Title

The Superfluous Congress: Executive Dominance and Business Lobbying in Mexico’s 2013 Tax Reform

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Winter 2021

Publisher

University of California Press

Source Publication

Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

Source ISSN

0742-9797

Original Item ID

DOI: 10.1525/msem.2021.37.1.93

Abstract

This paper analyzes the roles played by the legislative, executive, and business sector in Mexico’s 2013 tax reform, drawing on original field-research findings. I examine each of these actors’ influence over the public period of congressional debate, as well as the typically invisible agenda-setting stage and the adoption of executive decrees following the legislative process. I find that Congress remains subordinated to the executive in budgetary matters and that business is more central in shaping the details of the tax bill. The tax reform achieved little, leaving the overall fiscal capacity of the Mexican State largely unchanged.

Este artículo analiza el papel del legislativo, el ejecutivo y el sector empresarial en la reforma fiscal de 2013 a partir de los hallazgos del trabajo de campo. Se examina la influencia de estos tres actores, tanto en el período de debate público en el congreso como durante el establecimiento de la agenda de la reforma y en los decretos del ejecutivo posteriores al proceso legislativo. Se muestra que el poder legislativo continúa subordinado al ejecutivo en temas presupuestarios y que el sector empresarial tuvo una mayor influencia para definir los detalles de la nueva ley tributaria. La reforma tributaria logró poco, dejando la capacidad recaudatoria del Estado mexicano sin mayor cambio.

Comments

Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Winter 2021): 93-122. DOI.

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