Towards a Latin American Political Philosophy of/for the United States: From the Discovery of America to Immigrant Encounters

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in African American Philosophy: Disclosing the Existential Phenomenological Foundations of Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Continuing Significance of Race,” describes Yancy’s project as making a major shift in African American philosophy toward an existential phenomenological approach. Headley highlights one of Yancy’s objectives as justifying the legitimacy of the issue of race on an existential basis. According to Headley, Yancy accomplishes this through a phenomenological analysis of the concrete lived experiences of Black persons, focusing on the body. The meaning of the Black self is, in part, a constructed historical reality, one in which the white gaze plays a significant role. Finally, David Clinton Wills provides a short review of Yancy’s Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Continuing Significance of Race.

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ARTICLES

Towards a Latin American Political Philosophy of/for the United States: From the Discovery of America to Immigrant Encounters
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It could be said that the phrase “Latin American political philosophy” is a pleonasm at best, a tautology at worse. Much of what is considered “Latin American philosophy” consists of inquiries related to politics, social organization, cultural authenticity, and economic independence or development, not to mention the fact that many Latin American philosophers have held some type of political office or civil service position throughout their lives.1 Jorge J. E. Gracia refers to the political orientation of Latin American philosophy in his entry in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy:

It is difficult to characterize Latin American Philosophy in a way applicable to all of its 500-year history. The most one can say is that, in contrast with European and Anglo-American philosophy, it has maintained a strong human and social interest, has been consistently affected by Scholastic and Catholic thought, and has significantly affected the social and political institutions in the region. Latin American philosophers tend to be active in the educational, political, and social lives of their countries and deeply concerned with their own cultural identity.2

Iván Márquez ventures so far as to suggest that the political tendency of Latin American thought might even be considered a principle.3 He writes, “Latin America is a place where thought and action are often seen as going together. The line between thinkers and doers is not easily demarcated. The word and the deed, in many cases, go hand in hand. And many times, words are seen as deeds.” Márquez continues, “Many Latin Americans use the word praxis to identify this thinking for/about/in action, and in many cases, this kind of active thought or thoughtful act is further regarded as transformative or liberatory [sic].”4 It is in this line of thought that I attempt to rethink the political axioms that emerge from but also support interpretations of the initial meetings between the indigenous inhabitants of America and the European colonizers.

I focus on two paradigmatic understandings of this event: for some “America” was discovered while for others it was encountered. Equally complex and debatable, these historical interpretations provide a means of differentiating the theoretical landscape of political thought in all of the Americas, i.e., “the politics of discovery” and “the politics of encounter (encuentro).” While most literature regarding the debate between “encounter” and “discovery” concerns the perspective(s) represented by each term (i.e., either European, “Latin American,” mestizo/a and indigenous), encuentro and discovery characterize different responses to multiculturalism, different notions of the state, and (consequently) alternative conceptions of state-membership, i.e., citizenship.5 Ultimately, I suggest that the politics of encuentro are better for dealing with the migratory and multicultural nature of twenty-first-century societies—hence a Latin American political philosophy for the United States.

My understanding of discovery and encuentro correspond with what I take to be the two fundamental questions at the base of all political philosophy in America: the justification of the initial settler colonies in what became the United States and the justification of Iberian conquest in what became Latin America. The politics of encuentro acknowledge the fact that nation-states are sites where different people come together and interact, building heterogeneous bonds that transcend borders. The politics of discovery, as I will frame it here, assumes an enclosed, self-sufficient polity that privileges homogeneity through exclusionary practices such as cultural assimilation. My main contention is the following: If we can rethink the nature of the state in a way that recognizes its dependence upon such things as cultural diversity, third world labor, an immigrant workforce, and international commerce, perhaps this can inform us of alternative conceptions of state-membership and civil participation that are fluid, grounded in material need and connected to actual political communities.

The first section of this paper expands upon the paradigm of discovery. My goal is to link this paradigm to what Carole Pateman calls “the settler society.”6 The second section presents the political possibilities that exist within the paradigm of encuentro. Latin American immigrants in the United States offer an alternative framework for how to think about the state (and thus citizenship) from their experience of living in foreign lands amongst others of different ways of life—hence a Latin American political philosophy of the United States. An implicit
goal of this paper is to place Latin American philosophy into conversation with Anglo-American social and political thought. In this light, I suggest that political liberalism (the dominant political philosophy of Anglo-America) has maintained domestic or “nationalistic” tendencies that resemble settler-oriented commitments. Getting past these limitations is perhaps the next hurdle for political liberalism and those concerned with social justice in its broadest sense.

I. United States Settlerism and the Discovery of America

“Discovery” is the dominant interpretation of the events of 1492 in the Anglo-American world. In a place like the United States, where the national character of the country is said to be historically Anglo-Protestant, the discovery of America signifies a barren land, empty of real human inhabitants. The most apparent manifestation of this line of thought is the appropriation of the term “American” to describe the citizens of the United States—as if the only Americans that exist live within the boundaries of the United States. Founded upon the idea of empty land, or what Pateman calls terra nullius, the politics of discovery lends itself to a nationalism that requires cultural assimilation or amalgamation—the idea that all immigrants should conform to Anglo-American tradition and culture if they want to live in the United States and be “American.”

The link between the paradigm of discovery and assimilative expectations is the settler society, a self-sustaining, enclosed community of transplanted individuals (Europeans) living in a recently colonized or “new” region. In Contract and Domination (coauthored with Charles Mills), Pateman argues that the question of legitimacy is unavoidable for the settler societies of Great Britain, e.g., the United States and Australia. Historical justifications, which draw heavily from John Locke, among others, bypass any debate about whether the initial colonies of Great Britain were predicated on conquest or colonialism, the former being the outright declaration of war against natives while the latter is the establishment of a settlement. For Pateman, the idea of terra nullius in addition to the rights of husbandry help justify British colonial enterprises by referring to unused land and the absence of formal government (European forms of sovereignty) amongst native people. In this manner “conquest” is said to be a nonissue at the beginning of the United States (although one can argue that after Manifest Destiny, the appropriation of Mexican land, and other American imperial projects conquest is now a central concern).

Settlerism connected to terra nullius serves two purposes: First, it explains how and why countries like the United States can lay claim to the land that they exist on. In an area lacking sovereign inhabitants or where indigenous people fail to recognize the full potential of the land they live on, early colonial thinkers saw the potential for justifying appropriation. By positing terra nullius, apologists of European imperialism created a clean slate (using the language of “state of nature”) from where social compacts could be created. As Pateman argues, the supposed social contracts that pervade modern conceptions of government legitimize sovereign authority using a rhetoric of emptiness that simultaneously provides land rights and hegemonic power, since according to modern standards no state could be formed in an area with competing sovereigns. As the idea of sovereignty transitions from that of a monarch to that of a people, the second purpose of terra nullius comes into play.

The settler question provides a means through which ethnic and racial homogeneity is first situated in the colony and then maintained in the nation. This sentiment is expressed well by John Jay in Federalist Paper No. 2:

With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people—a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and independence.

Eduardo H. Galeano makes a similar point when he writes, The Mayflower pilgrims did not cross the sea to obtain legendary treasures; they came mainly to establish themselves with their families and to reproduce in the New World the system of life and work they had practiced in Europe. They were not soldiers of fortune but pioneers; they came not to conquer but to colonize, and their colonies were settlements.

Historically, the settler societies of New England did not live amongst natives and form mixed communities like the Iberian Conquistadors did in what became Latin America. Inherent to the sovereignty claims expressed by settler communities seeking national independence was the idea that they do so as an organized and distinguished polity. Familial relations, ethnicity, or religion tended to be that which differentiated settler societies from native peoples or other groups. However, when such things as kinship serve as the basis of political communities, the types of national identities that result exhibit a logic of exclusion and understandings of racial purity that culminate in hypodentist theories of race or neo-nativist sentiments which argue for a unifying culture.

By maintaining exclusive communities of ethnically or culturally European people—in terms of legal citizenship this was obvious with Chinese Exclusion, the denial of Women’s rights, Jim Crow law, anti-Irish and Italian immigration, and more recently against undocumented peoples—one can view the United States as a full partner in colonial projects of the North Atlantic (which is a point that demonstrates the difference between “post-colonial” and “de-colonial”). Today, the fight to maintain the uniformity of United States national identity, amidst the growing minority-majority population, is an attempt to maintain the legacy of imperial hegemony. Thus, nationalisms that incorporate assimilative ideals require that immigrants integrate into the dominant social group when seeking admission into the body politic of a country such as the United States—assuming that full admission is possible in the first place. Arguments in favor of assimilation arise from the concern that multiculturalism and the existence of immigrant or minority cultural enclaves may result in the division or balkanization of the country. Here, the price for official membership is an individual’s cultural existence. With assimilative nationalisms, cultural influence is one directional: immigrants must conform and not the dominant national group. The paradigm of discovery, in this sense, establishes a framework from where one can justify the exclusive right to land and the subsequent right to determine the meaning of “American.” In this setting, immigrants and the subsequent children of immigrant peoples forever maintain an outsider positioning that preempts the possibility of being a part of the United States (unless one is willing to buy into the politics of discovery). Here, the United States nation is a static idea based on a fiction of solitude and uniformity.
II. The Politics of Encounter: Towards a Latino/a Political Philosophy

Thinking about the political existence of Latino/as and Latin American immigrants in the United States is predicated on different axioms than the legacy of much Anglo-American political thought. Political issues regarding Latino/as do not presuppose land to be open and ripe for the taking. Through the lens of migration, Latin American immigrants arrive into populated or occupied territories. For migrants, the political question is one where dealing with differences and being “extra-national” cannot be ignored. As Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Ramon Grosfugel, and Jose Saldivar write, “Migrants do not arrive to an empty or neutral space.” Histories of colonialism and hierarchies of power pollute the political spaces where immigrants seek to go. Thus, for Latin American immigrants, and by association Latino/as who are already in the United States, a different political question needs asking. Rather than assuming a political philosophy that begins with the idea of emptiness, from where abstract principles of ownership can be formulated (i.e., settler contract), Latino/as start from trans-national predicaments grounded in the politics of encuentro.

For many, the only significance of “encounter” is the fact that people were in the Americas before Europeans arrived. A “discovery” took place only from a Eurocentric perspective. I interpret encuentro only as the “con-fron-tation” of different people, the historical fact of a coming together. My interests are in the political significance of what happens when “peoples meet,” to borrow a line from Alain Locke. Often times these meetings end violently. When this occurs war and eventually conquest begin. War develops when the appropriation and control of land/resources are in the background—this tends to be the case when indigenous politicians win a majority of votes in Latin American countries or when it appears as though Mexicans are taking over southwestern United States.

In this light, the paradigm of encounter has been viewed with much suspicion. Enrique Dussel issues a warning and implicit criticism in the following: “If the meeting (encuentro) of two worlds were to signify the new hybrid, syncretistic culture that the mestizo race is articulating, its content would be acceptable. Popular culture in its own creative consciousness would then be producing this meeting, and not the brutal event of conquest.” The concern is that “encounter” refers to a clash that ended in conquest. I take Dussel’s concerns further: I am weary of the traps of “mestizaje” and other unifying narratives in Latin America (encounter being one). Often times, as José Vasconcelos’s Raza Cósmica can attest to, mestizo or mixed-race identities are used in nation-building projects. These nationalism glorify the dead Indian but ignore the one in front of them. When heroes of mestizaje such as Vasconcelos employ the idea of a coming racial synthesis (it is always off in the distance, which permits the status-quo to remain) they note the whitening or Eurocentric demand and expectation for indigenous conformity. Mario Saenz, amongst others, calls this a “bourgeois mestizaje” compared to a “mestizaje from below.”

However, extending the idea of encounter, I argue that it is a better framework for dealing with questions of multiculturalism and perhaps even national-citizenship than is discovery. Encuentro lends itself to a political philosophy that responds to people whose existence in the United States is predicated upon internationality, i.e., people who, regardless of their citizenship status, have historically represented a “non-American” identity. In addition, encounters do not have to end in violence. This framework highlights the shared ethical responsibilities that people have for maintaining their places of residence or dwelling. Countries like the United States must recognize that maintaining one’s place of dwelling requires the social and economic contributions provided by alienated portions of society, those “on the outside of nationality.”

In his attempt to formulate a definition of justice, Socrates makes a similar claim about the interdependence of nation-states (for him the “polis”) in The Republic: “It’s almost impossible to establish a city [polis] in a place where nothing has to be imported. […] So we’ll need yet further people to import from other cities whatever is needed. […] Therefore, our citizens must not only produce enough for themselves at home, but also goods of the right quality and quantity to satisfy the requirements of others.” Interestingly enough, by assuming bordered, self-enclosed polities, the basic assumptions of Anglo-American political philosophy are counter to that of encuentro. This renders such issues as undocumented immigration or justice for immigrants an international question separate from basic conceptions of society or justice. Take John Rawls, for example, the most influential political philosopher of the twentieth century. A Theory of Justice confines the basic elements of justice to a “closed system,” a self-sufficient society assumed to be isolated from others. The theory of the state that arises from this perspective can be understood as the inheritor of modern colonial forms of social arrangement, namely, the settler society. While it can be argued that Rawls’s project is meant to supply a simple theory of justice that can be used to later resolve more complex questions, there are some obvious problems with a basic conception of justice that alienates upwards of twelve million undocumented people. When justice is construed in ways that allow only “official” members of a country to benefit, we confine the scope, range, and meaning of justice.

In the twenty-first century, it is no longer possible to understand social justice in its most basic form within closed (or bordered) frameworks. Migration, trans-national corporations, and multinational people challenge the possibility of formulating theories of justice that ignore the international elements of twenty-first-century societies. Likewise, given the legacies of social oppression visible within gender or racial differences, questions of reparations, affirmative actions policies, and other redistributive procedures necessitate a trans-historical approach to justice. As Maldonado-Torres, et al., write, “The old way of thinking about migration is obsolete today given the compression of space and time.” One cannot think of space as enclosed or isolated nor can time be viewed outside of the causal relationships that generate each particular moment. In considering the nature of justice, these new ideas of time and space must be acknowledged.

While I do not expect the paradigm of encounter to create immediate immigration reform, I do think it will put political thinkers on the path towards alternative bases for state-membership. The need to rethink citizenship is upon political philosophers in the twenty-first century. Even though climate change, depleting natural resources, war, and economic hardships are expected to increase human movement across the globe, state sovereignty does not appear to be going away. Thus, conceptions of state-membership (in both the legal and national sense) that can accommodate the existence of borders and yet make them less relevant in our everyday life are needed. Rather than starting as pure national, Latino/as begin from inter-national predicaments, with foreign nationality, race, ethnicity, and even culture serving as the signifiers of this status. With a notion of state-membership that begins “inter-subjectively,” the model for social interaction is not assimilation but asimilagao, an idea that fosters reciprocal cultural exchanges between immigrants and other “extra-national” individuals.
This is perhaps a better model for the state in the age of human migration. Human interests are better served by taking encounters for what they are, meetings, and trying to foster a sense of dialogue and mutual respect that does not alienate significant portions of society nor ignore the legal demands of civil participants who lack proper identification.

Endnotes

1. For an extensive list (over 200) of Latin American philosophers in Latin America, the Caribbean, and the United States, with short biographical notes, see El pensamiento filosófico latinoamericano, del Caribe y “latino”[1300-2000]: Historia, Corrientes, Terrazas, Filósofos, Eds. Enrique Dussel, Eduardo Mendiesta, Carmen Bohórquez (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno, 2009), pp. 701-993. In general, the political nature of Latin American philosophy can be characterized in three ways: nation-building (here I include colonial and “post-colonial” thought), nation-fixing (developmentalism, dependency theory, positivism), and nation-transcending (decolonial thought, transmodernity, recent indigenous politics, pan-Latin Americanisms, Hispanic philosophy in the United States). I lay out an argument for these divisions, and its philosophical ramifications, in the forthcoming The Political Nature of Latin American Philosophy: Nation-Building, Nation-Fixing, Nation-Transcending (unpublished manuscript).


4. Iván Márquez, p. xi. It can be argued that any philosophical perspective that takes colonialism and subjugation as its starting points will maintain a fundamental political orientation. In this sense, the impetus for political action has always been a part of philosophy in Latin America. However, individuals such as Risieri Frondizi suggest that all Latin American philosophy wades in the wake of practice after Latin American positivism. Thus, what set Latin American thought onto its path towards praxis and the political remains controversial. See Risieri Frondizi, “Is There an Ibero-American Philosophy?” In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 9 (March 1949): 349 & 355.

5. For more on the different perspectives represented by the paradigms I offer see Walter Mignolo, The Idea of America (Mass: Blackwell, 2005). Along these lines, the idea of “invention” is sometimes an alternative to discovery and encounter; see Edmund O’Gorman, La invención de America (Mexico: FCE, 1961). However, I see invention as one understanding of the nature of America connected to the paradigm of discovery. As Dussel and others have argued, it’s after America is covered-over that it is then “dis-covered.” The process of discovery thus refers to human ingenuity as it relates to the inventing of a continent.


7. Here I am using “citizen” in a way that corresponds to “nationality,” “nation,” or “peoples,” i.e., as in being an “American national.” I do not necessarily mean legal-citizenship. Nonetheless, national-citizenship does influence opinion over legal citizenship, in the sense that only those who enforce or ensure the legacy of the American people should be entitled to the rights and privileges that come with legal status. This tends to be what political philosophers mean when they refer to multicultural citizenship. For more on the link between legal-citizenship and national-citizenship, in addition to migration numbers, see Will Kymlicka, “Immigration, Citizenship, Multiculturalism: Exploring the Links,” The Political Quarterly Publishing Company (Malden: Blackwell, 2003).


10. For more on the difference between conquest and colonialism see Pateman and Mills, p. 44. Pateman intentionally ignores Manifest Destiny, the invasion of Mexico, and incorporation of Hawaii since these are outside her scope (p. 38, n. 6). Part of my argument in this paper is that with the rise of Latino/as in the United States, the paradigm of discovery is becoming less pertinent to the story of America. Instead, the paradigm of encuentro (which connects to conquest) is better for dealing with the history of the United States and the reality of United States society.

11. For the explicit use of “state of nature,” see Pateman and Mill, pp. 46-52. For more on autonomy and modern political theory, see Pateman and Mill, p. 39.


14. An obvious example is the encomienda system used in Latin America. Encomiendas were segments of land where an Iberian master was given control of a large tract of land populated by indigenous people. Native nobility, or Caçiques, were often given leadership roles in between the natives and Iberian masters.

15. It is possible to argue that the differing colonial projects of Anglo-America and Iberian-America created two different understandings of race. Given the current intermixing and exchange of people due to migration and globalization, one can even hold that there is a growing “Hispanization” of race in the United States. See Eduardo Mendieta, “The Making of New Peoples,” Hispanics/Latinos in the United States: Ethnicity, Race and Rights, edited by Jorge J. E. Gracia and Paolo De Nettas (New York: Routledge, 2008). Mendieta writes, “In the Americas...racial formations have coalesced around two axes: in the United States around the axis of domination and exclusion, in Latin America around the axis of hegemony and inclusion. Latin American racial formations are defined by mestizaje, multiracial group inclusion and color differentiation. Racial hegemony is maintained through co-optive incorporation and reinterpretation. U.S. racial formations are defined by hypodescent, strict phenotypic differentiation that polarizes into biracial categories. Racial domination is maintained through exclusion, marginalization and repression” (pp. 56).


19. For Hispanics, an imagined foreign status is based on skin color, language traits (like an accent or bilingualism), cultural habits, or ethnicity. Ètienne Balibar credits this imagined foreign status to the creation of “hyper-bounders,” i.e., walled, militarized divides between two countries. Hyper borders create distinctions between friend (insider) and enemy (outsider). The increased militarization of the border blurs the line between enemy and stranger. In a nation-state threatened by undocumented immigrants (“enemies”), strangers who...

20. My idea of “transnationalism” is indebted to Dussel’s notion of transmodernity. I emphasize the prefix ‘trans’ in order to express the fact that Hispanic identity ventures beyond the confines of a single nation or “peoples”; they transverse the boundaries of a single national group. Thus, by “transnational” I imply that Latino/as in the United States are extra-national or nationally ambiguous, their national affiliations either include more than one nation (such as “American” and “Mexican”) or they simply lack any national affiliation at all. Octavio Paz captured the last with his idea of the Pachuco, a person of Latin American descent who neither identifies with the United States nor Mexico. See Paz’s Labyrinth of Solitude (New York: Grove Press, 1985). Transnationalism also connects to the fact that this is a social positioning that begins from migrant peoples, i.e., people on the move, in transit. Thus, there is an international aspect found in “transnational” missing in scholarly uses of “multinationalism,” where a nation-state is said to contain more than one peoples or nations based on a constitutional federalist framework. In particular I have in mind James Tully’s use of “multinationalism.” See Multinational Democracies, edited by Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 2-4.

21. For Enrique Dussel the term “discovery” not only begins from a European perspective but also requires at least two different moments of European understanding. The first covers ower America by mistaking it for Asia; the second dis-covers the mistaken identity but posits a historicized identity altogether. Similarly, the idea of “encounter” (encuen tro) has a long and controversial history of debate in Latin America, especially Mexico. See Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of “the Other” and the Myth of Modernity (New York: Continuum, 1995), chapter 4, especially note 24.

22. Notice how the Spanish frontera (border) and the English frontier share the Latin frons as their root. The original meaning of frons refers to the “front brow” on a human face. Broken down further, this word also refers to that foremost part of an object, that which would come into contact with other things (the boundaries of a nation). Hence the idea of exchange or encounter between borders is derivative of this root. Add the prefix con to this, or “with,” and one has “confrontation,” not in a negative sense but one inclined towards meetings.


25. This is a lesson the United States must learn when it is said that the presidency of Barack Obama points towards a “post-racial America.” For more on Latin American nation-building see Janet Burke and Ted Humphrey (Eds. & Trans.), Nineteenth-Century Nation Building and the Latin American Intellectual Tradition: A Reader (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007).

26. See José Vasconcelos, The Cosmic Race/La Raza Cósmica: A Bilingual Edition, La Raza Cósmica (Maryland: John Hopkins Press, 1973). Vasconcelos writes, “The lower types of species will be absorbed by the superior type. In this manner, for example, the Black could be redeemed, and step by step, by voluntary extinction, the uglier stocks will give way to the more handsome. Inferior races, upon being educated, would become less prolific, and the better species would go on ascending a scale of ethnic improvement, whose maximum type is not precisely White, but that new race to which the White himself will have to aspire with the object of conquering that synthesis” (p. 32).


28. I use the phrase “the outside of nationality” in a similar way to how philosophers of liberation have referred to “the underside of modernity.” In the same way that one cannot understand modernity without the violent sub-narrative known as colonialism, one cannot understand nationality and nationalism without those exclusive practices that alienate and marginalize others.

29. Plato, The Republic (Book II: 369-71).

30. John Rawls. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap, 1971), 8. Rawls argues that his main object of inquiry is justice, the basic structure of society. As such, Rawls seeks out a simple conception of justice and, in this light, limits his project in one way: after noting that he is “concerned with a special case of the problem of justice,” he writes, “I shall be satisfied if it is possible to formulate a reasonable conception of justice for the basic structure of society conceived for the time being as a closed system isolated from other societies” (p. 6-7). In a later work, Rawls reemphasizes this limitation when he states, “In developing a Law of Peoples the first step is to work out the principles of justice for domestic society. Here the original position takes into account only persons contained within such a society, since we are not considering relations with other societies. That position views society as closed: persons enter only by birth, and exit only by death.” John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 26. See also John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, edited by Erin Kelly (Cambridge: Belknap, 2001), 11-14. I take issue with this limitation since it renders the question of social justice for undocumented people an afterthought. And, as stated above, this limitation reveals some knowledge about the individuals behind the veil of ignorance: they will be citizens (although we may not know if they are poor, rich, Black, White, Gay, able-bodied, etc.).

31. See Mills’s contribution to Contract and Domination for more on this intergenerational concept of justice. Insofar as political liberalism is concerned, see my project as trying to do to space what Mills does to time.


33. See Balibar, “Strangers as Enemies,” for more on this idea of borders or what he calls “cosmopolitics” (see note 19 above).


Is There an Ethics of Racial Political Solidarity?1

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Racial political solidarity has been discussed by a range of philosophers and political theorists in the United States, often in the context of Black-White relations. Tommie Shelby, for example, offers a sympathetic defense of Black unity in the interests of racial justice.2 Similarly, in a recent book, Julie Hooker articulates some key elements of political solidarity (Hooker 2009). She suggests that for many Western political thinkers, one of the key issues in political solidarity concerns “how to generate feelings of mutual obligation between citizens who are radically different from one another [or] [h]ow citizens

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