Document Type
Contribution to Book
Language
eng
Format of Original
19 p.
Publication Date
3-7-2013
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Source Publication
Handbook on Professional Economic Ethics: View from the Economics Profession and Beyond
Source ISSN
9780199766635
Abstract
This chapter examines economists’ indefensible attachment to the positive-normative distinction, and suggests a behavioral economics explanation of their behavior on the subject. It reviews the origins of the distinction in Hume’s guillotine and logical positivism, and shows how they form the basis for Robbins’ understanding of value neutrality. It connects philosophers’ rejection of logical positivism to their rejection of the positive-normative distinction, explains and modifies Putnam’s view of fact-value entanglement, and identifies four main ethical value judgments that contemporary economists employ. The behavioral explanation of economists’ denial of these value judgments emphasizes loss aversion and economists’ social identity as economists
Recommended Citation
Davis, John B., "Economists' Odd Stand on the Positive-Normative Distinction: A Behavioral Economics View" (2013). Economics Faculty Research and Publications. 476.
https://epublications.marquette.edu/econ_fac/476
Comments
Published Version. "Economists' Odd Stand on the Positive-Normative Distinction: A Behavioral Economics View", in Handbook on Professional Economic Ethics: View from the Economics Profession and Beyond. Eds. G. DeMartino and D. McCloskey. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. DOI. © 2013 Oxford University Press. Used with permission.