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Hellenistic rhetorical and literary conventions of moral exhortation used personal examples as a common device, as Abraham J. Malherbe notes. Most scholars agree that Greco-Roman education and rhetoric, as well as works (including narratives) that were written under their influence, emphasize models, paradigms, or exempla for imitation by pupils or readers. In this vein, Benjamin Fiore cites Pliny's letter to Titius Aristo (8.14) as claiming an


ancient custom of instruction by the example of one's father or equivalent figure: "But in the olden time it was an established rule that Romans should learn from their elders, not only by precept, but by example, the principles on which they themselves should one day act, and which they should in turn transmit to the younger generation. . . . The father of each youth served as his instructor, or, if he had none, some person of years and dignity supplied the place of the father. . . . Thus they were taught by that surest method of instruction, example, the whole conduct of a senator."3 Charles H. Talbert quotes a similar emphasis by Seneca on the effect of the teacher's life upon disciples: "Cleanthes could not have been the express image of Zeno, if he had merely heard his lectures; he also shared his life, saw into his hidden purposes, and watched him to see whether he lived according to his own rules. Plato, Aristotle, and the whole throng of sages who were destined to go each his different way, derived more benefit from the character than from the words of Socrates. It was not the classroom of Epicurus, but living together under the same roof, that made great men of Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polybius."4

Beverly Roberts Gaventa calls attention to how narratives impose "order" on narrated events, shaping events according to the writer's view, in "what Hayden White calls the intrinsic 'moralism' of narrative."5 One aspect of such moralism is the paradigmatic uses of narrative. Wesley A. Kort argues that even contemporary fictional characters, who differ so starkly from religious heroes in ancient literature, "provide us with paradigms that illuminate the human potential for good and evil."6 David Aune maintains that such paradigmatic purposes were quite explicit in ancient biographies: "The subjects of most ancient biographies are depicted as static personalities presented as paradigms of either traditional virtues or vices, rarely as a mixture of both."7

3. Trans. Radice in LCL; cited in Fiore, The Function of Personal Example, 35, n. 28. Cf. 34–37; Malherbe's citation of Pliny Letter 8.13, on imitating one's father (Moral Exhortation, no. 55, p. 137); Gutierrez, Paternité spirituelle, esp. 172–97; and Rainer Riesner, Jesus als Lehrer: Eine Untersuchung zum Ursprung der Evangelien-Überlieferung (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1981), esp. 70–79, on previous work on Jesus as teacher; chap. 2, 97–245, on Jewish popular education; chap. 3, on Jesus' authority, esp. 277–98, on prophet-disciple relations; chap. 5, on teaching of disciples, esp. 408–34, on their life together; 503–68, bibliography.


This chapter will demonstrate that that consensus about ancient paradigmatic uses of narratives holds also for the narrative of Luke-Acts, by pointing out similar concerns to provide models for imitation in other narratives from the Lukan Greco-Roman and Hellenistic-Jewish milieu. It thus illustrates for narrative forms Malherbe’s observations about the explicit and more subtle implicit uses of examples in many literary forms. The chapter further aims to relate what we know of Hellenistic rhetorical emphasis on narrative models for imitation as evidenced in Luke-Acts to contemporary concern for implicit moral exhortation to implied readers of narratives. It thus attempts to relate a historical-critical study of rhetorical models for imitation to recent narrative-critical concerns. Because the primary focus of the chapters in this book is historical, some preliminary definition of the key contemporary literary term implied readers is in order.

NARRATIVE CRITICAL CONCEPTS

A significant contribution of literary narrative criticism is the notion of the readers who are implied by the narrative. Although no text can be used to identify fully its real readers, who are outside the text (as are twentieth-century readers), the text itself produces and gives evidence for its implied readers, which are the kinds of readers demanded by the text, or the readers as the writer imagines them. A writer’s audience is always a fiction, as Walter J. Ong has demonstrated. Because writers compose in the absence of their readers, they must imagine readers’ concerns and how they would react to what is being written, unlike oral storytellers, who can adjust to listeners’ actual reactions. Implied readers are the kinds of readers who are imagined of OT events and retributive principles, citing the paradigmatic qualities of the sins and appropriate penalties of Ananias, Sapphira, and Elymas (p. 173).


Narratives differ from direct persuasion in that narrators normally do not address their readers directly but rather simply "show" the action taking place for the readers to observe, as it were. When narrators do directly address their audience, it is normally through prefaces, asides, and similar devices that precede or intrude upon the actual narration of the events. Thus, the narrator in Acts 20 does not directly exhort implied readers to imitate Paul but simply shows them Paul enjoining the Ephesian elders, who carried on his authority after his departure, to do so. However, it is not much of a further logical step for the implied readers to interpret Paul's actions as paradigmatic for later Christian leaders in general. This is particularly true in view of the ordinary first-century practice for teachers to urge their disciples to learn by their example, and the widespread Christian awareness that Paul himself had done so, as the narrative claims.

EXPLICIT EXEMPLA IN THE LUKAN CORPUS

The presence in Luke-Acts of at least two explicit exempla warrants our search for implicit uses of narrative models elsewhere in the Lukan corpus and in related literature contemporary to it. The farewell addresses in Acts

20:17–38 and Luke 22:14–38 draw explicit attention to Paul and Jesus as models to be imitated. As Malherbe observes, Paul’s farewell to the Christian elders of Ephesus in Acts 20 uses the standard procedures of moral philosophers of juxtaposing rival teachers (stereotypically portrayed as “wolves,” Acts 20:29–30) to his own example to be imitated (20:31–35), described in normal parenetic style. The farewell provides an occasion to make explicit the paradigmatic character of Paul’s life and mission for later Christian leaders and perhaps, by further implication, for other Christians as well. Thus, Paul is shown reminding the Ephesian elders of their knowledge of how he went among them teaching (Acts 20:18). He calls them to be on guard, remembering how he had admonished them for three years. Memory of how Paul admonished them is to guide how they are to admonish communities that they in turn oversee. Paul also points to his example of providing for his own needs and not seeking the Ephesians’ money: “All these things I showed you [πάντα ύπεδειξα υμίν] that thus [οὖντως] working you should provide for the weak and remember the words of the Lord Jesus” (20:35). The narrative thus appeals to two authoritative guides for how Christian leaders are to act: to the example of Paul and to the words of Jesus (independently of whether this saying happens to be authentic). The accounts in Acts of Paul’s activities provide sources for learning Paul’s apostolic example, and the Lukan Gospel supplies collections of the sayings of Jesus.

Similarly, in Jesus’ farewell address in Luke, Jesus twice asks the apostles to imitate an action of his. The traditional and textually problematic Eucharistic statement “Do this in memory of me” (Luke 22:20a) is a call for imitation, but not a formal exemplum. It is rather the imitation of a stylized liturgical action in a set ritual. The apostles are directed to do exactly the same set of actions that Jesus does—taking, blessing, breaking, and giving the bread to others to eat as his body. Such ritualized imitation does not tend to generalizations that interpret other actions of Jesus as analogously paradigmatic.

However, later in the farewell address (in Luke 22:24–27), where Jesus is teaching his apostles an explicit lesson about authority as service, he illustrates his point by using his own behavior as an exemplum: “For which is greater, the


one lying at table or the one serving? But I am in your midst as one who
serves [ὁ διακονῶν]” (22:27). Jesus' own example illustrates how Christian
authority differs from secular authority. Although secular authorities lord
their authority over their subjects and insist on honors for themselves, this
reversal of expectations likens Jesus' authority to that of a table waiter.

This exemplum within Jesus' farewell address invites the implied readers to
reflect on other narratives of how Jesus conducted himself in authority over
his followers, to illustrate in Jesus' actions how authority is in fact a form of
service. Inviting implied readers to see Jesus' actions as models for their own
alerts them to notice the paradigmatic features for Christian imitation in other
Lukan narratives about Jesus.

This chapter will advance two hypotheses: (1) From exempla and explicit
statements about narratives as behavior models in prefaces and intrusive nar-
rators' asides, it seems reasonable to expect that in other narratives in the
same works where the narrator is unobtrusive, a similar implicit paradigmatic
intention may be present, especially in biblical writings that use narrative
asides far more sparingly than do secular Hellenistic works.16 (2) Even though
the normally unobtrusive narrator in Luke-Acts seldom expressly mentions
models for imitation, the author of Luke-Acts would most likely be quite fami-
liar with such paradigmatic functions and use them more often than in only
the overt exempla. The chapter will gather representative explicit references
to paradigmatic functions of narratives from a wide spectrum of narratives
within the Lukan milieu to illustrate how widespread was the rhetorical motif
of imitation of models in narrative literature. With this background, it will
then illustrate how both explicit exempla and more implicitly paradigmatic
narratives within Luke-Acts exhibit a similar pattern and concern.

HELENISTIC CONCERN ABOUT
NARRATIVE MODELS FOR IMITATION

So far this chapter has discussed Hellenistic use of narrative models
within the broader context of imitation and exempla in education and rhetoric.
Pedagogical emphases colored the writing of narratives of many sorts—
biographical, historical, even novelistic. Biographies presented lessons for
living. Histories provided lessons for the future from the past. Novels tended
to be moralistic.17 Paradigmatic concerns are common to most of the major

16. By intrusive narrator, I mean a narrator who makes his or her presence known to readers or
audiences by directly addressing them or providing information that is not directly part of the plot
narrated, such as translations of foreign terms. Such narrators are normally said to be using a
“telling point of view.” Unobtrusive narrators simply “show” the plot unfolding, so audiences do
not normally avert to the fact that someone is narrating the story. This is called the “showing point
of view.” Cf. Francis Martin, Narrative Parallels to the New Testament (SBLRBS 22; Atlanta:
Scholars, 1988) 10–11. Focus on implicit paradigmatic intentions applies to narrative remarks
about subtle uses of examples in autobiography and pseudonymous letters in Malherbe, Moral
Exhortation, 136.

17. On models in biographies, see Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 137; on the past as lessons for
genres of narratives in the Lukan milieu. Therefore, the thesis about the use of narratives as models for imitation can be argued without entering the debate over the genre or genres of Luke and Acts. Focus on paradigmatic elements common to several genres of narratives is applicable to Luke-Acts as a narrative, however its genre or genres may be classified.

**Historiographical Imitation of Models**

Historiographical concerns that the past should provide lessons of profit for the future provide one of the rationales for Hellenistic paradigmatic use of narratives. These concerns influenced later biblical historiography such as 1 and 2 Maccabees, as well as writers like Polybius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Josephus. Thus, Polybius, in his preface (1.1), claims there is no more ready corrective of conduct than knowledge of the past (ἐτοιμοτέρον ... διόρθωσιν τῆς τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων ἐπιστήμης). His claim that the best education and training for political life is study of history (παιδείαν καὶ γυμνασίαν ... ἱστορίας μάθησιν) implies a protreptic approach that uses historical examples as paradigms of behavior (1.2). Thus, he claims that a method for learning to bear bravely the vicissitudes of fortune (διδάσκαλον τοῦ δύνασθαι τάς τής τύχης μεταβολὰς γενναίας ύποφέρειν) is to recall the calamities of others (ἄλλοτριῶν περιπετειῶν ὑπόμνησιν [1.2]). Despite the stereotyped nature of such prefaces, they provide evidence for actual expectations of Hellenistic readers—expectations grounded in their familiarity with rhetoric.

Statements toward the beginning of the life of Apollonius of Tyana (Philos. VA 1.3) that the author hopes this biography may have some use (ὡφέλειαν), along with the tongue-in-cheek comments in Lucian’s *How to Write History*, 9, that history has one task and end—the useful (τὸ χρήσιμον) that comes from truth and not primarily the pleasurable (τὸ τερπνὸν), such as that which comes from eulogies—provide evidence that this rhetorical tradition continued into the second century. Lucian later uses Thucydides as his authority that usefulness (τὸ χρήσιμον) is the purpose of sound history: “That if ever again men find themselves in a like situation [τὰ ὀμοία] they may be able, he says, from a consideration of the records of the past to handle rightly


what now confronts them [πρὸς τὰ προγεγραμμένα ἀποβλέποντες εὖ χρήσθαι τοῖς ἐν ποσί]" (Lucian Hist. conscr. 42; trans. Kilburn in LCL).

In his preface to Roman Antiquities, Dionysius of Halicarnassus mentions historical truth as the source of both prudence and wisdom (τὴν ἀλήθειαν ... ἀρχὴν φρονήσεως τε καὶ σοφίας οὔσαν [Ant. Rom. 1.1.2; trans. Cary in LCL]), thus emphasizing its practical value for action. Historians ought “to make choice of noble and lofty subjects and such as will be of great utility to their readers [πολλὴν όψελειαν τοῖς ἀναγνωσομένοις φεροῦσας]” (1.1.2). Dionysius refers to the rhetorical expectation by readers that writers admired lives like those about which they wrote (ὅτι τοιούτους ξῆλωσαν αὐτοί βίους, οίς ἐξέδωκαν τὰς γραφὰς [1.1.3]). Dionysius will present lives of illustrious ancestors as an incentive to their descendants: “And again, both the present and future descendants of those godlike men will choose, not the pleasantest and easiest of lives, but rather the noblest and most ambitious, when they consider that all who are sprung from an illustrious origin ought to set a high value on themselves and indulge in no pursuit unworthy of their ancestors [μέγα ἐφ’ ἐαυτοῖς προσήκει φρονεῖν καὶ μηδὲν ἀνάξιον ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν προγόνων]” (1.6.4).

The narrator’s asides during Dionysius’s narrative reinforce these statements in his proem by explicit references to his history’s paradigmatic dimension. For example, before summarizing how Larcium handled matters as Rome’s first dictator, the narrator interjects the following: “For I look upon these matters as being most useful to my readers [ταῦτα ἡγούμενος εἶναι χρησιμώτατα τοῖς ἀναγνωσομένοις], since they will afford a great abundance of noble and profitable examples [καλὸν καὶ συμφέρων παραδείγματον], not only to lawgivers and leaders of the people, but also to all others who aspire to take part in public life and to govern the state” (Dionysius Ant. Rom. 5.75.1).

It is therefore not surprising to see Rome’s founder Romulus treated as an exemplar of Roman values, which the intrusive narrator contrasts with contemporary shortcomings in asides to the implied readers. Thus, the narrator describes Romulus’s simple victory triumph and remarks: “Such was the victorious procession ... which the Romans call a triumph, as it was first instituted by Romulus. But in our day [ἐν δὲ τῷ καθ’ ἡμᾶς βίῳ] the triumph has become a very costly and ostentatious pageant, ... and it has departed in every respect from its ancient simplicity [καὶ καθ’ ἀποσοῦν ἴδεαν ἐξεβρήκε τὴν ἀρχαίαν εὐνέλειαν]” (Dionysius Ant. Rom. 2.34.3). This moralistic narrator’s aside contrasts the ancient simplicity of the triumphs as instituted by Romulus and the ostentation of contemporary triumphs, holding it up as an example for imitation in the present day. The narrators’ other asides point to Romulus as a model promoter of civic virtues and of simple religion that rejects blasphemous myths about the gods (2.18; 2.23.4–6).

In a later moralistic aside, the narrator turns to the implied readers after describing the austere virtue of Lucius Quintius: “I am led to relate these particulars for no other reason than to let all the world see what kind of men the
leaders of Rome were at that time, that they worked with their own hands, led frugal lives, did not chafe under honourable poverty, and, far from aiming at positions of royal power, actually refused them when offered. For it will be seen that the Romans of today do not bear the least resemblance to them, but follow the very opposite practices in everything—with the exception of a very few by whom the dignity of the commonwealth is still maintained and a resemblance to those men preserved” (Dionysius Ant. Rom. 10.17.6). Thus, Dionysius intersperses notices of his paradigmatic intentions throughout his multivolumed narrative.

Luke’s contemporary Josephus modeled his Antiquities of the Jews on Dionysius’s Antiquities of the Romans, so it is not surprising to find similar paradigmatic concerns in his work. Josephus’s preface makes a comparable statement about publishing for the public benefit (εἰς κοινὴν ὄφελειαν [Ant. 1 proem 1 §3]), just as Dionysius desires to write about noble subjects that will be of great utility to his readers (πολλὴν ὄφελειαν τοῖς ἀναγνωσμένοις φεροόσας [Ant. Rom. 1.1.2]). Josephus makes explicit a moral lesson for his complete work: “But, speaking generally, the main lesson to be learnt from this history by any who care to peruse it is that men who conform to the will of God, and do not venture to transgress laws that have been excellently laid down, prosper in all things beyond belief, and for their reward are offered by God felicity; whereas, in proportion as they depart from the strict observance of these laws, things (else) [sic] practicable become impracticable, and whatever imaginary good thing they strive to do ends in irretrievable disasters” (Josephus Ant. 1 proem 3 §14; trans. Thackeray in LCL). Not only does Josephus have this stated moralistic purpose, but he also calls attention to the worthy conception of God as he describes him in his work (in contrast to unseemly myths [1 proem 3 §15]). He presents this purified portrayal of God as a model to be imitated: “Be it known then, that that sage [Moses] deemed it above all necessary, for one who would order his own life aright and also legislate for others, first to study the nature of God, and then, having contemplated his works with the eye of reason, to imitate as far as possible that best of all models and endeavor to follow it [οὐτῶς παράδειγμα τὸ πάντων ἀριστον μιμεῖσθαι, καθ’ ὁσον ὁδὸν τε, καὶ πειράσθαι κατακολουθεῖν]” (1 proem 4 §19).

Josephus goes on to argue that without such a model and vision of God, Moses would be unable to find truth, “nor would anything that he should write in regard to virtue avail with his readers [οὕτως τῶν γραφημένων εἰς ἀρετῆς λόγων οὕδον ἀποβήσεσθαι τοῖς λαβοῦσιν]” (1 proem 4 §20). God must be seen, as Moses portrayed him, as bestowing retribution on both good and evil

19. John Lilley gathered these references in his April 1, 1989, paper, “Hellenistic Historiography and Ethico-Religious Paradigm in Luke’s Gospel,” for my graduate course. Other paradigms of behavior in Dionysius’s history that Lilley refers to include “Numa Pompilius (2.76), Gaius Marcius (6.92-94; 8.60-62), and Tarquinius, a tyrant whose treachery, theft and murder mark him as an extraordinarily negative example (4.68; cf. 4.78)” (p. 12).
conduct: "God, as the universal Father and Lord who beholds all things [πάντα ἐπιθέλετον], grants to such as follow Him a life of bliss, but involves in dire calamities those who step outside the path of virtue [τοῖς μὲν ἐπομένοις αὐτῷ δίδωσιν εὐδαιμόνια βίον, τοὺς εἴη δὲ βασινντας ἅρτης μεγάλαις περιβάλλει συμφοραίς]. Such, then, being the lesson which Moses desired to instill [τούτῳ δὴ παιδεύοντα θουληθείς Μουσίς τὸ παίδευμα] into his fellow citizens . . ." (1 proem 4 § 20). Josephus’s paradigmatic purpose could hardly be clearer.

Narrators’ asides continue to call attention to both positive and negative examples throughout Josephus’s Antiquities. Thus, Josephus uses Ahab as an explicit negative exemplum: “And further, with the king’s history before our eyes, it behooves us to reflect [λογίζομεν τε πάλιν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν βοσιλέα γεγεννημένων] on the power of Fate” (Ant. 8.15.6 § 418–20). Also regarding Antipater, the narrator says, “I shall relate the whole story of this in order that it may be an example and warning to mankind to practise virtue in all circumstances [παράδειγμα τὸ ἀνθρωπείῳ γεννησόμενον τοῦ ἁρτῆ πολιτεύωντος ἐπί πάσῃ]” (17.3.3 § 60).

As a positive model for imitation, the narrator proposes the witch of Endor for her generosity toward someone (Saul) who could not repay her: “It is well, then, to take this woman for an example [καλὸν οὖν ἐστὶ μιμεῖσθαι τὴν γυναῖκα] and show kindness to all who are in need, and to regard nothing as nobler than this or more befitting the human race or more likely to make God gracious and ready to bestow on us His blessings” (Josephus Ant. 6.14.4 § 342).

Synoptic comparison between the treatments of Mattathias’s farewell in Josephus and his source, 1 Maccabees, illustrates Josephus’s stronger Hellenistic emphasis on presenting oneself as a model. In 1 Macc 2:49–70, the Maccabean patriarch Mattathias presents only biblical models for his sons to emulate; in Josephus’s? Antiquities, Mattathias uses his own spirit (φρόνημα) as an example for his sons’ imitation: “I myself, my sons, am about to go the destined way, but my spirit I leave in your keeping, and I beg you not to be unworthy guardians of it, but to be mindful of the purpose of him who begot you and brought you up, and to preserve our country’s customs [παρατίθεμαι δὲ υμῖν τούμον φρόνημα καὶ παρακαλῶ μη γενέσθαι κακοὺς αὐτοῦ φύλακας, ἄλλα μεμνημένους τῆς τοῦ φύσαντος ὑμᾶς καὶ θρησκευόμενον προσαρέσχεσις ἐθετε σύζειν τὰ πάτρια]” (12.6.3 § 279–84).

2 Maccabees gives an explicit exemplum in the farewell address of the aged martyr Eleazar: “Wherefore now, manfully changing this life, I will show myself such a one as my age requires, and leave a notable example to the young [τοῖς δὲ νεόις ὑπόδειγμα γενναίον καταλείποις] to die willingly and

20. Jack Lilley’s “Paradigm” gathered most of these citations, as well as the following further ethico-religious paradigms in Josephus’s Antiquities (p. 16, n. 10). Positive models include Abraham (1.7.1; 1.13.2; 1.17), Joseph (2.4.1–2), and David (7.15.1–2); negative exempla include Joab (7.1.5), Rehoboam (8.10.2, 4), Asa (8.12.6), Ahab (8.15.6), and Caius (19.1.2).
courageously for the honorable and holy laws” (2 Macc 6:27–28). The narrator immediately reemphasizes the exemplary nature of Eleazar’s death in the eulogy of him: “And thus this man died, leaving his death for an example of a noble courage, and a memorial of virtue, not only unto young men but unto all his nation [οὐ μόνον τοῖς νέοις, ἄλλα και τοῖς πλείστοις τοῦ θύνου τὸν ἐαυτοῦ θάνατον ὑπόδειγμα γενναιότητος καὶ μνημόσυνον ἀρετῆς κατολιπών]” (6:31). By pointing out how Eleazar’s death is a model not only within the narrative for the young men to whom Eleazar hoped to give a good example but for “all his nation,” the narrator includes among those who should imitate Eleazar the implied readers of the narrative, who were being implicitly addressed (6:31).

The preface to 2 Maccabees confirms the presence of such a concern by the implied author to provide models for the implied readers. The three stated goals in epitomizing Jason’s account are “that those who want to read may have delight, that those who want to memorize might have easy work, and that all into whose hands it falls may have profit [ὡφελειαν]” (2 Macc 2:25). The Greek word for “profit” here is the same expression as that found in the prefaces of Apollonius of Tyana, Dionysius, and Josephus and is a synonym of the word χρησιμον used by Lucian. That the expected profit included lessons from history appears in such narrator’s asides as that in 2 Macc 4:17: “For it is no light thing to show irreverence to the divine laws—a fact which later events will make clear” (RSV).

On the spectrum of biblical and Hellenistic historiography, Luke-Acts lies between 1 and 2 Maccabees. 1 Maccabees more closely resembles biblical historiography than does 2 Maccabees, with no preface and a much less obtrusive narrator. Still, the narrator in 1 Macc 2:26 compares the action of Mattathias in killing the apostate Jew to that of Phinehas, a biblical paradigm of zeal for God’s law (cf. Numbers 25): “Thus he burned with zeal for the law, as Phinehas did against Zimri the son of Salu” (RSV). By implication, Mattathias also becomes a paradigm of zeal for God’s law for the implied readers.

Mattathias’s farewell address (1 Macc 2:49–70) repeats in 2:54 the narrator’s reference in 2:26 to Phinehas as paradigm of zeal for God’s law. The context of his exhorting his sons to “be zealous for the law” in remembrance of the deeds of their fathers (2:50–51) clearly shows the same concern for imitation of narrative models as the narrator had in 2:26.21 One of the common literary functions of farewell addresses is to address the time and concerns of the implied readers after the time of the story.22 Mattathias’s exhortation to zeal for the law according to the example of Abraham, Joseph,
Phinehas, ... Hananiah, Azariah, Mishael, and Daniel presents their paradigm for imitation not only by his sons within the story but by the implied readers.

**Biographical Imitation of Models**

Similar references to imitation of models appear in biographies. Thus, Plutarch defends his use of negative as well as positive examples among the lives he chose to describe:

The most consummate arts of all, namely, temperance, justice, and wisdom, since their function is to distinguish, not only what is good and just and expedient, but also what is bad and unjust and disgraceful, have no praises for a guilelessness which plumes itself on its inexperience of evil, nay, they consider it to be foolishness, and ignorance of what ought especially to be known by men who would live aright [ἐγνώναι δὲν μάλλοτα γνώσκειν προσήκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς βιωσομένους]. Accordingly, the ancient Spartans would put compulsion upon their helots at the festivals to drink much unmixed wine, and would then bring them into the public messes, in order to show their young men what it was to be drunk. And though I do not think that the perverting of some to secure the setting right of others is very humane, ... still, when men have led reckless lives, and have become conspicuous, in the exercise of power or in great undertakings, for badness, perhaps it will not be much amiss for me to introduce a pair or two of them into my biographies, though not that I may merely divert and amuse my readers by giving variety to my writing. ... So, I think, we also shall be more eager to observe and imitate the better lives [Καὶ ἡμεῖς προσθημό­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­…

Philo also emphasizes the theme of the importance of lives of virtuous people as models for readers’ imitation. In the introduction to his life of Abraham, he announces he will preface discussion of specific laws by looking at the lives on which they are based:

Let us postpone consideration of particular laws, which are, so to speak, copies [εἰκόνων] and examine first those which are more general and may be called originals of those copies [καθολικωτέρους καὶ ὃς ἀν ἀρχετύπους]. These are such men as lived good and blameless lives, whose virtues stand permanently recorded in the most holy scriptures, not merely to sound their praises but for the instruction of the reader and an inducement to him to aspire to the same [καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας προτέρωσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀμοιον ζήλον ἁγιαζέιν]; for in these men we have laws endowed with life and reason [οἱ γὰρ ἐμψυχοι καὶ λογικοὶ νόμοι ἀνδρες ἐκεῖνοι γεγονόσιν]. (Abr. 1.3-5; trans. Colson in LCL)

Philo goes on to say that Moses extolled these people for two reasons: to show that enacted ordinances do not contradict nature, and to show that those wish-
ing to follow the laws could see that others before them have followed them in their unwritten state with ease, so that one could call the enacted laws “memorials of the life of the ancients [ὑπομνήματα εἶναι βίου τῶν παλαιῶν]” (1.5). Even if one grants rhetorical conceits in such statements, they provide evidence of, and function within, cultural conventions that expect narratives of lives to be paradigmatic.

Charles H. Talbert refers to Philo’s similar treatment of Moses himself as prototype: “Philo, in his ‘Life of Moses’, depicted Moses as a perfect example of Hellenism’s ideal king. Having perceived the invisible good, Moses so modelled his own life after it that he became a paradigm for his subjects. Moses is νόμος ἐμψυχος, the incarnate representation of supreme and universal virtue.”

Lucian’s humorous biography of the philosopher Demonax also uses the rhetoric of presenting a model for aspiring young philosophers to follow: “It is now fitting to tell of Demonax for two reasons—that he may be retained in memory [διὰ μνήμης]... and that young men of good instincts who aspire to philosophy may not have to shape themselves by ancient precedents alone [ἐξοιν μὴ πρὸς τὰ ἄρχων μόνα τῶν παραδειγμάτων σφάς αὐτούς ῥωθμί-ζειν], but may be able to set themselves a pattern from our modern world and to copy that man, the best of all the philosophers whom I know about [ἀλλὰ κὰκ τοῦ ἡμετέρου βίου κανόνα προτίθεσαι καὶ ζηλοῦν ἐκεῖνον ἀριστον δὲν οἶδα ἐγὼ φιλοσόφων γενόμενον]” (Demon. 2; trans. Harmon in LCL).

Imitation of Models in Other Narrative Genres

Not only history and biography, but other narrative genres as well, use narratives as exempla for imitation. The biblical romance Tobit presents Tobit moralistically as a model of obedience to the law (Tob 1:10–12) and of self-sacrificing care of fellow Jews (1:16–20); it also treats Tobias and Sarah’s behavior on their wedding night in a moralistic fashion (8:7). Luke’s familiarity with Tobit and its moralism is supported by Richard I. Pervo’s claim that “Daniel 1–6, with its Greek additions, Tobit, Judith, and Esther, were almost certainly known to the author of Acts.”

Likewise, Sirach’s praise of the fathers (Sir 44:1–50:24) presents poetic narratives of ancestors as inspiring models and both positive and negative types of virtue or sin. Thus, the first ancestor mentioned, Enoch, was taken up as an example of repentance to the generations (μετετέθη ὑπόδειγμα μετα- νοίας ταῖς γενεάξ [44:16]). Although the narrator uses the term ὑπόδειγμα expressly only for Enoch, it is also implied in the ways the other figures are well-known biblical types of virtues or vices. For example, the perfect and

righteous Noah was taken in exchange so that a remnant was left to the earth (44:17). Abraham kept the law and covenant and, when tested, was found faithful (καὶ ἐν πειρασμῷ εὑρέθη πιστός [44:20]), so God swore to him that in his seed the nations would be blessed and they would inherit the land (44:21). The general pattern in these capsuled accounts of ancestors is that good deeds find rewards from God, whereas sinners like Rehoboam and Jeroboam receive God's wrath (cf. 47:23–25). This, of course, is closely related to the Deuteronomic theology and is deeply ingrained in much of Luke's OT.27 Luke's implied readers expected to find in OT narratives both lessons and examples for living as God's people and could be assumed to be alert to such a use of narrative in Luke-Acts.

One particular retributive pattern in Sirach 48 seems to have become a plot outline for Luke-Acts. Just as the wonder-working prophet Elijah was followed by his disciple Elisha, who worked similar miracles, so Jesus the wonder-working prophet like Moses is followed by his wonder-working apostles in Acts: "For all this the people did not repent ['Εν πᾶσιν τούτοις οὐ μετενόησαν ὁ λαός], and they did not forsake their sins, till they were carried away captive from their land and were scattered all over the earth [καὶ διε­σκοριώθησαν ἐν πάσῃ τῇ γῇ]; . . . Some of them did what is pleasing to God, but others multiplied sins" (Sir 48:15–16 RSV). The mixed reception of some believing and some rejecting the Twelve and Paul is a pattern running throughout Acts to its very end, so Jesus' prophecies of the destruction of Jerusalem and captivity among the nations in Luke 21:20–24 were to come true, as had happened after Elijah and Elisha.28 Thus, a pattern in Sirach becomes a typology in Luke-Acts, indicating probable use by Luke of Sirach's hymn to the ancestors. If this is so, then the use of the ancestors as prototypes in Sirach provided yet another model for Luke's own paradigmatic treatment of people in Luke-Acts.

*Implicit Paradigmatic Intentions Elsewhere*

The many explicit references to paradigmatic functions of narratives across a wide spectrum of narratives from the Lukian milieu thus provide support for two contentions of this chapter. First, the fact that a preface or intrusive narrator's aside draws attention to several narratives as examples to be imitated by implied readers warrants the hypothesis that an unobtrusive narrator may also have such an implicit paradigmatic intention in many other narratives in the same works. This seems especially true in the biblical traditions, which use narrative asides far more rarely than do pagan and secular Hellenistic sources. The second contention is that the author of Luke-Acts would be quite familiar with such paradigmatic functions and likely to be using them

even when the normally unobtrusive narrator does not draw explicit attention to that fact. With this in mind, we can look at some examples of possibly paradigmatic uses of narratives in Luke and Acts beyond the explicit exempla in the farewell addresses in Luke 22 and Acts 20.

PARADIGMATIC PORTRAYALS IN LUKE-ACTS

An obvious place to begin looking for implicit paradigmatic narratives is in the Passion of Jesus in Luke, which commentators have long agreed has taken a more martyrrological and less soteriological approach than that of Mark. Brian E. Beck has recently summarized the issues of martyrrological interpretations of the Lukan Passion in view of the imitation-of-Christ motif. Although acknowledging Luke's probable knowledge and use of Daniel and 2 Maccabees, as well as the many martyrrological motifs undoubtedly present in Luke's Passion, Beck argues strongly that many important martyrrological motifs are missing and that something more is at stake than Jesus' dying a martyr's death. It is a consensus that Luke's Passion has no emphasis on death as expiation, which is common in martyrlogies, despite the Eucharistic language of Luke 22:19–20 and the comment in Paul's farewell in Acts 20:28, which more likely indicate partially assimilated tradition than a leading motif in Luke's own narrative. Luke also lacks other martyrdom features like condemnation of persecutors, stress on physical pain, educative value of suffering for Jesus or Stephen, and a clear cause or issue and an easy way to defect (as by eating pork in 2 Macc 6:18–20).

Beck points to the garden scene in Luke 22:39–46 as particularly decisive for interpreting the Lukan Passion account. When his explanation is supplemented by that of Jerome Neyrey and other observations, a strong case emerges for seeing the Lukan redaction as portraying Jesus as a model for imitation. Both Beck and Neyrey argue that the disputed verses of the angel and the blood (22:43–44) are genuine, on internal criteria especially. In any case, the scene focuses on Jesus' struggle against temptation as an example to his disciples and as a contrasting exemplum to their failure to pray lest they succumb to temptation.

The redactional differences from Mark highlight especially Jesus' lesson in

prayer to his disciples. The Lukan introduction emphasizes the customary nature of Jesus’ going to the Mount of Olives and the fact that “the disciples followed him,” setting the stage for a lesson by the master (Luke 22:39; contrast Mark 14:32). Only Luke has Jesus begin by the command “Pray lest you succumb to temptation” (Luke 22:40), which Jesus repeats at the end just before his arrest (22:46), thus providing a frame for his own example to them of praying (22:41–45). In Luke, Jesus keeps all the disciples with him—not just Peter, James, and John, as he does in Mark. Unlike Mark’s portrayal of Jesus’ grief, where he falls on his face and fruitlessly looks three times for support from his closest followers, Luke shifts to the disciples the reference to debilitating grief (22:45) and shows Jesus manfully praying on his knees (22:41). His prayer has echoes of the Pater: πάτερ . . . μη εἰσενέγκης ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμόν (11:1–4). There is a typical Lukan emphasis on the Father’s will (εἰ βούλει . . . πλήν μη τὸ θέλημά μου ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν γινέσθω [22:42]). If 22:43–44 is not genuine, this simple acceptance by Jesus of the Father’s will provides a model of prayer for the disciples, whom he now finds sleeping (therefore missing his example), whom he awakens, and to whom he repeats his instruction to “pray lest you enter into temptation” (22:45–46). If the verses are genuine, Jesus’ example includes evidence of God’s help through an angel and the model of more insistent prayer in the face of intense struggle leading to sweat as drops of blood. In either case, Jesus instructs his disciples on the need to pray lest they enter temptation, then provides his own example of doing just that and rejecting temptation by accepting the Father’s difficult will for him, and finally repeats his instruction to pray not to enter temptation. Because the disciples in the story missed much of Jesus’ example by sleeping, the paradigm is clearly addressed to the implied readers, who are the only witnesses of the entire scene that the narrator depicts.

The death of Jesus in Luke 23 and the death of Stephen modeled on it in Acts 7 also readily come to mind as clearly paradigmatic portrayals in Luke and Acts. The Lukan tendency to downplay negative emotions of Jesus, such as those found in the Markan Passion traditions, is well known. The loud cry of apparent dereliction in Mark and Matthew based on Ps 22:2 is missing in Luke. Instead, Jesus calmly hands over his spirit into his Father’s hands (citing Ps 31:6) as he dies. If Luke 23:34 is genuine, Jesus exemplifies the forgiveness of enemies that he preached, as in Luke 17:3–4 (frequent forgiveness of someone who sins against you), and that he gave as an example of how to pray: “Father . . . forgive us our sins, for we ourselves forgive everyone who is indebted to us” (11:4 RSV). After enduring in silence the mockery of his enemies (23:35–39), Jesus peacefully assures the repentant crucified evildoer who defended him that “today” they would be together in Paradise (23:43). All of this is in sharp contrast to Mark’s picture of Jesus in torment. In Mark, Jesus asks loudly why his Father has abandoned him and dies after a loud cry. The Lukan redactional themes all go in the direction of portraying Jesus as a model of how to die, as Plato had presented Socrates.
The frequently noted similarities between Stephen’s death in Acts 7 and Jesus’ death on the cross confirm one’s initial sense that Lukan redaction has highlighted the paradigmatic aspects of Jesus’ death. Luke accentuates the exemplary aspects of Jesus’ death and passes over emphases on Jesus’ distress that were probably in his sources. By narrating the death of a disciple, Stephen, which echoes the exemplary aspects of Jesus’ death, Luke signals clearly his intention to use Jesus’ death as a model for that of Christians. Thus, like Jesus, Stephen is taken outside the city to be killed (Acts 7:58). Like Jesus, he gives his spirit over as he is about to die, but to the Lord Jesus rather than to the Father (7:59). And Stephen forgives his enemies, which parallels the disputed verse in Luke 23:34. His dying forgiveness of those who killed him, among whom Saul is intrusively mentioned (Acts 7:58; 8:1–3), prepares for Saul’s later conversion in Acts 9, just as Jesus’ forgiveness of those “who know not what they do” at his crucifixion opened the way for their conversion in Acts 2–3 after their sinning in ignorance (Acts 3:17; cf. 13:27; 17:30) by rejecting him.33

Acts provides balancing positive and negative exempla: the good example of Barnabas’ and the negative example of Ananias’s and Sapphira’s giving proceeds to the apostles from their selling of fields (Acts 4:34–5:11). Barnabas obviously embodies the narrator’s generalization that there was no needy person among the believers, but those who had fields sold them and laid the proceeds at the feet of the apostles (4:34–35). In the very next sentence after this general statement, the narrator introduces Barnabas and tells of his sale of a field and how he lay the proceeds at the apostles’ feet (4:36–37). Through the disjunctive particle δέ in the next sentence, the narrator immediately contrasts to Barnabas’s example Ananias’s and Saphhira’s false imitation of that act and of the community principle of laying proceeds from unneeded possessions at the feet (and disposal) of the apostles.34

Neither incident has an obtrusive narrator who applies it to the audience, as so many Hellenistic works do. But the narrator implicitly draws attention to the paradigmatic nature of both good and bad acts. First, the narrator states the general lesson of community sharing and generosity, which in the light of the Jesus tradition can be understood as an inspiration for Christian readers, whether or not strict imitation was envisaged. Next the narrator shows first a positive, then a negative, instance of the principle. After giving the negative case of Ananias and Sapphira, the narrator stresses how fear fell upon all who heard of it (Acts 5:11).35 In light of the frequent drawing of les-
sons from narratives in the Lukan milieu, this bears the mark of a Christian educator using both Barnabas and Ananias and Sapphira as examples for positive and negative imitation in analogous ways in the implied readers’ circumstances. But unlike many Hellenistic intrusive narrators who call attention to such paradigmatic usages, biblical narrators rarely draw explicit morals from their stories, and Luke-Acts imitates the biblical narratives in this respect.36

**IMPLICIT MORAL EXHORTATION TO IMPLIED READERS OF NARRATIVES**

This sampling illustrates the Lukan use of the ancient practice of narrative models for imitation. This section sketches briefly how this archaic Hellenistic practice relates to contemporary literary critical insights into communication with implied readers through narratives. This, in turn, provides a link facilitating ethical use of Lukan (and other biblical) narratives today.

The notion of implied reader implies a communication model for writing and reading: the writer communicates to potential readers concerning some referent.37 In communicating narratives, writers relate to their potential readers real or imaginary events. But since writers are not writing merely for their own amusement but for intended readers, it is legitimate to ask what goals they have in thus narrating events to them. This question plainly overlaps with the ancient rhetorical concerns that influence most writing from the Lukan milieu. Narratives that Hellenistic rhetoric would treat as models for behavior would, in this contemporary approach, be aimed at influencing the implied readers. Ancient rhetoric can thus provide clues for contemporary literary readings of a text. Hellenistic rhetoric indicates the likelihood that the author of Luke-Acts intended some of his narratives about Jesus and the disciples to be models for behavior. This provides in the text itself a justification for contemporary uses of such stories as models, that such uses are in continuity with the original intentions of the text and not mere eisegesis or pious accommodation.

Thus, the Hellenistic rhetorical paradigmatic use of narratives provides a

36. These are some among many possible samples of narrative paradigms in Luke-Acts. Other presentations of Jesus as model include the following instances: victory over temptation (Luke 4:1–13), persistent prayer (6:12; 9:18, 28; 11:1–13; 18:1), positive and negative examples of resolute obedience to God (9:51–53 vs. 9:57–62), friendship with sinners (15:1–2), ministry to sinners (19:1–10), and confronting unjust accusation (22:66–23:12). This list is adapted from Lilley, “Paradigm.”

grounding in the text for typical ethical, homiletic, and other church uses of Lukan stories as models for contemporary Christian behavior. Such paradigmatic uses of Luke-Acts today are in continuity with the paradigmatic uses originally envisaged for such texts. Although hermeneutical considerations are evidently required when spanning centuries and cultures, Lukan narrative does provide models for imitation, not only for Luke’s original implied readers but also for Christians today.

The Luke-Acts narratives have never legitimately been interpreted as primarily moralistic, but the use of some of them as models for imitation is one of their functions. This is indicated not only by the rhetorical expectations concerning many kinds of narratives from the biblical and Hellenistic milieus, including Luke-Acts, but by the fact that Luke and Acts themselves have also been used for moral examples throughout Christian history. Here there is space to mention only some obvious instances. Early Christian martyr literature, such as the Martyrdom of Polycarp, seems to have been influenced by Stephen’s death in imitation of his Lord’s in Acts. The Western monastic tradition provides a second conspicuous example of imitation of Acts narratives. In its origins, monasticism interpreted the Acts summaries about sharing of goods as ethico-religious models for imitation and considered itself as literally imitating their ideals and practices. Luke T. Johnson has proposed the “Council of Jerusalem” in Acts 15 as a model for community decision making. The Lukan Gospel has provided Christians of many generations and cultures even more models for Christian reflection and imitation than has Acts. Thus, Mary’s Magnificat canticle has frequently been interpreted, especially in liberation exegesis, as encouraging and exemplifying a preferential option for the poor by Christians. The story of Martha and Mary has for centuries been interpreted as a model for the contemplative calling. Jesus’ word of forgiveness on the cross has from earliest times to the present been held up in homilies as a model of forgiveness of one’s enemies.

This survey of Hellenistic rhetorical ideals and examples from Luke-Acts and its milieu indicates that many such common paradigmatic uses of Luke-Acts are not far from the original intention of the text. A significant number of the narratives in Luke and Acts are specially shaped and redacted to provide clear models for imitation by implied readers.