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Marriage from Renaissance to Reformation: Two Florentine Moralists

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Marriage is a central institution in any society. Any change in attitude or practice regarding marriage must profoundly affect society, but until recently historians have spent less energy studying marriage than in charting minute currents of political, economic, or cultural history, partly because marriage has been one of the most stable institutions in western society. New practices and attitudes regarding marriage, sex, and the family usually arise from economic and cultural causes and take place on the individual or microscopic level, like grass growing. A series of time-lapse photographs can show the growth of grass. In place of photographs, this study examines the views on marriage of two influential Florentine theologians whose lives were separated by a century. The two moralists are the Dominican archbishop of Florence, St. Antonino (1389-1459) and Peter Martyr Vermigli (1499-1562). Their teaching on marriage both mirrored and molded society's views. Both articulated attitudes which remained only implicit in most men of their times. Since both were deeply religious and learned men, their views obviously tended to be more moralistic than the actual practice of the time. Most of the differences between Antonino and Martyr result from the fact that Antonino was a Catholic and Martyr a Protestant. This might seem to make them poor subjects for comparison. On the contrary. The Protestant Reformation was the greatest intellectual change in the century that separated them and did much to modify attitudes toward marriage.

Antonino was probably the most influential practical moralist of the Renaissance.¹ His chief work, the Summa theologica, is really a summa moralis. Despite its six thousand folio columns, it enjoyed nineteen complete editions between 1477 and 1591, plus many abridgements.² “The Summa is probably the first—certainly the most comprehensive—treatment from a practical point of view of Christian ethics, asceticism, and sociology in the middle ages.”³ Antonino claimed that he wrote this monster book for the priests of his diocese, but in fact the average priest could neither have afforded it nor had much use for its involved canonical and historical argumentation. More immediately influential were his opuscula. The Confessionale is the general title given to three of his treatises on the sacrament of penance, two for confessors and one for penitents. Since the Confessionale ran through 102 incunabula editions, its influence on confessional practice must have been enormous.⁴

Peter Martyr Vermigli was nearly as prolific. Most of his writings were biblical commentaries or polemical tracts, running through some 110 publications, chiefly between 1550 and 1620.⁵ Almost all his writings were in Latin, but translations appeared in most major western European languages. In his own day Martyr enjoyed a reputation as one of the leading Reformed theologians, a judgment ratified by recent scholarship.⁶ His writings on marriage were particularly influential in England.⁷ He never wrote separate comprehensive treatises on marriage or sexual ethics but scattered tracts on these topics through his biblical commentaries. His posthumous Loci com-
muses, printed fourteen times between 1576 and 1656, gathered seventy-seven folio pages of this material as an exposition of the seventh commandment: "Thou shalt not commit adultery." Martyr also wrote a six-hundred page attack on clerical celibacy and monastic vows. Most of Antonino's ideas on marriage appear in his treatment of states of life and of the vices. Since the discussion in neither Martyr nor Antonino follows a strictly logical arrangement, this study presents first a general comparison of Martyr and Antonino, then contrasts them on a number of specific questions. Both authors were in fact more interested in the social, moral, and legal questions surrounding marriage than in developing a theology of marriage itself.

Neither writer was much concerned with literary elegance, but Martyr's latinity is far superior to Antonino's, whose style was totally unaffected by humanistic currents. It is clear and correct but thoroughly scholastic, a precise technical tool which recalls Antonino's mentor, Aquinas. While citations and allusions to scholastic writers and canonists abound, pagan authors and even the Church Fathers, except for St. Augustine, are rarely mentioned. While Martyr cites scholastic authors and canonists far less often than Antonino, he shows an easy familiarity with classical literature, with Roman law, and the Latin and Greek Fathers. Indeed, his erudition becomes Martyr's worst enemy: his encyclopedic mania inundates the reader—one good scripture citation never settles an issue if he can find seven.

Antonino consistently presents Christian moralism in the natural law framework of Aquinas. Human reason plays a dominant role in articulating the system of rights and wrongs, while the scriptural backing often seems perfunctory. In contrast, Martyr stresses divine positive law revealed in the Bible and gives only a secondary role to arguments drawn from reason. Canon law looms large in Antonino's Summa. Protestantism rejected canon law and suppressed its study. To fill the vacuum, Martyr, like most Protestant theologians, often turns to Roman law, especially the Theodosian and Justinian codes. Antonino serenely accepts canon law and concerns himself with determining its meaning and its application to particular circumstances. Martyr's attitude toward Roman law is more equivocal. It is a quarry, partly of arguments and precedents to counter canon law, partly of good law hallowed by time and usage. But his attitude remains critical. Martyr himself decides what is good or expedient, usually in the light of Scripture, and only then searches the ancient law books for precedents and support.

The serenity of his master Aquinas pervades Antonino. He writes from a long and generally unchallenged tradition. Of course there are objections and objectors to handle, but this is more by way of literary form or on minor points rather than confrontation with a bitter opposition on basic issues. Not so with Martyr. His pages sometimes coruscate with bitter polemics against Roman Catholics or Anabaptists. Antonino, although concerned with the legal aspects of sexual morality and marriage, is more concerned with sin as the internal act of the sinner than is Martyr. Martyr only rarely considers acts which remain in the heart without giving rise to external action. He lays greater stress than Antonino on the impact of individual moral actions on society.

We now turn to a comparison of the two moralists on specific questions concerning marriage and sexual ethics.

Both writers give definitions of marriage. Martyr draws on both Scripture and Justinian's Digests for his definition: "A conjunction of man and woman instituted by God for the increase of children, for the removal of prostitution,
and that thereby man might have help and aid.” He then scrutinizes marriage in the light of the four Aristotelian causes: the material cause is the conjunction of man and wife; the formal cause is the inseparable sharing of life; the final cause is first the procreation of children and second a remedy for human concupiscence; the efficient cause is God. Obviously both the form and content of Martyr’s discussion is very traditional. Although Antonino quotes with approval a definition from civil law (\textit{virii mulierisque conjunctio individuum vitae consuetudinem retinet}) he borrows his definition from the words of Jesus (Mt. 19:5): “A man shall leave his father and mother, and be made one with his wife; and the two shall become one flesh.” His explanation of this verse (a favorite also of Martyr) stresses the notion of a contract conferring on both the right to copulation whose end is the procreation and raising of offspring.

Both writers link their definitions with a rejection of polygamy. Both reject polyandry out of hand. Polygyny is another matter. Antonino justifies the polygyny of the patriarchs and early Jews on the grounds of a special dispensation from God granted in order to increase the small number of true worshipers. Much later he returns to the question of bigamy, but his interest is its legal aspects. His main argument against it is that it denies the sacramental nature of marriage which must mirror the union of Christ with his only bride, the Church (Eph: 5). Clearly Antonino does not feel that polygyny is a real problem to be faced. Not so with Martyr. His argument is long and detailed. His adversaries were contemporaries of real stature. Several Protestant theologians including Luther had written apologies for Philip of Hesse’s bigamous marriage, and various Anabaptists practiced and defended polygyny. The defenders of polygyny depended mainly on the Old Testament, especially the example of the patriarchs and the levirate law which obliged a Jew to procreate by his brother’s wife when the brother died childless. In all Martyr lists twenty-two arguments for polygyny. Most of his counter arguments are drawn from a philosophical analysis of the relation between husband and wife or from the New Testament. God institutes monogamous marriage in Paradise, and Christ renews and reinforces this original plan. St. Paul says (1 Cor. 7:2) that to avoid fornication each man should have his own wife and each woman her own husband; now if a wife must share her husband with another, he is hardly her own. Moreover, one man cannot simultaneously satisfy several women. Several women will resort to fighting over the husband. One wife will tend to become the favorite and the others semi-servants. Younger wives will tend to shove the older aside. The resulting envy will be transmitted to and magnified among the children. Paul compares marriage (Eph. 5:27) to the union of Christ and his Church, but Christ has only one Church, so the husband should have but one wife. Paul warned that the married will have tribulation—why multiply troubles by multiplying wives? Terence’s comedy \textit{Phormio}, for example, gives a vivid picture of what the man with two wives is in for. Martyr closes his sixteen arguments against polygyny with an attack on those who advocate the common use of women.

Both Florentine moralists devote several pages to the problem of abduction (\textit{raptus}), which is often accompanied by rape (\textit{stuprum}) and subsequent marriage. The evil of the practice is so apparent that neither author pauses to belabor it. Martyr’s concern is stamping out the practice and providing severe punishment for the abductor. The canonists admitted that the abductor and woman might really fall in love and therefore allowed for
their marriage, but Martyr considers canon law too lenient and counters with civil law and the decrees of some early councils. This leads to a long and exceedingly complex weighing of claims and counterclaims, of historical precedents, of canons and decreals, of scriptural, patristic, and scholastic quotations. Jewish and Christian traditions are not enough: Jason and Medea, Paris and Helen, the Roman men and the Sabine women, etc. wind their sor did way across Martyr’s ample canvas. In all this welter of erudition Martyr seems led by a single, simple consideration: if the abductor is given any possibility of marrying the girl, the crime will continue to the detriment of Church and society. The chapter *De raptu* in Antonino is mainly a catena of quotations from previous canonists and St. Thomas. His suggestions on the proper punishment for this crime depend greatly on the circumstances. Subsequent marriage between the abductor and the girl, while illicit, is valid.

Both theologians take up the question of whether people of differing religious views can marry. The problem was less pressing for Antonino. Fifteenth-century Catholics had few opportunities to marry Jews, Moslems, or heretics. His treatment of the problem is canonical and traditional. Disparity of cult is a direct impediment to marriage, that is to say, a Christian cannot marry a non-Christian validly without a dispensation. Two non-Christians, even of differing faiths (for example, a Moslem and a Jew) can marry legitimately, but such unions are obviously not sacramental. The marriage of a Catholic and a heretic is valid, but the Catholic who knows his prospective spouse is a heretic sins in contracting such a marriage. If a pagan polygastist is converted to Christianity together with his wives, he must live with the first one and dismiss the rest. A convert to Christianity can contract a new marriage if his or her old spouse makes trouble or endangers the faith. The Spanish and Portuguese discoveries and the rise of various Protestant denominations made the problem of marriage between spouses of differing beliefs more acute for Martyr. Martyr prescinds from the canon law tradition and turns to Scripture for a solution. The Old Testament repeatedly forbids marriage with pagans. Supporters of mixed marriages contend that the scriptural prohibitions refer only to marriages with Canaanites, and many instances of marriage between Jews and pagans are recorded in the Old Testament (Martyr discusses ten instances). Martyr cites the opposition of Jerome and Augustine to Christian-pagan marriages and argues that they are permissible only if the person belonging to the wrong faith (*damnata religio*) renounces it. God forbids these unions because the pagan will lure the true believer into idolatry. Yoke not the ass and the ox together. The Christian who claims to be strong enough to resist is tempting God—look what happened to Solomon and the other Jewish kings. Martyr fortifies his case with thirty-one scriptural and patristic quotations. Clearly Martyr is worried about marriage between Evangelicals and Papists or Anabaptists. He does not want to be too strict about minutiae, but he does propose a kind of minimal questionnaire to be put to the prospective spouse. His questionnaire rules out marriage with Roman Catholics who reject justification by faith alone and with radical Protestants who hold unorthodox trinitarian and Christological doctrines. Martyr carefully refrains from anything on the Eucharist which might rule out marriage with other mainstream Protestants. He then poses the further question: what if one of two married Evangelicals reverts to Papism or falls into heresy? He rejects the Roman position of separation without the right to remarry; the only kind of divorce he recognizes is that which allows at least the injured partner to remarry.
Although virtually every culture forbids marriage within certain degrees of kinship, recent studies in comparative anthropology have cast doubt on the generally assumed "self-evident rightness" of the incest laws and practices of Western Civilization. The Christian religion has been a powerful enforcer of these laws. Western Christians have so much accepted these laws as nature-ordained that the confrontation with a radically different code often produces a shock. But the problem was not new to scholars, and both Martyr and Antonino wrestled with it.

Martyr forbids marriage among relatives up to but not including first cousins. He believes that there is a natural repugnance within these kinship bounds and that this repugnance is based on strong rational arguments. Without kinship prohibitions severe inbreeding and clannishness would likely result. Moreover, those within the forbidden degrees of kinship generally live in the same house; if they were potential spouses, would they deal with each other with the same modesty and openness that domestic harmony requires? Martyr lists many sexual customs such as group marriages, son-mother, daughter-father, and brother-sister unions which seem to have been sanctioned by various ancient cultures, but he insists that history teaches that incestuous marriages always result in evil consequences and draws up a catalogue of incest from classical literature to prove his point. He admits that the light of nature is insufficient to impress on men the laws of nature concerning marriage; revelation provides the needed supplement, particularly the eighteenth and twentieth chapters of Leviticus. After discussing sixteenth-century marriage customs, he answers the objection that Christians are not bound by Old Testament civil laws by insisting that the marriage laws are not civil but moral laws. He sees in the degrees forbidden in Leviticus a prophylactic against incest and sexual profligacy.

On almost all these points Antonino agrees with Martyr, but he sees Leviticus partly as reaffirmation of natural law, and to that extent still binding. He adds another argument for incest laws: one purpose of marriage is to restrain concupiscence, but the possibility of marriage among members of the same immediate family would greatly increase concupiscence, hence the purpose of marriage itself forbids such unions. Antonino devotes great attention to tracing and explaining canonical regulations. Only God can dispense people so that they can marry within the degrees forbidden by natural law, but Antonino grants the pope power to dispense from prohibitions of the third and fourth degree, as well as the second collateral line, for these are forbidden only by the canons, not by natural law. Martyr disagrees violently: the Church cannot forbid by her canon law any degrees not forbidden by Scripture nor does the pope have the power to dispense. Claims to dispense are simply usurpations motivated by greed.

Careful calculation of the girl's dowry probably played as large a role in early modern marriages as romantic love. Antonino never questions the value of dowries as a custom; he seems to accept them as a good and natural institution despite accompanying legal complications. He deals at length with these complications. Martyr takes a more independent line. He sees dowries as a cause of civil discord, for daughters of poor men are thereby stripped of any hope of marrying rich men, while the daughters of the rich are hated and envied by poor girls. Large dowries make wives so haughty that husbands can hardly check their extravagant clothing and petty amours. A girl's dowry ought to be her virtues. As usual Martyr finds old Roman laws which uphold his views against corrupt modern practices. He sees some justice in the custom.
of dowries since the husband in return supports the wife, but he emphatically rejects the contention that a dowry cements concord between the spouses. Nor does Martyr consider a girl's good looks a sound foundation for marriage. Good laws should restrict the size of dowries and prevent husbands from dissipating them, for the dowry should be kept intact so that the wife can seek a second marriage if her husband dies. Should the wife die first, the dowry should be spent on the children's education. He closes his polemic against dowries with a theological argument: Christ's relation to the Church is the type of the husband's relation to his wife, but the Church brings no dowry to Christ, so neither should the wife.  

Martyr begins his treatment of divorce by contrasting the ease of divorce under the Mosaic law with the Christian concept of marriage. Christ (Mt. 19:7) explicitly rejects the Mosaic divorce law and insists upon the more primitive and stable form of marriage given by God to Adam—a man shall cleave to his wife. According to the Matthean account, God made the concession of easy divorce through Moses because of the Jews' hardness of heart, but in the new economy of salvation the Spirit is given more generously, thereby enabling men and women to live together in greater peace. But are not Christians equally hard-hearted as the Jews of old? Should not they too have recourse to easy divorce? Martyr answers that this is a matter for civil law, but those who obtain divorce on faulty grounds should be treated as gentiles and publicans by the devout. According to Martyr, the New Testament allows only two grounds for divorce. St. Paul (1 Cor. 7:15) allows divorce and remarriage to gentile converts whose spouses refuse to become Christians and do not let the converts live in peace as Christians. The prohibition against divorce in Matthew (19:9), although not in the parallel passages in Luke and Mark, makes an exception in cases of adultery, at least as Martyr interprets the passage.  

Not only did Rome take a narrower view of the Matthean text, but there were adversaries on Martyr's left flank who would considerably broaden out the grounds for divorce. Martyr names only Erasmus, whom he treats gingerly. Martyr carefully refrains from naming three theologians whom he deeply respected, Martin Bucer, Ulrich Zwingli, and Heinrich Bullinger, but with whose more liberal stance on divorce he could not agree. He states firmly but modestly that he does not feel entitled to go beyond the one ground for divorce, adultery, mentioned explicitly in Matthew's Gospel. In this he agreed with Luther, Melanchthon, Brenz, Calvin, and Beza. According to Martyr, Christ made this exception because no other sin goes so directly against the nature of marriage, the two in one flesh. Martyr attacks the papal practice of allowing the dissolution of non-consummated marriages and several other fine points of the Roman marriage canons. He allows the state considerable latitude in legislating marriage questions, thereby breaking with the medieval tradition of church jurisdiction over marriage. He warns his readers against contravening civil marriage laws but also insists that magistrates must legislate in accord with God's word and allow no loopholes which lead to easy dissolution or sexual license; neither should they hinder divorce on the two grounds approved by Scripture.  

Martyr next attacks Catholics for saying that the divorce allowed by Christ for adultery consists only in separation from bed and board without the right of remarriage. This is absurd because divorce among Jews, Greeks, and Romans always allowed for remarriage. He cites several instances of the early Church tolerating remarriage after a divorce. He insists that women should
have this right as well as men, even though the Old Testament did not allow the wife initiative in seeking a divorce. The Catholic refusal to allow divorce with remarriage in cases of adultery was based on the sacramentality of marriage and the opposition of the New Testament to divorce. Martyr flatly denies that marriage is a sacrament. Baptism and the Eucharist are the only sacraments. Granted that Paul (Eph. 5:32) compares the union of husband and wife to the unbreakable union of Christ with his Church, still Christ did not hesitate to divorce the unfaithful synagogue; therefore the Christian can divorce the unfaithful spouse. Martyr then turns to his most important adversary, St. Augustine, whose De adulterinis coniugiis ad Pollentium gives a radically different interpretation to the phrase “except for adultery” in Matthew’s Gospel, so that it agrees rather than differs from the parallel passages in Mark and Luke which do not allow adultery as grounds of divorce. Martyr in contrast argues that Matthew’s fuller statement should govern the interpretation of Luke and Mark.

Not only does Martyr wish to limit divorce as narrowly as Scripture allows, he also exhorts spouses with legitimate grounds for divorce to be patient with adulterous and non-believing partners so as to win them to the ways of truth and virtue by their kindness.

Paradoxically Martyr, like the other reformers, demands draconic punishment for adultery: death. The sinfulness of adultery is proportionate to the greatness and holiness of matrimony. Adultery tears up the home and family. The Scriptures compare it to idolatry. Jewish law (Levit. 20:10; Deut. 22:22) decreed death to the adulterer, usually by stoning. Martyr also investigates gentile punishments for adultery and comes up with a chamber of horrors: death in Arabia, noses cut off in Egypt, eyes plucked out in Locris. The Laciadae applied torture to the genitalia, while the ancient Germans stripped the adulteress naked and her husband cudgelled her to death. Martyr traces the various punishments decreed by Roman law at various periods. He refutes in great detail the arguments of those who contend that either the wife or the husband sins more seriously by adultery. They sin equally since their marriage vows bind equally. Martyr justifies his demand for the death penalty because this is what Scripture prescribes. Civil law punishes many lesser crimes with death. Martyr’s final argument has an ecumenical ring, although it will not appeal to the twentieth century: killing adulterers would end Catholic-Protestant arguments about whether adultery is grounds for divorce—the injured party would need no divorce since the adulterous partner would be conveniently dead!

Antonino devotes ten columns to divorce, but he is usually talking about imperfect divorce—separation from bed and board without the right to remarry. He does allow a second marriage when one of the partners of a non-consummated marriage takes solemn religious vows. Such cases must have been few indeed. Neither the enslavement nor the castration nor taking of simple vows nor the ordination of one of the spouses are grounds for divorce. He does devote several pages of his chapter on divorce to a practical discussion of cases when one spouse can seek separation from the other and when the wife is required to follow her husband, for instance, on an overseas business venture or pilgrimage or into exile.

Unlike Martyr, Antonino desires no legal punishment for adultery—the spiritual harm and the hatred and crimes it breeds among men are sufficient. To the evil of fornication (an improper arrangement for the bringing up of possible children), adultery adds injustice against the adulterer’s spouse and
children. The seriousness of the sin is clear from its efficient, material, formal, final, and circumstantial causes, each of which Antonino examines. This listing of causes is mainly an artificial framework to organize a list of all the spiritual, personal, and social evils that adultery gives rise to. His condemnation is replete with examples drawn from Scripture and even from pagan antiquity (Paris and Helen, Anthony and Cleopatra, Tarquin junior and Lucretia). Adultery is condemned by every law: natural law, Mosaic law, the gospels, canon law, even Roman civil law. 40

Both authors take up the problem of impotency. Both agree that there can be no marriage where sexual intercourse is impossible. They agree that the couples should not despair because of a few unsuccessful attempts at intercourse; they should persevere in their attempts for three years, for a man who is cold at first often becomes potent later. If in that period no success attends their efforts, they should seek an annulment, for there has never been a real marriage. The woman is free to attempt another marriage. Both authors are clear that frigidity in the woman and sterility in either have nothing to do with impotency. Martyr criticizes those governments that forbid marriage to older people; old age and impotency are quite distinct. He spoke from experience since his own second marriage dated from his fifty-eighth year. Of course neither moralist allows an attempt at marriage to those whose organic equipment is obviously deficient. Antonino distinguishes three kinds of impotency. First is impotentia naturalis: a person may have been born with defective genital organs or may be unable to use what he has. Second is impotentia accidentalis: some men have lost a necessary organ either by accident or by castration. Finally there is maleficum: sorcery and diabolic action. Antonino describes five different ways the devil can act on a man to prevent successful intercourse. The modern reader immediately recognizes various kinds of psychological impotency in these five kinds of diabolic action. If Martyr's treatment is blessedly free of impotentia maleficiata, he is less alive to the influence of psychological factors on impotency. 41

Is virginity to be preferred to matrimony, or matrimony to virginity? Catholicism and Protestantism have tended to give opposite answers to this question through the centuries. Antonino devotes three chapters of his Summa to the state of life of virgins and widows. All Christians are bound to practice the virtue of chastity, but according to Antonino this can be done on an ascending scale. The virgin practices a higher and more difficult degree of chastity than the widow, and the widow practices a higher and more difficult degree than the married person. This pre-eminence of virginity was not always the case. In the earliest days of mankind the command to increase and multiply made virginity positively wrong. Throughout the Old Testament dispensation marriage was better than virginity. The special dignity of virginity is a part of the Christian dispensation. It is a special grace, and one needs God's help and inspiration to embrace it as a state of life. Christian virginity is not a mere absence of marriage or sexual intercourse, but a special commitment undertaken for God's sake. It must be accompanied by other virtues, especially humility, sobriety, and modesty. The consecrated virgin is the spouse of Christ (just why this is so, Antonino never explains despite a long poetical effusion) and is especially disposed to acquire knowledge and wisdom and the other virtues. 42

Martyr takes a very different position. He does not totally deny the superiority of virginity, for St. Paul (1 Cor. 7) is pretty clear on that point, but he reduces the superiority of virginity to the fact that it lacks certain cares of
this life. His chief target is clerical celibacy. He offers six reasons for a married clergy. In Old Testament times the Jewish priests were married, while the only celibate priests were pagans. There is no special need for priests to be celibate since a wife is no hindrance to prayer or fasting. Catholics claim that celibacy frees the priest for work among the faithful, but in fact having a family would restrict few priests from apostolic labors. Neither do they keep their vows of chastity. The early Church allowed married priests; indeed, most of the apostles were married. If marriage were allowed the clergy, more men would be able to embrace the ministry. Unmarried chastity is a rare gift, an extraordinary grace that men should not presume they have. Catholics insist that priests have an implicit vow of chastity, and that they must live up to it. This is nonsense according to Martyr. One cannot make a vow to do an evil thing—such a vow has no standing before God. To vow celibacy and then to burn with sexual desires that cannot be controlled by chaste married love is to vow an evil thing. God in fact desires all to wed who cannot be chaste without a wife.45

It is noteworthy that Martyr's arguments for a married clergy do not develop a positive theology of marriage—they merely attack clerical celibacy. Neither Martyr nor Antonino develops such a theology; they are content to invoke certain hallowed biblical phrases over and over again. To look for today's personalistic theologies of marriage in writers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries would be an anachronism, but both writers do less than could rightly be expected. They squander their energy on peripheral questions, historical problems, and legal subtleties.

Neither can claim a clear edge in anticipating modern thought and practice regarding marriage. Both were men rooted in the past. Antonino accepted the received traditions of the medieval Church almost without question and devoted his energy to clarifying, codifying, and inculcating them.44 By Martyr's time many of the old foundations had been shaken; he took less for granted and tried to get to the bottom of some fundamental problems. His argumentation is certainly more modern and convincing. He attacked many old traditions but usually to insist on a return to still older traditions and laws by appealing against the medieval canons to Roman law or the early Church. It would be difficult and perhaps anachronistic to decide which of the two theologians was more liberal. Martyr's position on divorce and dowries might seem to mark him the liberal until his urging the death penalty for adultery is recalled. Martyr left less room than Antonino for romantic love and personal freedom in choosing a mate, for his insistence that children cannot marry without their parents' consent attacked the freedom which canon law allowed on this point.45 His friend Martin Bucer in particular took a more liberal stand on divorce and gave far greater emphasis to the mutual affection that should unite husband and wife.46

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4. Gaughan, p. 59. For Antonio I have used the following editions: *Summa Theologica* (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlaganstalt, 1959); *Confessionale*, (Venice: Piero de’ Quarenghi Bergamasco, 1514); *Summulae Confessionales utilissima...* (Venice: Franciscus Bindonus et Mapheus Pasinus, 1538); *Tractatus de cenirus ecclesiasticis; Item tractatus de sponsalibus et matrimonio* (Lyons, 1511). Antonino wrote many other works, including a popular three-volume history of the world.

5. Robert Kingdon and I are preparing a bibliography of Vermigli editions for the *Corpus Reformatorum Italicorum*.


7. Donnelly, p. 179.

8. *Loci Communes*... (ed. Robert Masson; London: Vautrollerius, 1583). References will be by Classis, chapter, and paragraph since this is more precise than page numbers and is uniform to all fourteen editions of the *Loci*. The section on marriage is II, 10, 1-74; II, 11, 1-83, and contains passages from Martyr's commentaries on the books of Genesis, Judges, Samuel, Kings, and First Corinthians.

9. *Defensio... de Caelibatu...* (Basel: P. Perna, 1559). This is an answer to an attack on Martyr by Richard Smith, who was deprived of his Regius Professorship at Oxford to make room for Martyr. Smith attended Martyr's Oxford lectures on First Corinthians, including the seventh chapter, which treats celibacy. As a source for Martyr's thought on marriage the *Defensio* is disappointing, for only rarely (pp. 528, 529) does it build a positive case. Most of it is an involved canonical, historical, scriptural, and patristic refutation of Smith's arguments for clerical celibacy and monastic vows.


11. *Summa*, Tomus II, Titulus V, De luxuria, Capita 1-15. Henceforward references to the *Summa* will give only volume and column numbers.


22. *Ibid*. Martyr's commentary on Kings, written about 1560, allowed an evangelical to divorce a spouse who had fallen into heresy. This represents a slight liberalization of his teaching a decade earlier in the Corinthians commentary, which will be discussed shortly.


32. *Loci*, II, 10, 55. For Zwingli, Bullinger, and Bucer, see V. Norskov Olsen, *The New Testament Logia on Divorce: A Study in their Interpretation from Erasmus to Milton* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1971) pp. 64-88. Martyr probably knew the writings of Zwingli and Bullinger on divorce, plus Bucer's early writings. Although Martyr's treatment of divorce in his Corinthians commentary antedates Bucer's extreme late position in the *De regno Christi* by several months, he may well have been abreast of Bucer's thinking from their frequent conversations as fellow professors at Strassburg. Olsen gives an excellent summary of Martyr's teaching but makes one slip; he assumes (pp. 89, 118) that the first edition of Martyr's Corinthians commentary was in 1567. Froshover published an edition in Zürich in 1551. That a Zürich publisher printed a book opposed to the views of Zwingli and Billinger and the town practice shows a certain open-mindedness. Martyr spent the last six years of his life in Zürich as a respected professor of the Old Testament. On Luther, Melanchthon, Brenz, Calvin, and Beza, see Olsen, pp. 43-63, 94-109.

33. *Loci*, 52-54. On dissolution of non-conssummated marriages, Noonan, pp. 129-36. Antonino was the first to report such dissolutions (Noonan, p. 130), so his discussion is a likely source of Martyr's comment.


35. Ibid., 58-61.

36. Ibid., 62-65.

37. Ibid., 69-71.

38. Ibid., II, 11, 22-36.


40. Ibid., 660-67.

41. Ibid., 43-48; *Loci*, II, 11, 72-74.

42. *Summa*, III, 133-42.

43. *Loci*, II, 7; Deieminio de caelibatu, 124-27, 234; 366, 528.

44. On many other questions Antonino was forward looking. "Antonino ... the first theorist of mercantile capitalism, and a close advisor of the Medici ... attacked the International Gothic style of Gentile da Fabriano as a frivolous distraction from the holy events depicted, and asked for naturalism and simplicity in painting, a set of qualities best matched in his environment by Masaccio." Creighton Gilbert, *History of Renaissance Art* (New York: Abrams, 1973) p. 92. Also see Raymond de Roover, *San Bernardino of Siena and Sant' Antonino of Florence: The Two Greatest Economic Thinkers of the Middle Ages* (Clifton, New Jersey: Kelley, 1967).


46. Olsen, pp. 76-85.