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Narrative

Pol Vandevelde

*Marquette University*, pol.vandevelde@marquette.edu

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The study of narratives is at the crossroads of several disciplines with significant overlaps. Literary theory and semiotics have analyzed narratives in their structures, roles, types, and ideological functions. Authors like Roland Barthes, Gérard Genette and Tzvetan Todorov on the French side and Vladimir Propp and Mikhail Bakhtine on the Russian side have provided a sophisticated framework within which narratives came to be recognized in their specific identity. The reflection on history has generated an abundant literature on the status of historical narratives with people like Hayden White and Louis Mink. Some trends in ethics have emphasized the centrality of narratives either as a vehicle for ethical standards or as the very articulation of such standards. A brand of virtue ethics, for example, led by Alasdair MacIntyre, has recognized the role of narratives for manifesting and preserving ethical virtues.

Besides the overlap of disciplines dealing with narratives, what complicates the approach to narratives is their close connection to the two other fundamental notions of discourse and text. Jacques Derrida’s focus on text as an original inscription of any act of the mind and Michel Foucault’s analysis of discourse as the framework within which subjects are able to articulate any claim have contributed to bring the notion of narrative into philosophical discussion, but with a certain ideological coloration with regard to the status of the subject and the notion of truth. Like text and discourse, a narrative is a form of mediation. What has largely motivated the philosophical discussion about narratives is precisely the question of whether thinking needs or does not need a mediation.

The framing of the debate about narratives is largely due to Aristotle who in his *Poetics* recognized the role of narratives or *muthoi*, but only for literature and history, which are both viewed as inferior to philosophy, although literature – tragedy for Aristotle – is more philosophical than history. It is only when the whole framework of mimesis was questioned, for example, by German Romanticism, and when truth was no longer simply a matter of the mind directly grasping the sense of what is external to it that the relevance of narratives came to be recognized to the extent that narratives offer an articulation of what can become a candidate for truth. This reformulation of truth as something that is not simply opposed to fiction or free from a linguistic articulation took place at the same time that literature gained its present status as an aesthetic production and history became a well-established discipline. I will focus on the role of narratives in philosophy and more specifically
in phenomenology, which has been one of the movements that has most forcefully reframed our understanding of truth. I start by listing some relevant features of what a narrative is and then examine how some phenomenologists have dealt with or used narratives.

Narratives in a historical context

Since early times the basic unit of thinking has been judgment and its content or expression, the proposition. This basic unit was compatible with a strong realist position of Aristotelian provenance as well as with a theistic view of medieval character or a modern account of Cartesian or Kantian inspiration. In all of these models, the judgment and its accompanying proposition was the ideal tool to formulate reality's essence (in the Aristotelian framework), God's plan in nature (in the theistic model) or the subject's representation of reality (in the Cartesian or Kantian framework). What is common to these different models is the unitary character of the source of knowledge, be it the world, God, or the subject, respectively. Once this unitary character was no longer seen as satisfactory or plausible, judgment lost its privilege as the unifying device that could provide a warranted or true knowledge. There are many reasons for such an explosion of the unitary character of the source of knowledge. Among them is the fact that the plurality or diversity of views on nature and the world in general both manifested the weakness of the prevalent models and the attractiveness of alternative models. Another reason is that reality or the world appeared far more complex than what a single subject could comprehend. A further reason is the claim by subjects, who became aware of their plurality and diversity, that their specific perspectives could not be subsumed under some general or universal types.

Parallel to the many reasons behind the recognition of their central role, narratives also have many different features that explain their attractiveness. Three of these features seem paramount: (a) narratives are perspectivist; (b) they include an element of fiction; and (c) they are open-ended and completable.

The very notion of narrative when used in matters of knowledge or accounts of reality entails a specifically subjective character in the sense that a narrative is both something that has to be performed by a human being and has an intrinsically conversational character. As a performance it is an utterance that is social in nature and which engages both the responsibility of the utterer and asks for the participation of a listener to whom the narrative is addressed. Due to its conversational character a narrative is not a definitely closed semantic unit, as a judgment can be, although it has a beginning and an end. It usually does not claim to provide some final account of what is the case, as judgments are usually understood to do. What narratives provide, instead, is an articulation of what is the case or what took place, whether it is an action, an event, or even a period of time, and they invite readers or listeners to link this articulation not on the basis of its truth in terms of an adequacy with what is the case, but on the basis of the relevance, fruitfulness, or future potential of such an articulation. Narratives, thus, have in themselves a conversational component and a malleability that judgments do not have and do not need.
What may explain the perspectivist character of narratives is their relationship to the future. Because they are not directly accountable to what is the case, narratives also have the potential to configure and to shape actions and events by linking them to the future. History is continuously rewritten by serious historians neither because their predecessors were careless and oblivious nor because they want to promulgate their agenda on past actions and events, but because they speak from the perspective of a different future, in the sense that it is the anticipation of a certain future we envisage that leads us to revisit and thus reinterpret the past. It is the future we anticipate for ourselves that seems to motivate our interest in a history of the United States from the perspective of the people (Zinn 2003) or the telling of what native Americans suffered. Hayden White and Paul Ricoeur, among others, have led a sustained reflection on this perspectivist and configurative power of narratives. Analogously, the availability of narratives in literature, for example, can also shape or reshape our common ways of looking at things and understanding ourselves. Ricoeur has here again been a pioneer in this reflection (1984, 2004). Someone like Martha Nussbaum has also shown how reading literature or narratives can enrich legal procedures by allowing judge and jury to see defendants otherwise than solely through legal molds (1995). In this regard the reading of novels can inform public reasoning and give new traction to rationality.

Besides their perspectivist character, narratives also include an element of fiction. There is in a narrative a storytelling component that cannot be neatly encapsulated in the fact that “it is about” something, as the canon of definition of judgment specifies: to state something of something. The fundamental opacity of the “of” or “about” something had to be acknowledged once it became accepted that the unitary character of knowledge could no longer be expected either from the subject or from reality itself, which only “speaks” through the proxies human subjects believe they are. Thus, the preposition “of” or “about” was no longer a mere syntactical marker, but revealed an ontological character of reality: as Sokolowski says in another, Husserlian, context, reality is “infused with syntax” (Sokolowski 2000: 88). And it is this ontological syntax that asks for a storytelling. Now, storytelling or fiction is not to be understood in the modern or pre-modern sense as if fiction could be assessed in its fictitious makeup by comparing it with a naked or immediately accessible reality. Since it is this very reality that is syntactic, providing the syntactic articulation of an action or an event is indeed inventing something. It is an articulation in words and sentences of something that did not exist in the action or the event themselves, since these are not made of words. However, this invention is not a fabrication of something that had no effective materialization before. And it is not a mere discovery of what that action or event was, since actions and events reveal themselves – almost photographically – through the narratives that are given of them.

Still, even if we grant that narratives reveal the relevance or fruitfulness of actions and events, do narratives evacuate the possibility of judging that some accounts are true and others are false? It may be that narratives render judgments more careful and more complicated, but ultimately it is still judgments that determine whether a historian is a revisionist or a serious one and whether an eye witness is just a good storyteller or a truth-teller. In order to determine the validity of narratives one could appeal to the distinction E. D. Hirsch makes between verbal meaning and
significance in the case of texts (Hirsch 1967: 31). Applying these notions to actions and events, we could say that the significance of an action or an event is what they mean to us, whereas the meaning is included in the action and event itself, not relative to us.

Unfortunately, while the distinction works neatly in small units of discourse, like a sentence or a small text, which are also directly available to other observers, the distinction loses much of its sharpness and attractiveness when we are dealing with a larger narrative, like a historical account, and when our access to the object of the narrative is made through a long chain of mediations, as in the case of the distant past. For example, when we are dealing with the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides offers us a powerful and coherent account, so powerful, however, that it is not clear how we could distinguish the meaning from the significance of the Peloponnesian War. The meaning of an action or an event may be simply the significance this action or event has for us when we are blind to our own background and framework of reference. In other words, it may be only in a diachronic perspective, when we are removed from a particular background or framework of reference that we can make the distinction between the meaning a particular event had at the time it took place and the significance it has for us. For example, we can see the meaning of Andrew Jackson's eviction of the Cherokees that forced them to move on a "trail of tears" to Oklahoma, a decision that was largely accepted and praised at the time, and the significance such a decision has for us now, when Jackson's action is largely blamed and condemned.

If the distinction between meaning (which is supposed to be intrinsic) and significance (which is supposed to be extrinsic) is a retrospective qualification in a diachronic perspective, and thus, as such, a category of interpretation, this distinction cannot by itself determine the truth of a narrative. What it can do is to validate a narrative through an interpretive process. As a consequence, when dealing with the truth of narratives, we have to accept an element of fiction, in the sense that truth is configured and is a matter of invention instead of mere discovery. While this may vindicate one of Martin Heidegger's main philosophical contributions that truth is disclosure, this element of fiction has also prevented a theory of narrative from establishing itself as a full-fledged candidate for a new theory of truth. And this may be due to the third feature of narrative (besides perspectivism and fiction): narratives are open-ended.

While narratives in order to be narratives clearly need to have a beginning and an end, the end is only of the perspective taken. Since narratives present themselves as perspectivist, there is inscribed in their core a radical openness that makes them amenable to being continued. This continuation can take different forms. We can revisit narratives, as we do with history, biography, or when we reinterpret the canon. We can amend narratives by adding new perspectives to what Lincoln realized or what Nelson Mandela achieved. And we can reject past colonialist narratives that do not fit with our values.

This fact that narratives are not definitive, although they make a claim to the truth, that they are finished, but not definitively complete, in short that they are completable, may be the most striking aspect of our current situation in the twenty-first century at a time when we have fully acknowledged the mediation of narratives. The explosion of types of narratives, whether of personal, sexual, gender, or ethnic
identity, whether of religious, social, or political allegiance, has certainly multiplied the many voices people can find and borrow. But these types of narratives seem to have been antithetical to any common good or any common set of values that was supposed to be the basis for plurality and diversity. The different features of a narrative mentioned above – perspectivism, fiction, incompleteness – were gained against a unitary source of knowledge that they were supposed to replace, but the unity was expected to remain in the thread, as it were, of plurality and diversity. Narratives were supposed to be a source of knowledge. Now we are at a point where the plurality and diversity of narratives have relativized the very notion of knowledge and with this relativization room has been made for power to take over discourse. Such a situation is remarkable, if not paradoxical, and Lyotard tried to address it in his own way (1984). On the one hand, in most social discourses praise is showered on plurality and diversity of narratives, but, on the other, there is one single discourse at the economic level: global capital, which has become the reference document for most economists or politicians and which functions as the vernacular of ordinary people. Despite the plurality of narratives motivated by a desire to unmask any meta-narrative, this economic discourse functions unimpeded as a meta-narrative and at the same time feeds a multiplicity of narratives while escaping their bite and scrutiny. This remarkable situation may point to a limit of a decentered and disseminated narrative knowledge when it comes to issues of social and economic justice.

Narratives in phenomenology

Phenomenology has been one of the most powerful philosophical movements to try to reformulate the notion of truth by examining its many mediations. The most important of these narrative mediations has been literature. Almost all phenomenologists from Roman Ingarden to Jean-Paul Sartre, from Heidegger to Ricoeur have seen in literature an invention of meaning. Among those who have explicitly reflected upon narratives in the narrow sense, French thinkers distinguished themselves, with Ricoeur and Lyotard as the main representative figures. While both Ricoeur and Lyotard have offered an explicit theory of narratives, thinkers like Foucault and Derrida have explored other aspects of the view that knowledge is narrative in nature.

Both Ricoeur and Lyotard appeal to the Greeks and especially Aristotle. It is all the more noteworthy that their focus is rather opposite. Ricoeur, following Aristotle, exploits the potential of emplotment: a narrative makes explicit through words, sentences, metaphors, etc., the implicit syntax that already lies at the heart of actions and events. Narratives fundamentally unify. By contrast, Lyotard brings attention to the stifling effect of narratives when they become a meta-narrative in the sense of an all-encompassing synthesis. Let us examine briefly these two opposite uses of narratives.

Ricoeur

Ricoeur cultivates the ambiguity of narratives: they allow us to understand time, actions, oneself, and history, as well as what constitutes the make-up of those
“entities,” although time is clearly not narrative just as action is not made of words. This cultivated ambiguity is also in the canonic Husserlian reformulation of consciousness as consciousness “of” something, the preposition linking object and consciousness in their ontological status, but in a way that does not “de-realize” objects as mere mental entities and does not valorize consciousness as what prescribes its order to the world in a Kantian fashion. Still, Ricoeur nicely illustrates the different features that were listed above, since the action as it is in its articulation cannot be separated from the understanding of this action. Narratives thus serve both as mediator – what allows us to understand actions and history – and as the meaning content of actions and events – it is only when recounted that we know what an action or event means. Narratives combine – or confuse – the ontological and epistemological levels. At the ontological level an action or event is narrative-made in the sense that an action has a pre-narrative quality and is what Ricoeur calls a “potential narrative”; at the epistemological level our understanding of actions and events is narrative-like in the sense that it is only in telling a story of what happened that we can come to know what happened. As Ricoeur says, the past does not give itself, because it is not observable, but has to be reconstructed on the basis of testimonies.

These two aspects of “narrative-made” and “narrative-like” are quite a provocative device in order to approach and render the past. In the case of time, Ricoeur attempts to show how time is understood, not what time is; in the case of selfhood, there is a privilege of the first-person perspective so that the self to a large extent depends on how the self understands itself. Thus, the claim that the self is made of narratives is a weak ontological claim since it is rather the self-understanding that is narrative-made. It is not so with actions and past events which are thoroughly submitted to intersubjective scrutiny and cannot be invented by an individual irrespective of what the public record is. Thus, to claim that actions and past events are narrative-made is a rather strong claim and will be a good test not only for Ricoeur’s theory of narratives, but also for the ontological plausibility of narratives.

The common view that a narrative about action and past events recounts them such as they were manifests the challenge of a theory of narratives. For, this apparently simple claim involves what Ricoeur calls the three genres of sameness, difference, and analogy. The genre of sameness is involved to the extent that historians, for example, are considered historians precisely because they claim that what they recount in their narrative is “the same” as what took place; this is indicated by the word “such.” But the genre of “difference” is also involved since there is a difference in nature between a narrative made of words and sentences, on the one hand, and an action or event made of physical movements and gestures performed by people of flesh and blood, on the other. Finally, the word “as” in the expression “such as they were” points to the genre of “analogy.” The past has to be recovered and reconstructed and thus requires a mediation that the narrative offers: the narrative exerts the function of representing (représentance) or standing-in (lieutenance) which offers an equivalent of what took place (Ricoeur 1988: Vol. 3, 143).

Ricoeur believes that this expression of “such as they were” illustrates a dialectic between what he calls the three levels of mimesis. The sameness claimed by the narrative toward what is narrated assumes that actions and events themselves are of a narrative structure. This is what Ricoeur calls “Mimesis,” as the pre-narrative level
of action and events. “Mimesis$_2$” is the actual level of telling a narrative of what took place, providing an explicit articulation of what was implicit in action and events by giving an analogon or a representing of it. The additional level of “Mimesis$_3$” represents the impact the level of “Mimesis$_2$” has on how we can act and behave (Ricoeur 1984-88: Vol. 1, 72). Narratives re-signify the world of action in the sense that we borrow narratives in order to act, behave, or understand. Literature is, in this regard, what Ricoeur calls a laboratory for moral judgments. This intermingling of narrative levels is a reformulation of the hermeneutic circle of Heideggerean and Gadamerian provenance: actions and experiences already have a pre-narrative quality so that rendering them in a narrative is neither redundant – merely repeating the same structure – nor violent – imposing a different structural order; rather, it brings them intelligibility and does them justice.

However, this latter point has left Ricoeur unsatisfied. We need some form of device to make sure that what is qualified as “pre-narrative” is intrinsically such, in itself, as it were, and not a retrospective qualification made from the perspective of the narrative that has been offered of it. In other words, we need some guarantee that the stories told about actions and events are not mere stories or “as if” stories that merely help us understand actions and events, but that these stories are “true” stories, bringing to light the “meaning” that those actions and events have in themselves. In *Time and Narrative* Ricoeur thought that the notion of a debt could guarantee the fairness or the correctness of the narrative enterprise. Because historians are grabbed by a past that speaks to them, they feel a debt toward what took place or toward the suffering of victims, for example; this attitude creates an obligation for historians to do justice to the past. Although it is richer than a mere dialectical movement between levels of narratives in the threefold mimesis, Ricoeur acknowledges that this notion of debt may not be enough to guard the pre-narrative level from being a mere retrospective qualification made by those who tell the story (2004: 279).

Ricoeur revisits his views in *Memory, History, Forgetting*, originally published in 2000, and appeals to the notion of attestation. Attestation is more than a mere existential attitude of being-in-debt, because it also includes the possibility of justification. What attestation does is to introduce in the narrative the parameter of the one who manifests herself as the author responsible for the narrative. This means that the historian, for example, presents herself as the author of the narrative and, by implicitly saying “Here I am,” opens herself to being questioned and criticized, but also moves the discussion further by also asking for further evidence or counter-evidence for the claims made (2004: 181).

This notion of attestation has two advantages. It acknowledges as uncircumventable the fact that the past cannot be merely retrieved such as it was. Because the past is “no more,” it can only be attested to in its character of “having been” or “having passed,” thus in the traces it has left of its passage. The “suchness” of the narrative – the “such” in the expression “such as it was” – neither replaces nor represents the “actually happened,” but allows it to reach its public presence and thus to be accessible. Ricoeur considers that this “representing” (représentance) adduces an “increase of being” or an “increase of sense” or an “increase of meaning.” The second advantage of attestation is that it links the claim to recover the past such as it was to the moral standing of the person who tells the narrative. Although it is
through the significance the past has to the author of the narrative that the meaning of what happened is articulated in the narrative, attestation makes the author of the narrative in principle accountable to what happened. While there is no empirical possibility to move back from the narrative as articulated meaning to the sense at the level of the experiences the narrative recounts, in principle attestation guarantees that such an exchange back from narrative to past events is virtually possible to the extent that the author of the narrative, if presented with conflicting evidence, will have to justify what she wrote, modify it, or retract it. Attestation makes the author of a narrative accountable and thus inscribes at the heart of narratives a process of justification. Narratives are stories and performance, and as performance they are social and moral acts in the public sphere.

Lyotard

Lyotard uses narratives in two different and somewhat opposite ways. In the *Postmodern Condition* Lyotard drew attention to the fact that in our post-industrial societies we cannot appeal to a meta-narrative that would unify all our discursive practices. This has led to a dissemination of knowledge and its transformation into power. While assenting to the view that all knowledge is narrative in nature Lyotard criticizes the sciences in general for denying their narrative character. He attempts to unmask the hidden narratives of justification and legitimacy that provide sciences with their status and these hidden narratives are ones that appeal to the mastery of nature and the increase of power. By unveiling these hidden narratives at the heart of a knowledge that claims to be free of narratives, Lyotard also wants to show that our post-industrial societies are deprived of any all-encompassing narrative, what he calls a meta-narrative, that would bring into a unity all the multiple narratives of morality, politics, or knowledge. People do not have faith anymore in the ideal of progress or emancipation or justice for all. As Lyotard claims, reason also gave rise to Auschwitz. This rupture between our post-industrial societies and the tradition that preceded and nurtured them is the starting point of what he calls a postmodern era.

In his ambitious work, *The Differend*, Lyotard offers a more systematic view of the link between narratives and discourse. He breaks down the entity of a narrative into what he calls “phrases” and emphasizes the performance aspect of “phrasing” something as well as the importance of the link between phrases, which include units of discourse as well as gestures (1988: xii). The different types of discourses – moral, political, economic – determine the modes of linking a phrase onto another. As speakers we are submitted to these discourses and modes of linking phrases in order to be recognized as reasonable speakers and professionals. Even stronger, we only become subjects when we have learned how to link to a series of phrases that precede our own occurrence. One of the most original notions Lyotard brings to the fore is what he calls a “differend” (1988: 3–5). Given the precedence of discourses and types of phrases, there are some facts or events that may not be susceptible to be articulated in the idioms or phrases that are current in a community or society and thus cannot reach the level of a narrative in which this unformulated deed, act, or event could be publicly discussed or litigated. Lyotard calls such an unformulated potential litigation a “wrong.” What may hint at such a wrong are silence, anger, pain or a feeling of powerlessness. Because such a wrong cannot be identified, even by those
who suffer it, it is a “differend.” However, there is also a productive aspect of such differends, for they ask for a change in the way we link onto existing phrases. They ask for new modes of articulating what heretofore could not be spoken of.

**Derrida and Foucault**

A discussion of narratives within phenomenology cannot ignore the important reformulation of this notion by Derrida and Foucault, each in his own incomparable way.

Derrida does not speak of narratives, but rather of texts, especially in his earlier period, claiming that “there is nothing outside of the text” (2004: 158). By taking issue with the self-identity that thinking and, by association, the subject claim to have, Derrida engaged in a rather productive enterprise of “deconstructing” or showing the “dissemination” at work in several canonic works of the Western tradition. By appealing to a process of inscription that precedes and makes possible the intentional acts of subjects, Derrida attempts to show that the very conceptual oppositions that we need in order to think, like internal versus external, proper versus metaphorical, original versus interpretation, are effects, rather than foundations. As a consequence, the interpretation of a text, for example, cannot claim to take the original as an object, but can only graft onto the original, continuing it and this means: writing another text. The net result is that any claim to truth, validity, or accuracy is relativized to the process of linking to a text within the general text of a particular historical period, with particular goals, a particular location in a culture with its own ideology, etc.

In the case of Foucault, one of his main interests has been the internal organization of a discourse and the types of discourses. From *Birth of the Clinic* to *Madness and Civilization* and from *The Order of Things* (Foucault 1971) to *Discipline and Punish* he has analyzed theoretically as well as empirically the status of what he calls a “statement,” and the different modalities such a statement can take within different discourses. Discourses, whether clinical, economic or scientific, are essentially practices and Foucault speaks of discursive practices. An object only exists within a network of relations among institutions, economic processes, types of classification, modes of characterization, etc. Although there is an evolution in Foucault’s views, his fundamental goal has remained constant: to bring to the fore the rules according to which discourses are formed. Since these discourses are the space as well as the framework within which anything, things as well as subjects, has to be articulated in order to reach a level of social recognition and intelligibility, unveiling the rules of discursive practices amounts to showing both the roots of ontology as well as the variations and transformations of ontologies in the course of time.

See also Jacques Derrida (Chapter 10); History (Chapter 21); Hermeneutics (Chapter 45); Deconstruction (Chapter 46); Post-structuralism: Michel Foucault (Chapter 48); The social sciences (Chapter 57); Literary criticism (Chapter 58).

**References**

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Further reading