Dangerous Associations

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When Curtis Marez delivered his presidential address on November 22, 2013, he could not have known that days later, the American Studies Association would become the target of a hegemonic bloc of university presidents and regents, politicians and watchdog institutions connected through their condemnation of the ASA resolution to boycott Israeli academic institutions. Yet his speech that evening made a strong case for why American studies scholars should orient our interests in empire, racialization, settler colonialism, gender, political economy, and culture around a new critical framework: “an American studies version of critical university studies.” What are we to make of this co-incidence? Of the fact that Marez calls us to take up the contemporary university as a critical project at the precise moment when that dense configuration of forces takes hold of the association? In my response, I revisit “Seeing in the Red: Looking at Student Debt” for the insights it yields into the complex strategical situation in which American studies—the field, we scholars, the association—now finds itself.

At the outset, reviewing Marez’s speech beside the dominant discourse of academic freedom being articulated in reaction to the ASA’s boycott reveals the silences and exclusions—the productions of ignorance—required to make that discourse appear coherent and noncontradictory. The first of these, as many have noted, is the exclusion of Palestinian scholars and their routinely violated academic freedoms from consideration. Yet dominant academic freedom discourse also produces ignorance about student debt, the repression of campus protest, the administration of higher education according to market values, and all the other coercions Marez outlines in his speech. Not surprising, but worth noting is that, despite all the national media at the annual convention, and all the university presidents who decided to investigate their institutions’ relation to ASA, none of their defenses of academic freedom cast even a disparaging glance at any of the issues Marez discusses under the rubric of “the university of debt.” Instead, the rubric of academic freedom enables a kind of epistemological violence; it circumscribes knowledge so that a statement such as “the true essence of a university [is] to foster dialogue and develop solutions
without regard to political, racial, and cultural differences” can be isolated from Marez’s critique (which would readily reveal its hollowness and violences): That the university—a site that has held so much promise for the transformation of society and our collective imaginations—has historically been a key institution within racialized and gendered capitalism; it has been a main locus for the social reproduction of racial, class, and gender inequalities and normative morality; and now it has become center and transit for the ongoing neoliberal debt economy, controlling dissent, and perpetuating old and new forms of settler colonialism. Palestinian suffering must be made meaningless to uphold this particular definition of academic freedom, coincident with student debt being made meaningless so as to preserve the emancipatory ideal of the university.

In sharp contrast to these exclusions, Marez’s presidential address both foregrounds and connects student debt and Israel–Palestine. This occurs strikingly in his penultimate argument, one that in the larger context of the speech provides an example of the “possibilities for comparative, transnational, and global critical thinking and action” opened by “the analytic of student debt.” Observing that a number of non-Palestinian groups focused primarily on student debt have posted boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) endorsements on a Birzeit University website, Marez provocatively argues that “the student-led BDS movement on college campuses [in the United States] could thus also be described as part of a broader effort to take some control over the student debt financing of settler colonial violence.” What enables Marez to make such a dangerous association between student debt and BDS? What enables him to boldly go where managerial discourses of “academic freedom” forbid us to tread?

Methodologically, it is important to note that Marez is exceptionally attentive to social movement activism alive on college campuses right now. He describes his speech as an “attempt to center collective dissent to student debt in American studies,” and mentions it began amid “mass student protests against budget cuts and increased tuition starting in the fall of 2010 in Puerto Rico, Europe, and the United States.” He focuses on the insurgent critiques of students at his own institution, the University of California, San Diego, who have reframed the budget crisis there as a racial project (exposing how privatization deepens the exclusion of students of color) and who testify eloquently to how deeply debt saturates the lifeworlds of college campuses, coercing students in ways that recall the debt traps of company towns of an earlier era. He further observes how the policing of student dissent against US militarism mirrors the containment of Palestine solidarity movements. The point is that the social
movements themselves connect student debt to the situation in Israel–Palestine; Marez’s task (stunningly accomplished) is to articulate their emergent and fragmentary critiques as the basis for knowledge production in American studies. In contrast to those normative discourses that treat student debt and Israeli occupation as separate issues, Marez’s reading of student debt activism expressed as support for BDS invites us to clarify how the interests of financial asset-owning classes emerge as debt speculation here and as settler colonialism there; that is, Marez invites us to investigate how neoliberal governmentality inserts itself into the distinct genealogies of student debt and Israel–Palestine.

Following this line of comparative analysis, Marez hits on a crucial point made more urgent by ensuing attacks on the association. “In distinct yet not unrelated ways,” Marez argues, “both student debt and the occupation of Palestinian territories cut to the heart of articulations of a right to education, or more broadly what Harney and Moten call ‘study,’ a practice of collective thought and social activity irreducible to and in fact antagonistic to market logics” (my emphasis). To amplify what is at stake, I would like to recast this “right of education” as a “right to intellectual labour,” following Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. The distinction follows from the one Antonio Gramsci makes in stating, “Democracy . . . cannot mean merely that an unskilled worker can become skilled. It must mean that every ‘citizen’ can ‘govern’ and that society places him, even if only abstractly, in a general condition to achieve this.”

In other words, by “intellectual labour” we are not referring to instrumental modes of knowing adaptive to reproducing how things are; rather, we are talking about constituting radically democratic relations within which all producers of knowledge are agents of its realization (not just elite knowledge producers). We are talking about critical–practical activity as transformative process, along the lines Karl Marx identified in his final thesis on Feuerbach, which states, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”

For Spivak, the formulation “right to intellectual labour” is part of her effort to transcode the project of epistemological change at the center of Marx’s Capital—if workers collectively learn they are the agents of production (when they stop, production stops), then a postcapitalist, socialist future might be allowed to happen—for contemporary times. “Here today,” Spivak states, “is the call to the move from vanguardism—producing class consciousness in the masses—to social democracy (more viable than the too-rational democratic socialism), at its best engaged in the persistent production of the understanding of the right to intellectual labour.” For our purposes, “the persistent produc-
tion of the understanding of the right to intellectual labour” speaks to the never-ending struggle to keep the university open as an institutional location where critical–practical activity tending toward social democracy can happen, despite the university’s alliance with state and capital. As the boycott condemnation clarifies, the “right to intellectual labour” is not an individual right; rather, its condition of existence is necessarily collective, because knowledge is a social product, conditioned by who can relate and under what terms, and critical–practical activity can occur only through collective learning and action. By attacking the BDS movement on college campuses, university administrators and legislators take aim at the seedling epistemological transformation, the intellectual labor, of a still-consolidating collective by undermining its institutional form. This simultaneously weakens the critique of economic normalization that links Palestinians under occupation to indebted students.

To get a bigger picture, let us consider how the complex strategical situation we find ourselves in today represents a new formation of the one Roderick Ferguson analyzes in *The Reorder of Things: The University and Its Pedagogies of Minority Difference*. According to Ferguson, “the academy and things academic,” encountering the insurgent race-based social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, became conduits for socializing state and capital into an adaptive hegemony, one that expanded and increased by incorporating minority difference into its aims and objectives. This involved a complex dynamic of exclusion and absorption: the university, functioning repressively, pushed radical social movement knowledges and activism beyond the edge of permissible rationalities. Yet in its productive, pedagogical function, the university incorporated transfigured elements of social movements, such as “an abstract—rather than a redistributive—valorization of minority difference and culture,” to convey “unprecedented forms of political economy to state and capital.”

So what new reorder(ing) of things might be taking place now? How does the American Studies Association, as well as its boycott resolution and the social movements that Marez draws on, figure within the university’s contemporary pedagogies, as these interchange with state and capital in the present? Marez’s speech allows us to see that student debt and solidarity with Palestine movements recirculate elements of 1960s and 1970s race-based social movements that remain antagonistic to the terms of hegemony, which explains why the university represses them. Marez argues, “The contemporary regime of university debt constitutes a form of racialized and gendered settler colonial capitalism based on the incorporation of disposable low-wage workers and complicity in the occupation of indigenous lands.” Activists of the earlier era, who com-
combined similar arguments with demands for Black, American Indian, and ethnic studies programs, might take heart (or be disheartened) that today a chair of ethnic studies continues to expose the university as a site of miseducation, which teaches (through example) complicity with indigenous dispossession and racialized economic exploitation. As for Palestine, in a forthcoming book, the American studies scholar Keith Feldman reconstructs the importance of Palestine for the thinking and activism of previous radical movements, from Black Power to the New Left to women of color feminism. Today the BDS movement also draws the attention of diverse social movements, from antiracist to indigenous ones; it constitutes one of the most important transnational alliances “calling for an end to forms of citizenship based on racial stratification, insisting on rights of political self-determination . . . , insisting as well on substantial ways of redressing the rights of those forcibly and/or illegally dispossessed of property and land.”

Yet it is the productive, pedagogical function of the university that should interest us most right now, that is, how the university, with the state and capital as its interlocutors, expands its capacities through adaptation. For the remainder of my response, I argue that the discourses reproving and condemning the American Studies Association for its boycott resolution are part of the articulation of a new managerial discourse, one that seeks to provide the rationality for “the global university,” or rather, for globalizing a specific form of the university needed to provide the infrastructure for the next phases of neoliberal capitalist development. What the railroad was to the early history of American industrial capitalism, the university is to our era of finance capitalism. As information (or data) becomes the value form, universities lay the tracks for “world governance by way of the globality of capital”; they build networks, disseminate the necessary rationalities, and provide outposts for training financial asset–owning classes in the new territories of economic globalization, even as privatization opens US universities to students with wealth from anywhere in the world. It is within this context that the ASA appears as a dangerous association, in addition to the contexts of the politics of boycott and US relations to Israel–Palestine.

That the managerial sector of the US academy has seized the ASA boycott resolution as an opportunity to generate, disseminate, and empower an institutional discourse can be seen by the sheer volume of statements written to condemn it. According to my count, 249 university presidents representing the gamut of US higher education have written statements that reproach the ASA for the academic boycott. Amplifying these (and sometimes providing
the language for them), the Association of American Universities, the American Council on Education, and the Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities have also made reproving statements endowed with the influence of their consolidated administrative authority.

Although such statements are addressed to audiences outside the academy, their greatest effect is actually within it. They are “institutional speech acts,” to use Sarah Ahmed’s language. Enunciated by university presidents, those with the greatest authority to speak simultaneously for the institution and about the institution, the antiboycott statements powerfully constitute and condition institutional norms and institutional cultures. When we look to the content of these particular institutional speech acts, and consider what their implied address to faculty, staff, students, donors, and campus partner entitles, we see that the ASA boycott provides a pretext for defining the university’s framework for internationalizing higher education, for producing permissible ways of seeing new global ventures and cultivating the dispositions that will support them. Consider the preamble to the statement condemning the ASA boycott circulated by Cornell University:

From the university’s inception 150 years ago, President David Skorton and Provost Kent Fuchs have indicated, Cornell and members of its faculty have had many working relationships and formal agreements with academic institutions around the world. . . . We believe that these interactions and collaborations have been productive even in countries in which some faculty, students, and/or alumni disapprove of the policies of the government. The sharing of knowledge and the substantive results that spring from these relationships benefit people from many countries, including our own, and often contribute to the betterment of the global community.

In addition to seeking to normalize an administrative push to reorganize Cornell as a global university, the statement reveals, in its anxious defense of collaborations, that political normalization is the effect and condition of the internationalization of the US academy. That is, US universities become agents of normalization when they accept status quo relations of occupation, oppression, stratification, and inequality as taken-for-granted in the conditions of their partnerships, in Israel and elsewhere. A field of permissible and prohibited thinking and action is created such that faculty, staff, and students can “disapprove” of the violences sanctioned by their partner states, but they cannot fight against them; an official politics of “productive collaboration” suppresses an insurgent politics of critical–practical solidarity; normalization works against a “co-resistance” framework, that is, a framework for joint initiatives to be based, in the case of Israel–Palestine, on the strong recognition of
the fundamental rights of Palestinians and Israelis and a commitment to resist all forms of oppression. The presidential antiboycott statements, however, cast Palestinian scholars outside the right to intellectual labor by not mentioning their existence. The blindness-by-design to Palestinian suffering, and, by extension, to others who suffer by the will or neglect of their governments, makes the ubiquitous happy talk about global academic collaborations in the antiboycott statements—how they “contribute to the betterment of the global community” and “improve health and well-being across the globe”—appear strikingly egregious for their blatant exclusion of internally oppressed peoples.

Another typical statement about the ASA boycott from the Association of American Universities reveals why it is that the globalizing US academy will articulate itself through concepts of “academic freedom”:

Academic freedom is the freedom of university faculty responsibly to produce and disseminate knowledge through research, teaching, and service, without undue constraint. It is a principle that should not be abridged by political considerations. . . . Restrictions imposed on the ability of scholars of any particular country to work with their fellow academics in other countries, participate in meetings and organizations, or otherwise carry out their scholarly activities violate academic freedom.

Here managerial discourse shields universities from institutional critique behind defenses of the academic freedom of individual scholars (which is why it compulsively refuses to recognize the ASA boycott as an institutional one). Stating that the principle of academic freedom must not be abridged by political considerations, managerial discourse articulates a logic that allows universities to claim the right to operate unencumbered by political considerations; compliance with professional norms becomes the only requirement for globalizing. My point coheres with the critique of academic freedom in the forthcoming Imperial University edited by Piya Chatterjee and Sunaina Maira: that it is an “essentially corporate protection,” which “creates an intellectually defensible zone of political autonomy for the professoriate” that shields universities from outside intervention, but does not enable transformative politics. The slogan of academic freedom secures the university’s corporate imperative to self-regulate across a complex field of territorialization, idealizing that imperative as the spirit of intellectual inquiry.

Academic freedom is, in fact, the spirit of professional scholarly inquiry. Yet its idealization as the spirit of all intellectual inquiry is a tactic that blocks “the persistent production of the understanding of the right to intellectual labour.” Statements against the ASA boycott repeatedly extol the mission of
the academy in terms of producing and disseminating knowledge, advancing knowledge, sharing knowledge, and so on. They rhetorically assert the value of institutionally validated, university-produced knowledge over and above all other forms of knowledge, a move inherent to the business of globalizing the university. We must ask who is being denied the right to intellectual labor as universities cement and expand their knowledge capital, in an era when information and capital are merging in unprecedented ways. We must also ask how the imperative for universities to globalize, under conditions created by the globality of capital, deforms the norms of knowledge generation. For as US universities territorialize new spaces, they cannot but respond to the call to put things (phenomenon, situations, people, objects) into what Marx called the “capital-relation,” that is, to know them in a way that produces and reproduces neoliberal capitalism. At the same time, critical–practical activities within universities tending toward social democracy, including the social movements Marez examines, confront new techniques of marginalization.

To consider the contours of this emerging terrain of knowledge politics, I turn to my alma mater, Columbia University, noting that its president, Lee Bollinger, has led both the negative response to ASA’s boycott resolution and the movement to globalize the academy. In fact, the same discourse of “free speech,” Bollinger’s field of expertise, mediates both efforts—and, I argue, the field of knowledge politics emerging as the US academy globalizes. Interestingly, in his statement against the ASA boycott resolution, Bollinger denies it the status of speech, portraying it as antithetical to “the discussion and debate” that is “an essential value of universities in an increasingly global society.” Yet in his statement opposing the New York State antiboycott bill, Bollinger recognizes the academic boycott as “free speech” that the enactment of the law would infringe on. The first stance obliterates the boycott as having a message in order to secure an idea of the political neutrality of academic knowledge, which, in turn, falsely represents the dominant episteme as total and universal. Using the language of transparency, openness, and dialogue, Bollinger passes over the lessons of epistemic difference and subjugated knowledges, reducing knowledge to information, an idea more compatible with the task of globalizing the academy. This disavows the possibility of epistemic change on which critical–practical activity, as transformative process, lives or dies.

In a presidential white paper titled “Bringing Cornell to the World and the World to Cornell,” President David Skorton calls on Cornell and other US universities “to take international involvement even further—to develop a new type of Marshall Plan that would reduce global inequalities.” Further,
he urges his university to act “as if Cornell were the land grant institution to the world.” When we reheat Skorton’s call through the “American studies version of critical university studies” Marez outlines, we can ask: What would a neoliberal settler colonial university system—one still dominated by the interests of US state and capital—look like? One answer is a pessimistic critical projection based on the model of Columbia’s Global Centers, of which there are currently eight, in Amman, Beijing, Istanbul, Mumbai, Nairobi, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, and Santiago. The centers are described as a globe-spanning network of “nimble hubs,” which deepen the access of Columbia researchers to global regions. Pessimistically considered, Columbia’s model portends a leap in colonial/neocolonial knowledge production. Only now the distance that formerly let us recognize the entrapment of “others” in the discourse of metropolitan scholars dissolves; area studies develops such that global scholars manage knowledge production in the area studied; world governance by way of the globality of capital gets the knowledge infrastructure it requires.

In light of this new politics of knowledge, it becomes clear why the ASA has been painted a dangerous institution. It is not only to defend the Israeli state from criticism. Over the last thirty years, the ASA has been a platform for collaboration and research that has developed the capacity for scholars to associate internationalizing US higher education with the complicated pasts and presents of imperialism, nationalism, racial capitalist exploitation, and settler colonialism, a trajectory Marez’s presidential address epitomizes. If the task of the global university is to disseminate information for globalization, to translate the world into the codes, relations, and antinomies that capital accumulation requires, and to limit the appearance of the social to forms compatible with accumulation by dispossession, the kind of American studies scholarship the ASA supports inquires into the power–knowledge relations that the rubric of “information” conceals, recognizes the epistemic and racialized violences that cut people, cultures, and contexts to fit capitalist rationalities, and provides rationale and precedent for guarding collective existence from expropriation. In contrast to globalizing universities, which partner with elites and reinforce a logic of discreteness by affirming the separateness of the states and citizenries linked by academic agreements, scholar-members of the American Studies Association have been trying to think though strange affinities, assemblages, and transits, and to be in touch with populations defined as fugitive, one way or another. When we connect the rise of industrial zones in the West Bank and economic incentives for Palestinian schools to institute Israeli curriculums, to the rise of foreign trade zones throughout US Southwest and attacks on ethnic
studies, to the regime of student debt, we see “education” as an endeavor shuttling between economic-political coercion and what Neferti Tadiar calls fate playing, perilous acts undertaken by people facing disposability, who stake their lives for a chance at a better fortune.26 But we also see that intellectual self-determination—whatever that means right now—is still powerful, a monkey wrench in the machine that normalizes neoliberalism.

The American Studies Association has held together contradictory tendencies for a long time; the boycott brings them to light. On the one hand, we are a professional organization dedicated to the advancement of our field and the success of our members within the university-system, on its terms. On the other hand, the American Studies Association is a home, even a power base, for many scholars committed to a wide variety of social movements that seek transformations of many kinds, including the transformation of the university. Without the “radical revisions” to the “university as a site of domination” Marez mentions, the contradiction between academic freedom and actual freedom struggles will remain, and the ASA will remain caught within it. Yet that aporia can be capacity building. In the complex strategic situation we find ourselves in, “to associate” is a kind of power, especially across lines of division. In “Seeing in the Red: Looking at Student Debt,” a striking analysis of the university of debt and dissent to it, Curtis Marez gives us lots of reason to hang together.

Notes


2. Susan Herbst, “President Herbst Addresses Boycotts of Israeli Academic Institutions,” UConn Today, December 23, 2013, http://today.uconn.edu/blog/2013/12/president-herbst-addresses-boycotts-of-israeli-academic-institutions. I am grateful to Lisa Lowe for providing the phrasing that so skillfully summarizes the presidential address in this passage. Although beyond the scope of this response, the use of the slogan “anti-Semitism” serves the same rhetorical purpose as “academic freedom” in the boycott debate; it forecloses rather than invites engagement.


8. Ibid.
12. These range from Yale, Harvard, and Columbia Universities to the University of Wisconsin–Madison, the University of Texas–Austin, Rutgers University, the entire California University System, and Georgetown University, to Skidmore, Colby, and Hamilton College. A seemingly definitive list with web links may be found on the website of one of the boycott’s staunchest opponents, AMCHA. See www.amchainitiative.org/organizations-universities-condemned-american-studies-associations-academic-boycott-israel/.
18. The first quote is from Ellen Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 23; the second is from Clyde Barrow, Universities and the Capitalist State: Corporate Liberalism and the Reconstruction of American Higher Education (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 14. Both are quoted in Piya Chatterjee and Sunaina Maira, eds., The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming), 38 and 36, respectively.
19. I am grateful to Kandice Chuh for her observation that the concept of academic freedom was inaugurated in the context of arguments over differing economic theories of labor in the 1910s. Therefore, as Ruth Wilson Gilmore notes, academic freedom has always been a labor and economic issue. This revives the relevance of “academic freedom” for discussions of debt. For example, how can we decry the damage that increasing numbers of adjunct laborers inflicts on academic freedom, even as we criticize academic freedom as a concept in service to the reproduction and sharpening of social hierarchies? See Frederick P. Schaffer, “A Guide to Academic Freedom,” City University of New York Legal Affairs Bulletins, January 2, 2012, www1.cuny.edu/mu/vc_la/2012/01/02/a-guide-to-academic-freedom; and Jan Clausen and Eva-Marie Swindler, “Academic Freedom from Below: Toward an Adjunct-Centered Struggle,” AAUP Journal of Academic Freedom 4 (2013), www.aaup.org/reports-publications/journal-academic-freedom/volume-4.
20. The phrase “Kapitalverhältnis” (capital-relation) appears throughout the three volumes of Capital. My usage relies on the sense of the term found in “The Secret of Primitive Accumulation” chapter of Capital (vol. 1), where Marx states, “The capital-relation presupposes a complete separation between the workers and the ownership of the conditions of the realization of their labour. . . . The process, therefore, which creates the capital-relation can be nothing other than the process which divorces the worker from the ownership of the conditions of his own labour.” See Karl Marx, Capital, trans. Ben Fowkes, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 874.


24. Ibid.
