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Navy, Modernized 1868-1894 [Encyclopedia Entry]

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a naval squadron led by U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry forced the *bakufu* to sign a treaty that ended national isolation by allowing a consul-general to reside in Japan, and Townsend Harris came to take up this post in 1856. He demanded and got a shōgunal audience at which he extorted a full-blown trade pact from *bakufu* leader Ii Naosuke—just as China was suffering defeat in the second Opium War in 1858. Ii signed the treaty, in a decision that countermanded the orders of the emperor in Kyoto, not the emperor in Beijing. This defiant act stirred up violent nationalistic opposition, first among samurai from Mito domain, who murdered Ii in 1860, and later throughout the nation as well. In 1863, two other Nativist hotbeds, the Chōshū and Satsuma domains, executed the expulsion edict that *bakufu* leaders had earlier rescinded, only to suffer a sound trouncing at the hands of modern Western armed forces. Random acts of violence against Westerners by individual samurai also met a similar fate. These abject failures persuaded younger samurai leaders to admit the impossibility of “honoring the emperor” and “expelling the barbarians,” so they took the step of disestablishing their own class privileges and ending Tokugawa *bakufu* rule so as to restore the imperial court to power.

To sum up, by discrediting the Chinese world order and tribute system abroad, and by calling into question the bases of warrior supremacy at home, Nativism provided grounds for ethnic nationalism and imperial sovereignty to emerge in Japan by the mid-19th century. The key ideas in Nativism were as follows:

1. The Japanese are superior to all other peoples for having spontaneously revered a divine imperial dynasty throughout history.
2. Japan’s emperor, not China’s, invested Tokugawa shōguns with ruling authority but did so on condition that they uphold national isolation, which perforce meant preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity.
3. That point required shōguns to expel unauthorized foreigners who forced their way into Japan and the ruling warrior class to live up to its *Bushidō* ideology.
4. Failure on those counts would justify ending *bakufu* rule and the warrior class in the name of imperial loyalism, and creating a new polity and a commoner conscript army better suited to carrying out the preceding tasks.

Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi

See also: Ii Naosuke; *Kokutai* and Ultrationalism; Mito School; Perry, Matthew; *Sakoku*; Tokugawa *Bakufu* Political System; Toyotomi Hideyoshi.

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Navy, Modernized (1868–1894)

Much like the modern Japanese army, the Japanese navy in 1868 was hodgepodge of

men, equipment, and facilities. Although it was initially subordinate to the army, the government gradually centralized the navy, updated its fleet, expanded shipbuilding facilities initiated by the Tokugawa shōgunate, sent foreign students abroad for training, and adopted and adapted the best practices of Western countries to form the most efficient navy in East Asia, which even rivaled some Western armadas.

During the early 17th century, the Tokugawa shōgunate banned the construction of ocean-going vessels and limited Japan's interaction with Western countries. By the 1850s, the growing European presence in the East Asian seas convinced the shōgunate to lift this ban. It called upon the large domains—in particular, Satsuma, Chōshū, Kaga, and Tosa—to develop and expand their coastal defenses and naval technology. This was a decentralized effort; the shōgunate relied on the Dutch to build a naval training center in Nagasaki, sent students to Holland for further training, and later turned to the French for help. French representatives in Japan were enthusiastic partners of the shōgunate, despite wavering support back in France. The shōgunate, under the direction of Oguri Tadamasu and Kurimoto Joun, invited the French engineer Francois Verny, who had been building a shipyard in China, to build facilities in Japan. Verny chose Yokosuka as the location to build an iron foundry, arsenal, and dry dock; construction began in 1865. The French also opened a school in Yokosuka to train future Japanese navy men, which included classes in mathematics and French language. Satsuma, in contrast, purchased ships and arms from the British.

By the Meiji Restoration (1868), the domains mentioned previously possessed between 5 and 12 steamships. Most of the ships were obsolete by Western standards,

having few armaments and little power, and, in many cases, represented nothing more than glorified transport barges. One American observer noted that Japan became the market for Western countries looking to sell their outdated ships. Naval considerations played little role in the fighting during the Restoration. One of the shōgunate's top naval men, Katsu Kaishū, who negotiated the capitulation of the Tokugawa forces, turned over some of the Tokugawa ships to the Satchō-led forces, while the rest were commandeered by the Enomoto Takeaki. Enomoto took the shōgunate's remaining fleet north to Hakodate, where he led a final battle against Satchō troops. He eventually surrendered, and returned the ships.

During the early Meiji period (1868–1912), concerns about a naval conflict with Western countries gave way to a focus on bolstering the Japanese army against invasion and possible domestic uprisings. Politics also favored the army's development over the navy—many early naval officials were former shōgunate officials, including those few who had any naval experience, such as Katsu Kaishū and Enomoto. Both men became navy ministers, but even they lacked significant knowledge of the sea. Still, the dearth of equipment and any significant naval tradition meant that the Meiji state could draw from a broad range of Western naval philosophies and new technologies. In 1870, the state officially adopted the British navy as its model, sending students to Great Britain for training, funding a British mission to Japan, and translating British naval texts. The British also helped the Japanese create a naval war college, and acquired the first ships specifically built for the Japanese market, which used the most recent technology.

The navy's importance grew during the 1880s. It received a larger share of the

military budget and attracted greater attention from the Meiji oligarchs, especially after Satchō men began to dominate the top navy positions. Several statesman, such as Iwakura Tomomi, argued that a country's standing in the world was displayed by its navy's prowess—a position that represented a shift from older naval concerns over defense of the homeland to Japan as an imperial player. New French naval developments continued to influence the Japanese navy, especially a controversial organizational philosophy called the “Jeune Ecole.” Rather than the relying on bulky fleet consisting of large warships, like the British model, this French school of thought emphasized small to medium-sized ships armed with light, fast-firing guns, especially torpedo ships. This model provided a solution to Japan's financial weaknesses; it could not afford a complete British-style fleet. Even so, Japan never completely abandoned its relationship with the British navy; in 1892, it purchased the *Yoshino*, the fastest cruiser in the world at the time.

Administratively, the Japanese navy finally became independent during the 1880s. Under the old British model, the top navy minister was beholden to a civilian bureaucracy; in contrast, the army followed the Prussian model and staffed its bureaucracy with royalty and others with direct links to the monarch. The state changed this model, creating a navy ministry that maintained equal footing with the army. This exacerbated competition between the army and navy for the public's attention and budget appropriations. One political strategy on the navy's part was to encourage a shared vision among citizens, businessmen, and politicians, to expand into the South Pacific (called “Nan'yō”) which could become a place for migration, possible colonization, and adventure. The

navy's attention southward rivaled the army's push toward the Asian continent, a source of tension that would never be resolved.

On the eve of Japan's first modern wars against China and Russia, the navy shifted from a haphazard mix of obsolete Western ships to one capable of defeating a navy as large as Russia's. Japan's initial naval weaknesses did not, however, put it too far behind the West; even during the 19th century, there was no consensus about how a navy should operate or how it should be equipped. Japan's naval modernization reflected the shifting trends in the West, allowing it to catch up quickly.

Michael Wert

See also: Imperial Rescript for Soldiers and Sailors; Iwakura Tomomi; Katsu Kaishū; Russo-Japanese War; World War I.

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New Guinea Campaign (March 8, 1942–September 13, 1945)

On January 23, 1942, Japanese forces under Major General Horii Tomitaro invaded New Britain, New Guinea, capturing Rabaul from its Australian garrison, known as Lark Force. Moving into mainland New Guinea on March 8, Japanese forces then occupied