Document Type

Article

Language

eng

Format of Original

20 p.

Publication Date

Summer 2004

Publisher

The Clute Institute

Source Publication

Journal of Applied Business Research

Source ISSN

0892-7626

Abstract

In a management buyout (MBO) offer, managers have an incentive to offer stockholders a price low enough to compensate them for the risks of increasing their equity ownership in a highly leveraged buyout firm. As these risks increase, managers are more likely to combine their offer with an anti-takeover measure. These measures do not protect a low offer, but do result in a higher takeover price when managers are unwilling to match a competitive offer. Such measures, then, benefit shareholders.

Comments

Published version. Journal of Applied Business Research, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer 2004): 11-30. DOI. © 2004 Clute Institute. Used with permission.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.

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