Document Type

Article

Language

eng

Format of Original

18 p.

Publication Date

9-2013

Publisher

Wiley

Source Publication

Journal of Religious Ethics

Source ISSN

0384-9694

Original Item ID

doi: 10.1111/jore.12026

Abstract

It is widely accepted that only the victim of a wrong can forgive that wrong. Several philosophers have recently defended “third-party forgiveness,” the scenario in which A, who is not the victim of a wrong in any sense, forgives B for a wrong B did to C. Focusing on Glen Pettigrove's argument for third-party forgiveness, I will defend the victim's unique standing to forgive, by appealing to the fact that in forgiving, victims must absorb severe and inescapable costs of distinctive kinds, a plight that third parties do not share. There are, nonetheless, significant, even essential, roles played by third parties in making forgiveness possible, reasonable, or valuable for victims of serious wrongs. I take a closer look at the links between victims, wrongdoers, resentment, and forgiveness in showing why the victim alone can forgive.

Comments

Accepted version. Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 41, No. 3 (September 2013): 495-512. DOI. © Wiley-Blackwell 2013. Used with permission.

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