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Saving Disney: Activating Publics through the Internet

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In December 2003, Roy Disney and Stanley Gold launched the SaveDisney.com Web site, marking the beginning of an innovative Internet-based public relations campaign. While public relations scholarship focuses on the need to listen and respond to publics, publics often do not have the means to participate actively in a meaningful way in this process. The emergence of the Internet has created an inexpensive and easily accessible forum for public organizing, which may, in turn, dramatically increase the presence, voice, and power of publics. This case represents the use of the Internet by dissatisfied shareholders to advocate for changes in corporate governance. The SaveDisney campaign demonstrates how the strategic use of technology, such as the Internet, changes the public relations landscape by shifting the balance of public relations practice in ways that give activist publics a significant and much needed voice.

The Walt Disney Company theme parks are known throughout the world as “the happiest places on Earth.” Yet, in the boardroom, Disney is not unlike other large corporations.
Problems and disagreements arise. At the start of the twenty-first century, Roy Disney, the only remaining Disney family member working for the company, quit his job and helped launch a campaign challenging and attacking the legitimacy of Walt Disney Company policies and practices. He and another former board member used the Internet, particularly the World Wide Web, as the primary medium through which to voice their concerns and to activate shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders to demand change. Although many of the predictions about the Internet's potential to facilitate democratic and equal voice in the public sphere have not come to fruition, the SaveDisney campaign is a fascinating example of how Web sites can be used by organizations to accomplish change. As such, it behooves both corporate and activist publics and public relations experts to consider how change in the Walt Disney Company was spurred by the use of a Web site as a public relations medium.

The World Wide Web and the Changing Face of Public Relations

There are few aspects of organizational life that remain untouched by the virtual explosion of new technology and media. Public relations practice is no different, as scholars and practitioners alike have been grappling with the challenges and opportunities presented by new technologies for the past decade. Among the technologies that are changing current thinking about public relations, the Internet and World Wide Web are perhaps the most prevalent and fastest growing (Howard, Rainie, & Jones, 2001). Many have cited the role of the Internet in providing greater access to both obtaining and presenting information (e.g., Badaracco, 1998; Coombs, 1998; Springston, 2001).

In looking at the role of the Internet in reshaping public relations, there are two primary lines of thinking (Gregory, 2004). First, there are those who consider the Internet as an extension of current one-way public relations tactics (e.g., e-mail is the new form of the memo). However, a second perspective suggests that this technology provides for two-way communication or a more dialogic process (Gregory, 2004; Springston, 2001; Taylor, Kent, & White, 2001).

Intuitively, the notion that the Internet allows for a dialogic process makes a great deal of sense. Both in providing greater access to information in a usable format and in providing avenues for feedback through chat rooms, discussion boards, and e-mail responses, the Internet can be the key to realizing the dialogic or relational model of public relations that has been the focus of a great deal of commentary and discussion among public relations scholars (e.g., Botan, 1997; Kent & Taylor, 2004). Yet, despite this theorized potential, surveys of Web sites over the past several years demonstrate that few organizations have taken full advantage of the Internet's dialogic potential (Kang & Norton, 2004; Kent, Taylor, & White, 2003; Taylor, Kent, & White, 2001).

To date, most studies exploring the dialogic potential of the Internet have focused on activist and nonprofit organizations. Having an Internet presence gives activist organiza-
tions a status that is commensurate with corporate organizations (Kent, Taylor, & White, 2003). Despite this potential, most activist and nonprofit organizations focus simply on the Web content (i.e., sharing information via the Web) versus having a Web presence (i.e., using the technology for relationship building) (Curtin & Gaither, 2004). This failure on the part of activist organizations affirms Kent, Taylor, and White’s (2003) contention that most activist organizations, although radically different in functioning than for-profit organizations, often use the same public relations tactics.

In a discussion of adapting public relations theory for activist groups, J. Grunig (2001) suggested that interpersonal communication would be the most successful method for organizing unempowered publics, since these publics “seldom pay attention to mass-mediated messages” (p. 19). However, we argue that this contention should be revisited in light of the opportunity presented by mediated messages disseminated via the Web that adopt a relational perspective. Taylor, Kent, and White (2001) suggested that public relations dialogue does not have to be that different from interpersonal dialogue. Both can provide for attraction, interactivity, trust, maintenance, and cost and rewards, which are factors associated with any relationship. Taking these two arguments together solidifies our belief that effective Internet use provides the perfect opportunity for activist organizations to build relationships with their publics. As few, if any, exemplars of relational use of the Internet are available, we are left to question what a public relations campaign that integrates the opportunity provided by Internet use—while embracing the relational perspective—would look like. The SaveDisney campaign offers an enticing intersection of technology, activism, and dialogue, providing a partial answer to these questions. Thus, we examine the SaveDisney campaign in an effort to determine in what ways the campaign managers and involved stakeholders took advantage of the dialogic potential afforded by the Internet.

The Online Campaign to Save Disney

On November 30, 2003, Roy E. Disney, Walt Disney’s nephew, resigned from his dual posts as chair of the feature animation division and as vice-chair of the board of directors at the Walt Disney Company. The following day, Stanley P. Gold, who had served on the board for over fifteen years, announced his resignation from the Walt Disney Company Board of Directors. Their resignation letters called for the resignation of Michael Eisner, then chief executive officer (CEO) and chair of the board of directors. The news of Disney’s resignation spread quickly, and, within a month, The Wall Street Journal had a special feature available on its Web site that chronicled the turmoil at Disney (“Battle for Disney,” 2004). However, media coverage of events at the company was not the only version of the story that was being told. R. Disney and Gold turned to the Internet to voice their side of the story and to encourage others to join them.

Creating a voice, starting a campaign. Well-designed public relations campaigns begin with careful research about the organization, the opportunity at hand, and the rel-
evant publics. Traditionally, the practitioner does research on his or her own organization or client. But, in this case, the activist nature of SaveDisney led to an unconventional process of defining the issues and identifying the organizational target. Even though the campaign began with only two people with a cause, according to L. Grunig (1992), this is all that is required to be considered an activist organization. She defined activist organizations as “two or more individuals who organize in order to influence another public or publics through action that may include education, compromise, persuasion tactics, or force” (p. 504).

**Organization.** Whereas SaveDisney was the organization that launched the campaign, the major organizational player under scrutiny was the Walt Disney Company. From their various posts within the company and board positions, R. Disney and Gold were privy to the day-to-day practices, finances, and overall strategies guiding the Walt Disney Company and felt uniquely qualified to judge what was in the company’s best interests. Their resignation letters outlined the specifics of what they saw as “failed initiatives,” “flawed plans,” and “unfulfilled promises” (SaveDisney.com, n.d., letters/spg_resign_letter, para. 4; accessed February 4, 2004). They saw problems with “Disney’s poor financial performance, a loss of creative leadership, and board accountability” (Stewart, 2005, p. 496).

**Problems/opportunities.** R. Disney and Gold argued that these problems were all tied to Eisner, suggesting that Eisner’s leadership was weakening the company. Therefore, they focused on Eisner’s control of the company and board as the major problem. In their letters of resignation, both R. Disney and Gold claimed that they had advocated for change for years, both in meetings and in letters, to no avail. They resigned from the board in the hope that they might effect change from the outside. The yearly shareholder meeting provided one of the only opportunities available to those outside the boardroom to voice concerns, and they felt they could use the meeting to generate a significant vote of no confidence in Eisner and other board members. To accomplish their goal, they needed to reach the individuals who owned shares either directly or through their mutual funds, which led to consideration of publics.

**Publics.** In terms of research on publics, R. Disney and Gold were aware of employee unrest and dissatisfaction. They counted themselves as a public audience of the Walt Disney Company and wanted to find others who shared their vision. Thus, their initial Web site,¹ which appeared originally in December of 2003, threw out a wide net, appealing to anyone who identified himself or herself as “concerned about the welfare of The Walt Disney Company and its future direction” (SaveDisney.com, n.d., main section, para. 1; accessed February 4, 2004). As the Web site developed, and they collected more information about who was accessing the site, they began targeting their audiences. In this case, the shareholder meeting meant that they gave high priority to Walt Disney Company shareholders as an audience and also to the proxy advisory services that controlled a majority of the stock votes. However, their campaign did not focus exclusively on the shareholders. The campaign also targeted employees, known as cast members, and Disney consumers.
What will save Disney? Within a week of their resignations, R. Disney and Gold started their SaveDisney campaign, launching the Web site that initially outlined one specific goal. The fine print at the bottom of the December 2003 version of their Web page indicated that “This website has been established to provide a forum for discussing, analyzing and critiquing the performance, direction and management of The Walt Disney Company” (SaveDisney.com, n.d., footnote; accessed February 4, 2004). However, the creators and managers of the campaign had a larger goal than just creating a quality Web site: They wanted “to restore Disney to its position as the preeminent entertainment company in the world.” For R. Disney and Gold, the return to greatness for the Walt Disney Company was going to be defined, in part, by the removal of Eisner from his posts as chair of the board and CEO. As stated on the Web page in a posting dated January 27, 2004, the campaign wanted shareholders to vote “NO on the re-election of Michael Eisner, George Mitchell, Judith Estrin, and John Bryson as directors,” because “they symbolize, respectively, the poor management, poor governance, poor compensation practices, and lack of board independence that are impeding the development of long-term shareholder value at The Walt Disney Company” (SaveDisney.com, n.d., Letters, Just Say No section, para. 5; accessed July 21, 2005). The concrete objective was to generate a critical number (10% to 20%) of no votes for Eisner in order to spark the board to make changes (Stewart, 2005).

Making it happen. R. Disney and Gold used both Internet-based and in-person strategies to achieve their objectives. The primary vehicle for communicating with interested shareholders was through the SaveDisney.com Web site. The innovative Web site was modeled on 2004 presidential-hopeful Howard Dean’s Internet campaign for the Democratic nomination (Stewart, 2005).

The first modest version of the Web page contained only text with a short message from R. Disney. They introduced the site as being “devoted to those concerned about the welfare of The Walt Disney Company and its future direction” (SaveDisney.com, n.d.). Along with this introduction, site visitors could find links to the resignation letters and contact information for R. Disney, Gold, and members of the Walt Disney Board of Directors, but little else. This first version was framed primarily as shareholders communicating with shareholders.

In January 2004, R. Disney and Gold launched a more stylized and strategic version of the Web site that included graphics mimicking those used by the Disney company Web site. The contrast between these two versions was striking, as the updated version included graphics, color, streaming audio and video, and multiple links. The site also included poll questions, an invitation to join the SaveDisney.com mailing list, a statement from R. Disney, and postings of news and commentaries relating to the company from around the world. The updated page had distinct sections that addressed families, consumers, and employees who associated themselves with Disney.

R. Disney and Gold attracted people to the Web site largely by word of mouth. In the weeks following their resignations, they received thousands of e-mails supporting their efforts (Holson, 2003). Visitors were invited to “Join the Fight” and had the option of joining an e-mail list that would keep them updated throughout the campaign. Registered visitors received a free SaveDisney bumper sticker and regular graphics-enhanced e-mail announce-
ments about the progress of the campaign. E-mails contained a message from R. Disney, along with links to SaveDisney.com pages and relevant news stories and announcements.

The e-mail updates sent by the SaveDisney campaign managers included specific requests to inform others about the campaign. A March 26, 2004, e-mail stated:

We are asking for your help in this effort by contacting your friends and family and getting them to join the SaveDisney Nation. The link below will allow you to forward a message to 20 of your contacts at a time and invite them to become involved in this historic grassroots campaign to preserve Disney for future generations. (personal communication, para. 3)

The e-mails consistently directed recipients back to the Web site to “check out what has been happening at SaveDisney.” As of January 2004, 15,607 e-mails were sent to supporters by the SaveDisney campaign as a result of this opt-in process. These e-mails resulted in 5,435 forwards, and 3,865 of those forwards were opened (“SaveDisney Rewrites the Rules,” 2004). The Web site had four thousand registered activists in mid-January, and that number grew to 35,000 by March 5, 2004 (Magill, 2004).

Although the Web page was the center of their efforts, SaveDisney did use other, more traditional, strategies. Throughout February 2004, R. Disney and Gold promoted the Web site and their cause in interviews and on television (Stewart, 2005). Specifically, they made presentations to several of the larger proxy firms to convince them to support SaveDisney’s objectives. For example, on February 2, 2004, they visited the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) to argue their case. Just over a week later, ISS recommended that shareholders withhold on their vote for Eisner while still supporting the other members of the board. Such visits and their successes were promoted in press releases on the Web site and were highlighted on the SaveDisney timeline.

R. Disney and Gold also used the Web site and the e-mails to promote their own rally, held the day before the annual shareholder’s meeting. The SaveDisney rally in Philadelphia was open to anyone who saw herself or himself as a Disney supporter. The campaign even helped people get to Philadelphia, securing and providing links to negotiated airline discounts. More than eight hundred people attended the Save Disney rally in Philadelphia.

Have we saved Disney? The next day at the shareholder meeting, the campaign appeared to be successful. R. Disney was allowed to speak and received a standing ovation from the three thousand shareholders in attendance (Orwall, Steinberg, & Lublin, 2004). According to final official numbers released in April 2004, Michael Eisner received a no-confidence vote from 45.37% of shareholders, and board member George Mitchell received a 25.69% no-confidence vote (“Walt Disney Co.,” 2004). Clearly, the campaign had met and exceeded its goals of generating up to 20% no-confidence votes for Eisner. Furthermore, the Disney board members met immediately after the shareholder meeting and decided that George Mitchell would replace Eisner as chair of the board and that the roles of CEO and chair of the board would be separated.

Being a good steward: SaveDisney round two. Public relations campaigns do not start and end in a vacuum; rather, they stem from and contribute to ongoing public dialogue.
Kelly (2001) argued that using the evaluation of one campaign to determine the direction of future campaigns and analyzing how well participants in the campaign are thanked for their participation and contributions are essential to understanding how public relations engages in long-term relationship maintenance. Indeed, the SaveDisney campaign not only spent time thanking those who voted and participated, but also used its first success to advocate for further change. The Web site soon posted a note:

Welcome to Round Two in the fight for Disney! Stanley and I are grateful to all of you for your support and encouragement in what we are now calling 'Round One' of the battle to remove Michael Eisner from his position.

Your votes—each and every one of them—were vitally important to the effort, and now we want to encourage you to STAY WITH US at SaveDisney.com in the coming weeks and months. We promise you that we will continue the fight... Thanks for your vote, and let's stick together to bring back the magic! (Letter from Roy Disney section, para. 1 and 2 accessed March 31, 2004)

Thus, while the SaveDisney campaign had clearly impacted the shareholder meeting, Gold and R. Disney declared their intent to continue. After congratulating readers for their efforts, R. Disney suggested that the board’s response of promoting Mitchell, who also received a large vote of no confidence, was outrageous and sent a signal that further change was needed at Disney. The Web site began to focus not only on the platform of corporate governance, but also on nostalgic reminiscences about the glory days of the Walt Disney Company and current problems in animation and the parks. In September 2004, when Eisner announced his resignation as CEO of the Walt Disney Company effective September 2006, SaveDisney welcomed the news. However, R. Disney and Gold responded that two more years with Eisner was not acceptable and called for his immediate replacement.

In March 2005, the announcement that Robert Iger would succeed Eisner as CEO was not well received by the managers of the SaveDisney campaign. The SaveDisney.com postings began to actively address the selection process. Specifically, R. Disney and Gold questioned whether the board of directors had conducted a thorough and open search. In a March letter, R. Disney and Gold questioned the presence of Eisner at all interviews and suggested that the actions had “eroded whatever faith” (SaveDisney.com, n.d., Open Letter to the Walt Disney Company Board, March 10, 2005, para. 2; accessed July 21, 2005) they had in the search process.

Finally, after several meetings with Iger in July 2005, the Walt Disney Company, R. Disney, and Gold issued a joint statement that they had come to a resolution and the SaveDisney campaign would come to an end (Gentile, 2005). The last few updates to the SaveDisney.com Web site cited positive changes at Disney. In addition, R. Disney was given an emeritus director position on the board and was re-hired as a consultant. With a statement thanking the SaveDisney supporters for their faith, trust, and support, R. Disney announced that the Web site would be taken down as “we here at SaveDisney have come to a mutual agreement with the new management at the Walt Disney Company regarding our mutual relationship” (SaveDisney.com, n.d., Joint Statement section, para. 2, accessed July 21, 2005). In August 2005, the Web site was taken down, effectively ending the historic shareholder revolt known as SaveDisney.
In many ways, the case of the SaveDisney campaign follows a very familiar Disney story-line: Good (SaveDisney) conquers evil (Eisner and board). Beyond being simply a good story where good presumably triumphs over evil, this case stands apart due to its innovative route to success. A consideration of the factors that made the SaveDisney campaign successful suggests several insights for scholars and practitioners of public relations.

The case exemplifies the ways in which the use of the Internet has and can alter public relations practice. The most commonly cited impact of Internet use in public relations is the increased ability to share and retrieve information. Part of the success of SaveDisney was its focus on those shareholders who had small numbers of shares. The use of technology allowed R. Disney and Gold to keep all individuals, regardless of how minor, involved. The Web site's ability to target shareholders both large and small allowed the campaign managers to create what Cozier and Witmer (2001) called an “online social organization” (p. 618). The Internet, with its interactivity features (e.g., discussion posting options and polls) brings previously isolated individuals into contact with one another, strengthening movements. In short, the Internet helps to foster the development of networks by adding to the density and centrality of stakeholder networks (Coombs, 1998). The SaveDisney.com Web site was a virtual place in which various stakeholders were able to come into contact with one another and share their stories. By bringing these voices together and providing avenues for them to be heard, the site allowed them to become part of the SaveDisney campaign. Indeed, we, the authors, felt connected to the campaign as we followed its development. Thus, we analyzed this case both as scholars who stand outside the campaign and as active participants. As such, we believe that the greatest contributor to the success of the campaign was the ability of the campaign's creators to use technology to create dialogue with and generate participation of stakeholders.

Kent and Taylor (1998) identified five characteristics that they argued were essential for a dialogic Web site: (a) the provision for a dialogic loop to allow the free flow of communication in both directions; (b) the inclusion of useful information for all target publics; (c) use of chat rooms, Q&A, and other provisions to keep visitors returning; (d) ease of use; and (e) including only essential links to keep visitors on the site. Our assessment suggests that the SaveDisney.com Web site met all of these criteria at a basic level and exceeded these standards in many ways. In terms of creating a dialogic loop, the Web site featured frequent polls throughout the campaign and encouraged visitors to submit Disney-related news items and personal memories. At its height, those visiting the site could peruse literally hundreds of letters and guest editorials from interested stakeholders. One former cast member letter read as follows (SaveDisney.com, n.d.):

Roy, I confess after reading that SaveDisney would propose no alternate slate, I figured that meant you had backed down. So, thanks for the Walt (email) quote (which I always read) . . . it made me click on the link to the site and read your message . . . I am a former Cast Member whose lifetime dream was to be part of the Disney vision. . . . Roy, keep up the fight! Thanks for all you're doing. (Cast Member Letters section, para. 1 and 4, accessed July 21, 2005)
All these features contributed to a dialogue between the campaign managers and its faithful followers.

Other notable Web site features included specific sections targeted at various stakeholder groups. The clean organization of the site allowed visitors to follow tabs to particular sections on the page, thereby fulfilling the ease-of-use criteria. The SaveDisney campaign encouraged return visits both by including weekly postings from R. Disney and through e-mail updates that informed readers of what was happening in the campaign and what they might find on the Web site. The cast member letter previously quoted suggests the success of this strategy, as the writer noted that she visited the site by following the link embedded in the e-mail update. Finally, visitors were encouraged to stay on the site by the inclusion of all pertinent articles directly on the SaveDisney Web site, rather than links to external Web sites. Thus, SaveDisney.com seems to fill a void by providing a model that fulfills the criteria established by Kent and Taylor (1998).

Kent and Taylor's (1998) scheme is an excellent starting point for capitalizing on the dialogic potential of the Internet. However, we argue that there is more to fostering a relationship with stakeholders than attention to the mechanics of a Web site. In particular, the SaveDisney campaign's success seems linked not only to the masterful use of the technology, but also to an effective use of rhetorical strategies for fostering identification with the campaign. Public relations research benefits from adopting a rhetorical perspective (Heath, 2001; Meisenbach & McMillan, 2006).

The postings and weekly updates were written in a personally engaging style that fostered familiarity. Every letter from R. Disney was written in the first person. Many postings began with salutations such as “dear cast members,” and “to our faithful supporters.” In addition to the familiar language, the postings directly referred to e-mails and letters received from SaveDisney followers. In this way, R. Disney assured supporters that he was hearing them and seeking to respond. The weekly cast member outreach postings serve as a particularly interesting example of this strategy. In a posting from November 2004 (SaveDisney.com, n.d.), the SaveDisney team wrote that “you have told us your concerns so that we may act upon them. You have given us suggestions.... and we have catalogued and archived your suggestions” to assist the campaign “in bringing those concerns and suggestions to the forefront of public awareness” (Cast Member Outreach section, para. 2, accessed July 21, 2005). These postings suggest that the managers of the SaveDisney campaign did, in fact, have an interpersonal relationship with every person who visited the site. The many posted responses from SaveDisney visitors suggest that the reverse was also true.

The rhetorical concept of organizational identification also provides some insight into what made the SaveDisney campaign so successful. An individual is identified with an organization when his or her values overlap with the values of the organization (Cheney, 1983). In part, the SaveDisney campaign fostered organizational identification by emphasizing the shared experience or magic that visitors associated with the SaveDisney campaign, contrasting the SaveDisney version of Disney magic with Eisner’s corporate greed and creating a unique logo and slogan, Restore the Magic. Taken together, the SaveDisney supporters showed themselves to be highly identified with the SaveDisney campaign. This identification was a key part of the dialogism associated with this public relations campaign and,
ultimately, was a large contributor to the success of the campaign. In using the Internet to create dialogue with shareholders, the SaveDisney campaign also represents a new possibility for incorporating shareholder and public voices in corporate decision-making processes. The unique strategy employed by the SaveDisney campaign and its explosive impacts on the company garnered a great deal of media attention. This case represents a model for other shareholder groups who wish to effect large-scale change (Jones, 2004). Jones pointed out that the success of the campaign was rooted in the strategy of reaching out to small investors and in providing specific explanations on how the voting process worked, even to those who owned shares through larger investment funds. Jones also noted that the SaveDisney campaign was effective in swaying public opinion beyond that of the shareholders. The import of the larger public voice resides in the fact that fund managers are in tune with broader public trends.

The concept of public relations invokes an image in which the public voice occupies a central position in the discussion. Yet, countless examples suggest that the public voice is either absent or limited. With increasing concern about corporate governance and executive accountability, shareholders and publics are seeking the means by which they might impact decisions made by corporate boards. Campaigns, such as SaveDisney, that utilize in savvy ways the capabilities offered by the Internet provide an avenue through which shareholders might be heard in ways never before imagined.

**Implications and Conclusion**

In terms of developing scholarly understanding of the changing role of public relations in the age of new media, the SaveDisney case demonstrates that many of the theorized impacts of Internet use are being evidenced in large-scale campaigns. Furthermore, this case suggests that it is not simply a matter of focusing on the technical aspects of Web page design (e.g., page load time and accessibility of links) but that the specific message strategies can contribute to the development of a strongly identified and powerful online community.

While much of the discussion amongst public relations scholars is turning toward the dialogic, few examples exist of what this might look like and how it might be effective. This case provides one example of how the dialogic potential of the Internet might be harnessed. The implications for public relations practitioners are twofold. First, practitioners cannot afford to ignore movements that begin on the Internet. This is one of the major flaws in the Walt Disney Company response to the SaveDisney campaign. Few, if any, direct responses to the Web site were offered. In short, many believe that company officials underestimated R. Disney and the impact that his Web-based campaign would have. Second, practitioners should look at this case to glean strategies for engaging their publics in dialogue. SaveDisney offers strategies that can work across organizations. Although some argue that companies do not need to engage in dialogic tactics to the extent that activist organizations do, the fact remains that as more people have access to the Internet and recognize the power and voice it provides, this type of campaign will continue. Particularly in an era of corporate scan-
dals and greater shareholder scrutiny, public relations practitioners must recognize that the Internet changes the dynamics of corporate board and investor relationships. The Internet provides a means for shareholders to send the same message that R. Disney and S. Gold often reminded visitors to the SaveDisney Web site: “We’ll be watching.”

For consideration

1. In what ways do new media technologies help organizations to adopt a relational or dialogic approach to their publics? In what ways do they hamper those efforts?
2. The Walt Disney Company and its board of directors chose to largely ignore the SaveDisney Web site. Evaluate the merits of this choice.
3. Public relations practitioners are faced with limited resources regardless of the type of organization they work with. Under what circumstances should a Web-based campaign be ignored?
4. Many in the press cite this case as the new model for shareholders to voice their opinions. To what extent is that true?
5. The authors suggest that the rhetorical strategies and tone employed by the campaign contributed to the campaign’s success. Which approach is more effective for activist groups: to mimic the tone of the target organization or to communicate counter to it?

For reading


Notes

1. There were several versions of the SaveDisney Web site that existed from its December 2003 launch until the page was taken down in August 2005. The content of the pages changed constantly as updates were posted on a regular basis. Most of the content was archived while the main site was active. However, the page is no longer active. Many of the pages can still be accessed via the Wayback Machine (available: http://www.archive.org/web/web.php). The authors visited the SaveDisney Web site frequently throughout the active campaign. In this chapter, the authors have noted the date that they accessed and archived the pages for all references to the Web page.
2. This e-mail was a part of a series of e-mails that was sent to individuals who signed up to be on the SaveDisney electronic mailing list. Both authors received copies of these e-mails.
References


