Journal of Financial Research
Using a sample of 195 unique real estate investment trusts (REITs), we examine factors related to the adoption of clawback provisions within managerial compensation contracts. In general, we find strong and consistent empirical evidence that clawback provision are directly related to firm size, complexity, leverage, growth options, monitoring incentives, and CEO performance incentives. We also find that clawbacks are associated with enhanced market and accounting performance, with stronger performance relations observed for adoption decisions tied directly to regulatory mandates. In sum, we conclude compensation clawback provisions represent a value-relevant, strategic governance mechanism for REITs.
Cashman, George D.; Harrison, David M.; and Panasian, Christine A., "Clawback Provisions in Real Estate Investment Trusts" (2016). Finance Faculty Research and Publications. 110.
ADA Accessible Version
Accepted version. Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring 2016)L 87-114. DOI. © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Used with permission.