Document Type
Article
Language
eng
Format of Original
20 p.
Publication Date
Summer 2004
Publisher
The Clute Institute
Source Publication
Journal of Applied Business Research
Source ISSN
0892-7626
Abstract
In a management buyout (MBO) offer, managers have an incentive to offer stockholders a price low enough to compensate them for the risks of increasing their equity ownership in a highly leveraged buyout firm. As these risks increase, managers are more likely to combine their offer with an anti-takeover measure. These measures do not protect a low offer, but do result in a higher takeover price when managers are unwilling to match a competitive offer. Such measures, then, benefit shareholders.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Peck, Sarah, "MBO Financing Risks And Managers' Use Of Anti-Takeover Measures" (2004). Finance Faculty Research and Publications. 13.
https://epublications.marquette.edu/fin_fac/13
Comments
Published version. Journal of Applied Business Research, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer 2004): 11-30. DOI. © 2004 Clute Institute. Used with permission.