Legislative Redistricting and the Partisan Distribution of Transportation Expenditure

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2024

Publisher

Springer

Source Publication

Economics of Governance

Source ISSN

1435-6104

Original Item ID

DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00308-w

Abstract

I show that a state representative’s political party determines transportation expenditure in the area she represents. Previous studies of this topic consider party changes through election outcomes, which may be correlated with unobservable determinants of expenditure. To overcome this issue, I identify my estimates using Ohio’s 2012 state legislative redistricting, which moved many geographic areas into districts with opposite party incumbents. The Republican party controlled the state legislature and governorship over the period I study. I find that areas moving from governing party Republican to minority party Democratic districts received $3.4M (0.18 standard deviations) less annual highway construction funding than areas remaining in Republican districts. Areas moving from a Democratic to a Republican district, on the other hand, experienced no increase in expenditure—the negative effect of moving to a different representative’s district appears to outweigh the positive effect of a majority party representative. Descriptive evidence suggests that changing representative’s party through redistricting had a different effect on construction funding than changing through an election, underlining the importance of my identification strategy.

Comments

Economics of Governance, Vol. 25 (2024): 1-29. DOI.

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