All Politics Is Local: Corporate Political Power and the Award of Federal Contracts

Authors

• Reza Houston, Ball State University
• Stephen P. Ferris, University of Missouri - Columbia
• José Pérez-Amuedo, Marquette UniversityFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

10-2026

Publisher

Wiley

Source Publication

Contemporary Economic Policy

Source ISSN

1074-3529

Original Item ID

DOI: 10.1111/coep.70032

Abstract

Political power in political economy lacks standardized metrics. This study introduces a measurement method combining individual legislators' power with firms' political contributions. This corporate political power measure explains federal contracting success. Results show local politicians representing firms' operational areas provide greater contracting benefits than powerful national politicians. Federal representatives support local firms to boost constituent employment and re-election prospects. Additionally, firms strategically reallocate contributions toward more electable politicians when experiencing political power decline, demonstrating adaptive behavior in maintaining influence.

Comments

Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 44, No. 4 (October 2026): 906-950. DOI. © 2026 Western Economic Association International. Used with permission.

Recommended Citation

Houston, Reza; Ferris, Stephen P.; and Pérez-Amuedo, José, "All Politics Is Local: Corporate Political Power and the Award of Federal Contracts" (2026). Finance Faculty Research and Publications. 174.
https://epublications.marquette.edu/fin_fac/174