Document Type

Article

Language

eng

Publication Date

4-2019

Publisher

Springer

Source Publication

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Source ISSN

0020-7047

Abstract

Is faith that p compatible with disbelief that p? I argue that it is. After surveying some recent literature on the compatibility of propositional (so-called faith-that) and non-propositional (faith-in) forms of faith with the lack of belief, I take the next step and offer several arguments for the thesis that both these forms of faith are also compatible, in certain cases, with outright disbelief. This is contrary to the views of some significant recent commentators on propositional faith, including Robert Audi and Daniel Howard-Snyder. The primary argument revolves around the possibility of maintaining a single faith through drastic changes in cognitive attitude. I argue that once we allow that propositional faith is compatible with weaker cognitive attitudes than belief, such as acceptance or assent, there is prima facie reason to consider propositional faith as sometimes compatible with disbelief. I then consider objections and offer some final reflections on the significance of the thesis.

Comments

Accepted version. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 85, No. 2 (April 2019): 149-172. The final publication is available at Springer here: DOI. © 2019 Springer. Used with permission.

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