Document Type

Conference Proceeding

Language

eng

Publication Date

1994

Publisher

Foundation Journal Public Finance

Source Publication

Public Finance - Finances Publiques

Source ISSN

0033-3476

Abstract

This paper presents an empirical model distinguishing evaders who cheat by filing fraudulent income tax returns from those who do not file. Using a maximum-likelihood procedure that corrects for sample selection bias, and data from Michigan's amnesty program, we estimate a linear probability model which relates the probability of filing to various economic and demographic characteristics. The results indicate that higher true income and automatic withholding raise the probability of filing, while males and single individuals are less likely to file. The evidence regarding a grouping of occupations often thought to be association with evasion is inconclusive.

Comments

Published version. Published as part of the proceedings of the conference, 49th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, 1993: 106-116. © 1994 Foundation Journal Public Finance.

Included in

Economics Commons

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