits that “persons are justified through baptism as hearers of the word and believers in it.”\textsuperscript{282} Thus, here is a clear statement that Catholics understand that baptism is efficacious, because those who are baptized, are hearers and believers in the word; any traditionally Catholic emphasis upon baptism as a conduit for the infusion of some supernatural power to heal sin and elevate the soul seems to be missing. What could Ebeling have against that, especially in light of his emphasis upon the role of person and word?

Additionally, it does not seem that the lack of the phrase of “faith alone” in the common confession of justification in paragraph 15 of the \textit{Joint Declaration} should pose that significant of a problem, as the letter of protest would seem to indicate. Traditionally, of course, Lutherans admit of the legitimacy of “grace alone” only when it is followed by

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\item[281] \textit{Joint Declaration}, 19.
\item[282] Ibid., 20.
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For the Reformers…the chief problem was neither moral laxity nor a Pelagianizing tendency to ascribe salvation partly to human effort apart from grace. In their situation the major function of justification by faith was, rather, to console anxious consciences terrified by the inability to do enough to earn or merit salvation. Even if grace is freely given “to do good works,” one does not escape the perils of the anxious conscience. Thus for Luther the answer to the question “How do I get a gracious God?” must be “by faith alone,” by trust in nothing but God’s promises of mercy and forgiveness in Jesus Christ. Here Luther went beyond the Augustinian primacy of grace (*sola gratia*) to that of faith (*sola fide*). In reference to this problem of the terrified conscience and the assurance of salvation, it does not suffice to say that “when God rewards our merits, he crowns his own gifts.” One should add that it is not on the basis of his gifts of infused grace, of inherent righteousness, or of good works that God declares sinners just and grants them eternal life, but on the basis of Jesus Christ’s righteousness, a righteousness which is “alien” or “extrinsic” to sinful human beings but is received by them through faith. Thus God justifies sinners simply for Christ’s sake, not because of their performance, even with the help of divine grace, of the works commanded by the law and done in love.\(^{283}\)

But, when one examines paragraph 15 of the common confession of justification in the JD, it qualifies the phrase “by grace alone” with “in faith in Christ’s saving work and not because of any merit on our part,” which sounds very close to the phrase “faith alone,” since this qualification excludes reliance upon good works and directs one’s attention solely to Christ’s saving work. Is this not the essence of the Lutheran concern behind the formula “justification by grace alone, through faith alone,” as explained above? This reading of paragraph 15 of the JD, moreover, is confirmed by the “Annex to the Official Common Statement,” paragraph 2C, which explicitly adds “faith alone” to paragraph 15 of section 3.0 of the JD; “Justification takes place ‘by grace alone’ *(JD nos.\(^{283}\)

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15 and 16), by faith alone; the person is justified ‘apart from works’ (Rom 3:28; cf. *JD* no. 25).”

Even so, paragraph one of the revised letter of protest still rejects the “Annex’s” and *Joint Declaration’s* use of “faith alone,” because according to paragraph three of the revised letter, the OCS, “…interprets these statements in a Roman Catholic sense against their Reformation meaning.”

Finally, an examination of section 4.3 of the JD reveals a plethora of language which could be given an existential interpretation, which would fit with Ebeling’s hermeneutical anthropology and relational ontology; paragraph 25 contains the phrase, “…which lays the basis for the whole Christian life” [Emphasis mine]; paragraph 26, the Lutheran explanation of the common confession, contains the phrase, “God himself effects faith as he brings forth such trust by his creative word. Because God’s act is a new creation, it affects all dimensions of the person and leads to a life in hope and love” [Emphasis mine]; and paragraph 27, the Catholic explanation of the common affirmation, says, “This new personal relation to God is grounded totally in God’s graciousness and remains constantly dependent on the salvific and creative working of this gracious God…” [Emphasis mine]. Paragraph 26 is of special interest, because it sounds so much like Ebeling’s word-event as introduced in section 1.12 and as supported by the investigation in section 3.22 in the study of Ebeling’s article, “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis.”

So, given all of these concessions and considerations, what could Ebeling have against the *Joint Declaration’s* explanation of justification by faith, through grace? Upon

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285 “German Professors Protest JDDJ,” trans. by Mark Menacher. Downloaded on October 6, 2007 from Word Alone website; http://wordalone.org/docs/wa-german-professors.shtml.

further reflection, however, I would argue that there are two problems in the background which prevent Ebeling from being able to give his assent to the JD’s explanation of justification by faith through grace. First, the Joint Declaration’s understanding of grace is not clearly identified, which allows one to read the worst into the document. Second, due to this ambiguity, there is the possibility of an unscriptural ontology creeping back into the JD, an ontology that, according to Ebeling, emphasizes human works in one’s justification, which would run counter to Catholic claims in the Joint Declaration’s common affirmation on justification that one is accepted by God “by grace alone, in faith in Christ’s saving work and not because of any merit on our part…”

Evidence for this concern over the understanding of grace is found in paragraph three of this letter of protest, which reads, “In the future the Lutheran Confessions would be interpreted according to a doctrine of grace which, although presenting justification ‘by grace alone,’ does not include the basic Reformation insight that this gracious event takes place precisely and only through faith” [Emphasis mine]. Of course, this letter of protest is not the only critique that questions the definition of grace as presented in the Joint Declaration. The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod’s analysis of the Joint Declaration explicitly noted this deficiency in paragraph 5, when it wrote:

Correspondingly, JDDJ fails to define clearly the word grace. Content to use the term “justification by grace,” the document does not resolve the classic question whether such grace is God’s undeserved favor (Lutheran) or whether it is a spiritual power poured or “infused” into the soul that enables one to love God and merit salvation (Roman Catholic).

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287 Ibid., 15.
288 “No Consensus,” 195.
In some ways, it might seem like this charge of ambiguity concerning the doctrine of grace as found in the Joint Declaration involves a very uncharitable interpretation of the Catholic use of “grace,” and I would agree, because in paragraph 27 of section 4.3, the Catholic understanding of justification by grace, through faith, seems to go out of its way to allay this fear; this paragraph reads, “Thus justifying grace never becomes a human possession to which one could appeal over against God.”\(^{290}\) Since one of the hallmarks of an infused grace, according to Ebeling’s understanding, is that it becomes a possession of the substance, this paragraph would seemingly refute the charge that grace is an infused, supernatural power.

Yet this charge in the letter of protest is not completely without merit. At the end of this same paragraph, the Joint Declaration refers one to the sources that were used in drafting this section. In one place, these sources seem to rely upon an understanding of grace as an infused power. One of these sources refers one to chapter seven of the sixth session of the council of Trent on the doctrine of justification; here the JD reads:

> Consequently, in the process of justification, together with the forgiveness of sins, a person receives, through Jesus Christ into whom he is grafted, all these *infused* at the same time: faith, hope and charity (DH 1530).

(Emphasis mine)\(^{291}\)

Now although this reference to Trent here in the supporting sources is not given an interpretation, its mere presence would be unsettling to those who, like Ebeling, absolutely reject the understanding of grace as an infused power which becomes the possession of a substance, because, according to Ebeling, it allows into the discussion on

\(^{290}\) Joint Declaration, 20.

\(^{291}\) Ibid., 33.
justification an ontology that emphasizes human cooperation in justification. Moreover, the “Annex’s” claim in paragraph 2C that “the working of God’s grace does not exclude human action,” would only confirm the worst of Ebeling’s fears, since, as he and the framers of the letter of protest wrote in paragraph three of this letter, “…the Lutheran Confessions would be interpreted according to a doctrine of grace which, although presenting justification ‘by grace alone,’ does not include the basic Reformation insight that this gracious event takes place precisely and only through faith.” And finally, the JD’s reference to the phrase, “…it feels compelled to stress the renewal of the human being through justifying grace, for the sake of acknowledging God’s newly creating power,” borrowed from Lehmann and Pannenberg’s text, The Condemnations of the Reformation Era: Do They Still Divide? in describing the Catholic understanding of the renewal of the human being, cannot help the situation, since Ebeling emphasizes God’s word, not grace as some sort of infused power. Of course, if one goes to the Catechism, which contains a modern understanding of the Catholic doctrine of justification, one can still find several references to grace as an infused power which belongs to a soul, such as that in paragraphs 1999 (“The grace of Christ…infused by the Holy Spirit into our soul to heal it of sin…” [Emphasis mine.]), and 2000 (“Sanctifying grace is an habitual gift, a stable and supernatural disposition that perfects the soul itself to enable it to live with God…” [Emphasis mine.]). Paragraph 2024 even says that habitual grace “…is permanent in us” [Emphasis mine]. Thus, notwithstanding the Catholic declaration in the

292 “Annex,” Joint Declaration, 45.
293 “No Consensus,” 195.
294 Joint Declaration, 33.
that justifying grace “never becomes a human possession,” it is not without cause that the signatories of the letter of protest fear that behind the *Joint Declaration* stands a Catholic understanding of grace as an infused power which becomes the possession of a substance, even if their interpretation of the JD is uncharitable.

### 4.22 The Theological Justification for Ebeling’s Rejection of the Joint Declaration’s Teaching on Justification by Faith and through Grace

The reason that the rejection of an infused grace is such an important issue to Ebeling is that the presence of grace as an infused power goes hand-in-hand with an unscriptural, works-emphasizing concept of reality which also entails a different understanding of the function of the life of the church. This emphasis upon the proper understanding of Christian reality was set up in paragraph one of the letter, as seen in section 4.11. And this difference, according to Ebeling, on understanding the function of the life of the church would justify church division and thus the rejection of the *Joint Declaration*. This can be demonstrated as follows.

It was discovered in sections 3.111 and 3.112 of this study’s investigation of “Die Grunddifferenz zur Scholastik” that Ebeling rejected the scholastic nature and grace coordination for three reasons. First, Ebeling rejected this coordination, because it is easy to confuse nature as substance with grace, which ends up making grace an inherent property of the substance. Second, nature and grace cannot be harmonized, because while nature is oriented toward the self, and sin, grace is oriented toward God. Finally, Ebeling rejected this coordination, because nature is oriented toward the present movement of things, toward what they presently are, not toward what they could become in the sight of God. Now, this rejection of the nature and grace coordination due to sin was expanded upon in section 3.12 in the examination of “Die menschliche Natur nach
dem Fall (Th. 26),” in which it was discovered that sin is principally the one original sin, which “…is concentrated in the unbelief, which implies spiritual blindness as such”;\(^{296}\) thus, sin defines the mode of existence of sinful humanity.

Yet, according to “Die Rolle der Hermeneutik in Luthers Theologie” and “Das Problem des Natürlichen bei Luther” in section 3.21, it would seem that there is another reason that Ebeling rejected this nature and grace coordination, a reason that, at first glance, seems to be somewhat at odds with the findings of the previous investigation. According to these texts, Ebeling claims that Luther’s study of Scripture led him to understand that “the understanding is something passive and all activity lies with the text…”\(^ {297}\) According to Ebeling, this realization led him to reject the nature and grace coordination, because nature is oriented toward its own emergence and production, which, in turn, emphasizes human autonomy and free will. This creates an active understanding of humanity which is analogous to that of God, thus tending to confuse creator and creature.

As seen in section 3.22 in the investigation of “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis,” Ebeling replaced this nature and grace coordination with a person and word coordination. The human person is no longer conceived of as a substance, having a nature and the power necessary to fulfill his/her purpose, which is concerned with the general condition of being as in an Aristotelian ontology, but rather as a person who exists “…before someone else and…in the sight of someone else, so that my existential life is affected”;

This is known as a *coram*-relationship.\textsuperscript{298} This shift from an Aristotelian ontology to relational ontology was already noted above in section 4.11 on “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis.” And because this judgment involves all facets of human existence (i.e., historical, linguistic, and social), a *coram*-relation is highly complex, since it involves all of these facets.

There are two basic ways that one can exist. One can exist as the world judges one to be, or one can exist as God determines one to be. These are not mutually exclusive ways of being, since the believer exists in both simultaneously. But, one’s mode of existence is determined by whom one primarily listens to; to the word of the world or to the word of God. These relationships are in competition with each other, in which the judgment of the world, *coram mundo*, tries to replace the judgment of the God, *coram Deo*, in order to turn the agent away from God; this competition is known as sin. Thus, Ebeling’s rejection of this nature and grace coordination due to his understanding of sin, as previously noted, is really complimentary with his replacement of this Aristotelian ontology with a relational ontology, because this Aristotelian ontology is focused upon the substance, the self, not God, which is sinful. But, to value the judgment of God more than that of the world means that one exists before the judgment seat of God, *coram Deo*, who kills the sinner with the word of law and yet brings about new life in one by the word of the gospel, which changes the situation of the soul, truly making one alive, by creating faith in the believer through this word. This was also seen in the presentation of “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis” in section 4.11. Moreover, according to “Das

Verhältnis von Christologie und Anthropologie” in section 3.23, to live by faith means to exist in union with Christ, in which Christ gives one his righteousness and the believer gives Christ his/her sin. In this union with Christ, however, “…the particular ego does not simply vanish, but rather gives room outside of himself to a different foundation and source of life,” in Christ, *coram Deo*. Thus, the believer truly lives by faith alone.

So, what is the role of the human person in his/her justification? According to “Rechtfertigungslehre und Anthropologie” in section 3.31, Ebeling’s basic answer to this question is that only God can bring about true belief, who alone gives faith against nature, because original sin has made unbelief in God the basic condition of human existence, a condition that was noted earlier in this explanation; “true belief in God is brought about only by God here.” Yet, this faith that is given is not an acquired virtue, inherent in the person, but is always dependent upon an external relationship with God, which is given in the “conjugal” union of the believer with Christ, through the word. Ebeling’s understanding of justification is always oriented toward Christ, word, and faith, not grace as a divine power inherent in a substance.

In “Der homo iustificandus nach den vier causae” in section 3.31, Ebeling argues that humanity is nothing but the undeserving, passive material of an event of formation, which is actively formed purely by God, who, unlike humanity, always creates everything ex nihilo and sustains it daily. God alone works everything in one. This is how Ebeling maintains God’s majesty and the distance between the human and the divine. The human person makes no contribution to his/her justification, but, according

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to this reading of Ebeling, one does consent to the work of God in one.\textsuperscript{301} God justifies the human person so that one might reflect the \textit{imago Dei}, which is the reflection of God’s holiness and righteousness, not some lingering image of God found in a spiritually-endowed rational capacity. The \textit{imago Dei} is recovered only in Christ, through the word of God. Faith is the beginning of this image, growing in one like a fetus, which will not be fully formed until death. It is the faith of Christ, growing in one by the word of God, that formally shapes the believer, giving one an existence that is not in the self, not adhering in one like a virtue, but outside the self, in Christ, making one to exist before God as lawful, true, and wise. This faith actually changes the reality of the soul. According to “Cooperatores Dei” in section 3.32, because faith actually changes the reality of the soul, making one lawful and wise, Ebeling claims that faith must produce good works, but these works do not contribute to one’s justification by making one good; rather, one does good works, because one has already by made good by faith. And if these works do not appear in the life of the believer, then one’s faith is not real. So works are not a mode of increasing one’s justification, but merely a mode of passing on love from God to one’s neighbor. Thus, any growth in one’s relationship with Christ is due to the work of God alone; there is no place for a doctrine of merit in Ebeling’s theology.

So now, how does this understanding of the event of justification and the human role in it create a different picture of Christian reality, which would legitimize church schism? According to section 2.22, it was discovered in Ebeling’s \textit{Dogmatik} that the function of the church is to foster the growth of Christ in the believer. Thus, one should

be able to see a clear connection between the life and function of the church and justification of the believer in Ebeling’s thought; because the final cause of justification is the growth of the *imago Dei* in the believer, which is recovered by Christ and given to the believer by the word through faith, the life and function of the church is to foster one’s justification, to foster the growth of Christ in one’s life, which gives one a new basis for life. And it fulfills this function by preaching the word and administering the sacraments by this word. Thus, Christ, who is to grow in the life of the believer, is the basis for church unity, according to Ebeling in section 2.23, which identifies what makes the church, the church.

But according to “The Word of God and Church Doctrine” in section 2.41, this is a picture of Christian reality far different from that of Catholicism. By implications drawn from this study, it is not the function of the church, according to this reading of Ebeling, to proclaim that justification is “a work of God’s love” in Christ, given through the grace of God, which enables one to cooperate in one’s justification and become sanctified through observing commandments, as it is in Catholicism, but to preach the word in ever changing historical situations so as to create faith in the believer, to foster the growth of Christ in the believer, to pull humanity forward into the presence of God (*coram Deo*), and thus create, by faith without any human cooperation, the liberating assurance of salvation in one’s conscience. Thus, according to this reading of Ebeling, he would claim that Catholicism and Protestantism have differing images of Christian reality, which is to say that they have different images of the role of Christ and the human person in justification, different images on how the church fosters justification, different images of what makes the church, the church, which legitimate church schism.
Therefore, the *Joint Declaration*’s refusal to admit the legitimacy of the Lutheran formula “justification by grace alone, through faith alone” in all its strength; its ambiguity over the definition of grace, with its potential for emphasizing human autonomy, and its concomitant ambiguity over the definition of faith and the role of word in the creation of faith; and finally the ambiguity of its denial of any form of human cooperation, all have the potential for “abridging” the truth of the doctrine of justification by faith alone. This is justification enough for Ebeling to refuse to support the *Joint Declaration*.

4.3 Paragraph 5—The Life of the Church and Ecumenism

4.31 Analysis of the Texts

Paragraph five relates to the second expectation that the framers of this letter of protest have for accepting the *Joint Declaration*, as pointed out in section 4.12; the life and function of the church. Paragraph five of this letter claims that the JD will have no “ecclesiological and practical consequences,” such as “sacramental sharing,” which only demonstrates to the signatories of this letter that the JD is part of a larger “ecumenical plan” of the Catholic Church to incorporate Protestant ministers into the hierarchy of the Roman church, only after which will full communion become possible. The revised letter of protest also makes similar claims, although it breaks them down into two issues. Paragraph five of this revised letter reads:

Through the OCS, the JDDJ is supposed to be confirmed "in its entirety". This would thereby affirm the whole Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue process as mentioned in the JDDJ, together with the ecumenical

302 “No Consensus,” 195.
perspective of purpose which has been one-sidedly influenced by the ecumenism-programme of the Roman Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{303}

Paragraph six reads:

The signing of the OCS would result in no improvements whatsoever in the practicalities of Protestants and Catholics living together in families and in congregations.\textsuperscript{304}

What is the textual basis in the Joint Declaration for making these claims against it? Section 5, paragraphs 43 and 44 in particular, of the JD on the significance of the consensus reached deals with the ecclesiological issues raised here by the letters of protest. The relevant portion of paragraph 43 reads:

Our consensus in basic truths of the doctrine of justification must come to influence the life and teachings of our churches. Here it must prove itself. In this respect, questions of varying importance still need further clarification. These include, among other topics, the relationship between the Word of God and church doctrine, as well as ecclesiology, ecclesial authority, church unity, ministry, the sacraments…We are convinced that the consensus we have reached offers a solid basis for this clarification.\textsuperscript{305}

Paragraph 44 concludes:

We give thanks to the Lord for this decisive step forward on the way to overcoming the division of the church. We ask the Holy Spirit to lead us further toward that visible unity which is Christ’s will.\textsuperscript{306}

I would argue that the problem Ebeling and the framers of these letters would have with these paragraphs is that they all sound as though the problem of church unity is still a problem to be solved, that it is something still to be achieved; “to lead us further toward”; “…the doctrine of justification must come to influence the life and teachings of our churches”; “must prove itself”; and “forward on the way to overcoming…”

\textsuperscript{303} “German Professors Protest JDDJ,” para. 5.
\textsuperscript{304} Ibid., para. 6.
\textsuperscript{305} Joint Declaration, 26.
\textsuperscript{306} Ibid., 27.
[Emphasis mine]. I can hear them asking now, “If we truly agree on the doctrine of justification by faith alone, why must it still come to influence the life and teachings of our churches? What must still be proved? What must we go on further toward?” This, of course, involves a traditional Lutheran understanding of the centrality of the doctrine of justification, but this concern is clearly referenced in paragraph one of the first letter of protest, which, in reliance upon the Smalcald Articles, declares the doctrine of justification to be the article “by which the church stands and falls.”

Logically stated, this means that if there is truly consensus on the doctrine of justification, then there must also be consensus on the nature and function of the church. But, by logically denying the consequent, one must also deny the antecedent. So, if there is no consensus upon the nature and function of the church, then there is no consensus on the doctrine of justification. Paragraph five of the letter of protest asserts that this is precisely the case, which explains why the JD uses the language of future fulfillment when discussing ecclesiological issues.

As noted at the beginning of this chapter in section 4.12, one of the expectations of the framers of this letter is that consensus on the doctrine of justification would result in mutual recognition of each other as the church of Jesus Christ and would result in mutual recognition of each other’s ministerial office of proclaiming the word. Yet, paragraph five of this protest letter asserts that this has not happened and gives some justification for this claim. It refers one to footnote nine of the Joint Declaration as proof that Lutheran churches are not recognized as belonging to the church of Jesus Christ by the Catholic Church; this footnote reads, “The word ‘church’ is used in this Declaration

\[307\] “No Consensus,” 193-194.
to reflect the self-understandings of the participating churches, without intending to
resolve all the ecclesiological issues related to this term.”

Although the following claim is an act of interpretation on my part, the fact that this note does not state a common
agreement on the nature and function of the church that applies to both communions, but
leaves this task to the respective “self-understandings of the participating churches,”
implies not only that there is no common understanding between these participants, but
also leaves open the logical possibility that neither church recognizes the other as
legitimate expressions as the one church of Jesus Christ. The plethora of ecclesiological
issues that paragraph 43 leaves open for future discussion only further support this
interpretation. Moreover, the fact that there is no general sacramental sharing between
Lutherans and Catholics, even to this today, also underscores this point, an issue that
paragraph five also raises.

All of this, according to paragraph five of the protest letter, only underscores the
significance of what the Catholics admit in paragraph 18 of the *Joint Declaration*

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308 *Joint Declaration*, 10-11.

309 In the encyclical “Ecclesia de Eucharistia,” para. 29-30, downloaded on January 26, 2010, from
http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0821/__P5.HTM, Pope John Paul II wrote concerning the theological
justification for why Catholics must refrain from celebrating the Eucharist with “separated brethren”; “The
ministry of priests who have received the sacrament of Holy Orders, in the economy of salvation chosen by
Christ, makes clear that the Eucharist which they celebrate is *a gift which radically transcends the power of
the assembly* and is in any event essential for validly linking the Eucharistic consecration to the sacrifice of
the Cross and to the Last Supper…The Catholic Church’s teaching on the relationship between priestly
ministry and the Eucharist and her teaching on the Eucharistic Sacrifice have both been the subject in
recent decades of a fruitful dialogue *in the area of ecumenism*...Nonetheless, the observations of the
Council concerning the Ecclesial Communities which arose in the West from the sixteenth century onward
and are separated from the Catholic Church remain fully pertinent: ‘The Ecclesial Communities separated
from us lack that fullness of unity with us which should flow from Baptism, and we believe that especially
because of the lack of sacrament of Orders they have not preserved the genuine and total reality of the
Eucharistic mystery…The Catholic faithful, therefore, while respecting the religious convictions of these
separated brethren, must refrain from receiving the communion distributed in their celebrations, so as not to
condone an ambiguity about the nature of the Eucharist and, consequently, to fail in their duty to bear clear
witness to the truth. This would result in slowing the progress being made toward full visible unity.” If
one of these communities is that of Lutheran churches, then this encyclical would only validate the claim in
paragraph five of the protest letter, linking the refusal of sacramental sharing with the fact that the Catholic
church does not recognize the validity of Lutheran public ministry.
concerning the status of the doctrine of justification as a criteria that orients the teachings and practices of the church to Christ, namely that “Catholics see themselves as bound by several criteria…”\textsuperscript{310} So, this inability of \textit{Joint Declaration} to jointly proclaim a common understanding on the nature and function of the church can only be taken as proof positive by Ebeling and the other framers of the protest letter that Lutherans and Catholics have not reached a consensus on the doctrine of justification, or as the revised letter of protest puts it, “the Doctrine of Justification as the centre of the teaching and life of the church has been ineffectual in these texts.”\textsuperscript{311} Thus, as both of the protest letters point out, they are forced to the conclusion that the \textit{Joint Declaration} can only be part of a wider ecumenical program of the Catholic Church to integrate Protestants into the institutional structure of the Roman Catholic Church. But, aside from the fact that he is a Lutheran, why does the doctrine of justification have such deep implications for Ebeling’s understanding of the nature and function of the church?

\textbf{4.32 The Theological Justification for Ebeling’s Rejection of the \textit{Joint Declaration’s} Call for Continuing Talks on the Nature and Function of the Church}

I argue that the reason the doctrine of justification has such deep implications for Ebeling’s understanding of the nature and function of the church is due to his hermeneutical anthropology. As revealed in the investigation into Ebeling’s \textit{The Problem of Historicity} in section 2.3, “man in this world of his…is historical man, caught up with the world in constant change.”\textsuperscript{312} Yet, as discovered in “Die menschliche Natur nach dem

\textsuperscript{310} \textit{Joint Declaration}, 16.
\textsuperscript{311} “German Professors Protest JDDJ,” para. 6.
Fall (Th. 26)” in section 3.12, human nature is also totally corrupted and prone to unbelief, which has warped our existence. According to “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis,” in section 3.22, God changes the mode in which one exists by confronting one with God’s word, which not only overcomes unbelief, but also gives rise to faith in one, thus changing one’s mode of being, because it fosters the growth of Christ in one. This is Ebeling’s understanding of justification. It has been the role of the church throughout the ages, according to his Dogmatik in section 2.22, to foster the growth of Christ through worship, through proclaiming the word of God. Yet, according to The Problem of Historicity, because humanity is caught up in a world of constant change, “…the word of the Scriptures, which was also spoken in a concrete historical situation, must be continually interpreted and translated into historical situations that are continually new,”313 so that the word of God can attain its creativity, or as he said in his Introduction to a Theological Theory of Language in section 2.3, can open us up to the future by transcending the present and making the hidden mystery of reality present, because “a Word of God which is not understood cannot be accepted as the Word of God.”314

According to his essay, “Word of God and Church Doctrine,” investigated in section 2.41, the church should protect believers from what he calls “positive” doctrine, or universal claims about who God is and timeless truths about what one should do, since it is not given to humanity, in our historicity, to know such things absolutely. Doctrine can be useful as a guide in helping the believer to understand God’s word, by witnessing to the intelligibility of God’s word, but to insist upon unchanging, standard doctrine is not

313 Ibid., 26.
the task of the church. The task of the church is a hermeneutical one. Since “man’s deepest need arises from his refusal to be contemporary,” the task of the church is to meet the needs of the world by pulling humanity out of the past, in order to encounter the “true presence” of God and thus to foster the growth of Christ in one by creating faith in one, which creates the liberating assurance of salvation in one’s conscience and changes one’s mode of existence. Even the needs of ecumenism are secondary to this task. But if the church fails in this task and, instead, insists upon believers accepting some standard doctrine, the church can actually hinder the proclamation of the gospel and, unintentionally, foster schism.

As can been seen in this presentation, Ebeling deemphasizes the institutional aspects of the church. As was presented in his *Dogmatik* in section 2.23, the present reality of the unity of the church is based upon Christ, not common doctrine and a common polity. There can be legitimate differences in “…theological forms of thought and ecclesial life styles.” What Ebeling hopes to see in ecumenism is a fostering of communion between participants at the local level, where it should be clear that the church’s unity is found in Christ and the unfolding of his life in the believer. As seen in *The Word of God and Tradition* in section 2.1, the task of ecumenism, according to Ebeling, is to come to a deeper appreciation on what really separates the churches, which, by implication, would allow the churches to reach a deeper appreciation on what really unites them (i.e., Christ), not to reach agreement on a common institution by doctrinal systematization. So, “…ultimately the problem of the unity of the church lies in this

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315 Ibid., 166.
realized unity as *communio* and not in the host of binding institutions and organizations that connect them.” In Ebeling’s opinion, pushing on toward full communion, or what he calls “maximal,” institutional communion, “…causes a dangerous confusion in reference to *what makes the church, the church*” [Emphasis mine],

which as seen in section 2.42 in “The Significance of Doctrinal Differences for the Division of the Church,” is preaching and the administration of the sacraments, not institution, doctrine, or hierarchy, a difference which could legitimate church schism.

In my judgment, these significant differences between Ebeling and the signatories of the JD over the task of ecumenism, due to their difference over the function of the church and the basis for church unity, are critical reasons why Ebeling could not support the *Joint Declaration*. Is the task of ecumenism to promote full communion, through the creation of doctrinal consensus, which, as seen in section 4.21, is to be accepted by an infused grace? Or, is the task of ecumenism to foster the realization that church unity in Christ is a present reality, due to their common *hermeneutic* emphasis upon promoting the unfolding of the life of Christ in the believer by the proclamation of the word of God, as seen in section 4.22? For Ebeling, this difference over the understanding of the function of the church, on what makes the church, church, legitimates church schism. And these differences over the task of ecumenism and the function of the church, along with his understanding that Catholicism is inextricably bound up with institution and hierarchy, would only feed into his support of the protest letter, which claims in paragraph five that the *Joint Declaration* is part of a larger ecumenical plan to integrate Protestant clergy into the hierarchy of the Catholic church, which is necessary to restore

317 Ibid., 372.
318 Ibid., 375.
communion. Thus, I would argue that Ebeling’s hermeneutical anthropology, and its resulting hermeneutical task for the church, played a crucial role in his rejection of the *Joint Declaration*. And the JD’s inability to display a common understanding of the church, and its function, would only reinforce his claim, as presented in the letter of protest, that the *Joint Declaration* does abridge the truth of the Reformatory understanding of the doctrine of justification by faith alone, because these differences over the function of the church demonstrate very clearly that the respective churches have a different understanding on the role of the believer in one’s justification and a different role to play in fostering one’s justification.

### 4.4 Conclusion

Therefore, in conclusion, I argue that Ebeling refused to support the *Joint Declaration* for two reasons, both of which were introduced in the first paragraph of the letter of protest, as demonstrated in section 4.1 of this study. First, due to the ambiguity of the doctrine of grace in the *Joint Declaration*, the JD allows for an understanding of justification that requires human cooperation in justification, which creates a very different picture of Christian reality in comparison to that of Ebeling, for whom one is justified purely through the action of God’s word, without a human contribution, which creates faith in the believer and changes the way that one exists. This emphasis upon word and faith plays a special role in Ebeling’s understanding of justification. This is how Ebeling’s hermeneutical anthropology influences his understanding of the doctrine of justification. Thus, the *Joint Declaration* abridges the doctrine of justification by grace alone, through faith alone. Second, the *Joint Declaration’s* understanding of the doctrine of justification does not produce an agreement upon the nature and function of
the church, which not only demonstrates that there is no consensus on the doctrine of justification, but also demonstrates there are fundamental differences over the function of the church in the Christian life. Is the church to proclaim that justification is the “…most excellent work of God’s love made manifest in Christ Jesus,” given through the grace of God, which enables one to cooperate in one’s justification and become sanctified through “…observing the commandments of God and of the Church”? Or, is the church to proclaim a justification by faith, without works, through the word of God in both preaching and the administration of the sacraments? This inability to agree upon the function of the church demonstrates that there is a fundamental difference in what identifies the church’s “true self,” or what makes the church, church, which, in Ebeling’s theology, justifies church schism.

Thus, in the end, I would argue that Ebeling’s hermeneutical theology, in which the being of sinful humanity is changed purely through the proclamation of God’s word by the church and the creation of faith in the believer, has had a great impact upon his refusal to support the Joint Declaration, because his hermeneutic has fundamentally shaped his understanding of the doctrine of justification. This answers the first question addressed by this dissertation, namely, why did Gerhard Ebeling refuse to support the Joint Declaration and sign the letters of protest? Now, this study will turn to the main question: What impact will Ebeling’s refusal to support the Joint Declaration have upon the future of the continuing ecumenical discussions between Lutherans and Catholics?

So, what impact could Ebeling’s hermeneutical theology have upon the reception of the *Joint Declaration* and the continuing ecumenical discussions between Lutherans and Catholics? What is Ebeling’s unique theological legacy to ecumenical discussions between Lutherans and Catholics? This is the second question that this dissertation will address. I will address this question by examining texts written by his students or associates, theologians whose theology has been shaped in varying degrees by Ebeling. The first scholar is Dr. Mark Menacher, pastor of St. Paul Lutheran Church in Au Grés, Michigan. The second is the late Dr. Gerhard Forde, long time professor at Luther Seminary in St. Paul, Minnesota. The final scholar is Dr. Eberhard Jüngel. The selection of Jüngel might seem surprising, since he, unlike the previous two, is a supporter of the *Joint Declaration*. But, being a theologian who was trained, in part, by Ebeling, his selection could go some distance in helping one make a judgment about the extent to which distinctive themes in Ebeling’s thought could continue to hinder Lutheran/Catholic dialogue, since Ebeling’s influence did not impede his agreement with the *Joint Declaration*. Thus, his voice needs to be heard in this study.

This chapter will proceed in the following manner. The first two sections of this chapter are devoted to examining the relevant texts in Menacher and Forde, looking at their objections to the JD and the continuing discussions between Lutherans and Catholics. Following these two sections, this study will compare their objections with those of Ebeling, looking for commonalities between their objections and the theology behind them. This will give one a sense about how Ebeling’s voice is continuing to
impact ecumenical discussions. Following this section, this study will then examine Jüngel, investigating texts which relate to the adoption of the *Joint Declaration* and its immediate aftermath, looking for the reasons why he initially refused to support the JD, but later changed his mind. This chapter will then conclude with a comparison of Menacher and Forde with Jüngel, not only looking for commonalities between them which would suggest how Ebeling’s voice could continue to impact ecumenical discussions between Lutherans and Catholics, but also looking for discontinuities, which would suggest the limitation of Ebeling’s voice.

In conducting this type of investigation, one can finally get a sense of what issues could continue to be lodged against future discussion between Lutherans and Catholics by Ebeling’s theological descendants, and thus a sense of what issues need to be dealt with if they are ever to be brought back into the discussions. But, by comparing Menacher and Forde with Jüngel, one can also get a sense of some common issues that may not be as divisive as one might expect. So, it is only after comparing the commonalities and discontinuities between them that one could make a reasoned judgment concerning the continuing impact of Ebeling’s theological voice in future ecumenical discussions, and thus answer the second question of this study; What impact could Ebeling’s hermeneutical theology have upon the reception of the *Joint Declaration* and the continuing ecumenical discussions between Lutherans and Catholics?

### 5.1 The Continuing Objections of Mark Menacher

#### 5.11 Ebeling’s Influence upon Menacher

It would be proper to consider Mark Menacher a “student” of Gerhard Ebeling in the *broad* sense, since he took his doctorate from the University of Manchester in 1998,
and thus did not directly study under Ebeling. The fact that his dissertation was on the language and theological method of Gerhard Ebeling suggests that he has been influenced by his theology. Moreover, this claim is further supported in that Menacher has also written two articles extolling him as “…one of the most important and impressive doctors of the church in the twentieth century.” So, due to this impact, it would be proper to consider him a “student” of Ebeling is the broader sense. Mark Menacher has written two articles which deal with the reception of the Joint Declaration and subsequent ecumenical work between Lutherans and Catholics, both of which need to be dealt with in this section. The first is “Confusion and Clarity in Recent German Ecumenism,” and the second is “Current Lutheran-Roman Catholic Dialogues.”

5.12 Textual Examination

But, before examining these texts, it would be useful to detour briefly and examine two texts in which he examines Gerhard Ebeling’s resistance to the Joint Declaration. In his article, “Gerhard Ebeling’s Lifelong Kirchenkampf as Theological Method,” Menacher explicitly ties Ebeling’s experience in the Confessing Church in World War II with his opposition to the Joint Declaration. Menacher wrote:

Despite his passing on 30 September 2001, Ebeling’s life as a pastor and theologian will continue to convey the message that Kirchenkampf is not limited to the ecclesial struggles of Luther’s Reformation, of the Confessing Church, or of particularly gifted theological scholars. Instead, Kirchenkampf is the task of every theologian and of every preacher called

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320 This brief biography of Mark Menacher is taken from the introduction on the back side of the front cover of Lutheran Quarterly 18, no 1 (Spring, 2004), “About this Issue.” This short quotation is taken from his article, “Gerhard Ebeling’s Lifelong Kirchenkampf as Theological Method,” Lutheran Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Spring, 2004): 1. In his article “Gerhard Ebeling in Retrospect,” Lutheran Quarterly 21, no. 2 (Summer, 2007): 163, he says much the same thing. Although Menacher may not have studied under him, in note 55 of page 192 in this article, he mentions that he and his wife spent an evening with the Ebelings at their home, and that he had some subsequent correspondence with him. Thus, there is sufficient evidence that Ebeling has considerably influenced Menacher’s theology.
to communicate the word of God. The ever continuing Kampf to differentiate between letter and spirit, law and gospel, the two kingdoms, and between the hidden and revealed God is the existential and ecclesial battle to stand firmly against all those forces which seek to falsify the gospel of peace inaugurated solely by Jesus Christ.\textsuperscript{321}

Given Menacher’s training, the employment of “word of God” and “existential battle” here in his quote also seems to reflect Ebeling emphasis upon the word-event, in that it is the word of God which creates faith in the listener, which changes one’s existence. In another article of his, “Gerhard Ebeling in Retrospect,” Menacher once again ties Kirchenkampf with Ebeling’s struggle against the JD. In the context of Ebeling’s involvement in drafting the German letter of protest, Menacher wrote:

> From the theological battles during the Kirchenkampf to the theological battles at the end of his life, the doctrine of justification by faith alone viewed through the law-gospel hermeneutic would be and would remain for Gerhard Ebeling the articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae. These ecclesial battles reflect the existential struggles raging in the conscience of every person, of every homo peccator, living coram mundo and coram deo because this God who is revealed solo verbo et sola fide in the person of Christ alone is the deus iustificans. Faith in this God made Gerhard Ebeling into the person, the pastor, and the professor that he became. Ebeling desired that every Christian person should be united in Christ in this same faith.\textsuperscript{322}

Once again, notice the impact of Ebeling’s hermeneutic upon Menacher’s understanding about why Ebeling was involved in this struggle. Although terms such as “coram mundo,” “coram deo,” and even “law-gospel hermeneutic” do not suggest any special influence by Ebeling, since Luther himself used these terms or conceptions, their use within the context of “existential struggles raging in the conscience of every person” do show Ebeling’s influence in Menacher’s theology. And this emphasis upon

\textsuperscript{321} Menacher, \textit{Kirchenkampf}, 20. He also wrote on p. 18, “Ebeling’s experience and Lutheran hermeneutic proved decisive when Ebeling assumed a leading role in the controversies in Germany surrounding the Joint Declaration...”

\textsuperscript{322} Menacher, “Gerhard Ebeling in Retrospect,” 187.
Kirchenkampf is also reflected in Menacher’s personal analysis of the Joint Declaration and later ecumenical discussions.

“Confusion and Clarity in Recent German Ecumenism” is Menacher’s analysis of the Joint Declaration, Dominus Iesus, issued by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on June 6, 2000, the Vatican’s Note on the Expression “Sister Churches,” issued on June 30, 2000, and two responses by the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland. The article takes the form of a detailed history of the drafting and reception process of the Joint Declaration, interspersed with his objections to it. Since it is fairly detailed, only a few high points of his objections can be covered.

Although in the first few pages of this text, Menacher seems to concur with the objections voiced by Jüngel and others, one of his first objections was actually lodged not against the Joint Declaration itself, but against the “Official Catholic Response” (hereafter OCR) and its reply, the “Official Common Statement” (hereafter, OCS).323 What Menacher finds especially problematic was the timing of the OCR. Because it was issued while the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity was in discussion with the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith over the formulation of the JD, Menacher argues that “the Vatican’s ‘Response’ should be interpreted as a calculated move to express a general disregard for the LWF and its process of ‘synodical consensus.’”324 What Rome is really after is not agreement with the LWF, but an admission from the “lost sheep of the Reformation” that they were wrong and their safe return to Rome. Given the structure of the paragraph, Menacher sees this verified by the fact that what

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324 Ibid., 25.
should have killed the JD, which in another article he called “crypto-Tridentine,” did not, in that the JD was salvaged by the OCS and its accompanying “Annex.”

Not only does Menacher finds the “Annex” to be “harmonious with Roman Catholic teaching as found in the Council of Trent,” he calls the OCS and its “Annex” confused, duplicitous, and insidious. It approves Lutheran terminology, but only if used in a Catholic sense. For example, while the “Annex” employs phrases like simul iustus et peccator in paragraph 2A, it can only understand them if sin is understood in a Catholic sense of “misdeed,” which the “Annex’s” employment of James 2:3 (“For all of us make many mistakes.” [NRSV] ) and Ps 19:12 (“But who can detect their error? Clear me from hidden faults.” [NRSV] ) would seem to support. It serves as a “model of confusion” in that while the OCR called the authority of the LWF into question, the “Annex” claims that “the Response of the Catholic Church does not intend to put in question the authority of Lutheran Synods or of the Lutheran World Federation.” The “Annex” is duplicitous, because he sees its employment of the phrase “by faith alone” in paragraph 2C to be condemned by canon nine of Trent’s Decree on Justification itself. Finally, it is insidious in that the OCS’s claim to confirm the Joint Declaration in its entirety leads one to believe that the JD was actually signed. It was not; only the OCS was. Thus, Menacher must understand this employment of “confirm” in the OCS to be really nothing more than an attempt to sidestep the JD, in order to replace it with the

327 Canon nine says, “If anyone says that the sinner is justified by faith alone in the sense that nothing else is required by way of cooperation in order to obtain the grace of justification, and that it is not at all necessary that one should be prepared and disposed by the movement of one’s will, anathema sit...”; “The General Council of Trent, Sixth Session: Decree on Justification (1547),” in The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church, ed. by Josef Neuner and Jacques Dupuis, sixth revised and enlarged edition (New York: Alba House, 1996), p. 762, para. 1959.
more Catholic “Annex.” Moreover, the OCS has no official standing with the member churches of the LWF, since, being different in wording from the JD, it was never approved by them, only by the LWF central office. Thus;

The confusion surrounding JDDJ and the OCS conceals that neither achieves their stated goal, namely, the non-applicability of sixteenth-century doctrinal condemnations between Lutherans and Roman Catholics regarding justification.328

Menacher continues that the confusion surrounding the drafting and adoption process of the Joint Declaration called for clarification, which the Catholic Church, through the CDF, issued in its letter Dominus Iesus. Section IV.16 of this letter is quite important.

“The Lord Jesus, the only Saviour, did not only establish a simple community of disciples (discipulorum communitatem), but constituted the Church as a salvific mystery: he himself is in the Church and the Church is in him”.329

What this means to Protestant ears is that a Protestant understanding of church as a community or communion of believers is simply deficient. Section IV.17 explains that the “‘Christian faithful are therefore not permitted to imagine that the Church of Christ is nothing more than a collection—divided, yet in some way one—of Churches and ecclesial communities…””330 There is “…a single Church of Christ, which subsists in the Catholic Church,” which has retained communion with the successor of Peter, the valid episcopate, and the “genuine and integral substance of the Eucharistic mystery,” unlike Protestant churches. Some see this as fulfillment of some of the fears voiced against the JD, namely that the JD envisions a Protestant return to Rome.

329 Ibid., 27.
330 Ibid., 28.
Needless to say, Protestant churches responded.\textsuperscript{331} In September, 2001, the EKD issued *Kirchengemeinschaft nach evangelischem Verständnis—Ein Votum.* The committee that prepared this text was headed by Eberhard Jüngel and Dorothea Wendebourg. It took as its starting place the understanding of the church held by the Leuenberg Fellowship, which distinguishes between the foundation and form of the church. Christ is the foundation, who is communicated through the proclamation of the gospel and the sacraments administered in accord with the gospel. Thus, this document is in accord with the *Augsburg Confession*, article seven; Menacher wrote:

Proclamation of the gospel in word and sacrament is the way in which faith is evoked and people are ‘brought into communion with the triune God,’ through whom ‘they become members of the body of Christ and as such constitute his congregation.’ The communication-event of church transpires through the public office of ministry in accordance with AC v.\textsuperscript{332}

According to Menacher, the difference between *Dominus Iesus* and *Kirchengemeinschaft nach evangelischem Verständnis* demonstrate that two models of church unity have been in competition for the past 40 years. The model of church unity manifested in the JD, “full, visible, organic unity,” can only occur by canon law, not gospel. He concluded this article by writing:

Viewed in this global context, the debacle of the *JDDJ* ranks as a confused and confusing distraction from the main ecumenical contest. The

\textsuperscript{331} Ibid., 28-29.

\textsuperscript{332} Ibid., 29. Article seven of the *Augsburg Confession* reads, “It is also taught that at all times there must be and remain one holy, Christian church. It is the assembly of all believers among whom the gospel is purely preached and the holy sacraments are administered according to the gospel. For this is enough for the true unity of the Christian church that there the gospel is preached harmoniously according to a pure understanding and the sacraments are administered in conformity with the divine Word. It is not necessary for the true unity of the Christian church that uniform ceremonies, instituted by human beings, be observed everywhere. As Paul says in Ephesians 4[:4-5]: “There is one body and one Spirit, just as you were called to the one hope of your calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism”; “The Augsburg Confession—German Text,” in *The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*, ed. by Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert, trans. by Charles Arand, Eric Gritsch, Robert Kolb, William Russell, James Schaaf, Jane Strohl, and Timothy J. Wengert (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2000), p. 42.
confusion in *JDDJ* is, however, symptomatic of the age-old confusion of law and gospel. According to Luther, the failure to differentiate properly between law and gospel, the two kingdoms, the hidden and revealed God, and so forth is nothing but the work of human sin and the devil. The structural clarity of ecclesial law is tempting, but the law can neither overcome human sin nor grant true church unity. Protestants who have lost faith in Article VII of the Augsburg Confession have lost faith in the gospel, which is the power of God to justify sinners. The Lutheran Reformers could not have been more clear about this.\(^{333}\)

Menacher’s second text that needs to be examined, “Current Lutheran-Roman Catholic Dialogues,” is a critique of the most recent US Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue, *The Church as Koinonia of Salvation* (hereafter, CKS), which came out in 2004.\(^ {334}\) This is a substantial critique of the CKS, going to thirty-five pages in length, although he spends the first ten pages of this article critiquing the JD, since the CKS links the possibility of its existence with the *Joint Declaration*. This critique of the JD offers little new beyond what he offered in his previous article, “Confusion and Clarity in Recent German Ecumenism.” In this analysis, he offers one basic “doctrinal” critique of the CKS, which will be covered in some detail, and several smaller critiques related to points of method, grammar, and reception, of which only the methodological critique will be reviewed as relevant for this study.\(^ {335}\)

\(^{333}\) Menacher, “Confusion and Clarity.” 29.


\(^{335}\) His grammatical critique relates to the inconsistency in the JD of the placement of the definite article before “consensus in basic truths,” which creates ambiguity concerning the level of consensus attained. Is it the *magna* consensus sought, or has this *magna* consensus become a partial consensus? This ambiguity can hardly serve as a basis for the CKS to build on, as it claims; Menacher, “Current Lutheran-Roman Catholic Dialogues,” 394-397. His critique concerning the reception, ibid., 397-399, argues that since the JD cannot plausibly have attained “…any credible ‘reception and authority’ in any church.” its reception and authority applies only to “those few individuals” who voluntarily submit to the crypto-
His “doctrinal” critique has to do with the fact that the CKS does not take as its starting point article seven of the Augsburg Confession, which he interprets in a fashion reminiscent of Ebeling:

\[\text{God’s word as promise makes the reality of God real and really present when the gospel is proclaimed not only in word but also in word-saturated water, bread, and wine. In short, to deny that the gospel purely expressed in word and sacrament is enough (satis est) for true church unity is to deny the present reality of the lordship and divinity of Jesus Christ in his body, the church.}\]

He makes this claim for several reasons; three will be listed here. The first reason is that according to the Second Vatican document, Unitatis Redintegratio, Catholic ecumenists have to take into account a “hierarchy of truths.” Menacher sees the presence of this hierarchy in the preface to the CKS, in which baptism grants admission to the church, Scripture, as interpreted by the church, fosters one’s “incorporation” into it, and the Eucharist and communion under the papacy bring it to actuality. Some Protestant ecumenists seem to be trying to interpret this hierarchy horizontally, which would be in accord with article seven of the Augsburg Confession, not vertically as in Catholicism, in that due to their common baptism and agreement on justification in the JD, these ecumenists seem to believe that it would be “proper” for them to ask the pope for his blessing on “limited interim Eucharistic sharing” as a way toward full communion. The pope’s refusal, however, shows this to be the wrong interpretation of this hierarchy, and since Catholic ecumenists have to keep this hierarchy in view, the Augsburg Confession cannot be functioning as the basis for church unity in the CKS.

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Tridentine statements in them, which only shows that any document that claims to be descended from them is far away from the “visible unity” they seek.

\(^{336}\) Ibid., 382-390. This quotation is found on p. 383. The actual text of the seventh article of the Augsburg Confession was cited in footnote 332 on page 171.
Another reason that he lists is that, to him, it is obvious that even the ELCA is more interested in promoting ecumenical relations with Catholics by relying upon their constitution and not the *Augsburg Confession*.\textsuperscript{337} The ordination of women is guaranteed by the ELCA constitution, which extends equality to women, even in ordination. Menacher, however, finds it curious that, given the ELCA’s “culture of inclusivity,” they did not defend women’s ordination in the CKS, but put it off until later. The final reason that Menacher claims that the CKS is not based on the *Augsburg Confession* is that in the discussion on apostolic succession, the ELCA grounded its acceptance of “episcopal succession” by relying upon the concordat reached with the Episcopal Church, USA in *Called to Common Mission* (hereafter, CCM). According to Menacher, CCM was actually accepted based upon a faulty interpretation of article seven of the *Apology of the Augsburg Confession*, which said that the Lutheran reformers had a “deep desire to maintain” the “episcopal pattern.”\textsuperscript{338} Yet ironically, in paragraph 80 of CKS, the Lutherans turn right around and contradict themselves, in that they then say “prior to the late 1530s, the theme of succession played little role in Reformation debates…”; the authority of the bishop was under dispute, not succession. But, as Menacher points out, this is what one gets when one tries to establish visible unity upon law and not the gospel as confessed in article seven of the *Augsburg Confession*.

Menacher’s methodological objection relates to CKS’s reliance upon what it calls an “internally differentiated consensus.”\textsuperscript{339} He first notes that there is some confusion over the terminology and meaning of the exact term used, whether the proper

\textsuperscript{337} Ibid., 385-386.
\textsuperscript{338} Ibid., 386-390.
\textsuperscript{339} Ibid., 391-394. The first in-line quotation found in this paragraph is on page 394, the second on page 391.
terminology is the confusing “internally differentiated consensus,” or “differentiated consensus,” or even Joseph Ratzinger’s, now Pope Benedict XVI’s, favorite “unity in reconciled diversity.” But whatever the term, he openly wonders; if this method was so effective, then why was the “Annex” and OCS needed to rescue the JD? And furthermore, some contest that the OCS actually replaced this “differentiated consensus” method with another, the “unity in reconciled diversity” method, since this is the term that OCS, paragraph 3, employed. Menacher argues that this “unity in reconciled diversity” is dangerous, if one of these remaining, but reconciled, differences is the indulgence, since it tends to lead one from Christ and “…thus also away from the one, true church founded on a pure proclamation of the gospel.” But in any case, “contradictory double-talk is no foundation for a credible agreement, regardless of the point of reference claimed.”

5.2 The Objections of Gerhard Forde

5.21 Ebeling’s Influence upon Forde

Gerhard Forde should be considered an “associate” of Ebeling. His student, Mark Mattes, demonstrates in his article “Gerhard Forde on Re-envisioning Theology in Light of the Gospel,” that Ebeling’s eschatological interpretation of Luther’s theology of the Cross influenced Forde.\(^{340}\) Moreover, Mattes also relates how Forde believed that

\(^{340}\) Mattes makes this argument in his article, “Gerhard Forde on Re-envisioning Theology in Light of the Gospel,” Lutheran Quarterly 13 (1999): 376, and note 14, p. 380, where he relies upon one of Forde’s early works, The Law-Gospel Debate. An Interpretation of its Historical Development (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1969). An examination of this text, particularly pages 177 and 199, reveals only that Forde was aware of Ebeling’s understanding of the gospel as an eschatological event, an “act character,” which frees one from the law in the present. According to the index, Ebeling is relied upon in several other passages. It is only in Forde’s 1990 work, however, Theology is for Proclamation (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 100, where one sees definite evidence that Forde was impacted by
“…language has the power to create and not just reflect reality.” So, one can justifiably place him within the same theological family as Ebeling and Fuchs, because, as seen in section 3.22 of this study, Ebeling claims that the word shapes the reality of the soul by creating faith. Thus, they both have an understanding of language as a “word-event.”

Conclusively, even Forde himself testifies that Ebeling’s interpretation of Luther and concern about hermeneutical questions shaped his thought in interpretation and preaching. So, it is with justification that one can consider Forde to be an “associate” of Ebeling.

Ebeling, which verifies Mattes’ claim. Here, Forde wrote: “For reconstruction in Christology this means that over against a use of the language of being and becoming which ends with itself we shall have to set the language of acting, more precisely a language that fosters and drives to the concrete act itself…The point is that we can move forward here only if we realize that in and through the human, suffering, dying, and resurrected Jesus we come up against God. God does himself to us in Jesus. The proclamation is the concrete event in which that occurs for us. Systematic theology must promote that occurrence. To do so, reconstruction in Christology must move to a language that drives to the act of proclamation as the doing of the deed.” The type of language present here, looks very similar to that of Ebeling’s understanding of the “word-event.” Moreover, this passage also demonstrates that Forde was moving away from a language of substance, of being and becoming, which is another similarity with Ebeling.

Mattes, “Gerhard Forde on Re-envisioning Theology,” 388.

See note 340

Gerhard Forde, “The One Acted Upon,” Dialog 36, no. 1 (Winter, 1997): 60. The content of this influence is also verified in footnote 340. James Nestingen, an associate of Forde’s, would like to downplay Ebeling’s influence in Forde’s theology; see “Examining Sources: Influences on Gerhard Forde’s Theology,” in By Faith Alone, ed. by Joseph Burgess and Marc Kolden (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 20-21. He argues that a few footnote references to Ebeling in The Law-Gospel Debate and others in his contributions to Church Dogmatics hardly prove that he was influenced by Ebeling. Forde does not refer to Ebeling in his later systematic works. In fact, Forde’s theological lineage is Norwegian; Haikola and Iwand.

Nestingen’s motivation in making this argument is clear. In this text, he says that some ecumenical theologians have recently ascribed Ebeling as an influence upon Forde. As he goes on to say, “The attempt to identify Forde with Ebeling is good example of what unfortunately appears to be the most common use of the argument for influence in the academic community. Ebeling is lumped with Bultmann’s existential interpretation, which is criticized for its ahistorical individualism, and Forde is then attached to Ebeling as a reflexive link in the chain. Such associations are the academic world’s equivalent of village gossip…” One can finish the argument. Given Ebeling’s opposition to the Joint Declaration, linking Forde to Ebeling would be a way to blunt Forde’s voice in ecumenism. Nestingen’s motivation in making this argument is also admirable; protecting the voice of his associate and friend at a time when Forde could no longer do so, suffering from Parkinson’s disease.

This point is well taken. Ebeling is not the primary influence in Forde’s theology. Yet, there is enough evidence from Forde himself that I can consider him as an “associate” of Ebeling, theologians who do have some similar concerns, not only because of Forde’s testimony, but also because of Forde’s
Forde has two texts that need to be examined. The first is an examination of the 
*Joint Declaration*, “A Call for Discussion of the ‘Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of 
Justification,’” while in the second, “Lutheran Ecumenism: With Whom and How 
Much?” Forde critiques the Catholic understanding of “ministry.”

### 5.22 Textual Examination

In “A Call for Discussion of the ‘Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of 
Justification,’” Gerhard Forde and some other members of the Luther Seminary faculty in 
St. Paul, Minnesota, urge the ELCA to delay the decision on the JD until more time has 
been spent evaluating it. They urge the ELCA to delay this vote for several reasons. 
First, the JD is fundamentally unclear on what it means by the term “grace.”

Is “grace” understood, as in Trent, as a power that is infused into the soul, “which enables the soul 
to grow in wisdom and goodness, to keep the commandments and do good works, and so 
to grow into greater and greater likeness to God.” If the soul is to grow in likeness to 
God, then faith by itself is not enough; “the soul must also be infused with the power of 
divine love (*caritas*), which impels the soul to growth toward the fullness of God’s own 
righteousness and life.” In developing this understanding of grace, this text explicitly 
refers to Aristotelian substance language. 

Or, is grace understood relationally, 
specifically as a relation to God, but also with other people, a relationship that is created 
by “actually speaking of God’s Word of promise in Jesus Christ, and simple, sure trust in 

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344 Luther Seminary Faculty [Gerhard Forde, Pat Keifert, Mary Knutsen, Marc Kolden, Jim 
Nestingen, and Gary Simpson], “A Call for Discussion of the ‘Joint Declaration on the Doctrine on 
Justification’” [hereafter, Luther Seminary Response], *Dialog* 36, no. 3 (Summer, 1997): 226-227. All 
quotations in this paragraph are from p. 226 unless otherwise noted.

345 Ibid., 226. The text reads, “Hence, the Council of Trent explicitly articulates its understanding 
of grace in terms of the four Aristotelian causes, which act to give substances movement and form…”
that Word of promise.” In this paradigm, grace is “a new communicative act on God’s part: the graciousness of God actualized here and now in God’s unconditional eschatological promise, which frees us from anxious concern for our own salvation and frees us for service to the neighbor and the world.”

According to this objection, the problem that the Reformers had with this Tridentine understanding of grace is pastoral, because it raises a whole host of questions. “Am I transformed enough yet? Do I have enough grace yet? What if it doesn’t work?” Looking carefully at this objection, one can see that some sort of ontological objection is working in the background, because this text relates that, “For Luther and the Lutheran confessions, ‘righteousness’ is not a matter of the progressive transformation of the soul’s substance through the causal power of ‘grace,’ but is understood relationally, in terms of persons-in-relationship to God and to each other.”

Another type of objection is that of equivocal language in the Joint Declaration, which calls into doubt whether there really is a consensus. This objection claims beyond the fact that paragraphs 8 through 12 of the JD do not present a consensual hermeneutic on how to read the Bible, which is at the heart of the controversy on justification, paragraph 15, the common statement on justification, could be interpreted in either a Lutheran or Catholic fashion, depending upon the role of works in one’s justification. Are they only to serve our neighbor, as a Lutheran interpretation would claim, or are they necessary for one’s justification, as a Catholic interpretation would claim?

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346 Ibid., 227.
347 Ibid., 226. Along similar lines, Forde also wrote in his translation of the German letter of protest, “The Critical Response of German Theological Professors to the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification,” Dialog 38, no. 1 (Winter, 1999): 71, “Since...Lutherans and Roman Catholics live in two different hermeneutical world, largely without knowing it, Roman Catholics balk at the claim that justification is the only criterion.”
348 Luther Seminary Response, 227.
claim? Moreover, the JD’s claim in paragraph 17, that “our new life is solely due to the forgiving and renewing mercy that God imparts as a gift” [Emphasis mine], could be interpreted in a Lutheran fashion as “God’s eschatological declaration of forgiveness,” or in a Catholic fashion as an infused power. The impact of this interpretation shapes the “ministry of the gospel.”

The last objection concerns the understanding of confessional authority. Not only is it unclear as to what level of authority the Joint Declaration would have in the ELCA, which might affect how justification is proclaimed in the ELCA, these theologians also argue that the ELCA needs to discuss the nature of confessional authority itself, because this question figures into one’s understanding of justification. In Lutheran thought, a confession is understood to be a response to the hearing of God’s word, which provides “guidelines for the ministry of God’s Word in the life of the church.” So, a confession is concerned with explaining the gospel; rejected teachings are of secondary importance. In Catholic thought, a conciliar decree focuses primarily upon what is to be rejected, (i.e., a canon), and the positive explanation of what is to be believed is secondary. This shows the impact of law in Catholicism, which is reflected in one’s understanding of justification and authority, which they summarized as follows:

If justification is by faith in God’s Word of promise, then proclaiming God’s living Word of promise—the actual delivery of the gospel in word and sacrament—is the highest exercise of authority in the church. If justification is a process of progressive renewal by grace and the reshaping of human habits through obedience to the law, then the highest authority

350 Luther Seminary Response, 229.
in the church will be a magisterium demanding obedience to law enabled
by the causal power of grace.351

Gerhard Forde passed away in 2005, having suffered for the last years of his life
from an aggressive form of Parkinson’s disease.352 In 2003, however, he published one of
his last articles, “Lutheran Ecumenism: With Whom and How Much?” in which he deals
with two more issues in Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue, Mary and the saints and
orders, although he mentions neither of the official texts from these dialogues.

Concerning the historic episcopate, Forde finds it strange that Lutherans are put in
the position of having to recognize the validity of the Catholic episcopate and
sacramental ordination, when, to his knowledge, “…Lutheranism has never really
‘unchurch’d’ anyone or declared anyone's ministry to be invalid.”353 The necessity of
having to recognize the legitimacy of the Catholic ministry in order to “create” mutual
recognition is to be tricked into playing the Catholic “game”; since Catholics do not
recognize the legitimacy of the Lutheran ministry, obviously Lutherans do not recognize
Catholic ministry either. In Forde’s theological judgment, Lutherans should be honest
with themselves and recognize that, for them;

Christ is the head of the church, that he makes Christians by grace alone
through preaching and the sacraments. Since Christ creates the
community, all human arrangements devised by denominations must be in
the service of the head of the church and his gospel.

Article seven of the Augsburg Confession sets the limits for what is necessary to
recognize church unity, which is agreement;

351 Ibid., 229.
353 Gerhard Forde, “Lutheran Ecumenism: With Whom and How Much?” 437. The following
block quotation is on p. 438.
…on the preaching of the gospel and the right administration of the sacraments. The preaching of the gospel is always the ultimate and the highest exercise of authority in the church: the authority that sets people free from sin, death, and the power of the devil.\textsuperscript{354}

Anything more than this confuses the Kingdom of God with the church, transgresses the eschatological limit of the church, which leads to tyranny, and threatens the proclamation of the gospel.

But according to Forde, honest discussions on real theological differences get “steamrolled” in the present ecumenical environment, in the drive toward “visible communion.” So, aside from the fact that present ecumenical discussions on orders tends to drive Lutherans beyond the seventh article of the \textit{Augsburg Confession}, since this article “is not enough” for Catholics, the other problem with present ecumenical discussion has to do with the present ecumenical method, which leads both participants to make theologically irresponsible statements.\textsuperscript{355} This is especially the case in the discussion with Mary and the saints. According to Forde, in Catholic teaching, grace works so well in some people that “…they immediately enjoy the beatific union and can be invoked to pray for us.”\textsuperscript{356} Lutherans, needless to say, are skeptical of such claims, because they hinder a “sound conscience” and incorporate an incorrect understanding of grace. So, to solve this ecumenical problem, “we move to a kind of middle ground in

\textsuperscript{354} Ibid., 446-447. The quotation itself is on p. 446.
\textsuperscript{355} Ibid., 440-441. Along this same line on p. 451, Forde wrote, “The Confessors did not claim that they were the only ones doing the kind of preaching and administration necessary to call the church into being and constitute its unity. What they did object to, however, most strenuously was that someone should demand of them something more than such preaching and, moreover, deny to them the right to preach the gospel on the basis of the fact that they did not knuckle under to those demands. The significance of pointing to all sorts of other Christians in the world is simply to say that if Rome cannot deny to these others the claim to being Christian, how then can they deny it to us? In other words, how can one possibly claim that variation in human ordinances and ceremonies ruptures the unity of the church? \textit{Satis est} therefore simply marks a limit beyond which one can make no demands and beyond which one cannot accuse anyone of destroying the true spiritual unity of the church.”
\textsuperscript{356} Ibid., 441-442. All quotations about Mary and the saints come from these two pages.
which Catholics say that Lutherans do not have to accept their teachings on the saints and Mary as long as they do not outright reject them. And Lutherans, for their part, are to promise not to accuse Catholics of idolatry in their faith and practice.” According to Forde, neither side should say such things. If truth is so important, so precious, then Catholics ought to insist that Lutherans adopt their understanding of grace and Lutherans ought to preach against idolatry wherever they find it. So, this method of differentiated consensus ultimately leads to a problem of theological integrity.  

In Forde’s opinion, this method is “theologically bankrupt” because it leads merely to “repressive tolerance,” the “deliberate obfuscation of language,” which hinders honest theological discussion, and the creation of theological statements that are quickly forgotten. Thus, he denies that inner communion should be grounded upon “exhaustive agreement in doctrine and polity.” What is needed is a new theological method, which involves, “…some form of conciliar ecumenism in which the denominations that recognize each other would agree to come together for serious conversation on [the] theological, [the] doctrinal, polity, and practice…” Why? Because “…in most instances of churches confessing the triune God, there exists enough common ground for us simply to declare ourselves to be in the fellowship that already exists.”

5.3 Summary of the Continuing Objections

In reviewing the objections by Menacher and Forde to the Joint Declaration and to statements issued by subsequent dialogues, four issues emerge which either presently

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357 Ibid., 439, 441-443. Theological integrity is so important to Forde, because “what the Lutheran communion has to contribute to the ecumenical church is its understanding of what the preaching of the gospel of Jesus Christ and the administration of the sacraments as gospel is all about. If we lose that, or decide that we need to compromise it in order to pursue a will-o’-the-wisp called ‘visible unity,’ we have no reason for being”; p. 445.

358 This quotation is in Ibid., 438-439, and the following is in Ibid., 437.
are influencing or could impact the continuation of the ecumenical discussions between Lutherans and Roman Catholics, all of which bear similarities with those of Ebeling in varying degrees and thus show that Ebeling’s influence is still being felt in ecumenical discussions.

First, there is the massive complex of what could be termed the “hermeneutical objection.” This is found in both Menacher and Forde, although it is stated differently in each. In Menacher, this objection is voiced in his article “Gerhard Ebeling in Retrospect” in section 5.12, where he describes the ecclesial struggles about justification by faith alone as reflecting “…the existential struggles raging in the conscience of every person,” and even describes this person as living *coram mundo* or *coram deo*.\(^{359}\) The presence of this objection can also be seen in his review of current ecumenical discussions, when, in his interpretation of article seven of the *Augsburg Confession*, he claims that “God’s word as promise makes the reality of God real and really present when the gospel is proclaimed not only in word but also in word-saturated water, bread, and wine.”\(^{360}\) At first, it may not seem that these are connected, but they are, through Ebeling’s theology. This will be demonstrated shortly.

This objection is also stated in Forde in section 5.22. It is found, first of all, in the Luther Seminary Response, which identified ambiguity over “grace” as an issue that needs to be clarified. This is an important issue for them, because the definition of grace impacts how one is justified. Is one made righteous through an infusion of grace as a supernatural power into one’s substance, which allows one to grow into God’s likeness? Or, is grace understood relationally, specifically as a relation to God, that is created by

\(^{359}\) Menacher, “Gerhard Ebeling in Retrospect,” 187.

“actually speaking of God’s Word of promise in Jesus Christ, and simple, sure trust in that Word of promise”? Although this Response does seem to link this objection to differences in ontology, Forde clearly says that Lutherans and Catholics live in different hermeneutical worlds, which would help to support this analysis of the Response, since there is a relation between ontology and hermeneutics.

In looking over Menacher and Forde, the connection between their objections may seem tenuous, for while Menacher speaks of “existential struggles,” with people living coram deo and coram mundo, Forde’s objections focus upon the ambiguity of grace and hermeneutical differences between Lutherans and Catholics. So, one could argue that they are unrelated. They are related, though, through Ebeling’s emphasis upon the word-event, an emphasis that they both likely received through contact with Ebeling. Ebeling’s hermeneutical theology is an attempt to get beyond subject/object dualism. As seen in section 1.11, this concern was bequeathed to Ebeling by Fuchs. That Ebeling has truly engaged this problem is seen in the fact that his hermeneutical theology is centered upon what he calls a word-event, as seen in section 1.12.

What is this word-event? As seen in section 3.21, word takes precedence over nature in Ebeling’s hermeneutic, which in turn requires an emphasis upon “person,” because the human person is ultimately a listener. According to section 3.22, the person becomes the addressee of the word of God in this hermeneutical anthropology. In this system, existence comes to be understood in terms of relationships. One of these relationships is with God. Listening to and receiving the word of God makes one to exist

361 Luther Seminary Response, 226.
363 Explaining this was also one of the foci of section 1.12.
coram Deo, which creates faith in the listener, changes the reality of the soul, and changes the place where one receives life, not in an internal transformation, but rather externally, in relation to God, in which case God, through Christ, truly becomes active in the believer, as the source of life, as seen in sections 2.21 and 3.32. This is the word-event.

In Ebeling’s theology, however, the advent of this hermeneutical anthropology is justified by what he calls Luther’s hermeneutical shift, as investigated in section 3.21, which occurred due to Luther’s study of the Psalms. As a result of this shift, the use of “nature” and “grace” became problematic, because “nature” is active, it “…realizes itself in the way of emergence and production, and is to be measured by itself,” which is unlike Luther’s emphasis upon the word of God creating faith in the passive listener. Thus, according to Ebeling, Luther rejected scholastic theology’s emphasis upon “substance” and “nature,” its basis in Aristotelian ontology, and opted instead for an emphasis upon what this study calls a “relational ontology.” Thus, Ebeling’s theology is distinctively centered upon this word-event and its existential implications, which one sees expressed in Menacher’s objection to the JD and the CKS, but this shift is grounded upon a rejection of the scholastic understanding of “grace,” which is not only expressed in the Luther Seminary Response, but also shared by Ebeling as one of the reasons for his rejection of the JD, as seen in section 4.21. It would be wise to observe if Jüngel separates them in his analysis of the Joint Declaration, but for the time being, both facets of this objection will be grouped under the heading “hermeneutical objection.”

The second emerging issue is that of ecumenical methodology, which could be tied to a unique feature of Ebeling’s theology, if one follows Menacher, namely that theology is done only within a context of struggle, which is known as *Kirchenkampf*. But both Menacher and Forde have problems with the current ecumenical method. In section 5.12, Menacher calls the method of “unity in reconciled diversity” dangerous, because it tends to lead one “away from the one, true church founded on a pure proclamation of the gospel.” And Forde considers the method behind the drive toward visible communion to be “theologically bankrupt,” because it fosters “repressive tolerance” and leads to theologically irresponsible statements, as seen in section 5.22.

Yet, Menacher takes his objection to ecumenical method to an extreme seemingly avoided by Forde, because of his understanding that *Kirchenkampf* is part of Ebeling’s theological method, as discovered in section 1.12. Thus, every sermon, or one might add every theological discussion, becomes a battle with the devil to achieve clarity between God and humanity. This association between *Kirchenkampf* and the rejection of the *Joint Declaration* is clearly displayed in section 5.12. But the tone of his arguments against not only the OCS in particular, calling it both “duplicitous” and “insidious,” but also the CKS, strongly suggest that he sees struggle against them as a desperate battle between good and evil, since they confuse law and gospel, which mandates the employment of almost any weapon.

There is little question that Menacher was influenced in his understanding of theology as *Kirchenkampf* by Ebeling, but the same cannot be said for Forde. Forde’s

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366 Menacher, “*Kirchenkampf*,” 8.
objections against theological method have been voiced by others, and since there is no indication that Ebeling’s influence upon Forde extends beyond that of the use of theological language as testified in section 5.21, there is no necessary connection between his methodological objections and those of Ebeling, even if Ebeling’s proposal that “we should rather make it our business to sharpen and clarify the question of truth that is concealed in these oppositions,” as seen in section 2.1, is clearly consistent with that of Forde. Thus, one should be very cautious in speaking of Ebeling influencing Forde’s methodological objections.

A third issue that has emerged from this study is that both Menacher and Forde object to Lutheran and Catholic dialogues on ecclesial issues that disregard article seven of the Augsburg Confession, interpreted to mean that nothing more is required for church unity than the proclamation of the gospel in word and sacrament, properly administered; anything more, such as making episcopal succession a condition of church union, confuses what is necessary from what is unnecessary. This is clearly seen in Menacher, when he notes that Lutheran/Catholic discussion, as reflected in CKS, does not take as its starting point article seven of the Augsburg Confession. This objection is also reflected in Forde, when he objects that Lutherans do not have to recognize the validity of the Catholic episcopate and sacramental ordination, because they have never “unchurched”

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367 For instance, the theological faculty at Concordia Theological Seminary, Ft. Wayne, “A Response to the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification,” para. 7, p. 29, and Department of Systematic Theology, Concordia Seminary, Saint Louis, Missouri, “A Response to the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification,” p. 42, both in The Commission on Theology and Church Relations, The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification in Confessional Lutheran Perspective (St. Louis: Commission on Theology and Church Relations, The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 1999), www.lcms.org (Accessed in May, 2008) record similar objections, but neither are directly influenced by Ebeling.

anyone. According to Forde, a Lutheran understanding of church is based upon article
seven of the *Augsburg Confession*, which is not enough for Catholics. In his view, there
is already enough agreement in critical issues, such as the Trinity, “…for us simply to
declare ourselves to be in the fellowship that already exists.”

Of course, these objections sound very similar to those of Ebeling. In section
2.23, there is ample evidence that Ebeling understood church unity as a present reality,
not something to be striven for. Moreover, in section 2.42, he claims that this pre-
existing unity, this “*vera unitas ecclesiae*” is not guaranteed by some “organizational
unity,” which would tie the church to time and place, but by what makes the church,
church, which is “…the preaching and the administration of the sacraments.” He even
cites article seven of the *Augsburg Confession* in this discussion. Yet, having noted these
similarities between Menacher, Forde, and Ebeling, there is no evidence that Ebeling
directly influenced either Menacher or Forde in this regard, and this is needed since this
emphasis upon word and sacrament as the criteria for the unity of the church is a
traditional Lutheran position. Even Forde himself testifies, as seen in section 5.21, that
Ebeling’s interpretation of Luther and concern about *hermeneutical questions* shaped his
thought, which limits the range of Ebeling’s influence upon Forde; this issue clearly steps
beyond this range. Thus, in this case, Ebeling merely shares a similar concern with
Menacher and Forde,

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370 Ebeling, “The Significance of Doctrinal Differences for the Division of the Church,” in *Word
371 This can be seen in Carl E. Braaten, *Principles of Lutheran Theology*, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis:
The final issue that has emerged from this study is that of the function of church doctrine and ecclesial authority. This issue is clearly present in the Forde’s objection to the *Joint Declaration*, when he observes that while a confession is understood to be a response to the hearing of God’s word, which provides *guidelines* for church ministry, a conciliar decree, or church law, *demands obedience* in what is to be rejected in one’s growth in grace, which is enforced by magisterial authority. So, there is clearly a difference between the communions in how church doctrine is understood to function. Of course, a similar objection is lodged by Ebeling in section 2.41 in his discussion on the relationship between the word of God and doctrine, for while Catholic dogma is a stable doctrine, guaranteed by the Magisterium, for the Reformation, church doctrine is a response to a fact, an encounter with the word of God, which gives “liberating assurance” to the believer’s conscience. But, while Forde and Ebeling share similar concerns, there is once again no evidence that Ebeling influenced Forde in this similarity.

So, having summarized this study of Menacher and Forde, what can one preliminarily conclude about Ebeling’s unique theological legacy to ecumenical discussions between Lutherans and Catholics? First, there is evidence that Ebeling’s emphasis upon the word-event and its concomitant rejection of grace, understood as a power infused into a substance, which has been labeled in this chapter as the “hermeneutical objection,” has caused great problems in accepting the *Joint Declaration* among some Lutheran circles shaped by Ebeling, because, according to both the German letter of protest in section 4.21 and the Luther Seminary Response, the understanding of “grace” is not clear in it. For these scholars, as seen for Ebeling in section 4.22, ambiguities over grace would make it unclear just what kind of ontology is at work in the
background, which impacts the human role in justification and how the church functions in one’s life, which in turn could have divisive significance, since there could be basic disagreement on what makes the church, church. Thus, any time an ecumenical document appears, which appeals to an undefined understanding of grace, this objection is likely to be lodged against it by one of Ebeling’s theological descendants.

Second, it would appear that among certain circles of Ebeling’s followers there is also the lingering problem of ecumenical method lying in the background, which Menacher associates with *Kirchenkampf*. As seen in section 1.12, this method requires the theologian to bring clarity to the human-divine relationship and so turn this distorted relationship into a “viable contrast,” a task that requires one to make “fundamental distinctions,” like the one between law and gospel, in order to bring clarity to this confusion. There is, however, in my judgment, a possible distortion in Menacher’s understanding of Ebeling’s method, which requires a temporary bracketing of this issue; more will be said of it after the examination of Jüngel. Forde’s methodological objection, that since the method behind the drive toward visible communion is “theologically bankrupt,” it needs to be replaced with a method that starts from the premise that church unity is already a present reality, is not uniquely Ebeling, and so should not be included in an evaluation of Ebeling’s theological heritage. The same must also be said for Menacher’s and Forde’s objections to the dialogue’s de-emphasis upon article seven of the *Augsburg Confession* and concerns over the understanding of authority and church doctrine. Thus, in concluding this preliminary section, Ebeling’s unique contribution to ecumenical dialogue is his hermeneutical concern that since the word of God creates faith

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in one which changes one’s existence, an understanding of grace as a power infused into a substance must be rejected, because it fosters an active understanding of justification, not one that is shaped wholly by the word of God.

5.4 Eberhard Jüngel

The purpose of this section is not to provide more confirmation for this preliminary conclusion, but to attempt to test the truth of this conclusion by examining Jüngel as a non-conforming instance. In this regard, Eberhard Jüngel plays a key role, because although his theology was shaped by Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling, in the end he could not sign the letters of protest, even though he himself admits that some of the language in the first letter was suggested by him. In fact, he was actually the keynote speaker at the tenth anniversary celebrations of the *Joint Declaration* in Augsburg in 2009. Thus, in discovering why Jüngel could eventually accept the JD, one could go some distance in determining whether there is any necessary link between Ebeling’s hermeneutic and continuing resistance to the JD and future Lutheran/Catholic dialogues by his theological successors, which would help one to know whether the conclusion stated above is accurate, needs to be modified, or needs to be rejected. That is the task of the final two parts of this chapter.

This study of Jüngel will focus upon how Ebeling’s word-event hermeneutic impacted Jüngel’s understanding of the doctrine of justification and his eventual support of the *Joint Declaration*. In order to do so, it will focus upon three texts, all of which

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have to do with his initial concern with the JD and his subsequent acceptance of it. They are: “Um Gottes willen—Klarheit!” the article that, according to Wallmann, started the German dispute over the JD;\(^{375}\) his monograph, *Justification, The Heart of the Christian Faith*, which is his explanation of the doctrine of justification, occasioned by the appearance of the JD;\(^{376}\) and finally, “Ein wichtiger Schritt,” which helps to explain why he finally accepted the *Joint Declaration*.\(^{377}\)

### 5.41 Ebeling’s Influence upon Jüngel

It is right to consider Eberhard Jüngel a student of Ebeling. John Webster, who not only wrote the introduction to Jüngel’s monograph on justification, *Justification, The Heart of the Christian Faith*, but also a lengthy introduction to his theology, lays out his theological training. According to Webster, Jüngel was early on intrigued by Karl Barth’s Trinitarian theology, which led to one of his early books, *God’s Being is in Becoming*.\(^{378}\) As a result of their association, they developed a deep friendship that lasted until Barth’s death. But, Barth was not the only influence upon his theology. Jüngel’s doktorvater was Ernst Fuchs, who trained him in the tradition of Bultmann and “existential Lutheranism.” But due to this association, he was also introduced to Gerhard Ebeling, who shared similar interests with Bultmann and Fuchs. Moreover, Webster testifies that Ebeling “…bequeathed to Jüngel a fascination with a complex of themes:

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Word (the proclamation of Christ crucified in eschatological speech events); justification (expounded anthropologically as a declaration in which the being of the sinner is recreated); faith (understood as passive reception of the Word’s saving effect.)” This is important, because, according to this testimony, Jüngel was impacted by Ebeling in the very issues that this study now intends to investigate; the relationship between word and faith, which is the focus of Ebeling’s hermeneutical anthropology.

5.42 Topical Analysis

There is ample evidence in Jüngel’s book on justification to demonstrate that Ebeling’s word-event has deeply impacted his theology, even going so far as to describe this event in existential terms. For example, Jüngel wrote that,” The God of grace, the God who justified the ungodly, acts in the justification event by the Word alone, solo verbo” [Emphasis his]. A few pages later, he adds a few more details; “The justification of the ungodly is brought about by the Word alone because only the Word can both pronounce and make us righteous” [Emphasis his].\(^ {379} \) Finally, in describing the strength and results of the justifying Word and one’s relationship with Christ, he wrote:

So the justifying Word remakes our human existence anew, by relating us to Jesus Christ and there bringing us to ourselves, outside ourselves (extra se/extra nos). Thus this external reference is not something inferior and superficial, but a relationship which defines us in our inmost being.\(^ {380} \)

And this emphasis upon Christ influencing human existence is emphasized at the beginning of the text, when he wrote:

\(^ {379} \) This first quotation is found in Jüngel, Justification, The Heart of the Christian Faith, 198. The next one is found on p. 204.
\(^ {380} \) Ibid., 213.
When we believe in the justification of sinners, our declaration of faith in Jesus Christ becomes a truth that sheds light on the whole of human existence.\textsuperscript{381}

This emphasis upon word, faith, and existence sounds very similar to Ebeling, as reported in section 3.23, who wrote:

\begin{quote}
Faith, which owes itself to it and in which it fulfills itself, corresponds solely to this word. How should God be honored differently and how should the first commandment be fulfilled differently, than through an affirming understanding: Amen, so it is, thus by faith alone. Therefore, Luther recognizes in word and faith a coherent event that changes everything from the ground up. The word changes the situation of the soul.\textsuperscript{382}
\end{quote}

Moreover, Jüngel even describes sin in relational terms. In fact, he probably goes beyond Ebeling here, showing the relational character of good and evil much more clearly than Ebeling, who merely demonstrates its existential import by comparing belief and unbelief, as demonstrated in section 3.12. First of all, Jüngel describes good as meaning “…existence together. Evidently, the Creator grants the same goodness and quality of communal existence to his creation which characterizes his own existence” [Emphasis his].\textsuperscript{383} Understanding this allows one to better understand how he identifies the sinner:

\begin{quote}
The distinguishing mark of sinners on the other hand—those who are unrighteous before God—is that they think they must and can take their rights. In doing so, they break out of the well-ordered system of relationships in which God has included them. And that is precisely how sinners destroy the good order of life and life itself. The sinful urge towards lack of relationships comes to an end in death. \textsuperscript{384} [Emphasis his]
\end{quote}

And finally, he even compared belief and unbelief, giving it an existential coloring:

\textsuperscript{381} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{382} Gerhard Ebeling, “Luthers Wirklichkeitsverständnis,” Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 90, no. 4 (December, 1993): 419.
\textsuperscript{383} Jüngel, Justification, The Heart of the Christian Faith, 103-104.
\textsuperscript{384} Ibid., 86-87.
Untruth and lying are by no means just theological concepts; sin is not simply an inhibition or confusion of the consciousness. No, unbelief, like faith, is an act which affects the whole person and destroys the wholeness of the whole person.\textsuperscript{385}

Finally, Jüngel, like Ebeling, has objections to a Catholic understanding of grace, which sound very similar to those of Ebeling as noted in section 3.111. Jüngel objects to the Catholic distinction between prevenient grace and justifying grace, because although prevenient grace precedes all human effort, justifying grace is understood as an habitual grace that inheres in the person, assisting one’s free will, and thus inhering in one; it becomes a personal possession. To Jüngel, this shows the anthropological basis of the Catholic understanding of grace. It sets up a “parallel structure,” requiring certain religious works to be done by the person, with grace doing everything which sinners cannot do. The problem with this is that it obscures the divine compassion which Jüngel takes to be essential to understanding the Reformer’s relational, biblically-based conception of grace.\textsuperscript{386} So, given all of the commonalities between Ebeling, Jüngel, and even Forde, as seen in section 5.22, how could Jüngel come to support the \textit{Joint Declaration}, unlike Ebeling and Forde?

A brief examination of the two articles mentioned at the beginning of this study on Jüngel can help answer this question, but the answer is unexpected, because in neither case do Jüngel’s comments relate to Ebeling’s word and faith hermeneutic. For example, in the first article, “Um Gottes willen—Klarheit!” Jüngel traces the history of the discussions and phraseology of the criteriological function of the doctrine of justification and takes issue with Cardinal Kasper over the adequacy of the wording of this article in

\textsuperscript{385} Ibid., 137. \\
\textsuperscript{386} Ibid., 189-196.
the JD as an “indispensable criterion that constantly serves to orient all the teaching and practice of our churches to Christ.” Jüngel’s concern is that to call the doctrine of justification “an indispensable criterion” is confusing, because if it is to mean anything, there must be “dispensable” criterion. What could that be? He has no idea, because to be a criterion, it must be “indispensable.” Such a formulation is not helpful. In fact, he charges this “indispensable criterion” formula with being absurd. But nowhere in this article are there any references to word or faith and their existential impact. The one thing that this article does demonstrate, however, is that since it began a series of heated responses to the JD in German theological circles, according to Wallmann as seen above, Jüngel’s primary concern with the JD must be its ambiguity over the status doctrine of justification as the doctrine that guides church teaching and practice, which could be potentially inconsistent with a Reformatory understanding of the gospel.

His second article, “Ein wichtiger Schritt,” is his analysis of the “Annex,” the text that responded to the objections lodged against the JD by the “Official Catholic Response.” Once again, this article does not display any relationship with word or faith and their existential impact. What this article displays is his judgment that the “Annex” adequately addresses his doctrinal concerns related to the JD. In fact, this article supports the veracity of his claim in the preface to the third edition of his book on justification that he does not find convincing the objection that the “Annex’s” responses interpret Reformation doctrine in a tridentine fashion. For example, he calls the “Annex’s” use of the

387 Joint Declaration, para. 18, p. 16.
Lutheran formula “by faith alone,” found in paragraph 2C, breathtaking, and he declares the “Annex’s” clarification on the criteriological function of the doctrine of justification to be a “clear improvement,” because it declares that “…the doctrine of justification accords a ‘unique meaning in the overall context of the basic Trinitarian confession of faith of the church.’” Thus, it would seem that Jüngel’s final acceptance of the Joint Declaration is based upon doctrinal considerations; Ebeling’s hermeneutical anthropology seems to play little role.

But if this is the case, then how does this analysis of Jüngel help this study? In my judgment, Jüngel’s monograph displays the absence of a condition in his theology, which in-turn allows him to deal with the Joint Declaration on a purely doctrinal level. The entry point for this observation is in his discussion on the problems of a Catholic understanding of grace. As presented above in this evaluation, he notes that the distinction between prevenient and justifying grace displays the anthropological basis of a Catholic understanding of grace. Ebeling would concur in this judgment. But at no time does he attack its underlying ontology as did Ebeling or declare that Catholics and Lutherans live in different hermeneutical worlds, as does Forde.

Jüngel actually either employs or approves this substance language. For example, Jüngel claims that “…Christian doctrine is right to express the mystery of God’s becoming human…as him assuming human nature…in the person of the Son of God,” and acknowledges in the next sentence that this insight was opened up by the use


of substance and ontological language in early theology.\textsuperscript{392} Moreover, he describes sin by saying that, “it is in itself unreliable and therefore has no substance, essence, foundation or basis.”\textsuperscript{393} And concerning the effect of sin upon humanity, he wrote:

We will have to maintain that the ontological structures of humanity cannot be destroyed by sin, but that the ontic-existential realization of these ontological structures is totally determined by sin. [Emphasis his]\textsuperscript{394}

Although he does not use substance language in this quotation, the fact that he has already defined sin as having no “substance or essence” means that an Aristotelian substance ontology maybe working in the background here.

Additionally, one will not find Aristotle’s metaphysic held up for general ridicule or excoriation by Jüngel. In fact, he praises Aristotle’s understanding of justice, in that since it reaches out toward all, it implies relationality,\textsuperscript{395} although he is also equally clear on the inapplicability of an Aristotelian concept of distributive justice in understanding the righteousness of God and on the inability of becoming good through the performance of good works.\textsuperscript{396} Most significantly, though, he never says that Catholics and Protestants have different conceptions of reality, or inhabit different hermeneutical worlds as does Forde. He never says that Catholics and Lutherans cannot communicate, although he does recognize that there is probably an unbridgeable gap between them over the role of human action in one’s justification.\textsuperscript{397} What this means is that there is no hermeneutical Grunddifferenz between Lutherans and Catholics in Jüngel’s theology. This is an important finding, because the absence of such a Grunddifferenz would serve as a

\textsuperscript{392} Ibid., 161-162.
\textsuperscript{393} Ibid., 111.
\textsuperscript{394} Ibid., 179.
\textsuperscript{395} Ibid., 52, 275.
\textsuperscript{396} Ibid., 61, 247.
\textsuperscript{397} Ibid., 177, 188.
necessary condition to keep discussions about the JD at a doctrinal level and so it would allow him to accept the Joint Declaration, once his doctrinal concerns had been clarified, because there is no sense in these works that Lutherans and Catholics simply exist and act in different worlds.

5.5 Re-evaluation of Thesis

This discovery about the lack of a Grunddifferenz in Jüngel’s thought is significant for this study, because it mandates a revision is its thesis. As was noticed in section 5.3, Ebeling connects his word-event hermeneutic, in which the word gives rise to faith in a person that changes one’s existential situation, with a repudiation of a theological use of substance ontology and its co-ordination of nature and grace, through Luther’s hermeneutical shift from nature and grace to person and word. I would argue that this looks very much like Ebeling’s version of a Grunddifferenz, in which Catholics and Lutherans live in incompatible conceptual world. This Grunddifferenz is missing in Jüngel’s thought and likely due to this, he does not link this word-event hermeneutic with the repudiation of a theological use of substance ontology; this requires a revision in the thesis.

Ebeling’s theological legacy to Lutheran/Catholic dialogue can now be stated both positively and negatively. Positively, because there is no necessary link between his word-event hermeneutic and rejection of a theological use of substance language, as demonstrated by Jüngel, Ebeling’s hermeneutic, with its emphasis upon relationality, could be used to deepen the agreement between Lutherans and Catholics on the doctrine of justification. Even the Luther Seminary Response noted such a possibility, although
not in relation to Ebeling. It noted that paragraph 36 of the JD on the Catholic explanation of the assurance of salvation, which in part reads, “to have faith is to entrust oneself totally to God,” could be used to form a breakthrough in Lutheran/Catholic discussions, because this paragraph is implicitly relational. But if one reads closely, there are other resources in the JD that sound this relational theme, as pointed out in section 4.21; paragraph 26, the Lutheran explanation of the common confession, “Justification as Forgiveness of Sins and Making Righteous,” reads, “God himself effects faith as he brings forth such trust by his creative word. Because God’s act is a new creation, it affects all dimensions of the person and leads to a life in hope and love” [Emphasis mine]; and paragraph 27, the Catholic explanation of the common affirmation, says, “This new personal relation to God is grounded totally in God’s graciousness and remains constantly dependent on the salvific and creative working of this gracious God…” [Emphasis mine]. All of these paragraphs in the JD could be used as entry points for dialogue with Ebeling’s theological heirs.

Stated negatively, however, if one insists that there is a Grunddifferenz between Lutherans and Catholics, because this word-event hermeneutic is linked with the repudiation of a theological use of substance ontology, then Ebeling’s hermeneutic will bequeath continued disputation between Ebeling’s theological descendants and supporters of the JD in future discussions. This continued disputation should be taken seriously, because if the JD does not yield the hoped for influence upon the life and teachings of the churches, and thus produce practical results at the parish level, which the

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398 Luther Seminary Response, 228.
399 Joint Declaration, pp. 19-20.
JD pledged in paragraph 43, then eventually some supporters of the JD may begin to reconsider their support of the JD.

Finally, a word needs to be said about that other unique aspect of Ebeling’s theology, which some interpret as *Kirchenkampf*. This methodological concept was left out of the study in Jüngel, because he has nothing to say about it in the texts that were examined for that section. It is quite true that Ebeling, Forde, and Jüngel all believe in theological “tough-mindedness” and will not settle for ambiguity when the gospel is at stake. But none of them use the language of Menacher, who called the OCS “duplicitous” and “insidious,” as seen in section 5.12. In my judgment, this is not the language of civil discourse; this is the language of war. Whether this is a legitimate interpretation of Ebeling’s theological method or not, an unintended (or perhaps intended if legitimate) legacy of Ebeling to future dialogue could be an almost uncivil aspect to future discussion in terms of the critique of the JD’s critics. If this transpires, I fail to see how it could help further understanding between supporters and critics, who will eventually have to be engaged, if one takes, as Cardinal Kasper recently said, the following as the ultimate goal of full communion:

> Ultimately, ecumenism is not an end in itself: it aims to go beyond itself toward reconciliation, unity and *world peace*. Let us thus be the vanguard and precursors of this unity and this peace.\(^\text{401}\) [Emphasis mine]

It is difficult to imagine world peace, without peace first existing in the church.

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\(^{400}\) This has already been demonstrated in section 2.1 for Ebeling and in section 5.22 for Forde, who actually first used the term “tough-mindedness” in his article “Lutheranism Ecumenism,” 437. This “tough-mindedness” is on display in Jüngel in “Preface to the First Edition,” *Justification, The Heart of the Christian Faith*, xxxv.

5.6 Concluding Remarks

So, in conclusion, the following could be said concerning the second question that is directing this study: What impact could Ebeling’s hermeneutical theology have upon the reception of the *Joint Declaration* and the continuing ecumenical discussions between Lutherans and Catholics? What is Ebeling’s unique theological legacy to ecumenical discussions between Lutherans and Catholics? Ebeling’s word-event hermeneutic could have two impacts upon Lutheran and Catholic dialogue, one positive and one negative. Positively, Ebeling’s word-event hermeneutic, with its emphasis upon relationality, could be used to deepen the agreement between Lutherans and Catholics on the doctrine of justification in allowing a deeper appreciation of how humanity total depends upon, or relates to, God, since there are multiple entry points for such dialogue in the *Joint Declaration* itself. Negatively, if one insists that there is a *Grunddifferenz* between Lutherans and Catholics, because this word-event hermeneutic is linked with the repudiation of a theological use of substance ontology, then Ebeling’s hermeneutic will bequeath continued disputation between Ebeling’s theological descendants and supporters of the JD in future discussions.

But it must also be said that Ebeling’s theological legacy is not confined to those aspects of his understanding of the relation between God and humanity that are uniquely his. His legacy also extends to those issues that he has in common with other critics of the *Joint Declaration* and Lutheran/Catholic dialogue, who raise their voice together. There are four issues here that need special mention. First, he would urge one to consider, what is the relationship between the word of God and church doctrine? This issue first appeared in section 2.41, but it has also been highlighted by the *Joint Declaration*...
Declaration itself as an area that needs further clarification. Ebeling would want to know how one could adequately formulate church doctrine to make the word of God intelligible to people today without having some understanding about how one understands the word of God. How does our historicity impact how we understand God’s word, about how God communicates to us? And, what does this imply for the human ability to formulate doctrine? Second, what is the purpose of ecumenism? Should ecumenism promote a communion that envisions the fullest, most perfect accord in all areas of church life? Is this type of communion even desirable? If not, could there be a difference between “full communion” and “visible communion”? Third, what is the purpose of the church? This is an important question, because it is only once one can answer this question that one can answer what is necessary in order for there to be church unity. And finally, once one can answer these questions, one is in a better position to address the question of ecumenical method. What ecumenical method best allows one to achieve these aims and purposes? Is there a method that would allow one to reach for church unity and yet maintain theological tough-mindedness?

The signatories of the Joint Declaration have pledged “…to strive together to deepen this common understanding of justification and to make it bear fruit in the life and teaching of the churches.” What if this never materializes? Although he is still hopeful, Karl Cardinal Lehmann is already sounding the note of regret; “…in some respects the JDDJ has so far not led any further, ‘because it has not been further deepened, implemented and thus made spiritually fruitful.’” The reception process of

403 Ibid., para. 43, p. 27.
the *Joint Declaration* has been “uneven,” sometimes yielding fruit, but often having little
impact upon the lives of the churches, especially at the local level. What if this becomes
a perpetual state? I would argue that Gerhard Ebeling, a supporter of ecumenical efforts,
would most certainly not advice the supporters to abandon the effort, but to encourage
them to continue on. Only, they should reconsider the goals of ecumenism and their
understanding of church unity. Thus, despite his activity in drafting the German letter of
protest and the disputation that one finds among his theological heirs, Ebeling’s
hermeneutical theology, his focus upon the word-event, still has ecumenical potential that
finds echo in the *Joint Declaration* itself. This is the ecumenical legacy of Gerhard
Ebeling.
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NOTE: This is an abridged copy of the bibliography that I put together on the doctrine of justification, which began with my research in Germany in November, 2005. Because the length of this bibliography has now reached almost 110 pages, I felt the need to abridge it, since it did not have to appear in this study in all its breadth. This abridged version focuses upon the major players in the drafting and reception of the Joint Declaration, major church officials, significant documents, and official press release sources, such as Evangelischer Pressedienst (epd). Thus, its utility as a research tool has not been significantly diminished. Please note that not all sources which appear in this bibliography have been used or referred to in this study. Its presence here is strictly as a general research tool.

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